A (3:28)

My goodness.

B (3:29)

To the point where I went to the balcony, I opened the balcony. I went in basically in my pajamas just to basically see what happened. Am I seeing smoke anywhere? It was so loud. And then I look up and I find basically that kind of little remnants of fireworks. It feels like basically as if they have intercepted and the debris is falling. So I was able to see the Debri, but it was, you know, like loud, absolutely loud.

A (3:57)

Well, Eamon, it's not just outside your bedroom that this war is escalating. It's escalating everywhere. In the last few days, the Houthis finally joined the war. We've been waiting for that. The Iranian ballistic missile barrages have been bigger and bigger. Iran launched 48 missiles yesterday. According to what I've seen online, that's nearly twice as many as the week before. So it raises the question what the IRGC's true capability is. Only a few weeks ago, talking points from the White House and from Israel were that, oh, we've destroyed 90% of their ballistic missile capabilities.

B (4:29)

Yeah, as if.

A (4:30)

Yeah, I think that was exaggerated here in conflicted.

B (4:33)

We told everyone before even the war started that the numbers that are out there are outrageously underestimating the capability. And the stockpile that the IRGC did, they were planning for this war for generation.

A (4:49)

Well, we've seen evidence of that become unmistakably clear in the last few days. There was a big attack against the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. A Boeing E3 Sentry, more commonly known as an AWACS plane, was destroyed or at least damaged.

B (5:07)

No, no, it was totally destroyed.

A (5:08)

This came as quite a shock. It was actually on the Runway of the base when it was attacked. This raises all sorts of questions, like, where is Iran getting this intel? But Eamon, this must have pissed off the Saudis. I'm wondering, when are the Arabs, the GCC Arabs, going to join this war properly?

B (5:26)

Well, it Seems that this moment is approaching and approaching quite soon. And I tell you why. My Saudi intelligence source, he told me that the Iranian IRGC used 14 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

A (5:43)

Oh, my God, yes.

B (5:44)

Which they are using on regular basis against Israel.

A (5:47)

Yeah, I've seen it. I've seen the videos. That sort of, sort of blows up in the air and then all these. These little spiders come out, and then how can you, how can you defend against such a weapon?

B (5:56)

Exactly. So now they have used this against Prince Sultan air base, just 80 kilometers south of Riyadh. And that led to a widespread destruction across the entire base. Several refueling aircrafts were either entirely or partially damaged, as well as the AWACS, the $700 million AWACS airplane that was totally destroyed. And of course, there were 15 severe injuries, including five in critical conditions among the American forces there. And I know my Saudi friends are going to be absolutely upset about it, but I can tell you there has been Saudi fatalities. The Saudis are wondering what to do. Do they announce them? Do they like? Because that will necessitate retaliation. So they are doing their best at the moment not to enter the conflict, but from every corner. They are being attacked by the IRGC from Iran by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones. They are being attacked now by the Iraqi militias, created and funded and directed now by Iran with drones and with cruise missiles, not only against Saudi Arabia, but against the entire GCC except Oman. And now the Houthis decided finally, you know, to grace us with their presence and to enter the conflict. Woohoo. And that according to my, you know, Saudi intelligence source, you know, basically he said, we feel besieged now from the north, from the east, from the south. And I said to him, lakhina, basically. So are you saying basically, I mean, you practically ducked. And he said to me, well, yes, but we're capable of giving good ducking back, too, so just wait for it, my dear friend. He was telling me, well, I was

A (7:57)

wondering, is it the Saudis themselves and the Emiratis who are holding back? Is the Trump administration saying, just hold on, hold on, I wonder what's going on behind.

B (8:06)

There is a reason. There is a reason, because why the Saudis and the Emiratis are saying, if we are going to attack, we have only one target in mind because everything else is being attacked. Basically, we are running out of target selection choices as far as Iran is concerned. But really, there is only one sector we would love to go and attack, which is the.

A (8:29)

It's the oil installations.

B (8:30)

Exactly, exactly.

A (8:32)

But that would be that would be a red line for Iran, big time. But, you know, a red line was crossed this morning, Eamon, because a Kuwaiti desalination plant was attacked by Iran. You have been telling us literally for eight years that desalination plants is the reddest of red lines for the region. So this is a major turning point, surely.

B (8:53)

Okay, I can reveal something to every listener here based on the, you know, privileged information that we here at Conflicted are privy to that on Thursday 26 March, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, these four countries exchanged among them the official letters of activation of military and defense treaties.

A (9:20)

I see.

B (9:21)

Yeah. So basically they are activating all of these necessary protocols to establish a unified command center for an operation. They will choose its name. They are basically like, I mean, preparing everything. And it's clear now that in the next nine, 10 days, we will see a far more assertive GCC, you know, defending its interest, even to the death, if necessary.

A (9:55)

Well, dear listeners, this is why you listen to Conflicted. This episode is going to focus primarily on the phenomenon of Iranian sleeper cells in the Middle east, but also, and especially in the rest of the world, including the West. We will talk about the allegations. We will talk about recent attacks which have been linked possibly to such sleeper cells. We will also talk about the history of sleeper cells. We're going to do the whole shebang as normal. But before that, we will talk a little bit more about the upcoming American action to secure the Strait of Hormuz. It's going to be a great episode. Let's get right into it. So, Eamonn, before we talk about Iranian sleeper cells, I do want to talk about the Strait of Hormuz. Friend of the show, Giri Rajendran, who has been on in conversation with me twice now, he sent me some pretty thoughtful text messages the other day raising the issue of Bandar Abbas, the big city with the huge Iranian naval presence just beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Now, you said it in a previous episode that there will be no land invasion of Iran, only an amphibious assault on the islands in the Gulf. Geary says, well, taking islands will not be enough, he says, because, you know, they can be. They're. They're exposed, they can. They're easy to target. They can be hit by ballistic missiles and drones, of course, all of these things from the mainland, especially Bandar Abbas, this significant city with a significant military presence. So, you know, Eamon, even if Kharg island is seized, it is hard to supply, it is hard to defend, so long as Iran dominates the mainland in the way that it currently does. So Bandr Abbas will have to be dealt with and it seems to me pretty obvious that they will have to at least launch a ground invasion of that part of the Iranian mainland to secure Bandar Abbas and to neutralize the threat that it does pose to their attempts to take over those islands.

B (12:08)

Well, first of all, I disagree to some extent here respectfully with your friend. And any friend of yours is a friend of mine, Thomas.

