The U.S. spent billions to rebuild Afghanistan. Was it successful?

Summary

Podcast Summary: Consider This from NPR

Episode Title: The U.S. spent billions to rebuild Afghanistan. Was it successful?
Air Date: December 20, 2025
Host: Mary Louise Kelly (with Scott Detrow)
Guest: John Sopko, former Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

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Overview

This episode of Consider This centers on the recently released final report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an office tasked with monitoring and auditing U.S. spending on Afghanistan’s reconstruction over two decades. Host Mary Louise Kelly speaks in-depth with John Sopko, SIGAR’s last Inspector General, about the scope of the waste, reasons behind it, and whether the U.S. has learned any lessons as similar reconstruction efforts loom in places like Ukraine and Gaza.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Scale and Failure of U.S. Reconstruction in Afghanistan

• Report Highlights:
  • The U.S. spent $144 billion over 20 years on Afghanistan reconstruction.
  • SIGAR estimates $26–29 billion was outright wasted.
  • Sopko’s headline: “The vast majority of it was a failure.”
  • [01:44] John Sopko: “The headline is we spent 20 years in Afghanistan and spent $144 billion on reconstruction, and the vast majority of it was a failure.”
• Concrete Example of Waste:
  • Purchase of 20 non-functional Italian airplanes for $480 million; the planes were immediately unusable.
  • [02:20] John Sopko: “We bought about 20 airplanes from Italy that were in a junkyard in Sicily... The planes couldn’t fly. They basically were trashed almost immediately.”
• Infrastructure Missteps:
  • A USAID-funded $335 million power plant operated at less than 1% of its capacity because "they didn’t need it" and there was "no grid to connect it."
  • Additional waste included "buildings that melted," "roads never completed," and "bridges that fell down."
  • [03:10] John Sopko: "It was a very good power plant. Problem is they didn’t need it… There wasn’t a grid for it to be connected. Those are the type of things we saw."

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Why the Waste Happened

• Too Much, Too Fast:
  • Massive influx of funds to a country unprepared to absorb or manage it.
  • Sopko: "The problem wasn’t money. It wasn’t a lack of funds. It was almost the opposite."
  • [03:48] John Sopko: “We were our worst enemy in many ways… just the amount of money funneling in and where the money ended up going.”
• Empowering the Wrong Actors:
  • Money funneled to contractors tied to Afghan warlords—historically unpopular figures—thus alienating ordinary Afghans and undermining U.S. efforts.
  • [04:04] John Sopko: “A lot of the money was going to Afghan contractors who were somehow connected to Afghan warlords... This alienated the average Afghan.”
  • Sopko’s mother’s wisdom: “If you go to bed with dogs, you wake up with fleas.”
• Warning Signs Ignored:
  • Sopko shares that despite repeated red flags raised in reports and Congressional testimony, there was little effect on policy.
  • [06:55] John Sopko: “Basically, it was, ‘Thank you very much, Mr. Sopko, you’re doing a wonderful job… keep up your good work.’ And they just continued pumping the money.”
• Inertia and Reluctance to Admit Failure:
  • Institutional momentum and reluctance to acknowledge fundamental problems kept projects moving despite visible dysfunction.
  • [07:31] John Sopko: "Once you start something like this, there's a tendency to just keep it going... Nobody wants to be the general or the ambassador or the AID administrator who says, well, I think it was a mistake."

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Lessons Learned (or Not)

• Bleak Outlook for Future Reconstruction Efforts:
  • Sopko argues that the U.S. government has not internalized the lessons from Afghanistan.
  • He is especially concerned about the diminished oversight capacity if reconstruction happens in Ukraine or Gaza.
  • [08:16] John Sopko: “No. I usually try to be an optimist, but no, I don’t see it. Particularly with the destruction of USAID. You eliminated all oversight, all capability in the government to carry out a reconstruction effort.”
  • Expertise in reconstruction and oversight has been eroded: “The worker bees out in the field… they're gone. They've all taken retirement, have been fired.”
• Lack of Accountability:
  • Failure to learn from past mistakes increases the risk of history repeating itself.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Waste:
  • [02:20] John Sopko: “We bought about 20 airplanes from Italy that were in a junkyard in Sicily... The planes couldn’t fly. They basically were trashed almost immediately.”
• On Structural Problems:
  • [03:48] John Sopko: “We were our worst enemy in many ways… just the amount of money funneling in and where the money ended up going.”
• On Empowering Warlords:
  • [04:04] John Sopko: “If you go to bed with warlords or oligarchs... you end up in the morning having to explain to the average Afghan why you're doing that.”
• On Ignored Warnings:
  • [06:55] John Sopko: “Thank you very much, Mr. Sopko, you’re doing a wonderful job… keep up your good work. And they just continued pumping the money.”
• On Hopelessness for Reform:
  • [08:16] John Sopko: “No. I usually try to be an optimist, but no, I don’t see it.”

