B (3:55)

Good to see you, Dan.

A (3:57)

So I know you've been talking to your sources, and I want you to empty your notebook in this conversation to the extent that you can.

B (4:02)

Yeah.

A (4:03)

So let's just start with what were Netanyahu's key requests or demands or hoped for conditions in his meeting with President Trump today.

B (4:14)

So this, Dan, we actually do know what the Israelis wanted to pitch to the president is that if there's going to be any agreement with the Iranians, they should be barred from enrichment of any uranium and the enriched material that they still possess even after the Israeli and American strikes during the June war, the this should be taken out of the country. As to their ballistic missiles, there should be limitations on both the inventory and development of ballistic missiles. And Iran should also commit and execute a disconnect between itself and between regional terror and influence. If you ask me, Dan, what's the probability of the Iranians agreeing to these demands, the way that the Israelis are setting them? According to every Iran expert I speak with, extremely limited they do not think that there is a chance that the supreme leader will actually answer to that. But it's up for the president of the United States to decide which of these demands is material. With this, the prime minister has come to Washington, D.C. there's also the possibility, I'm not ruling out, that they discussed contingencies in case the negotiations fail. And what I'm hearing is that this is absolutely the case. We already know that military officials and intelligence officials, officials, Israelis came to Washington one after the other during the last two or three weeks. So according to Israeli sources, they are indeed discussing with the Americans the possibility of strikes against the Iranians.

A (5:52)

So just so I understand the Sequencing here because the elaborate military preparations appeared to be in response to the violent repression executed by the Iranian regime in response to the protests over the last few weeks. And the military assets relocating to the region were, one would think, backing up the threats that President Trump made. And now we're in a negotiation about Iran's nuclear program and its missile program. So is all of this completely disconnected from the protest movement and Iran's response to the protest movement?

B (6:24)

If you're asking are the demands disconnected, it seems so. Israel is not making a formal pitch that there needs to be a regime change in Iran and that this could be an agreement because everybody knows that this is a non starter for the Iranian regime. Right. You can't make that demand unless you just want to go to war. I would listen very carefully to what the President is saying, what the President wrote after and you quoted at the beginning of this episode. And I would listen to what the vice president, J.D. vance, has been saying in the last 24 hours. The president has told his entire senior team that we should be trying to cut a deal with that ensures the Iranians don't have nuclear weapons. But if we can't cut that deal, then there's another option on the table. So I think the President is going to continue to preserve that option. He's going to have a lot of options because we have the most powerful military in the world. But until the President tells us to stop, we're going to engage in these conversations and try to reach a good outcome through negotiations. Now, as to the regime change issue, he said that a removal of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei regime would be up to the Iranian people. And that, I think, answers your question, Dan. However, after hearing what the Vice President has said, Israelis still have a hope and they can preserve that hope that a strike, if it is powerful enough, could actually corner the regime and lead to a fracture. That with the stability of this regime, a real fracture.

A (8:05)

Netanyahu was originally supposed to be in D.C. next week. He moved up his visit to the U.S. do we have a definitive reason as to what the impetus was for accelerating the timing of their meeting with the President?

B (8:18)

Let me say what formally or what we're hearing from Jerusalem. And then let me tell you what might be really happening. What we're hearing is that the Prime Minister felt it's absolutely essential to deliver to the President as soon as possible the Israeli positions as to that issue. And there was speculation that the Prime Minister doesn't want to be physically in Washington during the same week. Like the Council of Peace, because he doesn't want to be in the same stage with people who represent Turkey and Qatar because it's bad for him politically.

A (8:51)

Just for our listeners to understand, the Board of Peace is meeting next week at the Institute for peace in Washington, D.C. february 19, where they are expected to raise and announce billions of dollars for the reconstruction efforts, humanitarian efforts, and security efforts in Gaz. A number of governments will be represented. From what I understand, they're getting a real turnout of officials from various governments around the world participating. And under the one theory you posited is that Prime Minister Netanyahu does not want to be in town when all these leaders are there because he doesn't want to be pressured to appear at an event with leaders from places like Qatar and Turkey.

