What Actually Happened in Beijing? - with Carice Witte

Summary

---

Podcast Summary: "What Actually Happened in Beijing?"

Podcast: Call Me Back – with Dan Senor (Ark Media)
Date: May 18, 2026
Guest: Carice Witte, Founder & Executive Director of SIGNAL Group (Indo-Pacific/China-Israel Analyst)
Host: Dan Senor

---

Overview

This episode critically examines the U.S.–China summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Beijing, evaluating the outcomes beyond dominant media narratives. The discussion probes what Beijing genuinely sought, what Washington did (or didn’t) concede, and how recent shifts in the global order—including the war in Iran—are shaping Chinese strategy, especially relating to Israel. Carice Witte offers insights into China’s calculations, its relationship with Iran, and implications for Israeli policy as the Middle East continues in conflict.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The True Outcome of the Trump–Xi Summit

[04:25–06:11]

• Media Narrative: Most coverage suggests China “won” the summit, with the U.S. appearing weakened by the ongoing Iran conflict, economic issues, and seeking relief in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Carice's View: The accepted narrative overstates China's gains. Instead, she believes Trump “did a much better job than many…were worried about.”
  • Quote: “I would not agree that China got what it wanted out of this summit…I think they’ve come out relatively well.” — Carice Witte [04:55]

2. Symbolism: The Thucydides Trap

[06:11–07:41]

• President Xi referenced the “Thucydides Trap”—the idea of a rising power displacing a declining one, an implicit assertion of American decline and Chinese ascent.
  • Quote: “Raising the term Thucydides trap at this point...immediately evokes a weak US and a strong China. It was intended to make the point...that China’s in charge.” — Carice Witte [06:34]
• The Chinese media played up this notion, while Trump projected friendliness, contrasting with Xi’s non-reciprocal tone.

3. What Did China Really Get?

[07:41–10:01]

• Superficially, a new “cooperation agreement” aimed at mutual respect was presented, but it doesn’t bind or shift policy substantively.
• China had hoped to secure U.S. concessions on Taiwan (e.g., revised language on the U.S. position regarding Taiwanese independence), but Trump did not budge.
  • Quote: “They hoped and believed Trump would agree...but he didn’t commit to not going through with the approximately $12 billion arms sale to Taiwan, and he didn’t change anything with respect to the strategic ambiguity.” — Carice Witte [07:43]
• Maintaining U.S. “strategic ambiguity” is not a win for China—it’s simply the continuation of the status quo, which is preferable to direct support for Taiwan, but not the concession Xi sought.

4. China’s Calculus on Iran

[10:48–14:53]

• Beijing’s Interests: China desires regime continuity in Iran to keep U.S. military focus away from the Indo-Pacific.
  • “Iran...is a very valuable tool for China to leverage as much as it can and in an ongoing way.” — Carice Witte [11:27]
• China accepts a weakened Iranian regime but fears the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, vital for Chinese energy imports.
  • “A weak regime...is good for China. But a closed Hormuz is bad.” — Carice Witte [11:27]
• China quietly opposes Iranian nuclear militarization—fearing wider proliferation, including in South Korea and Japan.
  • Quote: “They never have supported nuclear military capability. They only support peaceful nuclear capability for Iran and every other country...China believes it would cause South Korea and Japan to go nuclear very quickly.” — Carice Witte [12:22]
• China assists Iran in military and economic ways (dual-use exports, oil purchases via “teapot” refineries run in yuan), while denying formal government involvement.

5. Iran’s Seizure of a Chinese Vessel: Tensions Below the Surface

[17:49–19:09]

• Iran’s seizure of a Chinese-owned vessel near Hormuz was a show of strength—reminding China that Tehran maintains control over the Strait and resists outside leverage.
  • Quote: “They have a strategic partnership, but it is a marriage of convenience...The $400 billion that China committed to investing in Iran…has come to almost nothing. And the Iranians really resent that.” — Carice Witte [18:09]

6. China's Plausible Deniability & Israeli Response

[19:09–21:39]

• China maintains “plausible deniability” in its support for Iran—supplying dual-use goods relevant to missile production while officially denying government connection.
• Israel, increasingly vocal about China’s role, is responding with subtle diplomatic pushback (e.g., hosting Taiwan’s Deputy FM, aligning with Western criticism over Uyghurs).
• Witte: Israel generally hesitates to escalate but is willing to flex when Chinese actions threaten major Israeli interests.

