A (4:36)

before today's conversation, a quick but exciting housekeeping note. Starting tomorrow, we're launching a brand new special series on our members only feed, Inside Call Me Back. In this three part series titled Inside Mossad's Shadow War with Iran, Ronen Bergman uncovers new details about the decades long covert operations between Israel and Iran, one that's been unfolding largely out of public view since the early 2000s. In part one, we take you inside a shadow campaign of sabotage between 2007 and 2012 Assassinations, cyber warfare and the Stuxnet operation that changed the rules of modern conflict. Part two reveals a dramatic 2012 military operation that was called off at the last minute. And Part three examines the joint Mossad CIA strategy of death by a Thousand Cuts, a sustained high stakes effort to slow Iran's nuclear program between 2018 and 2021. This is the kind of story that rarely gets told in full and we're bringing it to you starting tomorrow and continuing over the next three weeks. Exclusively on Inside. Call me back if you're not yet an Inside callmeback subscriber. This is an important time to join us. Your support doesn't just unlock these episodes, it helps make this expanded coverage possible and for us to be here when it matters most. You can subscribe through the link in our show notes or by visiting arkmedia.org and to our insiders, thank you. We truly couldn't do this without you. Now onto today's episode. It has been 18 days since February 28th when a massive joint U. S. Israel air campaign struck deep into Iran, decapitating much of its leadership and devastating its conventional military infrastructure. But in the shadow of that bombardment, what appears to be an increasingly suffocating crisis has taken hold. The Strait of Hormuz, the 21 mile wide artery that carries approximately 20% of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas, is for all intents and purposes closed. Despite the US Navy's overwhelming dominance meant to force the passage open, the tankers have more or less stop moving. Global oil prices have spiked and insurance markets have essentially vanished for any ship daring to enter the Gulf. This morning, the Israeli air force attacked Iran's South Pars natural gas field, the largest of its kind in the world. According to Israeli sources, this attack was coordinated with the United States. In response, Tehran said it will attack energy sites across the Gulf. Is today's attack part of a strategy to reopen the strait? With the massive military assets deployed by the US And Israel, why is it so challenging for the two most sophisticated militaries on earth to keep the gates open? With me is ARC Media contributor and senior analyst for Yediot Ahronot Nadav Eyel. Nadav, thanks for being here.

B (7:44)

Thanks for having me, Dan.

A (7:45)

I want to start with this dramatic development that I referred to the, that just occurred in recent hours. The IDF today attacking the South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf, which is considered, as I said, the largest of its kind. Its southern part is located in Iranian territorial waters and its northern part actually belongs to Qatar. So can you first start by telling us about this attack and what it is meant to achieve?

B (8:11)

So this attack, Dan, is a signal. It's a coordinated signal between Israel, the United States and, according to some sources, countries, it's an attempt to signal to Iran that they can't continue on their attacks on energy across the region. And they are attacking energy. They are distinguishing between energy and fuel refineries. They're not attacking refineries, for instance. They're not attacking the oil fields, for that matter, but they are attacking, for instance, oil depots, which is different to that extent, or at least this is what the Israeli sources are saying. This is the kind of distinction they're doing. But mostly, as you said, said in your introduction, Dan, they are blocking the Strait of Hormuz. And this blocking of the Strait of Hormuz is meaningful not only for the region but for the global economy. So I had a conversation late last night with an Israeli security official. I asked him about the Strait of Hormuz. And he told me, I think two Very interesting things. The first one is that he does not believe, according to his conversations with the Americans, that they're going to leave it be. They're not going to allow Iran to continue on extorting the global economy and basically making the Strait of Hormuz, which is an open passageway, an open marine passageway, a limited corridor controlled by Tehran that Tehran can allow different tankers to go through or not go through. For instance, Chinese tankers or tankers from India can go through its corridor and others could not. This is completely unacceptable, he said, as far as Israel and the United States are concerned. So I asked, does this mean that there's going to be an operation to open the Strait of Hormuz? He said something interesting. He said, first of all, we haven't begun pressuring the regime where it really hurts, and that is its energy sector. Because the US And Israel, beside one attack a few days ago in which the Israelis attacked military oil depots across the country, have not attacked any national infrastructure of the Iranian state. As to oil and gas, neither did the Americans. And since Iran is so susceptible to these attacks because of Hag island, which is basically the main oil terminal of the country, 90% of the oil flowing out of Iran is flowing through this tiny Hag island that President Trump has already ordered to take out all of its military defenses, said that official. It's very plausible that we will start seeing pressure on energy in Iran signaling if you want to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, there's going to be a price. Now, he told me that late last night and we woke up in the morning, Israel, time to the strike against first time national infrastructure of that Gaz field in Iran. But it's not a complete, wide ranging attack. It's a specific tactical attack that tells the Iranians something. Whether or not they're going to get the message, we don't know.

