C (6:44)

As we've been planning this, we try to think of Questions, legal questions to go along with the cyber play. How can we make this relevant to the different legal audiences? And information sharing is one of the key things that we focus on, right? And we're putting out questions that are requiring our legal audience to look at their nation and look at their national laws and look at their domestic policy. On, hey, how do we share how if this happened and we knew a partner was going to have or was having a similar thing, how do we do that? And so there's not an overriding international law basis to share that information. That's domestic policy, domestic law. And so this is, it's a good opportunity to kind of blend that international flavor of what we're doing, but then have them also hone down and look at, hey, well, how would we do this if it was with this partner nation or that partner nation? How do we share?

A (7:49)

So of the seven possible scenarios or storylines in the NATO parlance, including the legal one, it was ultimately up to the participating national teams to decide what they wanted to try out during the two week exercise. One storyline or many, a veritable buffet of tabletop exercises to refine their tactics, tools and procedures, while also finding and fixing gaps in their capabilities, solving new problems, threat hunting, patching and still keeping vigilant against perennial threats, and deterring and countering any adversarial action. And this being a military exercise, of course, adds an entire level of interesting complexity above what we might normally think of as tabletop exercises. The defensive work being practiced here is not just within a NATO alliance or a national military level, but importantly, it is also with national or international civilian industry. Think about it. Usually the military doesn't own the networks that it operates on, but military operations on that infrastructure can absolutely affect many, if not all of its users. So coordination, there's that word again with the civilian side, is a major part of this exercise, as is planning and understanding the operational effect of doing military operations on civilian cyber infrastructure. Mitigating risk while still working effectively. And crucially, you've got to make sure that you're not missing anything. And like any good training exercise, there were boundaries, of course. For example, everything was non offensive work. No hackbacks, no red teaming. There are other exercises for that. Cyber coalition is all about detection, deferment, defense. And while NATO was happy to share some information about the tools and tactics that they've been developing to aid their defenders, it was clear that the core of the entire exercise is really all about the human factor. Getting people to talk to each other, learn how to better Work with each other, find new ways to more efficiently gather and quickly share the kinds of information that can turn the tide of battle. A phrase that can sound like hyperbole most of the time, but in this case, not an exaggeration. Here's US Navy Commander Bryan Caplan again on the human challenges at play.

D (10:32)

We would love the nations to, you know, jump right in and share stuff, but it's never the case. You know, really, it takes sometimes nations that have participated in the exercise for years, they're more comfortable, they have a better system in place, knowing what they can share, what they can't. Some of the newer nations that are participating, they're more timid to really either ask questions to other nations or provide information to nations. So it, it is a challenge. And the key for us to kind of keep things moving in the direction that we would like it to go, which is the collaboration, the coordination and the cooperation, is to have mechanisms in place that kind of steer the nations during the storylines, to get them to kind of go outside their comfort zone, to, to coordinate and work with the nations to try to get further along in the story. The reps that come from the nations during the planning cycle, you know, by the time we execute, they have, you know, built a good rapport with the other representatives from the nation. So because we do icebreakers at events, kind of to try to get people to communicate, talk, get comfortable. So when it comes to the execution part, they're more willing to help. Now, the more difficult part is their nation back at home to, to be willing to provide representatives here with some of that information to then share it. So, yes, it's, it's definitely challenging, but it's a good challenge. And that's why we really have the exercise to kind of push those boundaries and, and get that flow of information, you know, up and down, left and right, and it really does help out.

A (12:31)

In our previous episode, I talked about NATO's Article 5, and that would be the mutual self defense clause. NATO officials many times made a point that the entire cyber coalition exercise operates below Article 5. Again, whatever that means. But I should note that it's actually a different part of the NATO charter that was more frequently mentioned throughout my conversations and interviews that day, especially as it related to efficiency in information sharing. And that would be NATO Article 3. Here's Irene Gibson, who is a storyline briefer from NATO's Cyber and Digital Transformation Division.

E (13:11)

Article 3, which is specifically says that allies may, and I'm quoting this so that I don't get it wrong. Separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity. Capacity to resist an armed attack.

