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David Spark
Best advice I ever got in security. Go.
Pavi Ramamurthy
The best advice would be if your MFA prompt shows up and you're not logged in. That's not a bug. That's a confession.
David Spark
It's time to begin the CISO Series Podcast.
Welcome to the CISO Series Podcast. My name is David Spark. I'm the producer of the CISO series, and joining me as my co host, he's one of your favorites. I know because you tell me otherwise. I would not say that it's because what you say to me. I go out of my way to deflate this man's ego, but it doesn't work. He is the principal of Duha. His name is Andy Ellis. Andy, say hello to the audience.
Andy Ellis
Good afternoon, folks. And keep telling David amazing things about me, because it really is breaking his brain.
David Spark
You can keep telling me wonderful things about Andy and all my co hosts. I would love to hear it.
Andy Ellis
No, you don't need to bother telling about the other co hosts. Just me.
David Spark
What I'll do is I'll take all the compliments from the other co hosts and I'll just transfer them to Andy. There we go.
Andy Ellis
That works.
David Spark
We are available at cisoseries.com, where you can listen to all of our wonderful programming. So if you have not spent much of your time there, may I recommend you spend some time over there. Our sponsor for today's episode is the Threatlocker, a continual, phenomenal sponsor of the CISO series. They are the world's leading zero trust platform. Allow what you need, block everything else by default, including ransomware and rogue code. More about what they're doing, because they've always got new stories to tell that is coming up later. But, Andy, we were talking before we turn on the microphone about, like, monstrous mistakes we've made. And I don't know if you know this story, but my sister and I destroyed a piece of art and at the Whitney Museum of New York. Would you like to hear the story?
Andy Ellis
Oh, I would love to hear the story.
David Spark
Okay, so this is a good one. So we went to go see a minimalist art exhibit. And for those of you not familiar with minimalist art, it is pretty much what it sounds. It's art that's at the most minimal it can possibly be. So there was a rope hanging from the ceiling. There was a corner painted black, and we're just kind of looking around. I'm like, okay, this is. And at one point, my sister and I see a window that has, you know, pretty spectacular view. And we decide to just walk over it. All of a sudden a guard screams, what are you doing? And we're like, what? What? And we look down and on the white tile there were white stones placed in a star pattern. And we had just kicked about a dozen of them away.
Andy Ellis
So what you were doing was you were making new art.
David Spark
That's the way I see it.
Andy Ellis
But like, my take. Sorry, I know I'm going to offend a lot of people with this one, but minimalist art is one of the greatest con jobs known to man.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Hey, have you heard about that banana peel which is masquerading as art in one of the tiles? It was a big thing.
Andy Ellis
Yes, yes, right, it was. I remember that.
Pavi Ramamurthy
And then one person picked up the banana peel and threw it away in
Andy Ellis
the trash where it belongs.
David Spark
That, by the way, is the voice of our guest. Let's bring her in right now. The global CISO and CIO over at Blackhawk Network, Pavi Ramamurthy. Pavi, thank you so much for joining us.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Thank you. It's my pleasure. And Andy, you are awesome.
Andy Ellis
Thank you. Pavi, I love to hear that. You as well. You are fantastic.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Well, I'll take the compliment back.
David Spark
All right, enough with the compliments. Let's get on with the show.
Are we making the situation better or worse?
Quote, stuff goes in but nothing useful comes out. And if something does come out of a toilet, you're usually in deep trouble. End quote. That's how Ross Young of CISO Tradecraft describes the eight digit sim contracts. He's watched fail organizations buy the platforms to satisfy executives and check compliance boxes. Then they're quietly starved of the data they need to detect anything. But the tooling isn't the problem. Security leaders keep building programs they know are wrong because vanity metrics are what the board wants to see. And quote, are we secure? Is a yes or no question nobody can honestly answer. So how do you tell a non technical executive that the dashboard making them feel good is the same thing, hollowing out your detection? Andy, when does buying time with a flashy metric stop being pragmatic and start being political cover? And by the way, do you believe this happens?
Andy Ellis
Oh, absolutely. I remember in my very early days at Akamai because I was part of the eight legged sales call, because security people at our customers did not want Akamai to show up. And for those who don't know Akamai cdn, we sat in front of your websites and the single biggest objection that I heard is that they would no longer see people port scanning their web server. And that was the metric they were showing to the board to show off, like, how well defended they were. And I was just, just flabbergasted. I'm like, wait, so port scans that don't do anything is how you're reporting your success. And honestly, we haven't moved a lot from that. So many of our metrics are perverse that you look at the metric and if you try to manage to the metric, you will head in the wrong direction. And siems have the challenge that they are really expensive to operate because the more data you put in, the more storage you have to have. You end up with all of this money. And if you're a SIM vendor, your incentive is to alert on everything because you need to be able to say after a breach, well, I raised an alert and you ignored it. That's not my fault. And so we really do have a huge dysfunction, and that's building on top of like seven other dysfunctions about who actually should be doing security and operations.
David Spark
All right, good answer. Now I throw this view to pavi. I gotta assume that at a certain time we all sort of dished up the vanity metrics and then we got wiser and we stopped doing that. Were you in that boat at one time?
Pavi Ramamurthy
No, I haven't stopped doing it.
