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A
All right, good morning and welcome to Dropsite News. Negotiations in Switzerland between Iran and the United States continue. We'll begin the program by talking about the progress being made there as Trump continues with his combination of threats and concessions in Lebanon. A very tentative ceasefire has taken hold. We'll be joined later by Sharif Abdel Cadous, our drop side colleagues, and potentially Lila Yunus may be able to join us from Lebanon. We'll see whether or not she can, she can make it to talk about the situation on the ground there. We also have major elections here in the United States, both in New York and Maryland, but also in Utah, where AIPAC has spent many millions of dollars trying to prop up its candidates against kind of anti genocide, anti Zionist candidates in, in several different areas. We'll talk about those at the very end of the program. But to start out, I'm joined by my colleagues here, Murtaza Hussein and Jeremy Scahill. Murtaza, good to see you. How are you?
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B
Good to see you guys.
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A
All right. And Jeremy, how you doing?
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C
Okay. You know, it's, it's an intense period because of the situation with Iran, Lebanon and Gaza, and we're trying to stay on top of all theaters of war, so to speak.
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A
Yes. And it all seems to be kind of forced into the same cauldron against the kind of demands of the Israeli government which had, you know, tried very hard, and they kind of lead up to the, the agreement to the MoU to try to separate out Lebanon. And also we can talk a little bit later in the program about the ongoing negotiations with Hamas and Gaza. But both the US And Iran seem to be pushing at least Lebanon and into the equation. Can you talk about where, where we stand as of now? And then, you know, after that, I can bring up some of Trump's latest kind of rantings that he's throwing up on Truth Social.
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C
Yeah, I mean, first of all, regarding Trump, I think it's, it's important for us to maintain our grounding in some level of sanity. And just recall for a moment that just as these negotiations were set to begin in Switzerland, Donald Trump went on another murderous rant and threatened not only to once again destroy Iranian civilization, but he appeared to be directly threatening to assassinate the Iranian negotiators who were traveling to Switzerland, saying that if they don't essentially capitulate to what he's demanding, that they won't make it back to their effing country. And, you know, this is not the first time that Trump has threatened such assassinations of Iranian officials. Or to destroy Iranian society. And also, it's important to recall that the Hamas negotiating team, when they were in Qatar in September of 2025, meeting to discuss a supposed ceasefire proposal that Donald Trump had delivered to them through Qatari mediators, the Israelis bombed the offices and the residents where the Hamas negotiators were meeting. So, you know, these threats that Trump was, was making sort of set the tone for how disconnected his erratic behavior and threats were from what actually happened on a technical level in Switzerland. And Mohammed Bagar Galiboff, who is the speaker of the Iranian Parliament and is the, the person that's been designated as the lead negotiator, at least insofar as these direct meetings with the Americans are concerned, spoke last night and offered some description of what actually went down there from the Iranian perspective. And he said that when they sat down across the table with J.D. vance at the onset of the meeting, they said to J.D. vance, you know, your president just issued this threat against us, and we are never going to negotiate under this kind of hostility and these threats. And GAF says that they then ended the negotiations with JD Vance before they even began. And the Iranian delegation then walked out of the meetings with J.D. vance. And they were, according to Galiboff, discussing actually leaving Switzerland entirely. And according to Galiba, what happened then is that the mediators from Qatar and Pakistan met with the Iranian delegation and they tried to convince them to stay. And what ended up happening was that the Iranians and the Americans then participated in indirect negotiations, which means that according to Iran, they didn't have any more face to face time with J.D. vance. Now, even before the Iranian negotiators had arrived in Switzerland, there was a lot of pressure on Galiboff and Arachi Basarachi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, not to participate in any photo op with JD Vance or Donald Trump if he had happened to show up at these negotiations. So I think there was a bit of, of sort of foreshadowing that something like this may happen with many Iranians saying that there shouldn't be a handshake or any pictures taken in the same room of senior Iranian officials and the men from the United States who are responsible for the assassination of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the killing of more than 160 schoolgirls in the Minab shooting bombing that happened in the first 24 hours of the launch of this war on February 28th. And in fact, the Iranian aircraft that they're utilizing has written on the side of it a remembrance for those schoolgirls of Minab, who were killed in that US Missile strike. And what, what played out then was, as you indicated, Ryan, the United States and Iran have both given very different takes on what went down in those negotiations. Just to mention a few topline issues. Donald Trump, who still is desperately flailing to latch on to a victory narrative, says that the Iranians agreed that there would be an immediate or imminent return of the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran says that it has a relationship with the iaea, but there are no imminent plans to have them deploy inside of Iran. In the context of this agreement, Donald Trump has steadfastly maintained that he wasn't going to unfreeze and repatriate any Iranian assets. Well, both Iran and the United States now agree that a multibillion dollar unfreezing of Iranian assets has taken place. But Donald Trump claims that Jared Kushner cooked up a framework that you they say, with the Qataris, wherein the Iranians would not actually ever take control of this money, but instead it would be put into a fund where they would have exclusive use of the funds only to purchase agricultural products from the United States. The Iranians have said that's total hogwash on Trump's part and that $12.5 billion is in the process of being unfrozen and that it's unrestricted funds, that Iran is going to spend it how it sees fit. The other element of this, that, you know, that there's some indication there was negotiations over was the Strait of Hormuz. Trump is saying, oh, it's. The Iranians are not going to impose any tolls on the Strait of Hormuz and that it's going to be open for free travel. The Iranians are saying, yes, it's true, we're not going to impose any fees for 60 days only. And that is, in fact, what the text in the Memorandum of Understanding says. But then after that 60 days, the Iranians say that their newly established Persian Gulf authority that is going to manage and maintain the Strait of Hormuz is going to start charging fees that are being framed as, you know, security fees, logistics fees, environmental fees, navigational fees, etc. And there is some precedent for this. There is Denmark does this, Turkey does this. So the Iranians are saying that this is perfectly lawful. And there was a meeting today with Muhammad, or actually last night, Mohammed Bagar Galiboff, when he left Switzerland. He and Arachi then went to the Sultanate of Oman. And of course, Oman is the other literal state on the Strait of Hormuz. And they were discussing a range of issues, but at the center of it was joint administration between the Omanis and the Iranians of the Strait of Hormuz and trying to solidify a working agreement. And Golubov said that the Iranians had said for quite some time, as a result of this war, we're not going to go back to the status quo ante when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz. Now, it's important to also remember Oman is not just Iran's neighbor in the Strait of Hormuz with a stake in the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is the longtime mediator preferred actually, by the United States and Iran in handling nuclear negotiations. And in fact, the Omanis were the mediators leading up to the February 28 launch of this war. And massive trouble began in the relationship between the United States and Oman, spurred primarily by the United States officials, J.D. vance and Steve Witkoff. When the Omani foreign minister, on the eve of the war, comes to Washington, meets with Vance and other senior American officials, comes out of the meetings with the American officials, and says that a deal is in the works to avert a war. And then the United States turns around and launches this surprise attack, assassinating the supreme leader of Iran and other top Iranian officials and members of their family. So the Omanis very much view Steve Witkoff as having misled them if not outright lied to them. Oman issued extremely strong, unprecedented condemnation of the the United States. And Trump himself threatened to also obliterate Oman not that long ago. Some, you know, weeks ago, another threat to wipe out another country. And this one in the, you know, Oman, which is an overwhelmingly neutral country that has a long history of being an honest broker of negotiations between the United States and Iran. And so the Iranians now are really intensifying their regional diplomacy. There are indications that Wagar Galiboff is actually going to go to China again soon. And the Iranians have said quite clearly that they're going to deepen their ties economically, politically, militarily with the Chinese as they move forward with this reality that the United States and Israel waged this war. But at the center of it all right now, front and center, is Lebanon. You know, yes, there. There does seem to be a reduction in the Israeli attacks in Lebanon, but there hasn't been an end to the attacks. Just soon before we went on the air, there was yet another operation launched by Israel. There are talks happening between the United States, Israel and the Lebanese government, but that's primarily been aimed at trying to kind of enlist the Lebanese army as a force that will do the bidding of the United States and kind of fight against Hezbollah or retake positions that Hezbollah took. Whereas the, the, the Iranians seem to be supporting Qatar starting a mediation process that would directly involve Hezbollah. So there's a lot of moving parts here. And what I would say finally is that Netanyahu is under a lot of pressure to continue the war in Lebanon, to not withdraw Israeli forces. And I think that, you know, while Israel would like to blow up this entire deal, what JD Vance seemed to indicate in his press conference in the last 24 hours was that they're going to, the United States is going to try to get Israel to at least for some period cease its fire and experiment with sort of saying that Israeli forces will withdraw from certain parts of southern Lebanon if the Lebanese army is able to go in and assume control of those areas. But I think that the United States and Israel were both stunned by how seriously Iran meant it when they said that it was a red line, that if the war in Lebanon doesn't end that the serious negotiations are not going to move forward.
