What we know about the emerging Iran deal - with Nadav Eyal and Mark Dubowitz

Summary

Podcast Summary
Call Me Back with Dan Senor
Episode: What We Know About the Iran Deal — with Nadav Eyal and Mark Dubowitz
Date: May 25, 2026
Guests:

• Nadav Eyal (Yidiot Ahronot columnist & ARC Media contributor)
• Mark Dubowitz (CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies)

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Episode Overview

This urgent, fast-moving episode provides a deep dive into the emerging US-Iran deal in the immediate aftermath of the 40-day war. Host Dan Senor, joined by experts Nadav Eyal and Mark Dubowitz, analyzes the shape of the new framework between Washington and Tehran—focusing on the deal’s possible components, the limits of American and Israeli leverage, regional reactions, and the strategic implications. Throughout, the discussion is candid about Israeli and American strategic cultures, the psychology of security, and the sense of unresolved frustration in Israel despite major military achievements.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Emerging US-Iran Deal: What Is on the Table?

(02:25-08:12)

• The framework under negotiation involves a 30–60 day ceasefire extension; Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and enter talks on limiting uranium enrichment and nuclear stockpiles.
• In exchange, Iran expects sanctions relief on oil exports, some assets unfrozen, and a US commitment not to strike militarily during negotiations.
• Mark Dubowitz describes this as a "Hormuz for Hormuz" deal: the US lifts its maritime blockade; Iran lifts its Hormuz shipping blockade.
• Key economic stakes: Iran gains potential access to up to $8 billion in assets and unblocks oil sales worth as much as $12–15 billion.
• The deal was precipitated by intense military escalation (the US obliterated Iran’s air defenses and set back its nuclear program), but Iran still controls Hormuz and retains significant enriched uranium.

“This is essentially the United States of America lifting its maritime blockade on Iranian ports … and Iran lifting its blockade on Hormuz where it’s been threatening international shipping, and then allowing these ships to start moving through the strait into oil markets.”
—Mark Dubowitz (04:46)

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Israeli Concerns & the Nuclear Question

(07:25–10:46)

• Israeli sources are deeply skeptical, fearing Iran will stall in negotiations and avoid real concessions on uranium.
• Two options for enriched uranium: either it leaves Iran or is diluted onsite under international monitoring. Israel prefers its removal, but might settle for rigorous onsite controls.

“If the war ends and there is no credible military threat, even if orally the Iranians said, ‘yeah, we’re going to agree to elimination of our highly enriched uranium stockpile,’ … what’s going to push them to do that in 30 days if there is no credible military threat?”
—Nadav Eyal (08:12)

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What Does a “Real” Nuclear Deal Require?

(11:13–14:35)

• Mark Dubowitz outlines necessary steps for a meaningful deal:
  • Removal of all forms of enriched uranium (not just the 60% material).
  • Dismantling of nuclear infrastructure, including hardened underground sites.
  • IAEA inspections with verifiable full access (“anytime, anywhere”).
  • A prohibition on enrichment (permanent or long-term).
• Anything less resembles a return to the much-criticized JCPOA; Dubowitz is skeptical Iran will agree.

“As long as you have any enriched material on your soil and you have centrifuges and you have the ability to spin them up, you’ve got to take out all of the enriched material…”
—Mark Dubowitz (11:36)

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American and Israeli Strategic Cultures Diverge

(01:10, 29:24–32:50)

• Israelis see “negotiating while fighting” as essential; Americans prefer to negotiate only after pausing hostilities.
• Trump’s approach is described as more “Israeli”—willing to keep escalation as leverage.

“Americans don’t do that. Americans fire and we stop, we do ceasefires… Israelis just completely don’t understand that approach. I actually think Trump is kind of more Israeli in that respect.”
—Mark Dubowitz (01:10, repeated at 29:24)

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The Limits of Leverage & Risks of Lost Momentum

(14:35–18:55, 21:53–23:30)

• If talks fail, the US retains options: escalate militarily, re-impose sanctions, or support internal unrest in Iran.
• As time passes, the threat to use force may be seen as less credible, weakening US/Israeli bargaining power.

“As time goes on, the credibility of the military threat diminishes. And if that diminishes, then US leverage starts to diminish considerably…”
—Mark Dubowitz (22:55)

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The Gulf States, the Abraham Accords, and Regional Realignments

(18:55–21:26)

• The UAE has borne massive costs and is recalculating, as are other regional players.
• Iranian rhetoric about saving Lebanon signals its renewed regional confidence.
• Ongoing military and diplomatic uncertainty impacts the durability of the Abraham Accords and overall regional alignment.

“The fact that the Iranians are very emboldened … presenting themselves as the saviors of Lebanon, the fact that this is even agreed in the negotiations, that they are capable of raising this demand…”
—Nadav Eyal (19:27)

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Hezbollah and the Ongoing Conflict in Lebanon

(26:07–27:58)

• Daily fighting and casualties continue for Israel in Lebanon, especially from advanced drone attacks.
• Some fear that any ceasefire the Iranians demand in Lebanon may only further solidify Hezbollah’s position.