7. How China Sees Israel—and How That’s Changed

[21:39–25:35]

• Historically, China’s asks of Israel were clear: intelligence, access, and support, but always colored by the trilateral dynamic with the U.S.
• Post–October 7th, 2023, China viewed Israel as weakened, shifting to highly anti-Israel rhetoric domestically; this changed after Israel’s prominent military/intelligence successes and Trump’s election victory.
  • Quote: “All of those things came together and China’s view of Israel transformed. They now saw that Israel is a regional power to be reckoned with.” — Carice Witte [24:06]
• Since then, China cooled its overt pro-Iran, anti-Israel messaging; Beijing’s rhetoric now reflects recognition of Israel’s demonstrated strength.

8. Domestic Chinese Pressures and Foreign Policy Effects

[25:35–28:53]

• China faces economic headwinds: slowing growth, youth unemployment, and demographic decline.
• Export earnings are huge, but thin corporate profits and lackluster internal consumer confidence persist despite government efforts to boost spending.
  • “China provides little social safety net because Xi Jinping…believes if you give too much support, the people will become lazy.” — Carice Witte [27:27]
• Domestic challenges drive China to refocus on overseas expansion and “status narratives,” even as underlying economic realities sour.

9. Implications for Israel's China Policy

[28:53–32:29]

• The U.S. and China are managing a “stale stalemate”—buying time to reduce mutual dependencies (semiconductors for China, rare earths for the U.S.).
• Any Chinese economic support to Iran is a problem for Israel; but Israel’s leverage is real, especially through regional alliances.
• Israel could take a bolder regional stance by joining the Indo-Pacific “free and open” initiative (signaling closer alignment with U.S. and regional powers opposed to China's assertiveness), but hesitates to avoid antagonizing Beijing.
  • Quote: “A verbal statement or written statement would open business doors…for many things, but Israel hesitates because it knows this would probably disturb China.” — Carice Witte [31:54]

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Raising the term Thucydides trap at this point...immediately evokes a weak US and a strong China.” — Carice Witte [06:34]
• “A weak regime...is good for China. But a closed Hormuz is bad.” — Carice Witte [11:27]
• “The $400 billion that China committed to investing in Iran…has come to almost nothing. And the Iranians really resent that.” — Carice Witte [18:09]
• “China provides little social safety net because Xi Jinping…believes if you give too much support, the people will become lazy.” — Carice Witte [27:27]
• "All of those things came together and China’s view of Israel transformed. They now saw that Israel is a regional power to be reckoned with." — Carice Witte [24:06]

---

Important Timestamps

• [04:25] – Carice Witte’s assessment of the summit outcomes
• [06:11] – Xi invokes the Thucydides Trap
• [07:41] – What China really wanted and what they got
• [10:48] – China’s calculus on Iran
• [14:53] – China’s approach to Iranian nuclear ambitions and Strait of Hormuz mediation
• [17:49] – Iran seizes a Chinese vessel: signaling and strategic messaging
• [19:09] – China’s plausible deniability on Iranian weapons support; Israeli diplomatic response
• [21:39] – How China’s view of Israel shifted after military successes
• [25:35] – Domestic pressures in China shaping foreign policy
• [28:53] – What Israel should be doing differently in its China policy

---

Conclusion

Carice Witte provides a sobering corrective to triumphalist or one-sided reads of the U.S.–China summit, underscoring the complex dance of managed stalemate, shifting perceptions of power (both global and regional), and the weight of underlying domestic constraints in China. Israel, meanwhile, navigates its limited but useful leverage while weighing risks in alienating Beijing—demonstrating how even smaller powers can shape the global chessboard when their strategic value rises. The episode closes with an open question: how can Israel harness its new status for regional advantage without provoking new antagonism from a wary and watchful China?