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A
Yeah. And ma, let's talk about the kind of conditions that are sitting behind these negotiations. The US Just announced that it was releasing. Let me see if I have the exact number. Just a massive amount from its strategic petroleum reserve. 9.1 million barrels of crude were released last week. That's the second largest drawdown ever, 1.3 million barrels per day. A few days ago, President Trump said that the reason that he had to reach a deal is that they within weeks he was going to turn into Herbert Hoover by bringing down the global economy. And he described bedlam was going to break out. Negotiator, you know, people who are expert at negotiations would suggest that perhaps you shouldn't kind of completely reveal, you know, how bankrupt you are entering into the talks. But you know, Trump has his own kind of art of the deal style. Speaking of that style, here's what he said this morning on Truth Social. He says despite their protestations and false statements to the contrary, coupled with the drumbeat of the fake news which is doing every everything possible to make the US Victory as small and insignificant as possible, Iran has fully and completely agreed to highest level nuclear inspections long into the future. Infinity. This will ensure nuclear honesty. If they did not agree to this, there would be no further negotiations. Based on this and other major concessions being made by Iran, I have agreed to allow the Hormuz Strait to remain open with no further naval blockade. However, all ships are remaining in place should it be necessary to reinstitute the blockade, which seems at this point highly unlikely. The money and or sanctions that the US treasury is releasing goes into escrow, controlled by the USA and will be used for the purchase of food and medical supplies exclusively from the US including corn, wheat and soybeans from our great American farmers. These are things that are desperately needed by Iran. This is a humanitarian crisis, and I feel it is necessary to help now before it is too late. Talks are going well. Thank you for your attention to this matter, djt. So can you kind of set the stage of where, like, where we are strategically and what kind of leverage the US has and what, you know, what we can read into Trump's latest outburst?
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B
Sure. You know, Ryan, I think we saw some of this people sharing these clips after the war, the ceasefire had come about. But Iranian senior leadership, IRGC officials, have always said that if they engage in a war with the United States, they know that their defense capacity and budget is far, far less than the U.S. i think the official Iranian defense budget is like 1% of the DoD budget. So they would have to fight a war which was asymmetric and encompass economic, political, social components. And really, if it was an existential war, they would target the global economy and the American economy, and that's how they would balance the scales in such a conflict. And that's exactly what they did in this case. They shut down the straits, they threatened global infrastructure, which would affect the US Economy and affect the Trump presidency very much. And they raised the stakes in the conflict such that despite their technical military inferiority, the US military, they were able to put Trump in a position where he was very, very disadvantaged in negotiations in any end state, would end the war on their terms. And the irony is that American leaders, despite how hawkish they were towards Iran, they've always sort of known this. And that's why since Trump, until Trump, sorry, nobody's actually taking the step of attacking Iran and giving them the ability to instantiate these advantages that they had, which were latent before, but they've become real in this war. So Trump mentioned he was afraid of becoming Herbert Hoover. He also said, thinking about maybe four weeks of oil reserves left, whether that's an exaggeration or he's trying to emphasize to his base that he had to make these very, very tremendous concessions. Either way, it shows the bad position he's put into. And I think now that, I think it's been for a while now, Iran has felt that they're not really in any Russian situation. And time is on their Side, Iran has been under sanctions and various forms of economic pressure for almost five decades now. This situation, this conflict, is the first time that Iran has actually been able to turn the tables and, and sanction other people. They've been able to sanction the rest of the world through the strait. They've been able to control traffic out of it and provide access to countries which are friendly to them and deny it to those who are hostile. They've been able to sanction the US Economy effectively and impose inflation, other things that the US Typically does to Iran. So the war has completely transformed Iran's own posture vis a vis the United States. And a lot of people were saying that it's made the war, Iran much more influential and powerful. And that will be to see after
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A
we see what happens in the next
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B
negotiations and so forth. But certainly it's changed Iran's position where if you look in January, Iran was probably the peak of its isolation and marginalization after the uprising took place in the country. There was no prospect of sanctions coming out at all. And now we have this general license for Iranian oil sales. We have the release of funds. There's discussions of total removal of sanctions on Iran potentially. So this is a tremendous change in the strategic position in a short amount of time. And Mohamed Bakhr Galabakh, like Jeremy mentioned, he's probably going to go to China sometime in the future. He, inside the Iranian system, is seen as a Sinophile in comparison to other leaders of the generation who were also people born in the Cold War, who were much more pro Russia. He's always advocated close Iranian ties with China. And I've seen mentioned the Iranian press and from Iranian officials that their goal is really to recreate a defense relationship with China similar to the one that Pakistan has, where they can jointly produce weapons and aircraft, they can do so at a cheaper price, and they have an alignment with China and various political issues vis a vis the United States and Asia. And that seems to be the goal going forward. So I think the war you mentioned, strategically, I think it's completely transformed, at least for the time being. Iran's strategic position, it's less isolated than it's been in a very, very long time, maybe in decades. It has a prospect of rebuilding its military, an advanced manner, relatively minimal cost, selling oil. Again, people are being forced to diplomatically engage with Iran. So I think that if you look at this just on its face, it seems like a tremendous strategic victory for Iran and capitulation by the US And Trump's statements on truth, social and his deputization of people speak on his behalf, other government officials, but also influencers and so forth in the MAGA movement. I think it's aimed at obfuscating this very obvious reality that the U.S. it didn't just fail in the war, it actually lost in a very tremendous way. And it's because of what the Iranians did. They implemented a strategy which would take the conflict beyond the military realm and even the score with the United States, such that they could actually prevail in a conflict when it came to pass. And I think that's exactly what's happening. I see a very narrow window for the US to reverse this. So maybe it's not even possible at this point. People have continued to call for the US Diminishing calls to reinstigate the conflict, to deploy ground troops, to attack Iranian infrastructure. Not a single one of those moves would actually turn the table in the situation. I think Lindsey Graham was saying that the US should bring up Cargill and other things again, in all those scenarios, Iran would still enjoy escalation dominance to make sure that the pain that they suffered was commensurate or even less than the pain that the US and the global economy would suffer. So I really see no way out of this situation that we're currently in. And this was maybe the last kick at the US Hegemony in the Middle east at the level we've seen in the last few decades. People have been talking about pivoting to Asia for a long time. The Iran war maybe would have cleared the deck, such that Israel could have a much clearer path to its own hedge of money backed by the US in the Middle East. I think that whole project's been set back very thoroughly. And again, with provisional. Things could change. But at the moment, I see the position of Iran as quite favorable. And I think the negotiations and the way they're approaching it, even their willingness to walk out of them, is indicative of that.
