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Dan Snow (2:38)

Hello everyone. Welcome to Dan Snow's History Hits. This is part two of our history of the Troubles, the euphemistically named conflict that gripped Northern Ireland. Some island Britain in many ways as well. For 30 years. In the first episode, we went all the way back to the beginning. We traced 700 years of British and Irish history from the reign of Henry II all the way through to the Easter uprising in Dublin and Sinn Fein's landslide electoral victory in the 1918 elections. If you missed it, there's a link in the show notes or just look back on your podcast player. I'd really recommend listening to that one before you launch into this one, although this one would make sense by itself. We start at that great watershed of European world history, the First World War. We're in 1919. The Irish War of Independence is beginning. The Irish Republican army, the IRA begin a guerrilla campaign against British forces. We're going to hear about how that campaign went. We're going to hear about the partition of Ireland into two states. We're going to hear about the civil rights movement and what happened during the Troubles themselves. Our expert guide through this tumultuous history is Thomas Leahy, a senior lecturer in politics at Cardiff University. Teaches British and Irish politics and contemporary history. He's an expert on the Irish Republican army in Sinn after 1969. This is the second part of our explainer miniseries on the Troubles. Enjoy.

Monday Sidekick Advertiser (4:02)

T minus 10 atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima.

Thomas Leahy (4:05)

God save the King.

Monday Sidekick Advertiser (4:07)

No black white unity till there is.

Dan Snow (4:09)

First some black unity.

Thomas Leahy (4:11)

Never to go to war with one another again.

Monday Sidekick Advertiser (4:13)

And liftoff. And the shuttle has cleared the tower.

Dan Snow (4:20)

Thomas, thank you very much for coming back on the podcast.

Thomas Leahy (4:22)

Thanks for having me Again.

Dan Snow (4:24)

We have left Ireland with the vast majority of people on the island of Ireland making it very clear that they wish to sever either entirely or practically their link with London, their link with British rule. There are six counties in the north of Ireland which have a Protestant majority for staying part of that British project. And the British crown is not just going to give up without a fight. Tell me about the Irish War of Independence. Comes at right at the end of the First World War. How should we think about this war? Is it a guerrilla campaign or are there armies clashing in the field?

Thomas Leahy (5:01)

It's the guerrilla campaign and what happens of it and why it ends up in that direction. What we talked about, you know, finishing off last time was talking about the. For Irish Republicans, they reflected on the Easter Rising and said there is no point having set piece battles with the British Army. The better trained, the better equipped, we will lose. So the idea of people such as Michael Collins, who becomes a key IRA leader and key in Sinna's political wing as well he says we're going to engage in hit and run tactics and a kind of, you know, what a modern parlance sometimes is called like the war of the flea. If the flea keeps biting the dog or biting the cat time and time again, eventually the largest species in this case the dog or the cat and or in this parlance, you know, what happened with the UK government is they'll eventually get ticker run and they'll leave because it's too much hassle for them. They'll have to negotiate for a settlement. And I mean at first their outlook was we'll try the political route. So they stand in that 1918 election, they get the majority deceit. They then if we link it to World War I, go to the Versailles Peace Conference and via particularly the American government, they tried to influence American government to say to the British government, let Ireland have self governance in terms of like basically independence. The way they tried to influence that. The head of the Sinn Fein party at this point, the president Sinn Fein of the president of the self declared all island republic is a guy called Eamon De Valera. And Eamon De Valera had American ancestry. So partly why they felt, okay, we might have some foot in the door if you like, with American government. The issue for Sinn Fein was that because of the alliance between American British forces, et cetera, in World War I and the government, America wasn't going to do that. It wasn't going to allow itself to be backing an Irish Republican led government in Dublin and Irish separatism. And then what happens is the British government, what does it do about this independent parliament set up in Ireland, probes it or just that's just one way of saying spends it, gets rid of it. And it does that because I think from a British government context, you've got to remember this is still an era of empire. And they do not want Ireland setting a precedent, for example say India to decide, right, we'll follow the suit, we'll do exactly what Ireland did. So the leaders of Sinn and the IRA are the ones that don't go underground, are arrested. That includes some of the Sinn Fein, members of the Irish Parliament, self declared republic and members of that parliament were arrested. And then what you get from 1919, then there's an uprising that involves the Irish Republican army, the ira, the armed wing of Sinn Fein and British forces. At this point, when we say British forces to begin with, it was what was called the Royal Irish Constabulary, the ric, which was the British police on the island of Ireland. And the IRA got involved in Assassinating them, killing them to begin with. And that then led to more and more British backup forces coming in. Some of these would have been British army, other ones would have been what the Irish population nicknamed the Black and Tans because of the color of their uniform. But essentially they were auxiliaries to back up the police. Armed auxiliaries to back up the police in Ireland to try and stem what the IRA was doing. The Black and Towns are mainly recruited from some ex British army, but also from what we could call like sec her in areas of Scotland to places like Edinburgh or Glasgow. And in this case it would have been from Protestant British areas of Scotland. So that's essentially what goes on. And really the type of conflict you get, you're hit and run and then you get kind of tit for tat war. And what this involves in particular the south of Ireland giving you like standard examples. So what was called Bloody Sunday, like one of the original ones in during this conflict. So Michael Collins, who is one of the IRA leaders, has a select and of IRA personnel. He works with the assassinated number of members of British Intelligence in Dublin on one morning. In retaliation, the Black and Tans go to a place on the same day called Croke Park. So Croak Park's the head of Gaelic Athletic game in Ireland. Interesting. Gaelic hurling or Gaelic football, that's where Bill played. So they go into the stadium and the Black and Towns shoot up the crowd. There's a number of people who die. Another example of this was in Cork City. So a number of IRA volunteers then assassinate Black and Tan and other members of British forces. In retaliation, the Black and Tan burn Cork City to the ground and declare martial law there. So this is the kind of thing that starts going on and very quickly there's a momentum to one side will do something, the other side will retaliate and it has a certain momentum to itself. And that's the pattern of the conflict really. The IRA engage in hit and run attacks. They live in what's called in this period flying columns. So they live on the run, often like in the countryside areas. And they come out to attack and then they just fade back away. They're obviously, it's quite clear the fact they're able to sustain that campaign. They've clearly got a very minimum, sizable minority of support. There's enough people are willing to aid them in terms of hiding volunteers, hiding weapons, etc. And that's basically how the campaign plays out.

