Loading summary
A
Jeremy I'm Jeremy Scahill and this is May 19, 2026. Welcome to our regular Tuesday Dropsite news livestream. We have a packed show today. We're going to be talking about Iran, Sudan, Bolivia, some of the democratic primaries that are taking place around the country, but we're going to begin with Iran. And we have a really great guest coming up in a moment, Nagar Mortazavi, who just got done doing a stint on what has become the most popular debate show in the Arabic language world. That is on Al Jazeera Arabic. But first, just by way of background, for the past almost three months now, of course, we've been living in a state of the U.S. israeli war against Iran. And it's become very, very clear. In fact, early on it became clear that Trump had really immersed himself in quagmire and is constantly running around saying that Iran is begging him to make a deal, while at the same time we have the Iranians putting forward very clear red lines and saying that they're not going to ret from them. And Trump sort of vacillates between threatening to destroy all of Iranian civilization to then claiming that they're begging him to make a deal. And last night Trump posted on Truth Social and I'll read part of it, that he had been asked by the Amir of Qatar, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the president of the United Arab Emirates to, quote, hold off on our planned military attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was scheduled for tomorrow, which would have been today, in that serious negotiations are now taking place and that in their opinion, as great leaders and allies, a deal will be made which will be very acceptable to the United States of America as well as all countries in the Middle east and beyond. Trump said this deal will include importantly all caps, no nuclear weapons for for Iran. Now, the Iranian president, Massoud Pescheskian, said on Monday that Iran is still open to negotiations with the United States. And he pushed back against the idea that Iran shouldn't be negotiating. He said, as for those who chant that we should not negotiate, if we do not negotiate, what should we do? Fight until the end. We negotiate with dignity, he said it's not logical to say we will not negotiate. We're capable of defending the nation's rights with the people's backing. We must speak logically and receive a logical resolution. Now, Pizzaskin's comments are interesting because that has been the position of Iran throughout. The Iranians have very seriously engaged with the US Proposals. They've put forward ideas of their own. And when the temporary ceasefire was achieved. Donald Trump himself cited an Iranian 10 point plan as what he called a reasonable basis to begin negotiations. And of course, nothing substantive came out of those negotiations that were led on the US Side by JD Vance alongside Steve Witkoff, the special envoy and President Trump's son in law. But Trump has stopped short of resuming a full scale military assault in in part, it seems, because the Iranians shocked the Trump administration with their ability to use asymmetric tactics in the Strait of Hormuz. It's very clear, based on now corporate U.S. media reporting, that Trump and his war secretary, Pete Hegseth, greatly exaggerated the extent to which Iran's ballistic missile and drone capacity had been damaged. And of course, unprecedented strikes took place against US Military facilities and other US Israeli infrastructure, not just in the Persian Gulf, but also in Israel itself to a degree that it really does seem that Trump is probably being told if he does attack Iran again, that it is going to be absolutely catastrophic for the region and is unlikely to result in any capitulation from Iran. So there's a lot to discuss here and I want to bring on Negar Mortazavi. She is a senior fellow at the center for International Policy and the host of Iran podcast. Nagar, it's really great to see you and thanks so much for all of your really excellent analysis you've been offering over these past three months.
B
Great to see you. Great to be back. Thanks for having me.
A
So let's begin with this latest news. Give us your sense of what's going on here, because clearly these GCC countries are panicking at the idea that if Trump bombs Iran again, that they're going to be struck very, very hard. And Trump is kind of hooking this on the idea that it was these Arab Gulf leaders that were the ones that kind of convinced him not to move forward with destroying Iran's civilization today.
B
Well, first of all, what day was it? It was Monday. Every Monday, something new comes as far as pressure, lifting pressure. This has very much to do with the market, which we know as a result of this war, the situation in the state of Hormuz, global energy prices have been going up, there's an inflation problem with fertilizers, and potentially there can be problems with food security. And this is very much a part of the Iranian strategy. We can discuss it further later if you want. But this is very much part of that asymmetric war or that sort of horizontal escalation opening the war on various fronts that you mentioned, Jeremy. And so I think that's front and center in President Trump's mind that, you know, every Monday what do I do about the market? It's about to open and this problem still persists. So I think I see that as part of the problem. And if we go back to his statements, a lot of his posts and this sort of, you know, shifts in the posturing, a lot of it has happened on Monday. If you remember that Freedom Project when he wanted to force open the straight of hormones that also came on a Monday. Well, it failed by Tuesday of that week. As far as the GCC states, Yes. I mean, I believe that there was pressure from at least majority of the GCC states because I don't also think there is a unified gcc. Not before the war, not now, and probably not after. I mean, a country like the UAE Emirates has a very different position vis a vis the US They've normalized with Israel and also with Iran and throughout the course of this war. But GCC in general, if we look at sort of the chunk of it, the majority did, did try to lobby the White House before the war. So the war doesn't start because the Iranians had telegraphed to them everything that they were going to do. They had threatened basically every step of the way. Which also is the irony because there seems to be surprise in the White House but by what Iran has done. But Iran hasn't done anything that they didn't promise or threatened to do. And so I think the GCC states foresaw this coming. They predicted they took Iran's warnings and threats very seriously. Nevertheless, they convince the White House essentially their power, their collective power. And add to that Turkey, add to that Egypt, it wasn't enough to match the power, the one country, Israel, who essentially the Prime Minister convinced Donald Trump to take this war, thinking it's a cakewalk, high on Venezuela, thinking this will be another Venezuela situation, easy regime change, assassination, I don't know, people rise up and we'll find a Del C. Rodriguez or something. And none of that happened. So throughout course of the war, the GCC states have paid a very high cost price for this war as Iran had threatened them that this will not remain inside Iran's borders, it will become a regional war. And they did it and they did sort of this asymmetric escalation. And the GCC states continue to suffer. And essentially the way I see them is they're stuck between a powerful ally which is the United States, which has these bases in these countries that were meant for defense and protection. These bases turned into the opposite of of what they were meant to be. I mean, they were used to attack a powerful neighbor, which now they're stuck between this powerful ally and a powerful neighbor, Iran, who's been there and will continue to be there. And so there has to be some rethinking and sort of a shift in how they've managed these two very important relationships post war.
C
Yeah.
A
You know, I want to talk also about what is actually being negotiated here. You know, Iran. And I, I speak regularly to Iranian officials and other Iranians who are, who have connections to some of the spheres of influence and power in Iran. And what I've been told about the issue of the enriched uranium is that in the, and mind you, let's, let's put on the table what we're talking about here. We're talking about roughly a thousand pounds of highly enriched uranium to what we understand to be a 60% enrichment level. And you know, Trump keeps saying that his bottom line is that Iran needs to say that it won't build a nuclear weapon. And he has said that he wants the, what he calls the nuclear dust to be removed from Iran and taken into the custody of the United States. Set aside the fact that Iran's policy for several decades has been that it is not going to build a nuclear weapon. And that has been its official policy. It seems like part of what has happened in the last couple of days is that Iran potentially put that in writing again and said we're not going to build a nuclear weapon because that has been their policy. So essentially restating the obvious, if you read between the lines of Trump's post, that that may be something that's taken place, but perhaps more relevant. I mean, that would be a crazy thing for Trump to say, oh, I won because Iran has agreed not to make a nuclear weapon when in fact that's been policy crazier. Yeah, crazier things have happened. But, you know, he is looking to fabricate a victory narrative. But setting aside that possibility, what I'm, what I've been told by the Iranians is that what they've put on the table is that they are willing to agree not to clear the rubble from three, the three primary enrichment facilities that were bombed by the United States and Israel during the so called 12 Day War in June, that there is potential discussion of a very limited time frame of suspending the enrichment of uranium, though they're not putting that in writing as part of these proposals right now because the Iranian position is that first we need to address an end to the war and the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the unfreezing and repatriation of Iranian assets and the lifting of sanctions. The United States has put on the table that it basically is not going to agree to any of those things and keep centering this issue of the highly enriched uranium. What is your understanding of where those discussions stand right now on the issue of the highly enriched uranium? Iran's position, because they are maintaining very clearly that they have a right to civilian enrichment activities. But at the same time, it does seem that if we get past an initial phase where there's sanctions relief and repatriation of assets, the Iranians actually are willing to exhibit flexibility in these negotiations, potentially even transferring enriched uranium to Russia or China as part of a comprehensive deal in return for yellow cake. So they can use it for civilian purposes.
