A (3:46)

Okay, so that's my most recent book, which is called Political Tribalism. And all, I mean, really is that. So first of all, human beings are tribal creatures, just like primates. And by that I just mean that we need to belong to groups. You can barely find a hermit on all of the planet. And once we connect to a group, we tend to want to defend it and cling to it and think of that group as better in every way. And so I go through all these kind of more scientific and anthropological definitions, but that's really all I mean. And I don't think that there's necessarily anything wrong with tribalism. Sports can be very tribal. I'm a very tribal person, I can tell you. Family is very tribal. But what I've been writing about is what happens when tribalism is takes over a political system. That's when things get problematic because then facts and policies and debates don't matter. Everybody just sees everything through their group's lens and basically just wants to take down the other side no matter what. And, you know, you really can't get a dialogue or any advances. So that's kind of like where I'm coming at it from.

B (5:03)

Yeah. And you've talked about areas, and especially in foreign policy, where American ignorance or blindness to the presence of sectarian conflicts in different places in the world have led us to just horrible foreign policy blunders based on a misunderstanding of what is motivating the typical person. You talk about Iraq and Vietnam, so can you just talk about what the standard narrative is from the U.S. foreign policy establishment and how that was mistaken.

A (5:37)

Yeah, you know, it's funny, A long time ago, when I wrote my first book, it was called World On How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. That was when I first tapped into this phenomenon that I called market dominant minorities. And this is something that most Americans and most Westerners just are really unfamiliar with, but it happens to be a phenomenon that is pervasive. And Iraq and Vietnam and actually all over the developing world. What I'm talking about is countries where there's a tiny ethnic minority, usually like the 3% Chinese in Indonesia. Indonesia is a huge country, but the Chinese only make up 3% of the population. And yet they control 70% of the economy. And Coleman, I don't mean, oh, a stereotype, they actually control that. And Indians are a market dominant minority in East Africa and obviously white in South Africa, the Lebanese in the Caribbean, and yes, in its own way, the Shia, sorry, the Sunnis in Iraq were this kind of a form of market dominant minority. That is for hundreds of years, even though they were only about 10 or 15% of the population, they actually controlled a disproportionate amount of Iraq's economy, not always by entrepreneurialism, sometimes just because of authoritarianism. And so I started noticing because of my own family's background about 20 years ago that when you just democratize and put in markets and democracy in countries like Iraq or Vietnam that have totally different ethnic dynamics than the United States, you don't just get peace and prosperity. So to answer your question back, I don't even know if you were born, but you know, right after 9, 11, the idea really, actually after the Berlin Wall came down, this is in 1989, it was like, okay, communism failed. Okay, so communism and authoritarianism are out. So the answer to everything has got to be capitalism and democracy. And this is when Francis Fukuyama's the End of History swept in and there was this huge euphoria that markets and democracy are the answer to everything. And basically I have been writing ever since my first book and all the way to my current book that, you know what, it's not that easy. Democracy in certain conditions can be very destabilizing. And specifically in countries like Vietnam, where people don't even know this, but there was a 1% Chinese minority in Vietnam that controlled like almost the entire private sector. And I think for a lot of Americans, it's a little bit. It's like, oh, Vietnamese, Chinese, Japanese, they're all kind of the same. But in fact, in Vietnam, there was this hugely resented Chinese minority called the Hua that had been favored by the French colonialists that controlled everything. So what people don't really realize is the Vietnam War wasn't just really these Communists fighting against the capitalists. It was also a majority of the Vietnamese fighting against these Chinese capitalists that were basically most of the capitalists. So anyway, that's just a preview. Like in my book, I explained how the US Comes in thinking democracy is the panacea to everything. And then bam, they just get not what they expected. And elections actually give rise to this kind of. It gives voice to this majority that is very resentful. Like the Chinese, Shia in Iraq, and they use their new power when they come into power, not to build bridges and for sensible economic policies, but basically for revenge. And that's exactly what happened in a country like Iraq. We put in these elections in 2003, and, oh, my gosh, what happened is the Shia, they're like, now that we're in power, it's payback time. And they targeted the Sunni minority that had been basically their, you know, their enemies for. And their persecutors for centuries.

B (9:52)

It seems like that's a point that's so obviously true and important that it should be. It should occupy much more space in these conversations. But it just seems like, why is there a blind spot when just from people's experiences, you can tell how much behavior is motivated by these small tribal tensions?

