B (3:27)

Thank you so much. Thank you for having me again.

A (3:31)

Yeah. So our first episode dealt mainly with Cuba. And if people want to know more about you and your fascinating backstory, I highly recommend they go back and listen to our first episode where you tell your whole story of being exiled from Cuba for various reasons and making a career pivot and becoming a journalist and advocating for the human and political rights of people all over Latin America. But this makes you an ideal person to dive into the situation in Venezuela right now. So I'm going to skip sort of your backstory since we covered that in our first podcast, and get right to what's happening. I want to touch on the situation in Venezuela right now, but before I do that, I want someone to be able to listen to this episode, just as one episode, to tell you virtually everything basic that you need to know about what's going on in Venezuela. So in order to do that, can you give an overview that answers key questions? What was Venezuela like before Hugo Chavez took over? What did Hugo Chavez and then Nicolas Maduro do to the country and why? And what do you think the likely result for Venezuela is now that Maduro is gone? So I know those are big questions. Maybe you could just focus on the first two for a historical overview. What was Venezuela like? What did the Chavez Maduro regime do to it?

B (5:06)

So we've been covering Venezuela through our site for a long time. As you know, we have journalists right now on the ground covering and telling stories about what's happening as we speak. And everything is changing on the ground. So Venezuela was transformed. Oil transformed Venezuela through basically the 20th century into one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America. Oil production began around the 1920s with a lot of foreign investment, foreign investment also from U.S. companies. And by the 1950s that remained. And in the 1970s, some things began to change. So it was one of the richest economy in the world thanks to these high oil revenues, oil export, founded public work, social programs, education, healthcare. There was a lot of growth in the country. Now, politically, Venezuela went through many different phases. In 1958, Venezuela transitioned from military dictatorship to an electoral democracy. It was called the Fourth Republic. And this political power was shared among major parties through the Puntofijo Pact. And this helped ensure a lot of political stability and civilian rules. Now, even before Chavez took power, remember that he tried to take power by a coup in the early 90s and he failed. But then that gave him some notoriety and eventually he was able to win elections. So Venezuela was facing structural problems at the time. There was an over reliance in oil, which made the economy vulnerable to price swings. And when oil prices fell in the 1980s, in the 1990s, well, that also had an impact on poverty and poverty rose in the country. So between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, both these non oil sectors shrank significantly and the GDP in Venezuela suffered. There was a big impact on Venezuelan's growth. All of those factors, along with corruption, which is the common denominator, unfortunately in Latin America. Coleman. And this is something that we've had to deal. All of those factors made Chavez takeover a possibility, a very real possibility. Many Venezuelans were dissatisfied with. With economic inequality, with unemployment, with this corruption in the government. And again they drank the Kool Aid of socialism. Despite of all the evidence, everything that happened in Cuba. I remember those days very well. I remember when Chavez won. I remember his first trip to Havana when he met with Raul Castro. We all told Venezuelans and this is something that we discussed many times among Cubans in Venezuela because we share the same enemy. So we're very close as a community in that sense. Right. And we warn people, we warned them about the danger of Chavez. When we saw that he was trying to attempting to change the constitution, we realized that was exactly Castro's path, Castro's manual in Cuba. And a lot of people looked at us in disbelief. That's not gonna happen in Venezuela because we are a democracy. You guys really didn't have a democracy. Times have changed and unfortunately history proved that we were right and that Chavez became the worst chapter in Venezuelan history. And instead of fixing those problems that can be fixed through a democratic process, instead of fixing corruption, it simply transferred the corruption at all levels of Venezuelan society. Increase criminality in Venezuela and Venezuela, transforming what we have today, which is a military, a mafia state, a military that is embedded into this Cartel de los Solas. This organization is called Cartel de los Soles because it's the sign of the military, the Venezuelan military. Cartel de los Solas runs the country. Cartel de los Soles. It's completely embedded in all the drug trafficking in Latin America. And it has really taken a tremendous toll in society. And we have all seen the poverty, the displacement of millions of Venezuelans around the world, how it has destroyed not just inside, internally Venezuela, but also the toll that has taken in other countries in Latin America who had to respond to this refugee crisis that we have seen in recent years.

A (9:57)

Okay, so at what point did Venezuela's government change from basically a socialist and somewhat corrupt government into an actual drug cartel running the country? How did that transformation take place?

B (10:13)