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A
And, Jeremy, I've been trying to figure out, to answer kind of Maz's implied question there, like, how does Trump thread this needle of this, like, embarrassing capitulation with his, like, insatiable need to be the victor and the champion of all things at all times. And I think it goes back to what you were saying earlier that he's doing, which is he's just going to lie constantly about what's in. In the terms of the deal. And he has a couple advantages when it comes to that. One, he has a very pliant section of the media. He's got Fox News. He's got, you know, one America. He's got, you know, he's got his. He's got folks who will repeat, you know, precisely what he says, down to the details. Hey, we're going to put this money in escrow, and it's only going to be able to, you be used for American farmers. And it's also, you know, fairly complicated. The American people are not following it very closely. So if they hear this from their media source, they're, they're willing to believe that. But I'm curious if Iran has any plan for how to deal with that, because in some ways, I could imagine them thinking, who cares? Like, if Trump, if Trump is going to agree to a certain set of terms and actually implement them and follow them through, like, let's take the 12 billion, for instance. So he releases the $12 billion, and Iran now has it at its disposal. Central bank can, can use it as it, you know, as it determines for the Iranian economy. And he successfully persuades a significant chunk of his base that he never did that, that he did something completely different. Does Iran care about that? Like, and do they push back publicly? Or they say, you know what? This is what our psychologists say this crazy old man needs. So as long as we get we need, we're going to just go with it.
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C
I mean, let me tell you something. When before this war began on February 28, and I was speaking to Iranian officials who were directly involved with the negotiations, the, the tone of what they were saying and the substance of what they were saying is, is diametrically opposite of the tone you hear now. What do I mean by that? What, what I was hearing prior to February 28th were it was an Iranian sophisticated assessment of the unusual nature of Donald Trump, that he is not just motivated by the, you know, sort of priorities of the American empire or geopolitical considerations related to American military or economic dominance or subservience to parts of Israel's broader agenda, but that he's a bit, you know, a businessman, a gangster, that he wants a little bit on the side for himself, that he wants to make sure that Jared Kushner is set up, that his friends are set up. And, you know, you heard Iranians talking about or, or sort of prioritizing in, to some degree the idea that there would be oil and gas concessions and that they were kind of going to bake into what they were offering, terms that they believed appealed to Trump's ego or to Trump as the kind of corrupt gangster businessman in the White House, not just the president of the United States. And they seem to be very aware of that to the point where they were saying, you know, combined with other flexibility that we're showing on questions regarding the nuclear issue or non aggression pact with the United States, we feel confident that what we're putting on the table is reasonable. And they even expressed a, a sort of optimism of sorts that the US Was a bit taken aback by how flexible Iran was being prior to the launch of this war and then the war happened. And so what were the direct answer to your question is what Donald Trump is used to, particularly in this term, and he gets it all the time from the leaders of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, is he likes to be fluffed up by all of these leaders praising him. It's why he loves those ceremonies. Like in Sharmel Sheikh, when he announced his fraudulent Gaza ceasefire. It was like a, it was like a, one of, it was like the gridiron dinner that Trump assembled with this motley crew of foreign leaders where it was like, you know, roast me now. Yeah, yeah. It was like seen out of Arrested Development. Yeah, yeah, roast me, Toast me. So he likes that stuff. He likes it when people are telling him how great he is, et cetera. I mean, it's really kind of gaudy stuff that he engages in, but, but it works with him. He likes that. And even to an extent in the Gaza negotiations, you know, the, the Palestinian negotiators were also saying, we're trying to frame things in a way that we think appeals to this psychological mindset that the whole world can see that Trump has. The Iranians won't give him that now. They just won't. And in fact, some of the same officials I spoke to that were talking about their flexibility prior to the launch of this war told me that during the negotiations, mediators, regional mediators were encouraging the Iranians to throw, throw bones in there for Donald Trump. And they said, we will not do that. In fact, they mocked the inclusion of the nuclear terms in this agreement where Iran reaffirms that it won't seek to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. They called it a cheap re gift to Donald Trump and, and spoke about it as though it was like they were patronizing him. And so Trump doesn't know. He really, I think he really believed. This is what I think is the direct answer to your question. I think Donald Trump genuinely believed that when he finally said, okay, we can end this whole thing, that Iran was going to like, set up a meeting with him and Mojtab Khamenei that he was going to be able to like shake hands, pretend that he had resolved everything, that the Iranians would go along with his lies as just a necessary poison pill, this deal. And they won't do it to the point where they utterly humiliated the Vice President of the United States in these meetings. Like you have not seen something like that in modern American history. They literally. Arachi goes into the room where J.D. vance is standing there. There's a shot where you actually see J.D. vance's reaction. He speaks to the Pakistani leader, turns his back to JD Vance and walks out of the room. That's unprecedented for an American vice president to be treated that way by a foreign minister of a country that they just bombed for weeks on end. But if you strip it down to it, I think most of the world looks at this and they say, yeah, J.D. vance and the United States killed more than 3,000 Iranians. They murdered school children. They killed the supreme leader of their country. They threatened to assassinate these very leaders when they came to Switzerland to negotiate a deal that Donald Trump asked for. And they're not having it. So Trump is in. I think Trump is in catastrophically bad narrative trouble here. And at the core of it is the Iranians just won't throw him a single bone. They will not go along with any of his lies. It's causing panic on the part of Trump.
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A
What's, what's their tactical rationale to not throw those bones? Like what, what about the war?
