A (4:02)

You know what, One of the reasons why I really was looking forward to speaking to you is because on the one hand you have officials from the Iranian government who are able to do media appearances. We were able to interview University of Tehran professor, but there's been a real dearth of voices of ordinary people, regardless of what their profession is, that have had a platform to share their perspective. And given that you've been in Iran, in Tehran over these weeks, I was hoping you could just kind of start by describing what it's been like, what you witnessed, your observations, what you think. So honestly I think the people watching this would just love to hear your insights, your reflections, your observations as you've been there these weeks.

B (5:03)

As you introduced me, I, I do work as a documentary photographer, but the Times didn't allow me to, to carry camera around and photograph the events. I, I was just a, an observer of things happening around me in the Iranian, within the Iranian context. And so that's my. Without having any privileged access to the events which you do have as a journalist, usually my impressions are quite limited and thus my conclusions might be also limited. Yet what I do notice from the outside, all the different fractions with Iran are trying to hijack the happenings for their political means, be it as you mentioned, Trump and the who is who of hawkish US politicians, Israeli politicians, be it the monarch, Iranian monarchists, be the liberal opposition, be it leftists who romanticize the happenings, but the very people who have been on the street and who have not been agitators of another power, but who have just been tired of the multiple issues and multiple crises Iran has been facing over the past years, they do not have a voice at the moment to express themselves because of the blackouts. And at the same time would they have a voice, all these fractions would just jump on them to hijack their narratives to their own ends. What I have seen, as I have written in my recent dispatch, had been quite peaceful demonstrations starting around Tehran's commercial hub, Tehran's Bazaar, addressing the rapid devaluation of the Iranian currency Riyal against US dollars. And they are import related markets who had an issue erring with pricing and hence with the lack of stability. They were protesting the situation, but then in different small to medium sized towns of less than 50,000 people, very radical demonstrations and protests, possibly you would term them, as RIOS started. And I Named a few of them in my dispatch that I had to look up in the map first, even as somebody was has been monitoring Iran for quite a few years. And that felt weird that you have synchronous happenings in small areas disconnected from each other or which should be rather disconnected from each other, but all going very brutal, very quickly attacking police stations, municipalities. And thus from a governance perspective, which I this is not, I'm not endorsing it. I'm just observing what I've seen or what I've read, responsing brutal responses. So if you, it's just, you know, if you attack a police station in the United States or in Germany and in liberal Europe, you do enforce some radical, some brutal response from a governance perspective. And given Iran's rather brutal report with facing these protests in the first days, as we do see on visuals which have been publicized, things. Were going rather soft. So I'm speaking from a totalitarian perspective. It was a very soft way of, of repression that could be seen on the streets. You have, there were visuals of water cannons which stopped throwing water on people once people walked in front of them. Or there is from the very first days in Tehran Bazaar this picture analogy to the Tiananmen, a visual that the tank man, there is this one single protester crouching in front of anti Rio forces on motorcycles. And these visuals would not have been possible in former protests in Iran because. The response would have been much more brutal from the start. And my impression was that there is a sympathy in the cause of the protests within the oppressive structure of the government. So you had the devaluation of real, you had the loss of purchasing power. And all these employees of the government also face the same crisis so that their wages, their salaries have been devalued all of a sudden like within a month by 30%. And thus there is a sympathy. Whereas in there had been sympathy. Whereas in other rios like the woman life freedom. There was an ideological issue in between the sides on the street. And you could see it by the body language of the operation forces on the streets that was much more relaxed. I noticed them a day or two after the initial protests when I had to go to Tehran's bazaar area. There were masses of them deployed there, but they were approachable, something that would not be possible during previous protest rounds in Iran.

A (12:58)

Go ahead, you can continue with what you were going to say.

B (13:01)

Well, but then that would be a different part. Things turned radical and very brutal once there was this invitation to protest published by, by the monarchists around the the Former prince of Iran.