A (12:21)

As you know, he's a very dear listener, Eamon. He follows us very closely and he admires you and learns a lot from you. This isn't a criticism. He's just really wondering what are they gonna do about Bandar Abbas. It is a good question.

B (12:33)

Basically. I mean they will just do a Gaza style, Lebanon style inner warning for the population of the city, possibly either partially or entirely to evacuate and then basically like in a deal with the city in a way that will resemble, in a manner that will resemble Gaza. And the reason is because they will look at the, they will look at the port and all the naval facilities and the docks and the berths and they will basically estimate the level of damage and destruction they have to inflict. And then they will identify certain centers inside the city that are centers of command and control for the IRGC Navy and special units as well as the IRGC anti ship missile units. So they will identify all of these centers and then based on that they will create perimeters on the map, publish the maps in Farsi and say anyone within that red highlighted zone on the map, leave. You have 24 hours to pack your bags and leave. Because the level of damage that's going to be inflicted on the port and the facilities there is going to be, well, decisive and huge. And so that is my understanding. And it's not only Bandar Abbas, by the way, Chabahar, you know, just on the Gulf of Oman and Bushahar, the, you know, the port of Bush with

A (14:17)

the very, very, very important nuclear facility, I mean civilian nuclear facility which people are really warning could be disastrous if it's compromised. And the kind of radiate the radiation cloud over the Gulf will be very bad.

B (14:30)

Actually I already have also like an, I mean intel from a senior source in the GCC where he told me that they received intel from another big western nation that the Iranians. You see on the day roughly about 24th of March, 25th of March, on these two days, Iranian trucks carrying C4 and TNT explosives were actually moving into the facility itself of the Bush nuclear reactor while 163 Russian engineers were just running out of it, straight into the buses and then straight. These buses were driving, you know, heading to Armenia. So it's a total evacuation of Russian engineers. In other words, now we could be witnessing soon a false flag operation where they destroy, you know, the reactor at Bushar and cause a significant radioactive contamination. Goodness, you know, for, you know, but that's like, in a basically way, they call it the strategic dead man switch. Oh my God, you know, the strategic dead man switch. You know, I'm, I'm, I, I'm holding the switch to a bomb. If you shoot me and then my, of course, like, you know, basically you shoot me, like, you know, I die and my thumb like, you know, will, will, you know, no longer be on the switch, you know, which I'm pressing, then if I'm dead, you're dead. I mean, so it's, it's really like, you know, what we are seeing. Forget Mexican standoff. This is radioactive Mexican standoff right now.

A (16:10)

Radioactive dead man switch. But you know, this is going to put the, the Gulf states on the other side, the Arab states in hot water. Because if, if as you said before, they're preparing themselves to enter the war in a big way and to fight to the death, that means they're willing to risk radioactive contamination from Bushehr.

B (16:28)

Well, there could be that problem. But also on top of this, the fact that the Iranians are doing that while saying, I'm going to attack you, but you can't attack me back. You know, and so no, no one's going to accept that you want to blow up Bushahar. Do it in a. Basically because we all know that no matter how much protestations you will do that, it was the Israelis who did it. You see, like in a bas. This is the problem with the Ayatollah's thinking. Always it's all about like, you know, basically if I go down, you go down. It's like that kind of like, you know, exceptionally vindictive, you know, military tactical mentality because they decided to build what we call ballistic missile cities. They are subterranean ballistic missile city. And we talked about it before they build cities like these, but they built cities like these around Bushahar itself, around the nuclear reactor. They were actually firing ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, the uae, Bahrain and Israel and Jordan from Bushahar. There are footage, verified geolocated footage of these ballistic missiles going through shafts in the mountains. Basically they are designed to go through shafts in the mountains and being launched from subterranean level and then if you try to blow them all up, some of them are extremely close to the Bushahar nuclear facility. Gosh, they are basically using what I call radioactive shield, not a human shield, radioactive shield. There has been of course attacks against these subterranean ballistic missile cities even in Bushar, especially those that are around between 8 and 5 km. But then there are some that are within 2 or 3 km radius of the facility. But now suddenly the Russians evacuated just on the, you know, they completed their evacuation on the 25th of March, just five days ago, all the way to Armenia. And the intelligence that the Iranians are basically driving explosives into the facility itself could indicate their intention to create a false flag and saying, well, the Israelis have been bombing the vicinity for a while now. It's the Israelis who did this. But the GCC has already been pre warned and do not believe that this is a Israeli attack.

A (18:58)

Well, just to sort of finish up on the Bandar Abbas question, you told us that on the first day in day or two of the war, Bandar Abbas was attacked in a big way. You know, so clearly they've been preparing the ground. But as you say, in order to give them the opening they need for the amphibious assault on the Gulf Islands that they want to take, they will have to issue evacuation orders to civilian areas of Bandar Abbas. And they're going to go full Gaza on that city. An important city, an ancient city, especially important in the Safavid era onwards when it became the Safavid empire's kind of naval foothold for the Indian Ocean. So that's quite a big, a big move. It's something to look forward to with trepidation, I say indeed, absolutely. Okay. Iranian sleeper cells. A know much has been alleged about Iranian sleeper cells. Iranian backed terrorist networks underground, not activated, not mobilized, but they're ready to act should the Quds Force tell them to do so. The UA recently announced that it had dismantled a terrorist network inside Emirati territory operated by Hezbollah and the IRGC. And since the 28th of February when this war began, there have been a number of attacks throughout the west which some people say signify Iranian backed or Iranian inspired sleeper agents being activated. On 6 March in London, four men were arrested allegedly working with the IRGC surveilling Jewish targets in the city. On the next day, 7th March, three synagogues were attacked with gunfire in Toronto. The day after that the US Embassy in Oslo, Norway was bombed. And the day after that a synagogue in Liege in Belgium was bombed. The day after that the US consulate in Toronto was fired at on 12 March. Two days later, a truck rams a synagogue in Michigan. Over the 13th and 14th of March, Jewish sites are attacked in Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. On 20 March, Scottish police arrest two men trying to break into a secure submarine facility in Scotland. On 23 March, an arson attack destroys Jewish run ambulances in London. That's just a few of these, you know, let's call them minor incidents across the west, often involving attacks against Jewish civilians that people are saying is evidence of Iranian sleeper cells. Before we get into the larger story about sleeper cells in Iran's sleeper cells. Amen. What do you think about these recent attacks? Are they evidence that Iran, that the Quds Force is activating sleeper agents?