A (11:23)

Now, you said, Nadav, that the Gulf states, or at least some of the Gulf states, had blessed this or were indirectly involved. So can you specify? Because I think we're hearing mixed things from the Gulf states. So how have the Gulf states responded and how could this unfold over the next few days?

B (11:39)

First of all, there is a difference between Qatar and all the rest. So I'll begin with Qatar. The Qataris condemned that strike by Israel. They use extremely harsh words. This is a gas field they actually share with Iran. And what they fear is very obvious that now their energy infrastructure is going to be targeted by the Iranians. And indeed, the response by the Islamic Republic was to issue warnings that it's going to attack specific targets across the region, including Qatar, in the uae, in other countries. And it's an evacuation order to these places. So they gave specific detail as to the sites that they're going to attack. Behind the scenes, sources are saying that everybody knew that this is going to happen. By everybody, I mean also Gulf countries and knew that the United States and Israel are starting to signal to Iran that they cannot continue with their policy of closing the Strait of Hormuz going completely unpunished. They can't think during this war that their energy sector has a shield of immunity while the energy sector of countries around them are being constantly attacked. And the moment you stopped the flow of 20 million barrels of oil daily through the Strait of Hormuz, just that our listeners will understand. About 150 ships used to cross through the Strait of Hormuz daily. Now we're talking about less than 10 per day. All of those tankers or ships are being authorized basically by the Iranians to pass. So it's worse, as we said in a different episode here, it's worse than the Iranians completely blocking this passageway. They're not blocking it. They're controlling it. They're extorting. Just to give you an example what it means. So first of all, in the US we're seeing gas prices and we're seeing the rise of gas prices across America. So that's one thing. But it's the poor countries that use, for instance, LNG gas that are getting hit really hard. And by really hard, I mean schools. Some regions in India are closing because of an attempt to save on energy. There are major changes across Asia because it's there that the price of LNG natural gas has spiked substantially, much more than Brent oil barrels. So we're really seeing a change there now over time because there is a change in supply because Hormuz is blocked. There's a change in demand because they're stopping some of their production sometimes. And because of that, we might also see changes in prices. It will just come to us in the west much later. I'll give you one example. Coffee prices, which are going to rise probably.

A (14:21)

And there's a massive, as we've been talking about on this podcast over the last few episodes, there's a massive naval presence, US Naval presence in the region right now. And yet Iran has been successful in keeping the Strait more or less closed to Western tankers. So can you reconcile those two? Like, there's this massive naval presence, and yet the impact that that presence has had on the strait seems to uneven, limited.

B (14:47)

Yeah. So the first thing we should remember that if we're looking at the 1980s when the US Navy forcefully managed to open the Strait of Hormuz, there was the tanker war actually between the United States and Iran following the Iran Iraq war. During the Iran Iraq war, the Navy, I'm quoting now the Wall Street Journal, the US Navy was twice as big as it is right now. Having said that, here's what Iran has done, according to my sources. And they have set mines on the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz in a way that will push those tankers towards the shores of the Iranian side of the strait. So they mined the Strait of Hormuz and they created a corridor there which they have both speedboats, they have surface to sea missiles, they have drones that they can use and we know the tankers have been hit there. Now another thing that they've been doing, Dan, which is interesting, they've been scrambling the electronic signals of those tankers. And this scramble is efficient in the sense that these are big boats and you don't want them to hit one another. So one of the things that these boats have been doing is they've been shutting down their transmitters and they're waiting actually stuck in sea, either on one side of the strait or the other side of the strait, usually within the Gulf and they can't pass. So there is like this electronic jamming. There is the mining of the strait and many other elements. Senior Israeli sources I've spoken with from the army, not political sources, have told me, whoever is saying that the US did not have a scenario and did not plan both politically and militarily to the possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being blocked by the Iranians, plainly saying something that isn't true. The person I was speaking with was a security official and his decision to weigh into this discussion is as far as I'm concerned, extremely meaningful. He said these are professionals. And he said specifically, I'm talking both on decision makers on the political level and on the military level. And they absolutely knew and prepared to the possibility that the strait will close. And this was also the assessment of the Israeli intelligence that they will close the Strait of Hormuz. So it didn't surprise anyone.

