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A
Jeremy.
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B
I'm Jeremy Scahill from Dropsite News. The war launched by Donald Trump and Israel against Iran on February 28 has not gone the way that Donald Trump imagined it would. Iran had telegraphed long in advance that it was not going to proceed the way it had in previous occasions when the United States and Israel had bombed it. Namely, it was not going to choreograph its retaliatory strikes or engage in any kind of back channel discussions prior to launching them. In fact, Iran said that it was going to delegate to command authority further down the line and that it was going to immediately begin counter strikes on a bank of targets that had already been predetermined. So what we've seen over the past weeks is that Iran has struck US Installations, military facilities across the Persian Gulf. It's pummeled Israel on an unprecedented level with ballistic missile and drone attacks. And this has resulted in the United States having to evacuate military bases and other facilities across the region. Now, there has been a lot of talk about a potential deal. Donald Trump has falsely claimed for many weeks that Iran was begging him to make a deal. Senior Iranian officials told me, however, that roughly the third or fourth day of the war after it launched on February 28, Steve Witkoff and other American officials began reaching out to Iran, asking it to talk. And we are now in a situation where the Iranians have agreed to a two week ceasefire that ends on Wednesday and there's questions about whether there is going to be a resumption of the US Israeli attacks or diplomacy is going to prevail in some form. Iran was very skeptical of entering into this kind of a temporary pause, in part because it felt that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the unexpected damage that it had caused to American military facilities, the fact that Israel's supply of interceptors, we know was dwindling, that Iran had leverage that it had not had even prior to the launch of this war. And we are very fortunate right now to talk to one of the sharpest analysts from Iran. I'm referring to Hassan Ahmadian. Dr. Hasan Ahmadian. He is associate professor of Middle East Studies at Tehran University and is at this point one of the best known Iranians, particularly in the Arabic language media, because of his appearances on Al Jazeera, where he's often fighting against five, six or seven other panelists. Dr. Ahmadi and thank you very much for joining us here on Dropsite.
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A
Thank you. Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure to be with you.
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B
So I want to begin by asking you about the terms that Iran would consider reasonable or fair as part of any settlement. But the overarching factor that Iran, of course, has to deal with is the fact that twice in the, in one year, when it was engaged in negotiations with the United States, the US And Israel then launched, quote, unquote, surprise attacks against Iran. So there's this dynamic of what does Iran want out of a deal? But there's also the fact that Donald Trump has repeatedly lied. He's very erratic. And how could Iran even believe the word of the United States at this point?
- [03:16]
A
Well, I think trust is not there to begin with. I don't see Iranians trusting the United States, specifically this administration. And at any time in the future, I think they will basically bank on what they have in terms of power, military power, what they have of leverage over the Strait of Hormones. The Iranians moved past the international community as a protector. The UN Security Council did not stop two wars, illegal wars imposed on the country. And so the Iranians learned it the hard way. It's about power. If you don't have power, you will be subject to annihilation. Because they came with goals, bringing down the system. And some of them spoke about bringing down Iran, some of them spoke about partitioning Iran. So it's basically Iran that is being targeted. And so the Iranian perception is that we cannot trust them and we cannot trust the international community to protect us against or shield us against aggression by Israel and the United States. Nergo, we need to bank on our power. And what is the power? It is an asymmetric power. The Iranians, of course, their power does not match that of the United States. Definitely not. I mean, the combination of US Israeli Air Force is basically way beyond what Iran has. Their military power is way bigger. I mean, if you look at the budget, military budget, Iran's is less than 1% of that of the United States. So there's no match there. There's no balance there. But what, what makes the balance, you know, what inserts the balance on the ground is the mere reality that Iran has an asymmetric capability to push back against aggression. And we saw that unfold in the 39 days of attacks on the country. And so back to what your question. I think Iranians do not trust the Trump administration at all. But what they're banking on is the fact that they stood against an aggression and forced them out of this aggression, short of achieving any of their goals that were stated. And secondly, they're building on the leverage they have, that includes control of the shipments through the steroid of Hormuz, and also, of course, other basically influencing variables, such as the nuclear program, such as Iran's capabilities in the region, that is the axis of resistance. All of these combined, the Iranians see that they can balance asymmetrically the power of the United States and can push it back. And so they don't trust it, though. They go for a negotiated settlement, because at the end of the day, you have to stop the aggression. And there are ways. Now, how the Iranians view these ways. I think we can talk about that.