Okay, so when, when Chavez took power, the role of the military in Venezuela with the drug trafficking was more like. More like a tall gatekeeper, right? They will. They would receive bribes in order to use the routes. There are three main routes in Venezuela for the drug traffic from Colombia and Venezuela and also for all the shipments that go to Puerto Cabello is a big port. And from that port, the drugs are exported into Europe and some into the United States, et cetera. So one of the. At the beginning, this was more decentralized and it did not have the same structure that it has today. But gradually Chavez became more ingrained into this system. And there was a perception back in the days after Chavez died and Maduro took power, there were many analysts who swore that, oh, sworn that now the drug trafficking and the role that Venezuela is having in this and the drug trafficking is going to decrease because Maduro is a civilian. Things are going to change. And what happened was completely the opposite. The Venezuelan government became. It is a criminal enterprise and acts as a criminal enterprise. Iranian presence who was already happening with Chavez, but increased. We have training camps of Hezbollah in Islam. Margarita, obviously the Cubans are very embedded inside the country. And the relationship with FAR dissidents strengthened the relationship with the eln. And it is a regime that is sustained by the royalties, by the drug trafficking industry that is undeniable. I'm a little bit. I was not expecting so much questioning about this because for us there is a big understanding. Everyone in Latin America knows el Cartel de los Solas is very famous. And everybody knows that it's run by the military in Venezuela. So you have to think of Cartel de los Soles instead of the regular way that we see other cartels like in Mexico, with like a very specific head of the cartel del Cartel de los Soles operates as a military unit. Right? So specific members of the military officers in Caraca, high ranking officers and officer in different states in Venezuela control different territories. So they don't compete among each other. They let each person control their territory in a way that doesn't Mean, they don't have internal problems, but they work in that way, like a military unit, like different commands, because they're military officers. And I remember back in. I believe it was 2018, when I was in Nicaragua and I was interviewing a few sources and I used. And I did a few stories on money laundering in Latin America. I had a few sources that told me once I was very naive, and I said, so the military is definitely receiving bribes to allow the drugs to pass. And they look at me. One of my sources I remember said, they're not receiving the bribe. They run the operation. It's their business. And that was, like, years ago. Right. So this is something that increased after 2013, increase after 2014, and now it's oil machine. Right. It's very well organized, and it has definitely taken a toll in Latin America. I don't think people understand the danger and the problems that we are facing, because Latin America, if this operation hadn't occurred, I think there is now an understanding inside our government, thankfully, that Latin America was about to get out of control. I hope this succeeds because the aftermath in our region, with the presence of Hezbollah, with the presence of this cartel, the way they're organizing, the amount of money they generate, I don't know if you're aware, but sometimes the cartels burn money. They burn money because they don't have enough places to store money.

A (14:38)

You're saying they burn money?

B (14:39)

Like they burn money? Yeah, they have cash.

A (14:41)

They literally. Are you saying they light cash on fire? Like in the dark night?

B (14:45)

Yes, correct. They light cash on fire. First time I learned that, I was in disbelief. They have these bodies, and sometimes they set it on fire because they don't have to store it. And they have so much that they don't really care. This was actually a story I did many years ago is like these narco potties that they have. Sometimes not everyone does it, but this is just to understand the amount of money that we are looking here, the amount of influence, the amount of politicians in Latin America that are bought, completely bought from South America to Mexico by.

A (15:25)

Is this mostly cocaine?

B (15:28)

Yes, it is mostly cocaine, but it's not just that. We have human trafficking, you have weapons trafficking, and of course, you have labs that are being set up. Well, that's particularly in Mexico. So you have illegal gold mining that is very. It's very big in Colombia, also Venezuela. You have all kinds of corruption and illegal trades. For example, in the. Gold mining is very complicated because a lot of that then gets to the United States and it is laundered here with companies and figureheads that they have around the world. It's very difficult to track.

A (16:14)

Right. So you've given an overview of how inextricable, how inextricably linked the issue of drugs are to the Venezuelan regime. Obviously, the other commodity that's important in particular from the American perspective is oil. And I want to ask you, not that you're in Trump's mind any more than I am or any other American journalist would be, but it's very important to understand what are Donald Trump's intentions here? What is he actually motivated by? There's many different reasons you could care about Venezuela. You care about Venezuela from a human rights perspective, and you've dedicated many years to advocating for victims of political repression and economic disaster. But there's very little in Trump's character to suggest that that's the reason he cares about this issue. He may also like that he has a chance to bring a restore freedom that already existed in Venezuela. But he's made it pretty clear that his main interest is oil. And, you know, Venezuelan oil companies had, or the state oil company had a close relationship with American oil companies for decades, and that redounded to the benefit of Americans, and that was lost under Chavez and Maduro. And Trump wants it back. Do you think that is the main reason for his intervention right now? Because you know that he's also sold many of his actions as a reaction to the drugs coming, allegedly coming into our country from Venezuela. And obviously there are some drugs coming into our country from Venezuela. But if that were the main motive, you would think his. His project would mainly be Mexico as opposed to. As opposed to Venezuela. So what I'm asking you, basically, and the reason this is important is because it may tell us how the situation is going to progress. What is in Trump's mind, what is he actually trying to achieve from his perspective?

B (18:31)