A (13:22)

You, of course, just, just to give people context there, Kaveh. Just to give people context, you know, you have the, the son of the late deposed shah who has been living in exile for, or living in the United States for 47 years. And he issued calls for people to rise up to attack institutions. Even Donald Trump in the midst of this too, called on Iranians to attack institutions. And you know, by, by all measures, you know, you mentioned this earlier, the Iranian diaspora around the world, it's a very diverse political scene. There is no one identity but the idea of popular support for Pahlavi. It's just non existence. I think most honest people will just recognize this is not the sort of unifying figure that has the ability to communicate to the entire Iranian diaspora. But nonetheless, he did make these calls and Donald Trump made these calls. And it sounds like what you're saying is that, and correct me if I get anything wrong, I just want to really make sure I understand your point here. You're saying what began initially as these protests from the bazaaris and others about largely or entirely economic issues. And of course Iran is under sanctions. But also people are really, it seems disillusioned by the way that Iran has navigated by, that the state has navigated the economic impact of those sanctions. And you're indicating that you sensed an understanding or even an empathy or sympathy for the causes even among the security forces. But that, but now what you're getting into is that these calls are made from the monarchists also. Donald Trump made those calls and you, you, you then started to see, you're describing attacks on police stations or acts of violence coming in smaller or mid sized cities. And so take us now from that point to the next phase of this.

B (15:27)

Thank you for the clarification that was indeed needed. I'm very much within the context, but the audience might need that. Just to clarify, I have not been to those small towns, so my access to the information is very similar to yours, to what has happened them there. But the way I have seen things in Tehran go on and the conversations I've had with, with friends and acquaintances and other contacts, it did not feel organic like the first. There was a clear cause with the market related protests in Tehran. But then very quickly a phalanx of media accounts of personalities abroad started to disseminate these visuals and hijack the narrative of the protests and make it to something more general, to a more general issue chronologically. That was the first step. And then very quickly these core protests in small, smaller areas started Being very brutal, but not sharing the very demands that had started in Tehran. And there was this disparity in what was happening that felt a bit awkward. Why should the protests in Tehran not happen the same way if it is that general. And it felt as if, like it felt as if, and I'm thinking loudly now, it is. It felt as if the, the means were to. Provoke reactions from the Iranian regime, as a day or two later, Trump took to true social, threatened to bomb Iran should Iran kill its population in a suppression measure. And it felt, as I said, the very demonstrations in these tiny places did not, in the satellites did not feel organic. And they were very synchronous, they were very radical. And. It's lacked, it lacked something to be natural, like, you know, a fire, like sparks to different areas. But this was not that way. It happened pandemically in different places and that was something new to observe. And once things started to happen in Tehran, all these very tiny places where they had gone to super radical, they stopped like there was no information passing about the brutalities there. Like, you know, the days which led to the invitation to the protest by, by the monarchists, those places where, where. Witnessing huge riots. And then once it started in Tehran and other major cities, they went more or less silent. Or have you seen loads of visuals coming out of there by now. Which would confirm atrocities having gone on there as well. It felt as if the themes shifted all of a sudden. And all this within the context of the foreign meddlers which we have mentioned, felt very, very weird. Like it felt as if all of this had been to some extent orchestrated. There has been valid protest. There is a reason for valid protest for people being fired. With the situation, with the nepotism, with the corruption, systemic corruption in the country, with the Kafka bureaucracy, with the inefficiency, with the way resources are not being used for the, the wealth and resources are not shared with the population. But the way these protests shifted, it didn't feel, yeah, organic. That's, that's the best wording I could find for it.

A (20:59)

I, I also, I appreciate that you are going out of your way to also delineate or separate what you witnessed from what you've heard from other people. Because, you know, so much of what is passing right now for reporting on Iran is, oh, I heard this from this person who heard this. And you know, especially now where you, you have a very limited number of people that are able to actually communicate externally from inside of, of Iran, it becomes very dangerous to draw major conclusions based on this game of telephone. So to the extent that you did witness relevant events that took place in the context of what you're speaking about, maybe you could share some of what you actually saw in this phase. Then when you're describing a kind of shift from the initial protest that had a clearly defined goal to kind of what started to happen after these acts of violence started to break out in different parts of Iran, including in Tehran itself.

B (22:07)

