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The Iran War Rages On: Israeli Assassination Strikes, Steve Witkoff's Texts, and the Mounting Storm in the Strait of Hormuz
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Sa. Sam.
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Sa.
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Sam. All right. Good morning. I'm Ryan Grimm, a reporter with a Dropsite news. Welcome to our Tuesday morning live stream. In a moment, I'll be joined by my colleague Jeremy Scahill and we'll also be joined by Professor Foud Ozadi from Tehran in a pre taped interview that Jeremy gave. Will discuss, we'll discuss a little bit ahead of time what he and Jeremy spoke about. We'll run that and then we'll come back again to talk about the. I guess we're day 18 of the U. S. Israeli war on Iran. I wanted to briefly mention that overnight Pakistan struck a hospital, a rehab hospital in Kabul and has killed, according to Taliban officials, at least 400 people, potentially more. Something like a 2,000 bed rehab that was bombed. We'll have more coverage of that in our newsletter. If you're not getting our newsletter, I highly recommend it's called Dropsite daily. Go to dropsitenews.com and sign up for it there. We'll also have on the ground coverage of that strike and what its relationship is both to the US Role in Pakistan and also the role that I think oil prices are having on creating kind of turbulence and political unrest around the world. But for now, you, you may have seen yesterday that there was a, a dramatic back and forth between the United States and Iran over whether or not the, there are actual back channel negotiations going on toward an end to this war. US Is claiming there are such talks. Iranians are, are claiming that they have ignored all entreaties from the United States. And that's based on a drop site news article from Jeremy Scahill early in the morning to talk a little bit more about, you know, the drama that unfolded afterwards. Let's, let's bring Jeremy in here. Jeremy, thank you for being here. You know, yesterday I, I'm trying to think, I don't know. I don't know if I've ever seen anything quite like this. And I think maybe it has to do with the way that public officials now engage both, you know, through the media but also directly with the public on social media. But set the stage for us here you've got competing US And Iranian claims. What are the claims that are being made here and why are they important to how this war is unfolding?
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Well, Ryan, so yesterday we did a story that was based on talking to two senior Iranian officials and what they told us was was that over the course of the past week, Steve Witkoff, who is the special envoy for President Donald Trump and was alongside Jared Kushner the lead negotiator in the fraudulent pretend nuclear negotiations that preceded this bombing. And of course, the US started bombing Iran February 28, when there was supposed to be another round of negotiations just two days or three days later in Vienna. And so, you know, Witkoff had dealt with Abbas Arachi, the Iranian Foreign minister, during those negotiations. And one of the things that we've reported is that there was actually much more direct negotiation that took place in these talks between the US And Iran that had been actually reported. And so what we reported is that throughout the course of the previous week, Steve Witkoff had personally sent a number of text messages to Abbas Arachi, the Iranian Foreign minister, and that senior Iranian officials said that Arachi ignored them completely and didn't respond to them. And, you know, we had. We had this story for a few days and we were trying to get our sources to agree to talk about it on the record. And then finally, early yesterday morning, I got them to agree to do that. And so I sent a text message because apparently that's how he communicates to Steve Witkoff, asking for his response to what the Iranians were saying, that he had texted them, trying to jumpstart some sort of dialogue or talks with them on a ceasefire and to get his response. And he didn't respond. And then I also reached out to the White House, and typically, Ryan, when Dropsite asks the White House for commentary, what they'll do is they'll send back a copy and paste of whatever the most recent public remarks were or truth Social post of Donald Trump, and they'll say, I refer you to this or I refer you to that. Well, this time the White House responded very quickly with a full paragraph that read like it was literally from Trump's Truth Social, except it didn't include all caps screaming words in which they denounced drop site news, said we are a far left radical publication that is carrying water for the Islamic terrorist regime, and that we were abhorrent and that we were engaging in what they called America Last behavior. And this was in. In response to an email that said, here's what Iranian officials are stating. We would like to hear what the Trump administration position is. And I also asked them, President Trump has been on a daily basis claiming that the Iranians are begging him to negotiate or to move toward a ceasefire, and that Trump is saying, you know, we're not there yet, we're not ready for this yet. And so what I was saying is the Iranians are saying that that is not true and that in fact their official position is they don't want a ceasefire right now because their war aims are to push the United States to a point where there's longer term deterrence because they recognize that the cost of doing this every few months to Iran is too high. So they, they unload this statement on us. And in fairness, we printed the entire statement that the, that the White House provided us. So we explained what the Iranians said, we said Witkoff didn't respond, and then we published what the White House said to us roughly an hour or so. It was actually less than an hour. Israel's Channel 12, which Barack Ravid, who is a journalist that is primarily a reporter for Axios in the United States and also he is a commentator on cnn, but he also works for Israeli media outlets. And so I think it was 40 minutes or so after our story was published In Hebrew, Channel 12 posts a message on telegram saying that Barack Ravid has been told by White House sources that Abbas Arachi has been texting Steve Witkoff. So this is the opposite of what our story was. And then an hour or so after our story had been published, Axios then does an exclusive. And they, yeah, so Barack Ravid and I think was Mark Caputo also. They do. Iran and the US have been in direct contact in recent days, sources say. So what they said was that U.S. officials say that Abbas Arachi has been texting Steve Witkoff trying to start talks on a potential ceasefire and that it's the United States that is saying, oh, that we're not ready to talk. And Barack Ravid says in it that Dropsite had reported this earlier claim and that the US officials are saying that the Iranians are the ones reaching out. And so, you know, I, for reasons we could talk about, now I know that our report is accurate, but I went back to, you know, to my source and I was talking, you know, and he said this is complete fabrication, it's completely not true. And then the kind of nuclear moment happens, you know, in a social media context, where then Abbas Arachi himself, the Iranian Foreign Minister, takes to X Twitter and he posts and says that he's had no contact with Steve Witkoff since Witkoff's boss launched a war against Iran in the middle of supposed negotiations. Barack Rabid.
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I can read it verbatim. I got it right here. My Last contact with Mr. Witkoff was prior to his employer's decision to kill diplomacy with another illegal military attack on Iran. Any claim to the contrary appears geared solely to mislead oil traders and the public.
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C
And what Arachi is referring to. There is that. I think many analysts in the world believe that at certain times over the past 18 days, Trump has made statements that have been deliberate attempts to try to manipulate market sentiment and to try to imply that maybe the war is going to get wrapped up sooner because they're very concerned about the impact of this on the, on the economy. So Arachi posts that, and then Barack Ravid, quote, tweets Arachi and says, a US Official tells me that he's lying. I then speak to a senior Iranian official who says the official that spoke to Barack Ravid and said that Oracci was lying is lying. So then I posted that. And then this story has been picked up also by cnn has two US Officials supposedly saying that it was the Iranians that had reached out. But I'm confident that we got this story right. And in fact, the Iranians have now officially gone on the record. And Steve Witkoff could, could. If they say that Abbas Arachi is lying or that our report is wrong, there's a very simple solution. As you were pointing out yesterday, Ryan, Steve Wyckoff can show us the pleading, begging texts from a baserace.
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Yeah. Or, or he could, even if he doesn't want to show them to us, he could show them to Barack Ravid or some. Or us.
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I just mean show them to the public. It doesn't need to be.
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Certainly they don't even have to be published. Let's say he doesn't want to publish them. Just show them to the reporter and say, hey, look, here they are. But, but as you said, that's not going to happen because they don't exist. Can you talk a little bit more about why you're so confident? Because you would. You'd said earlier that you're.
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Yeah.
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You know, you have a, an unusual level of certainty on this, on this question.
