Campus Files: “Espionage at Stanford”

Podcast: Campus Files (Audacy)
Episode Date: September 17, 2025
Host/Reporter: Margot Gray

Episode Overview

“Espionage at Stanford” explores a chilling and underreported reality: U.S. college campuses, particularly elite institutions like Stanford, have become prime targets for Chinese state-sponsored espionage. Through the story of two undergraduates, Elsa and Garrett, the episode uncovers how the Chinese government’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) leverages students and academic networks to funnel cutting-edge research, technology, and know-how back to China—often through coercion and fear. The investigation pulls back the curtain on the tactics used, the challenges whistleblowers face, and the risks posed not just to U.S. national security, but to the very students caught in the crossfire.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Initial Encounter – Elsa and Charles Chen

• Elsa, an East Asian Studies major, is contacted via Instagram by “Charles Chen,” who claims to be a Stanford student (01:03).
• He quickly pivots to asking if Elsa speaks Mandarin. Despite vague mutual connections, Elsa finds this suspicious (01:29).
• Charles offers to pay for Elsa’s travel to China, attempts to move the conversation to WeChat, and later publicly demands she delete their chat screenshots—despite no notification system on Instagram, unsettling Elsa further (02:06, 02:23).
• “That was sort of my last straw with him. And that's when I decided to end communication.” – Elsa (02:23).
• Elsa learns from campus China experts that Charles is likely affiliated with China’s MSS, tasked with recruiting or pressuring Stanford students into espionage.

2. A Parallel Experience – Garrett’s Discovery in Shanghai

• Garrett, an economics major, meets Stanford alumni in senior CCP positions during a university trip to Shanghai (04:17).
• These officials openly discuss programs to place and groom Chinese students at Stanford for the purpose of transferring research or creating similar ventures in China.
• “To hear the extent of direction the CCP uses... and the ways in which they funnel knowledge was brand new to me.” – Garrett (05:01).

3. Forming an Investigation

• Elsa and Garrett unite over their experiences and discover a surprising lack of systematic reporting on the issue (05:39).
• Leveraging Elsa’s ties to Stanford’s Hoover Institution, they gather input from leading policy and foreign affairs scholars (06:24).

4. Why Stanford?

• Experts explain China’s ambition to dominate emerging fields—AI, robotics, biotech—and how its centrally planned system lacks the open innovation ecosystem of Silicon Valley (06:58–07:17).
• American tech companies have often facilitated Chinese access, sometimes providing source code or research in exchange for market access (08:25).
• “Former FBI Director Christopher Wray has described this intellectual property theft as one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history.” – Margot Gray (08:49).

5. The Espionage Ecosystem at Stanford

• Stanford’s location in Silicon Valley and focus on tech startups makes it a “pipeline” for cutting-edge research and a prime target for foreign intelligence (09:29–10:03).
• Chinese universities aspire to “replicate Stanford,” with over 1,100 Chinese nationals currently enrolled (11:07, 11:23).

6. China’s National Intelligence Law & Student Vulnerability

• Since 2017, all Chinese citizens are legally required to aid state intelligence if called upon (14:02).
• This exposes Chinese students at Stanford to coercion—from surveillance to threats against families back home (14:57).
• “We’ve seen that look like parents being brought into police stations when students don’t want to turn over research.” – Garrett (14:57).

7. Culture of Fear, Secrecy, and Policing

• Recruiting sources is difficult. Both Chinese nationals and China experts fear reprisals and blacklistings (15:15–15:51).
• Even communication is surveilled—secure conversations must take place entirely offline (16:32–16:50).
• “There's no encrypted messaging app that is safe enough for them to talk about these things.” – Elsa (16:32).

8. The Mechanics of Academic Espionage

• Chinese students report to handlers, sometimes weekly, on research access and progress; meetings happen in person or via Zoom (17:50).
• “They sort of confessed…that they were meeting with a handler, so to speak, to discuss what they were researching.” – Elsa (18:10).
• Chinese American students are pressured as well, regardless of citizenship status (19:03).
• “They view Chinese Americans as ethnic Chinese, and therefore…loyalty should be with China.” – Garrett (19:03).

9. Resistance and Backlash

• Fear of being seen as racist or anti-Asian deters reporting. Both students were warned their findings could be dismissed as xenophobic (20:03).
• “That claim is exactly what Beijing wants…the culture where we just don't deal with this issue whatsoever.” – Elsa (20:25).
• Garrett and Elsa emphasize the primary victims are the students themselves—especially those being coerced by Chinese security agencies (20:54).