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C
They don't need to. Yeah, they don't. They don't need to. I mean, this is the thing. Have we ever in history seen something so kind of like sociopathic in terms of its public presentation? He's literally saying we're going to bomb a multi millennia civilization into obliteration. He's saying we're going to assassinate your negotiating team. He's threatening to also wipe out the Sultanate of Oman, you know, a multi decade negotiator. And I think the Iranians sort of see it as he's the president who cried wolf. No one believes him anymore. And even if he does decide to start bombing Iran again, the Iranians have proven that they can cause evacuation of American military facilities on an unprecedented scale, that they can cause utter crisis in the global economy, that they can put the leading superpower in the world in a corner where the President of the United States has to concede that they were just weeks away from economic catastrophe in the energy sector. I think Iran feels like we don't need to play that game with you at all you're going to do this on our terms, which we believe are fair. It's not that the Iranians are saying we want to take control of Hawaii as a concession. The Iranians are actually offering in a parallel track to resolve the issue of the highly enriched uranium. They're saying that they're open to a down blending of it. They forced Trump away from this business of the American military is going to come in and seize the nuclear dust, but they are willing to negotiate on these things. So I think that it's not that they're being cocky, it's not that they're being arrogant. I think what they're saying is we've put terms on the table that are fair, and we're not going to allow you to, to do these two things. We're not going to allow you to bully us, and we're not going to allow you to lie to the world and have our assistance as you tell those lies.
- [30:08]
A
Yeah. And Maz, is, is some of this related to the dissent within Iran? You know, you recently wrote about the, the skepticism among, you know, significant swaths of, of the kind of ruling establishment, or whatever you'd want to call it, you know, to this deal ar arguing exactly what Jeremy said, that these guys killed 3,000 of our. More than 3,000 of our people, including, including schoolgirls, including the upper echelon of our government, including the supreme leader, in the middle of negotiations after having done it previously. So we can't trust them. So we need to exact, you know, more, more, more, more pain, extract, you know, extract more pain from them. And so therefore, the entire set of negotiations are, are a mistake. So therefore, therefore, if they're doing some of this, like, flattering of Trump, it may be, like, kind of makes them look even weaker to this set back home. That is, that is standoffish when it comes strategically to the entire idea of talks. Is that some, some of what we're seeing here, that they're kind of, they have their own kind of internal incentives not to placate Trump's whims here.
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B
Yeah, definitely. And I would say also just briefly, to Jeremy's point, I remember reading once an account of an American negotiator diplomatically with Vietnam many decades after the war ended. And he said that, you know, the Vietnamese are kind of over it now and they like us and there's not really any problem. But the only thing that would always come across in negotiations that even many years after the fact, because they felt they won the war, the Vietnamese would always act as the superior party in negotiations with the US and the. And that would come across very strongly in private conversations. And that was like an indelible legacy of the war. I think that the Iranian view is the same. They felt that they always were afraid. The worst nightmare strategically, was a joint US Israeli attack on Iran. And there were questions. I remember speaking to Iran government officials before. They were questioning if they would survive such an attack. They not only survived it, they were able to maintain their own missile capacity and continue brutality until the end. They really, in their view, overcame their worst fear. So there's not really much that the US can threaten with anymore. And the threats that Lindsey Graham and Trump are making, very ostentatious, very disgusting in many ways, but they ring a little bit hollow at this point. If you run 21,000 air sorties and you can't subdue Iran, anything you say at that point is really just going to be treated with the utmost derision. So that's one aspect of it. But also, yes, Ryan, what you're saying is absolutely true, because inside Iran, although it's not by any means not a free democracy, there is a degree of public dissent and debate which is permitted and is very, very vibrant within a certain band. And the view of what's currently going on is very critical. Many people in Iran, even though the terms are seemingly very favorable, there's a very low amount of trust, as you can imagine, towards the United States after the killings of the Supreme Leader and all these civilians, and also the betrayals of several previous rounds of diplomatic negotiations, the violation of the nuclear deal in 2018, the attacks in 2025 and then again this year, including the killings of negotiators. There's a very significant contingent of people who don't want to make any deal with the United States. They want to continue the conflict, continue the shutdown, the strait, to send a message and completely destroy the Trump presidency and destroy the global economy to ensure that nobody ever tries to embark on such an attack against Iran again. They don't believe that Trump will stick to any deal. So the only way that they could stick, establish deterrence, is maximizing the pain towards Trump and the US More broadly. That faction does not seem to have the upper hand right now, as you can tell by the fact that negotiations are still going on. But that is a very predominant strain inside Iran. And I will say, even before the Trump presidency and maximum pressure and the killing of Qassem Soleimani and everything else we talked about in the last few years, even before that, there was great reticence and hostility inside Iran among certain factions of the government to engage with the United States, to engage in public photo ops. Even when the GCPOA was signed, Rouhani, President Rouhani did not go to the White House and shake hands with Obama or anything like that. There's a standoffishness and distrust which goes back to the 1979 revolution and US arming Saddam Hussein and many, many other things we can go over. They do not view this as it would be injurious to their own justifying ideology and their view of history vis a vis the US to engage in this sort of behavior. But you know, the funny thing is that in this case, and unlike the jcpoa, because of the fact that Qatar and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and Egypt and all these other countries are somehow in the mix of the negotiation to various degrees of intensity, a lot of the fluffing and the praising of Trump has kind of been outsourced to third parties. So, of course, Galabov and Moshtab Al Khamenei and Akina sort of praising Trump and saying all these things. But some of that in the process is being done by Shabazz Sharif, such that Trump can maybe feel that he's getting this affirmation. And Vance and others have talked about the reason that this deal is different or why it's better in their argument is that the regional countries are all on board with it. And that was not the case with the Obama deal. And I do think, in a way, it's making it easy for the Trump administration because they do not have the stamina or sophistication or commitment, I think, to actually engage in serious diplomacy with Iran of the type that will be necessary to make lasting agreements on any of these issues. But what the Qataris and Pakistanis are doing now is that they're effectively seems like putting a lot of the deal together, telling Trump that it's good, telling the administration it's good, helping create a force multiplier and selling it to the public globally. And they're making it as easy as possible for Trump to agree to these terms, which really are not very favorable to the United States at all. They're much more in line with Iran's demands, but there's less of the regional opposition that there was in 2015 and afterwards the JCPOA. So I think those are all very relevant factors. And I still think that it still remains to be seen whether the US Will actually adhere to any of the terms that they're agreeing to I'm sure that they would only do so through the utmost gritted teeth. These are very painful concessions. And if you talk about, if you look at the actual terms of the MOU and what's being discussed in the press and you compare it to what Trump was saying in February 28 and thereafter, these threats to destroy Iran, demanding unconditional surrender, demanding to select Iranian leadership, there cannot be more of a disjuncture between those two realities. And I think that the only thing we can count on, and maybe it's depressing, but is the fact that Trump's base doesn't really care and the American public is so against the war that they were really supportive of any ending to it. I think that Trump himself is going to bank on that. And while it may not be very complimentary of American diplomacy or the state of American politics, it certainly would allow him to end the war in a much easier way. He won't have to justify the distinction. But what he's saying in February 28th is actually happening right now because they are not really reconcilable in any way.