A (10:11)

Well, I know exactly why in the case of the United States or the west or even Canada, we are used to a certain kind of racial or ethnic dynamic because our major group or ethnic divide in this country has been basically, the dynamic has been this really economically and politically dominant white majority. And then all these persecuted minorities. You know, whether it's African Americans or Native Americans or Asian Americans. So for most of our history, we're really used to this. Like, so when we see Tibetans in China being persecuted, we get it. Or the Maori being persecuted, we get it. We're used to persecuted and economically and politically disenfranchised minorities. But when it comes to minorities that are really rich, minorities that control huge parts of the economy, Westerners and especially Americans get super uncomfortable. They're like, oh, my God, this must be a stereotype. We can't talk about this. And they were actually really unfamiliar with this dynamic. And that's one reason we just shove it under the rug. The other reason is America actually putting aside the African American population, we really have had a very exceptionally successful history of ethnic assimilation, certainly among the European minorities. So we had waves and waves of immigrants. And first they all fought, and then the Irish, then the Italians and the Greeks. So I think there was a naivete for us. We're like, hey, we're going to put in elections in Iraq. And yeah, we know the Kurds and Shias and Kurds and Sunnis are different, but once we have democracy, then we'll have intermarriage and everybody will assimilate. And that's just absolutely unrealistic and ridiculous. Actually, if you look at their histories.

B (12:00)

And you point out in the book how during the era of the British Empire, the Brits were extremely conscious of the sectarian divides wherever they went, where Americans have just had this strange mindset. I think you're right, that we don't understand how unusual it is to even pay lip service to notions of universal brotherhood. And you know, being an American is an idea. Whether or not these are realized, we don't understand that no one else in the world even has tried to do this. So we naively assume everywhere is like us.

A (12:35)

Exactly. And we focus on the tensions. But you're absolutely right, you know this. You know, it's funny, a lot of people think that the United States is similar to Great Britain and there are obviously many parallels, but that was one of my favorite points to bring out. The British were so ethnically conscious during their whole colonial rule, they did this divide and conquer thing. So I'm not saying one is better than the other, you know, because I mean, they messes. But it's what allowed them to basically be in power for several centuries in India, in the Caribbean. I mean, they had booklets about all the different caste systems in all these different countries. They knew it was completely different from our framework and they played them in a very Machiavellian way and were very successful. So. Yeah, I thought that was an interesting difference.

B (13:23)

Yeah. Other thing that occurred to me as you were talking is the, I think, unfortunately and strangely titled essay by Thomas Sowell called Are Jews Generic? Have you heard of this essay?

A (13:35)

I haven't heard of that essay, but I know his work. Yeah, the title sounds too funny. But he has a lot of. A lot of my work actually draws on a lot of his work. He was the first person to blurb my book when I was an absolute unknown person. But what did he say?

B (13:50)

Basically all the examples of market dominant minorities that you just gave. He basically talks about in this essay and he wonders whether some of the hatred of Jews has not been an economic resentment of successful minorities, Especially minorities groups who become successful in parts of the economy where the value that they're bringing is not readily visible. Like a merchant. Right. They're not building something themselves. But if you understand economics, you understand that they're bringing as much value as they're charging in profit. And then, you know, it's the Lebanese in certain places, the Indians in certain places. And his point is that this is a generic human phenomenon that often leads to riots, persecutions and even genocides that we misunderstand as mere racism. But that's actually racism caused by deeper economic resentments.

A (14:46)

Yeah, it's a really controversial issue. And the Jews in particular, it's complicated. I know his argument, but in fact there Are all these periods in human history going back to biblical times where I actually researched this, when Jews were not successful, when the Jews were in their shadows in Russia. And actually I discovered that in biblical times they were not particularly successful. So there's been. Jews are an unusual case. There definitely have been periods where they are the classic market dominant minority in countries like Romania and Lithuania between the first and second World wars. So I actually kind of talk about Jews very specifically in several of my books. And lots of times there's more than one reason. It's not like, if you boil it down to. It's always just economic resentment. That's not the case. But, yeah, I mean, we have a lot of overlap in our work.

B (15:41)

Yeah. So, related topic, what do people mean by the phrase model minority myth and what's your view of that?

A (15:52)

You know, I'm constantly getting in trouble for this on this topic, and it's so frustrating. So I think what people mean is they're referring to Asian Americans. And the idea is that, you know, Asians, number one, are so diverse. This term Asian American includes super poor Cambodian Americans and, you know, Hmong Americans, but also Chinese and Japanese. And the complaint is, like, when I published this Tiger mom book, people just didn't get it because it was sort of this. It was supposed to be kind of a satirical memoir, but they're, you know, about the super strict Chinese mom and they're like, oh, she's entrenching the stereotype of the model minority, meaning this minority that is works really hard and they do math and they play violin and they're automatically successful. And the complaint is if you just generalize and say all Asians are like that, number one, you miss how many Asian Americans are really poor and struggling. And number two, you don't acknowledge the kinds of discrimination against the Asian Americans face. And so that's kind of the way that argument goes. I sort of object to its overuse this term because while acknowledge that this is definitely a problem, I never like it when it's like, oh my gosh, if some Asians. So in this book, the triple package, I actually write about how Taiwanese Americans and Chinese Americans are among the most successful groups in America, along with Indian Americans, but also along with Nigerian Americans and Cuban Americans at this moment in history in terms of really crude metrics like per capita income, education, corporate representation. And immediately there was like, how can you say that? You're just, you know, re entrenching the model minority stereotype. And I'm like, you know, to me it's like more facts, the better. You know, let's get all the information out there. And the question is why? Why are some groups, why do we have this statistic? We can unpack it and see that. Look, actually, other Asian Americans aren't doing so well. And what's even more interesting, Goldman, if you. It's very, very much about the immigrant experience. So Asian Americans, if you take these aggregate statistics, there are these glass ceiling problems. Like they don't, especially East Asian Americans don't do great, like at the highest corporate levels, but their SAT scores are something like 140 points above the national median. But what's interesting is if you break out the Asian Americans so that you have first generation, that is these are the immigrants, and then the immigrants, kids, and then the grandkids of the immigrants, the third generation. What's fascinating is by the time you get to the third generation, they do not outperform any Americans. So what I find interesting is that shows it's not something genetic in Asian Americans, it's not something natural in them, and it's not even cultural in the sense that it's like they carry it around with them. But a lot of it is very much about the immigrant experience and it's generational. This kind of drive and motivation fades usually by the third generation in almost any immigrant group.