B (9:27)

I suspect there's another story there, and I don't want to speculate too much because I don't know that for sure. What I can tell you is that he might do both. So the speculation is, though, he's not going to go to aipac. He's supposed to make a speech in AIPAC because of the Council of Peace, and he was just using this as an excuse to say, oh, I need to move urgently to Washington, D.C. that's out the window. But at any rate, the general feeling across the region is that people find it very hard, I'm not talking only about Israelis, but very hard to see an agreement before an American strike. And many sources are saying it's much more likely to see some sort of an agreement after the American strike, after things are being tested, after abilities are taken. To some extent, it makes sense because the Iranians are still playing this game with the west, that they still hold or possess the cards, whether it's nuclear, to the extent that they have a nuclear plan that still survived, and, and they give the impression that they can actually be that regional power or empire they wanted to be in that sense. The feeling also by Gulf countries is that if they get hit hard, they might see the light and go to an agreement with the Trump administration that would be more favorable than getting an agreement right now.

A (10:53)

And what can you tell us about the current state of U.S. military preparations in the region for a possible attack?

B (10:59)

The Warsaw Journal published today that there is another aircraft carrier that is being sent to the Middle East. Across the region, the US has been amassing forces, both aerial forces and other capabilities. And what I can say from the Israeli sources is that they stand ready to coordinate with the US to share intelligence. Of course, the sharing of intelligence between the sides is ongoing, right? It's not that they're going to press a button at a single point. It's happening all the time mentioned as to those meetings in Washington D.C. and one of the things I think that is still a question mark is will the Americans want, if they indeed strike Israel, to be part of it? The feeling in Israel is that Israel is going to be part of it. Israelis are preparing their operational strike plans to assist in whatever the Americans would allow them to. But we know this from the past. Think about, for instance, the first Gulf War. Sometimes from political reasons, it's better in the region that Israel will not participate. However, in this scenario, we already saw one war in June in which the two countries were in. I'll give you one example. To the extent that I can give details, one of the things that the Israelis feel rather self confident about is their ability as to intelligence on the ground related to a command and control of the Islamic Republic. And we have seen the so called Red Wedding, nicknamed after that episode in the Game of Thrones in which the Israelis decapitated the entire command and control of the Islamic Republic, both Army and IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard. So when I speak with people who deal with the issue, they think that Israel has a lot to contribute.

A (12:54)

You know, this whole rap, I just want to stay on this point because I hear some Israeli commentators making this point that it's not a good look for Netanyahu to be running to Washington because it looks like he's trying to egg the US into war with Iran. And if the US Goes into war with Iran, then it looks like it was Israel's maneuvering. My reaction to that is one of the few things in foreign policy that Trump has been completely consistent about through both his presidencies is tightening the grip around Iran. Right? He took out Soleimani, the head of the IRGC Coutts force in Iran. He withdrew from the Obama's Iran deal. He imposed maximum pressure on Iran. He, I mean, we can go on and on. Obviously, the June 2025 attack against Iran. I mean, President Trump has been really, really focused on Iran as a threat going back. And he's been talking about it since he first ran for president.

B (13:42)

Also, the Iranians tried to kill him, right?

A (13:44)

They were trying to kill him after he'd done many of the things he'd done in his first term without getting into the motives behind it. He has been very focused on Iran as one of his foreign policy priorities. So the idea is now, here we are in February 2026, the idea that it's Netanyahu's seventh visit to Washington or seventh meeting with the president that is going to signal to critics of Israel in the US that it's Israel that is manipulating Trump and stiffening his spine to deal with Iran, when in fact, one of the constants of U.S. foreign policy under Trump has been dealing with Iran.