Okay. I think the part that I've heard this assessment about, if their concern was the drug trafficking, they would go into Mexico. Right. I think the problem is that people are forgetting that we have gone into Mexico to remove cartel leaders in the past. Right. The difference between Venezuela and Mexico, okay, is that the leader of the cartels and the people of the cartels are the government. I'm putting that obviously between quotes. So we have granted these cartel leaders diplomatic immunity. So by granting them diplomatic immunity, because these cartel leaders, basically. Let's go back to Pablo Escobar, right? Pablo's dream, Pablo Escobar dream, was to win power to become president, right? Because they knew that that grants them diplomatic immunity. And when you have that, you have a lot of. You have more possibilities. And you can actually do, you know, conduct your business in a very free way. You know, you have a lot of advantages and leverage. So that is a big difference between the situation in Mexico and the situation in Venezuela. That's why political scientists and people who study this explain Venezuela as a mafia state. You have leaders of the cartel. Imagine El Chapo Guzman. Imagine Pablo Escobar who took power. And I think this is what people are not understanding. And this has very real consequences because you have these people now sitting in the United Nations. They have the ALBA groups in Latin America. They have because of the profits, they have because of the oil, they have. They have a space inside all of an international system, all of our democratic system. It's not only what they're causing and the distress they're causing in a community in Mexico or in Colombia or in Costa Rica or in El Salvador. It's also the oppression against an entire country. And then because they have the diplomatic immunity and this cartel that took power of an entire country, one of the richest in the world, they have given the territory to terrorist organization. And this is something that has not been reported. But some of the information I have for sources inside the US Government is that the concerns were also about the terrorist activity that is taking place in the southern region. Okay. And I know that for several years, even law enforcement have been going to the tri border to South America because of the activity of Hezbollah. Remember that a percentage of this traffic that happened in Venezuela is also taking place with Brazil. But Hezbollah has embedded themselves also in this network of drug trafficking. So the situation with Venezuela is very different. Now, let me give another. Another point that I think is important to take into account to understand what's happening. For many years, people have been warning about how Venezuela, because the cartel runs the country, they have a very strong relationship, obviously, we know, with the Iranians, the Cubans, the Russians, the China, the Chinese. A month ago, A month ago, El Pollo Carbajal, Hugo Carbajal, who is sitting on a federal prison here in the US and he was extradited from Spain. He was an officer of intelligence in the Venezuelan government. He run also part of this drug trafficking enterprise. And that's why we extradited it. He defected from Venezuela in 2017, and in 2023, the US extradited him. Hugo Carbajal just said in the letter that he published, I believe, yes, a month ago. Finally, he admitted that he was guilty, that he did all that and his allegations were very serious. Number one, he explained how all the drug trafficking was designed by the Cuban regime with Hugo Chavez. The routes of the drug that they used to move the drugs were advised by the Cuban regime, Hugo Chavez, to damage the United States. He explained how Trendiara, what they sent people in the United States, that they're right now in our country. And I know this is all sounds like very hard to believe, but they explained how they had positioned people inside the United States for years. They explained how the Cubans would laugh and would joke around. And this is something that many think tanks have documentary in the past, but nobody listened. But now he said how the Cubans allege that they had thousands of people inside the US Government, okay? That Venezuela had many assets inside the US Government. How they bribe people in order to basically remain in power and downplayed and sanitize the seriousness of this regime. So if we look at the press, the mainstream press in general, we're not going to see a lot of this. But if you go at the Southco magazines, at the think tanks that have been researching the presence of Hezbollah.

A (24:18)

The.

B (24:19)

Seriousness of what is happening in that area, you get a very different picture of Trump's motivations. Now, going back to the oil, I do think because of the Venezuelan oil industry, definitely there's a lot of lobby, there's a lot of influence. My assessment is that the lobby was actually trying to prevent this from happening. I remember when Grinnell went into Venezuela, we criticized. He was widely criticized by the Venezuelans. He was laughing with Maduro and they were trying to cut this deal. And, and a lot of people were very upset when they saw the United States trying to cut a deal like that with the Venezuelan regime. And when Grinnell said that they didn't want regime change, that had a lot of back. Trump received a lot of backlash from a big part of his electorate, which is the conservative Latinos, who played a very important role. And I remember even the Cuban caucus that there were stories that they went and had meetings with him because of what this was causing in the community. The Cuban American community was not happy when they saw that the Venezuelan community that had voted for him was not happy when they saw that. And I have seen a shift also since that position that they took when they sent Grinnell to negotiate. From what's happening now. Now, I do think the role the oil industry played is that Venezuela oils industry, as you explained it, as we discussed, expanded after major discoveries that took place in the 1910s, in the 1920s, and US companies were among the first and the most important foreign investors in this industry. They helped develop this industry. And this is normal. Every country needs foreign investment. Okay. So obviously there was a lot of stake from this industry. Now this industry still have a lot of influence. And this because Venezuela needs to export its oil. Right. So I think the part that is important about the oil is that what Trump sees is an opportunity for the American business, because it's not the US Government, it's American business to also help develop this industry. Like it's going to happen everywhere in the world with foreign investment. It cannot happen in a vacuum. Right. And it's also a way he sees this as viable because actually Venezuela can pay for its own reconstruction, which he has to deal with a lot of the backlash domestically from when the US Makes these decisions to go abroad and free a country. Right. What we are seeing right now is a military operation that was flawless, but a political operation that it's a little bit clumsy, right. That we don't really know. And there's a lot of contradictory information because the political operation is ingrained with the media reaction inside our country. And our politicians have to respond and deal with all of this backlash and assessment. When I look at a lot of this focus on the oil industry, on Trump motivations, on the oil industry, I can only I have to think about what the Venezuelans are saying in the streets in El Arepasso, in all of the protests. They don't care about any of this because they don't have electricity. The oil industry was already stolen by China, by Cuba, by Russia. I mean, what was Del C. Rodriguez doing? What was Cuban regime doing? So Cuba owes the Venezuelan government billions of dollars from everything. All the oil that Venezuela gave the Cuban regime. When the Venezuelans gave the Cuban regime the oil do you think Cuba regime uses for its people? No, they resell it to China. They have this ghost flotillas that sometimes they go dark and they resell it to China. So that's another industry that have exploded. And there's a lot of people laundering money and stealing resources from Venezuela. So I do not know what Trump motivations are, but I do not know what he's doing. And what the United States did has given hope to millions of people. And if the United States a part of the assessment is okay, so this is a rich country and they are going to pay for the reconstruction. This is beneficial for everyone, for our industry, for our business, for them, for the region. I am not opposed to this kind of pragmatism of even utilitarianism because at the core of this decision, okay, it is a decision that took a lot of bravery. It is something that we were told it was impossible to do again, but it took a lot of moral clarity. And the benefit for the Venezuelan people, the benefit for Cuba, for Nicaraguans, that people talk very little about them, and for Latin America, for the region that I grew up with, the change for millions of millions of people. Coleman, I honestly don't care if his motivations are oil hotels. And I think that's why, when you look at the videos, Venezuelans don't care. They find even this assessment so disconnected from what we're going through. You know, it's an assessment. I understand. Right. Because, you know, it's logical and people want to try to find and make sense of everything that is happening. But when you're in Venezuela, when you're oppressed every day, God. At 8am after they took Maduro out, I was talking, you know, we have a WhatsApp group with people in Venezuela and my journalists, and they were so concerned because when they saw the Ozado Cabello still in power when Trump spoke and said that he was going to stay in Venezuela, that the U.S. you guys were not leaving, everyone on that chat started, like, screaming. Right. And people were like, crying of joy. The impact that this has in millions of people around the world. Nobody cares.

