
The last days of World War II & why the Japanese finally surrendered.
Loading summary
Dan Snow
Hello folks. Dan Snow here. I am throwing a party to celebrate 10 years of Dan Snow's history. I'd love for you to be there. Join me for a very special live recording of the podcast in London in England on 12th September to celebrate the 10 years. You can find out more about it, get tickets with the link in the show notes. Look forward to seeing you there.
Carvana Representative
Thanks for selling your car to Carvana. Here's your check.
Dan Snow
Whoa.
Evan Maudsley
When did I get here?
Carvana Representative
What do you mean?
Dan Snow
I swear it was just moments ago.
Evan Maudsley
That I accepted a great offer from Carvana online.
Dan Snow
I must have time traveled to the future.
Carvana Representative
It was just moments ago. We do same day pickup. Here's your check for that great offer.
Evan Maudsley
It is the future.
Carvana Representative
It's. It's the present. And just the convenience of Carvana. Sorry to blow your mind.
Dan Snow
It's all good, happens all the time.
Carvana Representative
Sell your car the convenient way to Carvana. Pick up. Times may vary and fees may apply. Popsicles, sprinklers, a cool breeze. Talk about refreshing. You know what else is refreshing this summer? A brand new phone with Verizon. Yep. Get a new phone on any plan with select phone, trade in in MyPlan and lock down a low price for three years on any plan with MyPlan. This is a deal for everyone, whether you're a new or existing customer. Swing by Verizon today for our best phone deals. 3 year price guarantee applies to then current base monthly rate only. Additional terms and conditions apply for all offers.
Evan Maudsley
Say hello to Mia.
Carvana Representative
Hey there.
Dan Snow
Mia runs a pet grooming service in Chicago. But getting new clients was rough until.
Carvana Representative
I started using Acast. I recorded my ad, targeted pet owners in the area and let ACAST do the rest. Now people all over the city know about my grooming services.
Dan Snow
Mia's business is looking sharp. What's your secret for happy pets and happy clients?
Carvana Representative
A fresh cut, a friendly vibe and a well placed podcast ad.
Dan Snow
Get the word out about your business through Acast. Visit go.acast.com advertise to get started. On the morning of August 15, 1945, 80 years ago, a voice crackled for the first time over the Japanese airwaves. Families gathered round the wireless had never heard this voice before. Only a sliver of imperial subjects had done. But it was one that belonged to someone that every single one of them knew. It was the voice of Emperor Hirohito. He was announcing something unthinkable. The surrender of Japan. After years of brutal warfare in Asia and the Pacific, the Second World War, there was finally Drawing to a close, you're listening to Dan Snow's history, and in this episode I'll ask, how did it all come to this? What made the Japanese Empire with its fierce military code, its powerful armies remaining across much of Southeast and East Asia, its deeply entrenched, oft repeated determination never to surrender? What made it lay down its arms? I'm going to delve into the complex story of Japan's surrender. There's the atomic dark destruction of the cities of Roshima and Nagasaki. There's the Soviet invasion of the Japanese Empire in Asia in Manchuria, and the prospect of invasion of the home islands themselves. In this case, defeat had many fathers. I'm also going to ask in this episode what would happen if Japan hadn't surrendered. We're going to explore the plans that the Allies had in place for a full scale invasion and what that might have meant for for Japan and the world, I'm happy to say. We're joined by Evan Maudsley. He's the former professor of International History at University of Glasgow and a historian of the Second World War and he's gonna help us unpack the final days. The Pacific War 80 years ago and those fateful choices made on all sides that shaped the course of modern history. Enjoy. T minus 10 atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
Evan Maudsley
God save the king. No black white unity till there is black unit. Never to go to war with one another again. And lift off and the shuttle has cleared the tower.
Dan Snow
Evan, thank you very much. Come back on the podcast.
Evan Maudsley
Thank you very much, Dan, for inviting me to come back.
Dan Snow
Can you give me a sense of what Japan's war effort was capable of or indeed what the Japanese people were experiencing through the summer of 1945? Was Japan on its knees?