B (14:18)

And also that train has left the station. Right. In terms of if you're going to dictate foreign policy, according to every conspiracy theory out there, nothing is going to get done to begin with. And they don't need convictions or facts or evidence whether Netanyahu is traveling or not. I would say, Dan, that it makes sense for the prime Minister to at least look like he's not pushing for a war with Iran. And Israel at the time said that the timing is wrong. And that was heavily publicized, like three weeks ago. About three weeks ago. And there's another factor that's really important. Netanyahu is in an election campaign. Internally speaking, the best kind of image for him is to travel to Washington, D.C. if the president decides to go to an agreement with the Iranians that is favorable to Israeli interests, great. He was part of that. If the president orders a strike, fantastic. Even better in terms of his domestic political needs. If the President decides that he's going to go to an agreement that Israel really doesn't like, I'm going to promise you, Dan, something. We're not going to see a speech by the prime minister in Congress saying that he mistrusts the President's judgment and that this agreement is a danger to the free world, like we have seen with the JCPOA and President Obama, whatever the agreement is, this is not 2015, and the Republican Party is not the same party. And this president is who he is. And for Netanyahu, he's everything. He's everything. I just saw a JPPI poll saying the support for the president In Israel is 73%. What kind of an Israeli institution or figure gets 73%? Who gets that? The President of Israel, who's bipartisan and a very important figure, Itzhak Buji Herzog. Does he get 73%? No, the Knesset definitely doesn't get 73%. The Supreme Court doesn't get that. The media doesn't get 73% or even half of that. Right. And Netanyahu definitely doesn't get 73%. The last time I saw a poll as to his popularity, it was 40%. So the difference between him and the president is so substantial, if the President decides there's not going to be a strike. This government is not going to criticize him, and the prime minister is definitely not going to go against it.

A (16:54)

I'm looking at the poll here. Trump is seen as one of the best presidents in U.S. history or above average and. Yeah, 73%. Yeah, amazing. Okay, I want to stay on this Iran situation. To what extent do you understand US Policy toward Iran to be not just about security or not just seen through the lens of security and concerns about nuclear capabilities, but is also part of a broader strategy related to energy and US Energy policy?

B (17:23)

I think in general, one of the issues that is constantly downplayed in geopolitics is energy. And I think some of it has a lot to do with the last 20 years or 15 years in which two big things happened. First is a lot of subsidies and a lot of renewable energy and a sensation or a feeling that fossil fuels days are extremely numbered. And the other one which is somewhat connected is the shale boom in the United States. Right. Which really made the US A net exporter. Now, that boom might have peaked of shale. And as to renewable, the general understanding in many places in the world is that subsidies are out the window. If you look at global affairs, if you look at manufacturing in China, if you look at what the Trump administration has been doing, if you read the doctrine published by the Trump administration, then you see that Venezuela is important. Those expressions by the President talking about the oil market in Venezuela and the way that American companies have been robbed of their properties in Venezuela, I've just read in Amit Segal telegram. I don't know, I didn't verify it from myself, that for the first time in a long time, Venezuelan oil is going to reach Israel. And again, I didn't check it myself, but we did hear about the President's understanding with Prime Minister Modi in India. As to India getting maybe Venezuelan oil instead of Russian oil. So what I see here is that in terms of supply, I just mentioned two issues. And there is the issue of demand with AI and data centers that are essential, and the estimation that there is a huge need for that, together with China, by the way, controlling rare minerals. This all looks like a big game, right? The grand game. I think it's actually material. Iran holds one of the biggest reserves in the world of oil. 90% of Iranian oil is flowing towards China. And that is meaningful. If there is a change in Iran, it's a problem for the Chinese. Now, this is not a huge problem, but if you look at Venezuela, you look now at Iran, we see more Coca. I think in a really long time, we didn't see coherence in national security doctrine of the United States. And suddenly both that document and the way it is sort of enacted, there is a sensation around the world that the Trump administration sometimes doesn't get everything it wants. That is Greenland. But it knows what it needs, and I think that's very substantial. And to some extent, China is being cornered. And, you know, the Trump administration done much better than I do. So I don't want to put myself. My expertise is Israel. But there are people within the administration, very serious people, that are strategists that think that you need to prioritize China and prioritize the struggle to contain China. If you think about Iran, is this really a diversion from that strategy, or could it be seen as complementing that strategy? Let's remember what happened that led the Biden administration to offer the Saudis a bunch of agreements for normalization. What did the Biden administration tell us? How did they brief us? They said, we're doing this to stop the Chinese influence and infiltration across the Middle East. We're fearful that Saudi Arabia will change sides. Iran is already on the side of the Chinese. Now, President Trump came into power, he improved the relations with countries across the Middle East. With Israel, but also with Saudi Arabia. With Saudi Arabia, but also with Qatar. He's now cornering the Iranians. What about the Chinese infiltration to the Middle East? It's gone. It has been evaporated. And now there's a chance for a change in Iran that could limit, for instance, supply of energy to China, the arch enemy of every American interest in the world. Now, I am not saying, and I want to be very clear about that, because this is the stuff of conspiracy theorists, and I try not to do that. I am not saying that this is a war about oil. I don't think it is. I don't think that's the issue. I think the issue is the way that they cross the red line, first and foremost presented by the president as to the protest, secondly, the nuclear issue. Thirdly, their involvement with regional terror and ballistic missiles. That's the issue. What I'm saying is that if you look at this also in terms of big geopolitics and China, the fact that 90% of their oil is flowing to China is meaningful for the conversation. Yeah.

