Dan Snow (2:08)

On a hot July morning in 1863, two great armies collided in the rolling farmlands of southern Pennsylvania. What followed was the largest and bloodiest battle ever fought on American soil. For three days, the Union army of the Potomac and the Confederate army of Northern Virginia were locked in a brutal contest over ridge lines and hilltops that are now etched into the American National Memory. McPherson's Ridge, Little Round Top, Cemetery Hill. Firearms forged by the machines of the 19th century Industrial Revolution fired volleys, tearing through units of men as tightly packed as their 18th century forebears had been in the Revolutionary War. Cannons spat a hail of iron. Officers and enlisted men alike grappled in the chaos of gunsmith. Charges were launched and propulsed. The fortunes of war veered back and forth. Gettysburg was fought for control of a crossroads, and indeed, it was a figurative crossroads for the American Republic. At the climax of the battle, the Union line held. It withstood a massive Confederate assault. And General Robert E. Lee's daring, desperate, foolhardy, optimistic attack was repulsed with shocking losses. The climax of that Confederate assault, the brief moments that they gained the top of the ridge that they were attacking up, is now known as the high water mark of the Confederacy. The defeat of the Confederacy marked a new phase of the Civil War, the beginning of the inevitable long decline of the Confederate states. Months later, U.S. president Abraham Lincoln would consecrate a cemetery on the battlefield and he would make a speech that was just two minutes long. It's called the Gettysburg Address, an invocation that brilliantly reframed the war as a test of democracy itself. His words turned Gettysburg into sacred ground. They relaunched the American project. In this episode, I'm very pleased to say, we're going to walk the battlefield, well, figuratively, ridge by ridge, hour by hour. We're going to explore why it happened, how it unfolded, and we're going to see why its legacy still endures today in the heated debates in the US over freedom and nationhood, in the idea of what the United States of America is, we are very lucky to be joined by friend of the podcast, friend of the history hit TV channel, Major Jonathan Bratton. He's a historian. He's a serving officer in the Maine National Guard. Let's get into it.

Major Jonathan Bratton (5:06)

T minus 10. Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king.

Dan Snow (5:11)

No black white unity till there is

Sponsor/Ad Voice (5:13)

first some black unit never to go

Dan Snow (5:16)

to war with one another again.

Major Jonathan Bratton (5:18)

And lift off and the shuttle has cleared the tower.

Dan Snow (5:25)

Jonathan, good to see you, buddy.

Major Jonathan Bratton (5:27)

Good to see you as well. It's sad that we've got this pond separating us, but it's still good to see you.

Dan Snow (5:32)

You and I have always talked about, well, a couple of days exploring that battlefield in person like we've done on so many others. So I'm Looking forward to doing that at some stage. But for the moment, we're have to be virtual.

Major Jonathan Bratton (5:41)

You know, it's what we have, and we're happy to have it.

Dan Snow (5:43)

First of all, let's work out the plan for this campaign. 1862, 1863, both sides exchanging blows. Some famous battles. Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville. In brief, neither north or south able to kind of get that decisive upper hand in that eastern theater of the Civil War.

Major Jonathan Bratton (6:00)

No one's getting that decisive Napoleonic battle that everyone so desperately wants. What you're getting is instead, you have tactical successes that are never able to be turned into sort of operational victory by either side. And specifically at the beginning of 1863, it's the Confederacy, it's the army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee that has been winning successive tactical victories that are never able to be transformed into that big strategic win. And so this is what's in the back of Lee's mind as he's coming out of Virginia. He's got an argument with the President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. Davis says, hey, the fortress city of Vicksburg is under siege. It would be very cool if you shifted forces west to the Mississippi to relieve that siege, that hub of Confederate stronghold there. But Lee says, no, I would rather invade Pennsylvania. So he's trying to, again, what he did in 1862, take the war out of Virginia into the north and bring the war closer to Washington, D.C. and specifically cause a political sort of meltdown, a political end to this conflict.

Dan Snow (7:14)

So you march into enemy territory, hopefully inflict a stinging defeat, and that forces the Union, it forces the USA to say, fine, let's negotiate some kind of settlement here and let these Confederate states go.

Major Jonathan Bratton (7:27)

Yes, it's very much designed as a political ploy to cause panic through the North. And when Lee's army leaves Virginia and goes up the Shenandoah Valley, enters Maryland, enters now Pennsylvania, finally. And then as his forces sort of arc northward, moving up towards Carlisle, threatening York, threatening Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania State Capitol, and poised to sort of move against the massive port at Baltimore or maybe towards D.C. you know, Stuart's cavalry ranges outside D.C. of course, all the newspapers react to this with their usual aplomb and calm, collected demeanor. No, no. Everyone freaks out. It's a complete panic, absolute panic throughout the North. Thousands of of reserve militia are called up from all the way west as Ohio, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania begins digging trenches around the city. They think that they're in for it. Reserves are called up in Philadelphia and as far north as New York. So it is causing sort of a widespread panic. And that is definitely Lee's goal.

Dan Snow (8:32)

And Lee, he doesn't have that many men, does he? Given this huge range of forces, militia and regular forces now ranged against him in the north, who's he got with him?

Major Jonathan Bratton (8:41)

Numbers are always a little bit of a weird game. As we know as historians, numbers don't always tell the full story. So Lee's got about 75 to 80,000 effective troops with him. Now, what we have to remember for the Confederate army, for the army of Northern Virginia, the majority of their logistics, their sustainment is being conducted by enslaved labor. Which means that all those in uniform, the majority of those in uniform are your trigger pullers, are the. Your cannoneers, are your cavalry, your fighting force is essentially your army. Your numbers are essentially your full combat force. Now for the US army of the Potomac, they do not rely on enslaved labor. So a lot of people look at numbers and you see the army of the Potomac around 95 to close to 100,000 effectives, give or take detachments here or there. That includes your orderlies, your teamsters, everyone who's got to do this stuff of bringing the things from the one point to the next point to support the people in the front, front fighting. So when it comes down to the riflemen on the line, you are looking at a near parody or maybe just a very, very slight advantage in numbers on the US side, but not a significant amount. It's not a 3 to 1 advantage. It's not a 2 to 1 advantage. It's barely an advantage at all. So those are sort of the numbers that we're looking at for this campaign.

Dan Snow (10:04)

Is the U.S. army better equipped at this point?