B
Yes. I mean, first of all, talk about creating goals throughout the course of an unnecessary illegal war and creating problems that didn't exist. I mean, this whole strait of hormones, if you ask half of the world where the strait of hormones was two months ago, nobody knew. And now everybody wants it open because it's a problem, problem that this war has created and now it has to be resolved. And the nuclear issue, also, just to remind your audience, the Iranians negotiated with this administration twice on this issue. Once last year, they got attacked with a war in the middle of those negotiations. Again this year, they negotiated, they got attacked in the middle. So the foundation of the problem here, there, there is no trust, first of all, in Tehran for this administration, and also the fact that the goalpost keeps moving throughout the course of the negotiation. So President Trump ran two campaign, two elections, and throughout, you know, even after he entered the White House, like you said, the main talking point was they can't have nuclear weapons. They can't have nuclear weapons. And great. That has been Iranian policy. The Iranians said this is something we can agree. I mean, we agreed with the Obama administration. We signed a nuclear deal which took, by the way, two years of intense negotiations. I mean, timing is also very important here. There's a lack of trust in Tehran. There's also a lack of patience in Washington for. For a deal. And so if that really is the issue, not having weapons and not having this civilian program, which by the, you know, reporting of State Department, US Intelligence, UN Nuclear watchdog, it has remained a civilian program to not have it weaponized, that that deal is easy. It's something the Iranians are going to agree to and that the US And Iran can hammer it out. The problem was created when the US Moved the goalpost throughout the negotiations and said zero enrichment. Now, zero enrichment is not just no weapons. Zero enrichment means no civilian program. From the Iranian viewpoint. The Iranians say we are a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty npt and as a signatory, we have the right to a civilian nuclear program and enrichment. And so I think that's one of the core of the problem in the mean, the problem that was created throughout the negotiations. One was that and then the thinking in the White House that, okay, if we can't get what we want throughout the negotiations, we're just going to go bomb the Operation Midnight Hammer last year, we're just gonna go bomb this program and come out and pretend like it's done. It was obliterated. That statement still exists on the White House website. If you look it up, Iran's nuclear program was obliterated. This is June of last year. And then again, somehow this nuclear program becomes a problem and then the country gets attacked and the nuclear problem doesn't get resolved. Now, as far as the details of what's offered, look, the Iranians understand that this is, is not just about the nuclear issue. This is very much a domestic problem. This is, as Barack Obama just recently in an interview said, the problem with the jcpoa, the nuclear deal that was made under him, was that he did it, it was an Obama nuclear deal, not that it was a bad deal. And Trump called it a bad deal. And so what he wants to sell to his base domestically in the US is to one up Obama and say, I had a better deal. And it took the Iranians a while, I mean, I would say a few years to under understand this domestic dynamic, but they finally understood it. And so now they have been saying both privately and publicly that they're prepared to deliver something that's better than the jcpo. They've actually said it. The Iranian Foreign Minister has actually said this will be better than the jcpoa because he knows that that matters now. Better than the JCPOA with the condition. Because the program has also expanded thanks to Trump pulling out of that nuclear deal. The jcpoa, it can look in different shapes and forms. Like you said, the Iranians have offered to transfer that 400 kg of highly enriched uranium which is now under the rubble to Russia to dilute it or to hold it, to do it in stages. Because this is also a problem, the lack of trust. What are they going to get in exchange for the transfer of this? What they see as their, one of their main leverages, they Want sanctions relief. They want an unblocking of their frozen assets. Billions of dollars of Iranian assets have been frozen outside the country in various countries because of pressure from the us. Every industry in Iran has been sanctioned severely by the U.S. oil, gas, you name it. And so they want some form of an economic relief out of this war, which they couldn't get at the negotiating table with this administration. Now they think they have the upper hand on the battlefield, and they want to get that. Now, I think at the end of the day, if, if you ask me about the big picture, Trump started this war with no reason, you know, illegal. No vote from US Congress, no vote from Security Council. It's very unpopular in the us it's unpopular around the world. Thousands have killed in Iran, not even considering Lebanon, and also across the region. He's the one who can end it. But in order to end the war, he has to understand he can't be the absolute winner. This talking point that he's winning. Winning, Winning. We destroyed their army, we destroyed their navy, we destroyed their air force, obliterated the nuclear program. We're going to force open the Strait of Hormuz, call it a humanitarian operation. None of that is going to work. I mean, the Iranians, like you said, they have put up a pretty big fight. And for them, I mean, easy for them, winning is just not losing. They're defending in their home turf, they're, they have the advantage of the home team. They're defending their homeland, their sovereignty, and they have had various cars to play and leverage us. And so they're not going to give up, they're not going to surrender, they're not going to capitulate. They're offering a deal, which by the admission of the Omanis, not just the Iranians or the Americans, listen to the Omani mediators in the nuclear negotiations. It was a good deal. Much better than the jcpoa, top US UK national security official who was involved in that process. It was a good deal. There's a diplomatic solution to this problem. So if the problem is a nuclear issue, the Iranians are showing flexibility. They have been going back and forth these proposals. They want to do it down the line after the war ends, like you mentioned, because, of course, it's a complex issue. It took two years with the Obama administration just for that one issue. You can't send your vice president halfway across the world, give him four hours to resolve the entire kitchen sink, you know, nuclear issue, Hormoz, ending the war and all of that. And so this lack of patience in The White House, I think, is a real problem. The lack of a serious technical team who can bring this all together. You can't have the vice president doing the entirety of a nuclear deal. You need experts, you need technical teams, you need support. And also, you know, this lack of trust in Tehran. So it has to be done in stages. There has to be some form of an assurance or guarantee. That's why the Iranians are looking east to China, to Russia, to these bigger powers who can put their weight and somehow, you know, give them assurance that what is going to be a agreed or signed or, you know, done in handshakes is going to actually happen. Because that's, that's how much trust is lacking for Washington and Tehran that the administration could say something and then they can go around and do something else.
A
You know, I also want to ask you about some of Iran's neighbors. I mean, I've, I've said consistently that if you landed on planet earth from Mars and, and you knew nothing about this, and you just listen to the speeches or read the statements of many of the GCC leaders, not all of them, but many of them, you would be under the impression that this place called Iran woke up one morning and decided to just start launching ballistic missiles at its neighbors. You wouldn't be aware that there was an entity called Israel in the world or a country called the United States. You would just say, why on earth would this country do this? Why would, why would Iran just start launching ballistic missiles at its neighbors? And what's become clear is that Iran had very sophisticated, detailed intelligence in all of those countries, certainly against U.S. bases. You know, the iranians managed to fly an f5 f5 warplane to bomb a u. S. Military facility inside of Kuwait. This is utterly scandalous that the United States was unable to prevent that attack from happening. It was, I believe, the single deadliest strike against American forces in this war. The Iranians had detailed information on where the CIA station in Riyadh was. They, in a very controversial act, they shelled a hotel in Bahrain. Now, I'm against the bombing of civilian infrastructure. I don't think there's any excuse for it. And when the Israelis do it, it's disgraceful. On the other hand, you add Iran saying, we hit this because it was housing American personnel that had been evacuated. And we later found out that that was true. This isn't an ethical or morality judgment I'm making. It's a point about intelligence. So the Iranians have all of this intelligence. And I think that it seems as Though several of these Gulf countries recognize that they have to go back to the period of rapprochement that preceded this war where Iranian diplomats were engaged in very intense diplomatic reparation work in the region leading up to this. But one country that sort of stands out is the United Arab Emirates, which very clearly is, has shifted its regional posture to openly being supportive and in partnership with Israel. And if Trump moves forward and bombs Iran, my understanding is that Iran is going to relentlessly strike the United Arab Emirates, just massively bomb them. I mean, I think, I think a lot of places are going to get hit, but they really want to go after it. And so as we, as we wrap, I want to ask you about that dynamic with the United Arab Emirates because it does seem like returning to a diplomatic position is possible with almost all of the countries in the region and Iran. But regarding the uae, it seems like this is the beginning of what's going to become a very intense story.