B (21:53)

Well, yes, the timing, you cannot mistake the timing. And also at the same time there has been briefings by MI6 talking about Iranian telegram channels, recruiting even young teenagers and inciting them to take up to do some action. Now, just like with Iran's policy of first using what we call old or small payload missiles, at the beginning of the war, they were firing basically the old stock to get rid of it and to prepare to use the better ones. It's the same thing here. They are basically using their amateurs for the time being, reserving the professionals for the bigger later phase.

A (22:46)

Well, Eamonn, I think it's true to say that in your long career in various guises, undercover agent inside Al Qaeda man, working for financial institutions, helping to thwart terrorist financing, and then later as a sort of, you know, spy for hire, if you like, freelance security consultant as they call you. You have a lot of personal experience with the phenomenon of Iranian sleeper cells?

B (23:14)

Oh, yes, because at the end of the day, the, I want to be honest, describe it as the Iranian sleeper cell phenomenon. I will describe it as the Iranian access of resistance sleeper cells. Because the IRGC built a formidable, formidable machine of people who are working in finance also who are trained as militants and people basically who went ahead and built front businesses on behalf of it. So actually the sleeper cell could be a terrorist financing and fundraising network, business fronting and money laundering network, narcotics trafficking, as well as trafficking in weapons and counterfeit currency, illicit goods and counterfeit goods, which I've seen it. Even baby formulas, you know, just don't get me started. Even baby formulas, you know, things like Aptamyl, which is, you know, manufactured in Iran illegally, you know, without permission, without license, and then smuggled, you know, to places as far as, you know, India and Pakistan and Turkey, you know, and you know, Russia, you know, pretending to be the original goods and even counterfeit tobacco. So I've seen that all. But then also there are cells that are actually, could be all of the above. And in addition, they have sophisticated military training, especially in acts of terrorism and sabotage, as well as hostage taking and assassinations. That I have seen.

A (25:04)

Well, Eamon, I can't wait to hear about your personal memories, your personal experiences. I'm sure you've got some interesting stories before we get to them, I think, you know, let's lay out a bit of the history. And the irony is that the history of the sleeper cell really can be linked to Iran, you know, as a civilization from the very beginning. Because some scholars say that the sleeper cell phenomenon first arises in, you know, between the 11th and 13th centuries among the Nizari Ismailis. We've talked about them unconflicted before. They had a group called the Assassins, you know, the Hashashiun, those who, you know, weirdly, those who smoked hashish, the Assassins, they were based in the now legendary Alamout Castle in the mountains in northern Iran. And they really, you know, caused fear throughout the Middle east and into Europe even. They were. They had operatives embedded in enemy territory. Those operatives would be secret. They would stay patiently waiting for. For the word. And then they would launch a quick, secret, targeted assassination. And this terrified people. The Assassins. Now, you know, that's kind of romantic. It may not really be the birth of the sleeper cells, but I always like to talk about the assassins. The real birth of the modern revolutionary underground sleeper cell emerges in the 19th century like so many problems in this world, especially now, problems plaguing the Middle east, they can be linked to that problem European radical strain that arose in the 19th century. And as always, a Frenchman is to blame.

B (26:44)

Amen. It's always the Frenchman.

A (26:46)

Louis Auguste Blanqui was the first major thinker to sort of systematize the idea of small conspiratorial groups embedded in the civilian population to slowly and secretly wait to do something dramatic, to effect affect revolutionary change. And no one will be surprised that Vladimir Lenin and his Leninism, his form of Marxist Bolshevism, Leninism, perfected this or moved this idea forward. In his book, in his tract what Is to Be Done, which was published in 1902, he advocated that professional revolutionaries around the world, linked sort of secretly in this way, should practice a kind of strict compartmentalization and create underground networks inside states that Lenin deemed hostile to the inevitable Marxist proletarian revolution that would happen now. The Soviet Union perfected it. The Soviet Union sponsored sleeper cells, underground cells of Marxist revolutionaries everywhere. This led in the west to the so called Red scare as America and other capitalist states tried to find these sleeper cells, uncover them, expose them and get rid of them. But it in, in the mid until the late 20th century, right, the model is globalized alongside the new left and third worldism again working with the KGB and the Soviet Union and groups like the FLN in Algeria, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, they all employed urban clandestine cells embedded with civilians with this idea of long term infiltration. So they would just wait, silently wait, build up the network, build up the capability and wait. And the sleeper cell by the end of the 20th century and al Qaeda really falls into this model to some extent the sleeper cell becomes the primary tool of weaker state and non state actors when they were, you know, combating strong states. And to some extent Eamon, the, you know, the, the major established states of the world, America, European states, Japan, China, they struggle to this day really to know how to deal with the sleeper cell phenomenon. But it has to be said, in the last 50 years, it is really the Iranian revolution that has most successfully utilized the sleeper cell. I mean, do you think that's fair to say?

B (29:27)

Indeed, without any hesitation now, I mean just to give the listener a little bit of background so they at least trust my word on the sleeper cells. Given the fact that some will ask, what are your qualifications, Ayman, on speaking on sleeper cells? What do you know about them? Well, I was embedded in quite few myself.

A (29:48)

So that's the first am indeed sleeper cell agent extraordinaire.

B (29:53)

Indeed. Well, because I was embedded within the Chechen Jihadist sleeper cell in Azerbaijan in Baku in 1996, in the finance, logistics, espionage, recruitment. So these are the four missions that were given to us. And I was a member of a five member sleeper cell and it was for more than five months. So imagine like five, five. And so that sleeper cell was active under the nose of the Azeri intelligence. And in fact we recruited surprisingly the head of the Baku, you know, branch of the Azerbaijani Security Forces and Intelligence.

A (30:48)

Yes, that's a real grab. My goodness, what a success story.

B (30:52)

Indeed. And so he was coming always every month to our villa, which was our headquarters, you know, which we used for the finance of course of the Cheshire Mujahideen, I mean Ibn Khattab and Sham Al Basayev and all of these people. And so they depended on us like in basically for the funding, cash, equipments, food, medicine, all of these things. And so he used to Come and we used to give him a $30,000 envelope every month, clockwork. So he not only turned a blind eye to what we do, in fact assist us. So at the time he was giving us visas, long term visas to stay in the country legally. If we need any shipments at the airport, you know, containers coming, whatever, I mean, he would clear them. You know, it's a hard work, man. But then, of course, I was a member of a sleeper cell that was planning a terrorist attack in a. Basically like, I mean, in one of the Gulf countries against the United States Navy, you know, and it was going to be big one. But luckily I was the spy also. So I was a double agent.

A (32:04)

Amen, Dean. What a life you have. Live honestly.