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B
Yeah. I mean, it's true that while Iran is being militarily assaulted by the United States and Israel, that it has shown that it can certainly win in an asymmetric sense, because it can block the United States from achieving regime change, from invading and occupying Iran, from imposing a different form of. Of government. And Iran has shown an ability to also respond on a symmetric level, because when the United States and Israel attack certain types of targets in Iran, Iran has shown that it can respond in kind in the Persian Gulf and also in Israel. But if that's taken away, if Iran is no longer in a state of war, which clearly it has, has shown an AB and a capacity to operate very successfully in, and there is some sort of a deal, then Iran risks, it seems, a scenario where if it then reimposes some new reality on the Strait of Hormuz, or if it launches strikes, that it would be portrayed, you know, as restarting the war. So I guess what I'm asking is if Iran gives up in some form, it's highly enriched uranium, which it says right now, it's not going to transfer it out of the country, and, and it gets sanctions relief, it gets some funds unfrozen. Those things can be reversed or gone back on by the United States. But Iran, it seems, would have to give up irreversible things, such as the enriched uranium. So I guess what I'm asking you is what does a fair deal and a realistic deal look like, given Trump's obsessive discussion about highly enriched uranium and wanting Iran to have irreversible conditions that it accepts?
- [08:26]
A
Well, many points there. I think the Iranians have made it clear they're not willing to let go of their highly enriched uranium. They are willing, though, to dilute it back to 20 and then below that, 20% and below that, but given it up, that's not an option. We had the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry saying that the uranium is like Iran's soil. We will not give it up to the United States or any other party. But there are ways to remedy concerns. If those concerns are real on the part of the United States and other Western powers, the Iranians are offering them that. They can dilute it back. They can bring in transparency through the iaea, you know, all the things they did, but still they were subject to aggression. But the reality is that, as you said, Iran can give up and then be subject to violation and then maybe aggression again. That's a very possible scenario. Taken into account the previous years, I mean, from 2018 till now, what the Iranians are thinking is quite different. I think the war, this war and the previous war, the 12 Days War, changed the strategic calculus in Iran in a way that, that I personally never saw in the sense that we are. We are to bank on the capabilities that we have and we have a guarantee. Now you're talking about, well, opening the strait, closing the strait, that that can, can happen, but of course, can bring in pressure on Iran. But things have changed to no return to my understanding. The strait is the key and is the table of negotiations. Everything is being put on that table. You want to get into negotiations, the Iranians say to the United States, stop the war in Lebanon. You want to have free flow of shipments and goods through the strait, then you have to give Iran the remedies to what you did to the infrastructure and the sanctions, unilateral sanctions you imposed on Iran. So that's the key to all issues. It transformed into the key. And I think it's easy for Iran to use it now. Of course, there are different aspects to it, but the clear picture of it is that we will get sanctions relief. That's the fair deal. If there is any fair deal. We will get sanctions relief, we'll get reparation for the aggression on the country, and in exchange, Iran will bring in the IAEA to provide transparency, dilute back its highly enriched uranium, and of course, try to remedy relations in the region with GCC countries. And of course, the United States can, you know, talk to Iran on different matters as well. That's the general sense of what a fair deal is. But we know that there is no trust, as I said. And so what guarantees for Iran? Again, it's this trade. You violate your commitments. There is something you have to pay here. And that, I think, changes the mentality. Iran didn't have much to offer back in 2018, when the United States violated its commitments in the JCPOA and in extension, the UN Security Council. 2231. But at this point, it has tangible leverage. That is one is, of course, the main one is Strait of Hormuz, but also the unity of the fronts. If you violate one front, the other fronts will be open automatically that they showed in, in this war. And I think they will stick to moving forward. So we're talking Trump's language now. It's not about international law. He, he, he never observed any law internationally. He basically, when it comes to Iran, he violated each and every one of them. And also, of course, towards the Palestinians, towards others in the region. But we were talking about Iran with regards to Iran. He violated each and every law and now the Iranians are talking his language. Give and take. That's a fair, that's, that's what brings up a fair deal. You can't just take and take and not give. You violated your commitments, now you have to pay for it. You attack the country and now you have to pay for it. If you don't do that, there is something that we can use against you and it's very effective. And it's. As you target our people, we are targeting the pockets of your people in terms of oil markets and energy markets and in terms of global economy. That's the asymmetric balance based on reality and power projection that is not necessarily similar to that of the United States, but it's as effective as that of the United States.