Evan Maudsley
It's important to see this situation kind of from a broader point of view than just the Pacific. I always think of it as the Asia Pacific War. There's a lot more going on than I think we often think of or American audiences think of. In many ways, yes, the Japanese war effort is going badly. Most of the Japanese Navy has been destroyed and the Americans are now really under close approaches to Japan. On the other hand, most of the Japanese army is intact and is in China. The Japanese hold most of China. They hold more China in 1945 than they held in 1944. They still hold most of Southeast Asia. They still hold what the Dutch East Indies and they hold Malaya, although they've lost Burma. So in some respects, although things are going badly, from the Japanese point of view, one might think we shouldn't see it as being absolutely at the end of all possibilities. And also, the Japanese have been trying to rearm rapidly to deal with the approaching Americans and possibly the approaching Russians. So they've expanded their army in 1944, 1945, and in the spring of 1945, they begin expanding the army and the homeland from about 12 divisions to 60. So there's a lot of expansion going on. You have to remember that although the war ended with Hiroshima, Japan wasn't being seriously bombed until March of 1945. And in fact, Japanese aircraft production peaks in September 1944. So there are a number of reasons why the Japanese think that we're not really at the absolute end of our possibilities.
Dan Snow
Yeah, I was going to ask about that because there's so much discussion, discussion, isn't there, around the Allied strategic bombing campaign on Germany and whether or not it disrupted the German war economy. That debate presumably exists for Japan as well. I mean, how seriously were Japan, Japanese factories, munitions production, how significantly they were affected by the enormous firebombing attacks on Japan's cities through the summer of 1945?
Evan Maudsley
The Japanese population was being very badly affected when the bombing campaign really began in the spring of 45. The original campaign, which began in June 44, wasn't very successful because it involved how to do bombing and wasn't very accurate. In 45, they went back to what the British had done, which was large area bombings which affected a lot more civilians. The idea was by doing that, you could indirectly affect things like the aircraft industry. But they were actually quite difficult. But I think they were coming towards the very end of the war. You know, this all kind of comes together. March, April, May 45 is when the bombing really begins. The big Tokyo raid takes place. So until that time, you could be somewhat more optimistic. I think things really begin to fall apart in the summer of 45.
Dan Snow
Okay. And oil, presumably the whole thing began, if you like, because the Japanese home archipelago has not got enough indigenous oil. Am I right in thinking that? Because most of the merchant fleet's been destroyed by the summer 45, so Japan presumably isn't getting much oil.
Evan Maudsley
No, I mean, because Japan had no oil, and as you say, they went to war largely for things like oil and rubber, which they could get from Southeast Asia. The whole point of the American war effort to some extent, has been cutting those lines of communications with the South. So, yeah, they're running low on oil, especially for aircraft is a big dilemma. The Japanese navy was very badly damaged in a series of battles. But even if it hadn't been. They didn't have enough oil to sail. That's why they did one way missions, because there was no way of getting back. You know, there wasn't enough fuel for that. So that's desperately bad. Japan has some coal, but not an awful lot. And there's problems of getting rice and other things. So any defensive Japan will have to be done on a fairly primitive level. It won't be the kind of high tech warfare that the Japanese did very well in 1941 and 1942.
Dan Snow
So it's interesting that the Japanese situation is. If you look at a map of Asia and the Pacific, some policymakers could think there was a sort of salvageable position there. But it's getting quite rapidly worse. It's changing month to month and it's getting significantly worse through the late spring, summer of 1945. Yeah.
Evan Maudsley
So if you were a Japanese general, you know, you might think that actually things aren't that bad. If you were a Japanese admiral, you'd probably feel a lot worse about it. But the army were more important politically certainly in 1945.
Dan Snow
And as you say, the army actually doing reasonably well in China, which many of them would have regarded as the sort of main theater. So that's interesting. Yeah.
Evan Maudsley
Plus the Japanese think, you know, we have this Japanese spirit which gives us an enormous edge and a readiness to sacrifice, which the west don't have.
Dan Snow
Yes. You know, when you're talking about national spirit, I say this as a Brit. When people start appealing to just innate national spirit, you know, there's no plan. You know, there's no plan. Okay. So you mentioned admirals and generals, and I think you've given a sense there of this diffused nature of Japanese decision making. Who's in charge of Japan? Is it the emperor? Like who's making decisions? Who's thinking these things?
