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- [00:00]
A
Jeremy I'm Jeremy Scahill from dropsitenewsdropsitenews.com it is Tuesday, May 5th. Welcome to our regular weekly livestream. There are a lot of developments happening in the US Israeli war against Iran. At the center of the news right now is the fact that Donald Trump is engaging in a significant escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. Not only does the US have this naval blockade, but now Trump launched something that he calls Project Freedom, where the United States is claiming that they're going to be escorting merchant vessels out of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is still ferociously maintaining that it has the legal authority and the tactical authority right now to continue controlling the strait. All of this is taking place against the backdrop of Donald Trump vacillating between making very extreme threats to bomb the hell out of Iran again to destroy its civilization, and then looking for an off ramp. We've done a lot of reporting on what's been happening on the diplomatic front. The foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Arachi, has been engaged in a very intense diplomatic campaign. You, of course, had the humiliation of Trump in recent days. When Arachi was in Islamabad, Pakistan, Trump claimed that J.D. vance was on an airplane going to meet him. The Iranians were saying, we have no intention of engaging in direct talks until the United States unconditionally lifts its military blockade and ensures that the ceasefire is going to be real not just in Iran, but also in Lebanon and on other fronts. There's been an exchange of messages indirectly through the Iranians and the United States, primarily through the mediator, Pakistan. Iran still maintains that the core of its conditions for negotiating an end of the war are contained in its original 10 point plan. And they say that the issue of Iran's nuclear enrichment is off the table until there are actual real technical negotiations. I'm joined now by my colleague Ryan Grim, and we go straight now to Tehran, Iran, where we're very honored to be joined by Abbas Aslani. He's senior research fellow at the center for Middle East Strategic Studies. People may also be familiar with Abbas. He regularly appears on Al Jazeera. Abbas, thank you for joining us from Tehran.
- [02:25]
B
Pleasure to be with you, Jeremy.
- [02:28]
A
Abbas, let's begin by the latest developments. The US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth this morning was directly asked if the military action on a low intensity level that we've seen in the past 24 hours in the Strait of Hormuz means that the ceasefire is over. He said that it's not, but Iran is saying that what the United States is doing with its naval blockade. And this escalation itself constitutes a violation of the ceasefire. Give us your analysis of what's happening right now in the Strait of Hormuz,
- [03:01]
B
Jeremy. You know, what is taking place in the film in the case that the United States wants to pressure Iran economically as well as militarily, and they are trying to test the will of Iran in terms of, you know, backing down from its position at the negotiating table. But in the meantime, they somehow seem not to be aiming to resume the recent conflict that, you know, we witnessed in the past couple of months or few weeks. And they have been somehow trying to reopen the Strait of Hormuz through different tools. Iran didn't yell under military campaigns, so it is not expected to see Tehran also exhibiting any sign of weakness in this regard under economic pressure or, let's say, political discussions. This indicates that the Trump administration, which is simultaneously is pursuing that diplomatic track with Iran, has not been able to create enough leverage to pressure Tehran to get the concessions they expect in relation to the Nixar program. And also now we are talking about the strain of hormones itself. And this is an implicit admission of their failure in meeting their strategic objectives in the war. So that's why they are resorting to different tools and methods. And in order to compensate, and we are seeing at different, let's say, occasions, they are trying different methods. And the timing of the recent announcement by the US in order to escort tankers, you know, all of a sudden they are now caring about the humanitarian aspect of those, you know, vessels and tankers in the region, which is, I think, difficult to buy because, you know, that was the United States, which also they targeted Iranian vessel, you know, then our backing, which was coming back from India, and they were unarmed and they were not in the military battlefield. They did it because it was fun and amazing. But now Trump saying that he's going to help, you know, vessels, this is not something which he could be somehow align with their previous actions. But this indicates that the longer this naval block here or the closure of strait goes on, the consequences also could be significant. The United States is pretending that it does not care about those consequences. But in action, what happens in the case that they want to control the situation, the shock that might be created as a result of this closure and the blockade for the global energy market impact in the US or for the allies of the United States for the region is important. And I think this has been a cliche, and they have said it several times. That's the story of who will blink first. The United States wants to pressure Iran in order to blink and to make those concessions they want, which is for Trump, it is full surrender. It is like exporting the highly enriched uranium from the country. It is halting the enrichment of uranium in Iran. And the story goes on. But that is also case that they have been trying to achieve this through different tools. They have not been able to achieve it. And the point is that if this is an attempt to find enough ramp from the situation or exit this dead end formula, this has not been working so far. And maybe this is closing the remaining windows for diplomatic resolution. And the timing is important at a time that Iran offered a proposal in order to address those, let's say, sticking points. It could be done in a two stage process. First, ending the war, reopening the striat of hormones and lifting the naval blockade and a number of certain measures. And in the second step, they could somehow move toward, you know, addressing the nuclear related issues and the sticking points and lifting of the sanctions in order to be able to clinch an agreement. The aim to separate them, to decouple them, was to make them somehow accessible because Iran saw those serious gaps on those issues and thought that maybe the immediate and urgent challenges