Major Jonathan Bratton (10:07)

No, not especially. Both sides are quite well equipped. The Confederacy has been, how should we say, enjoying some gifts from some island out there called the United Kingdom. Rolling around with a lot of Enfield rifled musket, a lot of tower stamped equipment. Very embarrassing. They've got a couple Whitworth rifled guns that are of English make as well British make. Both sides are looking fairly similar when it comes to logistics and equipment. However, with the exception that the further that Lee moves north, the further he moves from his own supply lines. The U.S. army of the Potomac under now as of June 28, George Meade takes command within just a few days of the battle of Gettysburg is moving, hugging its sort of supply lines along railroads. Railroads are key to this entire campaign. Railroads and river and waters are key to the entire campaign. If you want to understand Gettysburg, sit down at a map, look at roads, look at the rail look at the water as Gettysburg Park Ranger historian Troy Harmon lays out in a great book, and you will see exactly why the forces come together at Gettysburg has the confluence of everything that modern armies of the 19th century need to make war.

Dan Snow (11:26)

What about the morale, the sort of fighting ability? Because this is an area that's been mythologized and talked about and celebrated and decried. Were the Confederate forces just tougher, better motivated, higher morale at this point, the war? Were they better in a scrap than their Union adversaries, man for man?

Major Jonathan Bratton (11:47)

The short answer is no. The longer answer is more nuanced. So Robert E. Lee obviously believes that his army is superior. And I would say that the Confederate soldiers believe after Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville that they are superior. The problem with Chancellorsville, Chancellorsville is a weird one. Everyone at Fredericksburg knew that the army had been defeated at Chancellorsville. The army felt like it hadn't been defeated. The Union army fought very well at Chancellorsville. A whole chunk of the Union army never fought at all. It was a very small part of the army of the Potomac that was engaged at Chancellorsville. So there's very much this belief that we are the equal of Lee. Give us good commanders, give us a good battle plan, and we will lick him, we will beat him. And so the morale, especially as US Soldiers march into Pennsylvania, march out of Virginia, as the. Many soldiers referred to it as sort of the. The slave soil of Virginia, the sour faced people of Virginia, as all these Northerners are describing Virginia, and onto the friendly soil of Pennsylvania, marching through Maryland. The flags come out and you see people along the way welcoming you. Morale is actually sky high for both armies. So you have this sort of oddity of a lot of confidence coming together in this clash of arms.

Dan Snow (13:06)

Speaking of coming together, why do the two armies come together at Gettysburg? It's one of those rare kind of battles. Are both sides actually looking for a decisive clash or is this one of those accidental encounter battles?

Major Jonathan Bratton (13:20)

Well, Dan, we could literally spend an entire podcast talking about.

Dan Snow (13:25)

I'm sorry, I've triggered you. I did that on purpose. I'm sorry, man.

Major Jonathan Bratton (13:30)

No. So this is one of the great fascinating things that we don't fully know. As I mentioned, there's several different schools of thought. One is just the nature of the military terrain, so to speak, the logistical terrain, which means that this is the easiest point for armies to concentrate and fight each other. Another way to look at it would be that Mead is attempting to using his Germany. You know, looking at what is taught at West Point. Well, it's not clause of, it's, it's Germany and the idea of using an advanced guard to draw, draw in your enemy and then engage them in battle. Some could say that that is what Mead was looking to do on July 1st with the engagement that begins there. Really what it comes down to is that you have what is called a meeting engagement. It is a classic meeting engagement, a battle that's not planned by either side, but that both commanders have postured their forces to be able to mass on a certain point rapidly within about 24 to 48 hours. And we're talking the army of Northern Virgin, which is divided into three large army corps, and the army of the Potomac divided into seven smaller army corps. They're spread out on various roads, but because of the road nature of Gettysburg, they're all able to concentrate rapidly on that one spot. So why it happens, Lee has moved north, attempting to bring the army of the Potomac to battle. George Mead, his sort of prime directive, if you will, from the President is, well, don't lose. Protect Washington at all costs, but also bring Lee to battle. Don't let him move towards Philadelphia or Baltimore or God forbid, New York City. Everyone's looking at the political calculus here and Lee must be brought to battle and defeated rapidly.

Dan Snow (15:18)

And that battle takes place around the town of Gettysburg. Now if you look at a map, you will see there's roads coming from all directions. So yeah, for sure it's a huge crossroads. Then you get the town, then you get this interesting geography, don't you? There's this ridge that runs sort of almost due south of the town. And that ridge becomes pretty essential here. Just draw out the geography for me here.

Major Jonathan Bratton (15:40)

I like to say that Gettysburg happened because of glaciers. When the glaciers pass through this area of Adams County, Pennsylvania, you have essentially glaciers running in these long parallel lines which gouge out the earth, casting rocks up on these ridge lines and small hills leaving these little rocky clusters, you know, along the way as the glaciers melt, dropping huge rocks and boulders everywhere. And so what you have is essentially areas of sort of undulating waves of ridge lines, which is great for 19th century warfare, as you know. You know that high ground, it enables a better line of sight. You feel better if you're on higher ground shooting down versus attacking uphill. So it's really an area that is almost tailor made for a 19th century battle because you have these mix of ridge lines. So starting from the west, Harris Ridge to McPherson's Ridge to Seminary Ridge and then Cemetery Ridge, with Cemetery Ridge anchoring on this large Low hill mass over the town of Gettysburg called Cemetery Hill. It's so slight that most people almost do not even realize that it's a hill. It's so gradual. And it's the most perfect platform for 19th century artillery. You don't want to have a really steep hill where you can't depress your gun muzzles enough to build a fire canister at close range. You have a nice sort of gradual rise. It's just this perfect gun platform. And then a little bit further to the northeast, you have a large wooded, hilly mass called Culp's Hill that protects. Protects the Baltimore Pike. That's going to become very, very important during the battle. And then if you just run down Cemetery Ridge down to the south, you have two smaller hills known as Little Round Top, which is mostly bare of trees, offers very good line of sight, very hard to get artillery up there. And then Big Round Top, which is wooded and so therefore doesn't really give a lot of tactical advantage. And so Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge being these parallel ridgelines, are going to play a major role in the upcoming battle.

Dan Snow (17:48)

It sounds to me like whoever gets this high ground is going to be at a huge advantage in this battle. And talk to me about the 1st of July when there is a ferocious skirmish for that high ground. How do the two sides come together?

Major Jonathan Bratton (18:02)

Ferocious. I like that you call it a ferocious July 1st. If we were to stand alone, it would be one of the larger engagements of the Civil War. And that's the thing with Gettysburg. If you take any one of those three days, they stand alone by themselves as very significant engagements in the Civil War. But yes, it does start out as a skirmish. And it starts out as a skirmish because Meade is using his cavalry for their doctrinal purpose, to seek out and gain and maintain contact with the enemy. And he's got an advantage here because he's got some great cavalry commanders. The army of the Potomac cavalry has matured greatly in 1863, really come into their own. They are a match for Jeb Stuart's Confederate cavalry. More than a match, a little bit. Because Jeb Stuart has sort of lost his bearings a little bit by. He lets ego take over from common sense. And he. As the armies are marching north, he actually separates his cavalry command from the main Confederate army, leaving only two brigades back with Lee, and rides around the army of the Potomac. The problem is the army of the Potomac is moving north. So as the army of the Potomac moves north, Stuart keeps trying to hook left and keeps running into U.S. troops and can't gain contact with Lee, which means that Lee is operating in enemy country largely blind. He's actually using his cavalry brigades not for scouting, but for kidnapping freed people of color to send back into slavery. Talk about your ideology getting in the way of good operational tactics.