Dan Snow (10:06)

The Irish War of Independence was a guerrilla war really. It was fought in ambushes and raids and targeted assassinations. And the British responded as conventional forces do in guerrilla wars. They responded in enormous force. They unleashed the Black and Tans on Ireland. They were effectively paramilitary soldiers really. They were hastily recruited into the Royal Irish Constabulary, Ireland's police force. But they were poorly disciplined. They were notorious for their brutality. They often tend to be people that quite enjoyed the opportunities for violence and other things. During the First World War, they burned homes, they attacked villages, they killed civilians in reprisals. Thomas mentioned bloody Sunday in 1920 there. Sadly, that's not the only Bloody Sunday we're going to talk about in this episode. Their presence really antagonized the Irish. It deepened their resentment. Instead of pacifying the population, they drove many towards supporting Republicanism, supporting the Iraq. This tit for tat violence, IRA ambushes followed by Black and Tan reprisals created a cycle of bloodshed and hatred that really came to define that war. By 1921, both sides were exhausted and came to the negotiating table. The resulting Anglo Irish Treaty established the Irish Free State, a self governing dominion similar to Canada or Australia. So for many this was a triumph. To nationalist leaders like Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, this was a stepping stone to full independence. But it accepted a few things really. One is that Ireland would remain in the British Empire and also that the island of Ireland would be partitioned. The six northern counties would remain part of the United Kingdom. Now within the rest of Ireland, a division formed between pro treaty forces who supported the Free State and anti treaty forces who opposed the treaty and its implications for an Irish Republic that incorporated the whole of Ireland. Here's Thomas to explain more. The British government bows to the inevitable. Well, I suppose the inevitable given that they are unprepared to wage the kind of war that they might have been prepared to wage on the imperial frontier outside Europe. They bow to the inevitable. They agree to the Anglo Irish Treaty in 1921. Although it's a slightly complicated process that effectively means the Republic of Ireland will be born covering most of the island of Ireland, but not the six counties in the north which remain part of the United Kingdom.

Thomas Leahy (12:39)

And when we get to the peace agreement, why does the IRA also opt into this in Sinn is because a majority of that organization believe as in the two parts, IRA and Sinn Fein. We call it the Republican movement. The majority of the Republican movement accept that this is the best we're going to get at this stage. Anglar is treaty and they felt that we're at a point. Michael Collins claimed they might run out of weapons and we said we should throw a lot in with what the British government offer. We negotiate hard and see what the most they'll give us. Lloyd George's British government was willing to Give Ireland in 1921 Dominion status more than home rule, but it's less than full on republic independence. Because if you're in a dominion like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and you're still in the today, like the British Commonwealth, a sizable minority, about 45% plus of the IRA and Sinn Fein did not accept this. And they said that, you know, this is basically traitorous to what we set up in 1960 in a full on republic. And there was a close vote in early 1922 in Ireland, the Doyle which became the Irish Parliament. It was pretty close in terms of about 51% backed it, 49% were against it. The big thing is the 49% walked out and declared they were to set up a separate government. They have dual power in Ireland. The government that the British government recognized the kind of commonwealth in government. Then the other one which declared itself still the existing Irish Republic set up a place called the Forecourts in Dublin. And eventually partly under British government pressure to Michael Collins they're told to stop these lot carrying on like this, you need to bomb them out basically.

Dan Snow (14:13)

The resulting Irish civil war was short but it was devastating. It pitted the Irish Free States and pro treaty forces against the anti treaty forces. So these are nationalist comrades who had been united in the fight against Britain until so recently. They now turned their guns on each other. So fighting began in June 1922. Anti treaty forces occupied the Four Courts in Dublin. Pro treaty troops, now the official national army of Ireland. They shelled the building with artillery which was provided by the Brits. The conflict was bitter, it was brutal. The national army was better armed and better organised and they quickly asserted their control of Dublin and other cities and the fighting dragged on the countryside and the anti treaty forces, well, they went back to waging a guerrilla campaign that they were familiar with the same tactics they'd just used against the British in the Irish War of Independence just a few years previously. The war was again marked by assassinations and reprisals and executions. And for anyone wondering why we're talking about a war that was fought 40 years before the so called troubles actually began. It's just important to remember this kind of intercommunal fighting is so vicious and it creates, it's a resentment. And those fractures can last long after the conflict is done. One of the most shocking moments came in August 1922. When Michael Collins, who was a hero of the independence struggle, he was killed in an ambush by anti treaty forces. By May 1923, the Anti Treaty IRA were exhausted. They were outmatched and they ordered a ceasefire. The war was over, but its consequences were really profound. It shaped Ireland's politics. It cemented partition so the northern counties of Ireland would remain part of the UK and the Irish government accepted that and that in turn that remnant of the UK in Ireland would explode. Eventually in the Troubles the pro treaty.

Thomas Leahy (16:02)

Party won and then eventually the Irish Republic became a republic in 1949, just unilaterally left the Commonwealth by itself. So then the northeast which gets left behind. So why the sixth of the northeastern counties stay within the uk? And really it comes back to all the things we talked about with like the Irish War of Independence. And we just Talked about that 1916 Rising Ulster Protestants after World War I Large number of them had died. People who see themselves as British were going to the British government saying look at this rebellious lot in the south. So how on earth can you defer to them and give them self government whilst basically being traitors for us and forcing us into any kind of Irish Catholic rule, whether that's devolution or independence tenants. And you know this from the British government's point of view, they found this very difficult to resist as an argument. I think the political makeup of what's going on was important at that point after World War I. You've got Lloyd George as Prime Minister in this period as a Liberal he has to be in coalition basically with the Conservatives because they've got a number of seats. There wasn't an outright majority for either. You've got a Liberal Prime Minister with a Conservative government and the Conservative cabinet. And the Conservatives had a, a close relationship with the Unionist Party believing that, you know, Ireland was better to stay within United Kingdom framework. But then there's a question, well if we talk about Ireland's provinces, so anyone's into rugby will know this Ulster lens, the K monster. Now Ulster, when we talk about historically in Ireland was a nine county province. So it was the six counties in Northern Ireland today, plus Cavan, Monaghan, Donegal. So then there's a question, well, why was Northern Ireland made up of six of them and not nine? And that's because Ulster British Protestants via the Ulster Unionist Party, the main British Protestant Unionist Party in Northern Ireland said we don't want the other three because if you give us the other three, the Catholic Protestant makeup of the north east state or state, Northern Ireland would have almost been 50, 50% Catholic Protestant. Also, the British Protestant wanted a majority and not just a slight majority, they wanted a big majority. And the reason then, therefore the six counties are chosen is because that would have given them the largest majority feasible for them to hold on land. And the reason they want that because in their belief was we can't come under any all Ireland form of government devolution or not, because we'll be discriminated against.

Dan Snow (18:24)

And in Northern Ireland, the lines are being drawn very selectively, as you said, and moving around its population to make sure there's the biggest Protestant majority possible. So all sorts of techniques being used to try and maintain British Protestant control over those counties. Does it sort of roughly work from the 1920s into the 1960s, what starts to shake it?