A (30:44)

Yeah.

B (30:45)

Is a factor from our perspective.

A (30:49)

Yeah, I'm with you there. I mean, so here's the reason I asked the question. Personally, I don't mind if Trump went in for oil and that leads to all these other good benefits. I think it's okay if US Oil companies also benefit from a regime change that brings human rights and economic prosperity to Venezuelans. I see that as a win win. Right. And I understand that in foreign policy, heads of state have to think about things and frame things from the perspective of their own country first. So there's this part of the American public that thinks if America benefits, the other country must be losing. Everything has to be zero sum. But that's actually not how the world works. It's possible for the American energy sector to benefit and for Venezuelans to win by decapitating a brutal dictator that's destroyed what was a really lovely country. However, here's my concern. My concern is that if it's true that oil is top of mind for Trump, is he going to accept a status quo where he makes a deal with the remnants of the Maduro regime, The Maduro regime makes a deal with him on oil. That's very favorable to US Oil interests and, and allows reinvestment in Venezuelan oil. And basically the oil relationship goes back to how it was, say, in the 90s. But Trump allows them to continue the regime of repression of the Venezuelan people because he's basically gotten what he wanted and he claims a win. That's the scenario I'm worried about. And that's why I think it actually does matter whether Trump is motivated primarily by oil or primarily by all the things you mentioned, by the fact that Hezbollah is in Venezuela, by the fact that they're exporting drugs all over the world, creating instability in the region. If he's motivated by those other things, then he's going to want to actually make sure that this regime change ends up in a regime that is actually better, that's actually committed to democracy, not stealing elections, getting terrorists out of Venezuela, getting the drugs under control and so forth. So from that perspective, do you agree that it matters what's in Trump's mind here?

B (33:30)

No, I definitely think it matters what is in Trump's mind. And of course, we're speculating, right? Because I don't know what is in his mind. I don't think anyone knows. Maybe not even Trump. Right. Maybe also assessing the situation Right. As we speak. I do know that that is not all what is in the mind of the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, that is not consistent with his legacy and with his values. And to be honest, I don't think that is on the mind of President Trump. And I'm gonna tell you why. Because that is what Grinnell was trying to do. Trump didn't. There was no need to remove Maduro to make a beneficial deal with Venezuela about oil, because that's what Venezuela's offer was, okay? That's what Grenell and the people in the oil lobby in this country, that's what they were pushing. That's why I want to go back to what happened at the beginning of the year and what happened in the meeting, at the backlash with that meeting. And there is actually an article when you see Representative Salas or Representative Jimenez, Mario Diaz, Bellar, there was an article how they went to the White House after that meeting with Grinnell. Because also, let's understand the backlash in domestic politics. Any administration that makes that kind of deal with Venezuela regime, with the Maduro regime, is going to lose the Cuban American vote, is going to lose the Latino vote that supports Republican. Let's understand also, if we want to talk about being transactional and domestic politics, maybe they don't care. Right? But you Cannot have the Cuban American vote. If you make a deal and if you continue on that path with the Maduro regime, it's not going to happen. Cuban Americans are not isolationists. And it's a big important. It's a very small part of the electorate, but it's very significant to win Florida, which is very important also for Republicans. Correct. I think there are also domestic implications when you assess how Republicans and the decisions that Republicans also make. Because big part of their voters are not isolationists. Big part of their voting bloc would repudiate something like that. Okay. You have a very isolationist base who is very skeptical of what Trump is doing. And Trump has to deal with this base. So he has to be very transactional and careful about how he justifies this. But the other part of his base is not that. Okay? The other part of his base is not going to vote for anyone who makes a deal with the Maduro regime. Just like Obama. I mean, look what happened with Cuba when they did the Cuban engagement. It was a time that the Cuban vote was changing. It was younger people were voting more Democratic. The moment they made a deal, they took thought the demographic change and that it was not going to matter. The Cuban American vote, even among young people, generations that came recently, increased towards Republicans. Why? Because of the backlash of making these concessions with this dictatorship. So this has an impact on domestic policies. I can assure you that. Because I'm embedded in the community, because I speak with people, I listen to people, the millions of people of Latinos that follow us and that read our site. And it is an important and significant block that the amount of people were disappointed when we saw that they were trying to make that deal with Maduro. So I don't think this was necessary to make that deal. Right. I think what Trump reverted was the Grinnell side. And even inside his administration, you have the Rubios goals, his moral standing, his moral clarity. And you have this. The push of people like Grinnell and other people inside the administration that were trying to move Trump in a different direction. And my assessment is that they failed. Right. I'm not saying they don't exist. I'm not saying they're not gonna try to push. I also wanna clarify. There's a lot of money going and flowing through this country from lobbyists that are even appearing in media shows, influencers, and they're trying to push this. I mean, you probably. They tried to even portray it a few months ago. The Maduro regime is conservative. I don't know if you remember that story.