10. Publishing the Findings & Outcomes

• On May 7, 2025, Elsa and Garrett publish their findings in the Stanford Review; the article gains significant media traction (22:16).
• The Chinese embassy denounces their reporting in strong terms, with Chinese media attacking their use of anonymous sources—glossing over the real risks of identification (23:33, 24:13).
• “When you upset the Chinese Communist Party, Garrett and I knew that we were…doing something right.” – Elsa (24:13).
• Campus reaction is supportive; students share similar stories and express little surprise (24:35–25:02).
• “Everybody was like, we already knew about this...This is so obvious.” – Garrett (25:02).

11. Stanford's Response and Institutional Inertia

• The administration issues a generic statement about commitment to national security, perceived by Elsa and Garrett as a “non-response” (25:26, 25:44).
• Financial incentives play a role: Most Chinese nationals pay full tuition and the university has received large sums from anonymous Chinese donors (26:11, 26:35).
• “Chinese nationals are the number one victims of the CCP. It's really heartbreaking…that nothing is being done about it.” – Elsa (26:42).

12. Limits of University and Possible Solutions

• Stanford’s hands are tied on visas and sensitive work assignments; meaningful action must come from federal policy (27:32).
• No support system exists for Chinese students facing intimidation, nor for protecting their families (27:12).

13. The Broader and Growing Problem

• The issue of espionage is not unique to Stanford—it’s systemic across major U.S. research universities (27:54).
• Short of banning all Chinese students—a move they do not support—solutions are elusive given the regime’s reach (28:17, 28:32).
• “We do want to have the best talent...but...you have an authoritarian regime...exert[ing] so much control over its people.” – Elsa (28:32).

14. Personal Consequences and Looking Ahead

• Elsa and Garrett are now likely blacklisted from entering China. “We were aware that we'd probably never be able to go back to China.” – Garrett (29:16).
• They are continuing their reporting, hoping to foster more awareness and concrete policy response (29:54–30:03).

15. Escalating Stakes

• Plans by U.S. leadership to increase the number of Chinese students to 600,000 would massively expand the scale of the issue (30:33).
• “We need to be on our guard because…I think it would be really catastrophic if the CCP were to surpass the United States in technological advancements.” – Elsa (30:53).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “I had no idea how he would know that I had been documenting our conversations, because Instagram doesn't notify people. So that was sort of my last straw with him.” – Elsa (02:23)
• “They have programs whereby they specifically pick and groom people to get into Stanford. Then when they're there, they ask them to either send back research or come back to China and replicate the stuff they've learned.” – Garrett (05:01)
• “If you want to research China, you can’t be sort of saying bad things about China publicly…because…it’s very easy for the CCP to restrict these researchers’ ability to gain any access whatsoever to China.” – Elsa (15:51)
• “Some Chinese students will be required to have a weekly basis of reporting with a Chinese national or CCP member, whereby they go through the work they're doing in Stanford.” – Garrett (17:50)
• “Chinese nationals are the number one victims of the CCP. And I think it's really heartbreaking to hear these stories and…nothing is being done about it.” – Elsa (26:42)
• “This is happening, and if you don't talk about something that's obviously happening, you're not going to have a clear picture of the world when…decision makers are making important decisions about US-China Competition.” – Garrett (20:54)
• “We already aren't doing anything about it. We need to be on our guard because…I think it would be really catastrophic…if the CCP were to surpass the United States in technological advancements.” – Elsa (30:53)

Important Segments & Timestamps

• Elsa’s Initial Encounter with Charles Chen: 01:03–02:38
• Garrett’s Experience in Shanghai: 04:17–05:39
• Hoover Institution Consulting: 06:24–06:58
• China’s Systemic Innovation Strategies: 07:17–08:49
• Mandates for Chinese Citizens under National Intelligence Law: 14:02–14:57
• Challenges of Reporting/Communication: 15:51–16:50
• Mechanisms of Espionage (Reporting to Handlers): 17:50–18:48
• Publication, Backlash, and Campus Reaction: 22:16–25:44
• Stanford’s Financial Incentive and Response: 26:11–26:42
• Limits of University Action and Need for Federal Policy: 27:32–28:32
• Personal Consequences for Investigators: 29:16–29:36
• Raising the Stakes: Student Visa Policy Concerns: 30:33–30:53

Tone & Language

The episode maintains a measured, investigative journalism tone: candid, clear-eyed, and deeply empathetic towards affected students. Elsa and Garrett come across as curious, principled, and persistent, their words evoking both the gravity and personal risks of taking on such a story.

Summary

Through firsthand testimony, expert analysis, and investigative rigor, “Espionage at Stanford” vividly illustrates the complexity and urgency of foreign academic espionage on U.S. campuses. It highlights the sophisticated tactics of the Chinese government, the vulnerability this creates for both the American innovation ecosystem and individual students, and the difficulties in balancing openness, security, and inclusion. The episode underscores the need for transparency, policy action, and above all, support for at-risk students—making the hidden threats of academic espionage impossible to ignore.