Thomas Leahy (18:47)

Yes, absolutely right. And it's an interesting question there when we then look at the Northern Ireland conflict, you know, kicking off in 1969. Interestingly. Right. If we go back to time 1940s after war, there started to be some problems. And the problems were because when Atlee's labor government come in, it passed certain acts like Universal Secondary Education act, it started to bring in like a National Health Service. Now one of the fears there, and interestingly for the Ulster Unionist British Protestant government in Belfast, which was always winning elections because it was a majoritarian voting, not like now, power sharing, similar, what you have for Western is the first past the post. But if you've got a British Protestant majority in the state, funnily enough, they'll win every single election that you hold. But what was interesting is when the Labour government passed these acts under Atlee, the Unionist government in Belfast actually threatened to say, right, we're going to end up like Canada, Australia, we want to become a dominion, we don't want to be part of the UK set. The fear for Ulster British Protestants as well. If Irish Catholics are educated the same level of art, the discrimination becomes more obvious in 15, 20 years time when these people are coming out of school trying to get jobs and they can't get the jobs. The other worry was if you had any interference in Westminster, like with gerrymander electoral boundaries. So hang on a minute, there's a Protestant minority in Derry City, but they're electing more councillors. Why were they discriminating in areas where Catholics are majority, but in Unionist British Protestant parlance and heads Again, this is an excuse and it's just trying to explain the thinking. They thought if we allow Catholics any influence in this state in positions of power, we'll end up in an all iron republic, the better to hold everything you've got, even if you have to discriminate to stop that situation happening. So the first, I think chinks came in 1940s and we can see that by their reactions saying, well, we might become a dominion instead and threatening Westminster. That doesn't happen because Atlee, as the Prime Minister says, we're not going to interfere. What's going on? Northern Ireland, we passed these actors for the whole of the UK benefit of all citizens, but we're not going to interfere. You do your thing, we'll do our thing.

Dan Snow (20:49)

So that what Atlee gives them a sort of de facto opt out.

Thomas Leahy (20:53)

Not a thing such as either. For example, the NHS and the secondary education, they have to take those things on. But what Atlee promises is I'm not going to come and look at your books for what's going on in the town's employment figures or what's going on related to social housing provision and where you're giving the social housing. The social housing. Actually just reflecting on that, it's a really key area because this is a key dispute by law Civil Rights association in that 60s. Their argument is, and there's plenty of evidence for this, that scholars generally agree with this. We might disagree with other things, but we generally agree on this is that classic example, a place called Caledon encountered tyrone in the 60s where a single Protestant lady, she was about, I think in her, I think she was either 19 or 20, was given a house social housing. She also worked for local Unionist politician over a large Catholic family where there was greater need. And this led to some of the sit in protests that kicked off the civil rights movement. Now, okay, social housing, the Unionists didn't like that when Labour bought that in in the late 40s either because they thought this is a threat. But no, Attlee also said it's fine, your government and your councils could control the social housing, we won't interfere in that. So that's the potential first chink. You know, like we said, this discrimination has been there from the 20s. So why is there mainly protest in Northern Ireland in the 60s? Two main factors for that. First factor, when you look at the age of people in the civil rights movement, a lot of them might have been quite young, like 18, 19 plus into 20s and 30s. These were the people who were benefiting from the Secondary Education Act. So then these are people 20 years later, after the 40s and saying, oh, hang on, I've gone to the same school, a similar standard of school, just in the Catholic Era rather than the Protestant areas. My Protestant counterparts, I might be better qualified for them. I'm not getting a job. So it becomes more obvious then that okay, there's discrimination involved. The second big factor here is the global climate. And what we've got in particular is Martin Luther King and the US Civil rights movement. That's where they're picking up their tactic, the Irish Catholic generally population about civil rights. That's where they picked it up from seeing examples from the US and it was effective once, particularly Howard Wilson's government in the mid to late 60s. Its eyes are turned on this because of the protests happening. And you should have said that, that as well. They're having their sit down protests or their marches. And what was starting to happen was the Union estate, as in the government in Belfast was trying to ban some of the marches, plus the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the ruc. So Northern Ireland had its own devolved police force, it's predominantly Protestant, was ordered by the Stormwater government to try and clamp down on some of the marches. And these are being caught on cameras, particularly by Irish television rte. It led to more widespread anger in the Irish Catholic community. There is something going on here and this state is deliberately trying to resist what we want. And Westminster, yeah, in a sense can't turn a blind eye to this. We've had things like decolonization at this point across various parts of the empire is you know, in line with like human rights, et cetera. But in its backyard this thing is going on. So it has to take notice of what's happening.

Dan Snow (23:52)

So there are marches, there are fights at those marches that are, you see heavy handed policing, water cannons, batons being wielded and those are both engaging and provoking Catholic rage in Northern Ireland. But also now meaning the British government cannot look away. These images are being broadcast well across Britain and the world.

Thomas Leahy (24:12)

Exactly. And I think the other element we have involved here is not all of them, but a majority of the Ulster Unionist Party, the British Protestant main party in Northern Ireland and the British Protestant population are against the civil rights movement. And even to show that how peculiar this is in some respects when we then talk about Ulster Protestant loyalists. So when we use this word, same belief as Unionists keep Northern Ireland in the UK later on, Loyalists are willing to use violence against the Irish Catholic population in the IRA to achieve that. So that's slightly different than, you know, this political parties because they, they don't believe in violence, they would argue to achieve their objectives. But Loyalists are from the same like Ulster Protestant community If we called it that for British Protestant people there. Now what's interesting with them, some of this discrimination we talked about, you know, you had to own a house or you had to be the rent payer to vote. It affected them, some of the working class Protestants as well. But the Unionist, that mentality again we can't give an inch because if we give an inch we'll end up in an all island Catholic republic and we'll all be discriminated again. So you've, you've got the government plus then who are controlling the beast force, the Belfast government, controlling the police force, the IUC and that behavior and then the British government, you know, as the overarching administrator of rule in Northern Ireland because it has similar to devolution today. You know, and I always use the example with students. If the Senate in Wales said right, everyone with blue eyes in Wales can't have a job anymore, Westminster can shut it down tomorrow. It has the power to do that. It's the same in this period. But what it was trying to walk a tightrope a little bit. Westminster was what we don't want. And I think this goes into the part of the British army's ethos early in the conflict. We do not want an Israel Palestine Mark 2 situation where we're caught in the middle like they were in the 1940s and killed by both sides. So we have to push Ulster Protestants to reform and give civil rights as much as possible, but not to the point. We therefore push them into rebellion against us as well alongside potentially Irish Catholic population. So that was the situation as it stood. And I do think, yeah, because this is the era of civil rights. The British government was well aware we have to remedy the civil rights issues because if we don't then internationally we're going to look a little bit, potentially a bit of a pariah as well. Allowing this to go on. And obviously the American influence would be key here. The Irish Catholics and politicians from that background would be using their contacts with America to try draw attention to this to put pressure on the British government as well.

Dan Snow (26:39)

So the first chunk of 1969 is vital. Belfast very much modeled on the Selma Montgomery march in Alabama. Just had couple years before that was attacked. All on the route became pretty obvious that the police were sort of favoring those Protestants and occasionally turning a blind eye, that kind of thing. Tell me about the Battle of the Bogside.