could be decoupled in order to find a middle ground on them. This could somehow create, let's say, an atmosphere which could be somehow positive in moving towards further agreement on the remaining issues. And the trust deficit is very important in this process. Iran does not trust the United States. They were negotiating twice and specifically at a time that they were thinking that progress was being made. The country was attacked militarily along with Israel. And that's why Iran again has this reservation that maybe all these efforts are kind of, let's say, deception tactic in order to attack the country again. So in order to change this atmosphere, having an initial agreement on ending the war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the blockade could be working as a, let's say, gradual trust building measure in order to pave the way for further potential agreements. But what is taking place in the field in the case that the United States is not seeking that kind of, let's say, negotiation or resolution, at best, what they are seeking is a full surrender from Iran inside which Tehran does not accept. And this further complicates the path down the road. And this is why even talking of negotiations here in Tehran, some are saying that this is the continuation of the battle. It is not just, I mean, the guarantee that the United States will engage in serious discussions to find a middle Ground. What they want is a unilateral, let's say, victory in this game, which is going to be Iran losing and the US Winning, which is not acceptable for Iran. And that's, I think, going on. And in order to create leverage, the US Announced the recent move, or the second scenario could be that, you know, the US Is buying time. They are not after a, let's say, political agreement, and they want to somehow spend some time in order to revive their military presence and posture in the region in order to, again, weaken Iran through different tools, from naval blockade to military threats and actions. And the list goes on that this will continue for a long time. And that's why I think this has further complicated the situation. And we are seeing that the United States is, you know, announcing the recent, you know, announcement. If they, their aim is to create leverage, this is creating, you know, more and more of, let's say, distrust in Iran toward the United States. And this is not facilitating the process toward an agreement.
- [11:17]
C
And yet yesterday, Abbas, there was an explosion at the, at the Fujairah port in, in the uae. I'm curious, from, from your perspective, who was responsible for that strike? What is the kind of official statements that have been made about the Iranian leadership about that strike? And how is, how is Iranian leadership viewing the increasingly kind of rogue approach that the Emiratis are taking when it comes to the gcc, you know, having left opec, having really, like, linked themselves very tightly to Israel, making much more kind of aggressive statements about Iran than any of its, any of its neighbors or former allies. So how is Iran thinking about the Emiratis in particular?
- [12:08]
B
Well, there has been no official confirmation, at least from the Iranian side that they have been doing this. So that remains officially unclear, that what was the source of the attack. But in terms of the current, the status quo, Jeremy, it couldn't hold for long, you know, without any tensions. And it was somehow predicted from the very beginning that this cannot continue. I mean, the naval blockade for long term. And at one point in time, we could have been witnessing such kind of tensions, which for now, it seems to be somehow limited. Moves have been done in a calculated manner, but the risk of any escalation or things getting out of control is yet there. And any moment this can be possible. And the resumption of, let's say, a bigger conflict and hostility is yet, you know, foreseen. And it is possible. But in terms of what the role of Emirates, you know, they have been, you know, facilitating the US And Israeli aggression against the country for the Past years they have been working with Israelis and logistically they also help the US and Israel in this aggression against Iran. And even after the ceasefire, the fighter jets, Mirage, you know, from UAE also, they violated Iranian airspace. They also there were reports that they have attacked, you know, facilities in the southern island of Levan. And also in the recent announcement that the project that was announced by Trump in order to somehow reopen the Strait of Hormuz or to break the closure, the Emirati ships were included in order to move along with the US destroyers and to conduct this, let's say, this project. So that's why this created tensions. And this was somehow, let's say, predicted that a tension could be happening in the region. So this is somehow from Iranian perspective, a shared destiny. If there is going to be insecurity for Iran that can also include the neighboring states. If Iran cannot have its vessels or tankers transit in the Strait of Hormuz and there is naval blockade, the others also will not be able to do so. Iran was reopening the Strait of Hormuz after the ceasefire. Iranian Foreign minister posted let's say a tweet on X Amen back then. But the reaction from the American side and the US President was to double down on the amount of the pressure against the country. So that creates some impediments toward making a progress in this track. Some were saying that if the US shows actions or moves based on the good faith, the US might respond in kind and taking some positive measures. But what happened proved this wrong. And in reaction to Iranian positive movement, they try to somehow react negatively and in a different manner. And this indicates that the US might interpret any positive action from Iranian side as a sign of weakness. And this again can make the process even much more complicated. So that's why we ended up in a recent situation whereby we saw the tensions arising in the straight and foremost. And this might also provoke an escalated situation. And that's question that why? Also if the US is genuinely seeking a political agreement with Iran, why they are resorting to this kind of actions at this time, Specifically at a time that the Strait of Hormuz could reopen on that agreement, Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz, they could lift the blockade and they could end the war. But why are they doing this? And is somehow meaningful. And UAE has been encouraging Israel and the United States in order to resume hostilities and aggression against Iran. But I think from Iranian perspective, any war or any act against the country cannot go unanswered or without any cause for those who are trying to provoke that conflict.