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Key Timestamps

• [01:44] – Sopko’s summary of the report: $144 billion spent, most of it “a failure.”
• [02:20] – Example of wasted spending: non-functional Italian airplanes.
• [03:10] – Infrastructure example: $335 million unused power plant.
• [03:48] – Analysis of the key problem: money flooding into an unready system.
• [04:04] – Discussion on funding warlords and alienating local Afghans.
• [06:55] – Sopko on his warnings being ignored by policymakers.
• [07:31] – On institutional inertia and reluctance to admit failure.
• [08:16] – Sopko’s pessimistic take on whether lessons have been learned.

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Tone and Language

The conversation is frank and direct, with moments of skepticism and frustration regarding wasted resources and unheeded warnings. Sopko employs analogies and colorful language (e.g., “If you go to bed with dogs, you wake up with fleas”) to underscore systemic issues. The mood is reflective, somber, and tinged with pessimism regarding prospects for future U.S.-led reconstruction efforts abroad.

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a clear-eyed, unsparing assessment of U.S. nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, drawing on the most comprehensive government audit to date. John Sopko identifies how deep-seated structural flaws, a lack of accountability, and persistent institutional inertia led to massive waste and poor outcomes—while warning that, without meaningful reform and retained expertise, similar future endeavors are likely to repeat these failures.

Transcript

[Scott Detrow]

Foreign.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

It's Consider this from npr. I'm Mary Louise Kelly. Every other Saturday, we share a bonus episode for our NPR supporters. Today we are making that episode available to everyone so you can get a taste of NPR if you are not a supporter yet. And if you are, thank you so much for your support. You can learn more about NPR at. Plus that link is in our episode notes. 20 years notice how long the US fought in Afghanistan. From the invasion in 2001 to the chaotic withdrawal in 2021, the United States has poured billions into rebuilding the country. And now we have the fullest accounting yet of what those billions bought. It comes in the form of a report from a US Watchdog, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, known as CARGAR. This is the final report from CARGAR. The agency shuts down next month and it chronicles, and I am quoting, a two decade long effort fraught with waste. John Sapko was the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. We have interviewed him many times over the years. Today he's in the studio with me in person. Mr. Sopko, good to see you. See you. And speak with you once again.

[John Sopko]

Well, thank you for inviting me. It is a pleasure to be here.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

So this is a report that runs 137 pages. It summarizes years, the full accounting, the totality of cigar's work. If I were to ask you to write the headline in a sentence or two, what would it be?

[John Sopko]

The headline is we spent 20 years in Afghanistan and spent $144 billion on reconstruction, and the vast majority of it was a failure. This report identified the failures and identified how much that we determined based upon all of our audits, investigations and inspections, et cetera, how much was actually wasted, which came to about $26 billion. 26 to $29 billion.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Give me a concrete example of that waste.

[John Sopko]

Well, we bought about 20 airplanes from Italy that were in a junkyard in Sicily. We purchased them to send over to Afghanistan for the Afghans to learn how to fly. These planes, they're like smaller versions of the C130. They're called G222s and 400, I believe, $480 million on it. And the planes couldn't fly. They basically were trashed almost immediately.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Like literally couldn't get off the ground.

[John Sopko]

Well, they could, but parts fell off.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

I was reading another example. CIGAR found a $335 million power plant, a USAID power plant, that it was operating at less than 1% of its capacity. Less than 1%.