“What’s happening in Lebanon right now is that on a daily basis we have casualties. You get a message of another drone. These are drones that are led by fiber cables. And right now Israel doesn’t have a solution to that.”
—Nadav Eyal (26:21)

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Israeli Public Sentiment: Frustration and Fatigue

(27:58–29:22)

• Across the spectrum—from Netanyahu supporters to critics—there is dissatisfaction. Despite military gains, many Israelis hoped for a more decisive, transformational result.
• The prevailing feeling is frustration with the status quo and anxieties about the outcomes of war.

“Israeli civilians and Emirati civilians and Saudi civilians were bombed. And they were asking exactly for what.”
—Nadav Eyal (28:12)

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Evaluating Military Achievements vs. Political Expectations

(29:24–33:19)

• Major achievements: Severe degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—including the destruction of its intercontinental missile capability.
• The gap between bold political rhetoric (obliteration, regime change) and actual outcomes breeds disappointment and vulnerability to criticism.

“When you set the bar at obliteration and regime change and you fall short of that politically, then you look like the war has not succeeded… But … there have been remarkable achievements.”
—Mark Dubowitz (29:24)

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Is This a Turning Point or a Missed Opportunity?

(33:19–37:38)

• Dubowitz argues this is a rare window that could end Iran’s nuclear and missile threat—maybe even bring regime change, but only with decisive, coordinated US-Israeli action.
• Both guests agree it’s too soon to judge; the next 30–60 days and the US election will be critical.
• Nadav notes the sense of “frustration that … seems to just have been extended until we get some sort of an answer…” (35:19)

“I think this is the moment. We have two and a half years. It’s time to double down. I don’t think Trump is going to throw it away.”
—Mark Dubowitz (33:49)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the deal framework:
  “[President Trump] bought himself some economic relief for the global economy, for the US Economy. And we’ll see if that means he comes back harder and swinging…” (Mark Dubowitz, 07:25)

• On negotiating styles:
  “Israelis understand you’ve got to negotiate while fighting. Americans don’t do that.” (Mark Dubowitz, 01:10/29:24)

• On regional unease:
  “If you stop for a moment, they [the Iranians] just see it as weakness... Don’t stop attacking militarily without an agreement.” (Nadav Eyal, 23:32)

• On the public mood:
  “They wanted to see something that will change the region. And now many people are asking ... are we not back to square one, but back to square three or four?” (Nadav Eyal, 28:12)

• On the risk of lost leverage:
  “As time goes on, the credibility of the military threat diminishes.” (Mark Dubowitz, 22:55)

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Key Timestamps

| Timestamp | Segment Description | |-----------|---------------------| | 01:10 | Israelis vs. Americans: negotiating while fighting | | 04:46 | Details of the “Hormuz for Hormuz” deal | | 07:25 | Israeli perspective: concerns about Iran stalling | | 08:12 | View on Iranian nuclear concessions | | 11:36 | What a “real” nuclear deal must include | | 14:47 | US leverage options if talks fail | | 19:27 | The UAE, Gulf Arab recalculations | | 26:21 | The Lebanon/Hezbollah front | | 28:12 | Israeli public sentiment | | 29:24 | Achievements vs. expectations in the war | | 33:49 | Is this a turning point or a missed opportunity? | | 35:19 | Israeli frustration & uncertain path ahead |

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In Summary

The episode conveys a moment of ambiguity and geopolitical maneuvering: despite remarkable military achievements, Israeli and US officials (and publics) are anxious about securing real results at the negotiating table. The panelists present a clear-eyed view of the constraints, opportunities, and dilemmas for both Israel and the United States. They agree this is a critical moment—one that might close the Iranian threat for a generation, or prove to be the point at which the West and Israel failed to capitalize on the greatest leverage they’d achieved in decades.

If you want a sense of the stakes, the debates in Israeli and US security circles, and the mood on both sides, this episode captures that tension, urgency, and frustration with rare candor and strategic depth.

Transcript

[A]

Hi, it's Dan. Over the past couple of years, CallMeBack has grown into something much bigger than we ever expected. A place for clarity, context, and honest conversations at a time when those things can seem hard to find. That's what ARC Media is all about. Building a truly independent voice, which means no one shaping what we say or how we say it. To help support our rapidly expanding operations, we created Inside Call Me Back, our members Only feed, where we answer your questions and bring you into the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. If CallMeBack has been meaningful to you and you want to be part of what we're building, I hope you'll join us. Right now we're offering an annual subscription for $60. That's just $5 a month. Your contribution goes a long way in helping us show up when it matters most. You can [e-mail] or through the link in the show Notes and to our insiders. Thank you. You are listening to an art media podcast.