Well, Thursday, January 7th, almost a week ago, that's two weeks ago. By now, you know with when Internet is lost, you. You feel also when your connection is lost with the world, you lose the feeling for time. On Thursday, January 7, I had noticed the invitation to join the protests by the monarchists, but I did not expect for it to be able to produce such a momentum. And I think also the Iranian officials did not expect that. And it hit them very much by surprise. It surprised them very much that such big masses were mobilized. And what I noticed, and like I should make clear that diligence is due, that in the neighborhood where I have been, which is pretty much in central Tehran, I did not witness any killings and I did not, I witnessed very loaded situations, but I did not witness any atrocities. It was more of a very fierce fight between royal forces and people on the street. And given the blackout and lack of access to independent information for a few days, it took me three days till I noticed from different sides the scope of things, of the bloodshed, of the blood that had been lost like it was. It hit me differently then. But when things happened on. On around 9pm on January 7, I heard very loud noises from the main streets and had a look to. To notice masses of more than 2,000 people passing through very quickly and rather organized like, you know, the crowd moved very determined in a particular direction towards the city center. And by the time I reached the main street, which is 200, 250 meters away from Verain staying, this mass had passed and there were last bits of its running after the crowd. That was huge. That was huge to see that. And that was still before the Internet was caught. By 10, 10, I think it was 10 past 10pm when I went into the blackout for more than a week. And it was at the same time videos popped up on social media from different parts of Tehran, from different parts of Mashad Rasht, where huge masses had been mobilized. But by then, like it was only masses walking. What I witnessed on the street was this well organized way. The crowds of many was passing and there were very determined core groups in between them. Given my background, having covered protests in Europe for many years, it reminded me like the way they were organized and determined and also the clothing, very dark clothes, masked, disguised. It reminded me of antifa, the way they're very determined to reach political aims on the street. And like within a group of thousand people, there were maybe 20 people like that would be my guests, who were this determined and disorganized. And they were pushing the crowd and putting this in relation with what I have received, with observations of others that I have heard and I have read by now. It felt as if they were agitating the whole crowd. They were organizing the crowd, they were motorbikes, civil, plain clothes motorbike, organizing the crowd, giving it a direction. They were going to the front, checking the situation, coming back and just assessing the situation to dynamically shift the crowd towards the direction. And that's what I saw. That's what I saw. And then there were masked people again from different, which I still count within these four groups walking dispersed in different neighborhoods and changing the slogans. People were shouting like people were shouting dead to the dictator. And these people were adding very loudly, very aggressively, long live the king in relation to the prince. And you know, they were shifting the tide. And that again confirms me also afterwards when I talked with others who have witnessed things directly, that there were agitators in between them trying to hijack the legitimate cause of the people. And if I had not seen that by myself on the ground and would be speaking to you, like, would be speaking to you, it has a notion of a conspiracy theory, but it is what I have witnessed myself and it's just, you know, I do trust my eyes also, given my experience. But still the critique I have is that Iran is not allowing independent investigations into, into the cause, into the things just to make it transparent, you know.

A (29:37)

To, to this, this point. And you're, you know, you're describing being inside of Iran and, and yet you're, you only really have an awareness of what is around you or what the official media is saying because of the limited or total absence of access to the, to the Internet. But how were, or how have people been communicating with one another inside of Iran itself and sharing their experiences or, or notes right now? Because, you know, when I, when I asked Professor Fawad Azadi of the University of Tehran about the Internet shutdown, what he said is that the state, the state defense of that policy is that they're concerned about cyber attacks from Israel or the United States or other actors. And as you indicated, he also said this, it does seem like there's going to be moves toward reopening the Internet again. Maybe there's been a trickle of it as we, as we've been discussing, but many critics of the Iranian government, opponents of the Iranian government say that the Internet was shut down because they didn't want to say the world to see what had taken place and they didn't want ordinary Iranians to be able to post videos of what they saw. Obviously, you know, this is, this is going to not something that's going to be resolved anytime soon and it's, it's, it's not something I can weigh in on definitively. I just want to make sure people understand that that's what the positions are. But I wanted to ask you about how you've communicated with your friends, how other people are and how you've shared notes on what has happened given the limited information environment that you've been in.

B (31:26)