B (32:08)

And I was there for 13 months. It's like 13 months I was essential to the planning of this mission, but also the same time I wasn't the leader of it, but I was part of the planning. So thank God for that. So I knew who will be the suicide bombers. I knew who. And it was directed directly from Iran by Hamza Rabiya, who was the head of operations for Al Qaeda at that time. That was in 2004.

A (32:33)

Eamon, what was life like inside a sleeper cell for 13 months? What, what was your daily routine like?

B (32:41)

Same normal, you know, you go to the mosques, to the malls, like, you know, basically, you know, you go and, you know, have, you know, fun with the guys. Like, you know, basically like an, I mean, you go for, you know, either like an, I mean, fishing, boating trip, you know, you go to the beach. Like, I mean, life is normal except that at some times you have to source some materials for explosives. That's on the side, basically. On the side also you do the wrecking and surveillance, so reconnaissance and surveillance against the targets. And you report back to Iran to Hamza Rabih. And also you are in touch always with Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia, you know, and its leaders. So it was really a normal life, but with moments of kind of devious activities.

A (33:37)

Well, that reminds me of the documentary film I helped to produce, Path of Blood, which is made entirely of found footage of that. You know, that Al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia filmed themselves inside their sleeper cells. And a lot of that footage involves seeing them surveilling potential targets. You know, it's really creepy footage where you see this grainy old VHS recorder zooming in on the. On a guard post outside a, you know, a residential compound or something. And I guess actually, Eamon, now that I think about it, when you say that when you were a double agent inside your sleeper cell planning that attack against a US naval installation in the Gulf. And you were contacting Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. You were contacting those very guys whose footage I later helped make into a film.

B (34:29)

Indeed. You remember, you and I sat down and we were looking at the footage and I was telling you, oh, that's a friend. Oh yeah, I know this guy, remember?

A (34:36)

Well, that's how we became friends actually, just over, over that project. You know, you came in as an advisor to help us, you know, to anyway to verify that we weren't entirely wrong in our analysis of this footage and our analysis of the history. But it's creepy stuff. And you were one of those guys really, I mean, obviously working for the British, but still you were there.

B (34:55)

Indeed. And so this is like just to highlight to the listener the first qualification that I have as an expert on what a sleeper cell is, but also the other side of the expertise is that after I left the service of Her Majesty's government, at that time, I went into the service of His Majesty King Mammon. I joined a bank, King Mammon. But seriously, during my time in that global bank and that global bank had thousands of branches in 86 countries. Can you imagine 86 countries from Latin America to North America, Central America, Africa, Middle east, all of Europe, most of Southeast and East Asia. And so for me, I was straight away appointed into two distinct. But it meant basically I had two salaries and two hats. So I was serving in the geopolitical risk department, but also I was serving in the Financial Intelligence Unit.

A (36:03)

Unit.

B (36:04)

And in the Financial Intelligence Unit I was investigating, you know, charitable networks, you know, masks and also like, I mean, high net worth individuals who are giving to certain, you know, CSR projects. And I'm looking at the identifiers of sleeper cells and I was discovering them one by one.

A (36:27)

Well, Eamon, we're going to hear about your experience trying to uncover sleeper cell networks and the financing that underwrote them. When we get back from this quick break. When we get back, dear listeners, Eamon's going to tell us all about his experiences combating sleeper cells. We'll be right back.

B (36:50)

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A (37:27)

We're back. Eamonn. You know, I think it's important to point out that when we talk about Iranian sleeper cells, in a way, those entities that we call Iranian proxies today, like Hezbollah and the Houthis, they started out as sleeper cells. I mean, Hezbollah only came out from the shadows officially in 1985. But three, four years before that, it would have begun as efforts that the IRGC was carrying out inside mainly South Lebanon, finding recruits, Shia men, indoctrinating them, organizing them, training them, so that when they needed to, you know, call them to rise up, to mobilize and to do something, they would. So it's not like there's a huge separation between the proxies that are now big and powerful and, well, less so than before, but they're still established. And these sleeper cells that are in South America, in North America, in Europe and elsewhere.

B (38:24)

Look, this is why I say that when we say the Iranian sleeper cell networks, we are really saying the Iranian IRGC axis of resistance sleeper cell networks, it's really far wider than that. Because the IRGC realized from the beginning that by co opting Hezbollah into its network, they have gained a considerable reach. Because the secret word here is the global Shiite diaspora, especially the global Shiite Lebanese diaspora. Remember, for every, every individual living in Lebanon right Now, there are 5 million of them. There are actually four, you know, individuals who are living outside of Lebanon. So there are 22 million Lebanese diaspora.

A (39:21)

This is one of the reasons why there's so much IRGC terrorist underground terrorist activity in Latin America, in South America. Because South America has a very large Lebanese diaspora.

B (39:34)

Exactly.

A (39:34)

And so it has been a natural target for IRGC infiltration and organization since 1979. And in 1992, as you pointed out in Buenos Aires, there was an Israeli embassy bombing carried out by a sleeper cell linked to Iran. In 1994, the Argentine Israelite mutual association, the AMIA, was bombed as well, again carried out by a sleeper cell linked to Iran. 85 people were killed. So it's this Lebanese diaspora. I mean, we don't want to tar at all all Lebanese people outside of Lebanon. Not at all at all. However, a small number of them are used as agents by the Iranian regime to carry out terrorist attacks or at least plan terrorist attacks throughout the world and wait for the call to carry them out.

B (40:23)

I wish it was small. Thomas. We are not talking about really small numbers because that's my experience here. We're talking about Lebanese Shia, not like in Lebanese Christians or anything like that. Like in basically. Or Sunnis. I'm talking here Lebanese Shia. The 40% of them, the 40% of the Lebanese Shia who are ideologically aligned with Hezbollah, these are the ones who are most likely to be acting on basis of religious duty towards Hezbollah because of the. You remember we told you about the hive, the beehive mindset that you have the supreme leader of Iran being the ultimate religious, military and political authority.

A (41:03)

The queen bee.