B
Right, you're absolutely right. Look, these countries have been hosting US bases in the name of defense, in the name of protection. And essentially from the Iranian viewpoint, and this war didn't start this year, it started last year. Also, these bases are part of an infrastructure connected all the way to Tampa centcom, that has provided, you know, sort of the foundation for two illegal wars launched against the neighbor. And the irony is that when that neighbor retaliates against these bases, these bases are not enough to protect or defend these countries. Essentially, the US Almost is like, okay, you're on your own now. Defend yourself. And we're leaving the bases. So I think that, I mean, the irony is double sided, but from the Iranian viewpoint, and like you said, with the intelligence, of course, I mean, imagine if, if you have a wall, if you want to climb it at some point and there's a ladder, this is how the Iranians see the bases provided the logistics, the infrastructure, the confidence for the US And Israel to attack Iran with the support of these bases. Now, how much each country, each base was involved, that, you know, the intelligence has to be provided and presented. But as a whole, I think this, this is the idea. And like you're saying, the, the presentation of how this came out of the blue and it's completely separate from the war is just utterly false. I mean, Iran is not attacking Afghanistan is not attacking, Pakistan is not going around attacking, you know, every neighbor. They have specifically warned the Gulf countries, the GCC countries, they had specifically threatened them. And they specifically even said, you know, depending on how much engagement, what is being used, land Air, sea, the base, that they're going to retaliate. Now I'm also with you, I'm very much critical and against attack on civilian infrastructure. Even if you have military personnel house there, there was hotels, there were airport strike. But I think the other thing is the elephant in the room. I mean I've, I hear even US commentators talk about international law when they discuss the GCC attacks on GCC or the Strait of Hormuz. International law has been dead in this region. I mean talk about three years of genocide. Look at how Israel is quote unquote defending itself. I mean, can you imagine if everyone who was attacked would defend itself with a genocide in the region? So from the Iranian viewpoint, and not that I necessarily agree or disagree with this, international law is dead. They have been attacked in two illegal wars. Unnecessary, reckless, you know, all those political terms, but also illegal. The war started with an attack on an elementary school killing 160 children, elementary age children, universities, hospitals, schools, medical centers, I mean, you name it. As far as war crimes and you know, the death of international law, there are hundreds and hundreds of examples. I mean 2/3, Bloomberg had a report that 2/3 of the targets bombed in Iran were civilian targets. Infrastructure. From, you know, from the viewpoint of a civilian, you never knew if you're going to be the next target, the next collateral, your home, your child's school. And so to come to enter a game at like level 8 and suddenly start claiming international law, I think from the Iranian viewpoint just sounds absurd. And to your point about the GCC countries. Yes. I don't think, like I said at the beginning, there isn't a unified GCC or I think each country has had different relationships, different political position or at least I would categorize it in maybe two, three different groups. The UAE decided to put all their eggs in the US and Israel basket. They joined the Abraham Accords, they normalized and started these intelligence defense collaborations with Israel. And we see that what happened to them as far as the cost in this war has been the highest, the way Iran sees them and has engaged them in the war. A country like Oman, the other, the opposite end, very different. They've been trying very hard to keep themselves completely out of this war and I think it's been successful. Of course they've had a very close relationship with Iran and then a country like Qatar sort of in the middle, the host of the largest US base in the region, they were hit by Iran at the beginning, but they've tried a lot of back channel diplomacy and tried to Sort of remove themselves as much as possible from the war. So these countries, I think each of them will have a different path. But if you look at it big picture, again, like I said, they're stuck not to, not to decide. But they have to manage a relationship with a powerful ally. I don't think any of them are going to let go of the relationship with the United States as powerful ally they have relied on for many years have had, you know, trade, defense relations, but also to come to terms with this powerful neighbor that's been there for thousands of years will continue to be there. You can't just, you know, pretend like this has nothing to do with you. That's exactly the Iranian message, I think to their neighbors that it can't, war can't just keep coming to us. And you they tolerated once last year and then this year they changed the doctrine or the policy. It, the neighborhood cannot be unsafe for just one of us. And the rest of you be these oasis of, you know, safety and security and commerce and, and trade and all of that, while part of the infrastructure of the attack and the war on us is provided by, by some of these neighbors. So I think there's, there's hard thinking there will be a shift in the dynamics in the relationships, especially in countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi have a detente. I don't think it's dead, but it will probably take a different shape or it will take some time to amend. Also, it's important to note right now in Tehran, it's the military commanders in the driver's seat. Once the war is over, the diplomats will have to go out and do a lot of the cleaning up of what the war has done to the relationships. But right now the thinking is we're defending the sovereignty, the independence, the homeland, and we have to win this war, at least not lose it. And then diplomacy and other relations have taken a backseat seat or are not top priority and they will be considered later from the Iranian viewpoint. And then of course, the gcc, each country will have their own decision.
A
Yeah, Nagar, we only have about a minute or so left. But I do want to get your, I want to get your sense of where you think this is headed because as you pointed out, twice in a year the United States claimed to be entering or engaged in negotiations with Iran and then carried out massive military attacks with Israel against Iran. Trump is now saying that, that he, he believes that some kind of a deal is, is in the works. I mean, you also have holidays coming up. Id Al Ada is coming I think the GCC countries also, in part, are concerned about a war happening during that period. But what. What is your sense, do you think, that there actually is any viable negotiation that that can take place, given the position we understand that Iran is taking, as well as Trump's maximalist demands?
B
Well, right now, I think there's a narrow path to diplomacy. I don't have a lot of hope because I still don't feel like he's given up on this idea of winning. But again, I think it's simple. I mean, he started it. He can end it the moment he understands that he has to give. You know, diplomacy or deal making is give and take. Right now, it just sounds like from the US perspective, there's a lot of taking and not much giving. If he decides to make some concessions, accept whatever the win. I mean, the US has had victories. They have absolute military supremacy with Israel over Iran, so their gains have not been minimal, but just accept whatever has been achieved until now. Also considering the devastation of a country and just exit the war and hammer out the details of the deal? I think it's very possible. I think the ball is in Washington court, it's in the White House, and the decision is with the president. If he decides that he's done enough winning and he can just exit this war and claim what he want, but to wait more, to put more pressure, to use more force, thinking that at some point these Iranians will surrender, they will capitulate, they'll hold their hands up and say, you win, we lose. That's just not going to happen. I mean, we see literally these Iranian officials are willing to die in assassination after assassination and not certain there. If anything, it's made them more, you know, resolve and more hardline and more determined to continue to fight. So I think that needs to click in the White House that this won't end in surrender. This won't be Venezuela, this won't be, you know, another regime change situation, and it's time to exit. And in order to make a deal, you have to accept to make concessions.
A
Yeah, I largely agree with what you said, and I think. I think the most likely scenario is either Trump finds a way right now to fabricate a victory narrative, and maybe then we end up in a situation where there isn't any significant lifting of sanctions or any repatriation of assets, but Trump finds a way to essentially just abandon it with the status quo, as it is also possible that there's another round of strikes, maybe an operation in Hormuz before he does that. But at the end of the day, Trump is not going to win the kind of victory that he claimed. And for Americans, I think everyone should recognize that fact and say, look what has just been done over the past three months. Has this made us more safe or less safe? Has it helped American families or not helped American families? I mean, it's hard to expect people to care about the 165 girls that were murdered in that strike at the first end. It's just an unfortunate reality of American political life. The center of this should be the human costs that we're inflicting on the rest of the world. But through purely an American interest lens, none of this made sense from the very beginning. It was all constructed based on lies. I mean, you and I know all of this. Nagar Mortazavi, thank you very much for joining us and for all of the really vital work and analysis that you offer.
B
Thanks for having me. Jerry, great to see you.
A
Nagar is of course senior fellow at the center for International Policy and the host of Iran podcast. I want to bring on my colleague Ryan Grimm from dropsite News. We, we have a jam packed remainder of this show where we're going to be looking at Sudan, Bolivia, at some of the U. S. Elections that are happening right now. It's, it's jam packed. Hey, Ryan, how are you?
D
Hey, how you doing, Jeremy?
A
All right, well, I mean we're, we're a little over time here, so I'm going to hand it off to you. We, you, you and I could probably talk all about what's happening in, in, in Washington regarding Iran, but we can, we can save that for dropsitenews.com we got a lot of really good reporting coming up.