Dan Snow (19:35)

Jonathan, if you can't trust dashing, charismatic cavalry commanders to just utterly disregard chain of command and all their orders to go on their own little rampage, then, I mean, you know, what are they good for? What are they good for? That is what they all have in common through the centuries. Jeb Stuart is. Yeah, he's among good company there. Okay, so you've got the Union cavalry. These are guys on horses. They're obviously more mobile. They're able to cover more ground. So they're advancing, what, in a big sort of screen, like a bubble around and in front of the. The foots Union infantrymen.

Major Jonathan Bratton (20:08)

Exactly, exactly. It's this wide arc and you're the cavalry division front committed by the opposite of a cavalier. John Buford, who's very much a very common sense cavalry soldier, really sees the idea of cavalry as almost mobile infantry, almost like a dragoon is a little bit forward thinking there. What he's going to do is he. His job is. He sees it is preserve that high ground, preserve options for the infantry commanders. So he is going to screen his forces dismounted in front of Gettysburg, which are going to run up against Confederate infantry who are advancing blind. Because if you don't have cavalry, well, you use infantry for reconnaissance. Confederate infantry advancing towards Gettysburg. They've heard tell of Union forces in the area. But you do have a Confederate division advancing on Gettysburg. And what happens is first a skirmish and then exactly what Buford wants, which is the Confederates to slowly commit more and more troops. And as you commit, you slow down. And now it's a fight for the ridge lines. And as the Confederates sort of close up to the dismantled cavalry, they will fall back to the next ridgeline and the next ridgeline. This engagement begins literally a mile outside Gettysburg until by around 9am The Union cavalry, Buford's troopers, have fallen back to McPherson's Ridge, which is just when John Reynolds with the 1st Corps of Infantry arrives. And this is where Reynolds makes one of those shocking decisions. Reynolds is not the army commander. He has a corps commander. He's a wing commander. So he's got a little bit more authority. But he decides without asking Meade to commit his two Corps under him, the 1st and 11th Corps, to battle at Gettysburg, which is not in Meade's plan that we know of but it mirrors his opposite number. General Henry Heath, Confederate division commander, mirrors his decision to commit his entire division and then ask for support from Dorsey Pender's division behind him to commit these forces. When Lee's general order that morning was do not bring on a general engagement until the army is concentrated. So you have two commanders sort of just ignoring what we know of as their guidance to bring this battle into being. Wow.

Dan Snow (22:30)

So it's a case of their horizons shrink down and they want to take on the troops to their immediate front. Their sort of wider vision has just become super focused on the threat at hand.

Major Jonathan Bratton (22:41)

And we'd love to know what Reynolds was thinking. The problem is, we will never know because as he's deployed, deploying his brigades into line of battle, and as they're advancing into McPherson Woods, Reynolds is hit just below the neck with a rifle bullet and killed almost instantly. So now the senior corps commander, the senior Union commander is down as more and more troops are arriving on the field. No one's really super duper told George Mead that all of this is happening. There's been a few couriers back to say, hey, we're skirmishing, we're slowly engaging. Lee is just now being appraised that this is not a battle with some militia or cavalry, that this is in fact, a slugging match between infantry and the day. One morning infantry fight is absolutely brutal. You have a brigade of Mississippians that uses this unfinished railroad cut as sort of this cover and concealed route to get around the Union flank. They come up over it. There's a battery of artillery there, second main battery. And the battery commander says in his report after action report, you will understand how close the action was when I tell you that most of my battery horses were killed by the bayonet and not by rifle fire. So this is how close the action is. A charge by a Wisconsin outfit turns the tables on the Confederates in the railroad cut. The Union soldiers stand on either side firing down inside to the railroad cut until the Mississippians surrender. There's a charge of some other Union troops on the opposite side of the line that captures almost a full brigade of Confederate troops as well. And this sort of brings this lull on the field as General Heath realizes, oh, I've made a huge mistake. And around 11am Both sides sort of pull back and pause, just exchanging artillery fire while they wait for some senior leaders to show up and make some decisions.

Dan Snow (24:36)

Jonathan, as I'm hearing you talking, I'm so struck by what does this fighting feel like and look like on the Ground because it's this turning point in history or it's this, this astonishing moment in military history where you've got weapons that are capable of firing accurately over longer distances. So you mentioned this rifled round that kills the Union commander, but people are still regularly closing. There is hand to hand fighting, there's melee, there's bayonet thrusts, there's fighting that's recognizable from the, you know, two, 300 years earlier. But you've also got the beginnings of these weapons made phenomenally more powerful and accurate and lethal at range by the sort of industrial revolution. So I'm struggling to imagine sometimes what this. It's a bit of everything. Is it like if you're marching this brigade, are they marching shoulder to shoulder across these fields at the other side, or are they starting to advance in sort of open order in what we'd regard as a more modern sense?

Major Jonathan Bratton (25:26)

Yeah, it's a little bit of both. What you have at its essence is a clash of amateurs. These are volunteers. These are not regulars. They have not undergone the 12 to 18 months of training needed to create a, you know, good Prussian regular of this era or a, you know, a British regular. No, these are volunteers. They are mostly guided by a sense of sort of devotion to each other, this loyalty, these regimental loyalties. These are state regiments. Most companies are recruited out of individual towns. And they are following their leaders, their company, their regimental leaders, which is why you see massive casualties amongst leaders. If leadership by example is all you have, you can't rely on that sort of bedrock discipline, then you're going to take a lot of leader casualties. Those are people leading from the front. And so, yes, the rank on rank, the line style of fighting is necessary. Literally out of peer pressure. It's necessary for command and control. Because again, without this discipline, this is what you rely on. That said, Gettysburg will see experiments in open order. On July 3, there is an entire Union brigade that will attack in open order in a reconnaissance and force that is a harbinger of things to come.

Dan Snow (26:39)

An open order is what you're not. Shoulder to shoulder, how far might you be from the guys either side of you?