- [17:03]
A
You know, Abbas, because we did some reporting on this, you're mentioning something that I think we should really emphasize here that you're referring to soon after the ceasefire, or just before the ceasefire, which was originally going to be a two week period, was set to expire. There was mediation of the Pakistanis and several other regional players. And I also understand China was playing a role in this where there was an attempt to try to broker an extension of the ceasefire and try to get Iran and the United States back on a path to another round of direct talks. What I was told by Iranian officials was that Pakistan had told Iran that Trump is going to announce an extension of the ceasefire and a lifting of the naval blockade, and that the reason that Foreign Minister Arachi posted that tweet that said that they were reopening the Strait for all commercial traffic was based on that understanding. And what happened right after Foreign Minister Arachi did that is that Trump posted his own message on Truth Social that said thank you to Iran, and it referred to it as the Strait of Iran. And then moments later, I don't remember how many, but I think it was within two hours, maybe even less than one hour later, Trump then posts an additional message in which he says he's extending the ceasefire. Okay, that was part of what the Iranians understood what was going to happen. And then he said, but we're keeping the naval blockade in place. And then Iran responded to that by saying, okay, we go back to the status quo. My understanding was that Pakistan assured Iran that a certain series of events were going to take place, and Iran did its part. Trump initially did his part, and then he erased it all an hour or so later with that subsequent tweet. What's been happening, though, and it hasn't gotten much attention, and I really want to ask you about this, is that as Iran has been confronting this naval blockade that the US has imposed, it certainly has hurt the Iranian economy. But Iran has been fast tracking deals for land bridges, for instance, through Pakistan or Afghanistan, looking at using trains for alternative commerce and expanding its relationship. Some of these had been in the process of negotiation for many years.
- [19:23]
B
The.
- [19:23]
A
The Pakistani agreement, for instance. And after Foreign Minister Arachi went to Islamabad the next day after he left, the Pakistanis announced that they were effective immediately implementing third country transit to Iran through Pakistan. This was a huge deal for. For Iran. But what I understand from Iranian officials, and this is what I want to ask you about, is that they're looking at ways to counteract the economic and supply chain impact of the military blockade in the short term. But they're also envisioning a day where a new set of rules are imposed on the Strait of Hormuz, including the potential imposition of atoll including Iran making bilateral and strategic relationships with a variety of countries. I want to hear your explanation of this dynamic. Iran's short term moves aimed at trying to counteract the impact of the naval blockade, which is real and then also its long term planning on how it wants to administer the Strait of Hormuz, which the supreme leader Moshe Abba Khamenei also referred to in his most recent statement.
- [20:32]
B
One thing Jeremy, is that you know, Iran is not looking at this card. I mean the strata for almost as a negotiating card. It has been among core demands of Tehran at the negotiating table. And they do not seem to be abandoning this strategic leverage or asset because Iran and the world now know that the country has the capability and potentiality in order to disrupt the energy transit in that waterway. And this creates a with a leverage which is strategic. And this can work as a deterrent factor in future stopping and preventing any additional aggressions against the country. The economic aspect, like Iran charging fees for the transit of the vessels or tankers in the strait has been very much highlighted. But I think the security aspect is much more and the strategic perspective to this is much more important than anything else. And there have been talks about that in case of any potential agreement between the two sides who can act as a guarantor of this peace and let's say durability of that accord, let's say objective or you know, guarantor or which can function as a guarantor of peace in the region could be the strain of hormones itself and the new protocols by Iran because this can stop when the United States again in future they want to attack the country, they might think twice before engaging in any new round of military intervention. So that's why Iran is looking at this issue from let's say security perspective and abandoning that might pose some existential risks for the country. But more than I think the offending this current. The recent aggression was not the most important salvo, but the most important I would say element in the process has been how to end the war. So that's. We are seeing that the battle between the two sides on the conclusion terms yet continues. The United States want to somehow deprive Iran from the system strategic leverage and asset. But Iran yet insists that it has to keep that leverage in order to make sure that it will remain safe. Because For Iran, the rapid cessation of the hostilities was not the final gain and aim, but it was to remove the shadow of the war from above the country and to make sure that in the long run this will not be repeated. And in terms of Iran's, let's say, moves that was somehow met by actions which were somehow contradictory to the momentum or the process. We have seen this several times. Sometimes this is a question that why we see this amount of, let's say, contradiction with Trump has been saying or doing from what he says and what he does, whether this is somehow by chance. I think there has been somehow an intentional paradox or contradiction which aims to create confusion among Iranians or even in the region. Trump wants to seem unpredictable. And through this course, he has been trying to somehow gain benefits or let's say to get concessions from every actor in other fields, including in this game. He wants to get it from Iranian side. And that contradiction, I think is intentional. And that's why in the meantime that you're seeing that negotiations are being pursued. The US Responds to Iranian proposal. However, he says it is not good, but he is responding to that proposal which he considers as inadequate or insufficient. But in the meantime, you know, they are announcing the decision to escort tankers in order to break the closure adopted by Iran administrator. For most or right after the talks in Islamabad, they announced the naval blockade, which seems that it was pre planned. Maybe whether that was plan B or even plan A from even before the US Delegation coming