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Yeah. So what happened was that, you know, in talking to Iranian officials over the course of this bombing, I think it was, I'm certain that it was on day three of the bombing. I was told by an Iranian official that is close to Arachi that Steve Witkoff had been messaging them. So this, this extends beyond last week. And they weren't going into great detail about when I heard the name Witkoff. Of course, you know, that to me is a story. It's one thing to hear, you know, that the US Seems to be doing X or seems to be doing Y. And, you know, at the beginning, it sounds like what was happening is that through third countries, the US Was sending word to Iran that Maybe we should start talking and remember Trump. There were reports that Trump thought this was going to be a fairly short war. They were going to go in there and they were going to assassinate the senior leadership. And I think there were some assessments that the whole thing was going to collapse, which is ridiculous for anybody that understands the Iranian state. But I think there was one strand of power within the White House that thought that was a possibility. So the timeline makes sense. And so this was on my radar and I was know, I was trying to push for a source to go on the record and sort of officially tell me that so that I could go to the US for comment. But I didn't get that, you know, initially. And then periodically I would check in on that. And, and what happened is that a flurry of outreach efforts went down through other countries, et cetera. And then last week, earlier last week, I was told that Witkoff directly had begun texting. And I said, and, you know, I mean, obviously I said, can I see the texts? And no, you can't see the texts. I said, what is Iran's response? Well, we haven't responded. Are you going to respond? Probably not. So for days I was talking to the Iranian officials and I would check in and say, did you guys respond? And then finally I was told the decision was made that the Supreme Leader of Iran has to be the ultimate authority on whether or not there's going to be any ceasefire talks. And the position of the Iranian security establishment and the new supreme Leader is that the defense of the country is going to continue, that we're not interested in having these talks. So what they said is we didn't respond to Steve Witkoff. And, and so you know what, what we have. This reminds me, there was, there was a point years ago, Ryan, when you and I first got to know each other. I think it was in 2011. I did a story. Obama was president. I had gone to Mogadishu, Somalia, and I revealed the existence of a secret prison in Somalia where the CIA was interrogating prisoners, despite the fact that Barack Obama had said that he ended the practice of extraordinary rendition. And when I went to the CIA for comment, they then turned around and they called Barbara Starr, who was a CNN National Security reporter, and they preemptively leaked a story to her saying that the CIA has been assisting in the interrogation of some prisoners taken by Somali prison authorities. And it was my first upfront experience with this front running of news organizations when they're reporting something that you don't want out there. So, so what's pretty clear happened, just to summarize this, is that Trump has been running around claiming the Iranians are begging him for a ceasefire. The Iranians have been telling us and other news outlets for some time that they're not interested in a ceasefire right now. We then have something concrete to report, which is that the Iranians assert that Steve Witkoff, the President's special envoy, has been texting them and that they didn't respond. We then went to the White House, and very quickly what happened is they turn around and they go to Barack Ravid and Mark Caputo at a news outlet that has been used throughout both the Gaza genocide and the Iran war as a way for the administration or the Israeli government to leak information and get it out into public circulation. And so they spun an exact, like a bizarro world version of this story. But beyond what I know about this and the timeline, Ryan, there's one other factor. Anyone who has been studying the Iranian response or Abbas Arachi's positions on this, can you imagine, is there a universe you can imagine that man texting Steve Witkoff to beg him to have a ceasefire? It just, it doesn't. It defies common sense. So, you know, and what's, what's, what's kind of remarkable is that cnn, which knows very well that this administration is constantly lying and misdirecting and attacking the press when they report things that, that, that they don't want out there, that they sort of report this straight and say, you know, well, the administration says that this happened, and they mentioned that drop site reported this, or they mentioned that Arachi said this. But they're treating it as though the vast majority of the evidence leans heavily against the White House narrative.
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Yeah, right. And, yeah, just to underline your point one more time, this is an easily solvable dispute between the two sides. Like, one side says they exist, the other side says they don't exist. The side that says they do exist can just, you know, demonstrate that by pointing to them. You know, we all, we know all governments lie. We know this government in particular lies an enormous amount. We know that all governments lie even more during times of war. This comes one week after it was actually Axios again, that was used to plant the idea, the fact that that Kurdish forces had invaded Iran. Like, not that it was one thing to, to get a leak that says, you know, Kurdish forces are preparing an invasion. Kurdish forces are considering an invasion. The news report out of Axios was Kurdish forces are in Iran and the up, you know, the Kurdish uprising has begun. And immediately we and others began getting messages from Kurdish forces saying not passing judgment at all on whether or not this is a good idea or a bad idea. It's just flatly not happening. Like, they are either in, in the process of invading or they are not. And it turned out they were not. So it's remarkable that the American media, you know, continues to allow itself to get, to get used for what are, what are clearly strategic operations here. Like, there's something strategic about telling the public that this invasion has begun. Soon after that you had a, A, a force of kind of Iranian Kurds who were in Iraq get bombed. So was that, you know, was that instigated? Was that part of it? And, and so it, you know, it just continues to unfold. And so this kind of, I think, rolls into your conversation with Professor Azadi because it goes to the question of why, like, and, you know, why. Why are the Iranians so insistent at this point on continuing the war effort until, that they, until they have extracted enough cost from the US And Israel that they will not attack them again? And what does it tell us about, you know, how the Iranians versus the Americans and the Israelis feel about how the war is going? Because all of the censorship makes it extraordinarily difficult on all sides to kind of on a day to day basis figure out precisely what's going on. But I think we can kind of get a sense of the elephant by this basic fact that the Iranians, you know, considered in their interest for this to continue at this point. And the US Is the one saying, oh, no, no, they're begging us to stop. What, what is, what is your read and what is Professor Razadi, you know, how does he approach this question?
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I mean, I also, yeah, I mean, this is very interesting. We're going to get to it in a, in a second. I mean, just one, one note on all of this, Ryan. You know, one thing I have never, you know, I've been a, I started working in journalism in the late 1990s, and I've never in my entire time as a journalist seen a more intense attempt to criminalize speaking to the quote, unquote, other side than we're witnessing, you know, right now. And, and it certainly was true throughout the Gaza genocide. And you know, so, I mean, part of what we're, we're doing at Dropsite is, is basic. It's just basic journalism. You know, by talking to Iranian officials or by talking to Hamas officials or Islamic Jihad leaders, we believe that the best way to protect democracy is to have a free flow of information. And when we're talking about something as sensitive as the decision to go to war, the prospect of having U.S. ground troops put into Iran, the fact that we're destroying a 7,000 year civilization and trying to just smash it into a million pieces, Americans should have all facts on the table. And that means fact checking what the government says about the quote, unquote enemy. It means actually trying to understand and not cartoonize the other side. And so, you know, but by doing that, then you get information that says, oh, wait a minute, is our leader lying about this? Let's ask you. And instead of responding to it in a factual way, they call us terrorist sympathizers, abhorrent, say we're America last, and none of this is going to deter us. You know, you've been attacked, I've been attacked. None of this is going to deter us. But I just also want to just explain for our readers and viewers and listeners, this has generally been respected as a core part of journalism. And it's not that it hasn't been criminalized before, it's just more intense than it's ever been. And, and so, you know, just before we. Did you want to add something to that, Ryan?
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Yeah, yeah. I want to say, like, and nobody needs to hear this more actually than the US Government, than President Trump, if, if they blind themselves, they're going to make poor decisions. And I want to, I wanted to play one, one thing here and get your response to it. This is an incredible moment in the Oval Office.