---

Transcript

[Hadassah Hospital Spokesperson]

I want to take a moment to talk about daily life in Israel right now. One day can seem relatively calm, the next, sirens, rockets, everything changes. So the question isn't just what's happening at this moment, it's whether Israel is ready for what comes next. Hadassah hospitals in Jerusalem have built that readiness into the foundation of their work and their facilities. When a crisis hits, entire departments move underground in minutes into fortified maternity wards, ICUs and cancer units. Doctors and nurses continue treating patients in real time, even under fire. But here's the reality. It's not enough. More advanced underground operating rooms are urgently needed so that even in the most extreme conditions, Hadassah's life changing care continues. Hadassah is working right now to expand these emergency zones because in Israel, preparedness isn't theoretical, it's essential. If you want to help make sure Israel is ready. Go to hadassah.org and support this important work. That's H A-A S S A H.org because you never know what tomorrow will bring.

[Karis Witte]

You are listening to an art media podcast. The relationship between China and Iran is not one of alliance. The reason China's so interested in keeping this regime is not only because it pulls US attention and US hardware away from the Indo Pacific to the region, but because being the only fully anti US state in the Middle east, it is a very valuable tool for China to leverage as much as it can. So the same kind of regime that's anti US, that's weakened, is good for China, but a closed Hormuz is bad.

[Dan Senor]

It's 9:00am on Sunday, May 17th here in New York City. It is 4:00pm on Sunday, May 17th in Israel. Late last week, President Trump wrapped up a two day summit with Xi Jinping in China. The summit ended up very close to where it began. No big announcements, no hostilities, just a continuation, it seems, of the status quo. And maybe that was the point. The dominant read in the press, at least so far, has been that China, quote unquote, won the summit. The U.S. so the narrative goes, came in weakened by the Iran war, distracted by tariffs and looking for relief in the Strait of Hormuz. But that read may be inaccurate or at least somewhat incomplete. Today we're going to work through what we think actually happened in Beijing, what Beijing actually wanted and didn't get, and what all of it means for Israel as it continues to fight a war that China has been quietly watching and maybe quietly shaping from the other side of the world. My guest today is Karis Witte. She's the founder and executive director of Signal Group, which is an independent, not tied to any government, not the Israeli government, not the US government, not the Chinese government, an independent think tank in Israel focused on China and the Indo Pacific. Carice, who has traveled to China over 70 times and conducted over 2000 briefings in both China and Israel on China, runs an annual conference on Israel's China policy in Israel and has spent more than a decade in helping to understand and shape to some degree the architecture between Jerusalem and Beijing. She's one of a very small number of analysts who watches the US China relationship specifically through an Israeli strategic lens.

[Podcast Host/Announcer]

Now, before our conversation, one short housekeeping note. If you aren't already, please make sure to subscribe to our daily podcast Ark News Daily. Each morning Deborah Pardes thoughtfully walks you through the most important news concerning Israel and the Jewish world in under 10 minutes. I listen to it every day. It is very efficient. You can find that link in the description below or you can just go to arcmedia.org where you can find all our links and also subscribe to our newsletter.

[Dan Senor]

Carice joins us from Israel. Karis, welcome to call me back.

[Karis Witte]

Thank you. It's wonderful to be here.

[Dan Senor]

So I just want to start As I mentioned a moment ago, the conventional read on the Trump Xi summit, from the Wall Street Journal to most of the foreign policy commentariat, is that Beijing emerged from this summit stronger that the US came in, weakened, as I said, by the Iran war and distracted perhaps by tariffs and visibly needing something or seeking something from China on Hormuz. But before we get into those details, how do you assess what actually happened in Beijing based on what we know so far?