Evan Maudsley
A general point I'd like to make to start with is that Japan is not a totalitarian state. It's almost the opposite of totalitarian state. Could argue that Italy and Germany were aspiring totalitarian states. And you could say that Russia was a totalitarian state in that it was highly centralized and that there was a center that controlled everything or attempted to control everything. The thing about Japan is it's kind of very dispersed. Everyone likes the emperor or, you know, worships the emperor. But the kind of civilian control over the armed forces is very limited. In theory, the emperor is in charge of everything, both the civilian side of things and the military side of things. But in effect it means there's no, no Center. There was a lot of inter service rivalry during the war. There were debates about how the economy would run that couldn't be resolved. And there was a highly authoritarian political system. But it was nothing like what was attempted in Europe or in Russia. It wasn't democratic and it wasn't very efficient. But it was at least a lack of centralization that was important. Almost dysfunctional in fact, in terms of making decisions. One issue is that someone who can be seen as the dictator, and that was, I think Tojo was the person who featured heavily in Western propaganda. But Tojo gets removed in July 1944 when the Japanese lose Saipan. He is ancient history after that. There's a kind of caretaker prime minister after that, but he's not particularly powerful. The army high command, the Minister of the Army, General Anami, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Umetsu, are both powerful, but you know, the army is not as strong as it was. They're quite inflexible about not surrendering, but their power is not limited in a political sense one politically, including the Emperor who was ready to stand up to them. There's a big debate about Hirohito and what his role was. Did he have a responsibility for the war? Was he a war criminal in the same way as the generals were? And of course, the odd thing about the Japanese war is that the Emperor survives the war and is in place for decades after that. This was not unconditional surrender. And I don't want to get into what we can say about the Emperor's responsibility. What I think he was coming around to in 1944, 45, was some kind of negotiated peace. But he wanted a negotiated peace from a position of some strength in some respects, in terms of fighting the Americans, it's been one defeat after another. So from that point of view, the invasion of Okinawa in April 45 is for him very important. You know, let's defend Okinawa. Let's fight a full scale battle there, including, you know, mass kamikaze attacks, fighting to the death for the island, you know, in the hope that we'll get a victory of some kind. And the Americans and the Allies in general will then decide that, okay, we will negotiate some kind of peace at the end of war. It won't actually be a surrender, it won't be our victory, obviously, but it's going to be something where we survive. The problem is that the Allies are saying that we want complete control over what happens politically and we can't tell you what it's going to be so.
Dan Snow
The Allies, unlike the Iraq War, perhaps think that militarism in Japan is so deep rooted that there can be no peace in East Asia until the Allies have physically gone in and reordered the constitution and stamped it out. Just like they want to stamp out Prussian militarism in Europe.
Evan Maudsley
Yeah, yeah. I mean, it's regime change. I mean, I think that's the point. And it goes back to Castle Blanca Conference in 1943 with unconditional surrender. It goes back to the Cairo Conference in November 1943 when the Chinese become involved, but makes clear that any post war settlement will mean Japan giving up all its overseas gains, not just Manchuria, not just what it's gained in the course of the war from 1941, but also give up what it got from Russia in 1904, 1905 and what it got from China in 1895 from the Sino Japanese Japanese War when Japan got Formosa, Taiwan as part of its territory. All of that has to go. And then when they talk about politics, they're really saying, well, you know, yes, in effect, the country has been led by war criminals for the last five to 10 years. They have to go. That's the entire ruling elite. And it might be the Emperor, but that's what is not made clear. It's quite tricky for the Americans at least, maybe for the British as well, that although propaganda was mainly aimed at people like Tojo, you know, clearly the Emperor was seen as being a figure of hatred. Someone who featured in propaganda as an enemy of the Allies. It was very hard to say, okay, we want unconditional surrender, but the Emperor can stay. That's not really regime change. You want conceivably not just the generals and the admirals, but also the Emperor. The problem again, who's making peace are the generals and the admirals. So it's like Turkey's voting for Christmas. If they approve the final Allied des march is the potsin Declaration in June 45, which basically says they all have to go. We have to get rid of the entire elite and introduce a democratic Japan, whatever that is.
Dan Snow
And then the elite, unfortunately, the ones holding the reins at present, okay, so very, very few people in the United States of America, including the Vice President, we now know, knew about nuclear weapons, the nuclear program. So what is the plan in the naval staff in the War Department? What is the plan for how to defeat Japan?