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C
Thank you. You were talking about Iran a couple times today and what they did after Epic Fury began. You said they hit Qatar, Saudi Arabia, uae, Bahrain, Kuwait. Nobody expected that.
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We were shocked.
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Are you surprised that nobody briefed you ahead of time, that that might be their retaliation?
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Nobody? Nobody. No, no, no, no. The greatest experts, nobody thought they were going to hit. They were, I wouldn't say friendly countries. They were like neutral. They were, they lived with them for years, Peter. They were going to take over the Middle East. They were going to knock out Israel with a nuclear weapon. But after we knocked out their nuclear potential, their nuclear potential weapon, they started building missiles. Thousands and thousands of mission missiles. And they were going to do it with missiles while they developed. These are sick people. While they developed nuclear. Somehow they were going to start at a different site because that site was, you saw the site, the mountain. They were going to go into a certain area which we know exactly where it is, and they were going to do that. And it's incredible what we've done, I tell you the job we've done. Do you know, if I didn't turn
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and so nobody thought that they would do this.
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Yeah.
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What do you even say to something like that? Just talk briefly about what Iranian officials were saying both publicly before the war, what they said in a letter to the United nations, and what you reported repeatedly for drop site was Iran's planned strategic response to an attack by the US And Israel.
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C
Yeah, I mean, you can go back and read the reporting drops I did on this, and there's a, you know, there's a handful of other outlets, and the Iranians themselves publicly were making this quite clear. I mean, the short of it, Ryan, is that the only people that wouldn't have known that are people that are completely ignorant, not paying attention or being lied to in briefings, because what we reported at drop site was almost exactly what has happened. We said the Iranians are telling us they're not going to choreograph strikes anymore. They're not going to have a delayed response where there's kind of a, a gap between the US And Israel striking them and then them striking, and that they intended to do very quick response where they're going to attack every possible US Military installation among the Persian Gulf nations. They're also going to strike in Jordan and they're going to very heavily start launching missile and drone attacks against Israel. And that the Iranians are not going to play by the same rules of engagement that that were established in the 12 Day War in June of 2025 or in the other episodes over the past two and a half years where Israel has bombed Iran and then the Iranians calibrate or choreograph through back channels their response. And that's precisely what Iranian officials told us they were going to do is what they ended up doing. And so, you know, actually we should go to Fawad Azadi because it's, you know, he actually was one of the people that we spoke to. And again, he's not in any official position of power. He's a professor at the University of Tehran. But as is the case in the United States, you have people that are at think tanks or universities who move in certain circles where they hear information or they have good, you know, they have insight into how the upper echelons of the political classes in the society function. And I think people should listen to Dr. Azadi in that context, that he's an academic educated in the United States who maintains discourse with various players in Iranian society. And I began by asking him about the reports that Ali Larajani, who is the secretary of Iran's National Security, Supreme National Security Council, this is the top national security entity in Iran. Ali Larajani for many decades has been a key player in different components of the Iranian state. He was also involved with nuclear negotiations in the 1990s. So they killed, according to Israel Katz, the Israeli Defense Minister, they've assassinated Ali Larajani. And they also said that they assassinated the commander of the Internal Security Force in Iran, the Basij Golam Reza Soleimani. Israel saying they assassinated these two guys. We do not yet have confirmation on that from the Iranian side. But I will say that in when these high profile assassinations have taken place and Israel has announced them, generally Israel has done so after they have confirmed it. It's not that Israel doesn't lie. It's not they don't leak false stories. But generally speaking when they do this, it's because they have some concrete reason to put it out there in public. So again, no Iranian confirmation. But this is how I began by speaking to Dr. Fawad Asadi, professor at the University of Tehran.
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As you said, we don't know yet. What I can tell you is that Ali Larijani was one of the more moderate voices within the political establishment in Iran. He was a supporter of the nuclear agreement in 2015. And in the last number of months he had this position of the Secretary of the National Security Council. He was very much interested in reaching a settlement with the United States. And I think what the Israelis are doing is to make sure that there is no political settlement between Iran and the United States. They're trying to kill the people who could be available for such agreements. And I think at the end of the day, this will backfire on the Israelis. Because if you get individuals in Iran in position of power that are more hostile to Israel and United States, then that's going to be bad news for both regimes. Mr. Larijani was a long time negotiator on Iran's nuclear program in the 1990s. Very flexible. But it seems the other side is not interested in flexibility. They're interested in eliminating top leadership in Iran. Iran is able to replace these people and the people who will be replaced will be harsher towards the illegal assassination of Iranian leaders. And you can see this when you compare Iran's response to the 12 day war in June, very limited. And Iran's response to the attacks, illegal attacks this month, much harsher. And how do you explain this change in policy? The people who exercise restraint in June are no longer with us. And the people who are in charge in many of the decision making places are acting in the way that you are seeing. They're much more forceful. So this is a big gamble for the Israelis and I think they will regret eliminating more moderate forces within the Iranian political establishment.
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C
Dr. Zadi, it seems as though part of the strategy here is not just to eliminate leaders in Iran that are characterized as so called hardline, but anyone who is a key figure in Iran. And you know, of course there has been a unified policy between the United States and Israel. And of course, Netanyahu, this has been his life's work to try to get this type of a war against Iran. But in recent days, Donald Trump has backed away from claiming that this is a regime change war and has indicated that he would be looking to make a deal. In fact, he has dismissed Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, and, and sort of talks about him as though he's a totally insignificant character and on the other hand, says that he would be open to making a deal with an internal and eternal figure within Iran. But the Israeli leader, Netanyahu has continued to say that, no, this is in fact a regime change war. Do you think that there's some level on which, given everything you said about Dr. Ali Lahrajani, his track record, you identify him as a more moderate figure within the scope of Iranian political echelons? Do you think that there is a way in which Netanyahu believes that killing these types of figures that presumably would be involved when negotiations do happen down the line, that it's an attempt to sort of preempt any sort of moves by the Trump administration to have a more diplomatic scenario unfold.
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B
I agree with what you said. You know, sooner or later Trump is going to realize that this is a failed policy, that he is not going to be able to change Iran's government, that he is not going to be able to pick and choose leaders in Iran? Iran is not Venezuela. And he's right. Pahlavi is not a significant figure. His support inside the country is, I don't want to say less than 1% because that would be too much. And Trump realizes that fact when they ask about Pahlavi. He says he wants, he's looking for someone more popular. Pahlavi is a fascist. His father was a fascist. People don't like him here. So the US Policy eventually would lead to realizing that what Trump is doing on his second term is not working and he would go back to what he did during his first term. During his first term, he did not attack Iran militarily. He stayed with sanctions and other pressures. And initially there was that nuclear agreement. He left the agreement. Sooner or later, he will realize that reaching an agreement with Iran is the only possible pathway. And then Netanyahu does not like that idea. What Netanyahu wants is to change Iran's government. And he thinks if he is not able to do it on the second round of attacks, we had attacks in June, we had attacks. Now Netanyahu thinks that if he's not able to change Iran's government in the second round, he would do it in the third round or fifth round or the 10th round. And because he's using American soldiers to fight his wars. So he's not really worried about attacking Iran. Repeatedly. Of course, Tel Aviv and HEA and other cities are getting hit in occupied Palestine. But he doesn't care because he doesn't care about human lives, whether they're Muslims or Christians or Jews. And he thinks he can rebuild the buildings that are damaged. Maybe he will employ Witkov. Witkov used to be a builder until two years ago. And they have access to this Zionist money internationally. So what Netanyahu wants to do is to continue fighting Iran until he disintegrates Iran. And he realizes that sooner or later Americans will realize that he has been fooling them. And then what he's doing now is to eliminate individuals that could bring some level of dialogue with the other side. And this is, as I said, is a big risk, because when you're eliminating the more moderate people, they are being replaced by stronger individuals when it comes to their response to Americans and Israelis. And that will result in a total loss to the other side. You know, what they could do was just plunder the resources of the southern part of the Persian Gulf, as they have been doing for many decades. They became greedy. They want to take over Iran's oil resources, and they're going to lose it all. It seems they're headed towards that direction. That's what happens to greedy people sometimes in order to get more. They lose everything they have. And this is going to be a disaster for the United States, and it's going to be a disaster for Israel as well, because the policy is not going to work. These type of attacks are going to solidify different political factions in Iran. People who liked Larijani because he was more moderate realized that being moderate towards the United States is not a good thing because you get killed. So those people will look at the situation in a much more harsh Harsh way. Harsher way. And the result would be a country that is totally united against this illegal aggression.