A (17:10)

Yeah, I'll just add to that that has been my, based on the conversations I've had with U.S. officials, both uniform military and Pentagon and White House National Security Council types, that again, dealing with it at a practical level is obviously inherently complicated. As we're discussing Today. But the idea that they were blindsided by it is just preposterous that this is something that has been in the plans for years and these different scenarios and war gaming and contingencies, they're not thinking about it. For the first time in real time now, There are these 90 ships and tankers that have crossed the Strait since the war with Iran began and are still exporting millions of barrels of oil. Whose ships and tankers are those? Where are they heading? And why is the US allowing that to continue?

B (17:53)

So some of these ships are part of the so called ghost fleet of the Iranians that actually supplies oil to China. China gets 11% of its own oil.

A (18:04)

And when you say ghost fleet, because we've talked about this in the past on this podcast with Mark Dubowitz and with Rich Goldberg, how do you explain it? It's sort of off market. I don't want to call it black market because it's not black market, but it's just sort of off market. And they've been able to kind of evade sanctions over the years through this system, is that right?

B (18:19)

Yeah. How it works in the tactical details of how do you, for instance, buy oil from a ghost fleet? I don't know exactly how it works, but the Iran shadow fleet, basically it's a network of tankers and sort of secret alignments that are allowed to export oil and break sanctions. And how do they do that? For instance, as you know, and this is a tactic used in the commercial world of rebranding, so some of these tankers will go to another port and this would be rebranded as oil coming from a different place or an oil that doesn't have an origin, be sold for less money, et cetera, et cetera. Now, right now, around the world, I should explain that there was a lot of oil that was floating oil. In other words, it was in tankers. There were a lot of tankers that were en route back from the Gulf or from other areas. And this floating oil that we used to have is over as to who is passing there beside that Chinese tankers. So for instance, you will see them going off the transmitter just before the Strait and reappearing as though this was a gateway to another dimension after the Strait. That's one example. Another example are India or India based or sourced ships that also have been allowed to pass in the last 48 to 72 hours. And there were reports that India turned to Iran to do that. The foreign Minister of Iran, Al Gagchi, has said that they welcome countries that want to turn to Tehran and ask for permission to pass through the strait, which is, of course, his form of gloating.

A (20:03)

Now, Nadav, over the past few days, President Trump has called on Western nations to join the US Effort to open the strait. How could that help with reopening the strait? What could those Western nations do that the US Is not already doing? A and B. What has been the response to those calls for help?

B (20:21)

I'll begin with the response. The response has been very subdued. Basically, they're evading involvement both with NATO, which the President has to an extent called into action. I don't think he has called formally NATO into action. There is a process to do that, but generally he is called on NATO and he has called on countries around Europe. And the argument that is made, made also by the White House, made by the White House spokesperson Levique today, is that it's these nations that suffer most from the current energy crisis, the US Being right now a net exporter of energy. And that's the reason why they should participate. Now, most of these countries don't want to be involved because their leaders have made clear that they think that the war is a mistake. How could they be of assistance? I'll give you one example. Let's just say that you need to basically say with every tanker and accompany every tanker that crosses the straits, and you give those tankers some military assistance, then, yes, this could be of great help considering the sizes of the different navies to the United States, if these countries would have decided to answer the call by President Trump to a large extent, the way that they are reacting specifically to the Strait of Hormuz. Look, this war, they didn't want this war. They criticized this war. This is understood. But the fact that they're responding like that to the Strait of Hormuz could be detrimental afterwards by the US Saying, we're not going to forget what you're doing here. Usually when you hear that from the Trump administration, you should really listen because they mean what they're saying.