A (13:30)

Keeping in mind that the NATO treaty was written in 1949, it's interesting to think what continuous and effective self help and mutual aid could mean in the context of cybersecurity. NATO's answer to that is improving speed and clarity of information. Truly the sharpest blade in the arsenal of the defender, being able to separate that signal from the noise. And to do that, they've deployed a tool that they're calling the Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability, or vsisc.

E (14:05)

So VSISC is like a fancy phone a friend. So oftentimes when nations experience cyber crises and they wish to request aid, they will do so bilaterally, which basically means nation A will talk to nation B and say, hey, I have this crisis. Can you help me with it? This enables nation A to talk to 31 other nations at the same time and say, okay, I'm having this serious crisis and I'm interested in anyone who can help me that is an ally within NATO. The interesting thing about this is that in cyber, we don't normally think of cyber as an armed attack, but the founding of VISAS sort of elevated cyber to the concept of an attack where Article 3 doesn't just apply in terms of an armed attack, Article 3 can apply in terms of the cyber domain. This exercise is being run because increasingly, cyber capabilities are really defining modern warfare. And frankly, cyber is one of our greatest force multipliers within NATO. And it's really a critical enabler to ensuring readiness and information superiority as well. I think oftentimes in the military sphere, as part of the military staff, we think of sort of classic concepts of defense, you know, like historic things like hard weapons, high quantity, visible assets. And I think it's important that in the modern era, we have a fundamental paradigm shift to expanding those classic concepts to the constantly evolving cyberspace. And that means that we need iterative evolution and creativity, because in cyber, to stand still is to be left behind.

A (15:50)

At this point, I was pretty eager to actually see some of the people doing all of this crucial work and using these new tools. And after the briefing at the Estonian Ministry of Defense, we headed pretty much right next door to CR14, which is the facility that houses the NATO cyber range. Now, CR14 was even more locked down than the Ministry of Defense. For those that know the military parlance of a scif, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, that is essentially where we were headed.

B (16:26)

A skiff is a Space where highly sensitive military intelligence is shared, so security is intense. We were instructed to leave behind anything that could transmit a signal. No Wi fi or Bluetooth at all, which meant phones and laptops were obviously out. Personal smart devices had to go, too, including my smartwatch and Maria's, along with earbuds. Thankfully, though, we were allowed to bring our audio recorder, since it doesn't have any radio capabilities.

A (16:57)

And since I'm never without a notepad and pen, falling back on analog in a cyber range allowed me to take a few notes. As media, our presence in this military facility required specific protocol to protect classified information. Perhaps as a little girl in my wildest princess fantasy days, I might have dreamt of a dedicated escort and having my presence announced to a room before I entered it. But the reality of it was nothing like what kid me might have imagined. We were loudly announced before we entered any kind of room for the defender's benefit. Not so they could look busy for us media types, but so they could specifically not look busy. Stop handling sensitive information. Close down important windows on your workstations. Don't talk about anything secret, everybody. The press is here. The inside of NATO's cyber range in many ways looked unremarkable and indistinguishable from an average and beige cube farm. I was relieved to not see anything flashy, because while complex dashboards and threat maps may look cool for cameras, that's the kind of thing you show to try and impress people who don't know any better. The real work of cybersecurity is decidedly unglamorous, and the cyber range cubicles lined a long room. Each cubicle was labeled with a nation's flag, with two or more service members representing their component commands from that nation seated at their workstations, heads down and typing away, or otherwise coordinating with larger teams back home, or sometimes teams that were in the room with them from other nations. The cyber range room had heavy coverings lining all of the windows, so absolutely no daylight or prying eyes could peep in. And in the center of the room was a table with a few snacks, because snacks are always a good idea. And of all things, a little paper turkey. Like a Thanksgiving turkey table centerpiece of all the things. Well, given that the Cyber Coalition exercise is two weeks long and starts just before US Thanksgiving does, when I got a chance to sit down with U.S. service members for an interview later that day, I had to ask about the turkey. Here's Candice Sanchez, chief of exercises for the 16th Air Force, telling me more.

