John Bowman (29:37)
Yes, indeed. So the top seven and when I say this just for everybody's understanding, that's Apple, Alphabet or Google Meta or Facebook, Nvidia, Microsoft, Tesla and Amazon, those are the top seven. They make up 30%, almost a third of the value of the S&P 500. And get this just to go a little bit deeper, again peeling back the proverbial onion, Apple's market cap and I used to be involved in running Russell 2000 mandates very early in my career. Apple's market cap is larger than the Russell 2000. So just let that sit and marinate or decant maybe I should say on this show. But listen, the reality is that regardless of your view on this overall picture and debate, the concentration of The S&P 500 makes this comparable to very little. And I think we just need to be cognizant of that. Hartley Rogers admits that the exception is vc. And Kristi, you've already covered this. The valuations there are more anchored to the last funding rounds. So we'll need to unpack the differences across the stratifications of private equity. We don't want to throw private equity all into one bucket because mid market and VC and traditional buyout are all very different industries. So that's what you would argue the interim valuation doesn't matter argument led by our friend Chris Schelling. But I think it's important as we promised, to take a look at the other side. And I don't know about you Christy, as you think about arguments again at that Thanksgiving table, but I think it's fair to say that Cliff Asness did not agree. Just to put a finer point on it, Cliff suggests that Chris's op ed made his cranium explode. Cliff Asness, for those of you that don't know, is of course the brilliant and mercurial founder of the quantitative hedge fund aqr. We need to be clear here. And by the way, this is a complete coincidence. I'm in the middle of reading More Money Than God, which is Sebastian Malaby's account of the history of hedge funds, and Cliff has his own little chapter in it. So it was a funny aligning of the stars for me as I prepared for this episode. Cliff, brilliant guy. We need to be clear here that Cliff, as any honest hedge fund manager must be he is not a homer for the efficient market hypothesis. He does not suggest that public market indices are the answer to all of our problems. He understands that unconstrained strategies, the way they make money, are in inefficiencies and mispricings. And Cliff would never suggest that we shy away from that. He's also, interestingly, been very public about some of the benefits of illiquidity in private markets. I've quoted Cliff on this. He argues, quite playfully, or he did a few years ago, that maybe there should be get this an illiquidity discount because the inability for clients or investors to trade when they're behaviorally most tempted actually protects them from themselves. The lockup period is a gift that you should pay for. So interesting. I don't think he means that literally, but I think a really important element or attribute of private markets is that it stops you from doing foolish things. To wrap that up, Cliff as a prerequisite for his position, he is far from a private equity hater, to be clear, but there's no doubt this rejoinder to Schelling's op ed was scathing. He makes a very interesting point. The summary point is that unlike the private markets, public market investors quote, can't hide behind oversold equities simply because they think the market is wrong. I love this quote because they think the market is wrong. I don't know if this reminded you of everything just viscerally but by the way, one of the best financial books ever written, maybe with the exception of Liars Poker, is Roger Lowenstein's amazing account of the Long Term Capital Management collapse when genius failed. I don't know if you know this story, but 1998 enormous hedge fund fails Long Term Capital Management started by John Merriweather. Meriwether had brought on a couple Nobel Prize winning academics to help him with this hedge fund. Bob Merton was one of them. They had just won. He and his partner had just won the Nobel Prize only a year prior on the black scholes model in 1997. And the famous Merton quote that I was reminded of when I read Asness's response to Schelling was that Merton said effectively in a discussion with Lowenstein that their models weren't wrong, but rather the market was wrong. And Lowenstein has this amazing quote, listen to this. This is wonderful literature. He says quote, stuck in their glass walled palace far from New York's teeming trading floors, they had forgotten that traders are not random molecules or even mechanical logicians such as themselves, but people move by greed and fear, capable of the extreme behavior and swings of mood so often observed in crowds. If you've read Intelligent Investor, Ben Graham's protagonist in that classic book, Mr. Market, Ben Graham calls him the wildly emotional guy you wouldn't want to have as a partner. Why am I spending so much time on this? Because I think as we're going to get back to later, Christie, if you are passionate and intense about the breakdown in the comparison between public markets and private markets, it does lead you to discussion about the accuracy of the public markets. You just have to go there. And I think it gets you to this idea of do the public markets do really a good job at any given point of suggesting or expressing fair value. And so I mentioned this as just examples as you think through and process this larger question. So back to Cliff. So Asness, if you can't argue the market is just plain wrong. He says, by the way, I'm not sure I agree with that. But Asness in building his case says that if you can't argue the market's plain wrong, the market's the market. He argues that, quote, determining what you would get if you sold these companies today, these private companies, it shouldn't be a tricky question for these sophisticated financial wizards. This is not magic. And while perhaps exaggerated, he says you have to be able to accept that the public markets are at least directionally right, that the drop off is non trivial, it's not completely fictitious. And he goes on to say in the sound bite of the piece, I think the title, as I introduced this position, that the lack of honest mark to marking and resulting outperformance is nothing more than quote, volatility laundering. There it is. There's that phrase again. So in other words, it's the graceful swan above the water hiding the chaos of the webbed feet frantically swimming below the water. It's a mirage, to use your word earlier. And he ends the piece with a doozy. Really a doozy. And you skirted over this. I even see you alluded to it, but there was a touch point where I almost brought it up, but I thought I would save it for my piece. But Cliff suggests that part of this smoothing is the result these are my words of a principal agent problem, meaning that LPs are paying exorbitant fees to GPs. Back to Cliff's words now so that they can report unrealistically rosy and calm returns. They are an accessory to this, he's arguing. That last point is a whopper that we need to definitely unpack with Andrea and Scott because it stands in complete opposition, which is why this topic is so interesting for our first episode. It stands in complete opposition to Chris's statement earlier that LPs are the gatekeeper of truth, that they would spit them out if there was these shenanigans going on. So we'll park that for a while and see what Andrea and Scott have to say about it. Let me just also mention that superstar reporter, by the way, I think really highly of Pitchbook reporter Jessica Hamlin and she had a March article that developed this point volatility laundering or inflated prices a bit further. So in her reporting there is some evidence that there's an upward bias and manipulation of the numbers as well. One of the major auditors she cites for private valuations, Eisner Antner, admitted that while GPs adhere to most of the best practices set out by our friends over at ILPA or the Institutional Limited Partners association, they certainly aren't following 100% the principles and no one GP is following even most of the same ones. It's a box checking experience is what this argument suggests. And further, perhaps the most alarming part of her article is that was a discussion with a professor at Harvard, former mid market private equity professional gentleman by the name of Brian Bake. He contends that since the firms, the GPs decide who to hire as an auditor, who are those third party valuation experts, it's very likely that the auditor will okay whatever valuation the GP says. So barring an egregious error Brian says, or legal risk, it's probably going to be waved through. Please proceed and look the other way even if the choice of methodology is more favorable or the comparables are cherry picked. Again, I hope we have represented those two sides fairly. We have hinted at some of our own opinion and we will get back to that later after our guests. Before we invite Andrea and Scott in, we are going to move towards halftime where we're going to hear a little bit more from our title sponsor, Franklin Templeton Alternatives. So stay with us. Well, as promised, we are here with Dave Donahue. Dave is the co head of US Wealth Management for Franklin Templeton Alternatives. Dave, welcome to Capital Decanted.