A (22:12)

And as Neil Ferguson laid out in a recent episode on Call Me Back, that he's got this whole framework that, that we're in Cold War II right now between China and the US That.

B (22:20)

Was a wonderful episode, by the way. Not that Neil Ferguson needs compliments from me or you do, but it was a fantastic episode.

A (22:28)

Yeah, it was a tour de force. But he really has been making this argument. He'd made it on our podcast about three or four years ago, but he's been talking about it for almost six years, about Cold War ii, and he sees everything through that lens. And so what you're saying is, even what's happening in Iran and Israel and the US has this Cold War 2 frame on the talks. Back to the Iran talks. How much longer do you think these go? I know you don't have a crystal ball here, but what's just your sense, what does the Israeli security establishment assess for how long these talks could go?

B (22:55)

They think they have been dead on arrival. That's how they perceive it. They're saying, basically, look, if the Americans are going to focus only on nuclear, and that's it. And they're going to agree, for instance, for symbolic enrichment, nuclear Iranian enriched material being contained in Iran may be supervised again by the IAEA and everything is off the table. Ballistic, regional, terror, they might reach an agreement. But everything else that is more demanding than what I just said, they see these talks as an impossibility. And after saying that, I need to say the most obvious thing. An Israeli TV host that asked me a few days ago, the expression he used was so foreign to me. Suddenly he said, do you think that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner would be able to influence the president not to go for a strike? And I started smiling. I didn't know even why. And I told him, this is not how the White House works. It's not how things work. It's not political parties. It's not a coalition maneuver in Israel. Right, right. And of course, in Israel, nobody serves for the pleasure of the president. That expression doesn't exist in Israeli political sphere. I think we discussed that. Right.

A (24:10)

I was just having a conversation with Ron Dermer recently at an event, and he was asked to, like, size up the different motivations of the different players in Trump's circle and what their agendas are and how that influences things. And Ron, who's dealt with President Trump now, you know, in the first Trump presidency and now the second Trump term, said, you need to understand there are not factions in this administration the way there are factions in other administrations. It's President Trump. He decides. It's singular.

B (24:38)

I had a conversation with a person that had just a private conversation. It wasn't an off the record with a source that heard or saw how the President was consulting before the strike against Iran back in June. And he spoke about the difference between how this is communicated sometimes in the media and how things are really behind closed doors. And he was very impressed. This is not a political person and he doesn't work for the President. Of how the President was simply asking questions was very clear that it's the decision of the President and that he's very up to date with the actual details there. It's very detailed and granular. He said he was amazed by that. It wasn't like a general leadership. This is the direction now bring me the details. It wasn't Ronald Reagan. It was much more about the fact what's actually going to happen on the ground. It was an executive decision in a multi billion dollar corporation sort of decision. I need to know everything in order to make the right decision kind of way. That was his impression.

A (25:48)

Nadav, just being totally speculative here. To what extent could all of this, the negotiations, the Netanyahu visit to Washington, could it all be some kind of head fake to distract from a military operation similar to all the confusing signals we were seeing before the June attack or some would say were the confusing signals that we saw before the US Operation against Venezuela?