B (41:04)

Exactly. And that filters through all the way to the sleeper cell. The little bees in basically all across the world collecting nectar. But this is the true representation here. So when we talk about them. So you mentioned like in Latin America, and just to give you an example here, the Lebanese Shiite pro Iran, pro IRGC cells that exist all over Latin America is the reason why I spent months basically of my life between 2011 and 2013 on behalf of the global bank, basically going maybe seven times to Brazil, three times to Argentina, several times to Paraguay and Uruguay and Venezuela, basically to Caracas. So basically I spent my life at that time just looking at them. I went to look at the cities, basically. I went to Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina, I went to Parachi, I went to Sao Jose das Campos. And then of course, the crown jewel of everything that the IRGC and Hezbollah do in Latin America, which is the state of Parana in particular in Brazil, and in particular the Foz de Iguazu, where, of course, it is such a romantic place, beautiful place. I mean, I showed you the pictures where I was, you know, in the helicopter and everything and all that, you know, it's a beautiful place. And because it has the Fos de Iguazu Falls, so the Iguazu Falls, you know, they call it the cataractus, like in there. It's so beautiful. Like in. Basically like in the beautiful waterfalls, like in the, you know, with the Amazon and everything. But it is the tri border area, you know, if we remove the romanticism of the cataractes.

A (42:47)

Yeah, this is the border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.

B (42:51)

Exactly. So there are three cities there. So you have the Iguazu city in Argentina, the smallest of all the three towns. And then you have Fos de Iguazu in Brazil. And then you have, you know, in Paraguay, you could drive between the three cities in about half an hour. Seriously, you can take the triangle, you know, from one city to another, half an hour to take.

A (43:14)

Because they're sort of border cities. Central government in all three states is weak. There and am I right that the cities do have a large Lebanese diaspora population?

B (43:24)

A large Lebanese diaspora with some in handpicked IRDC commanders which I have identified some of them, I took pictures of them, I did surveillance against them at the time. So basically, I mean I was looking into what they are doing, where they were, you know, which you know, you know, safe houses basically they were staying in, although that wasn't my remit. But like, basically it's just, you know, it's your hobby. Yeah, the fox and the rabbit. Basically my fox instincts basically kicked in. And so what happened is I realized immediately that when you go there, I mean one of the weird things by the way is that you go there, it's almost like the Amazon jungle, except it's not an Amazon, but basically still similar to it. It's like a rainforest, is this Latin American rainforest. And then out of nowhere you see beautiful, you see this massive water, quite big mosque. You know, it's the largest mosque in all of the Americas. It's called the Fosd Iguasu Central Mosque. But also like, you know, I mean the Sunnis, because Sunnis and Shia like you know, basically use it there, you know, basically they call it Umar IBN Khattab mosque in order to throw away the suspicion. But in fact basically it is the center of everything happening there.

A (44:41)

Taqiyyah, man, Taqiyyah.

B (44:43)

Yeah, so, and then you immediately notice that in Sedade del Este there are huge crude old looking malls, which is not like the grand shopping malls with food courts and escalators and everything. No, these are normal buildings where you go in. Instead of apartments, it's actually shops with windows. So it's really crude. And these are Lebanese people with the high tech in all the high tech you can imagine from phones to laptops to screens and drones. But then slowly, gradually you can start to see the underbelly of that. Behind that is weapons, narcotics, immediately and of course counterfeit currency. And I spent weeks, they're investigating the whole thing, basically seeing which banks these people are banking with. And I realized that the bank I was working for was actually the reason why between four and up to $6 billion were laundered every year through the three cities. Because the bank I was working for had operations in Brazil, had operations in Paraguay and had operations in Iguazu and Argentina. So Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. And since these three cities make a triangle that is only like half an hour between them all, you understand immediately that they were laundering the money, pretending that the sale of weapons and narcotics are Actually the proceeds of all of these iPhones and Samsung and all of these laptops when in fact no sales were taking place. You know, it's, you know, it's like, who, like not many people like basically were buying these tax free things. The reality is that all of this in order to cash in. And basically I realized that as soon as like, you know, basically I realized that I then wrote a whole report about it. And then when you look at all the people who were standing there, there are always Lebanese in these shops and sometimes there is always one Iranian. So one Iranian guy moving between the shops, making sure basically that keeping an eye on the conversations, especially if they see a foreigner like me coming in.

A (47:12)

Well, I was gonna ask him, and how did you remain under the radar? I mean, clearly you were there, they saw you. How did you go undetected? They must have thought this guy's a bit suspect.

B (47:21)

Thank God I had some Brazilians with me, both male and female. So the female elements basically was a little bit like to push away suspicion. Yeah, we live in, you know, Sao Paulo and you know, Europa Jardines or whatever, like in basically. And some of the best luck in the basic neighborhoods in Sao Paulo. So we are pretending like we're coming for iPhones and laptops and all of these things. Like, you know, we did lucky, I mean, our homework before we went. So I wasn't alone, you know, I wouldn't. So. And so in the end, when I went back, I remember to the UK and I wrote a whole report about it and, and the CEO of the bank at the time realized that. Holy guacamole. Especially Brazilian guacamole. We need to exit one of these three markets. Which one? And then he looked me in the eye and he asked basically which one we are most exposed to that kind of shit.

A (48:22)

Sure, it's terrifying. Especially in the post 911 era and the post financial crisis era, the banks were being heavily looked at by the government, fined.

B (48:31)

Actually the same bank was fined, you know, $3.9 billion by the DOJ over Mexican cartels. Yeah, so earlier, like, so basically he was like nervous, like, you know, I mean, it's like, for God's sake, like, I mean, tell me which one is the most exposed? And I said, well, it's Brazil, sir. It's Brazil. Because in Brazil there are 6 million Lebanese, 2 million of them are Shia and safe to say 800,000 of them are, you know, solid Hezbollah. How do I know that? Or at least how did I guesstimate that based on Al Khums you know, the 20% religious tax they pay to Ayatollah Khwamani himself. Yeah, they call it Khums al Imam.

A (49:16)

Yeah, yeah, you've told us about Homsyl Imam. You know, so help us understand more the sort of how this works. So you said there's these shopp malls that are fronts. They are pretending to sell iPhones and stuff.

B (49:28)

Yes. For narcotics and for guns. Yeah.

A (49:31)

And. But so the guns especially, are these guns that are being sold to just kind of any criminal element who wants a gun or are these guns being smuggled in cartels?

B (49:40)

Yes.

A (49:41)

Okay, so it's not like these guns are being smuggled in to arm Iranian sleeper cells. They're just. They're just being smuggled in to sell and to raise cash on the black market for.

B (49:53)

Exactly.

A (49:53)

Iran's, you know, foreign policy activities.

B (49:56)

Exactly. So narcotics relationship with the cartels important, but also for smuggling humans into the US In a later luck. And so basically this is where, okay, you know, you first, you come to the first Deguazo region. From there, from Brazil, you make it into Venezuela. And in Venezuela, that's another, you know, game altogether. But I will just finish the story of what's happening in, you know, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Parachi, all of these places in Brazil, in Santa Catarina, the Shiite Lebanese community there, they collect the money, the hums, the 20% tax on income that they make. It amounts to billions of dollars every year. And then what they do with it is that they put it through with my own eyes. I've seen in the charity register just in the city of Sao Paulo, they have registered 20, 61 charities.