Major Jonathan Bratton (26:43)

Yes, you're looking at about 10 to 15 yards of people on either side of you, you know, within that shouting distance, sort of at staggered intervals with skirmishers in front. So you're always going to have that open line of skirmishers in front of you, sort of probing, looking for the enemy. But we're not going to really see, generally speaking, you know, we're not going to see a Division sort of looking, attacking an open order until 64, 65, that begins to happen. It's still very difficult. Command and control is very, very difficult in an era without immediate communication. You are looking at visual indicators, you have audio indicators, drums, bugles, fifes and flags and your commander's voice. And if you're out of your commander's voice, you can't really hear much at all. And so really this is why this linear formation is so important. But the problem is, as you point out, that rifled musket man 300 yards dead on with a.58-69 caliber round that is rifled thanks to Claude Binet. Those lovely Frenchmen really just causing carnage in the ranks. And you see massive casualties on the first day of Gettysburg. The Iron Brigade is one of the hard fighting units of the Union army. They're going to lose 8, 9, 10 color bearers in each regiment, unit colors. The staff is completely shot through by this horrific volley of fires. Everyone's sort of narrowing in on, on just that visible indicator that you can see. And you're exchanging volleys at 20, 30, 50 paces as they were in the revolution, as they were in the Napoleonic era.

Dan Snow (28:16)

But with weapons that are a lot

Major Jonathan Bratton (28:18)

more capable, with deadly accuracy and a lot more punch. I think we forget just how much more impetus that spin on around puts to that hit on the body where you're, you are smashing bones, you are not snapping them, you are smashing them, you're creating splinters, you're tearing into vital organs. If you're gut shot, you're pretty much given up. But that round is going to flatten out when it hits you. That lead pull whatever intestines vital organs with it, causing just really grievous wounds.

Dan Snow (28:50)

So you as a major, you as a company commander, you're leading a group of guys depending on your own voice. So they can see that you're like, come on, you're bunching together, you're marching, you're making your way towards an enemy unit. You're fighting at the kind of ranges you'd expect in the revolutionary wars. But you're using weapons that are beginning to resemble the kind of modern rifle that you and I might take out hunting, you know. So it's just lethal.

Major Jonathan Bratton (29:14)

It is. And this lethality is demonstrated late morning of July 1st. So Lee gets word, hey, this battle is happening. You know, he has some words with his division commanders, you know, how dare you. Probably very gentlemanly and whatever. And so the, the situation as it develops mid morning is Lee makes a decision to begin to concentrate his forces around Gettysburg. He's got an entire core north of Gettysburg up near Carlisle. So they're going to begin moving south as his forces move in from the west. So they're coming in and sort of closing in on this vice. So he's got a built in flanking movement that just happens by virtue of the road network in Gettysburg. It's not essentially designed. And then on the union side, the 11th Corps arrives on the battlefield under Major General Oliver O. Howard, who arrives to find that he's the senior ranking guy on the field. And he then has to figure out where he places his troops. And. And at the end of this lull, a Confederate offensive from this site called Oak Hill towards the north end of the Union line happens. And when you talk about where our leaders, well, you say, yes, if you're a major or a colonel, yes, you're right up there with your regiment. Brigade commanders, division commanders can be with the front of their unit, probably should be, or somewhere between the front of their unit and the rear. But in this Confederate divisional attack by Robert Rhodes, the division commander doesn't go in. The brigade commanders don't go in. It's entirely disjointed. An entire brigade of around 800 North Carolinians advances towards what they think is the Union flank, unaware that there's an entire Union brigade laying down behind a stone wall to their left. And within about 150paces, this union brigade stands up and levels the North Carolinians with a volley. They said that the dead afterwards were found with their toes completely on a straight line as if they were on parade. And this attack is utterly crushed. So this is that example of where should a commander be? Where should a commander be in this sort of combat? If you're too far forward, yes, you become a casualty, as we will see all throughout the battle. If you're too far to the rear, you can't control those immediate, in the moment things on the ground. So this is what technology is doing, this is what the tactics are doing. And they will evolve throughout the war, mostly to just everyone realizing the best thing to do, as everyone realizes in the fall of 1914, is dig as much as possible. As soon as you halt, just start digging.

Dan Snow (31:43)

Yeah. Well, that's what's so fascinating about the U.S. civil War and the lessons that were not learned by the international observers and professional militaries at the time around the world. Okay. So at the end of the first day, you've got forces flooding in to build upon, if you like to engage in this battle that, whether they like it or not, has pretty much started. You've got the Union clinging onto this high ground, right, this really good defensive position. But the Confederate troops are advancing, as you say, like a vice from different directions. So at this point, who would you rather be?

Major Jonathan Bratton (32:18)

So the day one of Gettysburg, you can chalk it up as tactically a Confederate victory because yes, that vice, that flank attack comes in and just crushes the Union flank. The poor 11th Corps, this poor German Americans, it's a largely German American corps and because of our lovely trends towards nativism, they get blamed for this day one loss. Even though no matter, anyone who's there is going to. When you're getting attacked in the front and the side and the rear simultaneously, you're probably just going to give it up. The Germans put up a hell of a fight, but they're falling back. They're falling back. So by 4, 5, 6pm It's a general retreat back through the town of Gettysburg. There's fighting in the streets. At one point a German battery commander, Hubert Dilger, great Baden, born artillerist in the Union army, there's a traffic circle inside Gettysburg and He puts a 12 pound Napoleon at each street like the spokes of a wheel, just firing down each street, firing grape and canister. Units barricade themselves inside the houses and they fight house to house. And by nightfall, the Confederates have driven the Union troops through Gettysburg and now they're concentrating on Cemetery Hill. The remnants are assembling there. Tactically, this looks like a great victory for Lee. The problem is Gettysburg is worthless. It's not a great objective to have. What you want to do is destroy that little formation of resistance on cemetery hill. The 1st and 11th rallying there, the 12th Corps arriving at nightfall. Elements of the 2nd and 3rd Corps arriving there. So really, Lee has destroyed or battered two of the army of the Potomac, seven corps. There's still five other corps that are coming up. And what he really needs to do is drive a night attack to drive the Union off Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill where they're setting in. Lee realizes this. He gives a discretionary order, which is very common of him, to one of his corps commanders, you know, drive them off that hill if practicable. The core commander that he gives this to is not aggressive. He goes and he conducts a reconnaissance and goes, I don't like this. He brings his division commanders and they all say, well boss, we fought hard, our men are tired. How about we give it to the fresh division? The guy is not here, you know, classic moment, vote in favor to commit the guy who wasn't present for the meeting. That division commander arrives as he needs to see the ground and by the time he conducts his reconnaissance, they know that they're facing a very well dug in enemy and they opt not to attack. What would have happened had they attacked that night? No one knows. A lot of people say, well, Stonewall Jackson, had Stonewall Jackson been there, he would have attacked. And I say, well, no, he wouldn't have because he would have been dead because he was already dead a month and a half and he would have just smelled very badly and not attacked anything. But the way it remains that night is that you have the majority of the army of the Potomac arrives. George Meade arrives and decides to fight here. Lee arrives, decides to fight there. And so the scene is set for the battle to continue.