- [37:17]
A
Jeremy on the question of Lebanon, real quickly, Naftali Bennett, who's a former prime minister of Israel, served for about a year and a half and I think in the early 2000s about five years ago, and is a front runner to replace Netanyahu if there is an election, if and if Netanyahu loses. He posted just recently this he says, I spoke until 2am with soldiers and commanders who are currently in Lebanon or left in the last day. And here are the facts from the field. The soldiers see with their own eyes Hezbollah terrorists re establishing themselves, repairing infrastructure, arming up and returning to activity and our soldiers are forbidden from opening fire on them. 2. They see terrorists observing IDF soldiers with binoculars and they're not allowed to shoot. 3. Decisions that once that were once closed closed with a field company commander's call now require a general's approval. Approval because of this red tape. Even when they see a terrorist running from place to place with a shoulder fired missile, they don't take him out because by the time approval arrives, he's already vanished. The enemy understands the limitations and exploits them for rapid re establishment that will lead to harm to the lives of our soldiers. 5. Air Force planes have completely stopped operating. 6. There were incidents with wounded and that required extraction with the activation of a massive fire fire envelope. They didn't activate mats of fire during the extraction and that led to harm to our soldiers, he's saying. And then he finishes by Saying, you know, release the hands of our. Of our soldiers. You were saying that the. There already has been another Israeli attack in southern Lebanon, which may, you know, be a result of some of this pressure that Netanyahu feels from his.
- [39:02]
B
From.
- [39:03]
A
From his opposition. But what do you make of this level of restraint that is being forced on the Israelis in southern Lebanon?
- [39:12]
C
I mean, first, just to directly address what Bennett is saying, because this is a common Israeli framing of this issue that just happens to be now articulated by a very prominent political figure who seeks the office of the prime ministership in Israel. Israel is occupying southern Lebanon. And what he's describing is Lebanese resistance forces having the audacity to monitor with binoculars foreign forces that are occupying their territory that have forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese, that have killed more than 4,000 Lebanese people since March 2, when Hezbollah entered the war. He's describing. He's basically crying about the fact that the local people have the audacity to resist a foreign occupation that has an explicitly open, genocidal tone to the way that it's articulated in terms of its. Of its mission. So, you know, when an Israeli soldier is killed inside of the territory of Lebanon, this is not Hezbollah launching a terrorist attack. This is that you illegally invaded another country's territory and indigenous forces from that country that have a right to resist, you have happened to kill your occupation soldiers. That part of the narrative is almost never just explicitly spelled out. And the Israelis never acknowledge that. They pretend as though it's like Hezbollah pillaging an Israeli village, when in fact, it's Hezbollah fighting against foreign forces that are occupying and are trying to push even deeper into Lebanese territory.
- [40:55]
B
What.
- [40:56]
C
What I think is also clear is that Israel thought that it was going to have a much easier time maintaining or sustaining that occupation, that Hezbollah was, in the eyes of the Israelis, in a much more devastated posture and position than it was in. You know, Murtaza and our colleague Sarmada have been doing a lot of videos examining the technology of the military tactics and equipment that is being deployed by Hezbollah. And a lot of it is innovative and relatively cheap and devastatingly effective against Israeli soldiers. You know, Hezbollah is not killing, like, 50 Israeli soldiers at a time. What they're doing is they're slowly picking off one troop, two troops, four troops, five troops. And this is causing massive panic within the ranks of the Israeli forces that are in southern Lebanon. It's terrifying for them. But at the end of the day, this was Israel's decision. So whether it's Bennett or Netanyahu crying about Hezbollah Killing Israelis. Who are the Israelis we're talking about? We're talking about soldiers. And so what is, what's happening is that in the context of the election, Netanyahu has to navigate these waters. Is he going to be, you know, the prime Minister that stands up to Trump and says we're continuing the war at all costs, including the friendship with America? I don't think so. I think that to a degree, Netanyahu is being forced to play along with this largely against his will. But I use the phrase play along because the Israelis always define ceasefires as they have the ability to continue firing even if the other side ceases firing and that Israel can always claim self defense. What's interesting recently is that J.D. vance, when he talked about Israel's right to self defense, he said, and other nations in the region also have a right to self defense. JD Vance also mentioned Lebanese territorial integrity that also is cited directly in the opening terms of the MoU signed between the United States and Iran. The Iranians are saying that territorial integrity means you don't have any foreign forces occupying the territory. So what I think is going to happen, or what I think is likely to happen if Netanyahu doesn't continue large scale attacks in Lebanon is that they're going to try to have some alternative negotiation track that directly involves Hezbollah because the Lebanese government does not control Hezbollah and that they're going to, the US Is going to try to restrain Netanyahu in the short term from, from firing or expanding the occupation. And then they're going to try to experiment with can we get Hezbollah to agree that the Lebanese army can move into some areas of Lebanon as part of a broader deal, that's a big wild card on whether or not Hezbollah would allow that. Because the way that Joseph Aoun, the leader, the official leader of Lebanon has been proceeding in these negotiations with the United States and Israel is viewed as borderline treasonous by many supporters of Hezbollah who feel that he is essentially participating in an Israeli led plan to convert the Lebanese army into an extension of American and Israeli policy in Lebanon aimed at destroying, disarming, dismantling Hezbollah. So you know, it's, this is going to be, I think, a really complicated aspect to this history is a very good indicator though of future Israeli behavior. And I think that whatever happens always runs the risk every single day or night of the Israelis doing something extreme. And then the Iranians have to make a decision of whether or not they're going to step in and be the enforcer of, of the agreement. And there is this cell that they claim that has been established that has to do with, you know, making sure that a ceasefire holds in Lebanon. To date, my understanding is that the Israelis are not directly participating in that, which cuts both ways. In a way, it makes the United States. If that's true that the Israelis are not directly participating, it means that the United States is directly on the hook as the guarantor of Israeli behavior. There's a way in which that benefits the Iranians because they can say, you are the party responsible for restraining Israel.
- [45:21]
A
And Maz, you continued to have this Syrian president, Al Shara, be kind of roped into these conversations about what's going to happen with Lebanon. He. He recently said, look, sure, we could continue doing war if we want to, but the. But Syria, for a long time has been a pressure on Lebanese political culture and society that shouldn't be there anymore. So maybe we can actually get to a place where we try economic cooperation rather than. Rather than, you know, military confrontation. What, what is the how. How is the how is that and the role of kind of Turkey in this entire situation influencing, you know, Lebanese thinking as it relates to whether or not they're going to just endlessly go through this cycle of conflict?
- [46:16]
B
Well, you know, it's funny. I saw Trump a couple times said that Syria was going to attack Lebanon on behalf of Israel or, you know, fight Hezbollah in lieu of Israel, even suggesting that Syria would inflict less civilian casualties than the Israelis do in such a war. I thought it didn't make a lot of sense, his statement, and it reminded me of in the early stages of the Iran war, Trump sort of volunteered the Iraqi Kurds to attack Iran. He, without consulting them, seemingly said that they were going to be leading the ground offensive against the Iranian government and in real time, was seemingly bargaining in public to try to put that into effect. Of course, it didn't come to pass, and it wasn't even plan at all.