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C
I wanted to ask you about the selection of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. He did release a lengthy and detailed written statement, but the public has not heard him or seen him. And Iranian officials that I've spoken to have suggested that part of the reason for that is for security because the United States is and Israel are systematically trying to assassinate any Iranian leaders at the same time. I was told also by senior Iranian officials that any decisions about a ceasefire would have to be approved and implemented by the Supreme Leader. Can you, can you give us a sense of what you understand right now about Mojtab Khamenei, his leadership and his role in decision making on a day to day basis in Iran?
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B
I think both things are true. You know, you cannot elect a leader every other day, so they need to. And given the fact that Israelis are good at assassinating people, they need to make sure that he's safe. I believe he's going to release a video message probably in the next few hours or a few days because people have been wondering if he's available to do that. I think he wants to make sure that he's available to do that.
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C
Well, and there were reports, there were reports, and these were confirmed by some Iranian officials that he was in fact injured or wounded in a strike in the initial hours of the US Israeli bombing.
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B
They are these reports. But I don't think he would have been elected as the leader if the doctors believed that he would not survive. So he's going to. If he's wounded, the determination was that he will survive and yes, he will be involved in that decision of war or peace. I think the decision that the current leaders of Iran have is to have a paradigm shift when it comes to how they operate foreign policy. You know, for 47 years, Iran was under illegal severe sanctions laws passed by the US Congress under illegal bombardment. And Iran watched billions of dollars go through the state of Hormuz. Iran was suffering economically and everybody was getting rich out of the resources of this part of the world. So I think the decision of the new leaders in Iran is to make sure that this wealth is shared. So either people share the wealth or no one will be able to use it. So the strait of hormones will be closed until some sort of an economic setup is reached. They are talking about leveling attacks at all on ships. You know, in normal times, about $2 billion worth of goods passed through a state of formos every day. So if you have a 10% toll, that would be $200 million. That would bring Iran about $73 billion a year. And that would be enough to offset the illegal sanctions that the country is going through. That would be enough to pay for damages after a few years. I think damages are quite extensive. So it wouldn't be able to pay for all the damages in the first year, but eventually it will pay for the damages. So Iran is not going back to the old days of just suffering under sanctions while others benefit from the oil belt in this part of the world. That's, I think, a decision that has been made. The country's leader mentioned this in the statement that he released the other day that the state of Hormuz will be closed and how these things will be figured out. I think the other side can see whether these oil rich Persian Gulf states want to foot the bill. They want to absorb the toll, they want to pass it to their customers. These are things that they will have to figure out. What Iran will make sure is that the straits will be closed until Iran is compensated and until enough prices paid by the other side to make sure that they don't attack Iran every few months. You cannot run a country with two nuclear regimes attacking you every few months. So if the aim of attacking Iran was to change Iran's government, disintegrate Iran, Balkanize Iran, that's not going to happen. Iran is more united than ever. And in fact, some of these historical problems or sanctions will get resolved after the dust is settled. And this is what's going to happen. And the more people like Masalarijani is killed, the more you get to this type of very strong stance by Iran. So in previous years, why Iran didn't do this because of people like Mr. Larijani, because they were more cautious, more optimistic about maybe reaching an agreement. He did nuclear negotiations for many years. He was supporter of what Mr. Rouhani did for many years. And people are realizing that being nice to the other side will get you killed. So people are not going to be nice anymore.
- [43:21]
C
You know, you're talking about the Strait of Hormuz. And of course, President Donald Trump is claiming that he's assembling an international coalition that's going to, you know, escort ships potentially, or is going to, you know, establish a presence in the Strait of Hormuz. Although even some of the US's most powerful and, and closest allies, like Germany and other European countries, in fact NATO itself are saying that this is not a NATO mission. And in fact, the German chancellor who really has shown himself to be kind of subservient to Trump since he became the chancellor of Germany, he's also saying the Americans and Israelis didn't inform us of this war beforehand and told us that they didn't need us. So it does seem like Trump's having trouble assembling that coalition. At the same time, you have the reports of the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary unit, somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 U.S. soldiers. And those specific type of forces, Dr. Azadi, are sort of quick response forces. If the U.S. for instance, wants to try to seize Kharg island, you know, this was an island that the United States and Israel bombed the other day. Trump said he wasn't going to bomb the oil as of yet, but they bombed some infrastructure on that island. 90% of the oil that comes out of Iran passes through that island. There could be a contemplation right now of the Americans trying to seize that island. What about those dynamics? If Trump does contemplate or consider actively deploying military forces to try to escort ships or they try to do an amphibious assault on Kharg island and seize the territory, what's your sense of how Iran would respond to that?
- [45:07]
B
You know, Iran was not interested in this war. Iran tried very hard to avoid it. We had an agreement available. According to the Omani foreign minister, Trump was not interested in an agreement. He wanted to change Iran's government. I think he still wants to do that. So the first thing that needs to happen is for these attacks to stop. But they are not stopping. They are attacking Iran every day. And if they want to expand by bringing foot American soldiers on ground in Iran, Iran does not welcome that because Iran is interested in ending this war. But if they want to do that, I think you will have some Iranian generals that would not mind that, because soldiers on ground are much easier to hit than F35 jets. And by increasing the number of American debt, that would bring more pressure on the Trump administration to realize that this is a very bad policy. These are young people with young families. It's very sad that they have to fight for someone like Trump. They have to fight for someone like Netanyahu. They have to fight for the Epstein class. But this is the decision that the other side has made. Trump happens to be the commander in chief in the United States, and by his policies, he's going to get a lot of American soldiers killed. The hope is that they don't do that. But if they do it, Iran would actually be in a better position. To get more casualties on the other side with regard to the Hague island. This is what Iranian officials have said, that if Iran is not able to export oil, no one will in this part of the world. So you really don't have to worry about the toll idea that I mentioned a few minutes ago because there would be no oil to export, there would be no oil facilities. They will all burn down. And that means a disaster for the world economy, a disaster for the US Economy. Trump will lose the midterm elections and he will be impeached for attacking Iran illegally in January of 2027. So that's an option that he has. The hope is that he doesn't use that option. But Trump is capable of making foolish decisions every day.