Dan Snow (35:28)

You're listening to dad Snow's history. We're talking about Gettysburg.

Major Jonathan Bratton (35:30)

More coming Up Foreign.

Dan Snow (35:38)

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Major Jonathan Bratton (36:56)

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Did I talk too much? Can't I just let it go? Thank you so much.

Dan Snow (37:07)

Take a breath.

Major Jonathan Bratton (37:08)

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Dan Snow (38:08)

And you mentioned they're digging in. That's important. We've talked about that earlier. At this point, unlike the battle of Waterloo, for example, 1815, a huge battle between large armies on this kind of scale, on the whole, they tend not digging. They take advantage of some natural features, but they're not digging in necessarily. Are those Union troops now getting their shovels out and digging, as we might understand them, trenches?

Major Jonathan Bratton (38:30)

Yes. So if you go up on Culp's hill, you can still see the lines of the Union trenches. And this is mostly due to one certain Union Commander, a over 60 gentlemen who is a civil engineer and an army engineer, prior George Sears Greene. I think he's around 62 at the time of the battle. He's a brigade commander, although he had experience leading a division. And as soon as he puts his troops up on Culp's hill, he has them get their shovels out. In every era, the infantry don't like to dig in, but he forces his troops to start digging. They dig rifle pits, so long lines of trenches with sort of lunettes in front of them, revetments in front of them. Eventually they improve it with overhead cover, building logs to basically just have slits to fire through. And so you have a long line, trenches running along Culp's Hill, making this an incredibly formidable defensive position, which is very, very important. So much of the battle of Gettysburg, it's the left flank of the Union line that gets talked about. Little round top Joshua Chamberlain of 20th Maine. But the most important part of the battle is actually the right flank, because the Baltimore pike is just behind Culp's Hill and the Baltimore pike runs back to Westminster, Maryland, which is the rail hub that is the army of the Potomac's lifeline. It's the only rail hub. And that's where all the core trains are. That's where all the core hospitals are. That's where the lifeblood of this army is. So that 15 miles between Westminster, Maryland and Gettysburg this is this vital link that if me loses this, he has to retreat, he has to fall back. And Lee is aware of this. Why he does not orchestrate his battle better is. Is amazing to me. He had dysentery. I guess that's all I would. I would put it down to. I mean, if you're suffering from dysentery the entire battle, your decision making is going to be off. But this is sort of the posture of where troops are beginning of July 2nd.

Dan Snow (40:32)

Well, I've lived to see everything now. I've lived to see Jonathan Bratton throw shade on his forebears. And I never thought that day would dawn. So this is how we know we're getting your true unblemished opinion about this historian. That's impressive.

Major Jonathan Bratton (40:45)

It is. It's a painful thing to do, but you have to overcome individual biases and look at the bigger picture.

Dan Snow (40:51)

A true professional. Okay, so day two, the 2nd of July. It dawns. Troops been arriving overnight, as you say, Union troops have been digging in, creating this formidable defensive position at that right at the northern end, that right flank of their line. What is the plan on day two?

Major Jonathan Bratton (41:09)

So Meade's plan on day two is concentrate his forces and fight from a defensive position. Remember, this guy just took command like four days ago. Yeah, right. Survive, don't lose. It's a very important thing. Don't lose. He's content to let Lee keep the initiative and keep attacking him. He's very confident that in his position, which extends from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Hill and then runs south down Cemetery Ridge towards Little Round Top, that's the famous fishhook. It's a beautiful interior line. You can reinforce any part of that line within 15 minutes to half an hour.

Dan Snow (41:46)

If you look on the map, it looks kind of scary. They look like they're surrounded, but actually, as an expert, you're telling me that those interior lines, they actually have a great advantage because they can shuffle troops around to meet one threat after another.

Major Jonathan Bratton (41:58)

Yes, it's a phenomenal advantage. And the road network helps them out too. You can move along those roads, you can move artillery replacements, you can move ammunition wagons, hospital wagons all around that sector. Now, for Lee, who has decided to take the offensive, being offensive minded, once he has the initiative, he doesn't want to give it up. Possibly not the best plan to have when you are limited on material and manpower. Strategically, I don't know. He is facing the other problem, which is he's too far apart. It will take a good hour or two to Move from one side of his line to the other. It's very hard to synchronize your effects. And especially his battle plan for July 2, which is for the troops in front of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill to demonstrate to fix the enemy in place there, essentially make it look like he's going to attack. And then for James Longstreet's corps to swing south and then attack along the Emmitsburg Road and Echelon, basically rolling up the Union flank from the southwest.

Dan Snow (43:04)

You've outflanked the north. Now try and outflank to the south and just crush them in the middle.

Major Jonathan Bratton (43:09)