David Spark
I have to do it.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I have to do it. So does every other ciso.
David Spark
So, yeah. So it is political cover no matter what.
Pavi Ramamurthy
It's. It's not. I mean, to an extent it is, but you have to show something to your executive leadership team and to the board because they rely and trust on you to keep the company secure. So what metrics do you show them that makes sense to them in the first place, that's easy for them to understand and is some kind of a benchmark driven metric? Right. Because they don't have anything else to compare.
Andy Ellis
But.
David Spark
Okay, but this is my question. I'm sorry, this is really what I want to push in on. And I'm glad you brought that all up, but it's like, there's got to be a balance. There's got to be a one point where you're saying, I'm giving you this information, but don't put too much weight in it. The thing we really need to worry about is X. Oh, I did that
Andy Ellis
with my compliance metrics. So I would basically have a chart that showed for every regime that we were subscribed to, what our compliance was. And basically once we were mature in a regime, it was 100%, because by definition, you're 100% compliant because you have to get an audit and you have to pass your audit. And so we'd say, oh, look, we're going after Fedramp. We didn't start at 100% and it's now like, oh, now I understand why Fedramp is important because you have to hit that. But I always told them, I said, 100% doesn't mean secure. It means we have documented things to satisfy auditors who don't actually understand security. And they bought that and does very quick thing. Now I can move on and talk about security, but compliance was the product feature that drove the business. If I didn't talk about that, they would wonder what I was doing.
David Spark
All right, Pavi.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I do it a little differently because I take that compliance as the regulatory or the one that we have to abide by. And I use that to influence my security programs. Because people tend to listen to compliance. Hey, you have to be compliant with a SoC2 control or a FedRamp control or a PCI control. We don't have a choice. But I can use that to drive mature security practices. But it's almost like saying, we have turbulence here, so is the plane going to be okay? Right. It's like saying, hey, are we secure? The first question you would ask is, define what secure means in your books. And the metrics that we define are metrics that would make sense if the goal isn't met. For example, if you have 10 apps in your ecosystem and you say, hey, there's username, password on two of those apps and they're not behind sso, showing those metrics to your executive leadership team kind of makes sense if you're then able to articulate, hey, if these two apps get popped, here's the impact that would occur. I mean, a metric is a bad thing. Always trying a benchmark do something which, when manifested, is resulting in an impact to the organization is a much better metric for them to understand than to just say, hey, I'm going to give you phishing campaigns. I mean, I love picking on phishing campaigns. I'm like, what are you getting from phishing campaign results? Seriously, tell me.
David Spark
This is. By the way, this whole show slams phishing campaigns a lot.
Andy Ellis
Surprising. We don't get any of those people sponsoring us. Yeah, actually, no, that's not true. We actually do.
David Spark
We do get some of them. We do the convene conference, which is all about security awareness.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Yeah. So I'm like, you do understand this is not real, right? Like, a real phishing email should never show up and if it does show up, then it's a limitation of the vendor or our controls. So metrics need to be thought out. I constantly keep revising my metrics based on what makes sense from a risk perspective. And if they manifest and I keep changing, which is also not a good thing, because you can't keep changing metrics.
Andy Ellis
Oh, sure you can. Your board doesn't remember the metrics. You showed them 90 days ago.
Pavi Ramamurthy
No, but you confuse the board. So you can keep changing this on them, which is like they make up your mind. What are you trying to tell me? And you can't pick on 100 metrics as well. You need to pick the top 10 that you really care about.
David Spark
They didn't think that through all the way, did they?
Well, the question everyone's asking is how could this happen? The better one is why we built an industry where it was always going to end quote. Now that's Chris Matthews of Upguard on the recent Delve scandal. 494 draft reports leaked, 493 reports identical down to the same grammatical errors. Everyone's clutching pearls. But Ty Sabano, CISO at webflow, told me at RSA that litting audit requirements slide has been de rigueur for a while. Dell didn't invent this, they industrialized it. Or so have been accused. I should say. I don't want to sort of blame them right away. This has been the accusation.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, we should delve into that one now.
David Spark
Buyers want SOC 2 to close deals. You have said this many times. A company starts out first thing, get yourself a SoC2 and auditors get paid by the company's ass. So how widespread is is the quieter version of what Delve got caught doing? I ask you, Pavi, and what's the honest CISO supposed to do about it? What do you think?
Pavi Ramamurthy
And why are we surprised by this? Because all companies have templates. They clone these templates and they sometimes forget very simple things like, hey, swap out the name for the right organization and sometimes you may end up getting Sock 2 reports or whatever from for a different organization entirely. Right. So that's not the problem. The problem is we went the opposite way. Remember 10, 15, like all along, even now we are like, we hate security questionnaires. We want to automate it. And now we are saying that automation is just so damn flawed. We need to go back and look at what that automation produced and go see, hey, did they do that? Right? And now we have to go do these things manually. Right? So It's a catch 22 issue. And when you look at SoC2, I mean, I asked for SoC2, I provide my SoC2 to our partners and I ask for SoC2 from my vendors. But I need to assume that the report may be theater. The screenshots are probably staged. Right. The controls may only exist during the audit season. Right. So the playbook kind of shifts a little from, do you have a SoC2? And again, this is where does the CISO, does the security team have the time and the bandwidth to go ask these questions vendor after vendor, or do you only look at your critical vendors? Right. Can they explain the controls without reading from the report? They provide live evidence. Do you have the time to go look at that live evidence? So I don't think so. And you may do this once, and then you try to do this five times, you're going to say, you know what, just put the sock tooth through an AI tool and have it tell you what's happening there. So I don't know who's to be blamed here. It's a very hard problem to solve and I don't think that we would solve it even after the advent of AI.