- [47:50]
C
You know, in addition to the claims that the Israelis made that they killed Dr. Ali La Rajani, they're also saying that they killed the commander of the Basij internal security force. And this is the culmination of a series of systemic attacks that the Israelis have been doing in recent days where they're also using drones to strike Basij checkpoints in Tehran and, and other cities. And, and it's clear that Netanyahu, from his messaging and also what we understand from recent history is that the Israeli position is that they would like to spark domestic riots or uprisings within Iran. And there, there have been repeated claims by prominent Israeli figures, by the, including media figures close to Netanyahu in Israel, including the former CIA director Mike Pompeo and others, that Israel was playing a clandestine role in the riots that took place in January when the peaceful protests then turned into extremely brutal violence and attacks against police stations and mosques. And then the Iranian state came in to crush what it, it perceived as a foreign backed terrorist uprising inside of Iran. But I want to ask you about the significance of these attacks by Israel, not just assassinating the leadership figures within the Basij, but also attacking these security checkpoints. And if you're concerned that eventually there is going to be armed clashes within Iran itself, yeah, you know, they're planning
- [49:35]
B
for something today, in a few hours. So it's about, as we are talking now, it's about 3:30pm Tehran time. In about 3 hours, 34 hours, they're planning to, because, you know, in the last 16 days since the start of the war, you have had millions of people coming to the streets. This is what Netanyahu asked them to do. But they're shouting against Netanyahu and Trump and everybody is realizing in Washington that this regime change policy is not working. So today is the last attempt, at least this month, that they. To see if they can start something. We have Mossad agents present in Iran. They have established a network dating back before October 7th. They have been working on Iran for many years. And they are going to do their best today in a few hours to create some level of riots. Whether they are going and the killing, if the news is too or attempted killing of the two individuals that we talked about today, the attempt, we can say that the attempts has been made. We don't know if they're successful or not. Today, killing these two people is designed to create a shock for what is supposed to come in three hours. And we'll have to wait and see how good Mossad is going to be this time. Because last time they failed. They shot a lot of people, innocent people. They shot over 200 police officers. But they were not successful. The riots in January were designed to provide a frame for Trump and Netanyahu to start the war in late February. And you know, you look at Western media outlets, I go on these outlets all the time, and they are not worried about the 165 little girls that were killed at a school. They don't mind that. But they always remember these exaggerated numbers that Trump mentions when he talks about the riots. You know, he went to his State of Union address and he, they come up with these exaggerated numbers. The number of victims, as you know, have been published by the Iranian government. And none of these Western news outlets have been able to add even one name to the list that they Iranian government published. But it is useful to demonize Iran so they justify illegal attacks on Iran. So we have to wait and see. So by this time tomorrow, if you want, we can talk again and see whether the attempt that is designed for later on today has been successful or not. It's not going to be successful as far as I can tell you. They can create some level of damage and with the huge media backing, they can exaggerate that level of damage. But they are not going to be successful. This is a failed policy. They can kill moderate Iranian leaders, but they're not going to be able to disintegrate Iran. These are pipe dreams. Many Iranians will be killed because of these pipe dreams. Some Americans, maybe many Americans will be killed because of these pipe dreams. It's a failed policy. But we are going through a process, unfortunate process. We are dealing with the abstinent class, so you cannot expect anything else.
- [53:45]
C
Dr. Zadi, every day the Pentagon holds a press briefing and Donald Trump, he answers his own mobile phone and has these 30 second or two minute interviews with a variety of journalists. And he and his war secretary, Pete Hegseth, are saying every day that they've won the war, that they've totally obliterated Iran. And they claim that Iranian missile launches have decreased by 90%, that drone attacks from Iran have decreased by 95%. They claim in the last 24 hours that they've been attacking Iran's industrial base and that Iran is unable to continue manufacturing missiles. It is true that Iran is launching less frequent missile strikes. It's still hitting every single day. It's still striking across the Persian Gulf. It's still bombing Israel. But there has been a reduction in the number of missiles. But I want to ask you if you think that there's merit or truth to the characterization from the White House that Iran's missile and drone capacity is significantly damaged, degraded, and to an extent, incapacitated at this point?
- [54:58]
B
You know, I don't know. These are military secrets. Iranian military officials disagree. They say that we are using old stock and we haven't even used the new stock. Some of that could be rhetoric. I don't know. What I do know is that the United States spends a hundred times more on its military in comparison to Iran. Iran is facing two nuclear regimes and it's the underdog. But for what Iran is going to do, which is close the Strait of Hormuz for at least six months if this war continues, if Iranians realize that this policy of attacking every few months is going to continue, the straits will be closed for the next six months. And Iran has enough missiles and drones and ballistic capacity to do that. I can assure you, you don't need that many drones to close the Strait of Hormuz. You may need a few. You, you know, once a week or twice a week, if you hit a ship that is going through, that would be enough for the Strait of almost to be closed. So you don't need to mine it. You don't need to have a huge navy. You just need to have access to drones to make ships that are taking the risk realize that they made a big mistake. And with the Strait of Hormuz closing for at least six months, I think that's a cost that the other side cannot accept and will not be able to manage. And this is a problem that they started, so they have to come up with some solution. It is true, you know, when you hit military bases in the Persian Gulf, then you don't need to hit them again because you have already done that. And this war has been around for 16, 17 days. So it is logical for the number of hits to decrease because you have done your job. How effective the attacks on Iranian military has been, we have to wait and see. But what I can tell you is that the Iranian military leaders will make sure they have enough stock to be able to close the formus for at least six months.
- [57:42]
C
Finally, I want to just ask you about Iran's position on how this war ends. Of course. Senior military officials in Iran have said that Iran is going to determine when the war ends. Yesterday I reported that Steve Witkoff has been sending text messages to Foreign Minister Abbas Arachi and that the Iranian side had not responded to Witkoff's text messages. And I based this on sources in Tehran, in the Iranian government that were telling me this. And they also said that messages had been sent through third party countries trying to appeal to Iran to speak to the Americans and start discussing a ceasefire. The White House reacted very angrily to my report and they denounced me. They called dropsite news abhorrent and they said that we are engaging in America last behavior and they attacked us for interviewing Iranian officials. They then leaked their own spun version of the story to Barack Ravid of Axios. And they said the opposite is true. That actually Abbas Arachi has been texting Steve Witkoff and that the Americans don't want to talk to Iran right now, even though Trump, Trump has been saying the Iranians are begging. Then the Foreign Minister of Iran, Abbas Arachi, publicly came out and said, I have not written to Steve Witkoff at all and I haven't been in contact with him since his boss decided to launch this war in the middle of supposed negotiations. Now, every Iranian source I talk to says that the Iranian position right now is that there aren't going to be any discussions of ending this war until Iran is confident that it has restored long term deterrence from these kinds of attacks. And they've also discussed the idea that any ceasefire must also apply to Iraq and to Lebanon, where the Israelis now are getting closer and closer, it seems, to a bigger ground invasion as well as reparations for Iran. And they want it certified at the UN Security Council. What is your sense of where the Iranian position stands right now on the end of this war? Do you think that the, let's say, maximalist position that's been articulated by Iran, where Iran is saying this is what our standard is, is there room for flexibility there? How do you think Iranian diplomats and leaders are going to handle this? Give us your informed sense, Dr. Azadi.
- [60:22]
B
You know as they are killing the more flexible leaders in Iran. As I said, we don't know if the news is accurate or not. But killing of Mr. Larijani would reduce Iran's flexibility when it comes to these conflicts. Questions. What Iran is saying is logical. It would be foolish for any Iranian politician or decision maker to say something illogical. What Iran says is that Iran will continue until Iran makes sure that Iran, the country, is not attacked every few months. So that's reasonable. Getting paid for all the damages that the other side has done illegally. That's not unreasonable. And the cost that this will create would make sure that the other side would not attack Iran every few months. Iranian, Iranians need to make sure that the other side pays a cost, otherwise they would want to attack Iran a third time, a fourth time. So I think that's a settled policy. I don't think we don't see anyone in Iran, even the most reformist minded individuals in the country. Nobody's questioning this policy. So this is not a maximalist policy. This is the policy of the country. You saw that in the statement of the leader. This is what the President said. This is what everybody else is talking about. Iran's ability to endure pain is greater than the other side. Iranian soldiers are fighting for Iran and the civilized world. American soldiers are fighting for Israel and the Epstein class. It makes a difference.