B (19:09)

Yeah, no, that accords with everything that I've seen with my eyes in my own family and I think accords with a lot of people's experiences.

A (19:17)

Are you from an immigrant family?

B (19:19)

On my mother's side. Immigrated from Puerto Rico.

A (19:22)

Ah, interesting.

B (19:23)

Yeah, her parents immigrated, so she was. I used to joke that she was a tiger mom.

A (19:31)

I'm guessing that she was just looking at you, but we don't have to go there.

B (19:35)

So I think with the model minority myth, I think there's another element that is motivating the resistance to your discussion in the triple package where you talk about various different ethnic groups. You mentioned Nigerians, Chinese and so on and so forth, to point out that success of any particular ethnic group seems to many people to be saying that racism doesn't exist against ethnic groups that are less successful, or that what explains racial or ethnic disparity is something other than the one allowable explanation, which is systemic racism. And part of this is just a function of how coarse our discourse about this subject is. Like what we talk about races, for example, Asians. When I've seen polling that indicates most, quote unquote, Asians don't identify as Asians. They identify as the particular country. But the more you begin to study actual ethnic groups, which is sort of how most people live, you begin to see how normal it is to see large disparities between groups that to an outsider might look the same. And therefore discrimination may not be the primary explanation for disparate outcomes. So how do you see how your research, what implications it has for the wider discussion of racial disparity that has been ongoing but is especially pressing today?

A (21:09)

Yeah, when we wrote this book, the triple package, it did well, but, oh, my gosh, we got so much blowback. And this is the story of my life. I don't think I've written a book that hasn't been wildly controversial. And I never quite get it because I feel like, gosh, if you really read this book, it says, look, we did the research and we're looking at why at this moment, certain groups are doing better than others. And, wow, it's not genetic. We show that, again, it's not like certain. It's all one race. Right. We actually show that so many Caribbean Americans and Nigerian Americans are at the very top of the list, outperforming whites, actually. And also the fact that it changes over time, so it's not rigid. This should be good news. Let's look at what are these groups doing so that maybe other groups can learn from it. But we hit exactly the wall that you described. It was like, bam, you're blaming the poor. You're saying that there's no racism. Even though on our first page we have this. I know it's first page, third page. The huge caveat. We are saying, obviously this is not a sole explanation. Obviously, for many groups, racism plays a huge role. And you know what's interesting is I have noticed a lot of people criticizing this book were actually very privileged people who. It's almost like an automatic thing. Structural racism explains everything. And I got a huge number of. A lot of historically black colleges and universities love this book. And I was so surprised they reached out to me and they're like, this is so interesting, you know, because we. So just to explain to your readers, in this kind of different book, it's not about foreign policy. We look at why certain groups in America are outperforming everybody else. And we include. We kind of looked at the snapshot who's doing super well, and was surprising. It included, like, Iranian Americans and Mormon Americans and Jewish Americans and, you know, again, Cuban Americans. So what connects these people? And we found three characteristics that we called the triple package. And the first is this sense of, like, exceptionality in the group, or we call it a superiority complex. Like we're, you know, we're the chosen people or we come from this ancient civilization. And the second was so the. It's almost like the opposite of a superiority complex. The second trait was insecurity, this idea that, oh my gosh, we're not being respected enough, we're outsiders, people are looking down on us. And the third feature was impulse control. And we said, this is so bizarre. In all of the groups that are so outperforming whites and also other groups, they seem to have these three features. A superiority complex simultaneous with a sense of insecurity, often coming from being an immigrant, that creates this kind of chip on the shoulder feeling like we've got to show everybody we're not getting the respect. And then this sense of impulse control, the self discipline thing. So I would get emails from people saying, this is so instructive because we want to reform our education. We want how we raise our children to see how other groups are succeeding. We can learn from this. So it was interesting that on the one hand you're getting usually for more privileged knee jerk people don't talk about this. That's cultural racism, they said. And then on the other hand, people are like, you know, from actually underprivileged places, you know, charter schools, they're like, you know, this is so interesting. We would love to know why certain groups do so well so that we can instill these things in our children. And also, it's so great to know that it's not genetic and that anyone can learn them. You know, I give Sona Mayor as an example of a triple package person because you don't have to belong to any group to have these features. A single mother can do it.