- [46:55]
A
They even leaked a leak to Barack Ravida that was happening.
- [46:59]
B
Yeah, it was incredible. Barack Ravida, the Axis reporter, actually posted that the offensive had started at some point a couple of days after the war, and clearly there was no offensive at all. All. So I think this is very similar. He's trying to volunteer somebody else to take part in a military operation he wants to happen or he thinks would be advantageous. It doesn't seem like that is going to come to pass. And there was actually an interview that Shara did a few days ago where he, you know, said some things about Hezbollah which are relatively conciliatory There's a lot of bad blood in Syria over the civil war and the perception that Hezbollah and Iran were on the side of the the previous government. And that really diminished the popularity that Hezbollah enjoyed inside Syria for many years before that. It was extremely popular, especially after the 2006 war with Israel. That's not really the case anymore, for the most part. But at the same time, I don't think there's really anybody in Syria within the government or the ordinary people who wants to fight a war against Hezbollah today, invade Lebanon, and least of all fight a war on behalf of Israel, basically the mercenary force for the Israelis. And in his comments, Shara seemed to rule that out entirely. But also at the same time, you see this from Israeli officials and the actions of the Israeli government. At the same time, they're at war with Lebanon, they're at war with Iran, they're at war with many, many other countries around the region. They're also at war with Syria. They're occupying southern Syria. They bombed the Syrian Defense Ministry and Israel. Katz and Netanyahu and other officials routinely talk about Syria, Syria potentially being next. They put it very much on their list of enemies. And they don't create differentiation or even try to be Machiavellian or intelligent in any way by trying to exploit divisions of their adversaries. They just say that, yeah, our enemies are Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and so forth. And that really speaks to the fact that it really is a threat to the current Syrian government, and they really have no incentive to align with Israel or anything like that, because they're actually very much under threat. And I think that the plan for this Iran war was afterwards to begin a confrontation with Turkey and the governments in the region, which are perceived as being aligned with Turkey. And that's how my own speculation has been said by Israeli officials on a routine basis, they're saying it. Even today, with the failure of the Iran war, they're still emphasizing that point. And the main theater, the initial theater for that conflict was going to be Syria. It was going to be to depose the Syrian government, which is seen as close to Erdogan, to support secessionist movements inside Syria, especially the Druze, secessionist groups in southern Syria and so forth. So, you know, we put all those things together. There's really not any incentive for any other regional leader, including Shara, to align with Israel, because all you'd be doing is taking out a country or a group, Hezbollah, at this point, which de facto is acting under defense of the Syrian government just by Tying up Israel and clearing the decks for them to attack you and move forward with the plan that they've already party stated is coming into play. So I think for all those reasons, Trump's kind of volunteering of Syria to be next to help fight the war against Hezbollah didn't really have much basis in reality and they denied it now and it just wouldn't make any sense realistically. And I'll add one more thing. The Syrian government is extremely weak. It has very low control of its own territory in many parts, a lot of securities outsourced to militias which are loosely aligned with the government. They're trying to institutionalize it and so forth with the help of Qatar, Turkey and so forth. But that's really a very long term process. Hezbollah, despite being hit very hard by Israel over the last couple of years, is still a very effective fighting force. And they were able to keep Israel in check in southern Lebanon, despite thousands of aerial attacks, the pager attack, assassinations and so forth. They're very robust. There's not really anybody in Lebanon who can fight them. And the idea the Syrian government could fight them with all the deficiencies it has and so forth, it also puts this plan, plan very much out of the realm of reality, in my opinion. So I think that something like that is not going to happen. But let's speak to the desperation Trump maybe feel at this moment, because he doesn't really have any plan for ending the conflict in a way which gives him a clear victory not just in Iran, but in Lebanon as well.
- [51:06]
A
And Jeremy, before we let you go, I wanted to ask you real quickly about the ongoing talks between Hamas and Israel and the US when it comes to moving through these, this multi phase agreement. Is there any interaction with the Lake Lucerne talks and what is the latest on the back and forth between the Board of Peace and Hamas?
- [51:34]
C
You know, Hamas in its public positioning toward Iran during this war, has been very, very supportive of, of Iran. That's the tone that they've set. You also have had high level talks between the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Arachi, and the political leader of hamas in Gaza, Dr. Khalil Al Haya. And it was announced as similar to a kind of head of state or senior leader exchange between the two of them. And there's been a very sort of robust debate that's occurred in the broader, you know, pro Iran community about why Iran seemingly didn't center an end to the war in Gaza in the same way that it did on Lebanon. And you know, I think that there, there are Some, there's some legitimacy to that line of inquiry. And, and, and it's, you know, it's important though, to understand that Hezbollah directly entered this war on March 2nd alongside Iran. And the Iranians very much view it as Hezbollah and Iran were combatants on one side of this and the United States and Israel were combatants on the other side of this. But Iranian officials have, have said to me and others that they have never lost sight of Gaza and that what may appear to be sort of not prioritizing Gaza is more strategy that the Iranians feel like if they defend the Lebanese front, if they strengthen and consolidate the victories that they've won in this war against the United States and Israel, and that it's going to ultimately aid the cause of Palestinian liberation in the, in the long term. In recent days, though, especially over the past 24 hours, there have been some suggestion from Iranian sources indicating that the Iranians may raise Gaza again in a more formal capacity in the context of these negotiations with the United States. But in parallel to this, you have had the Palestinians relegated to this bureaucratic swamp by Trump's so called Board of Peace, where essentially, and we've reported on this at a drop site, the Palestinians are being told that if they don't surrender their liberation cause by agreeing to a total disarmament of all Palestinian resistance factions, that the Israelis can't be prevented from resuming the full scale genocide. And so there is a, there is this process playing out and we have a scoop that we're going to be publishing later on today where we've obtained internal documents from the most recent round of negotiations between Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions and the so called Board of Peace that really show in detail how Trump's Board of Peace has been adopting the Israeli agenda and is trying to force the Palestinians into a surrender that the Israelis couldn't achieve through two and a half years of a genocidal war against the Palestinians of Gaza. You know, there's, there's almost no reporting that's happening right now on Gaza. The world's attention has shifted away, the region's attention has shifted away. And yet Palestine really does remain at the center of these wars in the region because it is an open occupation of Palestinian territory and ultimately the Palestinian state by this genocidal army that is now expanding its wars across the region. So I would urge people, our colleague Jawa Ahmad and I have really been reporting a lot on this. We have this story that's going to be coming up that, that really opens a window into how kind of Nefarious this process has been and the ways in which they're trying to use bureaucratic trickery essentially to try to compel the Palestinians to surrender and disarm lest they not get food or medicine or the withdrawal of any Israeli occupation forces.
- [55:35]
A
And that story will be out later today probably. Is that right? Y And so it occurs to me there, there are many thousands of people who watch this live stream. Some of them may not be signed up for the newsletter. So just go to dropsidenews.com and like, it'll, it'll prompt you sign up. It's free. Everything's free. Sign up. Get that story. Jeremy, we can let you go. You can go work on that piece.