A (38:24)

Yeah, no, Tucker Carlson is still trying to do that.

B (38:26)

He's gone because someone should remove the microphone from this guy. Unless when he tries to discuss Latin America. Please. They obviously doesn't know it.

A (38:39)

He's saying that Trump wants to go in there in order to bring social liberalism to the country, like gay marriage. And it's, It's. It's so disconnected from reality. It's. It's become a mockery. The far right in this country has become a mockery of this country.

B (38:54)

A mockery. It's. I don't waste my time watching any of that because it's like going into a mental institution and listen to people who are like, you know, have no sense of what's happening. Okay, let's talk about disconnected from reality. If I criticize that sometimes the media is disconnected from reality. From reality when they make these assessments. Right. When you go into that site, it's the same thing. Or worse. In his case, it's worse. But let's not even waste our time with that. But what I'm trying to. The point, I'm trying to convey is that dealing with our internal. With the base, with the media, with the backlash, with the numerous assessment, with the internal dynamics of the United States makes this political operation very complicated. Okay. I can assure you. I mean, it just makes sense that the United States has no. It's in a position of power to negotiate, even negotiate with the regime that is in place, because the regime is still in place in Caracas. Right. They have a lot of leverage. What complicates this political negotiation is the internal forces inside this country and everything that they have to also deal politically. It's a very risky move because like we said, you have a base that is. In the case of Trump, he has a base that is divided. So it took a lot of courage. It is a very risky political move that I think they know that they need this to succeed. And I also think it's gonna be a big part of his legacy. I think he sees himself, and he expressed this as a person that has fixed problems that nobody thought he could fix. I think that is a bigger motivator than oil for Trump's personality, right. To be seen as this person who did the unthinkable, make the longest dictatorship in the Western hemisphere collapse. If it's in the case of Cuba, destroy the Maduro regime, I mean, I think that is a big motivator for him also. He's going to pass in the pages of history. If this succeeds, it's going to change. And it's also, we're seeing our geopolitical alignment, which is fascinating to watch, right? Because what you have here, forget about Venezuela, it's not just Venezuela. You have right now a hybrid war where the US Is battling through this satellite in South America, the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians. And if we succeed in this and the United States is able to do a transition, they're dealing with this regime, remove this regime and actually allow the opposition to take power and move through a democratic future, rebuild Venezuela, the energy, you're going to see an entire realignment on the Western Hemisphere. You're going to take out from the Western Hemisphere these foreign adversaries that for 20 years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States completely forgot about Latin America. And our foreign policy towards Latin America has been completely misguided. People don't have knowledge about Latin America. There's no interest about Latin America. We don't invest the resources on the region. From an intelligent point of view also, they have forgotten completely on the region. And this is some. I discussed this with people, the State Department, with many people in the government because it's frustrating for us, right? Because we were seeing everything that was happening and it's like we are allowing to build a Middle east in sense of the instability and all the violence that has been developing, escalating in Latin America. What the United States. I want to convey to the American people and your audience, we need this to succeed. It's not just about the Venezuelan people, it's about the stability of the region of the United States. Because we are going to face, if this doesn't get fixed in South America, we really are going to be facing a crisis in terms of national security because we have all of these terrorist groups who have been slowly and gradually moving into this region, exploiting the richness to finance these groups. And Iran is there. And Iran's mentality is not just transactional. Right. So I think this is very important to open our eyes and realize that we are really trying to prevent a crisis in the making. I mean we, I mean the United States, the administration.

A (43:46)

Let's talk a little bit about the Cuba, Venezuela relationship. I think a lot of Americans were surprised to learn that something like 30 of the soldiers, police officers, whatever you want to call them that were killed in the operation were Cuban, not Venezuelan. Why were Cubans, the ones in Maduro's inner circle, defending him? How did that relationship come to pass? And what does this operation mean for the possibility of regime change in Cuba?

B (44:18)