for Islamabad for the round one of the talks. That is the question, I think, which is serious. And you look at, you know, these developments, I think we have been seeing this dull track from the United States and they are, you know, seeking, let's say, to pressure the country and to get the concessions. But he has been talking or defining different goals in this game. On initial days, they were talking about regime change, destroying Iran's military infrastructure and bringing chaos and instability to the country and so on. But later on, because they were unable to achieve their goals militarily, they tried to redefine it and pretend that the aim was to make sure that Iran would not be able to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran was not enriching uranium. And he was saying prior to the aggression that they were able to obliterate Iranian nuclear facilities. So this is that contradiction. But one thing which is making Iran and Iranians hesitant about the US intentions in this process is that the US President keeps repeating keywords like Iran's behavior in 47 years or civilization will die or they will destroy the infrastructure and things like that indicate and codify his actions in a manner that is not just limited to Iran and nuclear program. And the take here is that even if there is a potential agreement today between Iran and the United States, the other day they might raise new issues like the ballistic missile. The other day it's going to be Iran's presence in the region. And this will go on until the moment that they make sure that they have been able to weaken Iran, even to disintegrate the country. And the more they can inflict costs and losses on Iran, the better it will be for them. So that issue of trust, or lack of trust is very significant in this process. And Trump said that Iran has to pay a big and heavy price for its behavior in the past 47 years. He posted that right after, exactly, just right after the United States had responded to Iranian proposal. You know, is he seeking a diplomatic resolution or let's say, agreement with Iran or. The other day he announced this, you know, the decision to escort the tankers. And this is creating a situation whereby, you know, you cannot rely on what the US Is saying, but also what it is doing. And their military posture is in the region also being intensified. And this might, you know, suggest that the United States might be, again, like in the past, having something in mind, but, you know, but publicly saying something different. And this is somehow further complicating this situation. I'm sorry, maybe if I forgot the part of your question, if you could repeat. So I cannot miss it.
- [28:43]
A
No, I just, I mean, you can be very brief, but I wanted you just to comment on the fact that Iran is expanding its alternative commerce capacity by make brokering deals with its name with its land border neighbors like Pakistan and Afghanistan, and seeks to dramatically expand its rail system and its overland system of commerce.
- [29:08]
B
Well, in the face of the naval blockade, for sure, Iran is not going to remain idle. And the country has been under sanctions, you know, for decades. In the early of 1980s, Iran faced sanctions. And in the course of time, you know, the sanctions became more significant in terms of the intensity and the implementation and by the new naval blockade policy. I think Trump wanted to take the implementation of those sanctions to a new stage. Back in the past, it was like controlling the banking and insurance regulations, things like that, to control Iran's oil sale. But this time they are using hard power and military power in order to somehow, through that naval blockade to control Iran's business and trade, which could be precedent, at least for Iran, that this model to be adopted and applied again against the country in future. And this is why it is significant for Iran to get rid of this blockade. But in the meantime, Iran being under sanctions for decades or maximum pressure for the past years has been trying to adapt to the situation. We have something called resistance economy in the country which tries to somehow internalize the economy or to, let's say, provide food or some commodities that are needed in the country and also defense tools that the country needs to use when it is attacked. So this has pushed Iran toward finding alternatives internally as well as the country shares land borders with 15 countries. And as we speak, I think there have been thinking and pursuing of alternatives in order to somehow see to the extent they can to compensate those failures as a result of the naval blockade. But the point is that Iran, yes, it will suffer from the current condition, but Iran believes that this causes Iran. But in terms of the consequences for global energy market, it will also cut far deeper the United States interests and their allies. So this is, as I said earlier and that's been said by many, this is about who blinks first. And I think the feeling here in Iran is that in this, let's say, game, Iran can tolerate more. It has been adapting to sanctions. Shock of this kind or something similar to this is not something new or surprising to the country. So they are used to somehow being able to absorb those shocks and adapt to the situation. But comparing to some like the increase in the gas price in the United States and the reaction from the public to those developments and phenomenon, I think the situation will be different in these two countries. And I think more importantly, the significant amount of those repercussions will be related to other countries in the region, allies of the United States beyond the region. And Iran thinks that it has yet capacity to be able to tolerate the current condition and situation. So that's why they think that if this goes on and what was recently announced by the U.S. through this, you know, scoring the tankers, which was aimed at breaking the closure in the case that, you know, gradually maybe the signs of those consequences are emerging. And if, you know, these repercussions are lasting ones or, you know, happening in a longer period, time period, their impact, you know, on the economic, you know, issues could be somehow more lasting rather than to be short lived. So that's why it is important for the United States, I think, and Iran is trying to compensate the situation. I think it thinks that it can survive the point that Iran has not yet opened a new front like closing Babel Mandab in the case that the level of pressure on the country has not reached to their, let's say, to a limit that they cannot tolerate. So I think this indicates that the limit that Iran can tolerate this has not been full and Iran yet has a place for maneuvering and is aware, and Tehran is also fully aware that this is also having cost for the United States. And that's why we yet see that the battle yet continues.