[Karis Witte]

First of all, China has taken the lead in the messaging as it always does, and the US has somewhat played it down. They had a very brief readout from the summit. The Chinese readout was quite long and the success that the media is portraying is a continuation of the China image that it is trying to portray as a peer of the United States, which is already an achievement for China and that it has succeeded in achieving its goals, which is greater stability. However, I would not agree that China got what it wanted out of this summit and I think Trump ended up doing a much better job than many in Washington and the Indo Pacific were worried about how he might carry out the discuss and his public statements. And so the overall summit and the takeaways are all about expectations, how everyone on the both sides went into this and what came out. There were some very low expectations in general, but based on what China was looking to achieve, I would say they did not succeed as much as has been portrayed. And based on the expectations that the US Had, I think they've come out relatively well.

[Dan Senor]

So during the visit, President Xi invoked the Thucydides trap, a rising power displacing a declining one, which is the reference I don't think was lost on anyone. Maybe say a little bit more about the Thucydides trap and why that is, you know, could be interpreted as quite a swipe at the US As a geopolitical power. And then related to that, what do you think Beijing actually get out of the summit?

[Karis Witte]

Graham Allison, a Harvard professor, came up with that characterization of the relationship between China and the US and the Chinese were very pleased and really feted Allison after that because it put them in the role of rising, which is what Xi Jinping and China's leadership repeatedly say that China is on an inexorable rise and the US on an inexorable decline. And as a result, raising the term Thucydides trap at this point, after having used it repeatedly China and the US for the past two years, it immediately evokes a weak US And a strong China. So, as you said, it wasn't lost on anyone. And it was intended to make the point, without saying it, that China's in charge. And everyone talked about Xi Jinping's demeanor and how Trump said, you're my friend and we have a great relationship. And Xi did not return the compliment. This all fits into the same thing, where it lifts up Xi and the leadership of China and looks like they're on a higher level than Trump and the US in terms of what Beijing

[Dan Senor]

got out of this visit. What's your sense?

[Karis Witte]

Well, what they say is that there's a new cooperation agreement between the two countries that will require both sides to treat each other with mutual respect. They're basically equal and must cooperate in sync with each other. At the end of the day, it's just a comment, but the Chinese are portraying this as a kind of commitment that was made on the Washington side via Trump, agreeing that this stabilizing two country agreement would indicate that if the US Wanted to institute more restrictions on technology or take other steps that would be problematic for China. Beijing could call Washington out and say, wait, that doesn't follow this agreement that we came to at the summit in Beijing. So. So the Chinese perceived that as a win, but they really didn't get much of what they wanted. They were expecting that Trump would cave on one aspect at least of the Taiwan relationship, which as Xi Jinping said is the most important one for them. And they did not get a change in language which they hoped and believed Trump would agree to. And they've been lobbying for quite a while, which is, instead of saying that the US does not support Taiwanese independence, it would change it to the US does not oppose Chinese independence. And if you look at how Trump handles things, one would think he wouldn't really care that much about such a subtle, nuanced distinction, and he would be willing to give up on that if the Chinese would come through in other ways, like, you know, instead of 200 Boeing, stick to the original 500 deal. But Trump did not give in. He didn't commit to not going through with the approximately $12 billion arms sale to Taiwan, and he didn't change anything with respect to the strategic ambiguity that the US Maintains with respect to Taiwan. All of this is reassuring for the Indo Pacific, but it's not good for China.

[Dan Senor]

But couldn't you argue that that ambiguity itself and maintaining that ambiguity is at least a partial win for Beijing, even if it wasn't the formal concession China wanted or Xi wanted? Isn't just leaving it, like, in kind of status quo mode, a net positive from Xi's perspective?

[Karis Witte]

No, it's not. This strategic ambiguity has been consistent for decades. And the worry by many in, like, China watchers in America, many China hawks in D.C. many countries in the Indo Pacific, most clearly Japan, worry that Trump will back away from strategic ambiguity and go in the direction of, well, we're not really going to support Taiwan, so that would hugely weaken deterrence. If Trump said, yes, we are going to support Taiwan no matter what, then the Chinese would consider that a belligerent step, and it could possibly encourage China to take kinetic action towards Taiwan much sooner than it wants to.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, so let's now turn to Iran. In an offline conversation, you said that China wants the Iranian regime preserved not because it has any strong favorable feelings towards the regime in Tehran, but because Iran keeps America's attention away from the Indo Pacific. So as of now, the Iranian regime is in place. It is weak, no doubt, but that may be China's preferred outcome, a weak regime that's still in place and is still a magnet for Washington's focus. How do you expect China's policy towards Iran to continue from here, especially as it relates to poor Moose and Iran's nuclear program?