Thomas Leahy (26:59)

There's various of these kind of flashpoints. The Battle of the Bogside at this point, in fairness to the, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland at that point, the Stormont in the Stormwood government, the Aussie in this party is a guy called Captain Terence o'. Neill. He'd started in my view because the British government put massive pressure on him to do so, to start putting some of these reforms in place. Like you know, one person, one vote, not based on, you know, rent or whether someone's a property owner, et cetera. That march you mentioned, this kind of copy and sell month to Montgomery March in early 69, which was led by more radical elements within the civil rights movement to try and force the pace. It caused problems with o' Neill because he was trying to pass the reforms. But there were hard line elements within the Old sun and his party. Yeah, we're saying don't give an inch because this is what's going to happen. And this is not a civil rights movement, it's a United Ireland front. It's just a new front for the ira. So what then happened by the time you got to the Battle of the Bog side. So this is great where we're discussing the history across the episode because every summer in Derry and across various parts of Northern Ireland there's various marching season which commemorates for the Orange Order linked to William of Orange, for the British Protestant population the victories they had over the Irish Catholic population in the past, you know, establishing British Protestantism, the monarchy and rule in on the island of Ireland. So in summer in Derry there is a march which was to do with the siege of Derry in 1689 and it being relieved by William of Orange. So they have this march because of the background tensions of the civil rights that happened. The Protestant population is involved in the Orange Order would march on the city walls, the Irish Catholic bauxite area, particularly beneath the city walls. People go there, you can still see this today and the kind of boggy land and yeah, the tensions because of civil rights and just generally the Irish Catholic population not being that appreciative of the Orange Order for obvious reasons, just got again little bits of skirmish and some stone throwing, et cetera. What then happened is that the elements of Loyalists, so Ulster Protestant, more radicals if you want to call it that, they decided to go into the bauxite area, said right, we'll have a face off and we'll stop this stone throwing. Etc. Elements, not all, but elements of the IUC and the security services. There's a couple of backups to the iuc, something called the Ulster Special Cassabary. The Irish Nationalist Catholics would call it the B Specials, which was almost like 99, 100% Protestant. And it was kind of to the extent an armed paramilitary, a very ill discipline. So they got involved in fighting with the marches. This time the Irish Catholics living in the bog side stuck up barricade and they were ready with petrol bombed and. Yeah, and this went on for days and days and it spread because what were the civil rights marches and those involved in the Battle of the Bogside, as it was called, that area put out a call to brethren in Belfast and other parts of Irish national to do the same kind of thing in Belfast. It led to mixed areas, particularly by also Protestants burning out Irish Catholic homes in mixed areas. The British troops had to enter because it was pretty obvious that the, that point, the installment of the British Protestant government and the IUC had lost total control of the situation.

Dan Snow (30:13)

So the British army are now on the streets of Northern Ireland and the sort of really nuanced bit is that then the British army are not there to fight a counterinsurgency against Irish Catholic Republicans. And I don't think that the British political and military leadership did not want that to be the case, did they? I mean they're there what to sort of try and ensure the rule of law whilst the British government is pushing the Northern Irish government to offer more concessions to. Right. Some of the historical injustice. How do you see the thinking in that deployment?

Thomas Leahy (30:53)

Yes, exactly. To begin with, it was reluctant and it was reluctant in the sense that again, it goes back to the history we talked about. The British government and therefore its own forces did not want direct entanglement with Irish politics again. And it didn't want it for a few reasons. One, because it tried this when you had a franchise in various parts of the Irish population voting, as we talked about in the early 1900s, the end up all the home ruling, almost the Civil War and then obviously the Irish rule of independence. And they thought we would not want direct involvement in Irish affairs again because of this. The second reason why for Westminster government is just because there's no vote. I mean, I know we've had exceptions, say recent periods where like Theresa May's Conservative government was propped up by Unionists in London under the Brexit period from 2017, wasn't it 2019? But that's quite rare because we have a first past the post system voting Westminster election. So very rarely do parties to Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland today, what has 18 MPs and there's 600 plus MP. So very rarely, even if the government fell short the majority, they're going to rely on parties from Northern Ireland. So it's not somewhere that electorally has any attraction for Westminster governments to get involved with.

Dan Snow (32:06)

Even arguably more important than that, there are no votes on the mainland but about Northern Ireland. Right. So no one's vote is swayed in Reading or Glasgow or Cricket because they wish the British government was firmer in Northern Ireland.

Thomas Leahy (32:20)

Definitely. Yes, we hold the line here, we push the reforms through and hopefully the civil unrest rather than like kind of any main kind of paramilitary group evolving at that point. But this civil unrest between the communities will settle down. That's how they approach the situation initially to become a definite.

Dan Snow (32:40)

This is the dancer knows history talking about the Troubles in Ireland. More coming up.

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Dan Snow (35:19)

For the first time in generations, the British army was form sent into Northern Ireland to keep the peace. Soldiers patrolled the streets of Derry and Belfast and that marked the beginning of a military presence that would last nearly 40 years. Why Britain sent the army sent troops into Northern Ireland remains one of the most contentious part in this long and very complicated story. The decision wasn't taken lightly. For Westminster it was meant to be a temporary measure. They did not have any interest in British troops slogging around the streets of Northern Ireland when there was a lot else going on in the world. Soldiers were deployed to restore law and order to protect Catholic neighbourhoods from loyalist mobs and support the Northern Irish government which was close to collapse. So they're trying to please all parties here in the conflict and these core goals are at odds with each other. It wasn't clear whose side these soldiers were on. Catholics hoped the army would protect them from the loyalists and the Royal Ulster Constabri, the police force of the Ulster government. Unionists thought the army obviously would uphold their authority. Trying to satisfy both sides was impossible. So there was rioting in places like Derry in Belfast and the army struggled to contain the unrest. And it became clear it wouldn't be just there. For days and weeks it was drawn deeper into policing Northern Ireland and actually dealing with that brewing insurgency. As the situation worsened, well, it led to a cycle of violence and we see at this point the rise of the so called Provisional ira and we see acts by the Provisional ira, we see loyalist paramilitary retaliation and on and on and on. Welcome to the decades long troubles that sort of doesn't last. And by 1970 there are what looks like kind of kinetic operations against the ira, right? So more of that counterinsurgency and that.