- [34:13]
C
Yeah. And Abbasia, it certainly is here in the United States. And some time ago, President Trump said that within three days there would be shut in of the Iranian oil industry which would lead to massive explosions and it would never be able to be restarted again. Obviously, that three day deadline came and went with no such explosions here in the United States. We have a lot of kind of armchair analysts who have been trying to kind of pencil out how much time the Iranian oil industry may have left before it reaches shut in and whether or not it reaches that point before, say, you know, Kuwait or Bahrain or the Emirates or any others might, might reach it. What is the sense from, from your perspective about, you know, how long? Because, you know, recent, some analysts who are taking it more seriously have said actually Iran probably has 100 days or more or significantly more than that based on the adaptations available to the industry. So what is, what is your sense of how far off Trump was when it, when he launched that estimate and what do you suspect is a reasonable amount of time that Iran could go without the naval blockade being lifted?
- [35:34]
B
Well, I think at least from the Iranian end, I would can say that, you know, in terms of the essential commodities, this can continue for months because there are enough reserves in order to meet the domestic needs and even for this big population, however, in the meantime, even if we ignore the efforts that are being made to somehow compensate that blockade and in order to find new routes or ways in order to, you know, break that deadlock from different routes and to be able to bring commodities to the country and even in relation to the uranium soil, it is not stopping, stopping fully. And in the, I would say that if even this naval blockade is implemented fully 100% Iran yet has options to, you know, sell its oil and export its oil. But how? The details may not be provided by the Iranian side, but I would say that Iran thinks that it can survive as it has survived for decades and for the past years under, you know, enormous amount of pressure. So I think this can continue at least for months. And, but whether the United States is willing and ready to continue for, you know, several months, that's your question. It doesn't seem so and the recent moves in the case that they want to somehow change the current situation. But one thing is clear that we have been seeing ups and downs, volatile even discussions and negotiations between the two sides. One day a hope for clinching an agreement between the two sides rises. The other day the chance of a military escalation is in the agenda. So we have been witnessing this exact movement. One thing which could be sure, even in the case of a political agreement, there is no guarantee that the other day Trump will abandon those obligations and saying that he is not abiding by that agreement. Or maybe a scenario like what happened to Gaza, they said that they made a peace agreement, but what is the situation there we can see or what happened despite the changes in Syria, Bashar Al Assad is gone. You look the US sanctions or the season sanctions against that country are gone. Or Venezuela, you see the change. The leader is adopted and the US Is happy with that country, but the sanctions are gone. So this brings a serious question. And even in the case of agreement with the United States, the situation will not change so that Iran is not relying and counting on that agreement with the United States, let alone that the agreement is also breached from the American side. The reason that Iran is insisting on a step by step process or not exporting its highly enriched uranium is partly due to this reason that they expect Iran to implement all its commitments at one time and once. But there is no guarantee that the other side will keep to their promises of like they releasing Iranian frozen assets or lifting of the sanctions. That's why we are seeing this significant gap on the nuclear related issues and the sanctions. Iran has been open to transparency on its nuclear related activities. As it was the case back in 2015 nuclear deal. Iran was going under the most intrinsic inspections by the iaea. But and I'm sure that currently Iran has no, you know, problem with, you know, high level of transparency and inspections. But the point is that there's no guarantee that the other side will keep to their commitments. And this is making it much more difficult.
- [39:46]
A
I know you have to go, Abbas, but just one last question. You know, Trump's big narrative and this has been pushed, initially it was being pushed to Axios and Barack Ravid and journalists that have sort of emerged as the conveyor belts for sort of the official leaks from the White House or from the Israelis. But it's also been picked up by the broader Western media that part of the reason that there hasn't been a deal is that the Iranian leadership is in chaos. You know, Trump is Constantly saying they don't know who's in charge and they can't figure it out and they're a mess. And, you know, Iranian officials I talk to say, well, look at your own side. I mean, look at, look at Trump. It's out in the open. He tells the world that J.D. vance, his vice president's on an airplane, you know, or that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are there. Or one day he's saying he's going to destroy Iranian civilization and the next day he's saying, oh, we might make a deal, you know, that you're actually the ones in chaos. That's what I've heard expressed by Iranian officials. But as a geopolitical analyst, I want to ask you, and you're based in Tehran, what is your sense about how the decision making is happening and what the bottom line is going to look like for any deal going forward that would be acceptable to the various echelons of the power structure in Iran?