B (25:03)

Yeah, no, I think normal people like being told that they're in control of their destiny. And with regard to the. I'm not so surprised that the pushback to your book came more from people in elite spaces rather than historically black universities and colleges. Because I guess one reason is my father and sister went to hbcu and I remember I was talking to my sister once telling her about how much knee jerk woke anti intellectualism there was at Columbia where I went. And she said, huh, that's funny, because at Spelman there was almost none of that and everyone is black. Her analysis of it was, was that there's nothing to be gained by playing up your black activism, your knee jerk reaction to what is perceived as racism because there's no white people around. So if everyone is black. It just cancels out that variable as a mechanism for attaining social status.

A (26:11)

It's so interesting, I gotta tell you. So I teach at Yale Law School and I teach this class that's actually one of the most popular classes. It's called International Business Transactions. And you know, there's always 80 people and there's like a wait list of 100. But you know, I have a lot of super progressive people who come into this class, both conservatives and liberals and a lot of immigrants kids and going to. It's slightly different but similar feature. They'll. Immigrants kids will come to me or immigrants and they'll say, oh my gosh, Professor Chua, you know, I, I feel so guilty. Like I might want to be like in the corporate sector or I might want to like succeed or I might want to be a partner in a law firm or maybe be a judge. But there's all this like pressure from usually privileged, you know, people who can afford you and they're like, oh, that's elitist. You can't go to the corporate sector. You know, you can't try to clerk for a judge because that's all elitism and hierarchy. So you have people. I have people that are like my dad, this poor Iraqi refugee and I'd like to buy him a house. But I can't mention that here at Yale Law School because that would be called out, you know. And so it's just so ironic, this phenomenon of where a lot of this pressure is coming from. It's often from the people that can afford to say these things.

B (27:31)

I'd like to take a moment to give a shout out to our sponsor for this episode. Hiring is one of those things you don't want to mess up. To take your business to the next level, you need to hire great people. With Indeed. Instant Match, Indeed searches through the millions of resumes in their database to help show you great candidates instantly. This way you can do the part you really need. Meeting and hiring great people. Unlike some hiring sites, Indeed gives you full control and payment flexibility, delivering a quality shortlist faster. With Indeed there are no long term contracts. You can pause your account at any time and you only pay for what you need. With Instant Match, you see a list of great candidates with zero weight. Plus Indeed delivers four times more hires than all other job sites combined according to Talent Nest. So if you want your quality shortlist fast, you need Indeed. Right now, Conversations with Coleman listeners will get a free $75 credit to upgrade your job post. When you head to indeed.com conversations this is Indeed's best offer available anywhere. To redeem your free $75 credit, head to indeed.comconversations. again, that's indeed.comconversations. the offer is valid through March 31, and terms and conditions apply. I actually know people in my immediate circle of friends at Columbia who went out on whatever it's called when you're trying to get into consulting. You know, the crazy period of hard tests.

A (29:12)

Oh yeah.

B (29:14)

But who would tell their very closest friends, please don't tell anyone that I'm going out for this? Because in that context, it hurts your reputation.

A (29:24)

Which is crazy because if you really are progressive and you want to see the world change, you want underprivileged groups to be partners in law firms, to be at the top of corporations, to be the judges, and it's so backwards that nobody can do this, right? I mean, there should be room for all ways of reform, right?

B (29:43)

So in my research and thinking about these issues, I've come across and thought a lot about the difference between a race conscious policy approach to these issues and a colorblind policy approach. And putting aside the notion of colorblindness as an actual possibility from a subjective point of view for a person, if we're just talking about whether policy should be blind to these important group differences between people or whether we should adopt a kind of the Singapore model of just unapologetically enshrining ethnic quotas into housing policy and politics, which seems to work, seems to be a functional equilibrium for them. How do you think about policy with regard to the issue of ethnic tension? Should we explicitly recognize groups and treat them differently or have quotas to, you know, should we just kind of have a formally race blind process?

A (30:49)