A (21:58)

Well, the war is unpopular in many of these countries, the war is unpopular. America to some degree is unpopular. And so that seeming to participate in the war creates political pressure for them. Of course, just because they're not participating in the war doesn't mean that they're not going to be experiencing some of the pain, economic pain, as a result of the situation, which will also have political implications. The impact of that pain and the reality of that pain will also be unpopular in their populations, among their electorates, which will create cross pressure on the government to Just do something about it.

B (22:29)

I think that if you look at the Ukraine war, people tend to forget the reason that the Ukraine war led to the type of inflation that we saw where retained higher levels of energy. I'm not an energy analyst, but I do remember that oil was more than $100 or about $100 a barrel. Then it was hovering there almost a year. And this led to this fit of inflation together with, of course, what happened in Covid. So here we're week three of this war. I think that any way you want to look at this, as far as the Israelis are concerned, they're saying it's a matter of weeks maximum for this to end. So it could still be controlled in terms of the effects on economy. This is the thinking with decision makers. Again, I don't know if that's true. We'll have to wait and see.

A (23:21)

Okay, so I want to switch gears a little bit, but it's related. Two days ago, Israel targeted and killed the secretary of the National Security Council in Iran, Ari Larajani, who was for all intents and purposes considered to be one of the most prominent players running Iran, particularly in a post. Ali Al Khamenei, Iran. He was the or a key player. And then the other person that was targeted and killed was the commander of the IRGC's Basij Force, the instrumental principal instrument of repression inside Iran of the Iranian people. So both Soleimani and Larajani were killed. Who were they and why is them being taken off the map or taken off the chessboard, so to speak, so important?

B (24:04)

Ali Lajani was basically the man that was managing Iran. Ali Lajani was, to quote one senior official in Israel, everything that the system is. He was a spokesperson. He was the head of the judiciary. People don't remember that. This is the person who was responsible for judicial system that executes gay people and of course, dissidents and everyone who's a threat to the theocracy that is Iran. But this was years ago. He was the number one expert on national security. He was brought back from the desert, so to speak, by the Supreme Leader towards this war. And after the Supreme Leader was killed, but even before he was killed, since the June War, he was handling the preparations for this campaign. To some extent. Israeli sources are saying the killing of Ali Larijiani is more important than the killing of the Supreme Leader. And here's why. First of all, because the Supreme Leader was 86 years old. He was ill. He didn't make all the decisions to a large extent, much was left to the apparatus. And the person who was handling the apparatus was Ali La Ridyane. So that's one issue. Another issue is that it proves that Israel didn't only manage to collect hard, really rare intelligence and before the war, for its surprise attack that killed the leaders of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei and others, it manages to collect now real time intelligence during the war, after the Islamic Republic has basically ordered its shutdown command to all of its leaders that went into hiding. And the fact that the Israeli intelligence can do that is very impressive and it gives much more hope as to the rest of the war. And it's not only about this man that was killed, but as you said, the commander of the Basij Force. The Basij is basically a volunteer militia, ideological, that is set to safeguard the stability of the regime. And he was killed in a tent between buildings in Tehran. And one security official told me the reason he was killed in a tent is because he doesn't have any base or any apartment or anywhere to hide. So they thought that we won't be able to see him or to understand that he's there in a tent. So he's dead. And Israel is also hitting besieged targets and outposts and checkpoints across Iran. And what Israel is trying to do is to deter the people there that are working for the regime. But again, some of them are volunteers. They're saying basically don't come to work. Don't come to work and don't come to volunteer because you might get hit there. And that's very meaningful. As to a possible regime change now, it's really interesting, Dan, because the IDF keeps saying, by the way, on the record, we as an army are not aiming for a regime change in Iran. We don't know how to do that. They say off the record, but on the record they're saying it's not a goal of the war. So what is the goal of the war? And let me give you a quote from a senior military official. The objective is to push back the strategic threats to the state of Israel. And this is being done methodically. We have a lot of work to do. Even if the regime survives. He says on the day after the kinetic phase, which meaning the bombing campaign, it should wake up to discover that its capabilities have been so degraded that is going to be occupied mainly with reconstruction, not with destroying Israel, not with supporting the proxies in the region. For example, $1.5 billion they transferred to Hezbol only in the last two years. Every passing day means billions in damages To Iran and to the Revolutionary Guard. The scale that we are destroying Iran's military industry is enormous. This is basically what the Israelis are really focused at right now.