Thomas Leahy (37:02)

Comes through really because of two things, that the Unionist government still exists. It's not probed, it's not suspended in Belfast. The devolved government they keep in business until March 1972. So you think the conflict starts what, August 1969. So it's another two, three years on top. And the reason that is, and it gives us an insight into, you know, how's the British army getting more drawn into a conflict maybe with the Irish Nationalist population to begin with. Irish Catholic population, if we want to call it that, is essentially just because of the fact that Unionist government is still convinced that the civil rights movement is part of some kind of plot to draw Northern Ireland into Northern Ireland republic. So it's dragging its heels a little bit with some of the reforms. The British government's got to be careful in the army at this point. We do not want to get dragged into a conflict between both sides. And that means, for example, if we force for all civil rights and we force all these changes in Ulster Protestants, will loads of them start going to legal paramilitary organization. There was also a fear like what about all these Ulster Protestants we've had in the RUC and the British Security services in Northern Ireland or the B Specials? If we demobilize them and just back them and bow them from employment again, the ones we felt were involved in some of this trouble, where are they going to go? They'll join probably illegal loyalist paramilitaries and then potentially they'll be attacking this troop. So what then happens? I think early on that kind of Unionist paranoia then has an influence on British forces. And a classic example of this is something called like the Falls row curfew in 1970. The Falls Road now is, and it was at this point the heavy Irish Nationalist area, but particularly an Irish Republican area. Difference between those two terms. Just explain for listeners Irish Nationalist, someone who wants united Ireland that's happy for it in the long term via political means. An Irish Republican in this period pre1998 believes in the use of violence, you know, or the arms method to try and get an all island republic. And it needs to happen the SAP. And so what happened, the Falls Row curfew is British troops went in, had a curfew and they searched houses. They did find some weapons. But actually, you know, there's been British generals, et cetera, written books off and said, yeah, but actually all we did was make some people probably fences in the community were not necessarily backing Republican end up backing them. But the reason that search happens because the United States Protestant government influenced the British army and British government to allow it. Probably more based on paranoia than actual danger from that area at that point. But the second thing that's happening with the British army and partly this is because of a change of government in London with it, the Edward Heath government Coming in. There is more of a belief that we got to be careful here because if also Protestants resisting the change as we said, and they then have an uprising, we're stuck in the middle and a particular moment that's often I think overlooked. It was really key in this. We go back just a little bit to end in 1969, Lord Hunt was asked to do a review about the security services in Northern Ireland. The security forces and what have they been doing and how have they been discriminatory. He released something called the Hunt Report in the winter months in 1969 he called for the spending of the Beast Specials. So totally getting rid of that backup for the IUC because he said they were sectarian, pro British Protestant. He also said the disarming of the IUC now this never happened because of the conflict, but from an Ulster British Protestant perspective this was a nightmare and for them said that look, the British government is teaming up with Irish Republicans is going to port us again like into Northern Ireland republic. So there's some riots in the heavily British Protestant Shankil Road area, Belfast. And what happened is an IUC officer was shot dead. But there was a lot of skirmishes between the army and loyalists and this sent kind of shockwaves I think through the, I think British army and government. They thought hang on here, we've got to be careful because in their heads we're going to get caught in a two front war. And in a sense I think that leads to this ethos that no, let's focus on essentially troublemakers in the Irish nationalist population, the re emergence of the IRA and we'll crush that. And that will be the route to solving the tensions where they believe that would balance things out so they wouldn't be faced by two front war.

Dan Snow (41:07)

It doesn't work out quite smoothly as that. You mentioned the Falls Road curfew. There's a full on firefight, there's people killed, there's people discharging automatic weapons in the streets. It's extraordinary. Does that reach ahead in, in January 1972 with the infamous Bloody Sunday?

Thomas Leahy (41:26)

Yes. And the background, the Bloody Sunday as well. A really key thing is internment without trial was brought in in August 1971 by the Unionist government in Belfast. So internment about trial is pretty much what it says on the 10. You can intern someone without putting in a trial, so the internment can't set up. Now in theory that could have lowered tension if two things. One, it was introduced with the Irish government at the same time north and south of the border because otherwise if people from Irish Republican background run off to the south, well, they're not going to be interned. And that did happen during a brief small little IRA campaign in 1950. But at this point the Irish government was not willing to introduce internal trial because it said, well, you've got discrimination in the north and you've been discriminating against Northern Catholics who live in Northern Ireland. There's no way we're going to introduce internment about trial and tease, settle those problems up north. That was one disadvantage for internment. The other problem was that in the first evening of internment in August 1971, about 300 people were interned, over half of released because most of them weren't even in the IRA or Sinn. There was some of them are just in the civil rights movement. So it looked anti Irish Catholic or anti Irish Nationalist. And also no Ulster Protestants were initially interned. And some of these had been involved in the uvf, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the legal paramilitary terrorist organizations, whatever people want to call them. And the other issue with internment was it wasn't just like the Falls Row curfew wasn't just in one place in Belfast, it was across the whole of Northern Ireland. So now you'd had a way of antagonizing and irritating various Irish nationalist communities when you then get to Bloody Sunday in Derry in January 1972. So this background's useful because there was a civil rights march, but they were marching against internment that day in Derry City. And what happened Derry generally up to that point, a lot of the real bouts of the conflict, if you like, between the different sides were in Belfast Focus at that point. So Derry obviously had been the site of the civil rights dispute. But at that point there was no particular faction of like the IRA that had emerged as kind of dominant and really driving a conflict there. And partly some of that was because one of the Irish Catholic local, one of the exceptions it was in the ruc they had driven the kind of security policy where they've been barricaded up in Derry. Don't go in heavy handed to try and remove them. Basically have negotiations with the local people of that part of the population plus the IRA to see if we can get them to agree to remove barricades or agree to some other tenetary gesture. What happened by January 1972 is elements of the British army in certain regiments that have been in Belfast, taken a tough approach, said this approach needs to be taken at Derry. It's ridiculous to allow bits of the state and what the nationalists in the bogs, I call free Derry to basically opt out, live under barricade. They argue it's allowing the IRA to grow. So this is all culminating when you get to this anti internment march by the civil rights movement in Derry at the end of January in 1972. And what happened is the army units involved on the day decided we're going to have a snatch and arrest operation of certain people who turn up to the civil rights movement, may well be in the IRA and they start stone throwing or petrol bomb throwing at the army. But what then happened is when the. As we know from the 2010 Lord Savile's inquiry by the British government, 14 unarmed civilians were shot dead who were civil rights marches. Thirteen died on the day and one died later. 2014. And Savile's verdict was these people were not posing a threat to British security forces on that day in that area. The problem was then compounded because at the time, just shortly afterward, Edward Heath's government did allow Lord Widgery to do a report about what happened. But Lord Widgery's report was quite quick in nature, which, I mean, essentially it wasn't that thorough when we consider Lord Savill's report was well over a decade after the 1998 peace agreement coming to fruition. And Wood Reese blamed the civil rights march. So it just led to a mushrooming growth in the IRA in that area, in recruitment. And it kind of really was the cornerstone at that point. And policy changed slightly to this more overt security operation approach by the British Army. And I say overt. So it wasn't necessarily just targeting known IRA members or suspected there was an acceptance at least that the rest of the Irish nationalist population might get caught up in some of these things, whether they were in the IRA or not. And that was kind of. Yeah. Led to the dynamics of the conduct increasing, really.