A (50:54)

Wow.

B (50:55)

This is, we know. With multiple bank accounts for each one. How on earth are you going to bloody audit this?

A (51:03)

How?

B (51:04)

And then the money movement takes us into a whole new world in West Africa. And don't get me about West Africa. I will start with West Africa later. But then, then when you. Yeah, when you go to Caracas in Venezuela and all the Islamic centers there, you will see that. Look, man, you know, I remember one of them told me, you know, of course, because it's for me, I can easily pretend to be a Shia, you know, and no one can even challenge my Shia credentials because I'm a Bahraini with a Lebanese mother from the south.

A (51:37)

Absolutely. No. And you know, you know, the, the texts, you know, the mythology, you know, their whole theology.

B (51:43)

Yeah, yeah, I know the whole, you know, prayers. Dua u Kumail. Like, you know, basically I can, you know, recite the whole, you know, 12 imams and who they were. Like, in a basic way, you can

A (51:52)

practice a taqiyah all your own.

B (51:54)

Exactly. I have my own Ayman Taqiyah, like in a minute.

A (51:59)

I know. I'm telling you, dear listeners, we're all gonna find out in the end. And it was Ayman Dean all along. He was the puppet master behind the scenes. You are the supreme leader. All right, Eamon. So you can pretend to be a Shia and there you are. Was it Caracas?

B (52:14)

You were in Caracas? Yeah. And so again, around 2013. And so he is, you know, this guy in one of the Islamic centers that belongs to Iraqi, actually. I mean, he's an Iraqi who was talking to me, but he is in a hybrid Lebanese Iraqi because it belongs to Al Imam al Khuijah, you know, in Najaf. So he was telling me, by the way, like, I mean, if, you know, do you know anyone, like, basically who wants, you know, to purchase a genuine, genuine, not only a Venezuelan citizenship, but actually a Venezuelan citizenship with a diplomatic passport. I said, how much the cost? He said, $400,000. You get it a piece and you get it like, you know, basically, no questions asked. You will be a diplomat for life. And between you and me, I was tempted. It's like, hey, can. But you know, it's like, you know, Venezuelan diplomat, like, you know, viva la Hugo Chavez. Viva Maduro. Anyway, but he told me that at that time, and this is 2013, that 1,300 Iranian, IRGC and Hezbollah operatives were in possession of these passports and they are using them all over Africa, Asia and Europe.

A (53:31)

Wow.

B (53:32)

It grant them access, visa free access and even to Canada.

A (53:35)

Can I ask a stupid question, though, Eamon? I just.

B (53:37)

No question you will ever ask a stupid question.

A (53:39)

Well, I don't know, because I feel that maybe some of the listeners like me will be thinking, well, are these sleeper cells? Are we still talking about sleeper cells or are we talking about a global network of Iranian operatives, professionals who are moving beyond countries? Because I have an idea of a sleeper cell as kind of made up of normal people, normal civilians who are waiting. They're not really doing anything. They're waiting to be told to do something.

B (54:05)

And this is why I need to explain that there are five kinds of sleeper cells.

A (54:10)

Oh, my Lord, yes.

B (54:12)

So there is, you know, the religious authority sleeper cells. So the imams in these mosques and their assistants and some of their students are in fact sleeper cells. They are military trained, but also they are involved in finance, which finance the religious kind of finance. The homes, the collection of this money so that's the first kind of sleeper cell. The second kind of sleeper cell is the diplomatic sleeper cell. It's basically like, I mean, the individuals who are extra stuff, you know, in the embassies and they have, they do nothing except recruitment, espionage, and all of these things. So, you know, this is like what they do. That's the second kind of sleeper cell. The third sleeper cell is proper espionage. And, you know, who are ordinary individuals, they could be doctors actually in the uae there I said a doctor recently who was a sleeper cell. And this is where the underbelly, the underbelly of each of these countries, whether it is in Latin America or in Eastern Europe even. And in Europe is the two kind of drivers, the taxi slash Uber driver and the delivery, the food delivery motorbike driver.

A (55:32)

I'm not kidding, like a Deliveroo guy is, is an Iranian sleeper cell agent.

B (55:36)

We caught some of them here, like, you know, in the UAE recently.

A (55:38)

Oh, my goodness, yes.

B (55:41)

So because they have access to, in neighborhoods, like, you know, who, who would suspect, you know, basically like a guy on a motorbike with a bus box basically behind them says, you know, any of these, like in a Deliveroo or Uber Eats or whatever, or Kareem. I mean, at the end of the day, like, basically they will go around, they will collect information when in fact they are not in a delivery. They are being paid hundreds of dollars in order, like to collect information. So the same thing in Brazil, you know, or in. Or in Paris or in, you know, for example, another city I investigated for IRGC and Hezbollah activities. You know, their center in all of Eastern Europe, which is the city of Cluj in Romania.

A (56:19)

Wow. Cluj, a lovely city in Transylvania. I think I've been there.

B (56:24)

Yes, it's in Transylvania. I mean, you know, they love vampires there, so. But they are in all of these exotic places, even in the city of Ljubljana in Slovenia, they have like their own centers. So you have, you know, basically these. In a third kind of sleeper cell, the individuals who actually collect information and all of their mission, they are not trained on militant activities. Their entire mission is collect information on individuals, on installations, on sites, secret information, whether it is technology, defense, medicine, industry designs, IPs, anything, they will collect.

A (57:08)

So what are the other two types of sleeper cells then?

B (57:11)

The other two types is the business front. So like the people I met in Cidade Dilaste, you know, so these are the business fronts. Those people, like, basically who owns, you know, mostly mobile phone shops or they own restaurants. And I will tell you about restaurants later. Like Basically, I identified several restaurants in London that are IRGC owned.

A (57:34)

Oh, wow.

B (57:35)

Yes. You know, so and then you have like, in basically their, you know, favorite, you know, business, which is basically money exchange, they buy a lot of these licenses on behalf of Western Union. And I remember, like in basically Western Union, you know, for some reason wanted, you know, my help. But then basically they stopped, you know, because they realized that if I were to, you know, start investigating, like, you know, basically, it's like bringing a fox into the hands, you know.

A (58:06)

Goodness gracious, Eamon. This is also distressing.