- [13:53]
B
Well, you raised a number of interesting questions, but it also recalls to mind that prior to the US and Israel launching this war on February 28, when there were negotiations and discussions in Oman and then in Geneva, there were wide reports and in fact, Iranian officials confirmed this for me, that Iran was willing to put on the table a resumption of deals that would see the United States working in the oil and gas sector inside of Iran as part of a, of a deal. There's also some discussion of what a compromise might look like at the, regarding the administration of the Strait of Hormuz, given that Trump is so transactional and that he is using the presidency in the United States in a very clear and blatant way to enrich his family and his cronies, not just with insider trading, but the mere fact that his son in law, Jared Kushner, is just swimming in golf money, has all these initiatives with Israel, is very close personal friend of Benjamin Netanyahu, and the fact that Trump, you know, really views himself as kind of businessman as, as, as president. What could that aspect of a deal look like regarding oil and gas in Iran and Strait of Hormuz? Is it your understanding that any of those things are in play now as they seem to have been back in February.
- [15:10]
A
Of course, I think the Iranians main issue here is sanctions relief. And the main aspect of sanction relief is Iran's oil and gas market. That's the main thing. The Iranians need investments in those aspects, in those assets and their oil fields and their oil and gas infrastructure. And the sanctions have prevented them from developing those, those infrastructure. And I think the trade off is for transparency in terms of the nuclear program and a non aggression pact, if that is necessary. There have been ideas floating around that the United States and Iran can sign a non aggression pact that includes the region that is us leashing Israel from attacking Iran and its allies and Iran saying that we will not attack unless attacked, which is what happened basically. And so that's how the Iranians are trying to convey their way of dealing with the Trump administration. We know that Israel has immense influence. We know some Arab countries have influence. But the war showed that despite their efforts not to see this war unfold, the GCC countries, we saw them being outbalanced by a single person, that is Bibi Netanyahu. And so we know that the leverage there is way bigger than those that of the GCC countries. Now with the war going to where it went and the shortcomings on the part of us and Israel in terms of achieving their goals, I think that relationship can be tested between Trump and Bibi Netanyahu. We don't know the essence of it. There are lots of rumors and lots of talks and lots of news, as you know about it, about the influence Bibi Netanyahu has on Trump. But be it as it may, I think this war showed that what Netanyahu has been preaching and advocating is not based on reality. It's wishful thinking. And I think that has some sort of influence on how Trump thinks, how the United States thinks. And so I think moving forward, it's not about, you know, who has how much of influence in Washington. It's about the possibilities. The Iranians showed that they can fight a lengthy fight. As we speak, there are discussions in Tehran, why did we stop the war? That, that's very much debated in Tehran. Why did we stop the war on Israel? They attacked us. They had to pay a bigger price. They attacked our infrastructure. We shouldn't leave them without really, you know, putting immense pressure and denying them of anything that they can look at as sort of achievement moving forward. And so that.
- [18:28]
B
Can I just ask, can I. You're raising something that I think is really crucial and you're right And I've heard this also from Iranian officials. There are different camps of thought in Iran, including in the power structure on this issue. You know, the Israelis in the United States clearly were finding themselves enmeshed in a quagmire. And Israel's interceptors were running low. And the infrastructure of the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf had been damaged to an unprecedented degree. And I think that there were many people in Iran and in the broader acts of resistance that felt that the Iranians actually had Trump painting himself into a corner and that this pause of two weeks essentially allowed them to restock, to prepare for another round and also stripped Iran of immediate tactical leverage.
- [19:21]
A
Yeah, that's a good point. But I hear from my military friends or military experts friends that, you know, you can't just rearm as a US And Israel because anti defense missiles are not produced en masse. They can't be. There is an infrastructure that they cannot produce beyond that, the capacity of that infrastructure in the United States and in Israel. And so they're running low. They will be, they will be, you know, running low for some time to come. So they cannot just restart the war in two weeks. They cannot just restart it in two months. They need a lengthy period. The eight months that ensued after the 12 days war is quite telling on them, rearming and then attacking the country. And of course, we know that whenever the war would stop, the Israelis and the Americans would rearm. So does Iran. Iran is also trying to rebuild, rearm. Of course, they attacked much of Iran's infrastructure. They need to also remedy those. So it's a two side story.