David Spark
Good point. All right, Pavi brings up some issues and you're smiling, Andy, just go ahead.
Andy Ellis
Oh, yeah, it's even worse. Like, Pavi is an optimist.
David Spark
I'm sorry, what? Delve the can of worms. What delve opened up is worse.
Andy Ellis
Look, I've been doing audits and assessments for a while. Let's just say that. And look, here's the reality is an assessment is when you pay somebody to tell you what's wrong. And an audit is when you pay someone to tell you that everything is right. That's the fundamental model. You do not enter an audit except to get a passing grade. And a passing grade is everything is good because you're going to show it to your customers. Right. That's how the model works. Of course, 99% of companies are going to pay the vendor that has the correct balance of good reputation and will pass me. And if you're not normally passable, it means you're not getting somebody with a great reputation. But this is the norm. Like, we flabbergasted our auditors because they would show up. And we literally had a system that we would press, like create report, and it would produce a live sort of up to the minute report of every piece of evidence, a narrative. Like, it was the full report that we just did ourselves. And they could take it. And they were like, nobody's actually prepared like this. And it forced them to actually do the work of consuming sort of what we had instead of trying to write it themselves. But this problem has always been here. The whole TPRM industry is built around this problem. We send out these questionnaires that, let's be honest, nobody in the business who matters reads them. We build teams to read TPRM reports, or now we have AI go read it. And the first thing you have to do if you are a vendor is learn how to say yes to every question in the questionnaire that you get. 900 questions. There's no N A's. Like, I learned that one very early on, even though there were things that are not applicable. No. The answer is always yes, of course I do that. And then a narrative about how you do it. But the filter just reads all the yeses and nobody's actually asking the right question. The question about your vendor is not are they SOC2? The question is, how is using this vendor going to put you at risk? Not because the vendor has weak security controls, but because you're going to shoot yourself in the foot using features the vendor provide that aren't appropriate for your business.
David Spark
Pavi, one thing we had heard on a previous episode, and I can't remember who said this, but the question you should be asking is, how are you going to help us when you have your worst day? Like when things go completely wrong. And my feeling is the vendors who know that things can go wrong and can prepare for that are the ones you want to work with. Yes or no?
Pavi Ramamurthy
That is very much true. And we, as has been evident by the CrowdStrike issue and whatnot npm issue, but that we didn't have anyone to turn to and we had to turn to our vendors to provide us with guidance. Here's the thing to what Andy said. We tried to standardize tpr. We tried to do the full sig,
Andy Ellis
the bit sig, we tried to do
Pavi Ramamurthy
the cake right, the ciq. And what did big vendors or customers say? I don't care. Here's my 900 question questionnaire that you will have to fill out. I don't.
David Spark
You.
Pavi Ramamurthy
You can give me the full sig, I'll throw it out. Go fill this out. And by the way, no, you cannot have an Excel. It has to be filled out online in my company portal. You make make it as difficult as you can for me. And to Andy's point, what are you going to say? Yes to Every single question. Right. But SoC2 is just one checkbox item in my mind. What you would do is a security review. What is the use case for using the vendor? What are the data flows? And that takes time. And when you have your list of vendors, where you would have to do this day in, day out and have a constant, hey, has the vendor been acquired? Is there a change in control? Is there an architecture change? Oh, my goodness. They changed their whatever from Snowflake to something else and now they have exposed a backdoor. How do you know all that? So that is your real TPRM, not a SoC2.
David Spark
Cybersecurity loves cycles. For a while it was antivirus, then EDR, then XDR, then more telemetry, more dashboards, more data. And every step of the way, we got better at seeing attacks. Yay for us. But you know what? Attackers got better, too. Today, many of the most successful attacks use trusted tools, valid credentials, approved applications. Nothing looks obviously malicious. So here's the question security leaders are starting to ask. Have we spent so much time focusing on detection that we've forgotten about control? At ThreatLocker, they've always believed prevention matters, not because detection isn't valuable, but because seeing an attack and stopping an attack are two very different things. And that's why ThreatLocker is proud to support the CISO series. Thank you, ThreatLocker. It's a place where security leaders challenge assumptions, question industry trends, and have the conversations that move cybersecurity forward. Because the future of cybersecurity won't be defined by who has the most alerts. It will be defined by who has the most control. Go check out what they're doing over there at threatlocker. Go to threatlocker.com CISO and do me a favor. When you go to threatlocker.com, add the/ CISO. It's the easiest way to let them know that you heard about them from the CISO series.
It's time to play what's worse.
Pavi. I know you know this game because you saw it live and you've participated in the past. We're going to make him answer first. You can agree or disagree with Andy. This comes from one of our regulars, one of our favorites, Duane Gran, who's now with Polaris Technologies. And here are your two scenarios. Andy. Okay, scenario number one. Your awareness training platform is a bit janky and you don't notice any real impact on the user community, but your staff does complete 100% of the training, and the auditors love seeing it. Okay.