Evan Maudsley
It would seem to me that there are several plans on how to defeat Japan. Although I was saying there was disagreement in the Japanese government. There's also Disagreement in the American government and the armed forces as well. I'm not myself totally clear on who knew the atomic bomb. In fact, everyone, even people designing the bomb, didn't necessarily know it was going to work until the summer of 1945. So it's a very unclear, obviously a very interesting factor in the war. The army seemed to feel that an invasion of Japan was necessary and there was no way of winning the war without an invasion. And General Marshall thought that the American population would not tolerate a protracted war into the late 1940s rather than having invasion. I think Admiral King probably thought that blockade would have been another way in which the war could have been won and would not have involved the same sacrifice of American lives. It would have been not very good for Japan, but that would have been another way. I think the Army Air Force also thought that strategic bombing, normal, not normal, but heavy incendiary attacks could continue. This is kind of like with Vietnam, bombing Japan back into the Stone Age. Possibly that was another alternative idea. But on the whole, I think that President Truman had come around to accept the idea that there was going to be an invasion. And the intention was that In November of 1945, which is actually three or four months after August, that would have been an invasion of the southern Japanese island, Kyushu, supported by the bases that have been gained in Okinawa. And that it would be in the spring of 1946 that the main landings in Japan would be made in the area around Tokyo. So Kanto, that would bring the war to an end. So that's what a lot of the argument is about. Would that have been an exceptionally bloody campaign? Remember that had the war gone on much longer, there would have been quite a large British contingent in the invasion of Japan. I mean, there was already a large British task force cooperating with the Americans in 1945. There would have been elements of Bomber Command and also the British Army.
Dan Snow
I like your comment you made a little while ago about the American Army Air Force thinking they might be able to win it from the air. Because, after all, ever since the invention of aviation, there's no war that an aviation practitioner hasn't thought could be won through bombing alone. So that stretches all the way back 80 years.
Evan Maudsley
I think it was true both in Europe and in the war against Japan, that the possibilities of bombing were exaggerated. But it did have a lot to do with strategy. In the end, a lot of Allied strategy is getting air bases either in China to bomb Japan or in the Pacific Islands to bomb Japan. That kind of drives things. But, yeah, I would agree totally about aviators. I'm not sure the admirals are much better, but I think it's always a kind of quick fix with that. There are all kinds of moral issues.
Dan Snow
Well, obviously, and you mentioned that it would have been very bloody for the Americans, but the Allies and also for the Japanese people, as the fighting on Okinawa pointed out. And we've got a separate podcast that you can go and listen to on the battle of Okinawa and just how appalling that was for everyone involved, including the enormous civilian population who suffered terribly. But this is where we switch track to the atomic option. It's obviously a gigantic subject, but just give me a sense of the Manhattan Project. When does that. Well, it begins its genesis in Britain, really, and then that British effort is amalgamated with that of the Americans. What about 1943?
Evan Maudsley
Yeah, well, in practical terms, 42, 43. Yeah. I was just in Berlin at the Historical Museum doing a kind of what if exhibition. And one of the what ifs was what if the Americans had dropped the atomic bomb on Germany first rather than on Japan? And I think it's probably fair to say that the atomic bomb was developed in case the Germans themselves, who were quite hot on nuclear physics, were able to develop their own atomic. So I think that was the key thing. But the interesting thing about this exhibition in Germany, what they argue, was that the Bridget Remagen is really a very important fact, that the Allies were very quick to capture the bridge at Remagen.
Dan Snow
That's the bridge across the Rhine.
Evan Maudsley
Across the Rhine, yeah. If they hadn't captured that bridge and the war had lasted longer, then it would have been August or September, November 1945. The war would still be going on. The atomic bomb would have been operational, and the Americans were. Were looking at possible targets which they could use in Germany. How far one can push that, I don't know. What I would say was that the atomic bomb wasn't developed to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That's what happened. And anyone who's seen any of the films about the Manhattan Project will know that there was a lot of debate about what to bomb or where to bomb and what the ethics of that were. In fact, the actual atomic attack on Hiroshima was, in effect, a decision to kill 70 to 100,000 civilians in one event. The argument then becomes, well, yes, that was terrible, but would the alternative have been worse? But it was certainly not a simple decision, and it was not an easy decision, and it was not necessarily a moral decision. I'm not going to attempt now to argue for or against dropping the atomic bomb. But certainly it did involve 70 to 100,000 civilian deaths in one event.
Dan Snow
Was there an element of the United States wishing to prove to the Soviets it had that technology, you know, some of that other kind of 3D chess that comes into it. What's your sense around the decision that was made to drop that?