- [41:04]
B
Well, I would say that, you know, portraying or framing this as a fracture in Iran could be somehow misunderstood. Reading or misinforming the public about what is taking place in Iran. It cannot misinterpret the deliberations on, let's say, national security or foreign policy related issues here in Tehran as division or fracture. Decisions of this magnitude related to the national security, foreign policy, negotiations with the United States nuclear issue cannot be made unilaterally by one individual or even by one faction, or even solely by the cabinet or part of the government or one institution. And we know that, you know, even if there is a decision, there is no guarantee for the implementation. So that's why there is a clear, you know, framework for that, you know, those types of decisions to be made. And that is the Supreme National Security Council, which is composed of the president, heads of the government branches, members from the cabinet, institutions, including the security and military related institutions, and also some politicians. And any decisions cast in that council. And when they make a decision, the leader endorses that decision. So it is in a process that those decisions are made. And also including the negotiations with the United States, which has been normally considered as a sensitive issue, are also being discussed there. And they decide. And normally the leader respects the idea and the decision of the council. And but we are seeing the contradiction from the American side. They are insisting that there's fracture or division among Iranians, but in the meantime, they insist on continuing the discussions and negotiations with the same government. That they try to say that they are divided or fractured. But I can Say that comparing to previous years or back before for 2015 nuclear negotiations, the level of unity or coordination today in the country is much more than that time that a nuclear deal was made. And I think in terms of negotiations and even the agenda, there is a shared, I would say, consensus and perspective among different officials from the cabinet to government and others that how they need to approach that issue and what needs to be discussed and what they expect from the process. But for the United States, even during the negotiations, Iranian I think delegation, which was a high level one this time they had enough authority because they had clear agenda in mind that what they needed to achieve, they went to Islamabad and before Islamabad they were also in the negotiations. But even before the war, when the US negotiating delegation were coming to like Geneva or Oman, they were making a decision, they were agreeing on one thing. But when they were back to Washington, everything would change. And in Islamabad they also were discussing and everybody was expecting a kind of understanding to be announced in Islamabad back then I remember but Alabi started following some phone calls with Washington. Every everything was downturned and the situation changed. And they were not able to achieve any understanding or agreement on the framework of the following discussions. And I think this is not reflecting the reality that to say that there is a fracture in Iran, I think there is a clear, I would say framework for those decisions. And one point that the United States even assassinated the Iranian leader, high ranking commanders. But we're seeing that no changes being made in the country in the case that the system here outlasts the individuals, even those who are sitting at the top of the hierarchy. I'm not saying that those losses are not important. They are very significant losses for any country. But the point is that even despite those losses, we are seeing that the system works. It is fighting back against the United States in a very short time, just in 40 days, that a war has started and there has been a ceasefire. They are able to make a decision to go to negotiations with the United States. They know what they have in the agenda to discuss and they know what their red lines are. And I would say that even the leader was aware of what was going on. And he was also like it was in the past that the leader endorsed the decisions by the Supreme National Security Council. Yet that is the case as we speak. And I think from your perspective where I'm talking to you, I have the feeling and I'm seeing and I'm observing that the amount of the unity comparing even to previous years is much higher than what is being described in The United States, but for Iran is somehow a similar problem, that in the United States, there are different factions, those who are aspiring to see a prolonged war against Iran, those who oppose war, those who are having different ideas or views on what can be pursued or what can take place. And this is creating an uncertainty which has been clouding the discussions. And this has made it difficult to rely on such a process to expect something meaningful at the end of the day. But what I'm trying to say is that from Iranian perspective inside Iran, that fracture which is being described in the United States is existent. But from Iranian side toward the United States, the way they look at the US it seems that the United States, that fracture exists in the United States. Trump is somehow around him. He has different people with different ideas. In addition to that, he is also being manipulated by Israel. And as Israel dragged the United States to the war, as they have been saying, saying that this was Netanyahu's war, Iranian officials also have been criticizing this as Israel first policy rather than America first. So this indicates that also the influence coming from outside the United States has also been significant. This is not just something that is said by Iranian officials only, but even among elites in the United States these days, we are hearing such a, let's say, argument and this is impacting the progress and absent those, I think, impact, and maybe we would have witnessed a kind of agreement between the two sides. And yet this goes on and by, let's say, trying to portray it in the media in a way that Iran is fractured. This does not change the reality. But at the end, I would say that, you know, there are near realities on the ground which, you know, Iran does not feel that it has lost the war. Iran is behaving in these negotiations as it has emerged victorious. So that's why we are yet seeing that there are no, let's say, substantial changes in the Iranian negotiating positions and the system yet continues. And now there is a new perception here in the country, not among the elites, but among the public. Even those who protested against the government prior to the aggression. They thought, maybe some thought that if the US Attacks or comes to the country and assassinates some officials, it would be helping them in order to have a prosperous government or system in the country. What they saw was that schools were targeted, like in Minob, hospitals, civilian infrastructure. Trump threatened of a death of a civilization. He has been talking about death and destruction openly. And this change, you know, the mindset among some who thought that US Is coming to help them, but they saw that US was coming to kill them, not to help them. And this is qualitatively changing the situation in here. And I think this is also, they wanted to have a regime change, but what they did is that they somehow moved in a positive direction and they consolidated the foundations of such political establishment here in the country. And maybe they have, I'm not sure they have been able to somehow perceive that that was a big mistake to do so. But normally at around, at a time of foreign military intervention, we are seeing a rally around the flag impact in the country. They thought because of maybe economic hardship this time, this could have been somehow different. But again, those who were present in the streets to protest against the government before the war, some of them came to the streets again this time, but this time to support that political establishment and to condemn that foreign aggression.
- [51:08]
A
Abbas Aslani, senior research fellow at the center for Middle East Strategic Studies. I want to thank you very much for taking the time to be with us. Live from Tehran, Abbas Aslani, thank you so much.
- [51:20]
B
Thank you for having me on. Jeremy, it was a pleasure to be with you.