- [20:33]
B
Just to emphasize the point you're making, Majid Mousavi, the IRGC's aerospace commander, said on Sunday, and this is a quote during the ceasefire, our speed in updating and replenishing missile and drone launch pads is even faster than before the war. We know that the enemy is incapable of creating these conditions for themselves and they're forced to bring ammunition from the other side of the world in a trickle. So he's, he's essentially making the point also that you said you've heard from other military experts. But on the tactical matter, though, which, you know, I take your point on the challenges of the US And Israel restocking in that capacity, but on a political and a negotiation level, there's also an argument that Iran stripped itself of kind of unprecedented leverage by allowing this pause. Do you disagree with that?
- [21:20]
A
Well, I think it has some merit and I think that that has been also part of the discussions in Tehran. But all in all, Iran wanted to push back in a way that forces its foes to think twice and thrice before attacking Iran once more. And I think they did that. The United States will think more than once before attacking Iran. Moving forward, the region will be against any war. Though in the previous war, in this war, they didn't really matter to us on its priorities. But I think they will have more to play in terms of Baltics in the states pushing back against the possibility of another war. Israel itself, my understanding, and I'm a follower of Israeli politics and its power structure. Israel showed and showcased once more that it cannot shoulder such a confrontation with Iran absent the US it cannot really go for a lengthy period of time fighting Iran the way it did and receiving Iran's missiles and drones without US Backing. It cannot just do that. And that's a shift in the power, balance of power in the region. You cannot do much without the United States and with the United States, you didn't achieve your goals. That's important message and I think that's what the Iranians are banking on moving forward in terms of negotiations. Now, you can argue that the Iranians could have continued for some lengthier period. They did the second week. The Americans, I mean, the end of the first week of the war, the Americans were sending messages left and right to try to come to terms with Iran to stop the war. They knew it was a quagmire, there's nothing to achieve. And I think even before the war, many Americans were like, there's nothing for us in it. It's an Israeli war. We are doing Israel's bidding. That was clear. And from the get go after their, you know, imaginary way of thinking of Iran killing its leadership and then the system would collapse, did not materialize. They realized it's a quagmire, they needed to get out of it. And the Iranians continued for roughly 40 days. And then they decided that's they, they can, they can get out of it with their deterrence being strengthened, with their cards being strengthened and with negotiations to translate those cards that were strengthened into economic achievements. I think. Let me point to two factors that I think are important for the Iranians getting out of the war. Two aspects are crucial. First is their security. And second is an economic outcome. The security part of it is guaranteed or at least strengthened, as I said, with them fighting a lengthy war against two big foes or two nuclear powers and not giving anything up, but also achieving strategic points. And also, of course, they see in a deal maybe part, you know, strengthening this part of their deterrence moving forward. And, of course, the rebuilding. Sayed Majid Mousavi's comments are important because he's the head of the aerospace division. He's basically managing the two pillars of Iran's military power, that is the missiles power and the drones power. And so when he's saying that we are rebuilding faster than any time before this, that's only natural for Iran because it was subject to aggression from two powers and it needs to get ready for the next round. Whether or not it happens, that's another story. The second aspect that I think is very important is an economic outcome. The country was subject to unilateral, illegal sanctions, and now there are differences on the international sanctions on Iran. Of course, China and Russia and Iran are saying there are no international sanctions. That's another thing. But what's important is the war and attacking Iran's infrastructure. The Iranians are saying if we are to get out of the war and go for a settlement, that settlement needs to have economy front and center. You can't have sanctions on Iran and expect Iran to live with it and let you use its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will observe the Strait no matter what deal they get to, only to see that this is or make sure that this is not being used against them moving forward. So the military blockade that is blocking any military movement through the strait will continue indefinitely to my understanding. But economic shipments the Iranians are, you know, are happy to live with, provided that the sanctions relief and reparations for the war are provided to Iran. That's what the Iranians agree on. Any step away from this trade off creates trouble in Iran because it will be creating divisions. And I don't see the Iranians going to that direction at this point. They would stick to what they have a consensus on, that is this is the fair tradeoff.