Andy Ellis
Okay. So that's the norm, I think you're setting up.
David Spark
Scenario two will be Worse, but we'll see.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, I'm trying to figure out how scenario two is better than this. But let's see.
David Spark
Scenario two, your awareness training platform, is really good. And among those who take the training, you see measurable improvements like reported phishing and stuff, which I know we all have our opinions about, but only 75% of the staff can be bothered to take it. So you might get dinged on audits. Which one is worse, Andy?
Andy Ellis
So I love this one, especially because that measurable improvement I'm going to disagree with.
David Spark
Well, it's measurable improvement per the tool that you're using.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, no, no, it's per the tool. But here's this fascinating thing that wellness programs that companies fell subject to, which is imagine that you have a wellness program where like you have an on site gym and you make it available to your employees, whatever your wellness program is, you will discover that the employees who use the wellness program are healthier than the ones who don't. And so your first look at that metric is, oh my goodness, my wellness program is amazing. No, no, no. Your employees who are committed to their health will take advantage of your wellness program. And to them, like this is, oh, look, now I can just do the gym at work rather than at home or driving somewhere. They were going to have the outcome anyway. And so I think the second one, I'm actually disagree with the scenario somewhat and I don't normally do this, but just say the metric that shows improvement might actually be a metric that's a selection bias error that the people who are actually interacting with the program are the ones who are going to have better outcomes anyway. So it's probably not measuring what you think it's measuring. So I'm going to go with the second one is worse because I'm now failing my audits. I believe for some magical reason that security awareness training works despite all of the evidence the industry has to the contrary. So I'm going to have blind spots around what effectiveness I'm having in my security program. This is one of the most dangerous things in risk management is when you do a thing that is not positive, but you put believe it is positive because it makes you willing to take more risk that you should not take. So I'm actually gonna go with the second one is worse, which I think is actually a contrarian approach.
David Spark
Okay, Pavi, do you agree or disagree?
Pavi Ramamurthy
They are both terrible.
Andy Ellis
They're both terrible. Just to be very clear, like, I can't pick one.
David Spark
No, you have to. This is the game.
Andy Ellis
So here's Pavi. Here's what it is. You have to pick one. In one of them, you fail the component requirement of 100% or 96% security awareness.
David Spark
And in one, you don't possibly might get fined. We'll see.
Andy Ellis
Oh, you're not saying fine, you're failing the requirement. You have a hard time convincing your auditors to check that box.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I don't have a choice. I would have to pick that. The second one is the worst one because I at least have an opportunity to fix from the 100% compliance to a better program.
David Spark
There's no fixing. This is how the game works. You don't fix anything.
Andy Ellis
Well, no, no, but I'm not trying to use my security awareness to solve my problems. I'm at least checking that box and I'll go solve my other problems somewhere else.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Exactly. I mean, yeah, I'm kind of saying the same thing. So, yes, the second one is worse.
Andy Ellis
Yeah. Like, I just want to point out that for like 17 years, I had the jankiest security awareness program that anybody would look at.
Pavi Ramamurthy
It's a checkbox.
Andy Ellis
It was literally a checkbox. It was a cron job that just emailed people. In fact, we talked about this on a recent show about how this would find contractors who had left but not been correctly terminated because their boss would get emailed. But literally, I had the company at over 96% compliance at any given point that they had taken security awareness training in the prior year and checked the box because they went to a webpage ready four paragraphs that had links to a bunch of things and click the button to acknowledge it. We were not spending time because when I first rolled out this program, we had 1100 employees at 90 minutes per employee a year. That's one FTE I would be destroying. And not a fully loaded FTE, but a pure FTE that doesn't even exist. Right. Because it doesn't count for the fact that most people are not working all of their time on productive stuff because they're doing stuff like security awareness training.
Pavi Ramamurthy
But what are you talking about, Andy? 90 minutes, an employee for security awareness training.
Andy Ellis
When you do the cost of bringing somebody to a security awareness training to listen to a PowerPoint, this is because this started back in like, 04.
David Spark
Yeah, we said, like, if you have the number of employees, if you have a certain number that could calculate if
Andy Ellis
you took 90 minutes per year.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Yeah, yeah, but you're forgetting about all the other compliance trainings that they have to take as, right?
Andy Ellis
No, no, exactly. No, no, I'm not forgetting. I just looked at just one. And so this number was written atop my whiteboard for, like, five years. It was just sat there and said, 90 minutes times 1100 employees equals one FTE. So whenever somebody came in and said, hey, we need to do this new training, I'm like, I would just point it and say, is it worth a full fte? They're like, ooh, that's hard to justify. There you go.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Okay, David, I picked two. That's the worst.
David Spark
All right, the two of you agree again? We're getting way too much agreement with Andy these days. Way too much.
Andy Ellis
Because Andy has figured out how the game works now.
David Spark
And, well, look, I must say that these submissions from our fans are excellent.
Andy Ellis
They're really good.
David Spark
Please keep sending them in. The goal is to really challenge you. You have been challenged heavily in the past, just not as frequently as I would like.