B (58:09)

Yeah, so MoneyGram, all of these places, they buy these little, you know, little like in the corners. Even very small little franchises. Yeah, yeah, franchises within a shop, you know, so. So there will be, you know, for example, if you go to Edgewood Road in London or if you go basically like, I mean, to, you know, Saint Germain, like in Paris or in Molenbeck in Brussels and, you know, many other, like, I mean, you will see these little shops, you know, that are grocery shops, but inside them there is Western Union or MoneyGram. You go in, there is this little, very little window. You go to them, you know, and you say, well, I have, you know, €10,000 to send to here or there. Whatever they say in a festival at the beginning, they say to you, traditional or, you know, you know, the usual service or the privileged service, especially if they see you as an Arab and everything and all of that. So what's the privilege service? Who sent you? So basically, like, I mean, usually I would say, well, call them or bark or whatever. Like, these are the people like, basically who sent me. Like, I mean, and they say, okay, fine, no problem at all. And they give you a market exchange rate. In other words, they don't make a cent on it, at least the appearance, but the whole thing is. So they can like, you know, basically, you know, use it as a money laundering tactic there. They don't make money, they lose on the revenue. But this is how they, you know, when the. When someone come in with the cash, they can cash it on for them. So, for example, let's say I come to them and the money actually is the proceed of drug sales. Drug sales, yeah, let's say £10,000. I go to them, they will, you know, do all the invoicing and everything and all of that, and voila. I receive on my revolut, you know, you know, app. £8,000. They took £2,000, their cut from having done all of these hoops for the money basically, to go through certain journeys and Then to come back basically to my account. So money laundering is part of their mission. So these are the fourth cell, the last cell. Now this is where we come into it. Those who are trained on acts of terrorism and sabotage, they have experience.

A (60:22)

Okay, so this is what most people will think of as a sleeper cell.

B (60:25)

Exactly. But the problem is these people, the last cell, the last kind of cell couldn't exist without the other four cells. No, I see, yeah, they couldn't exist without the mosque. Basically, like, you know, I mean, the religious cell that will contain them. They couldn't act without the, you know, other cells.

A (60:44)

Diplomatic cover that.

B (60:45)

Diplomatic cover and everything. They couldn't act like basically without the information gathering of the other, other cells

A (60:50)

and then the money.

B (60:51)

The money, you know, and actually to give you an example, do you know how IRGC operatives, you know, whether they are Lebanese or Bahraini or Iraqi or Yemeni, when they are in London, you know, basically. Do you know like in a. Basically how they get their salaries? No, how they go to certain restaurants in London and let's say Persian restaurants on. In Maidaville in Kilburn and these places.

A (61:14)

I like those restaurants though, Eamon. They're. They're delicious.

B (61:18)

Exactly. Especially Mirza, Gassmi and Subz and all of that. I'm not talking about names of restaurants, I'm talking about names of dishes here. Yeah, Merza, Gassame, Subz, you know, Kebab Bag, Shello, Kebab Mahsooz, Chela, Kebab Sultani.

A (61:30)

So these IRGC agents go to these restaurants in London. What do they do? How do they get money?

B (61:35)

They just go, you know, sit down on the table and then basically say, you know, they order a dish that is not on the menu, you know, so the password is. Is a dish that is impossible to be on the menu, you know, so for example, like, you know, basically they will be, you know, asking for, oh, can I have a bouillabaisse, which is a French soup or. Yeah, yeah. Or can I have the chicken keef? You know, and so, wow, as soon as I say the chicken keef, you know, the, you know, waiter will ask basically, like, I mean, if it's with salad or fries or whatever. So he knows what is the exact amount and the exact rank of the individual.

A (62:15)

Wow.

B (62:15)

So the waiter is a fucking irgc.

A (62:19)

Wow, Eamon. This is something out of a James Bond or a Jason Bourne film. Are you serious?

B (62:24)

Do you know that there was a mosque, One single mosque without naming the name, but it was closed thanks to. And I know Many people in the British Counterterrorism Police who listen to my podcast, they remember my training. They remember my training, the training I delivered, and the investigation that was done into this mosque. Okay, so that mosque was collecting on annual basis, 155 million pounds from all the followers of Imam Khamenei, Ayatollah Khamenei, the now deceased one in the uk from the Iraqis, from the Lebanese, you know, basically from the Yemenis, like, you know, who follow, you know, the line of Ayatollah Khamenei. And it was in a bank, in a. Basically, that is one of the boutique banks in that account £155 million a year. So basically, when they disperse all of these salaries, of course, they do it in cash, and they do it. So when the waiter go inside, he comes back with a normal Iranian dish or whatever, but with also an envelope. And that envelope will contain the three or four thousand pounds or five or six, depending. And that's the salary of the militant individuals. These individuals who are just living there, waiting, waiting to strike. And some of them are taxi drivers. Some of them basically, like in the. Basically are students in universities. Some of them basically are, you'll be surprised, nurses or doctors. At the end of the day, they are just waiting for the time to be told, well, do something. So they get in touch with their cell leader, and as a result, their cell leaders activate them. They get in touch with him, and they are told, well, do you remember we are being given certain targets to choose from and to act against.

A (64:18)

And you think that the recent spate of attacks in Western countries that I listed at the beginning of the episode may have been carried out by individuals in cells like these. But then. And also earlier things. So, like in 2011, a plot was uncovered to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, for example. Now, this was linked to Iran. In 2018, there was an attempted bombing in France of an Iranian opposition rally.

B (64:46)

Yes.

A (64:46)

So do we think that these are examples of the activation of sleeper cell agents?

B (64:51)

Exactly. And this is, you know, and people don't understand. These sleeper cells exist from Alaska again to Patagonia, you know, all over West Africa, from, you know, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d', Ivoire, especially in Abidjan is like the capital of Hezbollah in all of Africa. That's Abidjan for you. I'm sure many listeners will be looking at me, you know, pulling their hair out of frustration. I mean, Lagos, Mauritius, and of course in Eastern Europe is Cluj, and to some extent, Ljubljana, Paris is one of these locations. And we could go on and on. And London, of course, Londonistan, who could basically forget about Londonistan, the role it plays in the IRGC wider network.

A (65:43)

But what about the United States, Eamon?