- [27:11]
B
You know, Donald Trump has been fond. He's trying to manufacture a kind of victory narrative. And he keeps returning to several themes. And one of them is that he's already changed the Iranian regime. And of course, you know, he's, he's made numerous false claims. The biggest is that Iran has been begging him to make a deal. I think it's plain to anyone that paid attention to any of this that Iran has been in control of when there are going to be talks and that no matter what what Trump has threatened, including literally saying that he's going to destroy an entire civilization that hasn't moved the needle at all. The massive bombing of Iran hasn't moved the needle at all. I think anyone who has eyes to see is clear on this. But it is true that the United States and Israel assassinated large sectors of the very top leadership in Iran with the opening hours strike against the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, leaders of the irgc, political leaders of Iran. That's certainly true. And I'm wondering, though, when Trump says, you know, there's a new regime, you know, people in his administration also sort of try to compare it to Venezuela and say, and the Israelis are pushing this talking point that some of the leaders in Iran right now are the kind of Delsey Rodriguez's, you know, of the Iran war. But I think it would be really interesting to hear your detailed breakdown of who you think is making decisions in Iran right now, how the different echelons from the political sector, the religious sector, the military sector in Iran are weaving. There, of course, is a supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. He's released a number of statements, though he hasn't publicly given a speech. Iranian officials are saying that's for security reasons at this point. But, Hasan, I really would love to hear your understanding. I recognize you're not an official from the Iranian government, you're an independent analyst, but can you break down your understanding of who's in control and how decisions are being made?
- [29:18]
A
Yeah, of course. But first, Trump has been piling a lot of, you know, points suggesting that he made an achievement. I can, I mean, I mean, I've been following US Iran relations for, for decades now, and I can see that he didn't achieve anything. He actually was forced out of the war and he was trying to get an achievement. The Iranians denied him any achievement. His main achievement is the assassinations that he did in the Israel did basically in the beginning of the war. And even that pales in comparison with what Iran achieved on a strategic level. And actually the smooth way the transition of power happened in Iran is quite telling as to what extent this was an achievement for him and for Israel. Now, when it comes to decision making in Iran. And I, I think that's, you know, he has been on a, the Israelis and the Americans, the administration in the US have been on a cognitive warfare trying to talk differences or touch differences in Iran, if they exist. And I think that has been part of it. There's psychological warfare in parallel going on against Iran, but also the cognitive warfare that targets the internal politics of Iran is part of this. Rodriguez, you know, the Venezuela model, etc. I think it's very simplistic to think that way for basic reasons. The Iranian system, and I'm speaking as someone who taught political system, comparative political systems for years now, the Iranian political system is basically very institutionalized, namely, name, name another system whose top echelon are assassinated and is capable on continuing or is capable of continuing and also waging a retaliatory war effort against two big foes. I don't see any historical, you know, parallel to this that speaks volumes to the institutional, institutionalized level of the system. Now, when you look at the system, the system has many institutions from bottom to the top. Everything happened after the assassination of the previous supreme leader went according to the book, according to the Iranian constitution, and the procedures put in place in the system according to its institutional capacity. And so you had the assembly of Experts choosing a new leader, and you had the leader appointing heads of or commanders of this, of the armed forces, the assembly, the Iranian parliament working, the Iranian government, the judiciary, all of them. We had an interim leadership council that worked until the next supreme leader was elected. And the simplistic view of this institutionalized system is basically wishful thinking because it's not only institutionalized. For every institution in Iran, there's a parallel institution. So if you wipe out institutions, the system will not collapse. It's basically designed to withstand collapse or with tents, these kinds of shocks. And so, so you have a parliament, you have a guardian council. That's the parallel thing. You have a judiciary, you have the revolutionary judiciary. That's a parallel thing. You have the Ministry of Intelligence, you have the intelligence of the irgc, you have the army, you have the irgc. So whatever you target, it's not only about figures, it's about institutions. Wipe out entire institutions and you will not get regime collapse or system collapse. That I think is not understood all in U.S. political debates. And so when looking at this institutionalized system, you could see that it's working according to plan, it's working according to the procedures and the constitution. The Supreme Leader was elected. In between, there was an interim supreme leadership council of three people. And then the new supreme leader was, was elected. Who's running the show? I think he's pivotal. He is not only the leader, he's the balancer. That's the, the tradition in Iran's political system, from Ayatollah Khomeini to Ayatollah Khamenei and now the new supreme leader. They are the balancers within the system. You have people from left and right in the system, you know, around them. They would try to balance the system, they would try to balance the politics in the country and they have the final say. And how that, how does that work in practice? It goes through the Supreme National Security Council, the body basically that has two main tasks to do. First, to create consensus or build consensus on strategic