- [62:12]
C
That is Dr. Fouad Azadi who was speaking to us from Tehran, Iran, just shortly before we went to Air Raya and I managed to catch him while he had Internet. He says he just has Internet for very brief periods during the day. You're muted there, Ryan, but
- [62:34]
A
what did you take away from how, you know, he considers, and the, and the Iranian echelon considers the war to be going from their perspective. If you listen to Hegseth and the other, you know, chest thumping, you know, backers of the US and Israel war, they'll say, okay, yes, it doesn't look great for us, but we are degrading Iran's capacities both, you know, throughout the region and also their capacity to launch and, and reproduce ballistic missiles and trust the, trust the degradation process. What is, what's your sense from, from talking to him as well as your sources on how, how they're feeling about how this is unfolding?
- [63:16]
C
Well, you know, I mean, Dr. Azadi did leave open the possibility that there's some, you know, sort of messaging that's, that's going on there. But then he quickly pivoted and said that his assessment is he doesn't believe that The Iranian military commanders would leave themselves in that position. I mean, we have to remember that Iran has been preparing for this. There's two levels on which we have to look at this. For 47 years, Iran has been, in one way or another, preparing for an existential war that it has predicted will eventually come from the United States and Israel. And Iran also was militarily attacked in a very heavy way for 12 days in June of 2025, more than a thousand Iranians were killed. The United States and Israel did blow up several facilities for nuclear enrichment, but also ballistic missile production. But what's interesting is in talking to munitions experts who also specialize in Iran, if you start to dig under the layers of the way that Iran's ballistic missile production system works and its drone production system, Iran has created what they call missile cities, you know, underground infrastructure that make the tunnels in Gaza look like junior varsity in terms of these tactics. And some of these are reportedly beneath mountains. You know, one of the reasons why the United States, I think, ultimately signed a ceasefire with Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, in Yemen, was that they just weren't able to blow up the capacity of Ansar Allah because they utilized the mountainous terrain of Yemen. And that's also true in Iran. I think the next week or so is going to be crazy. Crucial to see whose narrative is more rooted in reality. The Iranians have been saying, and they've been telling this to us for a long time, even before the first bomb started falling on February 28, that they were initially going to use their older stockpiles. You know, Iran has ballistic missiles that were manufactured between 2010 and 2014, and they say that that's been the bulk of what they've been using thus far. Part of it is, yeah, you're going to use your older technology, but also there's chemical components to some of these missiles in how they' produce, and those go bad. You know, one munitions expert was saying to me, it's like, you know, having milk in the refrigerator. Eventually it starts to turn sour. So part of it is that they. They. I think that's an established fact. They did expend a lot of the older munitions. There have been a few cases where we've seen them using some of the more advanced missiles. But it's true what Dr. Azadi is saying and what military officials are. We haven't seen them deployed in. In wide numbers. Some of those require much more time to set up and launch. So one of the reasons why Iran was able to launch so many missiles and drones in these past two weeks is because they very effectively utilized fairly cheap mobile launch units. You know, during the 1991 Gulf War, when against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, you know, Saddam's forces would fire Scud missiles and then the US Would immediately come in and they would. They would blast the launcher. And that very rapidly destroyed the Scud missile infrastructure in Iraq. In Iran, by all accounts, they're using a much more sophisticated, cheaper, mobile version of these launchers. They also say that they're continuing their missile production. Trump yesterday said there was massive damage done to the defense industrial base in Iran. That may well be true, but in talking to U.S. military experts that have participated in the, you know, in these kinds of heavy bombing runs, I'm told that to destroy some of this infrastructure, you would need repeated bombing in the exact same place with very massive bombs. Now, there's a wild card there. A lot of Iran's defense systems, air defense systems, have been wiped out, particularly in the west and south of Iran. Eastern Iran may be a little bit less touched, but one of the consequences of knocking out a country's conventional air defense systems is that you can then bring in more conventional aircraft that can fly without fear of being shot down. So the US And Israel both have started to utilize fighter bomber aircraft that indicate that they have confidence of air superiority over parts of Iran. I think there's no question that the U.S. because it's. The U.S. has done immense damage to Iran, to Iran's defensive capabilities. There's like no debate on that whatsoever. The question is now that this is a firmly asymmetric conflict and that Iran has spent so long preparing for this and intensely preparing for it since last June. The Iranians knew this day was going to come. They knew that there wasn't going to be a final deal with the United States. How effective are the mechanisms that Iran put into place to allow it to keep hitting the United States bombing its military assets in the region and continuing to pressure Israel by raining missiles down on it? Did they prepare for this long of a. Of a war on that front? They say they have. Did they anticipate the level of damage and strength of bombing that they were going to absorb and what the impact of that would be? I think we don't know that yet. There's a wild card or two wildcards here, Ryan, that I think are important to put on the board. One is that Hezbollah is firing an average of 100 or so rockets a day day at Israel. The Israeli government has had to evacuate large portions of its northern territories that it occupies south of Lebanon. Hezbollah has shown that it is in a. Is in much stronger shape than the Israeli and US Governments have led the public to believe. We'll see what happens with the Israelis trying to do a ground incursion. But as long as Hezbollah is consistently firing rockets, as long as Iran is consistently firing rockets, this, this is going to endure. I think the next week's going to be telling the other wild card, and you and I have reported on this in previous iterations, Ansar Allah, if, if Ansar Allah, the Houthis of Yemen, if they decide to enter this war, and some senior members of their political bureau have indicated this week that they're discussing a zero hour, meaning a day when they do get involved. You could see the Ansar Allah also launching missiles at Israel, which is not as big of a deal as the next thing I'm going to say, which is that they could also blockade the Red Sea. One of the things that's happening right now is that there's a huge armada of oil tankers that are going up the western Saudi coast and they're loading oil on. And then they have to go back down through the straits that pass directly near the coastal waters of Yemen. If the Yemeni forces under Ansar Allah decide the US ceasefire is done as a result of this and they start attacking those ships, considering them aiding and abetting or connected to this war, then that's a whole other front that's opened up. And so, you know, there's lots of wild cards. And the last thing I'll flag from what Dr. Azadi was saying is he's saying, and I heard this from Iranian officials, too, they do anticipate that there is going to be some domestic strife happening in the near future or attempts to spur some kind of an uprising, or that there's going to be protests. And so we'll have to, we'll have to watch that very closely. Certainly Israel's been assassinating the forces that would be the front line of Iran's state apparatus that is going to be out there in the streets. And they've been very clear. They're going to shoot to kill, you know, that they consider an act of treason in a wartime to be engaged in, you know, any activities that resemble what went down in January when things turned violent. So we have to see what happens.
- [71:08]
A
And Reza Pahlavi, my neighbor here and lives just outside of Washington, D.C. you know, he did an interview with Iran International, which we can talk about this publication we want to headline, Palavi Says Islamic Republic's weakening grip brings return to streets closer. In the interview on Monday, he said, where's. Where's the best quote here? Conditions must be taken into account. As everyone has seen, this government has no hesitation in suppressing people. It is prepared to see hundreds of thousands killed if that means staying in power. Therefore, the moment must proceed intelligently. The final call will be issued at the right moment. We want to reach the day after its collapse when the people around can achieve what they truly deserve. Complete freedom and an opportunity to rebuild and prosper effectively. He's saying the moment is soon and that the. The Israeli American effort to degrade the Iran's capacity to suppress protests is. Is ongoing. Pahlavi's supporters make up a portion of the, of those who would come into the street, but by no means, you know, represent all of. All of them. What, what, what. What is, you know, what, what do you, what do you, what do you believe Azadi is.