[Karis Witte]

So, first of all, I reiterate that the reason China's so interested in keeping this regime is not only because it pulls US attention and US Hardware Military hardware away from the Indo Pacific to the region, which China is happy about. But because overall being the only fully anti US state in the Middle east, it is a very valuable tool for China to leverage as much as it can and in an ongoing way. So Iran resents this to some extent because China also takes advantage of the sanctions. It gets cheap oil and there are many difficulties in that relationship. But going forward, you're right, a weak regime, the same kind of regime that's anti us, that's weakened, is good for China. But a closed Hormuz is bad. Very simple. China wants the Hormuz open because that directly hits their domestic issues, domestic needs and challenges. So China's juggling with Iran would be open. The Hormuz don't go nuclear because they certainly don't want a fanatic unpredictable regime with nuclear capability. They never have supported nuclear military capability. They only support peaceful nuclear capability for Iran and every other country. One of the reasons that they don't want Iran to be nuclear is because not only would it perhaps or likely spark a nuclear race in the Middle east, but much more close to home. China believes that would cause South Korea and Japan to go nuclear very quickly in response. So China's quite serious about not wanting Iran to be nuclear and going forward. What China will do is prop up that regime in every possible way except for nuclear. So it's going to take many steps to reconstitute Iran's missile program once again. We can trust that all of the hardware and missile propellant that they have been sending dual use, saying that it is done through the private sector and they have no connection to it, the government is not responsible for that. That is likely to continue going forward. China will also continue to buy oil from Iran as long as it can manage. And the teapot refineries, which are very small and under the radar because they work in yuan, the Chinese currency instead of dollar, so the sanctions actually don't apply. Yes, they can only refine a much smaller amount, but it does add up and it allows China to purchase up to 12% of its oil from Iran at a discounted price.

[Dan Senor]

And these are what they're like privately owned refineries, These teapot refineries.

[Karis Witte]

Yes. But all in China using the term private is kind of a misnomer. But they are not state owned.

[Podcast Host/Announcer]

Right.

[Karis Witte]

They are much smaller. They work through local banks, they don't work through major international banks. And so all of their money movement is done in a back channels way.

[Dan Senor]

Further, not the massive state owned facilities like Sinopec right?

[Karis Witte]

Yeah. They're not Sinopec. They're like a tip of the Sinopec iceberg. Yes, they're much, much smaller. That is the Chinese way of sourcing Iranian oil.

[Dan Senor]

And how do you expect China's policy towards Iran to continue from here, especially as it relates to Hormuz and the nuclear program?

[Karis Witte]

Well, China is going to continue to quietly encourage Iran not to develop nuclear military capabilities. It will work with the international community on that. As much as there is an international effort regarding the Hormuz, it's a very interesting question. It's pretty clear that China has been working behind the scenes supporting Pakistan to deal with this mediation, but they don't want any frontline recognition, which is very interesting because China, when it supposedly used the term, brokered the Iran Saudi rapprochement. They were very happy to make that public and the world praised them to such a degree that China thought it had new mediation skills and leverage in the Middle east and the wars of June 2025 and now have shown that China really doesn't have any leverage. China realized it doesn't have the leverage, the know how and the capability of mediating. So now, even when Trump says it was China that got Iran to the original negotiating table after the strikes by Israel and the us, China did not say a word. They didn't say yes, it was us or thank you or anything. They just kept totally silent because the risk is too high. They're not willing to be out in front where they might have massive egg on their face at the end of this and instead would rather to do it behind the scenes where they can actually impact the situation, help open the Hormuz. But if it doesn't work, they don't have to take the blame.