issues, and second, to translate or bring in the buying of all power circles within the system. It has 13 members from the main stakeholders in the system to representing the Supreme Leader. The president is the head of that council, but also it has a secretary who was assassinated, Dr. Ali Larijani, and then was replaced by the Supreme Leader. And so creating this consensus and then deciding on strategic issues is the main thing this body does. And it does it on the behest of the Supreme Leader and to basically create a space for all parts of the system to have a say on the decision. And it's a tradition also that the Supreme Leader wouldn't oppose it, oppose its decisions, because it's the consensus, a consensual based mechanism of decision making. And that creates a bit of a delay in strategic decision making in Iran. But it has worked to Iran's benefit because, you know, it's very much the bulk of, or the, the bulk of Iran's decision makers, logic, way of, or rational way of rationalizing strategic decisions are gathered in this body. And so it's a rationalization of the decisions that is ongoing on a consensual base that the system observes and accepts.
- [36:30]
B
I think it's interesting, the sort of parallel information war. Iran has really distinguished itself not just in the kind of free sector with the, you know, the Lego videos and explosive media, but also there were moments that went viral in Foreign Minister Abbas Arachi's appearances on American television. His recognition in the world has really risen dramatically. He's become very familiar to also Western audiences. There's also a whole meme industry about him online. Mohamed Bagar Galiboff, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, has regularly engaged in social media battles against Trump. He's also been flexing his sort of knowledge of financial markets in talking about the kind of very clear insider trading that is going on. But there is this kind of momentum to a broader narrative that the person that the United States is dealing with right now is in fact the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Galiba. And, you know, the American political system operates like that. And there's sort of everything you just said for the past minutes, your analysis and your academic explanation of how Iran is run becomes irrelevant in the broader discourse. And it's just cult of personality. It's we're dealing with this new guy, Galiboff, and let's see if he's going to be allowed to make a deal. If the IRGC is going to allow him and Iraqi to actually make a deal, we'll see. And if not, we have to bomb them again. But can you forget for people that are being told this, and this is the narrative that it really is dominant in Western media, including on Al Jazeera and elsewhere, that it's a Galiboff that's kind of in the driver's seat. What is the significance of him leading the Iranian delegation and what kind of authority does he actually have right now?
- [38:19]
A
Well, he brings in the authority that the Supreme National Security Council with the blessings of the Supreme Leader are giving him. Absent those two, is a regular politician. He's of course a very strong personality, is one of the people that was, that were in the, in the system from the get go. He fought the Iran Iraq war and he was in every up and down in the past five decades of the Iranian history. And so he has knowledge, he has experience, he has a lot of of connections and he's very much trusted by the Supreme National Security Council and by the Supreme Leader. And so absent that consensus within the Supreme National Security Council, I think he wouldn't have been meeting the Americans. So we have to weigh this into the Iranian political system and how it operates. I know that they are focusing on the personality because I think it's, as you said, it's a cold politics thing in the US that look at who replaces who and then we can deal with it. They cannot basically reckon with the reality that Iran has an institutionalized system. They need to see figures. But without the consensus that I explained, Mr. Kalibov wouldn't have met the Americans. Without that consensus, he wouldn't have talked to J.D. vance. And so him going there is a decision by the political system to meet on a higher level with someone the Iranians saw as opposed to the war that was imposed on the country, that is JD Vans. And so they didn't want to go the same way they did before with, with Witkoff and Kushner, who didn't. Basically they were doing Israel bidding in the, in the discussions. Maybe J.D. vance would do the same, we don't know. But at least the Iranians saw him as someone who was opposing the war and wanted to reciprocate in Mr. Qaliba being present there. But it's not about the person, it's about the system deciding to meet the United States on a Higher level. And I think even the discussions and the topics that were discussed there, they were prior, I imagine they had been discussed before within the Supreme National Security Council. That's how it goes in Iran. So to give a lot of credit and sway to a single person basically misses the point of how the Iranian system operates. Of course, Ali Baf as a person, as I said, is very much a strong personality within Iran's politics. And of course, personalities matter. Personalities have a. Have a weight basically in the system itself. He has a weight within the Supreme National Security Council, which is. Which he is a member of, as a speaker of the Parliament. And so he's one of the 13 people within the system, within that. Within that body. And so he's part of the core of the strategic decision making within the system. But as I said, without the consensus, without the blessing of the supreme leader, because he has the power to veto the decisions of the Supreme National Security Council, he didn't. So he went on with the decision taken by that body. And so as much as you give of a weight to Mr. Kaliba on a personal level, I think that pales in comparison with the authority that is given to him by a body that is tasked with strategic decision making. And that's why the Rodriguez Venezuela model is really ridiculous. If you look at it through the prism of how Iran's political system operates, it's a very much inside the bubble discussion in Washington than related to reality on the ground in Iran.