[B]

Israelis understand in the Middle east that you got to negotiate while fighting. And Americans don't do that. Americans fire and we stop, we do ceasefires, but we never seem to want to fight and negotiate right. And Israelis just completely don't understand that approach. I actually think Trump is kind of more Israeli in that respect. Like I think he does understand against the Islamic Republic of Iran. He's not going to get Hormuz open permanently or a nuclear deal that meets his minimum demands without escalating against the Islamic Republic. And I think he's keeping escalation in his pocket. He'll give diplomacy a chance. But at some point, President Trump's going to reach a decision point that he's got to negotiate while fighting. I hope he reaches that point. If not, President Trump will end up squandering the greatest opportunity a US President has ever had to deal with the Islamic Republic. And if that happens, I will be criticizing him and I'm sure Senate Republicans will be criticizing him, and I think his legacy will be severely tainted. I'm hopeful that that's not the President Trump that we've seen through two administrations confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[A]

It's 5:30pm on Sunday, May 24 in New York City. It 12:30am on Monday, May 25 in Israel as the world follows closely the fast moving developments in the U. S Iran deal. Also wishing all of our American listeners a meaningful Memorial Day. As of this afternoon, the United States and Iran are reportedly within reach of a deal. According to public reports, the framework on the Table involves something in the range of a 30 to 60 day ceasefire extension during which Iran will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate limits on uranium enrichment and nuclear stockpiles. In exchange, Iran would receive some kind of sanctions relief on oil exports, some unfreezing of funds, and a US Commitment not to strike again militarily. During the negotiating window, details being reported out on the outline of a deal were met with fierce criticism in some corners, including from some prominent Republican senators. The 40 day war that began on February 28th did obliterate Iran's air defenses and it sank its navy and it set back its nuclear program perhaps by years. But Iran still does control Hormuz. And Iran still has a 440 kilogram stockpile of 60% highly enriched uranium that will be negotiated during the ceasefire as we understand it. To work through all of this, I'm joined by ARC Media contributor and Yidiot Ahronot columnist Nadava Yel and Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the foundation for Defense of Democracies, who is one of the architects of the maximum pressure campaign against Iran and the man who spent 22 years warning against negotiating with Iran. Gentlemen, I will preface this conversation by saying that things are fluid. There are still a lot of details coming out, but we are going to try to provide the best snapshot of what, what we understand to be going on. So thank you for joining this conversation on short notice.

[B]

Thank you, Dan.

[C]

Thanks, Dan.

[A]

Okay, so as I said in the intro, we are recording this on Sunday afternoon and the situation is, as I said, moving fast. Mark, you have been speaking at length with American and Israeli sources. So walk us through what you know, what is actually in this emerging document or memorandum of understanding, and where do things stand?

[B]

So, Dan, there's, you know, there's obviously a lot of misinformation out there, certainly a lot of it being put into the social media ecosystem by Iran itself. So hard to get exact details. And, you know, we're waiting to see a final agreement. There's been speculation that about 95% of it's done and the last 5% is being negotiated and that we may see an agreement over the next 24 to 48 hours. What we're going to see is essentially a Hormuz for Hormuz deal. This is essentially the United States of America lifting its maritime blockade on Iranian ports that have prevented Iran from shipping oil and importing key commodities for its economy. And Iran lifting its blockade on Hormuz where it's been threatening international shipping, and then allowing these ships to start moving through the strait into oil markets. There's a lot of discussion about what is Iran going to get in return, the kind of sanctions relief it'll get return, and what is the timing of that? I've heard speculation of an unfreezing of about $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets that are held in Qatar and Iran's ability to sell the oil that is currently in tankers that have been blocked by the United States, and that may amount to 12, $15 billion worth of oil sales, mostly the Chinese. The assessment is that it was an economic game of chicken going on. We were imposing severe costs on the Iranian economy through the blockade. They were imposing serious costs on the global economy through their own blockade. And President Trump had made a decision in this economic game of chicken not to follow recommendations from Israel to launch major military operations against Iran's energy infrastructure, even though President Trump came very close to doing that a few days ago. Dan. I mean, we were minutes away. I was in Israel and it looked like a strike was coming. And at the last minute, the Gulf Arabs weighed in with President Trump and I guess persuaded him to take a last chance at diplomacy. So that's what he's doing. There's a 30 to 60 time clock. There may be some notional commitments in the MoU that is being signed that Iran will agree to some significant nuclear concessions. I'm skeptical that will happen. And I'm equally skeptical that there's going to be any kind of serious nuclear deal where Iran will meet President Trump's minimum demands on the nuclear deal. But time will tell. At the very least, President Trump has bought himself some economic relief for the global economy, for the US Economy. And we'll see if that means he comes back harder and swinging when he's been able to at least mitigate the economic and political impact that he's been having to deal with.