D
Yes, indeed. I'll catch you later. Thanks so much. And so for the rest of the program, we're going to move to Sudan in just a moment. After that, assuming we have time, we're going to talk about the uprising in Bolivia with Katherine Lederber who's going to be joining us from the Chapari region. And then after that, Julian Andreoni, our Capitol Hill correspondent, will be joining to talk about, uh, congressional primaries in which APAC is playing a major role. Today you have particularly the most expensive congressional primary in American history which is eclipsing the last two, which were Jamal Bowman and Corey Bush, in which AIPAC spent tens of millions of dollars. This is Thomas Massie's race in Kentucky where Trump and AIPAC are spending millions to try to oust him. Of course, he was the, the Republican who took the lead in exposing the Epstein files. You also have in Philadelphia APAC secretly spending, you know, three plus million dollars to try to take out a democratic socialist anti genocide candidate, Chris Rab. But first we're going to talk about, we're going to do one of our regular updates on the, the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Mason Mustafa will be uh, will be joining us for this as well as Nathaniel. Well, Nissan Harriman, photographer, global ambassador with Save the Children Oscar nominee. Thrilled, thrilled to have him with us. Misan, thanks so much for being here.
E
Pleasure.
D
And then Daniel Raymond joining us again from, from Yale to discuss the, the latest as it, as the crisis unfolds there. Do we have, do we have the thing? Oh, he dropped off. He'll be back here. He'll be dropped. He'll be back here in one moment. And Mace, are you able to join as well? But so Nissan, let me start. Mesa, how you doing? You're muted.
F
I'm still getting used to this man.
D
You'll get there. It's a lot like zoom. All right, so as somebody who has been trying to kind of draw attention to this conflict between the UAE backed RSF and then the, the Sudanese army in, in Sudan as it has unfolded for years now, what are you, what do you see as the kind of leverage points like where, where, where is the hook to kind of get politicians and, and the public engaged here?
E
I think it's. Can you all hear me?
D
You got it?
E
Yeah. I think it's a, it's a coalition of, of voices that need to understand how to cut through and I'll be frank, the ethno supremacist viewpoint of the lack of, of value that Sudanese lives have across the board. Because if I think of the work I did for Ukraine in particular and the amount of reach I was able to get with multiple humanitarian organizations and compare that to the screaming I have done on my social media for Sudan. I think it's really, really important now to, for both activists, media professionals in your world, Ryan, to really figure out the cadence and language that cuts through because it certainly hasn't. If you look at the biggest potential loss of life on this planet, it is only one country, it is Sudan. And what's going to cut through to a mom and dad in Ohio or in Manchester, it's usually something that they can relate to. And that is why the stats on the potential loss of life to children is something that is not really repeated enough. We speak about the violence towards children, but the actual potential loss of life to millions of children, I don't think is being represented in the way that it could do. And that may well cut through to a lot of people.
B
Cool.
D
So Nathaniel Raymond is back. We could welcome him onto the, onto the program here. Nathaniel. Oh, no, he doesn't have camera yet. So I, I want to, I want to interrogate that a little bit. It feels like, you know, we had a dar for moment right where we got George Clooney. I remember he got arrested, right. We got the musicians. And it was about a humanitarian crisis. It never really touched on the roots of the conflict. It was more about children are dying. We need to do something about it. Obviously, when children are dying, we need to do something about that. What can be done, though, to point people towards the, the roots of these conflicts? Like the reasons, the reasons that this keeps happening so that we can.
E
Well, I think that's, that's got a little bit better because the, the Palestine movement has actually helped a lot of people connect the UAE to what's happening in Sudan. The difference between the Palestine movement, I think, in Sudan and, you know, this may sound a little unemotional, but I think the, the amount of actual sort of footage of the horrors of what's happened in Gaza relative to the footage of the horrors of what's happening in Sudan, because in many ways they're, they're not, not too different, actually, especially in regards to children, especially in the age where people can share things and it can go viral very quickly is different. And I, I keep going back to this, but you have to remember that big parts of what I would say Black Africa traditionally have been looked at in a very sort of white savior lens. What I mean is the poor starving babies, let's put on a concert. That's the sort of thing that a generation ago a Western audience could really relate to. I think now we have independent publishing. You know, people like Dropside voices like mine and others, it is much easier to articulate that, you know, the places where many of you like to go on holiday are funding what many are saying is as close to another genocidal enterprise in Sudan. And it's so important to connect it to people's daily lives where they like to go on holiday and really connect that. Just like people are beginning to connect Congo to our iPhones and our Teslas. And it's all of these different talking points. Because if I think of a Sudan protest that I photographed and I photograph many, they are tiny. They are absolutely tiny relative to Iran or Palestine or Black Lives Matter or women's rights. And I think some of These movements need to bring in Sudan into the Palestine movement, for example, and have this shared sense of collective liberation beyond posts on Instagram, but actually within the actual direct action in the protest movement. We need to see Sudanese leaders and all the signs and talking about Gaza and then swiftly moving on to Sudan with well armed information on what's happening to the human beings there. And I don't think that's happening at all. The final thing I will add is I do not see CNN and others reporting Sudan in a way that humanizes the people of Sudan. And that makes it very hard to cut through to the busy Americans and Brits and the rest of people in Europe.
D
All right, Nathaniel Raymond, if you're able to join us now. Thanks. Thank you for being here. Really, really appreciate it.
F
Can you hear me saying no audio?
D
Oh, he's got, he's got no audio. Great. So, Misa, one other question there. It's not so, so it's not just where people holiday, but I think that's really important too. I've seen a lot of talk about the National Basketball Association. The UAE has done, has, has done everything it can, along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and other countries to kind of sports wash its human rights record. The con, the link that it has, the NBA is crucial to it. If, if the NBA would take a stand around this question. It feels to me like that is something that the UAE would actually have to pay attention to. What is what progress has been made kind of in that direction. The NBA, you have a couple of players who, you know, stood up when it came to the genocide in Gaza. It was made extremely clear to them that that was a red line, you know, that look at Colin Kaepernick. If you want to go the way of Colin Kaepernick, go ahead and say something about what's going on in Gaza.
E
It's a good test. It's a good test. You know, Kyrie Irving, extraordinary. You know, he's been really vocal about the genocide in Gaza. He's been extremely vocal in humanizing Palestinians with Sudan. They. There may be less pushback. Let me just be real with you. And if that's the case, then the big names in the NBA, I doubt you're going to get any serious management noises. But the big names or the big platforms should do something. And it's maybe something that people that have access to them should, should lobby. I've always been amazed at how quiet sports in general has been doing during the last three most violent years, in most of our lifetimes, and, and And. And how sad it is when we look back at the history and legacy of people like Muhammad Ali and how much. Much he was a voice, especially during. During Vietnam, and. And other very serious, you know, civil rights and human rights issues. I think Nathaniel's back in case he's.
C
Sorry about that. Can you hear me?
D
Yes, all good. Perfect.
C
Hi, there.
D
Sorry, go ahead. I've been kind of monopolizing.
F
No, no, all good. Hi, Nathaniel. I think maybe something that would be useful is to get some recent updates from Sudan. I think coverage kind of peaked back in November with the Fisher massacre, and it's kind of fell off since then. Can you give us some updates on what's happening on the ground and. And now the usage of drones that we're seeing? That hasn't really been covered as well?
C
Yeah, I mean, it's. It's been a very tumultuous six months where a lot of the assumptions about how the war was going have flipped back and forth multiple times. So the apologies for the African lion hunting dog in the background. So the main thing has been since Al Fasher, that the immediate aftermath of Al Fasher caused a real military shift where the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt put pressure on the supply lines from the UAE that were supporting the rsf. And there was a period where SAF had the advantage in basically end of January into February and March, where they conducted an offensive where they retook the cities of Kadougli and Dilling in the Kordofan regions, and they began to move to the west towards Darfur at a place called in the Hood. And at that point, it actually looked like the RSF was significantly losing ground. And then what happened with the Iran war, we've had real lack of fuel on SAF side. And so basically you've seen an uptick in reliance on unmanned aerial vehicle attacks by both sides staff and rsf, including targeting of civilian infrastructure by SAF and RSF in the past, particularly two to three months. And so we're heading into the wet season now with really the focus being on UAV attacks in Darfur against primarily civilian sites by SAF, including Nyala, in the past 48 hours. And then RSF attacking military and civilian sites inside the Cordofons with an offensive attempted in Blue Nile. And so we're heading into the wet season, which is starting now. It's already underway. And with El Nino this year, it means that the rains are going to be very heavy. And so the rains are heavy and the rains are coming early. And what's really important about that is traditionally in wet season fighting in Sudan, the amount of airstrikes decline. But that's because SAF in the past has been the only actor with air power. And they rely on what's called line of sight targeting, which is basically they look out the window of the plane to drop the bomb because they don't have laser targeting. And what's happened now is that both sides have advanced drones, as we're going to report later this week. Hopefully we're seeing new types of drones of a very specific make and model on the RSF side. And these platforms allow them to fly under cloud cover. And so we're going to see the strike tempo continue in the rainy season, which traditionally doesn't happen. And so as the roads flood and the wadis flood and the bridges go out, traditionally fighting goes down. But this year, because both sides are using UAVs, we expect this type of combat that we've seen from both sides in the past 72 hours, in particular Nyala Dilling and Ella Bay to continue over.