- [72:27]
C
What's he saying?
- [72:28]
B
Yeah.
- [72:28]
A
How serious is this? Yeah, like, how serious do you think he takes this?
- [72:33]
C
I mean, I think, I think part of what's happening with Pahlavi's calls for, you know, an uprising is, is that they actually want to see Iranians get gunned down in the streets. And I, you know, I think there's a very cynical weaponization of Iranians who want to see their government changed
- [72:58]
B
or
- [72:58]
C
are opposed to their government, which is the right of any of us in this world. And I think that a lot of the public sentiment about the suffering of Iranians at the hands of their own government has been cynically weaponized by Pahlavi's circle. And there's videos all over the Internet of his supporters showing that they really don't care if. If it's American and Israeli bombs killing Iranians. They're only concerned if it's, you know, bullets fired from the Islamic Republic security forces. So part of this is I think they understand that they don't have any kind of wide popular base inside of Iran. And so what they're doing is kind of a warped version of a vanguardist philosophy where if you get, you know, massacres to start happening or events that you can portray as a massacre that that is going to somehow build public mass or it's going to return this to front and center. Because Trump basically doesn't talk about the quote, unquote, Iranian people anymore. I mean, it's been 18 days of this bombing, and after the first 48 hours, it's like, Iranian who, you know, like, it's like, oh, I'll take a religious leader. I'll make a deal with the current administration. And then, of course, you have Netanyahu who's, you know, very cynically weaponizing the notions of individual liberty and freedom for Iranian people while they bomb and murder, you know, Iranian children. So anyway, point being, it's not that I'm hearing panic or grave concern on the part of Iranian officials about this issue, but they're speaking about it and they're saying that they're expecting it's going to come, that there is going to be an effort. And so we'll have to see what happens with how Trump responds to this. If there are people that are listening to those calls, if it is true that Mossad, you know, the Iranians have arrested a number of people over the course of these 18 days that they allege were engaged in, like, treasonous activity or working on behalf of foreign powers. You know, anytime a government says that, especially during wartime, you have to take it with a grain of salt. But just because, you know, you're paranoid doesn't mean you're not right. And so, you know, it's, I think it would be shocking if there wasn't Mossad on the ground in Iran. So, you know, we'll have to see. The Iranians seem not panicking or overly concerned, but recognizing this is a dynamic that sooner or later is going to rear its head.
- [75:20]
A
Last thing for you because and then we actually do have Imran Feroz is going to be able to join us drop site contributor who was at the visited the site of the Pakistan bombing of the hospital. But I wanted to get your reaction to the piece that we published last night at Dropsite News about the situation in Iraq. You've spent a lot of time reporting in Iraq over the years. I would suggest everybody, everybody read this, read this piece. It's, you know, fascinating look at the politics unfolding there as we continue to see U.S. ships, you know, crashing in Iraq or coming under fire, not US Airships, I mean, or, or then emergency landing as a result of taking fire from Iraqi militias. Kind of the point of the 2003 invasion was to try to take Iraq off the chessboard and make it a client client of the United States. But here there seems to be a little bit of difficulty. So what, you know, that the US Is, is facing there at the, the Green Zone, the US Embassy compound is, is under relentless bombardment from Iraqi militias, you know, who are kind of allied with Iran. What, what do you, what are you seeing unfolding in Iraq that People should understand.
- [76:40]
C
Yeah, I mean, first of all, let's remember that the, the United States went in, in 2003, you know, to Iraq invasion, occupation, and they completely dismantled the Iraqi government. And that, you know, as it existed under Saddam Hussein. And Trump in recent days has been saying that that was a huge mistake to essentially implement de Ba' athification and to fire the military and to fire civil servants. And he's been starting to say he doesn't want to repeat that mistake in, in Iran. But, you know, basically Iraq is a majority, it's a diverse society, but it is a majority Shia country. Yes, Iraq and Iran fought an eight year, extraordinarily bloody war, but there is a lot of religious and cultural cross pollination between Iraq and Iran. And one of the Results of the U.S. invasion and occupation is that Iran gained much more influence inside of Iran for religious reasons, for cultural reasons, and then certainly for political reasons. And Trump has really been staking out a public position that he does not want Nouri al Maliki to return as the prime minister of Iraq. And Nouriel Maliki, you know, was someone that had been a collaborator of sorts with the United States in the, in the post war, quote, unquote, rebuilding of Iraq, but has become much more assertive and independent in his posture toward the United States. So you have a mixture of dynamics going on. You also have Moqtada Al Sadr, who is also a Shiite religious figure, but he also speaks in the language of the Iraqi street, Iraqi nationalism. He oftentimes has tried to appeal for unity between the Sunni resistance against American occupation and the Shia resistance against American occupation. You have Ali Sistani, one of the most important religious figures in Shia Islam, who's revered also by many in Iran, who issued a fatwa of sorts about Iran, but it stopped short of a really explicit call to arms for people to go in and actively fight. But it's clear that Iran is on the minds of many Iraqis and the history looms over it of the US Invasion and occupation, certainly of the eight year war. But the political battle that is playing out right now in Iraq, I think is a story people should pay very close attention to because it's also the creation of American imperial policy. What we're witnessing Iraq, in many ways is up for grabs. And how this war against Iran is brought to an end or how it unfolds is going to have huge implications for the future of Iraq. These are ancient societies. These are strong nations. Iraq has two mighty rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. Iraq is an agricultural society. Until the Gulf War of 1991, it was a wealthy, modern, highly educated society. Americans don't often root themselves in the history of the countries that they're at war with. But our policy right now is going up against thousands of years of civilization that is never far from the minds of the people that are now in control or in power or vying for power in these countries. And I think their long view of history is clashing up against the short term attention span of Donald Trump and his concoction of neocon plus maga foreign policy. And I wouldn't underestimate either the people of Iraq or Iran to endure this blip of a moment in history because their civilizations indicate that they're going to endure.
- [80:26]
A
Well, Jeremy, you know, really appreciate you joining us in an incredible run of reporting. Looking forward to, looking forward to seeing more as well.
- [80:36]
C
All right, Take care, Ryan.
- [80:38]
A
All right. So we've also got Emran Feroz, a reporter and a contributor to Dropsite, joining us now to talk about this absolutely horrifying scene that is unique unfolding in Kabul where the Pakistani military has, has bombed a what I understand is a rehab center with some 2,000 beds or so, at least 400 killed, perhaps many more. Emran, first of all, thank you for on such short notice joining us here.
- [81:10]
E
Thanks for having me, Ryan. It's a pleasure.
- [81:13]
A
So what, what can you tell us about this situation as it's unfolding?
- [81:18]
E
Yes, so the thing is that for more than three weeks now, we have this war between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And mainly it occurred through Pakistani airstrikes and other military operations throughout the country, even in Kabul. And a lot of people, a lot of observers saw that, okay, there could be some further escalation. And unfortunately, this escalation happened last night, last evening after Iftar in the middle of Ramadan when this hospital in Kabul in the Pulitzerhi area was bombed by Pakistani jets. And afterwards we saw a lot of these horrific scenes that occurred there. And I think as you said, Ryan, like, you know, the, the local authorities, the Taliban, they said that between 250 and 400 people have been injured and killed. And I just talked to my colleague Fazel Min, Fazil Min Al, who is also who also worked with me on some pieces for dropside. And he's in Kabul. I'm not in Kabul, but he's in Kabul and other journalists are in Kabul. And he went to the site today and he visited the hospital where the people, the injured and the dead bodies are, you know, right now in this moment, and he said that actually this number could be much higher. It's not, it's like, you know, he said it's about something like 600, 700, 800. We don't know yet because a lot of bodies have just been burned. And he sent me some lists of the victims right now, and I, I just took a short look, but it looks terrible.