[A]

Nadav, you and I spoke offline, not in the context of a podcast. About a week ago, we were talking about the four ways this things could go. One was resumption of military action, which we did not think was highly likely. Two was just the status quo, just no change. And there were many reasons to believe that wouldn't be the case. There was some kind of new jcpoa. So, like JCPOA Part two, or Hormuz for Hormuz, the idea that the US Was going to end the blockade, as we were just talking about with Mark, and then Iran would obviously stop its mischief making in the Hormuz. So where does that leave the nuclear materials, if that's really where we are. From what I understand, Iran has agreed so far, again, this is all very fluid in principle, quote, unquote, to dispose of its enriched uranium.

[C]

So, first of all, right now, it does look like a Hormuz for Hormuz, but if it would end with that, that would actually be good news because they blocked the Strait of Hormuz. The demand was just open the Strait of Hormuz, and that's it. But it's not only that, because it does talk about unfreezing, at least according to some sources reporting, unfreezing of billions of dollars. And one of the things that has developed in the last six hours before we spoke is that Iranian sources are feeding international media and saying that the administration has backed off some of this unfreezing of their assets. The point here is, as such, if the war ends and there is no credible military threat, and even if orally, the Iranians said, yeah, we're going to agree to elimination of our highly enriched uranium stockpile, and we're willing to speak or commit to stopping enrichment orally, but it's not part of the principle, the agreement in principle, or the MOU right now. What's going to push them to do that in 30 days if there is no credible military threat? So one of the things that is out there is the possibility of the US just maintaining its positions for another 30 days or 60 days. But if this is the case, the question that one might ask is, why not get an agreement now? We've been in these negotiations for weeks on end. Right? The answer, as you put it, Dan, is very much economic pain is coming as a result of firmuz. Israeli sources don't like this development, to say the least. That's an understatement. They think that Iran sees itself as a country that has won the war. They feel that the Iranians are going to just do what they do in negotiations from now on. They're going to just dodge and they're going to be slow, and it's never going to reach any point of actual action. Now, to that I can understand the Israeli sources, but I can also see the international picture. And also I should remind ourselves about the commitment that President Trump has shown to fighting Iran and the fact that the president knows that if this ends with them having just the same nuclear program that they had before with the enriched uranium out there, he knows what would be the meaning of that. And we saw people like Ted Cruz, Lindsey Graham, and others today talking about that with the belief that the president is not going to go down that route.

[A]

But that material is still in Iran. So what does dispose of actually mean? Does it leave Iranian soil?

[C]

As to the enriched uranium, there are two paths, both are legit. One is take the enriched uranium out of Iran and the other one is diluted with international monitoring in Iran. Israeli sources would want the enriched uranium to leave Iran. But the truth is that if it's diluted and it's monitored by the United States on Iranian soil, it's the same kind of result to some extent, and they're going to live with that.

[A]

So, Mark, we talked about this 30 to 60 day window of negotiations. I guess a couple questions. One, what does Iran need to. Well, first of all, what happens in that negotiation window? What's actually going on? And then what does Iran need to give up for this to be a quote unquote, real deal rather than what's characterized as JCPOA 2.0? What actually has to be done on the nuclear side?

[B]

Yeah. So on the nuclear side, let's first understand that it's not just about 900 pounds of highly enriched uranium enriched to 60%. It's also about thousands of pounds of enriched uranium enriched at 3.67% and at 20%. And it's just a quick sort of lesson in basic nuclear physics. If you've enriched to 3.67%, you've done 75% of the work, you need to get to weapons grade, done it to 20% enriched uranium, you've done 90% of the work to get to weapons grade. And if you have enriched to 60%, you've done 97% of the work to get to weapons grade. In other words, as long as you have any enriched material on your soil and you have centrifuges and you have the ability to spin them up, you've got to take out all of the enriched material, not the so called highly enriched uranium. And I get a little concerned when administration officials and US Senators start talking about highly enriched uranium as if the 450kg is what it's all about. It's absolutely not. We need to get all of it out. And there are thousands of pounds of enriched material. And the Iranians know that that is a critical point of leverage and they're not going to give it up easily, if at all. The second thing is we have to dismantle their nuclear facilities, their enrichment plants. Now, much of that has been severely degraded through US and Israeli strikes last June in this war. But there's still places like Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz where the Iranians are working on building a new enrichment facility, new centrifuge manufacturing facility, new WE weaponization facility. That's going to go deeper down than the Fordo facility that you remember President Trump struck during Operation Midnight Hammer with massive ordnance penetrators. The concern is, is that we may not be able to destroy Pickaxe Mountain with massive ordnance penetrators. So we may need to negotiate our way out of this and get the Iranians to agree that they will not operate any underground facilities, including Pickaxe Mountain. And then third element of it is going to have to be like, full disclosure on nuclear materials, full verification inspections, iaea, anytime inspections, so that we can absolutely ensure that there's no nuclear material hidden, advanced centrifuges, covert nuclear sites, and that everything has been closed and dismantled. And finally, the most important element is Iran cannot enrich. So it is absolutely critical in this nuclear deal that President Trump get a commitment from Iran that they will not enrich. I think it should be permanently. There's some discussion that it'll be 20 years or 15 years, and the Iranians are obviously going to negotiate that. So those are the parameters of what an acceptable deal would be. If President Trump got that deal that is vastly better than jcpoa. If he doesn't get that deal, then the question is, what does he get? And then you start getting closer and closer to JCPOA territory. Then we start to see things that, for President Trump, I think, politically would be very difficult for him to sell. And for that reason, I'm deeply skeptical that there is going to be a nuclear deal where the Iranians will give up concessions and meet the minimum demands of President Trump.