Crush him in the vice. And that's the battle plan. What could possibly go wrong? Well, so many things. Mainly, Dan Sickles is what goes wrong for Lee. Dan Sickles, a phenomenal character, Literally a character. The only non West Pointer corps commander in the army of the Potomac. He's a Tammany hall politician most famous for shooting his wife's lover in broad daylight in front of the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue prior to the war. And his wife's lover was Francis Scott Key's nephew, the guy who composed the Star Spangled Banner. So this is, I mean, tabloid. Just go nuts. Everyone knows who Dan Sickles is. One of his defense attorneys is Edwin Stanton, who is going to go on to become the Secretary of War during the Civil War when they get him off on a. The first successful use of the temporary insanity plea. So it's really good stuff. And Sickles is great. Raises a brigade right off the bat in 1861. So that's great for the war effort. You need more manpower. And he's not a bad commander. He's a very aggressive guy. But because he's aggressive and because of some stuff that happened at Chancellorsville in May, he doesn't like where his corps is positioned. At the south end of the Union line. It's in a little bit of low ground dominated by Hoke's Ridge. It's a ridgeline opposite where he goes. If the enemy puts artillery there, I'm in a tight spot. I don't like this. So after negotiating, I guess is the nicest way of putting it, with General Meade all morning saying, hey, I don't like this spot. I don't like this spot. Boss, can you come down here and look at this spot? And Meade's going, hey, I have other problems elsewhere, mainly the Baltimore pike, my main supply line. I don't have time for you, Dan. Just calm down, sit tight. Around 1pm Sickles moves his third corps about 11,000 troops, about a mile and a half forward and positions them in this arc, this wide V with the V tip towards the enemy, running from this high ground at this place called the Peach Orchard, running back along through the wheat field and then anchoring it in this little rocky area called Devil's Den. And then his other wing is angled back toward the main Union line on Cemetery Ridge. But it's not large enough to cover this whole area. So it's just stuck out there like a sore thumb all on its own. And this would be normally very, very bad. But the problem is, for Lee, he didn't expect Union troops to be there. Remember, his whole attack plan is centered on this idea that they're going to roll up the flank and all of a sudden the flank isn't where you think it is. Now you've got Union troops who are right in your path. And so inadvertently, Sickles creates almost a tripwire. He gets inside Lee's decision making loop. It slows down the deployment of Confederate troops on the flank. Longstreet has to counter march because there are now troops where he didn't think there were going to be. And he doesn't actually begin his attack until around 5pm that's very late in the day. You don't have a lot of time left of daylight for fighting. And so when Longstreet does make his attack, he's now engaging sickles 3rd Corps well ahead of the Union line. And there's this great moment where Mead finally rides out to meet Sickles. Mead is known as that old goggle eyed snapping turtle. That's his nickname. And his temper is never good in any situation. His temper right now he's furious. And Dan Sickles says, essentially, hey, sir, look, I have higher ground. Isn't this great? And Mead says, yes, General Sickles, this is in fact higher ground. And if you were to continue moving forward, you are continue finding higher ground until you hit the mountains. And Sickle says, all right, sorry, sorry, sorry, I'll, I'll pull my core back. And at that moment, in one of those great timing moments, the signal guns for Long Street's assault begins. And a round shot comes bouncing on ground, buries itself in the earth nearby. And Mead says, general, I wish to God you could, but now I fear you are in it and I have to find a way to get you out. So Mead does an incredible thing in this moment and supports his insubordinate general and will support him through this entire engagement, which is the crux of the fighting on July 2nd.

Dan Snow (47:18)

And so what most of this fighting on this second day, it's around this southern edge of the battlefield, is it?

Major Jonathan Bratton (47:24)

It begins this way. July 2nd is notable for just the sheer ferocity that all happens after like 5pm this fighting at the southern end of the battlefield. The Confederate lines coming out of the woods must have looked just stuck, terrifying these endless lines and attacking an echelon, which means that you see sort of one brigade at a time coming out of the woods. This idea of an echelon, meaning they're attacking separated in time and space, meant to cause the defender to commit their reserves too early. And that means that you were hitting a vulnerable part of the line. If you're Gouverneur K. Warren, Mead's engineer, standing on Little Round Top undefended at the start, looking out and you're just seeing these waves of gray coated, brown coated troops coming out of the woods, the sun shining on their bayonets, and you're going, oh my God, we are, we are screwed. And so Meade's chief engineer, Warren, sees all this and this fighting is developing, that the Devil's Den is enrolled in gun smoke and the artillery battery there is firing. The commander is yelling, you know, give them solid shot. Give them canister, God damn them. Give them anything. I mean it's this very close in fighting. Once again, the fighting is continuing to the wheat field. And now the peach orchard is on fire and this whole flank is aflame. Mead is trying to find reinforcements for anywhere to bolster what he knows is a very, very endangered spot on the line. He doesn't want to pull too many forces from his right flank. But his fifth corps is coming up. And Warren, his chief engineer, sends one of his runners, Raynald McKenzie, who is going to have a big day at Little Bighorn in 1876, runs down the slope searching for anyone who's there. And then he finds he's Colonel Strong, Vincent with his brigade, which contains this unit called the 20th Main Infantry. And Vincent says, well, what are your orders? And he said, I'm looking for division commander General Barnes. I have orders. I need a brigade. And Vincent says, give me your orders, I will go with my brigade. This is rash, rank insubordination in the 19th century in a very orders based system. Vincent is putting his entire career on the line. And he leads his brigade to the undefended Little Round Top and puts them in place just as the first confederates begin coming through the gap between Devil's Den and Big Round Top, coming up through Brushing through the skirmishers. And then two Confederate regiments come over Big Round Top and smash into Vincent's left flank where the 20th main is. So you have two Alabama regiments versus this one Maine regiment.

Dan Snow (49:59)

So Jonathan, this is Lee's plan now, potentially working. He's going to roll up this Union position from the south and he's a few seconds away from achieving that kind of surprise, capturing Little Round Top. But instead the Maine guys got there just before Maine.

Major Jonathan Bratton (50:15)

And to give them credit, Pennsylvania and New York and Michigan and then good old Paddy O' Rourke and his 140th New York who come howling in, Irishman Paddy rolling in at the last minute. They don't have time to load their rifles. They roll in with a bayonet. They smash into the Texans at the crest of the hill and it's hand to hand fighting. So all of Little Round Top is this sort of very dramatic scene. The most dramatic in my opinion, of course, that 20th Maine of around 320 soldiers holding that extreme left flank under the command of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, professor of Bowdoin College, liberal arts professor of all things, commanding this regiment. And they're going to fire through their 60 rounds very rapidly. 20 minutes of fighting is really all it takes to fire through all your ammunition. The Confederates are flanking. They're flanking some more as more and more Confederate units are committed to this fight after they break through Devil's Den. And so it's a sort of onrush of Confederate troops. And Sue Chamberlain is left with the decision of what do you do with no ammunition left? Do I die in place? Do I retreat? Can't retreat. And so the famous order of bayonet forward. The bugle sounds the call and it's a bayonet charge down this little hill catching the incredibly exhausted Confederates. I mean, these Alabama regiments have already marched 25 miles in 85 to 90 degree weather in massive humidity directly into this attack. These guys are exhausted. It's sheer adrenaline that's keeping them going. And this bayonet charge of these Mainers catches them off guard. They retreat. Many are captured. And this sort of saves this left flank. Ironically, the exact same thing's going to happen on the right flank that night. So in the darkness, Colonel David Ireland with the New York regiment is going to do the same thing. He's on the far right flank. The Confederates are mounting night attacks against these dug in positions. It's going horrifically for them. It's not a good story for the Confederates. It's probably why that side of the battlefield Never gets talked about because there are night attacks occurring against Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill fails utterly for the Confederates. David Ireland bends his regiment back into a V as well and then runs out of ammunition and conducts not one but two bayonet charges to clear the enemy and keep the vital Baltimore pike open. And there's this whole memory problem, right? You know, probably that decision did more to win the battle than the 20th Maine on Little round Top. But because Joshua Chamberlain was a phenomenal writer and wrote about his experiences after the war, that's how we look at that one. So it's a matter of, hey, who writes better?

Dan Snow (52:57)

Wow. Okay. So on day two, the Union line has bent, but it is not broken. And roughly speaking, Lee's plan to crush it in the vice, to outflank it and crush it and kind of concertina it up in a way. It has not worked.