Evan Maudsley
One of the things about the bomb, of course, is that it existed. So therefore you couldn't uninvent the bomb at that stage. You couldn't say, well, there was some alternative. I mean, I think certainly some people in the American government probably saw this as a kind of demonstration. I think more it was a sense of, well, what can we do to shock the Japanese into surrendering? And, you know, at one level, that's what works. You know, does that in fact have the effect? It gives the Emperor the power to intervene. But I'd stress that really, you know, the bomb is dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and pieces made on the 15th of August. I mean, no one is actually very in Japan is very clear about what's actually happened. You know, Truman gives a kind of public discussion of what the bomb is, you know, what it can do, and that does filter through to the Japanese. But, you know, if you are an army commander commanding an army in China, this doesn't necessarily have that much of an effect on you. You know, you don't really see, well what's actually happened. I can't see it. Americans have been bombing us for six months. What is the difference between that and now? And the Americans probably don't have a lot of atomic bomb. You know, maybe these two bombs are all they've got, and that's when they've dropped them. There's no further thing. I mean, that's kind of why I think the Russian invasion is also important in that when the Emperor eventually does say that we're going to make peace, and that's on the 15th of April, and he has this broadcast called the Rescript, which is, you know, a kind of proclamation by the Emperor. He says that, well, they've dropped this terrible bomb on us, so we have to bring the war to an end. He didn't actually say we were surrendering, but he does say we're bringing the war to an end and to do that, we have to stop fighting. Fighting. Clearly, the bomb is used as a reason for coming to making peace. But it's actually the first of two different rescripts that the Emperor issues. The second rescript is one that he sends out on 17 August, two days later. And that one is aimed kind of more at the Japanese army in Southeast Asia and China and everywhere else, saying, look, guys, the Russians have now entered the war. They entered the war on the 9th of August. You know what that means? That's why we have to surrender. So he was really saying in that statement to the army that, that the Russian entry in the war is actually more important. We hope the Russians might act as kind of intermediaries. That clearly isn't going to happen. The Russians haven't invaded us. We can't defend Manchuria. So really it's all over and we have to cease fighting. But again, the whole idea that the Emperor ends the war but doesn't surrender, de facto he is surrendering, but in effect he's just bringing the war to an end.
Dan Snow
You listen to Dan Snow's history talking about the surrender of Japan and the end of the war are coming up.
Carvana Representative
Thanks for selling your car to Carvana. Here's your check.
Evan Maudsley
Whoa, when did I get here?
Carvana Representative
What do you mean?
Dan Snow
I swear it was just moments ago.
Evan Maudsley
That I accepted a great offer from Carvana online.
Dan Snow
I must have time traveled to the future.
Carvana Representative
It was just moments ago. We do same day pickup. Here's your check for that. Great offer.
Evan Maudsley
It is the future. It's.
Carvana Representative
It's the present. And just the convenience of Carvana. Sorry to blow your mind.
Dan Snow
It's all good.
Evan Maudsley
Happens all the time.
Carvana Representative
Sell your car the convenient way to Carvana. Pickup times may vary and fees may apply.
Dan Snow
Hello, cherished listeners. This summer I'd love for you to accompany me on a history lovers holiday vacation around Europe on the podcast. Right throughout August, I'm going to be showing you Europe's most iconic historical hot spots. I've got a special series you'll be glad to know, Dan Snow's Guide to Europe. We've talked to local experts. We're going to be exploring Notre Dame in Paris. We're going to be talking about Napoleon there as well. Obviously. We're going to be walking the streets of Pompeii. We're going to be getting the gladiator's eye view of the Colosseum in Rome. We're going to be unraveling the mysteries of the Minoans on the island of Crete. Let me narrate your historic summer on this podcast. Just hit follow. You'll never miss an episode. Let's talk quickly about that Soviet invasion. It's difficult for people perhaps to get their heads around the fact that technically the Soviets and the Japanese state of neutrality existed between those two countries. Despite Hitler's efforts to get Japan to enter the war, to invade the USSR from a different direction, which could have been game changing, the Japanese decide not to. And it's only with the end of the war in Europe that the Soviets decide they're going to pivot to the east and invade Japanese possessions in northern China, that kind of Manchuria area.
Evan Maudsley
It's before that, I think that they've agreed in 44 that they'll go into the war once the European war ends and then they agree with the altar pact that they'll do it three months after war ends. So, yeah, they have an interest in that. But yeah, it's important to bear in mind that Japan and Russia signed a neutrality pact in the spring of 1941. And they adhered to that right the way through. I mean, the Japanese were tempted from time to time, but what they did do was they allowed a very large amount of Lend Lease shipping to go through what were in effect Japanese waters to Russian ports in the Pacific. So there was this position where Russia was, it wasn't doing a lot for Japan, but it was certainly Japan was doing a lot for Russia. You know, there was a. The Japanese were aware that they had to keep Russia sweet. There was a danger. By the time you get to the winter of 1942, 43, it's pretty clear that the Russians aren't going to lose the war against Germany. And by the time you get to the summer of 44, the Japanese are advancing very rapidly. One thing, by the way we haven't mentioned, which is actually quite important, is that in May 1945, Germany is defeated. Until that time, the Japanese position is slightly different. You know, okay, the Allies are now fighting two wars in two different places. Now with Germany gone, it's now the entire world fundamentally. You know, Russia, America, Britain and China all against Japan. It's a tough game to play.