Dan Snow (45:57)

The British government got rid of the Northern Irish Parliament and assumed direct control a little bit later in 1972. Is that an acceptance that this problem is now just growing and growing and you cannot leave it to this devolved administration? You have to run this from London.

Thomas Leahy (46:11)

I think it was a few things. Yes, I think that's absolutely right. One thing it was doing was it was an attempt to shift the blame really in somewhat for Bloody Sunday, that it knew there were major ramifications for this. So it had to be seen to do something so it would appease the Irish nationalist population. Plus, we should add, in the Irish government at this point, the Irish government was absolutely outraged by things such as Bloody Sunday, as were its population I mean, the British Embassy in Dublin got burned down shortly after by protesters because of Bloody Sunday. But the second point is, I think it was an attempt at this point where Edward Heathley had the Northern Ireland Secretary of State position creative. William Whitelaw came in and William Whitelaw for Conservatives said, we've got to make an effort to try and appease the moderate part of the Irish Catholic community. So that included a party that then existed called the Social Democratic and Labour Party. The FDLP was later led by John Hume, who some listeners may know. He was a Nobel Peace Prize winner for the peace process. And their argument, these are largely the stlp, were the main. And from most of the conflict, about 60% the Irish Catholic population backed them. And they did want United Ireland in the longer term, but in the short term they accepted there'd have to be some agreement where Northern Ireland would stay in the uk. But the civil rights issue needed to be sorted. An Irish Catholic part of the population needed to be given some political autonomy within the Northern Ireland area to attempt to appease them, getting rid of Stalin because they didn't like it either. It was attempt to please the Irish government because the Irish government and the SCLP pretty much on the same hymn sheet in terms of what they thought of the situation. And it was, yeah, the British government's attempt to try and, yeah, woo or win them over to some kind of more reconciliatory political initiative in Northern Ireland, which essentially the trial with power sharing.

Dan Snow (47:59)

Overall, did the British government do things on the ground around social housing, employment rights, things like that that did address some of those civil rights issues?

Thomas Leahy (48:12)

Yes, and acts were put through from the late 60s into the 70s and 80s about some of the discrimination that happened and, you know, largely for majority, like 50 to 60%, the Irish Catholic community were fairly content with that and the changes have been made. And then there's a question like, okay, why doesn't this solve the conflict then? Why does, you know, the IRA's campaign continue right into the 1990s as some of that was just essentially the damage had been done partly by what happened with things such as Bloody Sunday or internment we talked about and the whole, like civil rights problems in the first place. And it was hard to reconcile some people back to changes that were then later made. But the second point as well is that actually in the 70s and large parts of the 80s, some of the acts that came in, things to do with examples, quotas at work institutions, et cetera, public or private employment about, you know, how much of the Workforce should be Irish Catholic background or as the Protestant. And how do you monitor this? At first the British government didn't necessarily in all these areas make it a statutory. It made it, you know, recommendations by acts of parliament. And actually later on the Irish government STLP and then later on Sinn Fein, a political IRA pushed that. No, this has to be made by legislation. It has to be put in and then monitored by the ombudsman that there's not discrimination going, going in. So they, yes, they did make those changes quite early on in the conflict, but probably too late from the just, you know, placating the majority, the civil rights movement view. But then there were still disputes going on really into the 90s about things like fair employment and non sectarian appointment of people into businesses or public institutions. That that should be statutory and it should be actually made illegal by organizations to do that.

Dan Snow (49:59)

And I guess the other problem is that it's very easy to start wars, it's very difficult to end them and they take on a dynamic of their own. And once you get tit for tat violence, bombings, assassinations, some of those political disputes can be forgotten. And the war just has its own dynamic.

Thomas Leahy (50:15)

Definitely. And I think some of the events we talked about on all sides, really some of the kind of standout, largely indiscriminate measures by say the British Security Service at the beginning or the British army specifically like Bloody Sunday, that has a lasting impact. And then on the, you know, vice versa. Some of the things for example the IRA do or Protestant paramilitaries do, so UVF or Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defense association is another big one, uda. Some of the things these do then can lead to inspirations of violence from the other side. And I think the key thing when we look at like Irish Republicanism, it allowed the IRA to sustain what it did for so long and like the motivation to do so. I mean there were people in the movement who were long term Irish Republicans and they had been since you know, the 1920s for their families and they felt their partition was wrong and that go back to 1918, that Sinn Fein, the IRA they would say legitimately or Sinn Fein at that point won the Westminster election and they said they were gonna declare independent republic but the British government got rid of it and then didn't allow for Ireland to be a republic. And the treaty negotiations in the twenties it was that. But actually for a lot of people who joined the Iran Champlain, their view of anti partitionism comes really from the civil rights dispute. And that plus the way the civil rights movement was treated largely by the Unionist government, but later on by British forces they would have seen involved in that. There's a debate now like in history where the fdlp, so John Hume's old party would say, Sinn Fein today claims it was part of the civil rights movement. It wasn't the United Island Movement. It's trying to rewrite history. And then Sinn Fein would counter that and say, well, we partly were a civil rights movement. And I think the truth of this is actually just in my view, somewhere in between because of the fact that in fairness to most people who would be in the Irish in Fein, the difference between them and the stlp, the SDLP people believe we can work with the British government, we can work with Unionists, we can work with the Irish government within the Northern Ireland state in the short term at least have civil rights. And therefore the United island thing could be parts of later. But in an IRA and sinn viewpoint, civil rights in the United island were the same thing. They thought you can't have civil rights living in any part of the British state on the island of Ireland, so you have to have a united Ireland. And that's essentially just a different type of opinion they had. And it explains why, you know, with some people willing to, you know, sustain the IRS campaign as long as they did.

Dan Snow (52:34)

There'll be more on Dan Snow's history about the troubles in Ireland coming up after this.

Thomas Leahy (52:44)

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Dan Snow (54:10)

The rivalry between these two visions would define nationalist politics throughout the Troubles. And in many ways it was as bitter as the conflict with unionism. The SDLP's condemnation of violence and focus on equality in the here and now clashed with Sinn Fein's defence of the IRA's armed resistance. As Thomas said, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the SDLP was the dominant nationalist party and it took part in negotiations like the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which proposed a power sharing and a council of Ireland. Sinn Fein and the IRA opposed all that fiercely. The Unionist opposition opposed it too. In fact, they killed it. Bizarrely. The irony is, in the long run, the SDLP's vision would prevail and Sinn Fein had been the beneficiaries, because Sinn Fein eventually succeeded at the ballot box and have had a stake in ruling Northern Ireland ever since. But that all came from their acceptance of a path that was much closer to the one that John Hume and the SDLP had always advocated for. But in the early 1970s, that was very far from certain. The years that followed saw the violence reach a terrifying crescendo. The British army ends up fighting a massive campaign of counterinsurgency, one of the biggest deployments since the Second World War in its own territory. You're supplying police stations at places like Cross McGlenn, which I've been to a couple of times. Had to be done by helicopter. I mean, it's just an extraordinary thing. And the ira detonated on 21 July 1972. 22 bombs in Belfast in one day. What's the nadir here? When does this really look like hot war?