- [42:32]
B
Do you get the sense at all? You know, there's also, there's a lot of reports that are, you know, we should say, based on, quote, unquote, U.S. intelligence or Israeli intelligence, that there are these divisions between the IRGC and the political echelons in Iran. Is this, is this pure propaganda or, or is there. I imagine, and I'm an outsider, I have no. I have no inside knowledge of Iran. But I would imagine that there certainly are very intense debates about strategy and that you have very powerful personalities who represent large, powerful constituencies within the institutions of the state. But do you get a sense, Hasan, that there actually is a kind of friction or any disunity or conflict between the IRGC and what it controls in Iran and the political echelons that Ghaliba and others are sort of representing?
- [43:30]
A
Yeah, I think. I think there is some merit to this in the sense that there are debates in Iran. I mean, as I said, within the Supreme National Security Council, you have different people talking and they represent different power circles within the system. But the system is designed in such a way to observe, observe those kinds of divisions or differences of opinions. Now they have different strong opinions. And so that body is to remedy those and bring them closer to one another. Now, of course, I mean, to say that there are no differences basically defines the logic of human actorship in such a way that is happening within the political system in Iran and elsewhere. But to say that these are divisions, that one party is basically blocking and going its way and the other is trying to reach an agreement with the United States, that's pure propaganda. That's my understanding. That's cognitive warfare aimed at the unity that has been kept during the heaviest bombardment of the country the past century. And so that is propaganda, to my understanding, aimed at creating division rather than seeing division. And I don't see it really materializing in any shape or form in tangible results that the United States and Israel are after. But what's important here is that you have those differences, you have a way to remedy them. And then you have also showed that you are working in accordance with the procedures you have in place. There has been a very clear announcement by the Supreme National Security Council right at the announcement of the ceasefire with the United States. Three pages. It doesn't do that usually, but it was detailed. I haven't seen any Iranian official going a single word out of this announcement on an official mission, be it with the United States or with the region or with the world. Everything happened according to this three page document. And so to talk about divisions, I think, you know, defies this reality on the ground that we have seen. And I think it's continuing to happen.