B (65:44)

It's Dearborn, Michigan, with some cells exist under the protection of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in places like California and Texas. And we could go on and on about them. Now, don't forget also the Gulf. Now we come into the gcc, your neighborhood. Exactly. Because we are the biggest target and therefore we have our biggest share of sleeper cells who are unfortunately, unfortunately do not need to be diaspora. Unfortunately, because of the manipulation of eschatology and the Shia faith, some young and foolish inner members of the Shia communities in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain, in Qatar and in the UAE sold their souls to the Ayatollahs and decided to betray their own nation states. And, you know, despite the opulent, you know, an amazing living standards and the incredible opportunities that these Shia citizens enjoy and you know, please investigate before you tell me they are, you know, isolated and poor and whatever. Just like look at Kuwait, look at Bahrain, look at Saudi Arabia. It's not the case at all, but nonetheless they are recruited. And then of course, like, I mean, I'm, you know, in the last several weeks there has been significant amount of arrests in Kuwait, in Bahrain and Saudi, in the uae of members of the Shia communities who are citizens of these countries. Some of them have high paying jobs. That's what, what kills me.

A (67:30)

Like what kind of jobs?

B (67:32)

Okay. One of those who was arrested in Bahrain for giving extremely sensitive data and information about locations and individuals and places in Bahrain to the Iranian government was a computer engineer, one of the top computer engineers in the Bahrain National Statistic Agency. So he was a director in the Bahrain National Statistic Agency.

A (68:04)

Oh my.

B (68:05)

On pay. And his pay is the equivalent basically of $182,000 a year, tax free.

A (68:14)

Wow.

B (68:15)

And he was given medal by the Minister of Interior and a recognition certificate for his role in designing the Bahraini passport.

A (68:27)

Oh my goodness.

B (68:29)

It's not like we're talking about the deprived here.

A (68:32)

These are ideologues. They're fellow travelers. They have been recruited to a revolutionary, radical global movement.

B (68:40)

Exactly. And so for me, when I know that in another Gulf country, it's someone who was responsible for zoning skyscrapers in the municipality of one of the largest cities in the world, and his salary was $22,000 a month, tax free, plus parks and everything.

A (69:04)

Oh, gosh, I'm in the wrong business. Podcasting doesn't pay nearly as much as

B (69:09)

that Eamon, the paypack didn't come from the irgc. It came from their own countries, you know, which they betrayed.

A (69:17)

Now, Eamon, we have to wrap. We have to wrap this episode up for. No, because you've got to go, as you told me yourself. So what are we gonna. I mean, are there any stories, particularly stories from your, from your past that you want to share? Or can we just go straight to the question of what listeners, and maybe particularly our listeners in the west, in America, in Britain, in Europe, what they might expect to happen as this war continues? You made it clear at the beginning of this episode the war is not going to end anytime soon. Maybe two months, maybe longer. It might go on. For if Iran has only so far activated its amateurs, as you called them, and they have their professionals still to activate, what might we see throughout the West?

B (70:04)

Indeed, we will see several types of attacks. The first one will be attacks on the grid and national infrastructure. We will see that, so sabotage against electricity pylons and pipe, and also fiber optics basically to disrupt Internet and telecommunications. We will see attacks against even cell towers, the mobile phone towers. We will see attacks against the water installations and facilities, especially the places where they are most vulnerable. We will see also the attacks against synagogues. We might see basically an attack against a nightclub frequented by either Jews or Americans. We could see an attempted attack against the gates of military barracks, especially in a military barracks shared with the US Personnel in certain bases. That's basically when we talk about Germany, when we talk about France, when we talk about the uk that's the kind of things we might expect. We will see potential attacks, especially stabbing and whatever, in hotels where Jewish or Israeli tourists basically are known to frequent. So unfortunately, this is going to be activated on a mass scale over the next two months as the war progresses. Because we said the war will continue

A (71:28)

two months, and you're saying with 100% sort of certainty, you know this is going to happen.

B (71:34)

I would make it 110%.

A (71:36)

Okay.

B (71:36)

You know. Yeah, it's inevitable. It's inevitable. And within the next two months, watch out for the synagogues, for the hotels, for sabotage on national infrastructure. Unfortunately, that will become a phenomenon. But the sleeper cell is there. And remember, there isn't just only one type of sleeper cell, there are five, as I have explained, as far as the Iranian access of power diaspora is concerned.

A (72:07)

And are the security agencies in Britain, in America, in France, in Germany, are they awake to. Are they working hard to find these cells, to uncover them, to neutralize them?

B (72:21)

Based on those who I Talk to Germany already preempted this by a year. I mean more than a year ago they arrested 1,060 plus IRGC and Hezbollah operatives. Many were deported, businesses were closed. They're good. The German authorities, oh my God, like basically they're really good. They did it like in a. Basically decisively, you know, and you know, without fuss. Like, you know, basically just go arrest

A (72:49)

them, close their business and without much fanfare. People haven't really heard about this. That's a lot of arrests.

B (72:54)

Yes, 1060, you know, it's well known. In addition, the French are trying to be more like one by one, two by two, three by three. Like, I mean they're trying to be like, I mean basically like in a. More discreet about it. The British are like really good. They are like, I mean monitoring everything. There has been several arrests as you have seen. Like basically several plots were thwarted. So they are on top of it in terms of awareness, but the scale of it might overwhelm them. That's what I'm afraid of, to be honest.

A (73:31)

Oh dear. Well, dear listeners, that's it for this week's episode with Eamon Dean of Conflicted. It was all about Iranian sleeper cells and some really interesting analysis at the top, top there about the war, what's going on. It's not likely to end soon. Thank you very much, dear friend. I think I can announce, I think it's fair to announce that this evening, Eamon, you will be going on the Piers Morgan show to give Piers Morgan's millions of viewers a bit of dose of conflicted energy.

B (74:02)

Indeed.

A (74:03)

And I think we can just wish you well for that. Piers Morgan, I think it can be running the gauntlet because he often has a lot of loudmouthed, argumentative types. So you're gonna have to outshout them.

B (74:15)

Aemond, seeing the panel today, I think it's a very sane panel. Thank God for that.

A (74:21)

Oh, that's good.

B (74:22)

So we are not gonna have like any shouting matches. I think basically it's gonna be more of an intellectual, proper intellectual. That's what I hope. Exchange of opinion and analysis. I hope, at least I hope that will be the case.

A (74:35)

Well, we're proud of you, Eamon. We're glad that you're getting this recognition and that you're getting, you know, your knowledge and analysis more out there. Of course, it's also good for the little podcast that could Conflicted that continues to grow. Dear listeners, you should think about subscribing to Conflicted and becoming members of the conflicted community. Don't just be a dear listener, become a dearest listener and join our growing staple of dearest listeners who get an extra episode every week. Until then, you know, I think we can just say, stay well, Goodbye.

B (75:07)

Goodbye, everyone, and stay safe.

A (75:08)

Conflicted is a Message Heard Production. Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.