[A]

So, Mark, at the end of the period, whatever it is, 30 days, 60 days, somewhere in between, if we do not reach the limits on the Iranian nuclear program that we want, what leverage do we have?

[B]

Well, I think we have enormous leverage if President Trump is prepared to use it. I really think President Trump thinks he can get a nuclear deal out of Iran. I think he still thinks this is a pragmatic leadership that is under enough economic pain that they're prepared to surrender both their nuclear program and their control over Hormuz. We haven't even talked about what this Hormuz deal is all about, because I am deeply concerned that there is really a meaningful Hormuz deal. But setting that aside, I think the leverage we have is a return to major military operations. The Israelis were poised to launch massive strikes against Iran's energy infrastructure. Refineries, power plants, electrical grids. I mean, these are the kind of devastating economic blows that would essentially lead Iran to economic collapse. So maximum pressure, which is military and economic, maximum support for the Iranian people, which is to arm them, to come back to the streets, take down this regime, and then leading to kind of maximum fracturing. I'll just end with this because I think it's really important for your listeners to understand Israel has done devastating damage to Iran's missile program. Now, if there is a nuclear deal with Iran that doesn't address the ballistic missile program and allows Iran to restore and rebuild with Chinese help, that ballistic missile program, I think that's as bad and as dangerous as a deeply flawed nuclear deal. Right. And I think Trump reached a point where he was not ready to deliver the knockout blow militarily. I think that the US Military's plan to open Hormuz did not persuade President Trump that it could be done quickly enough in order to head off a coming economic crisis globally and in the United States. And so I think what he did was he stepped back. He did the Hormuz for Hormuz deal. He bought himself some time. He released the economic pressure on the United States and the global economy. He's going to do his best to try and negotiate. I think he's to fail on the nuclear side, and he certainly may not even touch the missile side. And then I think he's going to face the stark choice. And when he faces the stark choice, he will either pick the least difficult option, which is restore economic sanctions, the maritime blockade, and try to squeeze the regime economically. I don't think that works enough. I don't think this regime will make major concessions because of economic pain. One, I don't think they care about the welfare of their people. And two, they demonstrated that they are willing to sustain massive economic damage in order to survive. And so I think President Trump is going to then be faced with a decision that he turned down just a few days ago, which is, will he return to major military operations? And if so, will he unleash the US Navy to open Hormuz and the Israeli Air Force to go destroy Iran's energy infrastructure? And then is he prepared to deal with the knock on consequences, which will be Iranian retaliation on Gulf energy infrastructure and desalination? But I think if I were President Trump, I think what I would do is I would try to buy some time ahead of November, stabilize things, get the economy on a solid footing, keep the House, keep the Senate, or at the very least keep the Senate, push this after the election and then in the fall, in like late November, December, January is when then I would start to think about returning back to major military operations, but not doing it before the midterms, when the knock on consequences could be very difficult for him politically. I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of Ark News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started ArkNews Daily. Every weekday morning I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything and I don't waste your time. On most days I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show. Notes.

[A]

Nadav Mark just referenced the risk to the Gulf states and retaliation from Iran hitting the Gulf states. Infrastructure, critical infrastructure. And one country in particular that has sustained more pain, more damage than any other country in the region is the uae. Has the UAE been shifting its position? Because I know for a time they had a very hawkish position in Iran during the course of this war. What is their position now and what are the implications of its position for the continued durability of the Abraham Accords?