A (28:06)

And just to be clear, by systematically taking out the political leadership, I mean, they are creating the conditions for regime change. Right. Because at some point when there's no one left in charge, or if the incentive structure is such that no one wants to be in charge, because being in charge means that there's a target on your head, it doesn't mean that Israel is actually executing upon regime change, but it is creating the conditions by which, if the people feel that the regime looks wobbly, they may take matters into their own hands.

B (28:39)

Exactly. Look, I think that the IDF to a certain extent in saying we're not trying to bring about a reg change or we don't know how to bring about a regime change. On the other hand, the IDF is attacking Basij checkpoints. It's not only attacking the Basij commander, it's attacking checkpoints. Israeli Prime Minister is calling upon the Iranian people to rise up against the Islamic Republic. So I think basically it's to some extent playing with words. Israel is trying to create an atmosphere in which a regime change would be possible by decapitating leadership. One could absolutely be skeptical if this would lead to a regime change in Iran. I really don't know. When I speak with experts for Iran and I can name them, they're extremely skeptic as to what's going to happen. What they're saying is that right now, through the Iranian regime, they're seeing radicalization. They're seeing the IRGC that is invested in the state apparatus and feels that if this state falls, it's their families that are going to be executed, not only themselves. The IRGC is becoming even more resolved to get this war not only done in a good way as far as the Iranians are concerned, but to create deterrence across the region. Some Iran experts are saying even when the US and Israel want to end the war, it's not sure that the Iranians would want to end the war because they are trying to, quote, unquote, collect or see a price that sees more blood being drawn across the region so they won't have to deal with them again. This is the pessimistic view. Here's the optimistic view because, Dan, I know you're big on optimism.

A (30:19)

I was about to jump in with the optimist case, but to counterbalance you out. But I'll let you. I'll let you make it.

B (30:25)

Yeah, you don't need to push back. You don't need to push back. Let me push back against myself as an Israeli, I want to believe an optimistic viewpoint that says that not all plans for a change in Iran have been put into practice and that there is another phase there. And I'm just listening to what President Trump is saying and the way that he talks about the day that the bombing stops and what happens then. This regime has been weakened substantially. They can radicalize as much as they want, but when they wake up again, their military capabilities are degraded. And in so far, the Iranian opposition, they have just been dealt so much help by outer parties. The US And Israel have done so much in that regard. They might not be able to bring a regime change, but no one can say that they didn't get an assistance to do that. The idea that the regime became stronger as a result of this war, I don't think anybody thinks that it became stronger. It maybe became more radicalized, but it doesn't mean that it became stronger. I'm happy to hear more positives from you, Dan.

A (31:29)

No, I mean, both things can be true. The surviving regime could become more radicalized and kind of deepen in its commitment to preserving what's left of the regime. But what's left of the regime could be very thin in terms of its military capabilities, both offensive and defensive. Its reach of repression within Iranian society just has less capabilities, fewer capabilities and so less offensive capabilities to project throughout the region, virtually non existent defensive capabilities to protect the regime from attacks from elsewhere in the region, from Israel, from the Gulf, from the US and fewer capabilities inside the country to keep the population that would likely become increasingly restive at bay. It's not uncommon in history for political actors in charge to both become more rabid, more extreme and weaker at the same time. In fact, as their hold becomes weaker, they lash out. Just because they are on the back foot doesn't mean they also can't be in terms of their capabilities can also be at the same time they're on the march, that they're trying to hang on. But that doesn't mean that they will have the capabilities to do so. And without the capabilities and without the thickness of a heavy state structure, seeing as it's being thinned out right now, means that it's impossible to know and predict exactly when these pressure points kick into some kind of flywheel that topple a regime. But the conditions, it appears to me at least, are increasingly in place. And when I talk to US Administration officials, that's their observation, it's not that they're necessarily outlining regime change as a benchmark of their success, but these conditions that seem to be being created are part of the plan.

B (33:07)

I want to ask you about that letter sent by the director of the counterterrorism, Joe Kent. Yeah, the letter of resignation and what you make of it. We know who this person is according to his history. But I'm intrigued to hear what you have to say about that on that.