Dan Snow
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria is fascinating, isn't it? I mean, it is like the Soviets have had their warm up, they've defeated the Wehrmacht in Europe and they just turn around and employ those same deep penetration, massive artillery, vast numbers of men and tanks. And it's just an absolute rout, isn't it? I mean, it's a complete disaster for the Japanese.
Evan Maudsley
I mean, the problem has been that the Japanese have been thinning out the defence of Manchuria really for the last three or four years. You know, in 1944 they're moving lots of divisions into the Pacific or back to the homeland. That was the cream of the Japanese army. You know, the Japanese army throughout the 1930s has only one enemy, and that's Russia. Russia is always seen as the most dangerous enemy. America, in terms of the Japanese army, is not seen as a serious threat. Britain isn't seen as a serious threat. China isn't seen as a serious threat. Russia really is. Russia is rearming. Russia is industrializing. We fought a war with Russia in 1905, you know, so it's a very dangerous thing. They are very aware of that. Even in 44, 45, they never underestimate the Russian army in the same way that the Germans do, because the Russian army actually fights fairly well in 1905. I mean, it's defeated nevertheless, it's not totally defeated. And Russia is very big and very powerful. But when the invasion comes, I mean, it takes a long time to move forces from Europe to North Asia. You know, there's only one major rail line, and it's harder than you might think. But there's over 100 divisions by the time they actually get going. And unlike the Japanese army, they're used to fighting a war of movement. So when it does start, the Japanese army is overwhelmed. It also results in 600,000 Japanese soldiers being captured by the Russians and put into POW camps at the end of the war. It's a much bigger event than is often thought. It would be wrong to see it as Stalin being opportunistic. The Americans are very keen that Russia join the war in the Far east. That is, especially before the atomic bomb.
Dan Snow
Works, given its intensity. You know, over a million and a half Soviet troops, 5,000 tanks, 600,000 German Japanese. Given its intensity and scale, it's got to be one of the shortest wars in history. I mean, it's good pub quiz question that The Soviet Japanese War of 1945 is absolutely astonishing, isn't it? It's over in the space of a few days because as you said earlier on the back of Nagasaki, Japan is out of this war.
Evan Maudsley
Yeah, it's actually interesting in scale. It's kind of like the German invasion of Poland in 1939 in terms of the number of troops involved. In fact, the number of Russian casualties is about as high as Pol casualties were in 1939. It wasn't just a walkover. There was a lot of fighting, especially in the eastern part of Manchuria. But in the west, the Russian just swept through. This again, may be possibly American trucks. We should. I never failed to mention Studebaker when I'm talking about World War II, but it certainly meant this. The possibility of advancing rapidly across terrain which the Japanese thought was impassable. I wouldn't see it as opportunistic. The Russians have been worried about Japan for a very long time. And you know, when Stalin does rearm or begins this massive industrialization program and modernization of the Red army in the 1930s, it's with Japan in mind.
Dan Snow
And so we have the Japanese surrender. It's a little bit difficult, isn't it? Because there must have been concern that die hard Japanese generals elsewhere in what was still a very far flung empire would fail to get the message from their imperial palace. Was there some nerves around that?
Evan Maudsley
Yeah, I think they were worried about that. They were worried about POWs as well, that POWs would be massacred if people didn't make peace. So it was very important that the Emperor was on board, I think, because on the whole, the one thing which everyone kind of agreed about was the Emperor that was a central figure, a godlike figure who they had to adhere to. That wasn't entirely the case. And the Emperor was always wary about using his power. Maybe partly he agreed with the program, you know, with the wartime program, but I mean, by 1944, 45, he was an intelligent man. He realized realizes that they were going to lose the war or they weren't going to win the war. And unlike the generals, he had a more realistic view and he had less to lose. But certainly he was important. That's also very important after the war. I mean, I think the idea of keeping the Emperor is important both for getting the peace and the right kind of peace, but also for transforming Japan from this kind of militarist mess in the 30s and 40s into something, you know, that was really quite close to a functioning western style government. Government.