Well, just to address your point with the general issue of the Internet, I mean, sooner or later the visuals, videos, pictures of what has happened will come out and by, and then the actors responsible will be held responsible for that. I do understand the cutting of Internet. Like again, I do not endorse it. I understand it. The moment things went, went extremely brutal given what I have seen with the agitators which I mentioned that they, and it happens synchronously all over the country. So it needs, from my understanding it needs a network conducting this synchronicity and to cut those connections. I do understand that, but that would be something brief. I strongly think it is a wrong media policy. It is a very lousy media policy to cut Internet for this long and the state should invest into firewalls into, into its infrastructure instead of sabotage, sabotaging it. And coming back to, to your question. Well, it, it was very peculiar because on that evening I, on Thursday, January 7th, I, I wanted to, to visit a friend like we had prior to the demonstrations. We had discussed that I would visit them and then I tried to call them, but by 10pm and I wasn't aware that the phone lines were dead, so I couldn't. And then I went to their place, but then nothing was working so I could not go to their apartment and I came back and that was the weird thing. So everything, every way of connection, even Iranian chats, Iranian applications which allow chats were shut down very quickly. SMS was shut down. Internet not to talk from the Internet. So for, for a few hours, like until early morning hours of Friday, everything was cut. So if there would have been a Burglary, I wouldn't have been able to call the police. And then during the day things got better again. In the evening of Friday, things were caught until 1 or 2am on Saturday. So it was a cat and mouse game with connections. How can you reach someone a few days later, like maybe a week later? Until a week later you could not call. There was no way to, to call outside Iran at all. So you, if you had a travel or anything, you would have to do it blindly. But then things slowly improved. You could call an un, normal self with a normal self online. You could, you could call abroad. But there was no way to do it with the Internet. There were very, very minor peaks of Internet connection, like Internet. In contrast to the nationwide intranet, which you may want to contextualize, there was, there were very minor peaks like in January 18th, I, I managed to, to connect for, for an hour and a half or something. But until then there was only this nationwide Internet where you could, you could. Access very basic services offered by Iranian sites and Iranian news websites. And otherwise you would go analog. You would call friends, you would meet friends, acquaintances and very old school.

A (36:38)

You know, the, a big focus right now in, in the discourse around this is the issue of the number of deaths that, that took place, the number of arrests or detentions that have, have taken place. And you know, you mentioned that there are, you know, there are estimates into the thousands, certainly including from Western non governmental organizations. The Iranian government last night released some statistics of its own saying that more than 3,000 people were killed. And they, they say that roughly 2400 of those were either innocent civilians or law enforcement personnel. So they're saying the vast majority are innocent civilians or law enforcement personnel. And in their own designation, they describe it in a kind of sweeping term by saying that they were victims of this aggression and terrorism. So there's no, you know, there's no accounting for. Did the security forces or affiliated government militia do any of the killing? From Iran's position, they've stated that this is entirely the responsibility, the deaths are entirely the responsibility of agitators, rioters, elements backed by foreign governments. Of course, the Western organizations that have been doing it are also being careful not to attribute. Those that are trying to be responsible about it are not trying to do a breakdown when they don't have it. But the clear sense from the other side, or you know, from the many other sides that constitute the opponents of the Iranian government is that the vast majority of people killed were killed by Iran's security forces. What is your sense of the discourse in Iran in your circle. And again, I want to emphasize to people Kaveh is not being asked to speak for every person in Iran or, and nor is he pretending to, to know everything that happened anywhere. So when I asked this, I'm talking about one individual's experience. So in the discourse that you've had, what is people's sort of sense of, of this. That's an extraordinary number of people to be killed in such a condensed amount of time. You know, thousands of people killed in a relatively short amount of time. But do you understand what I'm saying? I want to get a sense of sort of the discussions you had. While we both recognize you're just sharing what you lived through, you're not speaking, you know, in some definitive way on the entire truth.

B (39:27)

Thanks for clarifying that. I am not the spokesperson of any side for which I'm being accused by now by all, you know, it's massive attacks coming towards me from all different fractions because I am not speaking in their favor and I'm sharing my as, as I implied my, my very limited impressions with the very limited means I have had regarding the debt that's being highly politicized by all fractions involved. And that is, you know, one debt is too many. But this collateral damage for imperialist aims, as you know, being the royalists, be it the liberal opposition and all sides, also Iranian government trying to win the narrative over the numbers, but there is no transparent data accessible yet. There have been thousands of deaths. There has been. The country has been soaked in blood, as you say, with that density of deaths within two days of killings, not deaths of killings, whoever they are, it's just a bloodshed has happened. And the problem is all these factions are trying to use all these souls who have lost their lives as collateral damage to further their causes. And Iran would do itself a favor to establish more transparency within the coming days, as soon as possible and even allow the international observers, you know, to assess those figures. You know, figures differ from, From those the Iranian government has published yesterday to those that independent human rights organizations could confirm that those five digit figures who have been used by activists abroad and to denigrate Iranian government. And we don't have transparency on what has happened underground. And this should be established as soon as possible as journalism lives from its pluralism. So we need more independent access to assess things. Thus we have a better picture. That is what I think we owe to those people who have lost their lives, whatever side they have been on.