- [51:24]
A
All right, stay safe, Abbas. Thank you. That was Abbas Aslani joining us from Tehran. Ryan, I wanted to ask you about the way that the Trump administration is navigating the question of the War Power Powers Act. You know, I mean, it's, it, it presumes that the Democrats would actually do anything about it. But, you know, this morning at the Pentagon press briefing where, by the way, it's like there's, there is no real independent press there right now, the reporters got up and, and engaged in a long soliloquy about how amazing and awesome this military operation has been before, then asking a question that pissed off Pete Hegseth precisely because he then asked something that wasn't just heaping praise on him. I mean, it's really like would make the barons of the Soviet media empire blush with, you know, secondhand embarrassment for these guys. But he did say essentially that they think that it's now reset and that, and so they're, they're doing two things. They're saying this humanitarian mission that we're on, Project Freedom in the Strait of Hormuz, this is a humanitarian thing. And anything that happens bad there is because we have to defend ourselves against the Iranian fast forward boats or missiles or whatever. And then on the other hand, they're saying that if they decide to resume the war that the clock has reset. What, what, what's your sense of things in Washington right now on this question?
- [52:44]
C
Yeah, I mean, the reasoning from them is just Totally preposterous. There's this idea that has taken hold that there's a, this after 60 days, you know, that the, the executive has to explain what they're doing and then get, you know, some type of congressional approval. You know, that's, that's disputed based on whether or not what the definition of quote unquote entered into hostilities are. Yeah, what they're saying is that, okay, well, we ended that last war and so now we're doing a new war. So the 60 days goes back to zero. But of course, entered into hostilities. American service members are entered into hostilities at this moment. Know they are, they are within range of, you know, adversarial fire. And so scholars for a long time have said, no, if you. It just the very act of sending American service members from the con. From the United States out somewhere else aggressively, even if they don't fire first, like that counts. Now Trump is also now saying that the entire thing is unconstitutional because, you know, he, he's the, he's the commander in chief and, you know, get out of his way. Ultimately, this is a lot of, you know, this is kind of procedural and paperwork, but it is, it is kind of interesting that Trump has always cared about this. Even in the first Trump administration where there was, there were, there were war powers resolutions that were pushed by, I know Ro Khan in the House, Bernie Sanders and I believe Rand Paul in the, in the Senate around the, the U.S. saudi Yemen war. And he always cared. It was very interesting, like, because you can imagine him saying, well, this is unconstitutional and I don't really respect Congress, period, as a co. Equal branch, yet for some reason, like, he recognizes the political potency of Congress going on record and voting against him entering into, into hostility. So that's, I think that explains why he's now doing this kind of semantic silliness around, well, this is a new war.
- [54:57]
A
Well, I, I think also, I mean, really, the, the whole game right now is, is this question of whether or not Trump is going to resume, you know, active military attacks against Iran. It seems that the Israelis certainly appear to want that, although, as you've reported, and we all know, you know, there are questions about their ability to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles at the same capacity they've been able to historically. But it does, I mean, the thing that Abbas Aslani was saying at the end is a fair point about the different factions within the United States. And, you know, it's not often written about that way. You know, if the United States was reported on the way that we report about Other societies where everything is always viewed as sort of a banana republic. It all is playing out there. And Trump is clearly having to try to reconcile multiple special interests, not the least of which is Israel's agenda. And also, you know, he's hearing, you know, he's hearing certain things from Jared Kushner. He has Steve Witkoff, who's a complete imbecile, you know, that that doesn't understand the technical issues. He has J.D. vance, who, whether, whatever you think about J.D. vance, and if you think that he is, his people are kind of fanning this idea that he has some dissident view within the administration because of his future political ambitions. The core fact is he represents the United States government. He's the vice president elected vice president of the United States government. But it is true that you have different factions within Trump land, and they're in disarray. And what we're seeing is Trump trying to figure out how he's going to get out of this thing. He wants to be able to achieve victory. It seems pretty clear the Iranians don't want to give him the kind of victory that he wants. I mean, one Iranian official said to me the other day that in the J.D. vance talks, what they were saying would kind of define victory for Trump is not just the removal of the highly enriched uranium, but also that Iran, for a lengthy, fixed period, will do no enrichment whatsoever. And the Iranians have pushed back very strongly against that. At their bottom line, the most minimal, they say we have a right to use it for medical research and other peaceful purposes. But if Trump can't get that kind of quote, unquote, victory from the Iranians, which I highly doubt they're going to give him at the beginning of a discussion that doesn't include lifting the blockade, ending the war, and then going into lengthy technical negotiations, then what does Trump do? Well, Iranians think he may well authorize a military operation in the Strait of Hormuz, and that part of what he might be trying to do here is lay the groundwork for that. They also told me they believe that it's likely that Iran will be hit with another round of assassination strikes waged by Israel and the United States. And from the Iranian perspective, yes, it's about lifting sanctions, yes, it's about repatriating tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets. But it's also about long term insurance that the US And Israel don't think that they can just periodically bomb Iran. And that's a very hard thing to get a guarantee on. They can't rely, rely on the United Nations. They can't rely on Russia and China. To an extent, maybe they can in terms of arguing technicalities. But what I'm hearing from Iranians is we understand all of that and our guarantee is our refusal to concede is our display in front of the world that we have a very powerful weapon in the Strait of Hormuz. And any alternatives that people are talking about building, whether it's the Emiratis or others, those are long term wishes and the impact is going to be multi year if you don't resolve this with us.