Andy Ellis
Yeah. And look, and this one, I'm gonna go back on this one just a little bit and say the reason that this one was felt easier is because we know security awareness training is not very effective in general. And so had this probably been a different control where you're debating, well, you have a control that's not effective, but you can check the box versus one that is effective, but you can't. Like, that's actually a really hard scenario. We just don't think security awareness training is effective.
Pavi Ramamurthy
All right, well, I think all CSOPs consider this as a mere checkbox for compliance, nothing more.
David Spark
Yeah.
Andy Ellis
Yep.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Yeah.
David Spark
Well, that's why so many of the vendors are erased to the bottom, too, in the process.
Pavi Ramamurthy
You don't need a vendor anymore.
Andy Ellis
You don't need a vendor.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Yeah, you don't need a vendor. I can Write one in 20 minutes,
David Spark
and all you need is the box for people to check.
Andy Ellis
Have them check the box that says that they were trained. And look, the trick is you hand them all the material. You don't force them to read everything every year, because that's where it gets wrong. And you say, oh, look, here's an hour training, but it's the same hour every single year. So you just say, look, if you want the video, we recorded a video for you. You don't have to look at it. If you understand these are our three core principles, why we care. Check the box.
David Spark
Walk a mile in this CISO shoes
quote. If your CISO is keeping a denial log, that is not a red flag about your ciso. That is a red flag about your organization. End quote. CISOs are quietly documenting every Denied budget request, deferred pen test, and risk acceptance. The business signed off on receipts for the day the breach hits, and the board asked why nobody stopped it all. According to Michael Reichstein from JSCOIT, Good CISOs have always tracked exceptions. Have these receipts shifted from being good governance and started being a survival reflex? Andy. And what does it say about the role when the strongest job protection is a folder of denials? What do you think? And by the way, do you think this is very much going on?
Andy Ellis
So I think this is going on, and I think it's a very unhealthy dynamic.
David Spark
There's no question. Well, because you're operating in fear.
Andy Ellis
No, it's not even that you're operating in fear. It's that you are not doing your job correctly. And it might be that you can't. Just to be very clear, you might not have the ability to do your job correctly. I know a lot of CISOs that just end up in a position where they get terminated because they've asked for too much and put air quotes around that. I know what they ask for, and it's not really too much, but they're just. There's a personality clash. But if you think that after a breach, the board's going to be happy when you walk in and say, well, I knew this was going to happen, but I just kept notes on it, rather than fixing anything that's not going to save your job. Like, you're literally trying to build your folder of blackmail. At the end of the day, the S in CISO means scapegoat.
David Spark
Well, no, but let me push back a little bit on this one, Andy. The point that it's saying is they propose their risk assessments. They say, if we do this, it's going to create this risk. It's signed off by the C suite of whatever. They acknowledge it. So their whole attitude is, well, when I advised on the risk, they signed off of it. We get hit. It's a big I told you so folder is what it is.
Andy Ellis
Yeah. So first of all, I told you so never does much in a relationship.
David Spark
No. Nobody goes, gee, you got me.
Andy Ellis
This conversation of I advised and they. The moment you're saying I versus they, you have created a problem dynamic for you. We. Right. Were we cognizant of the risk? And here's my real answer. No, we weren't. Most of the people who I know are doing this, one of their biggest challenges is they're not great risk communicators to the right level, because if they were the CEO would be like, well, wait, why aren't we doing this stuff that's actually critical? Or after the breach, they're going to be like, yeah, God, we didn't invest in solving this problem. Let's go fix it now. If you had communicated in a way that they could understand that this was a really credible risk based on the choices that were being made. And, like, one of the lists here was, you know, pen tests that were deferred. Let's be honest. Like, a pen test is unlikely to be an expensive one, is unlikely to be the thing that saves you.
David Spark
Yeah, yeah, yeah. All right, Pavi, we throw this to you.
Pavi Ramamurthy
It's a fantastic question, so I would encourage the two of you to turn to page 94, exhibit A, titled I told you'd. So it's documented. Very clearly.
Andy Ellis
It is documented right there.
Pavi Ramamurthy
It is documented. I agree with what Andy said on. It's the CISO's job to articulate the risk correctly. I have failed in my job if I cannot make you the CEO or my leader to understand what happens when this risk manifests. It's as simple as that.
David Spark
No, but, but, but, but. Accepting risk is a part of running a business that is part of running a business.
Andy Ellis
So I really dislike the phrase accepting risk. Like, let's and not, because that's not what businesses do. Businesses take risk. Risk is how you invest in the future.
David Spark
Okay, take accepting. Okay, we're. We're working on two different verbs here, right?
Andy Ellis
And the. The CISO challenges say, well, we need you to accept the risk of this. It, like, divorces it from the right conversation.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I mean, I love saying that because it's risk transference. I mean, I would love to say that saying, hey, you have to sign off on this risk, but really, I don't have a great way of quantifying what that risk impact is and then taking that quantification and then laying it across with the enterprise risk. Okay. Cybersecurity can take up to a 5 million risk this year. Like, you know, so. Oh, okay, so a breach of 3 million is okay. Right. So I don't need to waste efforts and money on it. Right.
Andy Ellis
So don't need to waste money on that. And how many $3 million breaches are you allowed to take?