Dan Snow
As the Japanese flag came down across this great empire, former European colonial troops returned, you know, the Brits to Hong Kong, the Brits to Singapore, the Dutch, the French to Indochina. But Japan's astonishing disruption of 1941, 1942, it changed Asia for good. I mean, the European powers would never fully re establish themselves.
Evan Maudsley
Yeah, it's extremely important. I think there's the Dutch empire, the French empire, the British Empire. They don't survive that. In some respects, Singapore for the British is more important than almost anything else that happens in Europe. Not than Dunkirk, but it certainly spells the end of British power in the Far east eventually, but also the rise of American power in the Far east as well. So from that time, the power of the European empires and Europe in general declines massively. Also the post war period in Asia is really very interesting. In China, the Allies insist that Japanese troops stay in place to maintain order. There's a long time where the people holding things together, both Japan and say in Indonesia. Japanese are also important in Vietnam for a while in holding things together. So what goes on is really remarkable but also happens in China especially. But what I think is the strange thing about all this is that it's not expected. It's not expected the world end the way that it does. All of a sudden the war ends in like two weeks because of an event that nobody knows about. It's not really. It's that which brings the war to an end. The Japanese just capitulate. There's no long term fight to hold their possessions in east as once the emperor says war has ended, everybody accepts that and there's nothing really in place to deal with that. No one's got occupation plans for how will we deal with China or whatever. And they kind of, for example, they improvise with what they're going to do about Korea. They decide quite rapidly to divide Korea. Korea was part of Japan at that stage to divide Korea into two zones very quickly they have to send troops into Russian troops and American troops to do that. But it's not done with any long term invasion clear cut plans in place place. So I would stress that that period in Asia when Japan suddenly surrenders and this as a power vacuum is a really very interesting one.
Dan Snow
Certainly is. And we can talk more about it in the years to come for all the 80th anniversaries of the big events.
Evan Maudsley
Well, thank you so much for listening to me and asking questions that were really decisive in trying to understand what's going on and how things seem to the Japanese.
Dan Snow
Well, thank you very much Evely for coming on. Thanks very much for listening everyone. Before you go, I tell you that ever at the cutting edge, the bleeding edge of what's new and exciting. After 10 years of the podcast, you can finally watch on YouTube. We are moving fast and breaking things here, folks. Our Friday episodes each week will be available to watch on YouTube. And you can see me, you can see what we're talking about. I'd love it if you could subscribe to that channel over there. Just click the link in the show notes below and you can watch it on your phone, your tablet or even a tv or even a giant cinema movie screen if you have one in your underground lair. See you next time, folks.
Carvana Representative
Popsicles, sprinklers, a cool breeze. Talk about refreshing. You know what else is refreshing this summer? A brand new phone with Verizon.
Evan Maudsley
Yep.
Carvana Representative
Get a new phone on any plan with Select Phone. Trade in and MyPlan and lock down a low price for three years on any plan with MyPlan. This is a deal for everyone, whether you're a new or existing customer. Swing by Verizon today for our best phone deals. 3 year price guarantee applies to then current base monthly rate only. Additional terms and conditions apply for all offers.
Dan Snow
Beth, you're in charge of ordering the tacos for the meeting today.
Carvana Representative
Yeah, I'm not gonna order the tacos.
Dan Snow
Uh, what?
Carvana Representative
I'm going to Easy Cater the tacos with Easycater. You can order from a huge variety of restaurants, track expenses and save time.
Dan Snow
Nice.
Carvana Representative
Oh, by the way, you're emailing the meeting notes, right?
Dan Snow
No, I'm going to easy mail them. Where's my music?
Carvana Representative
Sorry, Ben, there's no Easy Cater for that.
Dan Snow
Easycater. The easy way to order food for work. Order now@easycator.com.
Podcast Summary: Dan Snow's History Hit – "The Surrender of Japan"
Episode Details:
In this poignant episode, Dan Snow delves into the complex and multifaceted events leading to the surrender of Japan in World War II. With the expertise of historian Evan Maudsley, the discussion explores the factors that compelled the Japanese Empire to capitulate, the internal dynamics within Japan, and the profound implications of this surrender on both the immediate post-war period and the broader geopolitical landscape.
Evan Maudsley provides a comprehensive overview of Japan's military capabilities and economic state during the summer of 1945. Contrary to the perception that Japan was entirely on its knees, Maudsley explains that while the Japanese Navy had been decimated and American forces were inching closer to the home islands, the Japanese Army remained robust in regions like China and Southeast Asia.