D
And speaking of that Al Fasher massacre and also speaking of events that actually were caught on camera and drew some international attention, wanted to share this post from Dropsite recently related to a Reuters investigation where they, where they say that Abu Lulu, who was, who kind of became notorious internationally after footage of him, you know, emerged showing him executing unarmed civilians after that takeover. Now, Reuters, citing 13 sources, including top, including RSF commanders, reports that Abu Lulu is now has been quietly released. So under, under pressure, kind of you. The UAE saw to it, or at least claim publicly that he was being detained for, for these, like, over the top human rights abuses. Like, like a, a line had finally been crossed. Okay. Executing unarmed civilians on camera glibly is. That's too much. We're gonna, we're going to do something about this to deal with the international outrage. According to Reuters. You know, he's back on the scene. You know, Nathaniel, what can this tell us about, you know, what the, you know, what, what the UAE's role is here and how seriously they're taking international criticism?
C
Well, just one note. Some people are saying that Abalulu is dead. So that's that. That's a separate discussion. There's credible claims that Abalula's been killed. The big thing is, do we know
D
how recently they're making those?
C
Within the past month. But it's, it's hard to determine.
D
Well, that would, that would also indicate, well, was he killed in battle or killed.
C
Killed in battle.
D
Right. So then he would have been released back into.
C
Yeah. And. And so we. But we have the big issue that five of the most critical RSF commanders have defected, including Savannah and others who. Who play critical roles in Al Fasher. And so basically, there are, you know, rumors that I can't confirm that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been paying off RSF commanders to defect to saf. There has been a flurry of defections of groups that. Individual groups that focus around specific RSF commanders within really the past two to three weeks, and including forces that are over a division in size. And so the question is, is there an effort to try to defect the RSF into defeat? My colleague Omar Ismail, who's the former interim foreign minister of Sudan, who's on our team now at Yale Omer, made this point yesterday that it's about the balance of weakness. Now. Both sides are extremely weak. They're weak in terms of fighting power, in terms of actual personnel, they're weak in terms of supply lines, they're weak in terms of fuel. They're weak in terms of positioning. And so we really have a war that's basically like a bar fight in a parking lot between two extremely injured people where it really comes down to who runs out of blood first. And the defections in the past three weeks are extremely concerning because they were the primary middle management command of the massacre in Al Fasher. And so what's so concerning about that is that SAF is basically saying, we'll let you launder your crimes against humanity, which the UN has concluded is genocide in Al Fasher, and you'll be welcomed back with open arms if you bring your forces. And so what you've got to understand about RSF is that it's really a confederation of tribal groups outside of the mercenary elements from Colombia, et cetera, and Chad. And so you have multiple tribal groups, the Myseria, the Resegat, the Mahamid, the Beni Hawas. And so if these sub commanders break off, it's not just about the sub commanders. It's about a fracturing of the confederation of tribes that RSF needs to keep fighting. And so it really raises some huge questions about any accountability in the future with those who are primarily involved in Al Fasher being welcomed into SAF after committing these crimes.
F
I think something that's interesting is that, I mean, I feel like a lot of people compare Gaza to Sudan and how different the uprising has been for both. But something that's interesting is that Gaza, I feel like during the Iran war, the coverage has also diminished over Time. But Sudan actually in comparison is more geopolitically relevant because of its, because of the way the UAE impacts it. And yet we still don't see any coverage. Yet we still don't see, you know, the, the movements in the Western countries, you know, using this moment to really, to really highlight what's going on. What do you think? Nathan's dropping off, it looks like. But Masan, I wanted to give this to you as well where I think a lot of something that the Gaza genocide really did for Western people was, was make them connect how their role in, in affecting another place and their role in, in a genocide. Why do you think this isn't translating the same way for Sudan? Because we do know that there are Western links there as well. What is it that you think? Is it the media framing? Is it something within?
E
It's, it's a cultural framing as well. I think one of the extraordinary things about Palestinians is, is the creative output from Oscar nominated films to documentaries to a strong history of, of poets, both dead and alive writers, both dead and alive. Sudan has all of that, but it's never been amplified within the infrastructure of entertainment in the same way. That's number one. And I, when I think of, you know, people like Kwame Ture and
G
not
E
just a Pan African movement, but the idea that once the movement of the, the Arab Muslim world and the African world actually unite it, it, it's always been such a scary idea, which is why many of the especially African American voices that would go in that direction were persecuted. It really will become a kind of unbreakable bond that we haven't seen in a generation. And there is a real opportunity through Palestine into Sudan and Congo where we can have a union of resistance in voices, but also how it's represented to the Western world, that's never really happened before. And it's a really important thing that I'm trying to do with many other people is when I mentioned whether it's a West bank, whether it's in Gaza, it's also important with the same tone and sense of importance and urgency to speak about Sudan and Congo. And the other thing I wanted to just bring to everyone in, in this conversation is, you know, obviously Dubai is very vulnerable, but financially because of Iran, that's been well reported. Is there a, a situation where the UAE may actually fiscally struggle to, you know, to, to continue with this because of how hard it's been hit with tourism and, and, and, and the, the uncertainty of what's going to happen in the future with Iran?
G
Yeah.
D
Nathaniel, if you have audio back.
C
Yeah.
D
I'm curious for your take on that. The UAE has been on an adventurism spree for the last decade with this kind of being, its kind of climactic expansion of its military role in the, in, in not even the region, but kind of a broader region. Are there, Misana? That's a good question from Hasan. Like, are there actual physical limits that are being put on the uae? Forget that.
C
Yes.
D
Geopolitics forgot the pressure. Their money flows out of the ground. A lot of the, you know, the straight of Hormuz being blocked, the pipelines getting hit. What, what does this do? And have we seen any of that yet on the ground?
C
Well, their money flows from the sovereign wealth fund. And so the, the real threats to them are the Manchester Football Club and the NBA. If there, if there is consumer pressure from the Americans, that stigmatizes investments in co branding with the sovereign wealth fund, which is basically the Emirates Airlines logo that you see on the court right now in the NBA finals. If there's pushback on that at a moment where occupancy in hotels in Abu Dhabi such as Burg Al Arab is at 10% of what it was prior to the war, which was 80%. So they're, they're struggling on tourism. They have a vulnerability seen by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Committee letter to NBA, Warner Brothers, Disney and airlines that came from Congress about two weeks ago. I think it was the most important advocacy moment in the war, maybe in about three years, was Congress sending a letter to Commissioner Silver saying you need to rethink your ties with the uae. Basketball diplomacy can do more here than the Quad than a Jetta, a reignited Jetta process can do on ending the war. Because what we learned at the start of this year in observation from space of the supply lines is that the RSF is very fragile in terms of ammo, drought. They consume a lot of ammunition. And if you disrupt 30%, not end, but disrupt 30% of the volume in those supply lines, they stop moving on the front line and they have no defensive line. The RSF is an entirely offensive force they can't defend. And because they're guys in pickup trucks with flying robots either blowing up or shooting missiles above them. And so that means they're basically like a, a football team that only has wide receivers in an offensive line they can't defend. And so what I'm trying to say, the UAE has immense vulnerability right now because of the war, immense vulnerability because of the growing action in Congress against their commercial ties to the United States. And the same thing's happening in England with the Manchester Football Club. If that turns into a movement that's broad based, the UAE is in big trouble because their real funding is the sovereign wealth fund and it's based on. On Western commercial acceptance.
D
All right, Manchester United, National Basketball Association.
E
That's really useful to know because we can lobby people to lobby. Lobby the teams as well. So from a lobby.
C
Kareem.
D
Yeah, lobby.