Thomas Leahy (55:45)

Yeah, I would definitely say 1972 is definitely the kind of standout moment of this. So there's a couple of reasons for that. First of all, that in the two main cities, and certainly in, like, counterintergency doctrine, British army, the American army would use places like Vietnam. You know, the belief was, I don't necessarily think this is actually accurate, but the general belief was you start having real problems when in the capital city or the major cities, you've got an armed uprising by insurgents. Because, again, if these. These groups take over cities, certainly in terms of PR on an international level, it looks like you've lost total control. So, yeah, there was certainly an ethos very early on. We cannot allow, if possible, the IRA to grow and establish campaigns in the cities. But then some of the things we just talked about, like Bloody Sunday, certainly in Derry, it allowed the IRA to mushroom and grow in Derry City. And I like Peter Taylor's books when he done some really fascinating work about different aspects of the conflict. But I think he says, I can't remember the exact figure, but there's about 20 out of 150 shops left at Derry Sick center by 1975. Because the IRA totally blitzed the city centre consistently. So in a sense it caused more problems. In 1972, we really see that starting to rise in the cities.

Dan Snow (56:56)

The conflict spread, didn't it? I mean, there was some attempt by loyalists to strike targets in the Republic of Ireland and then there were IRA attacks in Britain itself. How were they attempting to change things in Northern Ireland? By reaching beyond the borders.

Thomas Leahy (57:16)

Okay, yeah, so we'll do a loyalist first because you mentioned that. So loyalists, British, Protestant, paramilitary. Their ethos of attacking places in the Republic of Ireland was simple enough that they felt it would have an effect on the ira. They felt that anyone who might be backing Sinn, the IRA and the Republic will get a message, don't because we can come down there and attack you. It was also aimed at the Irish government. So the standard example of loyalist attacks was something called the Dublin Monaghan bombings in May 1974. 30 plus people die in bombings in Dublin and Monaghan, which Monaghan is a town by the border, on the same day. This is actually the largest number of people killed in single linked incidents on the whole of the conflict on a single day. But there were quite a few of these loyalist attacks and they're often not known about around the border areas. And, and what's sad about it as well is actually the Irish citizens who died that their own Government in the 70s and 80s in the Republic of Ireland just kind of forgot about them. And I think from my own work, it's just a sense that if you complain or push back too much and these loyalists might visit, rain down more violence from the north to the south. And I do think those types of attacks did lead to the Irish government, yeah, backing off a little bit in terms of wanting some political influence in Northern Ireland, probably to the mid-80s. That's why loyalists did it, because that was the purpose of it, is to put the Irish government off directly having a say over Northern Irish affairs. And then the second question, right, so the IRA's campaign in England, I mean the IRA's thinking with this is that we gotta remember this is an area before 24 hour news. Now a bomb in like County Tyrone Or Fermanagh today probably would make like BBC News, 24 other news outlets, or Sky News, et cetera. Now, back then when you just had the 9 o' clock news because of the daily kind of grind of the conflict, these attacks just didn't really resonate anymore, certainly on like British media. So the thinking for them was they used to have a phrase I think Republicans use, like one bomb in England was worth 10 in Ireland. So in other words, that particularly if you were attacking places like in London, an economic target, it would grab attention. The IRA's like overall thinking with the conflict key here as well. And you didn't necessarily, particularly from the late 70s, have to escalate what you're doing. If you just kept killing British soldiers, IEC officers, hit an economic target, et cetera. Eventually they believed that, you know, people in England, Scotland, Wells and in Britain would press their government to leave, would say, we should leave here because the cost is not worth it. You know, in this thinking, partly where they picked this up from was the Vietnam War and that what was happening between like the Viet Cong and the American Army. Of course the situation is a bit different there because of the America was a conscript army of Vietnam. Overlooked that a little bit, but that was a genuine belief that it would lead the UK public to wanting to leave that England, Scotland, world's public to say, let's just pull out and just leave Northern Ireland to it.

Dan Snow (60:09)

By the time we get to the mid-90s. Galloping ahead here, I'm afraid, folks. Obviously you've got the Birmingham pub bombings, we've got Margaret Thatcher targeted in Brighton, which kills five people. She was incredibly lucky to escape with her life. But by the mid-1990s, you've got these really big bombs. City of London, the Canary Wharf bomb. We now know that they were really very, very close to a genuine ceasefire and peace negotiations while that was going on. So that was the IRA demonstrating strength whilst in those negotiations.

Thomas Leahy (60:39)

Yes, and what it all goes back to, and we see this like fascinatingly in back channel talks that were going on in the background between Sinn Fein leadership. So people like Jerry Adams, Mark McGinnis, Jerry Kelly and the British government. And this will be done by intermediaries 5, somewhere in my 6. And then Republicans had their own intermediaries as well. But what we see in the back and forth is in the 90s, fascinatingly, when John Major's government would say, well, if you have a ceasefire, we can talk about these things much more at length and in more detail and really hammer some of the Point down, Republicans get very suspicious and they'll say, well, what's on offer here? What is on offer if we call this ceasefire in the 90s? And they keep referring back to 1975 and they said they'd say to the British government, don't forget, we haven't forgot that you messed us about in 1975. What they're referring to. There was a couple of IRA ceasefires. There was one in 1972 and William Whitelaw, undercover, et cetera, flew the IRA and Republican leadership over to London, talks in Chelsea, and the talks just broke down quite quickly. In 1975, there was another attempt to solve the conflict involving the Republican movement. At that point, Harold Wilson's government and they had quite lengthy negotiations over most of 1975. The end of 1974 was back channel talks between Irish Republican representatives and then British government representatives, again, largely MI5 or MI6. And what was discussed at those points? There was discussions about, you know, would Northern Ireland potentially become like an independent state or would it become part of the Commonwealth, you know, to try and keep Unionists and Republicans happy? Was there a midway measure? But the Republican leadership at that point who negotiated that ceasefire generally didn't tell very much to the grassroots. They just told the, you know, IRA volunteers or Sinn Fein kind of grassroots members, we're sorting this out and we'll get some form of British withdrawal or disengagement, as they kept calling it. So when that didn't materialize, the leadership who later took over. So again, people like Mike McGinnis or Jerry Adams, for the overall Republican leadership, there was a lesson from them, from that, and they genuinely believed we had been led up the garden path by the British government in 1975. And we had pleaded with them that we'd really wanted peace and that that is true. If we look at the documents, the Republican leaders in 1975 were definitely saying to the British government, we want this to stop. You've got to give us more towards, you know, an objective Irish unity. But the Republican leadership, he took over later, he said, like Jerry Adams, Mark McGinnis, etc, generally believe that if you appeared desperate like that, of course, in their view, the British government sat back and thought, well, we're not going to have all these headaches. We'll have to have a talking to the ira, which at that point didn't have a political mandate. So if they're that desperate, they're clearly losing. So we'll just continue as we are with the security strategy. And so then when you get into the 90s that's the thinking that you know, you have to, when you go to talks you can make it clear you want peace. You also to an extent talk like war and conflict at the same time and that, that to make sure the person opposite you doesn't think that, yeah, you're desperate and you'll settle for anything.