[John Sopko]

That's correct. That was one of the things we found too, and it was a very good power plant. Problem is they didn't need it. It wasn't really connected and there wasn't a grid for it to be connected. Those are the type of things we saw. We saw buildings that melted, we saw roads that were never completed, bridges had fell down.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

What you're speaking highlights one of my key takeaways from this report, which was the problem wasn't money. It wasn't a lack of funds. It was almost the opposite. The US Spent way too much money way too fast in a country that the report says was woefully unprepared to absorb it.

[John Sopko]

Absolutely. That is the big problem. We were our worst enemy in many ways, and one was with just the amount of money funneling in and where the money ended up going to. It wasn't just US contractors or international contractors. A lot of the money was going to Afghan contractors and mainly Afghan contractors who were somehow connected to Afghan warlords. Because we befriended them, they used their connections with our people to get the money. And this alienated, not only did it waste of money, but it alienated the average Afghan out. And outside of Kabul, we were basically the problem. I remember my mother saying, if you go to bed with dogs, you wake up with fleas. Well, if you go to bed with warlords or oligarchs or whatever you want to call them, you end up in the morning having to explain to the average Afghan why you're doing that. Because these were the people who they hated and these are the people who they kicked out to bring in the Taliban the first time. So what did we do? We made friends with those people.

[Scott Detrow]

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[Mary Louise Kelly]

John Sopko I identified you as the former Special Inspector General. You were among a number of inspectors general fired by President Trump back in January. Correct. He has defended that decision, the firings across the board. The White House has cited changing priorities as the reason. It does prompt me to ask, how involved were you in this final accounting?

[John Sopko]

I originated the idea and got it going and reviewed. I don't know how many drafts before January. The report was almost done or should have been done toward the summer. It didn't change too much when you.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Raised red flags, like, hey, guys, we're spending billions and it's being wasted. And I know you raised red flags because you testified frequently on Capitol Hill. You gave a bunch of interviews. I did some of them with you over the years that you were chronicling this. When you raised red flags to policymakers in Washington, what'd they say?

[John Sopko]

There was some support by some members of Congress. But that's one of the issues I think we should have addressed more in the report is why did all of our warnings go to naught? Basically, it was, thank you very much, Mr. Sopko, you're doing a wonderful job. You know, a little pat on the head, you know, keep up your good work. And they just continued pumping the money.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

It prompts the question, why? Why was there so much inertia? Why wasn't this documented report by a US Government funded watchdog taken more seriously? Why didn't anything change?

[John Sopko]

Part of it, I think, is that once you start something like this, there's a tendency to just keep it going. Nobody wants to be the general or the ambassador or the AID administrator who says, well, I think it was a mistake. That's human nature. We confronted that and we were saying the emperor had no clothes. What we were doing in Afghanistan was not working. And people didn't want to hear that.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Is there anything here that should give us hope that lessons have been learned? I'm thinking about wars around the world today. Ukraine, Gaza. The US Is presumably going to be involved in reconstruction. Anything that gives you hope that this will be done better with more accountability?

[John Sopko]

No. I usually try to be an optimist, but no, I don't see it. Particularly with the destruction of usaid. You eliminated all oversight, all capability in the government to carry out a reconstruction effort.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Although, in fairness, we were just talking about a USAID plant that was operating at less than 1% capacity in Afghanistan.

[John Sopko]

This is not to say that USAID did not make a lot of mistakes, and I think that was a problem. And a lot of the USAID administrators came in and testified and gave happy talk about all the great successes they were doing. But the worker bees out in the field, that's where your expertise was on development, they're gone. They've all taken retirement, have been fired. So if we do do reconstruction, and I think we're planning to do billions of dollars of reconstruction in the Ukraine, if they are going to do reconstruction in Gaza, where's the expertise? There is none. So I'm not optimistic if we go in there because we don't have that expertise.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

John Sopko, he was special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction from 2012 until this past January. He's been speaking with us about the final report from his former agency. John Sopko, thanks.

[John Sopko]

You're welcome. Thank you very much.

[Mary Louise Kelly]

Once again, you can go to plus.NPR.org to support public media. And as a thank you, you get bonus episodes like this one from many different NPR podcasts. You also get sponsor free listening and lots of Other great per plus.NPR.org this episode was produced by Daniel Offman and Katherine Fink. It was edited by Jeanette Woods. Our executive producer is Sammy Yenigun. I'm Mary Louise Kelly. Thanks for listening and thanks for supporting. Consider this from npr.

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