[C]

So I don't know that they changed their position as to Iran, but we are seeing some signs that they are reconsidering. I'm hearing what Mark said. I have to say that from original vantage point, the picture is much more pessimistic now. I'm speaking again, I'm hedging because I don't know if the president is going to go with this deal, but basically the fact that the Iranians are very emboldened in saying we're not going to sign any agreement to open Hormuz without having a sustainable ceasefire in Lebanon, presenting themselves as the saviors of Lebanon, the fact that this is even agreed in the negotiations, that they are capable of raising this demand. So the UAE will need to have its own calculations, because if every country on that call with the president was pushing towards an agreement besides the uae, this puts Mohammed bin Zayed in a very difficult spot. Now the general assessment I'm hearing, okay, it's not my own, is that if this stops now, the idea of a credible military threat is not going to be there as it is right now. What the region feels is that it's going to end the war. And also there are elections in Israel. So it's not only the November elections, it's that Netanyahu is not going to want September, the beginning of the school year, to look like another full blown war with Iran. So this takes us months and months ahead, and we didn't even start speaking about the regime change. Very far away from original expectations. I'm sorry to be the party pooper in that sense. I understand that. It's also about perceptions. If we're talking about deterrence, perception is sometimes more important than actual results, which I agree with, Mark, militarily speaking, are very impressive. The question is, what can you do with it when you're negotiating with a fundamentalist regime that doesn't care about their people?

[A]

Mark, I want you to respond to what Nadav said. And also just generally, are you concerned that if there's a sense that the momentum shifted, and at least you said maybe after the midterms, so sometime after November, these tools could be deployed, but it's a long time between now and the end of the year. So do you feel the sense that, you know, whatever we talk about in terms of the tools available to us, the likelihood of us using them have gone down considerably, which is basically what Nadav is arguing.

[B]

Look, I'm also sure if President Trump realizes that he's not going to get an acceptable nuclear deal that won't humiliate him in Washington politically, then I think he may decide to return to a full blown economic warfare campaign very soon. He may even decide, okay, I was this close a few days ago to launching major military operations. Let's go back at it and all right, iaf, Israeli Air Force, let's go. Let's take out, you know, the Abadan Refinery and trigger massive gasoline shortages and hopefully long lines and big protests like it, like it occurred in 2017 in Iran. I could see that happening. And by the way, I'm not optimistic, Nadav, that this ends well. Like, I'm worried because I think President Trump has, to his credit, established the most leverage over Iran of any American president. 47 years. It deeply concerns me that he's gonna squander that leverage. And I say time and time again, the only place Iranians ever beat Americans is at the negotiating table. I think President Trump knows that all of us have been nervous Nellies over the past number of years during first term Trump and now second term Trump, that Trump is gonna chicken out. Trump was gonna do a bad deal. Trump is gonna get taken to the cleaners by Iranian negotiators. I think time and time again, President Trump has proven the nervous Nellies wrong. I hope he'll do so again. But I do worry, yes, as time goes on, the credibility of the military threat diminishes. And if that diminishes, then the US Leverage starts to diminish considerably, whatever sanctions campaigns we're running. And then the Iranians will begin to restore the capabilities that I think have been admirably degraded by both the United States and Israeli militaries.

[A]

Nadav, what's your response to that?

[C]

Yeah, I agree. Look, Israel, Israelis, they're never going to go against the decisions of the United States or the president. You're not going to see the prime minister criticizing the president himself. Many people in the US Would also say, we've just fought a war that was more of an Israeli interest than our own interest, and for what. And this is a question that gets repeated over and over again. So the Israelis understand where they are with this, but they will need to live with the repercussions of this war in the years to come. And right now, what you have in Iran is a regime that survived after it was, for the first time attacked by the world's most powerful military superpower. And it's still there. Think about the ethos there. Think about the fundamentalist groups across the region. Think about, Dan, Hamas, who I am told by sources is really getting slower and slower in its negotiations to change in Gaza because they're looking eastwards towards Iran. So this is a very delicate moment. And at this moment, even politically speaking, the way that this is portrayed, it looks like this was an overplay by the Netanyahu government. Too many. They could have ended it at the 12 Day War. It's true that they got so much in practical terms, but at the end of the day, it was an overstretch. And this is something from within the defense apparatus. They also said, don't stop attacking militarily, Iran, without an agreement. If you stop for a moment, they just see it as weakness. This was really a recommendation both by the Israeli military intelligence and by the Mossad. You want to negotiate, negotiate with them, get a good agreement. But in order to get a good agreement, you'll need to keep up military pressure or nothing's going to happen in a positive way. I think Israel's position in Washington, D.C. is somewhat weakened, to say the least, and its ability of leverage internationally is definitely weakened. And of course, as an Israeli, I need to raise this. What are the repercussions of this War on Israel's standing within the American political sphere. And you guys would know better than I do, did it only expose friction and problems or did it materially change something in a negative way? As to Israel, the fact that the Israelis wanted this war to be fought, it's absolutely the case. It was fought and it is not seen now by most of the American public as a success.

[A]

I do want to ask you though, Nadav, about Hezbollah and Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. What does all this mean? Israel's at war every day you and I have talked about it. Israel's suffering casualties. What does this mean for the war against Hezbollah?