Your work, and I am so admiring that you have the guts to go out and say what you do. I mean, this is. I teach on one of the most liberal campuses in the, on the planet. And it's like, I can't believe you're not canceled by so my own work because I started in the foreign policy sphere. I didn't start in the affirmative action America sphere. I have slightly come at this from a slightly different angle than you. I'm not like, I don't have like a strong view that this is so. For example, my first idea is like, when it's countries like Iraq and we're about to invade, my first principle is, let's at least know the difference between these different ethnic groups. You know, because it's whatever your policy is going to be, whether it's race blind or sectarian Blind or whatever. Let's at least know the ethnic dynamics because we are going to really mess this up if we don't. In terms of what you actually do when you go into these countries with ethnic conflict, I want to be the first to say that it's not easy. You know, like there are failures of totally race blind policies and then there are failures where people go in and they're really trying to like engineer all the different ethnic groups and those blow up. So I think it's very difficult. The way I look at America is I don't know if this is a directly. It's probably not directly responsive to you, but I have been saying so there are these real liberals and that might be. I don't know if this is where you come out, but it's kind of like, let's not think of America in terms of all these different races. And I think that might be a great world where we could get to that one day. But to me, because I study tribalism at this moment in history, I think that's kind of like telling people, stop liking your favorite sports teams, stop liking the Patriots or the Dallas Cowboys and just like all sports together, because humans just tend to want to have these groups. But what I see America as being is I have this term supergroup. And we're very unique. There are a lot of things wrong with our country, but we forget what's sort of amazing. So to be a supergroup, it's super easy. You need to satisfy two requirements. First, you need a very strong overarching national identity, you know, like American France. But to be a supergroup, you also have to satisfy a second condition, and that is that you let all these different subgroups flourish. So I think that what's amazing about America is that at our best, and I do not think we are at our best right now, but at our best, this is a country where you can be Puerto Rican American or Irish American or Korean American or Japanese American or Lithuanian American and still incredibly patriotic at the same time. So where I'm getting to is that I see some of the debates that you are sometimes in or like Mark Lilla, whom I like a lot. And I think that, to me, I think that what's amazing about America is that we don't need to choose between a strong overarching national identity and multiculturalism. We can have both because our overarching national identity is ethnically and religiously neutral. And if you think about any other country, like China, it's not a super group because it's Got this really strong overarching identity. The Chinese are so proud, you know, 98%. But it's an ethnic identity. And so if you're Tibetan, member of the Tibetan minority, of the Uyghur minority, you have no standing, you cannot voice your identity. And interestingly, in France, which is actually very similar, we think to us, they're not a supergroup either because they're just like China. They've got this strong overarching French identity, the race blind, if you will. You know, it's like it's just French, but they don't allow people to express their religious identity, their ethnic identity. They really try to. You can't wear the signs of religious, you know, the burkini band. And a lot of people think, Coleman, that that has caused more friction and more tension there. As firm a position as you, because you kind of know what you're talking about here. Because I'm comparative, I'm always looking at US versus China versus Iraq versus France. I can't say whether I think this policy or that policy universally would always be better.

B (35:11)

Yeah, I think this is such an interesting area to me, because you mentioned France. If Singapore is the paradigm for an unapologetically race conscious model, then France is the paradigm for an unapologetically colorblind and race blind model where you can't, even if you're an academic in France, you can't even study racial disparities. It's illegal.

A (35:34)

Right, Exactly. I think that's kind of a polar opposite problem. And they have problems. I mean, there's a lot of unrest and a lot of people trace it to that kind of suppression, not allowing these subgroup identities to flourish.

B (35:47)

Yeah, it seems to me there has to be some kind of middle ground where we establish a firewall where it's okay to be unapologetically rooted in your tribe, whatever that is, you know, with what you wear, for example, in a religious context. But then on the other side of that firewall there are, at least in the West. I hesitate to criticize a model in a country that I don't fully understand because it could be that if you get rid of race consciousness in Singapore, all hell breaks loose. And this is one of the lessons of your writing, is that you can't just impose an abstract idea on a place that's different and hope that things are going to go well. But in America, I think it makes sense for there to be a firewall between matters of ethics and politics and procedural justice on the one hand, and then everywhere else where I'm happy for people to express their deep cultural attachments.

A (36:43)

Right. And because I teach at a law school, so my husband and I wrote a piece in the Atlantic called Tribalism and the Constitution. And one of the things that I find most disturbing right now is, so I'm a huge fan of the US Constitution because that I think is the glue. Right? Like, and I know how imperfect this thing is. I know that, you know, we have repeatedly failed to live up to the principles in the Constitution. But I'm always telling my students, we need to distinguish between saying, we have this really impressive Constitution with these values that have held this country together, that we have shamefully failed to live up to those principles and we gotta do better. That's saying one thing or saying what. I'm increasingly hearing your generation, which is this Constitution is a racist document. It was written by a bunch of white male rapists. And we shouldn't even pay attention to it because that is actually our one hope. When you're talking about what can be this neutral thing that connects us all together, it's these values in the Constitution. And what I see teaching on a campus is that there are threats to the Constitution now, which is simultaneously a threat to our national identity, coming from both the left and the right. And that's what makes this such a scary moment. From the left, it's what I was saying. It's like, oh, you know, all the Founding Fathers are. We don't really respect them. Let's just. To me, it's throwing the baby out with the bathwater. I mean, I'm all in favor of not whitewashing our history, but just to throw the Constitution out. You know, what's going to be left? Look at. Look at these developing countries I studied that literally fall apart. And then from the right, you're starting to see people. This is the extreme of what you're talking about, this kind of white nationalism, or they're also losing this identity of a neutral racial and ethnic identity and saying, you know what? I actually think America should be defined by white Protestantism or something that's ethnic. And so if you go in that direction, you're also basically turning your back on what's sort of unique about our Constitution. So I see the threat to the Constitution at this moment coming from both extremes of the political spectrum.