[Podcast Host/Announcer]

Lately, many have been asking me, where can I go to think more seriously about this moment in Jewish life? One of my strongest recommendations is the Shalom Hartman Institute's Community Leadership Program in Jerusalem. This summer, from July 1st through July 7th, you'll study with scholars like Hartman presidents Danielle Hartman and Yehuda Kurtzer alongside Yossi Klein Halevi, Alana Steinhein, Tal Becker, who's very familiar to our listeners and others. You'll join dedicated learners from around the world for an immersive week of study, conversation and community, exploring big Jewish ideas and and wrestling honestly with the challenges facing Israel and the Jewish people today. In this moment, being in Israel matters. So does learning together. Asking difficult questions, challenging assumptions, and imagining what comes next. If you're looking for a summer learning experience grounded in seriousness, debate community and hope. This is an invitation worth considering. Space is limited and last year the program did sell out. So to learn more and reserve your spot, go to shalom hartman.org CLP.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, Last Thursday, as the summit was about to begin, Iran seized a support vessel owned by a Chinese security firm near the Strait of Hormuz. This is according to reporting in a number of places, including the Wall Street Journal. How do you interpret that move by Iran and what does it tell you about the China Iran relationship?

[Karis Witte]

Well, first of all, Iran said it was a statement to show China who's in charge of the Hormuz. And in general, as I said earlier, the relationship between China and Iran is not one of alliance. They have a strategic partnership, but it is a marriage of convenience. The $400 billion that China committed to investing in in Iran a few years ago, a 25 year commitment has come to almost nothing. And the Iranians really resent that. They feel like the imports that they get from China are all very low quality, cheap. They feel insulted by China. So it's not a surprise that Iran will flex its muscles where it has them and not allow China to feel that it has any leverage over Iran, perhaps to press Iran to open up the Hormuz or in any way get special treatment unless Tehran decides they want to give it.

[Dan Senor]

Okay, you've described China's support for Iran as operating through a frame of or an approach of plausible deniability. But there's also other evidence, satellite navigation, radar systems, electronic warfare, suggesting that perhaps that deniability is cracking and that China has been more directly connected to a number of the moves that the regime has made as it relates to military action against the US Military action against Israel, military action to other targets in the Gulf. At what point does China's indirect support cross some kind of threshold for Israel or the US where they do have to respond to directly.

[Karis Witte]

You're absolutely right. And an example of that is the sodium percholate that China has been providing to Iran for the past year and a half since there was an explosion by some source in Iran that blew up Iran's ability to produce solid rocket fuel. Solid missile fuel and the sodium percolate can be used. It's a dual use item that is both for fertilizer and can be changed into ammonium, which then becomes this rocket and missile solid fuel that has been going on for a while and little by little, Israel certainly has become more and more vocal about what China is doing. And the way that Israel has dealt with it is to push the envelope diplomatically. So, for example, Israel hosted the Deputy Foreign Minister of Taiwan in Israel. That was a very major statement. And by some accounts, you could say Israel took a risk of blowback, serious blowback from China. Another example of how this could play out is Israel signed on to a criticism of China regarding their treatment of the Uyghurs recently for the same reason. But in general, Israel tends to hesitate before it takes any response to China's overstepping. How far would China have to go for Israel to push that envelope further is a very good question. And I really can't tell you what

[Dan Senor]

it would take in terms of China's perception of Israel and China's perception of Israel's policy towards China. Can you just talk a little bit about that? Because I don't think we have a clear understanding just generally of what actually Israel's trying to do with regard to Beijing and what its options are, what its limitations are. Can you just tell us a little bit about that?