Correct. Well, the Cuban regime has embedded itself in Venezuela for Decades since Chavez traveled in 1994 and met with Castro. Castro and Chavez developed a very close relationship. We have said it and has been documented. Books have been reading about it, about the Cubans takeover of Venezuela. If you listen to some of the testimonies of Venezuelans who have been tortured in prison, they tell you many times there were Cubans the ones who tortured me. I could hear Cubans access. So the Cubans embedded in themselves in every sector of Venezuela, at the military, in the intelligence community, they have completely taken. Why? Well, the Cuban regime has a lot of expertise in intelligence. It was framed by the Soviet Union, it was more sophisticated. I was listening before we began this interview. I was listening to former shift of Latin America for the CIA shift of operation. And he was making an assessment about the role that Cuba has been played playing in Venezuela for years. So Cuba needed this relationship. Okay, let me briefly explain what happened in 1994. Cuba was about to collapse. We had El Maleconazo big protests. Their economy was completely in ruins. It was the special period. It could not have survived. Right, because they had lost all of them. The funding and the. And the subsidies from the Soviet Union. Correct. So Chavez travels. Castro tells Chavez come to Havana and they begin to develop. Castro hadn't even paid attention to Chavez before that. That's what some accounts. They begin to develop this very close relationship. And Castro designed the entire manual for Chavez how to remain in power, transform the constitution. Everything they did in Cuba and said, and we are going to provide you, okay, the intelligence that you need to control that country. Because if we know how to do something is to control a population. Right. They have been doing it for over 60 years. So in exchange for all of the intelligence, all of this military support, et cetera, Chavez began to give Cuba this. Their subsidies in the form of oils. And then Cuba embedded intelligence and better military gave them doctors. I think we discussed this in the past. Doctors. Cuban health workers are subject to a modern form of slavery that has been recognized by the United nations because countries pay the Cuban regime for the doctors X amount. And the Cuban regime confiscate 90% of the salary of health workers. Right. Now what we saw is that for years the Cuban regime has been denying that they had troops in Venezuela. Everybody knew it was documented, but they denied. The US is lying. We have no troops or no troops of Cuban troops in Venezuela. Now what we realize and what they had to acknowledge on Sunday the Cuban regime is that they lost 32 soldiers and they were members of the armed forces that were not police officers. They were members of Cuba's armed forces, and they were members also of the Ministry of Interior. Some people think there were some black beret. This is a unit that was trained by China back in the early 2000s. So you have all of the inner circle protecting Maduro was Cuban, and also some parts of the outer circle. It's Cubans. Cubans have embedded themselves at all levels also to monitor any dissent and to control the population, because they know how to do that. So they're the ones who have guaranteed the regime to stay in power by allowing them to lease all of their structure, the repressive system, their mechanism, everything they have learned for over half a century in exchange for oil, in exchange for all of this money that the Cuban regime has stolen from Venezuela to finance the repression, obviously at home. And as we discussed. And then what they do, the Cubans do sometimes is that Venezuela sends Cubans the oil and Cubans resell the oil to China and they profit from this. The Cuban regime needs this, and Venezuela needs this because it is because the Cuban repressive system that Venezuela did not have, a sophisticated repressive system that Cuba had, It was modeled from the KGB that the Venezuelan regime was able to stay in power. If we go back to the indictment in 2020, there were also some comments there about the role that Cuba plays in this drug trafficking because they're providing the defense, they're providing the ships. Also, sometimes the Cuban military owns a lot of ships. I mentioned the other day that Cuban military owns 80, 85% of the countries of Cuba, hotels, industries, et cetera, they belong to the Cuban military. Again, very complicated system because we're talking about two cartels. Correct. The Cuban military has companies abroad. Obviously, they're not military companies. They have them in the hands of figureheads around the world pretending they're civilian, but they are controlled by Cuban intelligence and by the Cuban regime in order to launder this money. Right, because the money, the drugs come to the U.S. but the money has to go down to Latin America. Right. So you need all of this financial structure to clean the money. Right. So you have a lot of companies in the United States to belong to, figureheads that are allowing all of this structure to continue and to finance all of this, and they're laundering the money for all of these enterprises. And definitely I have to assume that this is a big concern of the United States also.

A (50:54)

So why hasn't America done regime change in Cuba? I mean, obviously this operation in Venezuela, from a military perspective, was incredibly impressive. It was precise, it was Highly organized. It went off without a hitch. It involved an enormous number of resources that all came down on the same mission without any mistakes that have been reported thus far. It showed a level of competence that is obviously the US has the best military in the world. We know that. But even accounting for that, it showed a level of competence that was surprising to people. And it begs the question, why hasn't America done something like this with Cuba? The Cuban regime has been in place since 1959, right?

B (51:45)

Yes, correct.

A (51:46)

A very long time. Many, I mean, in principle, many opportunities. What are the variables that are different in Cuba that make it so that we haven't done that?

B (51:57)