- [55:57]
C
You got to close the story.
- [55:58]
A
Yeah. So I bet you can actually fulfill your promise that will be out later today. Thank you.
- [56:04]
C
Thank you to everybody for your continued support of, of drop site and Maz Ryan, talk to you.
- [56:08]
A
Yep, you got it. Quick, quick second. Let's talk about some of these, these primaries. We'll make it shorter than I, than I wanted to because I misread when my train is going to New York. So I gotta run and get down to that train station. Are you in Claire Valdez's district or, or Nydia Velasquez is the current representative. She's, she's retiring. Antonio Reynoso and Claire Valdez are running to, to replace her as well as well as an also ran candidate named Julie Wan.
- [56:42]
B
Yeah, I don't think I am actually. No. Which district are there? Let me check it.
- [56:46]
A
New York 7. So the, the key, the key races are New York 7, which is Velaz. Velasquez is stepping down. Velazquez decades ago kind of toppled the Brooklyn machine, but has become herself, you know, in kind of ensconced member of the establishment there, but was an early supporter of, of Mamdani at his victory speech. She was the only member of Congress that spoke at, at that victory speech because he wasn't really expected to win. I remember seeing her there and be like, wow, look, she's really went out on a limb here. And so she begged basically and, and cajoled Mamdani to get behind Antonio Reynoso, the Brooklyn borough president and the one that she wanted to name as the kind of heir apparent to her seat. And there was some back and forth and he declined and he backed a DSA backed candidate who also has the support of the UAW and Bernie Sanders. Clara Valdez, who was a kind of administrative assistant at Columbia University, she got politicized by, by being kind of the lead negotiator for the contract talks. And it was, I believe it's a UAW affiliate that, that represents the workers, the workers up at Columbia. So she's. People expect that she will win. The weather. How is the weather up there? Because I understand that, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's bad here. Like it, the weather could play, could play a role. Are you, I, I see your background. You're back at home. Is it, is it, is it getting dangerous out there?
- [58:25]
B
Pretty dangerous, but definitely it's rainy. It's. You can see that people outlast and so forth. So there's something like that which could, if it's a razor thin margin or could affect turnout, that certainly could be something which comes into play. Certainly people are not rushing out at the moment. But, you know, it's interesting because I was out of town for most of the campaign. I wasn't in the US but there's a lot of energy over it. You can see in the streets that people are kind of excited about the election and much more so than you would in, like a congressional race like this in most years. I think that the energy is different. There's a feeling that there's a momentum for certain types of candidates. And Mamdani has become like a kingmaker in some ways in New York, which is quite remarkable given that, as you said, he wasn't even expected to win the mayoral election not that long ago. So I think that's all coming into play now. So I think that we have to see if there have been many surprising results recently in domestic politics or local politics, you can say, in New York. So I wouldn't be surprised seeing more momentum on the. Signed this one.
- [59:30]
A
Yeah. So. And then Brad Lander, who is a. Was his mom Donnie's ally. He also ran for mayor, but because of the ranked choice system, they, they were kind of like this buddy pair. And Lander was also kind of. Was his biggest champion. Showed up at his, at his victory speech. He hoped to get a position in the, in the administration. Momdani snubbed him and kind of encouraged him to run In New York 10 against Dan Goldman, this incumbent Democrat, who, Who won, I GUESS it was 2022 because there was a split field. He's one of the heirs to the Levi Strauss fortune. Interestingly, the mayor of San Francisco is also an heir to the Levi Strauss fortune. Why Levi Strauss fortune is bequeathing us with so many politicians, we don't, we don't Completely understand he is one of the most unapologetic supporters of Israel. And I think if in any other circumstance, he probably comfortably represents that seat for the rest of his life, if he wants to. But he actively picked fights with campus protesters, for instance, went out of his way to be to the right of even the kind of middle of the road, you know, get Democratic support for the genocide, and invited a real challenge from Brad Lander, who describes himself as a liberal Zionist but willing to criticize Israel and supportive of Mamdani. Goldman, as far as I know, has never, never, never even voted, never voted for Mamdani in the general election either. So he's on the wrong side of a very popular mayor.
- [61:09]
B
And then I was gonna say it's very funny because, you know, Mandani, there was so much reticence to him, his candidacy, and obvious discomfort when he actually won too. That hasn't seemed to stop him at all. And it's not stopped his ability to be influential in other races like this. And the irony is that Mamdani very much campaigned on working class issues in New York and he's actually become a very beloved mayor. The cultural aspect of it, he's very charismatic and so forth, but also practical level, you see the improvement of services and so forth. It's quite perceptible in the city. He's doing sewer socialism, I think it's called fixing the potholes and getting the snow shoveled and all that stuff. It's very noticeable. And you wonder what was going on all the other years. This couldn't have been done. But that's coming into play right now. And he didn't actually make Israel, in my opinion, the center of his campaign per se, but it's such an important part of New York politics and it was constantly brought up to him. I remember during the debate there was a famous moment when they said, which country are you going to go to? And everyone was, you know, competing to say how many times they go to Israel. And he just said he'd stay in New York. That really shook people up and it kind of made Israel part of the discussion regardless, even if he wasn't choosing to do so, he was kind of putting something which is kind of different out there, which did resonate with public opinion on the subject very much so. You know, Dan Goldman, I think this Israel position in New York, which was really a stronghold of pro Israel groups for a long time, has kind of become a. An albatross now. And you see Lander and other people who are able to exploit it and it's not even like you said, Lander is not even like a radical, you know, Red triangle type person at all. He's like a cognitive liberal Zion. He's probably like a J Street type person. And yet even that is so intolerable and seen as such a, you know, radical departure from the normal politics on the subject. But I do think it shows how out of touch the pro Israel people are now. The more people supporting the genocide and so forth, they do not have the wind behind them politically in public opinion, not just in New York, but seemingly throughout the country. And I think that one thing that Mamdani has done and Lander has done as well too, is that they've galvanized a lot of people don't normally vote younger people who are interested in politics now and so forth. And this is an issue which really animates them. The genocide and apartheid in Israel, Palestine and so forth. So by making it a central part of municipal politics, they've ironically actually disadvantaged themselves, whereas in a previous generation maybe that was something that they gained political capital from.