[Karis Witte]

The Israel, China relationship is very interesting. It's evolved a lot over the years, but in that relationship has always been the United States from the very beginning, from the time that PRC, the People's Republic of China, was formed in 1949 and Israel was a year old, US was in that relationship. So as we go through, you know, the decades, China always had a plan on what it wanted from Israel, even before there were official relations. And that has continued. And Israel had only two things that it ever wanted from China. One, assist us in preventing Iran from going nuclear. Its assistance they never got. And stop voting against Israel. So consistently in the United Nations. Abstain sometimes. Never got that either. However, China has had a long laundry list of what it wants from Israel. Different times, different things. And China's always ready with that list for in every interaction. So that changed on October 7th. China's list became blank. It no longer wanted anything from Israel because it felt that Israel was a failed state. And they turned really rabidly anti Israel, rhetorically giving massive support to Iran during the Gaza war, being incredibly anti Israel. I was told by Chinese that they could not open their social media on their phone without saying some image of Gaza with like, you know, a poor woman sitting in rubble all the time. 24, 7. And the aim was really to turn the Chinese from liking and respecting Jews and Israel to being anti Israel. And it succeeded to a great extent. However, during the fall of 2024, Israel's military and intelligence successes, the killing of Haniyeh in the IRGC hotel in Tehran, we're talking about getting Nasrallah very deep, deep, deep down in a hole with a complex aerial operation that required a lot of intelligence. And of course, the piece de resistance was the pager operation against Hezbollah. When those things happened one after the other, and then Trump won, which was also seen as a pro Israel or a strengthening of Israel, all of those things came together and China's view of Israel transformed. They now saw that Israel is a regional power to be reckoned with. And so they began to show some more respect for Israel. They significantly reduced their support of Iran, certainly rhetorically, and they reduced their anti Israel atmosphere, anti Israel statements, et cetera. And we can see it in the difference in the readouts, even from the first Iranian attack on Israel back in April of 2024 and the one in October between that period of time. The readout in April was, israel is an aggressor. And this is after we received hundreds and hundreds of missiles and rockets. They said, we're the aggressor. In October, after we were successful, they said, both sides need to restrain themselves. This is for China. It's not a 180, but it's definitely like a 90 degree change. And we've been seeing this ever since. So if you look at this war where Israel has been fighting side by side, the United States taking out various targets in Iran very surgically. So, first of all, you have many Chinese who appreciated the surgical nature of Israel's capabilities, its successes in air force successes, the same thing with June 2025. And you do not hear from the government any statement about Israel being in the wrong. They make general statements, they protest the war, they want a ceasefire, but no word against Israel. And that is all due to perceiving Israel as being strong, influential and having power.

[Dan Senor]

I'd be remiss if I didn't ask you. This is more of a general question. But it's related to this in terms of China's, the government's anxieties about its domestic situation, slowing economic growth. It's technically the second largest economy in the world, now surpassed Japan, something like 18 to 20 trillion dollars in GDP, yet not clear how, at its current growth rate, and it's slowing growth, that it can keep up with the US and huge problems with youth unemployment and obviously a demographic downward spiral, given that its population is going to get older very fast, it has huge, shall we say, fertility limitations. To what extent does all this limit or impact its foreign policy?

[Karis Witte]

It's a very good question. It does strongly impact the foreign policy, but quietly so economically. There's Certain dissonance because Beijing is the most solvent central government on the planet, because exports are massive, but the actual profits by the corporations, be they state owned enterprises, you know, owned by the government or sort of from the quote unquote, private sector, their margins are very small and being damaged further because of this war with Iran and the closure of the Hormuz. So China has been trying to encourage consumer consumption for the last couple of years and completely failing that, people will not spend money because there are great limits to the social safety net that China provides. So you can ask, why doesn't China provide a better social safety net? It has all this money. Well, Xi Jinping believes that if you give too much support, the people will become lazy. And they watched how this happened in the UK and he said in his internal meetings, we don't want to become like the British just on that.

[Dan Senor]

Chris, what do you mean by we don't want to become like the British,

[Karis Witte]

having so much welfare that people do not choose to work? They would just rather sit home and take welfare than go out and work? So now that there is inflation due to increased costs because of the oil situation, all of this is damaging China's economy. They already have something called involution, and that's the term for so much competition internally in each field that the profit margin reduces down to almost zero. And actually there have been cases of certain commercial entities which have paid consumers to use their product because they're trying to build a consumer base and steal it from the other company. So the internal situation is extremely difficult. It is not getting better. And as a result, China's foreign policy stresses expansion overseas. And as long as it is successful in doing that in the global markets, then it's some compensation for the lack of movement of money internally. However, you know, regardless of what China does, there are a lot of external forces that are preventing growth. The world is slowing down. Certainly this Hormuz situation is ramping up the slowdown. All of this bodes very badly for China's economy. And I think that's why we see a lot of the narrative about China's status and a lot of things that are not very bottom line, because the bottom line isn't that great.