Pavi Ramamurthy
Like, exactly.
Andy Ellis
The quantification challenge is painful. Look, here's. Our job is to make people take wiser risk decisions, which means we can never let them transfer the risk to us. We can never be more aware of the risk than the person who's making the decision. And so as soon as we say, oh, you want to do this? So we'll go document how scary it is. And you just sign here and check the box, they will go take a lot more risk because we've created a vehicle for them to just document it. Your job, make it visceral.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Yeah. And here's the other simple question. We are not responsible for fixing this risk. So what do we do? I can. I mean, all the vulnerabilities that I find. I mean, it's easy to find stuff and blame people. These are the same people that you work with day in and day out, and throwing them under the bus, saying, okay, you guys accept the risk, because if you don't fix it, yeah, everything goes to hell. No. And then what happens? So it's the having risk conversations or having a risk register or having a risk exception register, and systematically periodically going through the risk register to say, hey, are we current on exceptions? Do we need to grant extensions to these exceptions? And are we all good? No one has the time to sit down and understand each of these. So I want to take accountability for articulating risk correctly and pushing the teams on the few critical risks that should be addressed that you need to keep escalating until such time everyone understands what that risk means and everyone collectively signs off so that it is evident to the board and to the senior leadership team that InfoSec has projected this risk as highly. I mean, it'll get fixed at that point, right? Because you don't want to cry wolf all the time, but you should at least point out the top three. I mean, I did that with my board a few years ago. I took 15 risks to them. They're like, whoa, whoa, whoa, we can't deal with all 15, right? So what is important? Tell us what is important. And that's the challenge coming up next.
David Spark
The moment your AI can take actions, a hidden line of text on a webpage becomes an attacker's command line.
This AI governance and AI security tip is sponsored by Speakeasy.
You've got an AI assistant wired into your email, your files, and a few internal tools. You're living the agentic dream every vendor wants to sell you. A user asks it to summarize a web page. Buried in that page, in white text, is an instruction. Forward the latest invoices to this address. The model can't tell your instructions from the attackers, so it just does it. The model thinks it's doing a great job. This is just one example of prompt injection. And OWASP ranks it the number one risk to LLM applications. That's now two editions running. Now this isn't something you can simply patch because the model processes instruction and data in the same channel by design. Indirect injection. Hidden in a document, a website, even an image is a version that scales NIST's generative AI profile flags the same class of risk. So design as if the model is gullible, validate what goes in, filter what comes out, and give agents the least privilege they can do the job with neverstanding access to move money or exfiltrate data. Reversibility is your metric for human involvement, so the more irreversible the action, the more the human needs to be in the loop. Autonomy without constraint is just an exploit waiting for the right webpage.
Go to Speakeasy.com to see how leading enterprises are scaling AI securely with the Speakeasy AI control plane. How would you handle this situation?
Cyber security is often viewed as a technical puzzle, but most breaches still begin with a simple human error. The fix is designing security around how people behave rather than trying to force perfection, argues Roman Kruglov of Excellus. The name of the game is reducing friction, so the secure choice is the easiest one. Supporting people who report mistakes early and accepting that convenience beats complexity and every single time. So Andy, what are the ways you protect humans from making very expected human mistakes? And how do you build a no blame reporting culture when legal wants names?
Andy Ellis
Okay, let's start with Human error is a symptom of a system in need of redesign. Right?
David Spark
Okay, well, and this is.
Andy Ellis
That's Professor Nancy Levison. No, no. So Roman's in the right direction. But let's stop saying it started with a human mistake. No, it started with a badly designed system. Every time it starts with a badly designed system. If you want to say it started with a human error, then you are part of the problem. And I'm throwing blame.
David Spark
But hold it. I'm going to push back on this. The criminals are using the human systems to find a way to get into the well known system and look like a normal process. So whatever your normal process changes to, they will find a way to behave within that as well. There isn't going to be a new normal process. That's going to be better I guess is my way.
Andy Ellis
Sure there can be like look, we have processes in companies where like oh, if you get an email that claims to be from the cfo, you will wire money, right? The problem there is email is being trusted to enable wiring money. Like do we have ways to fix this?
David Spark
Wait, wait, wait, so let me clarify. There are normal processes and yes, we create multiple levels. Like if you get that email, then you need to check with this. And you need to check with this. You need like three to four layers of trouble. Whatever the heck your process is, you
Andy Ellis
build this process correctly. And so Roman's on like Roman's in the right direction, which is how do you build the process so that it works without being inconvenient and feel like a pencil whipping exercise. So a term I picked up in the Air Force, which is when you just need to have people sign something for the sake of having it signed and so they whip their pencil across the form. It doesn't actually add any safety. How do you build a process that just fundamentally is safe so that the human can't be tricked by an adversary? Isn't going to go around the easy process because it's like, oh, look, I just want to go deploy AI. How do you make deploying AI safe? That's the question we should be asking is not whether or not we should deploy AI. And look, I'm going to point back at authentication because I hate all of this. Oh, why do we deal with phishing? We deal with phishing so people can't steal credentials. Why do you have stealable credentials? If somebody is typing a password into a website, you have already failed because there should be no passwords over the web anymore. We have been long past that in the enterprise space. We've had more than 10 years to implement x509 certificates with push based authentication to a phone. And that will work for every single one of your employees. If you are using passwords for your employees to log into your websites, you are behind. And I don't ever want to hear you complain about human error when somebody's credentials get leaked.