- [83:12]
A
What did, what are, what did he say about why this hospital might have been hit? Because the Pakistanis are, I believe, haven't commented on the strike yet. But what, what, what could possibly be at issue here? Like, how did this happen?
- [83:32]
E
Yeah, there are many different theories. For example, one of them is that the Pakistanis are using old maps and old intelligence because this place, this hospital apparently used to be a NATO military site, and after the Taliban took over, they switched it into a rehab center. Another problem is also that, like, you know, when, you know, hospitals in Afghanistan, they're often very overcrowded. You mentioned 1,000 to 2,000. That's also what the Taliban regime yesterday said and the health ministry in Kabul. But now they talk about 5,000 people who are inside the hospital because these places are often really overcrowded. So one thing we have here probably is flawed intelligence. But if that was the case, we should wonder why other military sites were hit. And, you know, apparently no, no, no civilians were harmed there. For example, an airstrike also took place last night in western Kabul. And when I, in western Kabul is the place where I live when I'm in Kabul because my family is, it's my neighborhood. And I, I immediately talked to the people over there and they said, okay, it's just a military side again that has been hit, so no civilians. So how could this happen? That on the one side of the, on the one side of the city you could precisely apparently hit a military side, but at the other side you hit a hospital. So, yes, of course, flawed intelligence could be a problem. But to make it clear in, in the, you know, what many, many Afghans think and believe is that this was, this happened on purpose and this was just another war crime by the Pakistani army, like it happened over and over during the last days and weeks.
- [85:29]
A
Well, the US Appears to be kind of expanding room for what is, what is allowable on the international stage. You know, the US Began the war by striking the, the girls school in, in Southern Manob, killing, you know, more than 170, 80 people, most of them young girls. There was also, over the last, I believe, 24 hours, another elementary school in Iran that was hit, that was called Shahed Khamenei Elementary School. And the, the suspicion among people following this is that the US is continuing to use AI to do its targeting. And because the elementary school included the name Shahid in it commonly used word, but because it included that, and that is the, that is the drone, the brand that they use for the drones as well, that, that was how that elementary school, this new elementary school ended up being hit. Similarly, they struck in Tehran, a park called Police park, but it was literally just a park. You know, trees, benches, grass, a park, but it was called Police Park. And so I wonder if the Pakistanis are using some version of AI that had not been up, updated. And, and what it also shows is a just complete lack of concern for any deliberation or, or, you know, just, just double triple checking. You're, you're sending absolutely lethal amounts of bombs. You want to check like, oh, let's make sure that this, that this Shahid is actually a production facility and not a school named Shot, or that this hospital, that this base that we think we're hitting is actually still a base and not converted into a hospital, because that must be many years ago. Taliban has been back in power for, you know, quite some, quite some time. So I also wanted to ask you about how this, how this war is unfolding. So when I, when I heard about this, you know, most recent major attack, it, I could, I could only consider it kind of in the context of Pakistani politics right now, which are in turmoil because of oil prices and the austerity, the renewed austerity that the, that the population is facing. This is a government that did not, was not legitimately elected. You know, the population overwhelmingly elected other people back in 2024, but they took power anyway. Our, our colleague here, Waqas Ahmed, recently reported that Miriam Nawaz's son used the Pakistan state jet to fly to Vienna for his honeymoon. A story that has kind of gone viral all over Pakistan. And so Pakistani government is on the back foot, you know, politically and economically, and I feel like sees Afghanistan as a way to kind of justify its existence and rally people around it. But how do, how do Afghans see this war? And what is the, like, what is the, what is the way that this could possibly come to a conclusion?
- [88:47]
E
Yes, I think the thing that you just said was very much on point. Pakistan always needs the existence of Afghanistan to, you know, to accumulate money, a lot of money, millions, trillions went to Pakistan during the last 20 years of the war on terror. And what many People also tend to forget is that in the 1980s, when the war against the Soviet Union took place during the Cold War between the United States, the Western world and Soviet Union, and the communist government regime in Kabul and the mujahideen, the Afghan mujahideen, on the other side, you had the civil war level and then you had the Cold War and everything back then, Pakistan had a lot of involvement and they really need it. And for many Afghans, like, often for me, it's quite interesting that you hear a lot of theories and analysis from politicians and historians and scientists and academic academics and journalists. But people in Afghanistan on the ground, like very, very average people. I mean, like even farmers or traders and so on. I remember how one of them said something like, whoever is ruling in Kabul, it doesn't matter. Pakistan will see him as anatomy. It does. And if you take, take a look at the Afghan history from back then, when the Afghan Republic was founded more than 50 years ago, when the, when the monarchy was in power, and later when you had the communist regime in Kabul, when you had the mujahideen in Kabul, when you had the Taliban in Kabul, and even the pro western republican government that was built during the last 25 years, all of them had one thing in common. They mostly did not want to accept the Durand Line that was. That is separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is a colonial border, which was created by the British in 1893. And all of them, from the communists to the monarchists to the Islamists, said, we reject this. And as long as you reject this, you have always the Pakistani involvement, the Pakistanis, Islamabad, they will take a look. Okay, who is on the other side? Who is fighting? Who is the opposition of the government in Kabul? We will, whoever it is, we will support it. And now you have the situation that the Taliban, who used to be very close to Pakistan, at least parts of them, they are the government. And they took this nationalist stance against the Durand line and said, okay, we, we have to behave in, in this way because that's more of our national interest and so on. And Pakistan feels threatened again. And for that reason, you always have this fighting at the Durand Line at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I remember when I was there in 2021, a few months before the pro Western government collapsed in Kabul and Taliban took over and you had Pakistani army attacking Afghan soldiers on the other side and just pushing them back to grab lands, to grab Afghan land and to create idps and so on. And this situation is continuing during the Taliban too. But now It's a total escalation because, you know, just if we, if we take a look at the hospital attack, it might be one of the worst war crimes Afghanistan has seen during the last years or even decades. Yeah.
- [92:23]
A
Remember the US Bombed a, a doctor's out borders hospital.
- [92:30]
E
Yes.
- [92:30]
A
But nothing, nothing. But it was nowhere near this. The size.
- [92:34]
B
No. Yeah.
- [92:35]
E
Also back then. Yeah, I remember that. That too, because I also reported about that. You know, back then you also had this conflict between the pro American Afghan government, the Afghan army and the Americans themselves because the, the Americans blamed the Afghans back then and said they gave us the coordinates and they told us to bomb it. And there was a blame game back then and today it's not even a blame game. You just have a huge propaganda war, especially from the Pakistani side.
- [93:11]
A
Right. Well, we'll, we'll continue following this as extraordinary crime and extraordinary tragedy. But Emron, thanks for jumping on so quickly and we look forward to. I know you're probably going to be doing some more reporting on this. We look forward to seeing what you continue to come up with.
- [93:29]
E
Thank you, Ryan.
- [93:30]
A
All right. All right. Well, thank you from all of us over at Dropsite News for joining us today. I'm Ryan Grim. This has been our Tuesday morning live stream. We'll see you next time.