B (26:09)

Do you want me to talk about intuition? I can talk about intuition, but I am going to hedge very strongly right now. I'm saying this is only my intuition. So nobody holds this against me. My feeling is that Israel and the United States are very much coordinated, by the way, probably with other countries. If they're not going to answer the demands of the President, what's going to happen might be bigger than what people think and maybe not exactly how we think about that. I'm looking very carefully. The Iranians arresting reformist leaders in the last few days. I think they're very worried about the Venezuela scenario and they might have a reason to. I again do not know as to these issues and I'm speaking as to my intuition. So, yes, if you're asking if some of it might be sort of a psychological ploy, an attempt to mislead the Iranians to some extent as far as the Israelis are concerned, most probably after I said all that, I want to say again, I do not have any hardcore information as to that. If I would have had that, I would have published and I would have sent you the breaking news.

A (27:16)

Okay. I tend to share your intuition, but you know, we'll see. Last question for you. We talked about there's this big Board of Peace meeting next week in Washington there's transition to phase two of Gaza. Now, what is your sense of how things are going?

B (27:32)

So, first of all, we heard this week something remarkable, and that is that Indonesia is willing to send soldiers into Gaza, something that many people said it's going to be impossible. What I'm hearing is that this is advancing, that there is an agreement between Israel and the United States that if Hamas would not disarm, Israel will act in Gaza and that the only way that Hamas will disarm is that they will have to see a credible threat of use of force. There is no way they will disarm if they do not really believe that. The other possibility is that the entire area of Gaza will be occupied by the Israelis. And because of that, Israel really needs to prepare for a full occupation of Gaza and it needs to mean business or else Hamas will never disarm. And this is one of the reasons that it's getting the backing of the United States, because all the players in this understand that they don't want to start building for everything to go down the flames. And you hear that from the uae, for instance. They want to make sure that Hamas disarms in order to make those investments.

A (28:46)

Yeah. The Trump team on this, Steve Woodkoff, Jared Kushner, Josh Gruenbaum, Arye Lightstone. They have been singularly focused on this piece of the puzzle. And I am struck by how much buy in they are getting. I do think the news they are going to deliver at this Board of Peace next week is going to exceed expectations in terms of commitments they have from other governments and not just financial commitments that some of these governments are willing to make.

B (29:11)

Gaza is a place where this can succeed. Gaza is small enough, central enough now, so devastated it really needs to rebuild. This could be a sort of a success story that we have not seen in many, many years. And the fact that the US Would commit to it the way that it is committed to it is one of the most hopeful things. I'm saying this as an Israeli. This gives hope, the fact that the US Would be there. It's a modern day Marshall Plan. Although this money isn't coming from the US Taxpayers.

A (29:45)

All right, Nadav, we will leave it there. Thank you for this. I'm sure we'll be nagging you in the days ahead to get the latest, but before we wrap, I just wanted to say a word about a member of the Ark Media team who co created a podcast with us. What's your number? Our weekly podcast about the economy, about the tech scene, about the Israeli business scene. Michal Lev Ram, who's a longtime Israeli journalist based in the Bay Area where she's lived for some time working at Fortune magazine and also co hosting the podcast with Yonatan Adhiri. She was offered an exciting career opportunity with Morgan Stanley and that will preclude her from her regular co hosting duties. Fortunately, we have a terrific new co host that she's handed the reins over to, Yael Wissner Levy, who is based in Tel Aviv, and Yael in Yonatan will continue hosting what's yous Number? I encourage you to subscribe. Nadav. I know you're already a subscriber. I encourage our listeners to subscribe. We have a terrific team that is hosting it and producing it. We will miss Michal. We will expect her to stay in the community. She can run, but she can't hide. And just wanted to thank you Michal for everything you've done. All right, thanks Nadav.

B (30:55)

Thank you.

A (31:05)

That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members only show, Inside Call Me Back. Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal, Amit, Segal and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling. To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to ark media.org that's ark media.org call me back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Arc Media's Executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Our Production manager is Brittany Cohn. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio Community Management by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.