B (38:57)

Yeah. This is such an interesting issue in America because. And this is a point that I'm getting from Eric Kaufman's book White Shift. Every ethnic group has symbolic attachments that are just sacred and ways of expressing pride, whether that's in a concept of the motherland or in a concept of having overcome historical oppression. There's a story every ethnic group tells themselves about who they are and what that means, and it provides people an enormous sense of meaning. So there's ethnic pride on the one hand, and then there is patriotism on the other hand. And it's difficult to tell the difference between those things. Sometimes we might like to think of them as completely separate concepts, but I think they tap into similar psychological mechanisms in the brain. And Eric Kaufman's point in this book was that for many white Americans, especially white Protestants, people who are descended from what you would call the white Protestant core of the country, the symbols of ethnic attachment, because it's taboo, for very understandable reasons, to say, oh, I'm proud that I'm white, as a black person might, or as an Asian person might, those things get replaced by symbols of national identity, like the flag. So when you wonder how a person could. A person who burns the flag on video has their life completely deranged by death threats when part of what that flag stands for in principle is the right to burn it. In a country that prides itself on free speech, part of the way to explain that is in terms of these ethnic symbols having been substituted for these national symbols. Do you buy that, or.

A (40:53)

Well, you know, I know his work a little bit, and I guess I'm like you. I don't want to say anything about something I haven't fully thought through. But where I thought you were going to go is that, you know, it goes back to your first question about tribalism. It is human nature to want to be proud of who you are, you know, and right now we're in this real kind of weird moment where all white people who are woke are supposed to just say, I'm the worst thing. I apologize for being white, you know, And I think that's not psychologically that sustainable. And I think one thing is. And you said every group has ethnic pride. What happened in the last 20, 30 years, again, for understandable reasons, is the white people almost became the only group that you can't take pride in your background. And again, I understand exactly why, like, white supremacy. But it's asking a lot of people to just say, like, you acknowledge that you're the worst group on earth. You know, you can't be proud. And I think what's happened is that pushed a lot of people underground, and a lot of it is it morphed into a more toxic form of white nationalism that in a way has to do, you know, is a response. The idea, like, you know, we're. That it's just human nature to want to be proud of your group. So I've thought a lot about these issues, too. And, you know, obviously J.D. vance has written about it a lot. He was my student.

B (42:17)

Right. Yeah. So you brought up something really interesting that I want to talk to you about, which is political tribes, you know, the Red tribe and the blue tribe. And what brought this out in what you just said is white Americans on the left, especially in the younger generation, seem confusing vis a vis the paradigm we've been talking about in this whole podcast, which is that everyone likes to have pride in their group. I think that's a. That's just a fact of human psychology. It's a generalization, has exceptions, but it's true. So then we come across a phenomenon that doesn't fit the model, which is white people constantly talking about how horrible white people are. And so I've been confused about that for a long time. And there's a few ways to explain it. You can sort of, you know, John McWhorter explains it in terms of, you know, the same mechanism that gets Christians to enjoy thinking about original sin. There's some psychology of sin and guilt that is meaningful to people. But I think there's another explanation which is compatible with that, but which is also very useful, which is that they don't actually mean what they're saying literally. And when they say white people are awful, what they're. They're actually saying something different. They're saying white people from the red tribe, which I view as a totally different tribe than my own. You know, Republicans, the wider culture of American conservatives, you know, import any stereotype you want here relating to Budweiser or nascar. So what they really mean is those people are horrible. And so, in a way, they're no different than every other group that is expressing pride. It's just you have to do a little bit of work on the translation end.

A (44:13)

Absolutely. And I write about this at the end, too. And, you know, it's interesting because I've studied as an academic what is an ethnic group, and all the definition, and a lot of it has to do with. I mean, it's really hard to define, but in rate of intermarriage between two groups is one symbol. Like, if you have, like, zero rate of intermarriage between these two groups, that's more evidence that you're two separate ethnic groups. And what I wrote in this book is that just because of really, it's this class difference among the whites and education difference, the difference now between basically Trump's base, those whites, red state whites, and the woke coastal elite whites. It's almost like an ethnic difference now, Coleman, because it is so much more likely that a white person who attends Columbia will marry somebody from a South Asian background or a Korean American background or Nigerian American background than for that person to marry someone from Appalachia with no education. So I think, as I, you know, I've been interested in this, this idea that it's a subset of what you're talking about coastal elites. As early on we talked about market dominant minorities. This term that I coined in 2003 to be this really resented minority in developing countries that are viewed as controlling the levers of power and everything. So I wrote recently that we're seeing for the first time in our history, this phenomenon where it's almost like the coastal elites are viewed now by a lot of people in the rest of the country as this little snobby minority. They control Wall street, they control D.C. they control the Ivy League, they control Silicon Valley, they control Hollywood, and they look down on the rest of us. And so I kind of have written about how the 2016 election that brought Donald Trump to power is in some ways more like an election that we would see in a developing country where you have a very, a lot of frustration among a majority, often including a lot of poorer members, against what they see as this snobby outsider elite that basically cares more about the poor in Africa than they do about the poor in their own country.