Major Jonathan Bratton (53:11)

Not at all. No, no, it has not worked. And it's caused so many casualties. July 2nd is so incredibly bloody. Just for example, the wheat field is a very, very small area on the Gettysburg battlefield. Approximately 18,000 troops, 18 to 20,000 troops, all told, will engage in the wheat field. Back and forth, back and forth, back and forth. About 50% of them become casualties. This tiny little area has 10,000 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing. It's just this horrendous, horrendous spot. I mean, the whole wheel field is just covered with bodies. When night falls on July 2, it's important to remember Lee has fired almost all of his artillery ammunition. His ordinance trains have about enough for two sort of general engagements. Meade is beginning to worry about his ammunition reserves. Both sides are worried about their wounded, trying to get them care. These are sort of the things that are going through everyone's head. Lee has a moment on July 2nd at night where he thinks that he might have broken through. On Cemetery Hill, Confederate troops rush up to the muzzles of German gunners again. Diedrich's battery, a great moment where Louisianan puts his hand on a gun tube of this battery and says, I take command of this gun. And the German gunner holding the lanyard says to so si haben basically, then come and take it and pulls the lanyard and blows the guys to spin the rings. Reinforcements again. Interior lines. Meade is shuffling soldiers back and forth, back and forth. This is what keeps his line intact. His line does not break. He holds a council of war that night with his commanders. Do we stay and fight? Do we attack? What do we do? And they say, we'll stay and fight. We'll fight on the defensive, which sets us up for July 3rd and actually a very little known Union offensive on July 3rd.

Dan Snow (54:59)

More Gettysburg after this. Don't go away.

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Dan Snow (56:25)

Well, well, I was not expecting to say that of course, because you know, as an amateur I was expecting to talk about the most famous offensive in US military history. But let's get started with the Union attack before we come on to Confederate One. Tell me dawn on July 3rd, what's going on?

Major Jonathan Bratton (56:40)

Dawn on July 3rd. Confederates have crept into some of the abandoned rifle pits on Culp's Hill. They are threatening that supply line and Meade gives the order for the 12th Corps and elements of the 11th and the 1st Corps. This is a three corps attack to attack that morning and retake. So relieve this pressure on his artery, his lifeline. The Baltimore Pike. This is something that we just never talk about and it's sort of stunning. You have approximately 20,000 Union troops attacking at dawn. 48 gun artillery barrage to initiate this assault and then a fierce Union onslaught against dug in Confederates who after fighting for about four hours in some very determined, stubborn really close in action are driven out of the rifle pits and by around 10am Mead's line is secure and Lee is left going well. Now both flanks have failed. This informs what is commonly known as Pickett's Charge. This is why it's so Important Lee is not just realizing that, oh, well, you know, it probably doesn't. Isn't going to go well on the flank around Culp's Hill. It's. He has utterly failed. His troops have been driven out of their position and are left nearly combat ineffective.

Dan Snow (58:03)

Lee's troops over the last 36 hours, they've failed on the north flank, they failed on the south flank. So where are they going to attack, Jonathan? What's left, right, bang up through the middle route one.

Major Jonathan Bratton (58:16)

Well, you take a page out of the Battle of Alma in the Crimean War, the British do a phenomenal frontal assault across a river, take massive casualties. They bet they break the Russians. And this is in Lee's mind, we think as, hey, it's possible. It's within the realm of possibility. The British did it. How hard can it be?

Dan Snow (58:37)

Well, just because the British do something doesn't mean it's easy, right? These are highly trained professional redcoats talking about here. So come on, tell me about Pickett's Charge.

Major Jonathan Bratton (58:47)

So the misnomer of Pickett's charge. Pickett has one division out of three divisions that are committed in this attack. The other two were bloodied heavily. Units taking anywhere between 10 to 50% casualties on July 1st and some of them on July 2nd. Pickett's division is fresh. You're looking at about 12 to 15,000 troops that are going to cross a mile of open ground to break, you know, concentrate mass and concentration, crack open the center, defended by about 6,000 Union troops, while simultaneously, Jeb Stuart finally is back. The cavalier has returned with 100 wagons, which is all he can show for his time away. And Jeb Stuart is going to threaten the Union rear again, threatening one of the supply routes in the rear with sort of a cavalry action, which is going to be foiled by George Armstrong Custer, a good Ohio boy. Good Harrison County, Ohio boy, which is where I'm from. And by a charge of Michigan Highland, leading a charge of his Michigan brigade, yells, come on, you Wolverines. The Cavaliers are checked by audacious Midwesterners. And Stuart decides that he does not have the combat power to sort of press this attack. And so another part of Lee's plan is sort of falling away, which leaves this spectacular assault that will be preceded by. What do you precede an assault by Dan?

Dan Snow (60:14)

A massive artillery bombardment.

Major Jonathan Bratton (60:16)

Which works every time, right?

Dan Snow (60:18)

Well, yeah, some of the first of war generals be scratching their heads now and giving the side eye, but yeah, that's the idea.

Major Jonathan Bratton (60:24)

Yeah. Sir John French and Douglas Haig would say yes, Absolutely. This is totally a great idea. Two hour artillery bombardment. One of the largest concentrations of artillery in North America. Probably the largest artillery duel of the Civil War. And it is mostly defeated due to the genius of one man, General Henry Hunt, the commander of army of the Potomac Artillery. The chief of artillery, who realizes right away exactly what this bombardment presages, tells his gunners to cease fire to make it look as though the Confederate counter battery was effective. And that gives the trigger, so to speak, for 28 year old E. Porter Alexander, the commander of Confederate artillery barrage, to go to General Longstreet and say, we've sort of met the conditions. Their counter battery is less, the return fire is less. Now is the moment. Also, we've run out of rounds essentially, so you have to go. Longstreet. This corps commander of Lee's cannot himself give the verbal order. He just simply nods. He has significant reservations that this attack will fail. He's argued against it. But at one o', clock, these long lines of 15,000 troops emerge from the woods in perfect order from Seminary Ridge and begin crossing into what they think is a relatively artilleryless zone, which could not be further from the truth.

Dan Snow (61:52)

So that Union artillery opens up. Let's just talk through some of those projectiles initially. Are they firing solid ball which is able to travel further than other kinds of rounds? What do they open up with?

Major Jonathan Bratton (62:03)

They open with approximately 100 guns firing from Little Round Top to Cemetery Hill. So it's a converging fire. They're firing at angles to each other. They are opening a solid shot with spherical shot, spherical case, which is the explosive shell. It's got a time fuse. The Union artillery is incredible. American artillery has always, always been one of the strong points in the US army all throughout our history. And it does incredible work at Gettysburg. As the Confederate lines are getting nearer and nearer, they're switching from spherical case to grape and canister. You know, around the 300 yards, these shotgun shells. Cowan's New York battery loads triple canister and nearly causes one of the guns to do a somersault backwards.