There haven't been political will to do that. We during the Reagan administration, if you ask many people in our community, I hear this so often, they say we thought every day that today was our day. Right. We were told every day it is happening. And Reagan that it's widely admired by. By Cuban Americans. But Reagan never did it. Bush never did it. I think after 9 11, a lot of the priorities for the United States shifted towards the Middle East. I also think to go back to what I mentioned, I think since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was this perception in Washington that communism was no longer a threat. Cuba had lost its benefactor. Cuba was going to fall by its own weight. A lot of people did not anticipate what Castro was going to do in Venezuela and the level of success that he was going to have in Venezuela and taking over Venezuela the way that they did. There was a lot of skepticism inside Washington. Like I said, I think it's for. Unfortunately, for the past 20, even 30 years, there has been a lack of interest in general and a constant uphill battle from the Latino community, Venezuelans, Cubans, especially Cubans, et cetera, Nicaraguans, to try to make people in Washington, policymakers to understand other factors that are in place that we sometimes think might have played a role. Is that when you look at the past 20 years, the amount of Cuban regime intelligence agents that have been captured in the US And Abele Montes that we discussed, wrote an entire assessment to our intelligence community telling them Cuba is no longer a threat. That assessment was even cited by people in the Obama administration even after Anna Belen had already been captured. The assessment was never even debunked. You have spies at State Department that were captured. You have just recently Rosha, the ambassador that is facing charges for being a Cuban spy 40 years. Rocha was an advisor in the National Security Council at some point, even at by southcom. So I Do think the Cuban regime exaggerates sometimes when they try to they pretend and they did this with Chavez, that they have more inside and they have more presence inside the US that they actually have. I think this is the assessment of some people I know a lot of people in my community are going to disagree with me. I do think the Cubans lied and exaggerated a lot. But it is undeniable that the Cuban regime has a lot of presence in the United States. Because the pattern is that they have constantly recruited people since during universe at the university level, young people who are today occupying positions of power. And we have, in my community, we have consistently dealt with many people inside the US Government, in the Democratic Party and also some Republicans who are more isolationists, who never wanted to to change the policy towards Cuba in terms of being more assertive towards helping us with regime change and freedom. Regime change has become a taboo. Nobody wanted to talk about regime change. This was actually part of the strategy of the Cuban regime. There's a phrase that people say, well, Cuba problem has to be solved by Cubans. I am convinced this is part of the propaganda that the Cuban regime has tried to expand because Cubans, the problem of Cuba. First of all, you have millions of Cubans living outside, right? And we're also par. And we also want to solve the problem. But the reality is that you have an entire population who is hungry, who has no water, no electricity and has no weapons, okay? And you are dealing with a criminal enterprise that is very well funded, that all of these its resources are directed at controlling the population and remaining in power. David Fitzgerald from the CIA was making these assessments. And one of the reasons the Cubans are so good is because they have one target, the United States. So when you deploy of your resources, all of your capabilities on only one target, unlike the CIA and other intelligence agencies who have many targets, all of the Cuban regime resources are to target the US So the level of success is disproportionate because they only have one target. They only have one thing to preoccupy themselves with, right? And the same thing happens. They don't care about public opinion. They don't care about the people of Cuba dying. We ended 2025 with like five subtropical diseases in Cuba. Like millions of people getting sick because of all these diseases that are taking over the country, completely collapse the whole system. They do not care about fixing that. All they care is about their political survival and their financial survival because they have a lot of money that they're making with all of these dealings that they have with these cartels in South America and also with the oil industry that they were reselling the oil from Venezuela. So it's a very complicated. It's a very complicated, disheartening landscape because for many years, even when I was in Washington talking to people or people at State Department, last time when I came, I told you I want regime change. That's what everyone wants. Imagine if I would say I don't want the regime to change. What kind of person would I be? Correct? I mean, of course I want the regime to change, but there was like, they tried to sanitize this, like, oh, no, it's gonna be a peaceful transition to democracy. Look, I wish, I wish, but I don't think it's possible. That's not realistic. Every time the people of Cuba, who, by the way, have been resisting communism for decades. It's not that we're not doing anything because protests are happening in the island in many different localities and communities, but they're crushed immediately. But with what, Coleman? Every time they go on the streets, they arrest them, they send them to 10 years in prison. People don't even have food to put on their table. You think they're going to be able to. It's a very difficult situation. There's a population control that is very effective, and that's how they were able to export this to Venezuela and also control the population in Venezuela with the difference that Venezuela had other institutions that in Cuba, everything was destroyed. Venezuela kept some institutions, have a democratic history, had even organizations, depending press freedom, more organized that in Cuba. So the context was different.

A (59:33)

Hey, Coleman here. If you're enjoying the show, then you probably care about how political decisions really get made. If that's you, I want to tell you about the new podcast On Notice, produced by the nonpartisan newsroom Notice. Each week, journalist Reece Gorman sits down with lawmakers for candid conversations, not just about the headlines, but about what makes them tick and what brought them to Washington in the first place. On Notice gives you an insider's view of the people shaping policy in the U.S. reese's approachable style has earned him trust on both sides of the aisle, unlocking unguarded conversations that you won't hear in traditional interviews. So tune in to On Notice. That's Notice spelled N O T u S. It's available every Monday wherever you get your podcasts or on YouTube. So I. I just have two questions before we close this round. There's a lot of talk. I mean, the. The main conversation in the American press right now around Venezuela is why Trump has chosen to partner with Delsey Rodriguez as opposed to Maria Machado, who recently won the Nobel Prize, won something like 2/3 of the Venezuelan vote in the last election via her stand in candidate. What do you think the thinking is here? Why partner with Rodriguez as opposed to Machado? And why? What are the implications of that choice for the Venezuelan people?

B (61:05)

Yes, I think that the answer that Secretary Rubio gave the other day in Fox really explains the reality and the constraints for the U.S. government. And he was mentioning, look at the backlash that the administration received only for taking one drug dealer, Maduro, and look at everything that happened. Imagine if the US has stayed in the country, right, for a week, taking the Cabello, taking the Rodriguez brothers, taking Padrino. Imagine if that would have happened. It was not viable, right? It was not possible, not from a military perspective, but from a political standpoint. It was not possible to remove the head, the other heads and key figures of this cartel, Right? That's what we've seen, that the regime is intact. And there are two differences. There is symbolic power and there is concrete power. Right? Maria Corina Machado did not rise through the traditional party machinery of Venezuelan politics. So this is very important to understand because what is happening, to understand what is happening, because a big part of her brand is that she never accepted deals with the regime and people respected her for that, Never. Unlike other Venezuelan politicians or opposition leaders, Maria Corina was fearless in her stand for freedom and her convictions, and she won the hearts and minds of the Venezuelan people. That doesn't mean she can control the military immediately. That doesn't mean she has concrete power to go in and control the police and control the roads. So there's an imminent period, a very small window from when you take that you extract this dictator who is a drug dealer I know is facing charges, but the evidence is very overwhelming. You took this drug dealing from power and you have to keep the order inside the country, right? And the United States is trying to minimize the bloodbath that can occur, right? They're trying to prevent from a second wave from having to go back in, which, no, I think it might be something really plausible and the United States might have to go in a second time, but they're trying to prevent that from happening. So this is a game, like a chess game, right? They removed Maduro, they put the Venezuelan regime in a position of weakness. They showed the US strength, right? So now they forced them into a different level in the negotiation table. Because before they were not negotiating, not to the standards that the U.S. wanted. Right. So now they're in a weaker position, but still they're things that the United States have to deal with. I did not like the way Trump answered those questions about Maria Corina. I felt like he was undermining her standing when he said she has no respect, no support. I think that is true when we discuss. She does not have the support of the military because the military is the cartel. Obviously, she has no support. That doesn't mean she has no support of the people. That is not an accurate assessment. I think Secretary Rubio made that distinction. Right. So they're not really dealing with Del C. Rodriguez. Correct. They're dealing with Vladimir. They're dealing with Cabello, with Padrino Lopez. They're dealing with the entire structure that is in place. And they're trying to force them to. To leave so they can have a transition and rebuild that country. And that is where we. Right now, we're looking here. And we're, you know, there's a lot that is unfolding as we speak, and everything can change very dramatically and very fast. From a strategic perspective, I also think if my moral standing, okay, if my position of power, my ethos with the people of Venezuela is that I never deal, I never made deal concessions with the regime. I never did what other opposition's leaders did. I think it's also strategic to Maria Corina Machado not being the one making deals with this corrupt criminal enterprise because she represents also this moral standing, these aspirations of the Venezuelan people who are fed up of all those deals. So I also think, although the comments have been unfortunate, although the flawlessness of the military operation is not this, I haven't seen the same flawlessness in the political operation. I do think from a communications perspective, it's also interesting to watch how Maria Corina Machado is not destroying her moral standing by being the one that is sitting on the table making concessions with the people who sold the life of millions of Venezuelans and send them into exile and torture them.