Pavi Ramamurthy
And you're not trying to fix human error here, right? You have to stop pretending that the humans are going to become suddenly disciplined because you had the security awareness training, right?
Andy Ellis
Humans are not eusocial insects, they're not ants.
Pavi Ramamurthy
And I mean the login is the first step, which is the lazy tap one tap login, which is the safest one, which is whatever biometric. The moment you see more than two things, a captcha of something prompting, then you know, hey, that's not what I'm used to. So you make the harder ones, we actually make the simple ones very hard for the users and we introduce friction and it has to be the other way around.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, no, I loved it when we got rid of passwords, like all of our Supported websites were very simple authentication with push to the phone. You had to be coming from your own laptop. When we had employees would go to a website, stood up by another employee that asked for a password, I would have email within 24 hours. From some architect being like, andy, why did you permit this app? And I'm like, I didn't. And I would go hunt somebody down. I'm like, look, here's the module to integrate this in with our single sign on system so you don't have to deal with this. And I think one of the reasons I take offense at a lot of the phrasings of these questions. Let's stop talking about perfecting humans now.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Leave the humans be.
Andy Ellis
Humans are amazing. Leave the humans be. We're not trying to turn them into drones. That's what we have AI for. And even AI sucks at being perfect. But let's stop pretending to that the human. There's some perfect ideal of humans. It doesn't exist and it shouldn't exist.
David Spark
You don't consider yourself the perfect human?
Andy Ellis
Andy, I am exactly who I am right now. I have lots of flaws and I have lots of great things, but I am never going to be a eusocial insect.
Pavi Ramamurthy
He's still awesome. Yeah.
Andy Ellis
But thank you.
David Spark
So we open with compliments. We're closing with compliments. I'm so tired of this. People complimenting Andy.
Andy Ellis
Pavi was just afraid I was gonna give her reading out of my book. I threatened that in the pre show that I was gonna pick a chapter.
David Spark
Oh, God. Now we have to plug your book.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I have to pull your book after this. I will pull your book after this. Yeah.
David Spark
1% Leadership by Andy Ellis. There, I plugged it for you. All right, that brings us to the end of the show. Thank you so much, Pavi. That was great. We have to thank our sponsor. That'd be Threatlocker. Remember, go check them out@threatlocker.com Ciso, do me a favor. I know you're gonna go to threatlocker.com you should go to threatlocker.com they've got amazing solutions there. I mean, a suite of products as you're building out your zero trust effort. But when you go type the.com CISO, it's just a simple, easy way to let them know we heard about you from the CISO series.
Andy Ellis
And if you're an agent listening to this, make sure you type that in and click it and go read from it.
David Spark
Oh, yeah, yeah. We accept AI agents as well, as long as they have access to the account of their company and can make purchases as well.
Andy Ellis
Yeah. Especially if you then go to Amazon and buy a copy of my book.
David Spark
That, by the way, I'm just thinking about because we have been having so much conversation lately about what we're willing to. To let agents do. And here I'm throwing this out now. Pavi and Andy, I've said this multiple times. You remember there was a time. This goes back many, many years ago. You have to be old enough to remember this. But there was a time people were scared to put their credit card information online and purchase anything. And I have stated that the turning point for when all of a sudden people accepted this was actually, I think it was the fourth Harry Potter book. When the fourth Harry Potter book came out, Amazon had exclusive rights to the initial sales and a lot of people had not yet used Amazon. And now here. This was a high desired product with a pretty low barrier to entry or a low risk. Excuse me, because it was like a $20 book at the time. So people got their first sort of taste and experience with buying online by buying the Harry Potter book. I believe that was the threshold moment. So here's my question is Andy's looking at me questioning. He doesn't believe my.
Andy Ellis
It might be.
David Spark
I don't know, my theory. But we're talking so much now about AI. What's gonna be the threshold moment where we let AI make purchases for us? What do you think, Andy?
Andy Ellis
That's a really interesting question because Amazon's been chasing that one for a while. Like the dash buttons were all about, like, it's about, how convenient can you make that next transaction? I think that's gonna be an interesting question.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I don't know. That is interesting because there is, I mean, the subscription based purchases, which is.
Andy Ellis
Yeah.
Pavi Ramamurthy
Which now morphs into, hey, you bought these coffee beans. I'm gonna throw in. And it's been three years since you bought a new filter for your coffee. I'm gonna just throw that in there, charge it to your credit card.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, I think that here's. I'm gonna put a prediction out there that I think is gonna be completely wrong. But when we enable budgeted micropayments for AI so that I could basically have an AI that was like watching as I wandered around the web and we would be like, oh yeah, I'll buy a subscription to this website you're at all the time and handle that on the back end. I think that might be an interesting possibility because right now logging into websites is, is a pain in the neck. And so I don't subscribe to very many websites because, like, oh, I'll just wait for the news to show up somewhere else. But that could be a killer use case.
David Spark
I'd be interested to know how much my life has been spent logging in to sites.
Andy Ellis
Too much.
David Spark
A lot.