[C]

So, first of all, I don't know again, what are the clauses in the agreement the Iranians are saying are arguing. And again, I don't think I should believe what the Iranians are saying. But I'm just saying that for the record, the Iranians are saying that that means a complete, sustainable ceasefire in Lebanon. As of itself, it's not such a bad idea considering that Israel isn't a problem in Lebanon and it's in a problem that is technical. Sometimes tactical problems carry strategic weight. What's happening in Lebanon right now is that on a daily basis we have casualties. You get a message of another drone. These are drones that are led by fiber cables. And right now Israel doesn't have a solution to that. And the Israelis can't advance in Lebanon, so they're keeping their positions and they can't hit Beirut. So what kind of leverage do they have? If Hezbollah is now getting the defense of the Iranians and it is acknowledged by the international community that the Iranians become a player again in Lebanon, the news of the death of the so called Axis of Resistance were slightly premature. As an Israeli, I always worry that it might start rebuilding itself. And in terms of the Lebanese society, the hopes that they will take care of Hezbollah don't exist anymore. And in that sense, I'm not sure again that a ceasefire there is not saving Israel from itself. You know, you cannot really disarm Hezbollah without occupying the entire state of Lebanon. Israel is not going to do that. Or without the Lebanese disarming Hezbollah and they're not going to do that.

[A]

I must ask you, Nadav, just before I bring Mark back in, what's your sense for how regular, everyday Israelis, those who aren't in government or trying to figure out how to play this, who aren't in the security leadership, what's the sentiment?

[C]

Generally speaking, the right wing isn't happy, including the Netanyahu supporters. Are not happy of this agreement. And the censure is not happy either. And the left isn't happy from anything that the Netanyahu government does. Israeli civilians and Emirati civilians and Saudi civilians were bombed. And they were asking exactly for what. And the answer they're getting from the defense establishment is we eroded substantially a lot of their capabilities. What Mark said, it's absolutely true, and we're more secure right now. But I think Israelis were betting on something even more strategic. They wanted to see something that will change the region. And now many people are asking, is it the case, or are we not back to square one, but back to square three or four? You know, Mart just spent a lot of time in Israel, too. Maybe he has a different kind of perception of what he's hearing. I don't think anyone in the security establishment is saying we shouldn't have done it. Okay? We shouldn't have gone to this war. I didn't hear anyone saying that. But many people are asking, what are the actual results we can expect.

[A]

Mark, anything to add to that point?

[B]

Yeah, I think Nadav's had some very interesting insights, and I just want to kind of go through them one by one. I think the first is partly it's a political problem. President Trump talks about obliterating everything, and Prime Minister Netanyahu talks about bringing down the regime in Iran. Now, when you set the bar at obliteration and regime change and you fall short of that politically, then you look like the war has not succeeded. But if you step back and you say, well, what has been achieved in the past two and a half years of fighting at significant cost to Israelis and to Americans? There have been remarkable achievements in terms of the severe degradation of Iran's nuclear program, the severe degradation not only of their ballistic missile program, but we've destroyed their intercontinental ballistic missile program, Dan. And as Americans, that's what we should be really concerned about. I mean, the Israelis are concerned about medium range ballistic missiles, but we have destroyed their intercontinental ballistic missile program, which only has one address, which is the American homeland. So if you had told me three, four, five years ago that we would have done this kind of damage to Iran's missile program, I would have said you were high, because I could never have imagined how we would have ever done this diplomatically or through sanctions. And I never thought that the United States and Israel would be able to do this kind of damage. So I don't want to be. I don't want to be Pollyannish about this, but I think that there's a significant gulf between what the political leaders promised, which was obliteration, and regime change, and what has been achieved, which is significant, but of course insufficient, because as long as this regime is standing, they will try to reconstitute and we will have to continue to fight the Islamic Republic for years in the future. The second insight, and I think Nadav, really pointed to the fundamental difference between Americans and Israelis, and that is that Israelis understand in the Middle east, but maybe everywhere in the world that you got to negotiate while fighting. You got to be firing and negotiating, and Americans don't do that. Americans fire, then we stop, we do ceasefires, then we negotiate. Maybe we go back to military action. It's been a big question of this podcast, will Trump go back to military action? But we never seem to want to fight and negotiate, and Israelis just completely don't understand that approach. And Israelis also escalate to de escalate. They believe if you really want to de escalate a conflict, you got to escalate against your enemy and you got to strike massive blows against that enemy in order to de escalate and maybe get a diplomatic agreement. We Americans fundamentally don't believe that. We believe you de escalate to de escalate and you have confidence building measures and you negotiate and you get smart people in the room and you come to some kind of compromise. I actually think Trump is kind of more Israeli in that respect. Like, I think he does understand against the Islamic Republic, Iran, that he cannot negotiate through confidence building measures. I think he tries charm and he tries break Iran. Great. Again, he appeals to their egos. But fundamentally, he understands, like, he's not going to get Hormuz open permanently or a nuclear deal that meets his minimum demands without escalating against the Islamic Republic. And I think he's keeping escalation in his pocket. He'll give diplomacy a chance. 30 days, 60 days. I hope not longer than 60 days. I think the Iranians will do everything to humiliate him. But at some point, President Trump's going to reach a decision point where he's got to understand that he's got to negotiate while fighting, and he's got to escalate to have any chance of de escalating. I hope he reaches that point. If not, President Trump will end up squandering the greatest opportunity a US President has ever had to deal with the Islamic Republic and put an end to this threat. And if that happens, I will be criticizing him, and I'm sure Senate Republicans will be criticizing him. And I think his legacy will be severely tainted. I'm hopeful that that's not the President Trump that we've seen through two administrations confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[A]