A (66:12)

Yeah. Okay, final question for you. What is the situation like in Venezuela right now? Because we've seen videos of Venezuelans all over the world celebrating for good reason, people in tears, people dancing, people singing and so forth. But if you're still in Venezuela right now, the truth is America is not running the country. Right. The regime, the remnants of the regime are still there, as you just mentioned. So what is life like for them right now? What are their hopes and aspirations and what are the challenges that they're facing?

B (66:49)

Definitely, they have hopes and aspirations that they didn't have last week. And that is something I hear from everyone. So what the journalists that we have on the ground in Venezuela are telling me and the stories we're covering. There are checkpoints in many different areas of Caracas by colectivos. Colectivos are Chavista paramilitary groups that the regime has deployed in many different areas in Caracas. So when you go out in Caracas, they're stopping everyone at those checkpoints. They're going over your phone to see what your communications are. People are relying in these neighborhood WhatsApp groups. WhatsApp is very big in Latin America. So there are different. Every building and communities have WhatsApp groups of the neighbors. And people are constantly sharing information through these WhatsApp groups where the checkpoints are. So we heard some mothers on these groups that were concerned, because at night, on Sunday night, the colectivos came on cars and took some of the younger Venezuelans from some young Venezuelan men from their houses. They don't know where their kids are. They don't know what they took them. They said that they were not members of the military or anything. So there's a lot of confusion, a lot of fear. Also rumors, right, because people are afraid that they're gonna be taking their kids and recruit their kids to support the regime. Yet last night, there were some videos of some shootings on the streets of. So all of that scenario creates a lot of confusion because they don't have enough information. The regime obviously is controlling the information. You saw that yesterday. They were already arresting journalists. Journalists are having a lot of struggle to move from one place to the other because they could be arrested at any moment. In fact, before this happened, the journalists we had on the ground were detained. I believe it was, like, two weeks ago. So everyone that is on the ground right now, it's being extremely careful. And Caracas is, for the most part, people are avoiding the streets as much as they can. Early after the abduction, the US Took Maduro out. There were a lot of lines forming because people went into sort of a panic trying to buy goods. But for the most part, they're being very careful of going on the streets. And what I heard from many different people is relief and hope, especially after Trump said that the US Was not leaving. But of course, they're also not present in the country. So it's like, we're not leaving, but they know that they're not present. So they have to deal with the repression that is definitely taking place right now in Venezuela. So let's see what happens in the next few weeks because it's gonna be very interesting to watch because I also don't think it's sustainable that if the US Is gonna stay, I think something is gonna have to happen if the regime continues to oppress people. Remember, they haven't released the political prisoners. So that is a big concern of the Venezuelan people right now because if Maduro was removed, but obviously the structure continues in place. It's weakened, but it's still there. And they're trying to see how they survive. And a big part of that is proven by the fact that they haven't released political prisoners. The other thing I wanted to tell you is not so much about what the Venezuelans are happening, but what we know apparently is going to happen right now is that the counterintelligence, especially Cuban counterintelligence, is going to begin, most likely an entire investigation on who were the people who informed the CIA or this person or some people believe it's more than one that informed the CIA right. Where Maduro was. And so there's going to be a lot of Cuban intelligence activity in the country trying to at those levels at the inner circle inside the government. Let's see what also the CIA or the US Government does to protect this person if is still on the country.

A (71:09)

Right. Okay, Hillet, thanks so much. You're a fount of wisdom and information on all these issues. I'm sure we'll have another occasion to have you on, but thanks so much. And before you go, tell my listeners where they can follow your journalism.

B (71:24)

Okay, so you can follow us in ADN Cuba. We are on X on Instagram ADN Cuba.com also is a webpage. And if you want to see what our coverage is from Venezuela, you can follow us also at adnamerica and my handle and X is Helit Martinez.

A (71:43)

All right, thank you.

B (71:44)

Thank you so much for having me.