Evan Maudsley (04:36): "The Japanese hold most of China. They hold more China in 1945 than they held in 1944. They still hold most of Southeast Asia."
Economically, Japan faced severe shortages, particularly of oil, due to the destruction of its merchant fleet and the effective blockade imposed by the Allies. This scarcity critically hampered Japan's ability to sustain its war efforts, especially its already weakened air force.
Evan Maudsley (07:37): "Japan had no oil, and as you say, they went to war largely for things like oil and rubber, which they could get from Southeast Asia."
A significant portion of the episode is dedicated to understanding the internal decision-making processes within Japan. Maudsley highlights the lack of a centralized authority, contrasting Japan with totalitarian states like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Instead, Japan exhibited a dispersed and often dysfunctional political structure, with limited civilian control over the military.
Evan Maudsley (09:26): "Japan is not a totalitarian state. It's almost the opposite of a totalitarian state."
Central figures such as Emperor Hirohito played a pivotal role in steering Japan towards surrender. Unlike previous leaders like Tojo, Hirohito emerged as a moderating force, recognizing the futility of continued warfare and seeking a negotiated peace to preserve the imperial institution.
Evan Maudsley (12:20): "Hirohito [...] realized that they were going to lose the war or they weren't going to win the war."
The Allies grappled with multiple strategies to force Japan's surrender. Maudsley outlines the divergent viewpoints within the American military and government:
Dan Snow (16:28): "Because, after all, ever since the invention of aviation, there's no war that an aviation practitioner hasn't thought could be won through bombing alone."
Ultimately, President Truman leaned towards the acceptance of an invasion plan, though the use of atomic bombs shifted this trajectory dramatically.
The episode delves into the origins and ethical dilemmas surrounding the Manhattan Project. Maudsley emphasizes that the atomic bomb was not initially intended exclusively for Japan; there were considerations to target Germany had the war in Europe not concluded.
Evan Maudsley (17:43): "The atomic bomb wasn't developed to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That's what happened."
The decision to deploy atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains one of the most controversial aspects of the war. Maudsley discusses the multifaceted motivations behind this choice, including:
Evan Maudsley (19:39): "What can we do to shock the Japanese into surrendering?"
A turning point in Japan's decision to surrender was the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan in August 1945. Maudsley describes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria as a swift and overwhelming campaign that further crippled Japan's already strained military resources.
Evan Maudsley (25:31): "The Soviet invasion of Manchuria is... astonishing."
The scale of the Soviet offensive, involving over a million troops and vast numbers of tanks, left Japan with no viable option but to capitulate, especially in the face of relentless bombings and the bleak prospect of a mainland invasion.
The culmination of these factors led to Emperor Hirohito's unprecedented decision to intervene and announce Japan's surrender. Maudsley explores the nuances of this surrender, noting that it was not entirely unconditional as per the Potsdam Declaration but rather involved a nuanced negotiation to retain the emperor's position.
Evan Maudsley (28:55): "The Emperor was important for getting the peace and the right kind of peace."
This move was instrumental in facilitating a smoother transition to post-war Japan, avoiding a complete regime change and setting the stage for Japan's eventual emergence as a democratic nation.
The episode also touches upon the broader ramifications of Japan's surrender on Asia. European colonial powers, weakened by the war, were unable to fully re-establish their pre-war empires. This led to accelerated decolonization and significant geopolitical shifts, including the rise of American influence in the region.
Evan Maudsley (30:23): "Singapore for the British is more important than almost anything else happens in Europe."
The division of Korea and the power vacuums left by the retreating European forces marked the beginning of a new era in Asian politics, laying the groundwork for subsequent conflicts and alliances.
Dan Snow's exploration of Japan's surrender illuminates the intricate interplay of military strategy, economic hardship, and political maneuvering that culminated in the end of World War II in the Pacific. With Evan Maudsley's scholarly insights, the episode provides a nuanced understanding of a pivotal moment in history, highlighting the profound and lasting impacts of Japan's capitulation on both the immediate post-war period and the broader international order.
Dan Snow (32:24): "Thank you very much, Evan, for coming on. Thanks very much for listening everyone."
Notable Quotes:
This comprehensive summary captures the essence of "The Surrender of Japan" episode, providing listeners with an in-depth understanding of the factors leading to Japan's capitulation in World War II and its far-reaching consequences.