- [58:44]
C
Yeah. And as Abbas Aslani said, you know, from his perspective, the Iranians have at minimum several months that they can, you know, that, that they can play this kind of game of chicken. Whereas Trump is running into real time and physical reality questions, physical reality questions on, on the economic front in, in particular because he's driving, you know, the, you know, the fertilizer crisis, the energy crisis and so on. But the physical reality on American military capacity and, and ammunition, like the idea of a full on assault that goes through the Strait of Hormuz would, would eat up so much ammunition just from a defensive capacity as they tried to obliterate Iran's ability to, you know, fire at them as they're going through, but then also at, in a, a defensive capacity as they're, as they're trying to make sure that, you know, ships aren't sunk by, by drones and ballistic missiles fired at the thing. They're already, you know, vastly diminished from what they had in their stockpiles, you know, two months ago. That would, that would disarm the United States to an extent that it really hasn't been since kind of the end of World War II practically. And he's running up against the calendar deadline of his meeting with Xi Jinping, which is just what, less than two weeks away at this point.
- [60:15]
A
Well, and Abbas Arachi is reportedly imminently going to be going to Beijing to meet with the, the Chinese leadership. Also New York Times had an interesting piece that I had heard something about this as well from sources that China recently transferred a bunch of dual use materials into Iran. And the Chinese are not denying it. They're just saying we follow all the rules about dual use. And you know, China has its own bilateral relationship. But you know, I think the Iranians, you know, are definitely strengthening and deepening their relationships with Russia, with China, with other countries in the, in the region. You know, there was a really interesting, you know, moment that kind of went viral and May turned into A meme of sorts where Esma Al Bagai, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, was asked at a press briefing yesterday, the United States is a superpower, and why isn't Iran capitulating to these demands? And he said, we're also a superpower. And, you know, so it's, I, I, I think that what the American public is being treated to right now is that this was portrayed as a slam dunk in many ways, and that the cartoonized version of Iran, the idea that it just exists around a cult of personality, was false from the beginning, and those who actually knew were not the featured voices in the narrative. And that's easy when you have Trump because he's so cartoonishly, buffoonishly villainous in some ways, and he lies repeatedly. But that's been a pattern that extends through both Democratic and Republican administrations, and it's a broader media tone. Whatever else is true, Iran has shown that it has very serious institutions that can withstand even the wiping out of the top leadership of almost every aspect of that system and keep going and fight the United States to what is effectively a standstill. This is a remarkable moment in history that we're living in, and those who refuse to kind of learn the lessons from this are doomed to continue to jeopardize American standing in the world and, and American security ultimately, at the end of the day. Not to mention just that we're a country that appears to much of the world to be a completely rogue, systematic committer of war crimes.
- [62:34]
C
And I wanted to underline one other point that he made, too, which is that if they really felt like they were in a desperate situation where they were not currently winning the standoff for the United States and couldn't wait them out, that they would have moved on the straight above Almanda by now. That was, that was an interesting point like that. And so I think that people should keep that in mind and kind of watch that straight. You know, as, as people say, watch this space. You know, if, you know, if, if you see them moving there, it might paradoxically be a signal that they feel like the standoff is not no longer going in their direction. But the, the longer that they are satisfied to, to use that term with the status quo, then the longer they, they, they hold that act suggests that Trump's claim that he's the one holding all the cards isn't, isn't quite honest. And also, by the way, he, he posted himself with a full deck of Uno cards, you know, wild cards, too. Yeah, yeah. If you have, if you have that many Uno cards you're losing. Like to see. I don't think he's played Uno for a while, but yeah, you're supposed to not have any cards in Uno to win, so.
- [63:46]
A
And you saw that the spokesman, the spokesman for Iran's conventional joint military forces, they then posted a picture of him showing four cards instead of five, and they were all like reverse or block symbols and, you know, saying, we actually understand the rules of the game. Anyway, Ryan, thanks. Thanks so much. And I also want to thank everybody who's a supporter of Dropsite News. You know, are the main way that we are able to keep doing this journalism is because of our readers, our listeners, our viewers. And we don't put anything behind a paywall. And that's a principle. It's, it's something that we are committed to. But we do appreciate the generosity of those of you that support this journalism who are willing to become paid subscribers or to make a 501c3 tax deductible donation to support the journalism at Drop Site News. We've got a lot of really great reports right now at our website@dropsitenews.com we're one of the few news organizations that actually has sources in Iran. And we try to really make sure that we're providing our readers with a comprehensive, nuanced campaign of reporting so that people can make informed decisions about how they view this US Israeli war against Iran. On behalf of our whole team@dropsitenews.com I want to thank you so much for your support. Thank you for joining us. Till next time, I'm Jeremy Scahill with Ryan Graham.
- [65:26]
B
Sam. It. Sa.