F (19:20)

There's A number of Americans out here, we're like, hey, let's just have Thanksgiving together. And then we started inviting our partners to come over. And a lot of them, this was their first time experiencing Thanksgiving. We learned just recently this year, they like deviled eggs. We gave them the experience of we brought cranberry sauce in a can. We brought it over so that they could have that experience, experience as well. Some enjoyed it, some didn't, but it was definitely a staple we had to have. We found a turkey this year thanks to our Estonia partner. They were able to find us a turkey in the local area, so we were able to do that.

A (19:51)

The only other room that we went to at the NATO cyber range was what I presume was a SOC or something like one. All of the workstations were locked and that's good. And the large monitors against the wall were off. And just like all the windows, many of the monitors were also physically covered with sheets. There wasn't really anything for us to see. And I couldn't help but shake the feeling that perhaps there was at some point going to be some kind of tech demonstration in here for us to see. But current events overruled, perhaps the fraught failed peace negotiation in Moscow. But that is just conjecture on my part. It bears repeating that NATO Cyber Coalition is a defensive military exercise on its own. It's kind of extraordinary that we even know of its existence. No one here is going to be imparting any tips and tricks here for the practitioner, nor was there much concrete detail about what the defenders at this exercise did. So temper your expectations, okay? Without tipping their hand too much, NATO wants us to know that they are practicing for a lot of different scenarios. They also want any potential adversaries of NATO to know this as well. And over the course of the day, I found many interesting parallels on how over the years, this specific exercise seems to have followed the maturity of the cybersecurity world in general for a long time. When talking about tactics, tools and procedures, that last bit, the procedures seemed to get a bit short changed compared to the tools. The promise of that single pane of glass, that one perfect tool from that vendor, that's definitely not over promising. That might be the silver bullet to make up for major gaps in security hygiene. Oh, if only. Tools are bits, they're a gadget. They represent potential for efficiency, maybe even ease. Generally, they work or they don't. Binary. Humans, however, we're messy. We poke holes where they don't belong. We break things that we're doing just fine. So it stands to reason for both the industry and for military alliances like NATO that the human side of cybersecurity is where a lot of work remains to be done. And to me, the best perspective on that is from Major Tobias Malm of the Swedish Armed Forces. He's been a participating member of the NATO Cyber Coalition for 13 years now. A highlight for me was hearing his thoughts on how much this cybersecurity exercise has changed.

G (22:34)

When I started like 13 years ago, it was very focused on the technical part where you had these technical training audiences who solved some technical issues. And then it has developed to what it is today where you have much

A (22:52)

more

G (22:54)

complex system of sharing information, its emphasis, the importance of cooperation within the alliance. So it has changed a lot, I would say. And when I look upon what Sweden has done during these years, we started with a technical team and today we have technical teams, we have the Cyber Command, we have the National Cyber Security center and a lot of other agencies within Sweden. So it's, it's much larger and it's much more complex and it's more focused on operations and sharing of information, how do we do it, which system we use and etc.

A (23:49)

It is always tempting to point to the technical solution and certainly there are those. But truly a lot of the growth and the challenges come down to the human factor. It's those three Cs again. Collaborate, cooperate, coordinate and in the end they're really one big C. Communicate the

G (24:06)

whole domain with cyber, since it's is not geographically locked, we need to share information and work together with others and we need to train that because it's not as easy as you can imagine. So for us this exercise is very important to actually know which. Which system should you use for which information, how do you pack the information, which information is relevant to the others and, and sort of just train how you communication, I would say, because we are usually not that good at communication as a human. So we need to train that and, and this is an excellent opportunity to do that.

A (25:06)

Thank you for listening to this second episode of our three part series. I enjoyed cracking open the time capsule of our day with NATO in Tallinn back on December 2, 2025. Hope you enjoyed coming along with us in our next part. We're staying in the present and reflecting on what we learned and the broader meaning for global cybersecurity in a fraught geopolitical moment. This episode was written and hosted by me, Maria Varmazes. It was produced by Liz Stokes, mixing, editing and sound design by Trey Hester, our executive producer is Jennifer Ibin with content strategy by Mayan Plout. Peter Kilby is our publisher. Thank you so much for listening.