[Dan Senor]

All right, if your synthesis is right, Chris, China projected confidence going into and during the summit. It doesn't appear that they gained that much. Trump conceded almost nothing and both sides preserved some kind of, I don't know what you'd call it, a managed stalemate. So if that's right, then the US China relationship is in some kind of holding pattern. But Israel is still fighting a war and China is watching that war closely. And China has a number of equities in that war. So given everything we've just discussed and worked through, what should Israel from your perspective as actually be doing differently in its China policy right now?

[Karis Witte]

I just want to go back to this stalemate idea. The, the point of that status quo is that it gives both China and the US Why are they agreeing to do this? They both have time to reduce dependencies on each other. So on the Chinese side, the well known semiconductor issue, on the US side, it's rare earths, critical minerals and some manufacturing. Israel has a different game that it's playing. And any support that China gives to Iran is very problematic for Israel. Every dollar or yuan that it spends in Iran is probably a UN that's going to go to another bomb directed at Israel or its neighbors. And Israel has some leverage. We're a tiny country and you know, it's always the common joke, if you put Israel and China together, you've got 1.38 billion people. So the difference is immense. However, there are things that Israel can do. Israel is a regional power and its relationship with the Emirates has improved significantly. We see that the rift between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia has caused the Emirates to move closer to Israel and also the United States. The Emirates are the pillar of China's economic interest in the entire Middle East. So 60% of all of their exports to the Middle east and Africa go through the Emirates. So this is very significant. Israel can use that. Israel can use its defense capabilities in the region. It can use many, many things that are an issue for China as a way to motivate China to take steps that will be in Israel's interest. One of the things that Israel could do, which may not be very familiar to many people, but they could declare a free and open Indo Pacific. This is a statement that the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe raised this concept as a way to convey to China that its encroachment in the South China Sea is unacceptable. So it does imply, like the term Indo Pacific is basically Asia without China. It is a statement that implies some kind of contest or challenge with or by China or from or by China. And free and open Indo Pacific is the same thing. So Israel hesitates to declare a free and open Indo Pacific, which would open many doors in the Indo Pacific with countries such as the Philippines, Japan, South Korea. Of course, we already have very good ties with India, but many of these other countries would appreciate it and it would make a real difference. A verbal statement or a written statement would open business doors, both government to government. We're talking about very large sales of defense equipment, which would be good for Israel. Joint R and D. It would open doors for many things, but Israel hesitates because it knows that this would probably disturb China.

[Dan Senor]

All right, Chris, we will leave it there. Thank you for this. Obviously, this is not a story that is in its last chapter. It's constantly evolving and taking twists and turns. So I'm sure we will be coming back to you. Until then, thanks for doing this.

[Karis Witte]

Well, it was really my pleasure and I look forward to the next opportunity. Thank you so much.

[Podcast Host/Announcer]

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Weiner. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. Hi, it's Dan. Over the past couple of years, Call Me Back has grown into something much bigger than we ever expected. A place for clarity, context, and honest conversations at a time when those things can seem hard to find. That's what ARC Media is all about. Building a truly independent voice. Which means no one shaping what we say or how we say it. To help support our rapidly expanding operations, we created inside CallMeBack, our members only feed where we answer your questions and bring you into the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. If CallMeBack has been meaningful to you and you want to be part of what we're building, I hope you'll join us. Right now, we're offering an annual subscription for $60. That's just $5 a month. Your contribution goes a long way in helping us show up when it matters most. You can [e-mail] or through the link in the show notes and to our insiders.

[Dan Senor]

Thank you.