Dan Snow (62:50)

These are tins really, with effectively sort of musket balls packed into them. So that each one of those cannon, as you say, becomes like a shotgun in some ways like a machine gun. Just dozens of these little rounds just flying out, creating just beaten zones in which it's hard to see anything, any flesh, anything surviving.

Major Jonathan Bratton (63:08)

Yes. And so this is what they're going into. And units who have again, these guys have been fighting for three days. Many of the units that were mauled on day one. Don't even make it halfway across the field before they turn tail and run back. So already the attack is dissipating. The lines are getting closer and closer together. Sort of as you're getting fired on from both flanks, everything sort of begins to converge. This attack is supposed to converge against Cemetery Hill, but really it's converging at a spot along this stone wall by this clump of trees. A lot of people mistake the clump of trees as Lee's objective. The objective is really Cemetery Hill, this vital position. But because of the Confederates converging, it doesn't help them that the 8th Ohio swings out on their flank and begins firing volleys into the flanks of the Confederates. While on the other end of the line, the brigade of Vermonters swings also in this long arc and begins firing musketry down the flank of the Confederate advance, further pushing them together, converging on the spot, this angle and the stone wall. And so you have at the crux of it, as the sort of. The point of penetration is several thousand Confederates massing into this one small little 2 to 300 yard front. And they run up against. To the right, you have Alex Hay's division. You've got units firing buck and ball. This is smooth bore muskets with a musket ball and three rounds of buckshot. And they've been preparing all morning with extra muskets. And this is again this constant volume of fire. No Confederates get across that part of the wall. But at the angle around 400 to 500 confederates are able to pierce that line and come up over the wall. And there's this moment where Lee thinks maybe he's done it. But as every single World War I general, whoever led an offensive will tell you, it's easy to punch a. It's about what happens afterwards. Can you develop it? And he had nothing. He had no reserves left. There was no way that these 500 individuals are going to pose a threat against the thousands of Meade's massed reserves. The sixth Corps has already arrived. This is an entirely fresh unit that Meade is using to fill holes in the line. And so this clash of musket butts wielded and bayonets and pistols fired at close range ends in absolute defeat for the Confederates. And as the Union line seals itself and counterattacks and stops the assault at the angle and Pickett's charge, Longstreet's assault, Lee's folly, as I would call it, has utterly failed on the lands of Abraham Bryant, a free man of Color, which I think is incredibly symbolic.

Dan Snow (65:57)

And that little section where they punch through that wall, known as the high water mark of the Confederacy, which is

Major Jonathan Bratton (66:03)

always funny to me, because the Confederacy, the high water mark would be sort of up by York, about 70 miles north.

Dan Snow (66:10)

Come on, man, it's poetry, Jonathan, honestly, you engineers, you scientists. I'll tell you what, it's hard working with you guys. Longstreet's attack, Lee's folly, Pickett's charge. Over half the men killed and wounded.

Major Jonathan Bratton (66:21)

You're looking at around 50% casualties once you take in the prisoners as well. And there's this iconic moment when these Union troops realize that they've repelled the assault. Alex Hayes, division commander, kisses his aide, mounts his horse, rides out to the front of his line, grabs a Confederate flag that has been captured by his men, drags it behind him on his horse, followed by the rest of his staff doing the same, riding along sort of his cheering division front, which is a hell of a vision and sort of an image. But, yes, you have more than half of the regimental and brigade commanders in this attack are killed or wounded. And the attack is essentially decimated. So what's left? You've got just battered troops sort of staring at each other across this gap in the lines.

Dan Snow (67:10)

And the following day, the 4th of July, Lee bows the inevitable and retreats. And I mean, just explain to me the importance of him breaking off that battle and retreating to the South. What does this mean for the American Civil War?

Major Jonathan Bratton (67:26)

So to set the stage, July 3, there was meant to be more fighting. Mead was looking at bringing up his reserves and mounting an offensive. He conducts, as I mentioned, there's a brigade that conducts an open order reconnaissance at around 4pm it just dumps rain, absolutely pours rain that whole night. So now it's just miserable conditions. Lee waits it out. He's in a defensive position. He pulls his troops back to defensive lines on Seminary Ridge. There's still examples of some of the fortifications that they dig in there. He begins digging in, and then on July 4, he does bow to the inevitable, and he makes his retreat. Meade closely following on his heels. Everyone's exhausted. There's clashes all along the way. This decision of Lee's to retreat means that the Confederacy will fight purely defensively for the remainder of the war. What also happens on July 4, of even greater import than Gettysburg, is that the fortress city of Vicksburg on the Mississippi river falls to General Grant's besieging forces. So now the Confederacy is split in two. New Orleans is a Union port now and the Mississippi is a United States River. Once again, the Confederacy is split in two. Everything is made that much more difficult and now Union strategy can focus on destroying this eastern sort of stronghold. You're going to see the stage is now set for an invasion of Georgia and for pushing further south against the rail line at Petersburg, Virginia the following year. So all of this is enabled by the twin victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

Dan Snow (69:06)

Well, listen man, thank you so much for a marathon that was as long as the battle itself. And I know you got plenty more where that came from. And people should watch this space because one day you and I are going to walk that field and we're going to do an in depth look at how that battle went blow by blow. I look forward to that day. Jonathan, thank you very much for coming

Major Jonathan Bratton (69:23)

on the podcast, Dan. As always, it is a joy. I look forward to going out there and hoisting a pint together at the Garriott.

Dan Snow (69:31)

Three days of unrelenting combat had left more than 50,000 men killed, wounded or missing and changed America. Gettysburg did not end the Civil War, but it certainly shifted its course, particularly combined with that other Confederate catastrophe over on the Mississippi, Vicksburg, which was fought around the same time time in the Eastern theater. From this battlefield, the Union began to push inexorably southward and the Confederacy's hopes of victory really faded away. Gettysburg lives on in how Americans tell their national story. It's become one of the great milestones in the Republic's history. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address has become canonical. It's in some senses one of America's founding documents. Thank you for listening to Dan Snow's history hit. If you're interested in learning a bit more about the American Civil War. Well, we did an episode on two titans of the conflict, their rivalry, Ulysses Escrin, Robert E. Lee. You can find a link to that one in the show notes below. Please remember to like and subscribe. If there are any other battles that you would like us to cover, there is an email there in the show notes that you can send your ideas to and we might do an episode all about that. Till next time folks. Thanks for listening.

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Adam Grant (71:10)

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Dan Snow (71:45)

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