- [46:02]
B
We only have a few minutes left, but I want to ask you about the narrative that has become the dominant narrative among the GCC countries. These are the, the Gulf countries that have been housing the US military facilities, that Iran has been striking in these retaliatory strikes. And some of the, the most intense debates that you've had, Hasan on Al Jazeera, particularly on the Arabic language channel, although it also happens on Al Jazeera English. I want people to also understand that Dr. Hassan Ahmadiyyan is debating people in three different languages at, at different times. And primarily during this war. It's been in English and in. And people can go online and watch. A lot of these have been translated and they've gone viral. But what's at the heart of it is that there is a narrative that is pervasive among the GCC countries and their leadership that Iran is the aggressor in this conflict. When the GCC countries sponsored a UN Security Council resolution. It didn't mention the terms United States or, or Israel. If you were to land from a different planet and just listen to the leaders of the GCC countries describe what's happening in the world right now, you would believe that Iran woke up one day and decided to just start bombing infrastructure and damaging civilian life of all of its neighbors. I would challenge anyone to find me a contrary narrative that is more realistic or factual than the one that I just stated. But Dr. Ahmadi, and you've been then dealing with this on these panels. So I, as we end, I want to hear your sense of kind of what it's like when you're sitting there and you're basically being portrayed as representing the kind of villains in this and you're on with all of these Gulf Arab analysts and sometimes American journalists you recently had a debate with. But also more importantly, that narrative that all of these GCC countries are acting like this happens in a vacuum and none of them are saying almost anything about the fact that the US and Israel launched this war against Iran in the same way that they did nothing about the burning alive of children in Gaza except offer thoughts and prayers. So both those issues, your appearances and the broader narrative as we end, I
- [48:20]
A
think, you know, it has been really surreal to listen to those discussions in absence of, of acknowledgment of the aggression that happened unfolded both from the United States and from Israel. Now the United States part of it is very important because it banks and it banked on the gc, the CENTCOM enterprise which is present in GCC countries. Now when it comes to GCC positions, they have differences. Of course, Oman is out of the other. You know, it has been kept out of the war because it didn't allow the usage of its land against Iran. Qatar, in between the war, tried to stop attacks from its lands against Iran. And the Iranians were, you know, calming things down with it. Right after the Raslan attack and retaliation to the attack on Iran's infrastructure. Kuwait was a surprise to many Iranians because they didn't expect it to do what it did. Giving land and bases to the United States to attack its neighbors. Now UAE and Bahrain normalizing with Israel, they have had not only American bases but also Israeli strong intelligence presence. And so they were used in the war. I mean, you know, it's, it's really surreal to listen to analysts saying, denying only. Whereas if you, if you take the same people out and talk to them, they would say, well, there is, there is logic in what you say. But you know, our official position is denial. We have to deny it. And so it's, it's basically something that has been, you know, being talked of on tv, on media. But everyone knows what transpired in this region. The US Used these lands, used their spaces, and used their, their, their sea. The, the New York Times said it clearly that, well, office spaces and, and hotels were used after Iran attacked their, their bases. They moved to office spaces and hotels and conducted the war from there. And so there's no point in denying. But at this point, they are denying, they have been denying. And I think they are coming to terms with reality that they cannot just deny everything. They have to talk to Iran and come to terms with how to remedy this. Because, I mean, moving forward, if there's another war, the same thing will happen, if not worse. And so they need to find a way out of it. But when it comes to debates, as you said, denial is the main thing here. And it's easy to deny without providing any, any argument. And basically denying means the end of argument. And you can't discuss anything with the person who's denying the reality on the ground because arguments are based on realities. But generally, I think there is a strategic shift in the GCC that I see, you know, seeds of that is these bases did not protect us. Actually, the defenses that we had and purchased and paid heavy for have been used to defend those bases. And those bases in turn, they are not for the security of the region. They are for the security of a single actor, that is Israel. That realization, I think, is very strong now, both on public level and on official level. Because before this war there were talks of this. But you didn't have a clear evidence or experience to back your argument. Now you have it. And these discussions, I had discussions with many of my Arab friends. I think they are reflecting on these ideas. Why do we have these bases? Why are we putting ourselves in line of danger where the United States gets into a war without asking us and despite our advice or against our advice, and then continues the war and only talks about US Assets and bases and Israel did not care if we were attacked and then get out of the war, go for a ceasefire with Iran without consulting us? What kind of a relationship is this? What kind of security providing that the United States is doing for these countries? They are basically targeting their security, not providing them with security. And I think that realization is the basis of many changes that I see forthcoming in the future. But of course, many mistakes were made in the past decades, few decades between Iran and Gcc countries and other countries, including Iraq. I'm just hopeful that they will not repeat those and basically move to a different direction where they don't need foreign presence. They can provide the security. Iran would not have to attack a base in Kuwait or in Qatar to stop aggression on itself. It would just focus on its main foe who is attacking us. That's, I think, a hope that I think is closer to reality if you compare it to the before the war time.
- [53:55]
B
Hassan, thank you very much for joining us.
- [53:58]
A
Thank you. Pleasure.
- [54:00]
B
Dr. Hassan Ahmadian is associate professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Tehran University.