Dan Snow (63:42)

Why do we see peace in the mid to late 90s? What change the American attitude changes? Are people just war weary? What's the reason?

Thomas Leahy (63:50)

Yeah, I think in my view the key factor is an armed and political stalemate between all sides. And in terms of the kind of hot conflict, what's actually happening on like the kind of military front the IRA continues to persist and it's running a low level intensity campaign, has peaked the troughs at certain times and standout events they seem able to conduct. So that's a problem for like the British government, the Irish government, Unionists and other players in the conflict and peace process because you think, well this isn't going to stop, we can enact some more security measures but if we enact things that are overt too much again and are non discriminatory, we end up by bloody Sundays or internments again and then the IRA gets more support. So they were just kind of stuck. And particularly if you know, the British government decides it doesn't want to go, I don't know, and do something that we've seen in recent years like, I don't know, the Sri Lankan government did to the Tamil Tigers and have an outright conflict where a lot of civilians die. But then you're going to get in big trouble with international organizations because you've probably broken en masse like human rights rules, et cetera. So that was part of it. The other key part of it is what was happening on the political front. Sinn Fein's winning roughly in Northern Ireland about 35 to 40% the Irish Catholic vote consecutively from 1981. Now to put that in context, when people voted for Sinn Fein, you know, in the 80s and 90s, they were absolutely categorically, if you voted for Sinn, you vote for the ira. It wasn't as if like people didn't know this was happening. When you think about it, that's actually, you know, sizable minority of that population backing Sinn Fein. So that was a real headache for like the British Irish government Unionists because let alone have they got this persistent IRA campaign, you know, they're not going to go away in politics. They're there all the time. And if you wanted a permanent as possible political solution you probably had to involve Sinn Fein in the IRA because of the percentage of support it had. And I just think that. But if you flip it on the other side for Sinn Fein in the ira, yes, they've got a sizable minority support, yes, they consist of the IRA's campaign. But where are these things going to? Otherwise you're just stuck in perpetual conflict. So I think for everyone really you just reached a stalemate situation where trying to work out a political solution seemed the kind of optimum solution to go for. And I think the last point I would say as well just with Sinn Fein is, you know, ultimately one of the things they wanted and they got out of the political settlement that the British government accepted that some form of Irish self determination was allowed in future. And it wasn't exactly in the end what we get in the peace agreement that Sinn Fein, the IRA wanted because they wanted the 32 counties, the whole of Ireland to vote as one unit, which of course British government units weren't going to accept. But if British government did accept and say yes in the future, both parts of Ireland separately, but concurrently same day referendum, but they have to both say yes, could they could have a unification vote. And it's none of Westminster's business what the decision of that referendum is other than to implement whatever the decision was. And that was quite key. So, you know, with loyalism as well and republicanism, they did have, you know, nationalist or separatist objectives that are things that are tangible that governments can negotiate.

Dan Snow (67:01)

With, we should say. The peace process was certainly not smooth. And there was the actual worst single instance of the Troubles, the Omar bombing in August 98 that killed 29 people. That was a splinter group, so called real Iraq. But let's finish if we can, what bits of peacemaking. So what things are in that Good Friday agreement that were innovative or new? And you mentioned the big one there, which is just that essential recognition by Westminster of the sovereignty of the people of the island of Ireland to make that eventual decision. Was there anything else clever? You know, people living in Northern Ireland could be Irish citizens or whatever it might be. What are the bits that stand out to you in that agreement?

Thomas Leahy (67:42)

I would say, you know, number one, as we said, reiterating that self determination is really key because if part of the IRA's purpose was about getting Irish self determination, you solved that. It wasn't exactly as they wanted, but they could still sell it to their own movement that we got that. So I think the self determination point was really key because it means that for the governments Involved the Irish and British governments can argue to group to maybe still use violence or want to use violence. That and our method that well. But there's a democratic path to do this. So I think that's a key point. Second key point, the power sharing setup. Two points to this because it ensured that you tried to get all the parties working together. Now, in fairness to Northern Ireland government is. We've probably seen it collapse is quite a lot over say the last 25 years, et cetera. Now there are backup options that if the government collapsed it is. It usually goes to direct rule under Westminster and then the Irish government. Because the various agreements from the British and Irish government in the 80s is allowed to have a say on what you know, consultancy role with the British government. You generally keep kind of satisfaction for both in the main communities, Northern Ireland in that period. But there's also an incentive there because you want to get rid of direct royal. Then you have to power share again. That probably means you have to compromise. And so that seems quite a sensible system of government. Definitely the point that you said as well about allowing people dual nationality and people can in Northern Ireland be British, Irish or other and they can choose to what they want to do. We see this sometimes in sport. You'll have people who are born in Northern Ireland or play for like the Republic of Ireland or people sometimes less Obies sometimes do get it. People in the republic might play for Northern Ireland. And I think that's important because people then don't feel like their identity and their culture is being diminished or you know, being put second place to a dominant culture. I think that's really key. I think just the fourth element as well is really important about the Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland. It tried to. And the reason I think it succeeded where other attempts failed in Northern Ireland in the 70s in particular, it tried to include as many parties as possible, including those with the paramilitary wings. So like the IRA and the loyalists. You know, when you try to include as many people at the table as possible and take all views and then based on mandates try and work out compromised solutions, no one's exactly really satisfied with what you get, but no one's mega disappointed either because they feel their viewpoint that she's been listened to. And I think it just shows that, yeah trying to have an inclusive process, it can help to try and remedy some of the grievances that are there.

Dan Snow (70:09)

Thank you so much for coming on.

Thomas Leahy (70:11)

Thank you very much. Thank you.

Dan Snow (70:17)

Well, that's all everyone. Thank you very much. Thank you for listening. That's the long and complicated story of the Troubles from the 12th century Anglo Norman Invasion to the Good Friday Groom in 1998. As you've just heard though, this is an ongoing story. There are future chapters yet to be written, but as they're now written, I hope you'll have a reasonable understanding of the context. These two episodes have given you a strong foundation for what's coming next. Thank you to our amazing guest Tyler. What a legend. Thomas Leahy. Thanks to all for listening. If you want some more explainers to help you make sense of the history that has shaped our world, make sure you hit Follow in our podcast player to get more like this from me on Dan Snow's history. Thank you very much for listening as always. That's all folks.

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