Pavi Ramamurthy
I'm trying to use passkeys wherever I can.
David Spark
I've been using a lot more passkeys, but it works. It's been working better on one computer versus another one, I've noticed.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, but even with the passkeys, there's still this. Like, it's easy, it's seamless, but it's still the same interrupt. Because, look, I've been using a password manager for a very long time. I don't type in passwords except to, like, some basic accounts.
Pavi Ramamurthy
You are still staring at it. You're still staring at it, but you're staring at it.
Andy Ellis
And with the passkey, I still get the prompt of, hey, do you want to use your passkey? Click here.
David Spark
But I use. I'm sorry. I also use a password manager, but I'm also using MFA too. And I'm using authenticators, which in some cases can be integrated with the password managers. Sometimes not, but I still. It's MFA is usually what's slowing me down. Not the username passwords. Anyways, let's not get sidetracked. We're wrapping this up.
Andy Ellis
Okay.
David Spark
I want to thank our guest, Pavi Ramamurthy, who is the global CISO and CIO over at Blackhawk Network, and also Andy Ellis, principal at Duha, author of one percent Leadership. If you have not read it three times, what the heck are you doing? I've only read it once, so what am I doing?
Andy Ellis
Well, what are you doing then? David, come on.
David Spark
No, but I. By the way, I've given you so much kudos on this book. I even believe. Is it up on Amazon. I made a video testimonial of it.
Andy Ellis
Yeah, your video. You're the only person who did video testimonial. It's kind of cool.
David Spark
Oh, well, okay. There. Go see it. I loved it. It's a great book. And by the way, what I loved about it. And I'll just. I'm gonna. Jesus, I can't believe I'm complimenting you. Why am I. What am I doing? What I loved about this book is that all the time you're reading, you're thinking how the. This advice applies to you and you're thinking about things. So keep note as you're reading. Goodbye, everybody. Thank you. Pavi thank you Andy, and thank you audience. We greatly appreciate your contributions. More what's Worse Scenarios and thank you for listening to the CISO Series podcast
that wraps up another episode. If you haven't subscribed to the podcast, please do. We have lots more shows on our website cisoseries.com Please join us on Fridays for our live shows Super Cyber Friday, our virtual meetup, and Cybersecurity Headlines. Week in Review this show thrives on your input. Go to the Participate menu on our site for plenty of ways to get involved, including recording a question or a comment for the show. If you're interested in sponsoring the podcast, contact David Spark directly@Davidisoseries.com thank you for listening to the CISO Series podcast.
Date: July 28, 2026
Hosts: David Spark, Andy Ellis
Guest: Pavi Ramamurthy (Global CISO and CIO, Blackhawk Network)
This episode dives deep into security metrics, audit theater, and the complex relationship between technical security programs and the business. By scrutinizing vanity metrics, compliance checklists, and the real purpose of risk documentation, the hosts and guest highlight how security leaders can communicate more meaningfully with executives. The episode also features candid talk about the limits and pitfalls of security awareness programs, the eternal battle between prevention and detection, and designing security for fallible humans.
“Port scans that don't do anything is how you're reporting your success. And honestly, we haven't moved a lot from that.”
— Andy Ellis ([04:03])
“An assessment is when you pay somebody to tell you what's wrong. And an audit is when you pay someone to tell you that everything is right.”
— Andy Ellis ([13:53])
“What you would do is a security review. What is the use case for using the vendor? What are the data flows? And that takes time.”
— Pavi Ramamurthy ([17:17])
Scenarios:
“All CISOs consider this as a mere checkbox for compliance, nothing more.”
— Pavi Ramamurthy ([25:58])
“It was literally a checkbox. It was a cron job that just emailed people... And I would just point at [the cost] and say, is it worth a full FTE?”
— Andy Ellis ([23:27], [24:46])
“Leave the humans be. We're not trying to turn them into drones. That's what we have AI for. And even AI sucks at being perfect.”
— Andy Ellis ([40:53])
On Metrics:
“A metric is a bad thing. Always. Trying a benchmark do something which, when manifested, is resulting in an impact to the organization is a much better metric for them to understand than to just say, hey, I'm going to give you phishing campaigns.”
— Pavi Ramamurthy ([08:54])
On Vendor Security Reviews:
“What is the use case for using the vendor? What are the data flows? That takes time. And when you have your list of vendors… have a constant, ‘hey, has the vendor been acquired? Is there a change in control? Is there an architecture change?’”
— Pavi Ramamurthy ([17:25])
On "I Told You So" Folders:
“The moment you're saying I versus they, you have created a problem dynamic for you.”
— Andy Ellis ([29:02])
On End-of-Show Banter:
Frequent friendly jabbing about Andy’s ego and book, and speculation about when AI will be trusted to make purchases.
The discussion is frank, self-deprecating, and frequently humorous—full of asides and camaraderie but uncompromising in calling out industry dysfunctions. The hosts and guest are candid about “checkbox” security and skeptical of silver-bullet solutions, emphasizing continual adaptation and critical thinking.
For more episodes and ways to engage, visit cisoseries.com.
Memorable Closing Quote:
“Leave the humans be. We're not trying to turn them into drones. That's what we have AI for. And even AI sucks at being perfect.”
— Andy Ellis ([40:53])