C
Kareem. Kareem has been. Kareem Abdul Jabbar has been silent. Magic Johnson has been silent. MJ has been silent. You get one hall of Famer to come out and say the word Sudan and it changes this war. I'm not kidding. You get Lebron or Jalen to come out and say the word Sudan. Say it and you'll change this war. And it's both. It should be hopeful and it should depress you to no end that the NBA can do more here than the United States government and the EU has done.
D
And maybe it's. Nathaniel, maybe it's easier to do than Gaza.
C
Without a doubt. Without a doubt. I mean, the, the issues here is that if there was just students at the college level this summer with a hashtag dropping tick tocks could burn the entire course of the war. I'm not kidding. And I say this as someone who was involved with the State Department in Jetta 1. I was part of the first negotiation process. And I'll tell you that at the end of the day, the RSF uses the negotiations as cover for action, for atrocities. They're never going to make a military settlement because they have only one military goal, which is to retake Khartoum and to defeat saf. And SAF is never going to go into humanitarian ceasefire with RSF because they know they use it to buy time to commit atrocities or to basically reposition. And so there will never be a negotiated end to this war. And so we're now in this, as Omer was saying, this balance of weaknesses. And in the balance of weaknesses, if the UAE supply line line becomes not cut but tenuous because of outside pressure on the sovereign wealth fund, that will cause the RSF to collapse. They have no defensive line. They cannot defend Nyala, they cannot defend El Janina. They can only defend through offense. And so if the UAE feels that they have to choose between RSF and the parquet floor in the NBA finals, that's a very easy choice for Mohammed Benzayed.
D
All right, well, everybody has their marching orders and Misan, I know You've got to get going.
E
Yeah, really useful, Nathaniel. I. I'm gonna definitely see if I can cause some good trouble with your information. Thank you, everyone. Thank you. Thank you.
D
And Nathaniel, really appreciate you fighting through the technical difficulties and thank you for
C
your patience, for all your work.
D
We're looking forward to this report on the. On the drone technology that you're be putting out this week and that we'll be. We'll be covering it for sure.
C
Thank you, guys. We appreciate everything you're doing on Sudan.
D
All right, thanks, Nathaniel. All right, Mesa. Well, up next, we're going to be joined by Catherine Lederber from, I believe she's in Cochabamba at the moment. Let's see if she's move through her technical difficulties. You're. You're muted there, so just unmute and then we should be pretty good to go. Or she. Or she muted on our level. All right, perfect. Catherine. Oh, no, you, you. No, you. You muted right back again.
G
Put.
D
Yeah, keep those in. Then.
F
Then unmute on the computer. Yeah.
D
Okay. Okay, that's pretty good. How we doing?
H
All is well here. Conflictive. How are you? Nice to see you again.
D
Yeah, we're doing good. And I think. Yes, Mesa, Julian's in the control room if you want to go chat with him. And then we'll. We'll welcome you back when.
G
Catherine.
D
Catherine is back. So. Yeah, for people who don't know, I. Catherine, I met CATHERINE Back in 2005 when I was down in Bolivia covering the protests that brought Eva Morales eventually to power. And so there are now protests again, very similar that have erupted as a result of. Of news reports indicating that the new government of Bolivia was going to try to arrest. Was drunk with. With the United States collaboration, arrest Eva Morales or. Or go beyond arresting him. He's facing all sorts of legal. Legal difficulties. So. But I think it'd be easier for people to latch on here if we get. Give a little bit of background about, you know, how. How we got to this place. So, you know, 2005 and 6, Morales and his. His movement towards socialism. Moss, you know, takes power. You kind of have a splintering eventually of. Of the left in, In Bolivia along the way, you saw arguably the kind of biggest lifting out of poverty of. Of a. Of a civil. Of a. Of a population in the world perhaps competitive. Perhaps competitive with China maybe. Maybe I think even better than. Than China did. Yet this kind of internal splintering left them vulnerable. There's. Then. So bring us up to the coup. The. The coup in 2019. The restoration of the left. And then what got us to here?
H
Thanks. Yeah. Evo Morales was finishing his third term and running for a controversial fourth term. I think that, you know, MAS was thinking of running a different candidate, but they saw what had happened with, in Ecuador with Lenin Moreno, and there was a lot of worry that his, you know, that the person to follow him may not, you know, follow the policies or the vision that had been established in the first three terms. And we're talking about a 34% reduction in extreme poverty, the use of, you know, to, to invalidate the resource curse, you know, the use of hydrocarbons, income and natural gas to fund social welfare programs, education, indigenous people, infrastructure. So a very long run. Much to the chagrin of the Bolivian right that had been ousted for a long time. But using this fourth run, the Bolivian Constitution says you can only have two consecutive terms. After the elections occurred, the right cried fraud, backed up by the OAS and the Trump administration. These charges of fraud were debunked by colleagues at the center for Economic Policy Research in a very technical, academic way, along with MIT educated electoral observers. And using this fraud accusation, there were three weeks of right wing blockades. The OAS admitted an audit saying that the elections were in fact fraudulent, although there were no facts to back that up. And right wing protesters began to attack Morales. His supporters actually threatened or the people in the constitutional line to become president tortured members of their family, burned homes, forcing Morales to flee soon afterwards. And then they illegally positioned Gianine Anez, who was the second secretary of the Senate, as the illegitimate president. And the very next day the military went out on the street and started killing. As you know, Ryan, there were two massacres. There were, there was torture, there was the actions of para state groups, the Union Juvenil Cruzenista that uses a Nazi salute, groups in La Paz and Parastate groups in Cochabamba as well. After this extreme violence and extreme corruption during the pandemic, elections were finally called and Morales successor, former Minister Luis Arce was elected. Unfortunately, there was a situation with Arce in power that although the Inter American Human Rights Commission completed a detailed report on the coup processes against human rights, violators and people that were key in the coup were quite slow. And Arce began to diverge from established MOS policies, generating an extreme economic conflict, a lack of income for the state and a great deal of corruption on his part at that point in time, when elections came around, there was a splintering of the left arse section of the mosque Party, which he had wrested away from Morales under questionable means. Another former Morales follower and then Morales party attempted three times to register under, as an alliance with the party or under a new name. And they were systematically and illegally blocked by the Electoral Tribunal. So what we have is an election last year that didn't have all the candidates represented or all the political forces represented. The leftist, the FARSAY followers had become discredited. In fact, RC is in prison as we speak for corruption charges, although that's not clear how it will proceed. And what we saw was an exclusion of the great majority of grassroots voters, indigenous peoples, social movements, who ended up voting for Rodrigo Paz, the current president, because his vice president, Edmund Laura, had a populist line and they perceived him as the least of the electoral evils. But what we saw upon the election of PAS is almost no grassroots representation in the Congress, a Congress dominated by PAS's party and even further Right Libre party. Jorge Tuto Quiroga, who had been vice president and president in 2021 and had carried out repression under US pressure and a government that isolated the vice president that has no plan for governance. The economic crisis continues and they eliminated, in an effort to receive foreign loans, the fuel subsidies. So from one day to the next, the week before Christmas, prices doubled and tripled for Bolivian consumers as their administration, we're now in the sixth month has gone on. They've been corrupt, they have not implemented key policies. The government is bankrupt. And grassroots sectors across Bolivia have marched to La Paz. These are indigenous Communities from the 20 provinces of La Paz, largely Aymara communities, the National Labor Union, teachers, minors, and a group of Evo Morales followers that are marching from the chaparral.
D
And so here, here's, here's footage of some of these protesters marching. There's, there's also, there's something about Bolivia's geography that makes it kind of particularly kind of small d democratic, which maybe you could explain to, to viewers. You've got, you know, you've got the, the city of El Alto, the kind of sister city of, of, of La Paz, which is much more working class, that's just kind of just above La Paz. La Paz being in this, you know, you know, in the clouds for one. But there are only really a few ways in and out. And that's why I say it's small d democratic in the sense that the kind of enough people can shut down La Paz if, if they're willing to take on the violence of the state in a way that isn't the case in most capitals, you know, because that have a lot of different ways in and out. So what, you know, when did. When did these. When did these marches start? And what has the kind of response of the state been so far? I saw this maybe this morning, that a couple major unions have. Have now joined, one in Santa Cruz and another one somewhere nearby that is, you know, also blocking roads kind of in and out of the city. So what, like, what. What is. What is the status as we speak of. Of this mobilization?