B (46:25)

Yeah. I was reading an amazing essay by Scott Alexander, who writes the Slate Star Codex blog, and he pointed out that the difference between the reaction of the American left when Osama bin Laden died and when Margaret Thatcher died. So when Osama died, if you're on the left, it's, you know, you sort of remain silent. You definitely don't celebrate because we all acknowledge he was a horrible person. But to celebrate the death of Osama bin Laden marked you as someone who was unsophisticated. And the thing you're supposed to think if you're in that tribe was no human death should be celebrated. Sure, yeah, it has to be done. But no death had to be celebrated. Whereas if you were on the right, you could just say, I'm glad Osama's dead. You know, you could just celebrate that. And then when Margaret Thatcher died, what Scott noticed was that the same people who were talking about every death being a tragedy were just saying, ding dong, the witch is dead. And the wider point of this essay was not that there was anything unique about the hypocrisy of the left because he went on to point out similar hypocrisies on the right, but it was to make a point about political tribal bias in America between, you might call them, reds and blues and how that has actually become deeper in some cases than the kinds of bias we spend more time worrying about. Racial and gender based bias, no doubt very real problems. But it's precisely the kinds of bias that you don't even view as bias because they're so entrenched, that can become problematic. Have you paid attention to any of the research on implicit bias between Republicans and Democrats and how in certain instances it's been measured as higher than between racial groups and so forth?

A (48:32)

Not recently. I did all that when I was writing this book. But in a way getting at the same issue again because I'm so interested in what makes different ethnic groups. And it's often language and what you wear and how you behave and you think about the again, red state whites and coastal elites. This politically, this kind of language that we talk, you know, we have to say Latinx, not Latino. They can't. It really is like a different language. And sometimes it's almost like a gotcha because it's like if you're some poor person growing up in a farm in the middle of whatever Kentucky, you're not going to know. It's so complicated. I'm a professor at Yale and I have to like navigate all this changing vocabulary constantly.

B (49:14)

I'll do you one better. You don't have to go to the farm. If I walked out in New York and talked to every Dominican or Puerto Rican looking person I met, it would be hours before I met one that knew the word Latinx or voluntarily said it.

A (49:29)

Absolutely. Or even I had a student who was super left wing and she was talking, she was very in favor of, I think she used the term prisoners. Oh my God. Totally called out. You can't use that term incarcerated people. So back to what you were talking about. I don't know. It's not exactly implicit bias, but it is like a different language and it's signaling, which is like you talk that way, you can't use our language. You're in the out group. And if you think about how many. Even just the way people dress or obviously even just like health is, there's this. So it's just fascinating. I kind of am coming at this from a different direction, the different features and I think it explains, in some ways why Donald Trump. I wrote about this in a Politico essay. A lot of people, like, I don't get it. How could these poor people in Appalachia vote for a rich guy who lives in New York? And to me, it was so obvious. His Persona is more like them. You know, I'm gonna eat burgers, I'm gonna watch wrestling, and I, you know, and I'm gonna deliberately be not politically correct. And I don't read. You know, it's like, and. And the fact that he's always being called out for saying things, you know, all of my friends like, oh, my God, this is gonna bring him down. But what. So many people in the middle of America, they're like, that's what happens to me all the time. I'm always in trouble for saying the wrong thing. So I think that these kind of markers of cultural markers or group markers are really interesting to observe. And reinforcing your point about these two different tribes within the white population.

B (51:02)

Yeah. I remember a few months ago, over drinks with a friend, that idea actually popped into my head that it's easier. What's happening in the country with politics makes more sense if you just imagine that Republicans and Democrats were, you know, Shia and Sunni, just like two groups that. Or any other two groups that just have a deep ethnic and historical or religious hatred of one another. And then so much of what's going on in the country in the media and in politics just begins to make sense.

A (51:35)

Absolutely. And studies show this. It used to be, like, 50 years ago, a Democrat would be perfectly fine having his or her daughter marry a Republican or a Republican parent who'd be fine if their children dated somebody from the other political party. Right now the polls are so interesting. It's like 90% of Democrats say that they would be disowned their child if they married a Republican or a Trump voter. So it's just like you're saying it is like this. It feels almost like an ancient enmity, but it's a relatively recent vintage.

B (52:12)

Yeah. So how should we view this? Because at the beginning of the conversation, you said that tribalism is. I'm paraphrasing, but it's not bad inherently. It's just. It's sort of the way of things. It's how we're built. So does it not make sense, then, to worry about political tribalism or to try to fight it?