A question for both of you. Just pivoting off what you just said, Mark. And again, the obvious caveat that history is still really being written in real time. But are you thinking about this decades from now in terms of how these last couple of months will be judged, this war that it produced, a turning point that ultimately contained Iran or over the long run, remove the Iranian threat, or a moment of opportunity during which the west blinked?

[B]

I think it's a true moment of opportunity in the next two and a half years before January 20, 2029, to use all instruments of American Israeli power to end this regime's nuclear threat, missile threat, military threat, and now economic threat to the global economy. And if history smiles on us, to end the regime in its entirety. I say January 20, 2029, because I think, Dan, that is the pivot point, because I think that's where everything can go wrong. With a new US President not prepared to confront Iran. With everything we say about Trump and all the concerns and all the disagreements, I don't think we're ever going to get another US President this committed to Iran. He's the last one. And if he does a bad nuclear deal that crosses Israeli red lines, the prime minister, or Netanyahu, whoever's prime minister at the time, is going to have to confront Trump on this, because then it'll be an existential issue. But I think this is the moment. We have two and a half years. It's time to double down. I don't think Trump is going to throw it away. And I hope the Israelis are ready for major military operations to resume. I hope they're ready to go back to that regime change plan that didn't get implemented in its entirety because President Trump blinked and because Erdogan of Turkey convinced them not to unleash the Kurds, and because there were a number of elements that I think could have been implemented where we could really have capitalized on the war to bring about the end of this regime.

[A]

Nadav turning point or a moment that the west blinked?

[C]

I have no idea, because it's not over yet. I simply don't. And the jury's stood out. I would say that when you look at wars like that and you look at conflicts, you need to be honest with yourself and you need to ask difficult questions. For instance, were the Israeli plans, which indeed were not implemented in full or even half full by the way, were they, to begin with, rational? Could they have succeeded? Were Israeli decision makers misleading and misled by their own professionals as to what you can actually achieve in Iran? How much was it that decision makers were influenced by the demonstrations in Iran, which, of course, Israel presented as a stark opportunity to really change history, and it was a bit too much. I'm not asking these questions to criticize. If I wanted to criticize, I would have. I thought that a war against the Islamic Republic to prevent them of nuclear weapons is justified. I thought that military action in response to the massacre against their own people is justified. And the fact that Iran has fought a not so secret war against the United States and Israel, killing many, many hundreds, if not more of Americans and killing many thousands of Israelis and more, it justifies a military action against it. But the Israelis don't have the luxury of trying to fool themselves because it's about allocation of very limited resources. And Israel has been through a very difficult war. And I'm not talking about the Iran war. I'm talking about the war that began on October 7th. It's been, it's Israel's longest war. And what you feel in my voice is this slight frustration that many Israelis feel, by the way, right and left. They want to see a result to all of that, which might not be like an eternal regional peace, but something that will mean a change, a shift in the region. That's the reason you asked me that question. And that frustration seems to just have been extended until we get some sort of an answer in 60 days or 30 days or after November, which means that the Iranians are still playing with their cards in the region. And this frustration, if it indeed lasts, is going to meet us come the September elections in Israel.

[A]

All right, we will leave it there. Nadav. Mark, thank you for the conversation, especially on short notice. And I'm sure we'll have lots to analyze and update in the days ahead. So stay close to your phones because I'll be calling.

[B]

Thanks, Dan.

[C]

Thanks.

[A]

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar. Our production manager is Brittany Cohn. Our community manager is Ava Weiner. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Sound and video editing by Liquid Audio. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor. Hi, it's Dan. Over the past couple of years, Call Me Back has grown into something much bigger than we ever expected. A place for clarity, context, and honest conversations at a time when those things can seem hard to find. That's what ARC Media is all about. Building a truly independent voice, which means no one shaping what we say or how we say it. To help support our rapidly expanding operations, we created Inside Call Me Back, our Members Only feed, where we answer your questions and bring you into the conversations that typically happen after the cameras stop rolling. If CallMeBack has been meaningful to you and you want to be part of what we're building, I hope you'll join us. Right now, we're offering an annual subscription for $60. That's just $5 a month. Your contribution goes a long way in helping us show up when it matters most. You can [e-mail] or through the link in the Show Notes and to our insiders. Thank you.