H
You're right about the geography. La Paz is in a bowl, and because of the mountain passes, it's. It's very easy to block off the entrance. This has been a situation that's been going on now for over two weeks. So the city. The city's been shut down, and the government hasn't shown an ability to negotiate with broad sectors. They blame everything on Abel Morales. They clearly, you know, they omitted a new arrest warrant for Morales. There have been a lot of sounds from the DEA about taking imorales. You know, that's something that we've looked at over the years, Ryan, this DEA obsession with capturing Abram Morales after they were expelled in 2008. But Abram Morales isn't running all of this. So you have different sectors with different demands. Although the key joint demand is the resignation of Rodrigo Paz. There's not necessarily unified sectors, but it's the great majority of the Bolivian grassroots, and they're protesting because they probably aren't going to have enough to eat next year. You know, there's a huge discourse on the part of the Bolivian government about the good Bolivians and the bad Bolivians and many of the racist overtones about indigenous people and these very strong social movements that were the backbone of the Morales government, but have also always had a very key role in Bolivian politics. The state has sent out the police, the state has sent out the armed forces. So far, they have been using tear gas and rubber pellets. But as we know, after 30 years of observing conflicts in Bolivia, when you run out of tear gas and rubber pellets, the bullets start flying. We have two reported fatal victims, an unclear amount of injured people. But we also have an incapacity on the part of the government to govern effectively or to present solutions. And as they ended up having to pay the police a $300 bonus to go out on the streets and repress protesters, the continuing participation of the security forces is unclear. A lot of this is inherited from the 2019 coup, which was facilitated by the Trump administration. And right before PAS's election, all of the cases against the military and the coup leaders and the politicians that carried out this violent coup were dropped and erased. All the charges against the violent parastate groups were erased and the sentences were erased. So you have this pervasive impunity but also a decision making power that is independent of the civilian government on the part of the security forces. When you have of course SOUTHCOM now making agreements with the Bolivian military going back to military to military representation and communication. The DEA back in Bolivia, although they have no operating budget for this year, they've been here since December 6th and they're flying things in from Lima. We've had the extradition of a major drug, not the extradition. The DEA just picked him up and took him away. No extradition process. And we're very worried that this can be, could be a precedent for some sort of operation against Morales. As a result the Chapari coca growing region which you know has been completely shut down by coca growers protecting key areas and protecting the, the coca grower MOSS headquarters in LA Kenya.
D
And have they, I've seen some footage of them blocking runways. Like have they shut the Cochabamba airport itself completely down or just out just more rural runways? Like what, what are they doing to prevent the DA and CIA and, and the Bolivian government from getting in and, and capturing Morales?
H
What they've done if, when you remember when we went on to the anti drug base, that airport in Chimore near the MOS headquarters was the key portion for drug war repression and then it became a civilian airport as well. So what they've done is they've surrounded this airport, they've covered all the landing strips, there are farmers surrounding the airport because there was a past attempt two years ago to shoot Abel Morales for by the intelligent police and they had flown into that airport. They've also surrounded the 9th Army Division in the Chapari and especially some anti drug checkpoints. They're very, very concerned. They're very, very concerned especially after what happened in Venezuela. The extraction of Maduro without any legal proceedings and proceedings in a very very violent invasion.
D
So who, who has the momentum at this point that as far as as you can tell and if he did step down then, then what?
H
Well I, you know, I think the outcome right now is unclear. This, the gut. This government also has lost the support of the far, far right there because the security forces are not anxious to go out in the mix for a government whose lifeline is unsure. The government is really allowing the para state groups to operate again or to get revved up there was a march in La Paz where they tore the Wipala, the indigenous flag. Last night you have the union juvenile crucinista whipping mosque union leaders while they're giving up protests. So they're allowing the conflict to unravel and hoping that there will be violence or at least they have no other viable strategy. So it's not clear what's going to happen. Now. The government can either call a state of exception, you know, a state of siege where they shut things down and they start firing, or they can just allow things to deteriorate. But on the right, Jorge Quiroga is anxious to take power. You know, there's a lot of pressure from the US and we see kind of dark figures in US Politics, like Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater, weighing in, the State Department weighing in, you know, kind of rolling back into a time that you and I know well where that, where the US really calls the shot, called the shots. And that's so different from how it has been for most of the last 20 years. It's not clear what's going to happen, but it's, but it's worrisome. And there's no key figure on the left, left that would take power. The vice president, because he is a populist, although I don't really think he's a progressive populist. My guess is that the right will not allow him to take power and they'll either move down to the head of the Senate or the House of Deputies or an unpredictable but worrisome right wing figure could come in.
D
And I know you got to run to. Last question for you. What, what, what about, Ava? What's his current status? I know he's been facing a lot of kind of sex crimes charges over, over the years. He's facing all sorts of attempts at prosecution. Does he have any remaining political base that could see him return to power or is he completely kind of iced out? What's, what is, what's his status?
H
Well, well, that's unclear. I mean, you know, currently there are charges brought against him for having a relationship with a girl who was apparently underage. And so there were arrest warrants out for him there. The woman, supposedly the victim and a mother of a child, says that was not the case. She didn't file a complaint. She was also persecuted and had to leave the country. They put her father in jail. So all of these things are un. But there's a great deal of pressure and I think the hope on the part of this government who carry on this right wing strategy of blaming Evo for everything when I think the movement is much more profound than that. Evo Morales does have strong support in some sectors, but the way that he has been isolated inappropriately from Bolivian politics and a lack of representation in the Congress or a lack of national electoral opportunities has kind of generated this perverse dynamic where people don't feel that they can have a role in their government and they have to take to the streets once again. You know, we saw this in 2003, we saw this in 2005. We've seen this many times before. So it's not clear if Evo Morales will continue to be a key figure. But right now he's locked in the Chapari and very concerned that somebody going to come after him and not in a way that follows due process and not in a way that is appropriate and not a way where he would count on a presumption of innocence or any human rights guarantee.
D
Well, Catherine Lederber, is there a way that people can support the work you're doing in Bolivia?
H
Certainly you can look at our Twitter feed @andianinfonet. I'm the director of the Andean Information Network. I'm happy to have more followers take donations. We're very small grassroots organization and we've been here since 1992 and we're really working hard to kind of get the word out on Bolivia in, in English and to elevate the voices of social movements and, and grassroots leaders.
D
Well, Catherine, thank you so much. Thank you so much. Really, really appreciate it. All right, let's bring, let's bring Mesa Mustafa and Julian Andreoni back on. So Mesa, we're. Today is primary day in I got out what Alabama, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, the key races. I mean there may be a couple others that I'm missing. Tell let me know if I am. Key races we want to talk about. Here in the Lehigh Valley we've got this interesting contest between Bob Brooks and a. Another Democratic candidate who has had, I think more than a million dollars spent on his behalf by Republicans who are kind of faking pretend. They created a pack called Lead Left Pack. And if you, if you look it up, it looks like the kind of website that if you're a Republican, you would make about Democrats. No, no super PAC would ever actually call itself left because a super PAC is going to be funded by, you know, huge amounts of money. People who have huge amounts of money hate, hate the left. But if you're a Republican, you wouldn't know that. But then of course you've got Chris Rabb in, in Philadelphia running against Sharif street and Allah Stanford APAC funneled more than $3 million through a super PAC called 314 Action to try to boost Stanford. But they dropped their spending about a week and a half ago as, as her race collapsed. And now it's an open question as to whether or not she collapsed so fast that her support will go to Sharif street, son of the former mayor, or if Rabbit will have the momentum there. But let's start in Kentucky. So Julian, what's so Thomas Massie facing a, facing a primary after being kind of the lead Republican who, who pushed for transparency when it came to the Jeffrey Epstein files and also has voted against, you know, various war efforts from the, from the Trump administration. So what are we looking at in Kentucky?