A (52:34)

Oh, so I say that tribalism inherently is not bad. Like, I'm like, tribalism in sports or tribalism in family. Like, I'm so tribal about my friends, but I do think it's horrible, very bad, when tribalism infects the political system. I basically. It's exactly what you said. I think that's what happened in countries like Iraq, in countries like Afghanistan, you know, that's what happened. And we can't let that happen here. You know, I give a lot of talks, at least pre. Covid. Around the country, and people would say, okay, Professor Chu, what is. Is there a model out there, another country that you could point to that we can follow as a model to help us overcome our political tribalism? And I always. I know they're always thinking Canada, you know, and I always say, no, we are the best model. Like, we're in a terrible moment right now. Like, it's getting increasingly difficult to be optimistic. But if you just sit back and look at what we have as a structure, like, basically the DNA of the country, we actually have the best framework. Again, it goes back to the fact that our Constitution is ethnically and religiously neutral. We have the possibility of a national identity that is open, doesn't belong to any one ethnic group. And so I think it's a terrible problem right now where you see movements on both the left and the right kind of undermining that. So I definitely think that we're. This is a moment that we are. It's a perilous moment that we have to. You know, that's one of the reasons I decided to do your show. Like, I think it gives me hope that, you know, different voices can still talk and be very popular, because I do find it so different teaching, even at the Yale Law School, even from just, like, three years ago, completely different. I have to be so much more careful in what I can say and what I can do. And that's. It's almost like it's very dangerous when half the country views the other half not just as people they want to argue with, but literally as evil, un American people, because that's a recipe for civil war.

B (54:42)

Yeah. I wanted to talk to you a little bit about this before the end of our time. There's a lot of conversation about cancel culture right now. And I signed a letter, the Harper's Letter, that broke whatever tiny sector of the Internet pays attention to such things. And so you're on a campus, and you're someone whose work, for reasons that somewhat mystify me as well, has been consistently viewed as controversial. So have you. A, do you think cancel culture is a real thing? B, have you encountered it and in what form?

A (55:20)

It's a real thing. All the critics are right that it's often less powerful, less prominent people that really get canceled. But I have experienced it firsthand, and it is. No matter how established you are, it is extremely unpleasant. I will maybe end on a kind of optimistic note. So I got into a huge controversy because I wrote a Wall Street Journal piece talking about the positive mentorship of Brett Kavanaugh before all the scandal stuff came out and the accusations came out. That was in 2016. And by the way, my daughter had been hired before that, like, you know, a year before that, having nothing to do with me. And I disclosed that in the Wall Street Journal. But that was. There was a huge eruption at the Yale Law School, and I was definitely canceled for at least a year. And I'm still canceled by a large portion of the population. They'll never take my classes. But when I came back, I was told by the dean, you know, you got to watch out, because, you know, you have to issue an apology. And I said, I'm not going to issue an apology for something I didn't do. Tell people to dress like models is ridiculous. Have you ever seen a courthouse? You have to wear a suit, you know? So she's like, okay, if you don't apologize, then you may get boycotts, and only three or four people may take your class. Even though I had previously had among most popular classes, so that would have been cancel culture. So I was like, fine, I will just teach a class with three people, because the one thing I will not do is apologize for something I didn't do. So we advertised the class, and it shows how, in a way, even the administration, these administrators don't know 120 people signed up for the class. So then I was like, oh, my God. And they're like, well, these could be boycotters. So I went into my first class thinking that they were all going to get up and walk out, but they didn't. They didn't. You know, I capped the class at 25. I had a wait list of 90. So my point here, Coleman, is I think that there is a huge silent majority that just wants to be able to debate, that doesn't want to do this. But every time you. It's just too hard, because if you don't say these things, if you don't, you'll get. You'll get shamed, and you'll get. You know, you'll get pushed out of the tribe. And for a lot of people, they don't want to deal with that. It's just too much trouble. So they kind of go along. But I do think that with, like, strong leadership. I hate that term. But, like, I just laid out the rules of my class, I advertised it, and I was like, do not take this class if you don't want to engage in lively political debate with all views, you know, And I threw it out there. And again, my colleagues were like, oh, my God, maybe you're going to get in trouble. And I was like, that's ridiculous. We're on a campus. How could you? And again, I think there were probably a lot of students that would not take my class because of that, but 200 students did want to take it. So it's the way to. I think that it is a real phenomenon, cancel culture. And it's scary. Like, I will not say things now because I don't want to deal with the trouble. On the other hand, I am an optimist because I'm still standing, you know, I'm still teaching. My classes are still overflowing. So I think that if you kind of stand up for your principles and you still have your show and it's getting better and better. So in that sense, I know what the critics are saying. It's not like you're blotted out forever. But I do think a lot of people, you're not taking into account all the people that feel they can't say anything because of the phenomenon.

B (58:46)

Well, thank you. This has been one of my favorite podcasts so far. And before you leave, can you just tell people where to find you and what you're working on now?

A (58:56)

Yeah. So stupid me. Every time I'm controversial, my email is public. It's on the Yale website. Amy Chua Edu. I have a Twitter account, but I'm not a good tweeter, just horrible Mechua. And it's my daughter that runs my Facebook. I'm on the wrong generation, but I am available and, you know, love talking about these things. And I'm working on a new two new books. I alternate between these political cultural things and then these more personal things. And at the moment, I have a top secret project that's more on the personal side. So stay tuned.

B (59:31)

Can't wait. All right, thank you so much, Amy.

A (59:33)

Thanks, Coleman. Bye.