A (43:00)

You know, Kaveh, I really appreciate you taking so much time to share your observations and your reflections. And I also really appreciate, I can sense the care that you take to and the responsibility you feel given the stakes of this, to reflect on what you saw or what you feel and to be very clear about that. And I want to give you the last word and sort of just zoom out a bit as an observer of these events and an observer of Iran for all of these years and someone who's paying attention to the bigger picture of the threats from the United States, the threats from Israel, the various factions trying to hijack this moment for their own purposes. What, what you would like to see happen going forward, what is needed right now.

B (43:53)

You know, the, the, the amount of debris on Iran is, is insane and you don't know where to start. I have mentioned it is a dysfunctional state at the moment. It sits on the world's second biggest gas reserves, yet it lacks enough gas to provide its own population. There are multiple crises regarding water scarcity, regarding energy, regarding fossil fuels. And there is systemic nepotism. There is, as I mentioned, the Kafka is bureaucracy historically designed to be, to not be population friendly, to work in the favor of the elites. And all this is going in a very wrong way. And I wish, like, I mean there are the issues coming from the abroad, the, the warmongers, the, the, the imperialists, all those who want to rise to power in Iran to have a piece of the cake, beat oil, beat energy, but they do not, they do not care for the people and the people, the situation but the people is, has become dichotomous in a way. A dialogue is not possible because you have the radical people supporting the regime. You have the radical people who want it gone. But there is no scenario for what comes after. There are no civil structures which could maintain change at the moment. And then there are all these voices from the abroad who want a piece of cake without making their own hands dirty, without wanting to commit the things. And they push for a conflict, be it an internal conflict, be it an external conflict. Whatever the script be I wrote in my dispatch, it might lead to a surreification of Iran. And I'm not alone with that notion. There are a few scholars also addressing this risk. And that definitely would not be in favor of the population. What would help is a dialogue. What would help would be to build up civil infrastructures where problems can be addressed and solved directly. And what is definitely needed is reforms regarding the nepotistic and corrupt behavior of the elite in Iran.

A (47:36)

Given that you just said that final thought then it's very clear that Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu are not finished with their quest to intensify the attacks or to enact regime change in Iran. That also seems to be a large part of the circle around Donald Trump their agenda and maybe talk about that. The fact that you have these the United States played a totally central role in in creating the conditions that now exist in Iran beginning in the removal of Mossadegh in 1953. The the support for a brutal dictatorship under the Shah created the conditions that then sparked the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The US has imposed sanctions that have overwhelmingly harmed ordinary Iranians. And even Trump's treasury secretary said recently that the whole point of the US Economic war against Iran was to spur these very kinds of actions that we have been documenting or hearing about over the past several weeks inside of Iran. So as you weigh this and you call for an Iranian dialogue or you suggest that that would be the most constructive path forward, what about the external actors in this, these major nation states that seem so intent on on continuing this multi decade trajectory of interference in Iran's affair and future?

B (49:13)

You mentioned it was the US Secretary of Treasury you mentioned. Was it?

A (49:19)

Yes.

B (49:20)

Yeah. And that was at Davos. And in Davos there was also the Canadian Prime Minister stating the end of the rule based order. And what we are seeing is that a shift in the geopolitical shift in the whole world where interests are being brutally fought for by superpowers and Iran is, has been an exuberant nation for many years being with Mossadegh, whom you mentioned still now with the foreign politics it has been conducting. It is a rather small nation in this big game and there are superpower interests pushing for controlling the exuberant and aspect that would not be something for the people. And I hope more and more people start to realize that superpowers interests do not overlapping with the general public's interests and that there is not any record where they have helped an independent nation towards a better direction. And I mean I'm not a politician. I just sincerely hope that Iranians, however fed up they are with the current situation, they realize that vultures will not shed tears for them as they have not during the recent launches.

A (51:36)

On that powerful note, I want to thank you very much Kaveh Rostamkhani, Essayist Documentary photographer for sharing your observations and your experiences over these past several weeks inside of Iran. Thank you so much for joining us.

B (51:53)

Thank you very much for having me, Jeremy.

A (51:56)

And that does it for this broadcast. I want to thank everyone who continues to support our journalism. We don't ever put anything behind a paywall. It's free to subscribe@dropsitenews.com if you do have a little bit of extra money and you want to support our work. The main way that we support and fund our journalism is through people who voluntarily pay to become subscribers@dropsitenews.com on behalf of everyone on our team, thank you so much for your support, whether it's financial or just spreading the word on social media, or even amongst your friends, your family, even your foes. Until next time, I'm Jeremy Scahill from Dropsite News. Thank you so much for being with us.