A (33:22)

I mean, obviously it's headline grabbing, but in every administration, particularly administrations that are in war, you have, let's call them to give a generous characterization. You have conscientious objectors, you have officials who are uncomfortable with the policy and they resign. Sometimes they resign quietly, sometimes they resign with a lot of fanfare. This is actually not uncommon. It's happened in Democratic administrations, it's happened in Republican administrations. So I understand why the press is so fixated on it. Particularly because his resignation letter was laced with this charges of policies driven by dual loyalty and these anti Semitic tropes, as though the administration was tricked or goaded or manipulated into this war against Iran. I think it's a one day story. I think it's already winding down. Now. Why is that the case? Because at the end of the day, the undisputed most popular figure in Republican politics is Donald Trump. And two things are true about Donald Trump. His polling is overwhelmingly unprecedented off the charts among Republicans in terms of being, as I said, the most popular leader. And when you look at the polling among Republicans, whether it's self described maga, Republicans or Republicans more generally, support for what Trump is doing in Iran is off the charts, 80s, 90s, 90%. So because you have an official that objects to the war and even worse, uses these tropes to explain why he objects to the war and why he's resigning, it's ultimately Nadav only interesting if it's representative of a broader trend or as a signal of where administration policy may be going. So I find the language that he uses obviously disheartening to read. However, it does not appear to represent where the conservative movement is, where the MAGA movement is, and where the figure who sits on top of it all, Donald Trump is who by the way, is still gonna be president for the better part of the next three years. So the world is looking at this and I think the Iranian leaders and players in the golf are looking at this and saying Donald Trump is as popular as ever among his base and he's still got the better part of three years left. It doesn't Mean he's gonna be doing this indefinitely. I hope he's not. But it does mean that he's in a completely different position relative to his predecessors for purposes of fighting this war. And so I think these facts are far more important than the daily headline that flashes across our screen about a disgruntled opponent of administration policy.

B (35:53)

Yeah, and I of course noticed the Iraq accusation that these tropes that you mentioned, of course the isis. I think that it's just the stuff of conspiracy theories in the same ledger. I would just add to that. The Israelis don't think that this is going to last for very long. They understand it's a matter of a week, of two weeks. They were told to prepare for a few weeks of this lasting, but they don't think it's going to go over that. And it's still the general assessment, just reflecting on something I said earlier, is that when the US wants it to be over, even this Iranian radicalized regime will understand that they better stop shooting. This is the general assessment. I presented an Iranian expert contrarian views, but the general assumption is that it will stop when the US thinks it should stop.

A (36:48)

So with that, and I just want to wrap where we started. Do you imagine the strait being open soon and you can define what soon is, given everything we've discussed.

B (36:57)

Open, open? No, soon. I don't know what soon. Soon in the Middle east is the next six hours. So the answer is no, that's soon. You're talking like in the next week to open the strait, you forcefully, you will need an operation there. It's not a matter of days or could be like a week or longer than that. And because of that, there is a serious issue here. A point to be made as to the energy crisis is that during the Ukraine war it was mostly about fear that something's going to happen here. Something has happened. You shouldn't sugarcoat it or downplay it that it's 20% of global energy or global fossil fuel is not flowing. By the way, the Chinese are relatively ready for that. They've prepared for that. Their reserves are at peak levels. It's very interesting to see even Pakistan is more ready than it was because of the Ukraine war. So they have a shift to solar renewable energy, some sort of shift there. But there are countries that are getting hit hard and of course consumers are getting hit hard. And the main question, and this is again more for Washington insiders like yourself, I know that you're in Washington, Dan, is to what extent would the President want to see this through. And what kind of credit does he have there? I see the polls, you mentioned those. Even the weakest polls give him more than 80%. The Republican base, sometimes they give him up to 90%. And they're not changing. They're not eroding.

A (38:26)

Yeah. All right, Nadav, we will leave it there.

B (38:29)

Thank you so much.

A (38:30)

Thank you. We'll be in touch soon as I'm sure. And before we wrap, a quick reminder. On April 20, I'll be interviewing Rachel Goldberg Polin at the Stryker center in Manhattan to mark the release of her upcoming book, When We See youe Again. I have read this book. I highly, highly recommend it. I couldn't be more emphatic. It will be published and released soon. If you're in New York City and would like to join us, we will have a link for tickets to the event in the Show Notes and hope you can make it. That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal Amit Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the Show Notes or you can go to arcmedia.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Areddy. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Wiener. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. Sam.