- [63:43]
A
Yeah, and the only real noticeable difference between Claire Valdez and Antonio Reynosa, for instance, is that Reynosa wasn't actively bad when it came to Israel, Palestine, but he just avoided it. He took a very long time to call for a ceasefire and he wouldn't call out the genocide until he launched his campaign for Congress. And that became a proxy for people to say, well then you're not fighting for me on all these other issues. Even though if you look at their, the rest of their issues, Valdez and Reynoso pretty much agree on most, most things. It's an extremely blue Democratic district. But when people are like, well, who's going to fight for it? You know, who's the one who's willing to take risks? Valdez comes out on top of that. You're seeing that very heavily though in the uptown race, which is New York 13, which is this guy, Adriano Espat, who is the actually chairman of the Hispanic Caucus, represents Harlem and kind of surrounding areas there. I think he's about a 10 term office holder. He primaried Charlie Rangel multiple times and so he can't really complain about people primarying him. And he's supported primary challengers of other of other incumbents. But he has the explicit support of millions of millions of dollars from Apex super pac which they're funneling through a kind of Hispanic PAC that masked it for a while, but the money's public at this point and he's he's running against Dario Dariel Issa Avila Chava Chevalier, who's challenging him. And it has become this extraordinarily racist kind of old school New York ethnic campaign. You know, if you think back to like the 19th century where you'd have, you know, if an Irishman tried to run an Italian area, they would be just savaged just, just for the fact that they are Irish. And so even though she is Dominican, because of her last name sounding Haitian, they're calling her a Haitian Muslim. Like, they're like, they're like, it's, it's become this like ruthless, like over the top racist campaign to the point where mom Donnie recently was like, when did, when did Haitian become a slur? Like what, like what, what is going on? Like, she's not. But that's not in today's New York. We should not be using that as a slur. Reminded like when 1856, the Republican candidate was this guy Fremont they all accused of being Catholic. And he's like, I'm not Catholic. But it's like, so what if you are like. And so the, the forecasts are that it's going that it may have done enough damage and that she may come up short as a result of these millions of dollars spending and this, this racist kind of very ethnic, tribal kind of campaign against her.
- [66:30]
B
Yeah, I saw that. They're accusing her of doing like a great replacement of Haitians of Dominicans in New York in her district. I live in a very Haitian area, actually. It's kind of funny because that's, you know, these divisions, like, I don't think they're that pronounced in an interpersonal level, but they certainly come out in the political campaigns and people try to exploit them and there is something like spot lines and so forth, which can be exploited very cynically. But, you know, it'd be unfortunate if that happened in New York. But again, these kind of very specific hyper local divisions are very unique to, I think New York. People in the rest of the country may not expect them or understand them for the most part. But yeah, they are there and it'd be unfortunate if it came to pass. But so, you know, wouldn't be surprising completely.
- [67:10]
A
She. She also, in her kind of more ultra online period of her life, had a lot of. And which wasn't that long ago has she said f. Kamala Harris at one point in a tweet. And that has become a mailer that has been sent out to like everybody in the district. And it's the kind of thing that Resonates more with people, a certain subset of people online. But when it's brought out into the real world, when you have kind of older voters in Harlem who don't have that level of hostility towards Kamala Harris, for instance, I think that's gonna, that's gonna end up hurting her as well. I really wanted to touch on a very overlooked race down in Southern Maryland, which is also, since we have such a, such a global audience, people will find it interesting that the top three candidates, or at least three of the four top candidates, one is from Ghana, one is from Nigeria, one is from Uganda, which is kind of, kind of fascinating. The, the guy from Ghana was that he was born in Virginia, grew up in Prince George's County. He worked for Steny Hoyer, who is the maybe the most outspoken Democrat in support of, of Israel. Every two years he would organize Apex trip to Israel. I don't know if people know Apex nonprofit every other year funds all of the freshmen who get elected to go on a junket to Israel. And if, and you're under enormous pressure to go on it. If you do not go on that junket, you are marked as kind of an enemy of apac and they're going to organize against you. J Street started doing its own trip to try to give people who didn't want to take the APAC trip an option to take that. And if people took the J Street trip, APAC would then, you know, try to try to take them out going forward. But Steny Hoyer is the one who's been, has been leading that consistently. This guy Adrian Boafo, who his opponents are calling apac. Adrian then went and became an Oracle lobbyist. So he literally lobbies four data centers and for AI, for Oracle, which is founded by Larry Ellison, the number one donor to the idf, the Friends of the idf. So it's like a Howard Zinn level comical attempt to get a former Hoyer aide who is literally working for Larry Ellison into Congress. And AIPAC and crypto interests have spent $12 million in this very small media market so far to try to get him elected. Amazingly, they might lose. There's a last minute consolidation around the Ugandan immigrant Quince Quincy Barib, who was former kind of auditor and then became a home health care worker, home healthcare CEO. And so with her own money was able to spend maybe half as much as AIPAC and crypto were able to spend. So she's gotten some name recognition. Rasher and Baker was pretty well well known local official is, you know, is seriously in the race as well as this woman Walla Blay, she's the Nigerian. So because it, because there are 24 candidates running, like a small number of votes is going to be needed to get over the top. But it will be amazing if APAC and crypto burn through $12 million and fail to win this seat in Steny Hoyer's district like their lead champions district. That would be something of a watershed moment even though all the attention will be on New York City if, if they fall short there. It goes to your point that it's not just this is not a New York phenomenon only. This is a rural and suburban area of, of Southern Maryland, kind of like D.C. suburbs and, and south. And if APAC can't resonate there with 12 million bucks, they're, they're in, they're in deep trouble.
- [71:06]
B
Yeah. I wonder, I'm curious your take about this and maybe we should wrap it up relatively soon. But it's kind of interesting that it seems like the Israel issue is kind of becoming a signifier of authenticity or lack thereof. Whereas the people, the candidates who are pro Israel, they sound like they're acting on behalf of the establishment or oligarchs and so forth. It's just the way even if they believe it actually they just kind of sound like that. Whereas people are willing to criticize Israel, be critical of the genocide and so forth, they speak to the authenticity which voters seem to attract more. I don't know if that's the case in this race but it's kind of amazing. You were laying out the financial resources going into it. They able to overcome that. That's very indicative that maybe money is not able to buy everything anymore. And there's something about this issues particularly radioactive.
- [71:49]
A
Yeah. Drop to that point drop site and zo in the in Michigan we we chipped in together to fund a survey and one of the questions we asked was basically is supportive APAC a proxy for you for whether or not you can trust a candidate to fight for you on other issues. And overwhelmingly even moderates answered yes it is. And so that helps explain why for people who don't list kind of Israel, Palestine as say Even a top 10 issue because you know, healthcare, wages, you know, cost of groceries, cost of gas like housing, interest rates like people have immediate, you know, material interest that, that they rank, that they tell polters are more important. And so then that has allowed a lot of politicians to say well they don't really care about this issue of Israel. And no what it turns out they don't think you're going to fight for them on any of these other issues that they do care about if you're willing to sell out on this one. So I think we are in that era where people are going to even start cynically attacking Israel just to pretend that they're going to fight for you on other things. We're approaching that level, I think, of, of flipping of the issue. Amazing. All right, so I guess I got to run to this train station. I'll maz if you can stop by the cla Valdez thing. I think it's pretty close to your
- [73:12]
B
neighborhood being send me a note. I will.
- [73:16]
A
So thank you everybody for, for watching. And if you're up in New York, hopefully I'll, I'll see you out in the streets. Stay, stay dry out there. Don't forget to don't forget to do your civic duty and get out there and vote if you haven't all already. And thank you to everybody who makes this work possible. If you haven't subscribed yet, if you haven't become a donor, you can do that over@dropsitenews.com on behalf of all of my colleagues here at Dropsite, thank you for watching and we will see you soon.