G
Yeah, I mean, there's been to date more than $34 million worth of spending in that race. It's the most expensive House primary in American history. And 95% of the funding that Ed Gallerin has, which is Thomas Massie's opponent, has raked in has come from the pro Israel lobby, whether that's aipac, the Republican Jewish Coalition, or from mega donors like Miriam Adelson and Paul Singer themselves or John Paulson, obviously, who's, who's in the Epstein black book is another donor who's put, I think $250,000 into this race. So, so we're seeing just massive corruption on a broad scale. Obviously it's legalized, but they're pouring money into these dark money super PACs and they're coming out against Thomas Massie. I spoke with Thomas Massie on Friday before Aipac poured another $3 million into his race this weekend about what he thinks the pro Israel donors are focused on here. Why do they have a bone to pick with him specifically? And not only did he talk about his opposition to the Iran war, but he also spoke about, like you said, his effort to lead the push to release the Epstein files. He said, yeah, you know, Miriam Adelson and Paul Singer probably have enough to buy enough money to buy their own island. So maybe they weren't on Epstein island, but they were certainly running in circles, going to cocktail circuits, going to dinners with people who were aligned with Jeffrey Epstein. So thus they're a part of what he calls and what many of us have begun to call the Epstein class. And he was just talking about also the fact that there are well established ties, mainly through our reporting here at Dropsite, led by Ryan and by Murtaza, between Jeffrey Epstein and Israeli intelligence American intelligence. And it's not beneficial to them to have somebody in Congress who is pushing for transparency about the way that not only those intelligence agencies operate, but the way that the state of Israel has operated throughout its history. And I think that when you take a closer look at that, you can see that they've interfered a little bit more than they should be towards an ally in the United States or a supposed ally at that. Yeah. Ryan, you want to.
F
Yeah, we can. I wanted to play a, a little bit of the clip just because it, it was a really, really strong one. We can start from here. Hopefully the audience connected.
I
These folks are trying to send a message which, which is if you're Republican, you better do whatever Israel wants. And I think it's going to backfire on them. They're going all in. They've pushed all the chips in. Miriam Adelson's probably spent more money on my race than she is on the ballroom.
D
What are your.
G
I mean, would you extend that logic to the big pharmaceutical companies, the defense contractors that are big oil companies that are pouring money in? Do you think that that is also corrupt, sort of the democratic will of the American people?
I
Well, AIPAC is kind of a proxy for the military industrial complex. They, when they used to try to lobby me, they tried to convince me that the aid to Israel would help our country because it would all be spent in gift certificates at your local Lockheed Martin and Raytheon outlets. And I'm not buying that, like, Americans are not, not better off when we build bombs for Israel and then pay for them and then drop them on people in the Middle East?
G
You think this has to do with the fact that you've led the push to investigate Jeffrey Epstein and he's had ties that have been established between intelligence.
I
Well, this has a lot to do with the Epstein class. Is it just pure coincidence that one of the three big donors against me is in the Epstein class files, you know, organizing an event for Howard Lnick and shaking down Jeffrey Epstein for money for that event? I mean, I think it's pretty interesting. And, you know, maybe Miriam Adelon and Paul Singer didn't particularly go to Epstein Island. They probably have enough money to buy their own islands, but they certainly go to dinner with the people that were at Epstein Island. His real interest, of course, like Jeffrey Epstein was part of Mossad's operations and even our own.
F
Yeah.
G
So I'll introduce an anecdote here, which is when I was in, when I was in the middle of Nebraska traveling around with the Osborne campaign, I Was talking with farmers in areas on the outskirts of Omaha, but also near Crete and Lincoln, Nebraska. And I kept asking them about politics more broadly. Obviously the race that I was covering was significant, but I wanted to know, I mean, who do you trust up there, if anybody? And they always said the only people we trust in Washington are Khanna and Massie. This has gained them a lot of credibility with people in the middle of America. The push to release the Epstein files, the opposition to the war, regardless of the party lines that have been established within, within Congress or whether one leadership group or the other leadership group are sending memos down to their members to support, support or to oppose any given measure, it seems like Khanna and Massie are emerging as like these independent thinkers who are pushing these things. And that's reflected in the grassroots donations. Massie has raked in around $1.8 million of small dollar donations, but below $200 per person. Ed Gallerin hasn't even scratched 200,000. And so, I mean in this race, it really is a battle and a microcosm of what we're dealing with at campaign finance. It's the big money from the pro Israel donors who have vested geopolitical and special financial interests versus ordinary people on the ground who are fighting for representatives in Washington who they deem to be credible to, you know, secure a more dignified lifestyle for themselves and secure more transparency for the American working class.
D
Yeah, and the, the polling shows that, you know, if you're 50 or 60 or go up, you're pretty anti Massey in this primary, 50 and under. Massey's winning by about 30 points. The problem of course is that Republicans are old. In fact, Democrats in, in their primaries are older too, but Republicans are older than Democrats. And so, you know, it may not be a long term strategy to be that solid with Republicans, I mean with, with, with elderly voters. But in a snapshot on primary day, like if, if you are up 30 with elderly voters and down 30among younger voters, you're probably going to win like, you know, and so what could we. Maybe not. Maybe Massey shocks, shocks the country and, and wins. But I feel like he's the honor underdog at this point given the, the historic spending against him. What do you think the message will be to Congress? What do you think people will take from it if Massie does go down tonight?
G
I mean, I think that people will take from it to shut up. I think it's like they're pouring millions and millions of dollars. It's 20 million, so roughly 20 million alone from the Pro Israel lobby. And I think if, if somebody as high profile as Thomas Massie, who's got millions of followers on social media and has become, has sort of burst into the national spotlight after the push with the Epstein even he can be taken down. I mean, in his last primary, I think he secured around 75% of the vote in the Republican primary. And it shows you that all it costs is $20 million from a special interest group to take you down 25%. That's a third of his base. And you talked about the age difference, difference. I think a lot of that comes back to the type of media people are consuming below 50. A lot of people have gone to independent media. People have gone online, they're watching podcasts and long form conversations to get a sense of what candidates believe and where they stand on the issues. People over 50 are still consuming corporate media. And corporate media is completely in, in line with what the state is saying at this point. So if Trump gives down the message to Fox News or to Newsmax or whatever other organization it is to say, hey, Thomas Massie's on the chopping block, we're not in favor of him anymore. And they run end to end coverage against Thomas Massie, that's going to chip away at the base. All they have to say is Thomas Massey's a Democrat, Thomas Massey's a Democrat over and over and over again. And people are going to jump ship. And it shows you just how much control corporate media still has over that age demographic.
D
So let's turn to Pennsylvania for a second and particularly Phil Philadelphia with the race between, you know, Chris Rabb ala Stanford and Sharif Street. Cory Booker, you may recall, very famously refused to get involved at all in the New York mayoral contest. He represent, he's a senator from New Jersey. And after Mamdani won the primary, a lot of Democrats were under pressure to say, okay, he won the Democratic primary, he's the Democratic nominee. Isn't it time to endorse a Democratic nominee? Chuck Schumer never did. To this day, we don't even know who Chuck Schumer voted for in the, in the general election. Cory Booker said, you know what? This is New York. I represent New Jersey. Even though there's a lot of overlap there. This is, this is not an issue that I'm remotely, it's not a race I'm remotely paying any attention to. Not, not, not my problem. Now down in Philadelphia, which is not a part of New Jersey, look who showed up. So here's Cory Booker rallying along with the entire Kind of echelon of the Philadelphia Machine in front of about 25 people, almost as many Machine members as they had actual members of the public. Booker delivering here a speech that I think he might come to regret. Let me play this for you.
A
I am not distracted, I am not deflected. I am not deterred. I know the way to go. There is only one way. And that street.
C
I say one way, you say street.
G
One way street.
C
One way street.
D
Oh, wow. So I can't really think of a worse kind of political message that you would try to convey to the public that then one way Street. Like I get that his last name is street, and so you're trying to play but one way street.
G
It. No, it makes total sense if you don't think about it. Yeah, no, I think that what, what they're trying to do is trying to catch up, create a catchy phrase that will distract people from the issues because Sharif street doesn't really have much of an ideology behind, besides being more moderate than Chris Wrap. You know, it's funny, when all of Stanford was asked about Chris Rab using the word genocide to describe what's going on in Gaza, she said that the G word is really hurtful. It's really hurtful. We don't want to use the G word. And she compared it to the N word. And this is what a lot of the pro Israel folks have been doing is they're trying to loop up a bunch of innocent groups in, into complicity with what the Israeli government is doing. So they're trying to say if you criticize Israel, you're criticizing the black community or you're criticizing American Jews and it's just a dirty tactic. And it's the same thing now that Sharif street is trying to do where he's saying, if you send Chris Rabb to Congress, he's not going to be a good black politician because he's not supposed to supporting Hakeem Jeffries. He's not supporting Hakeem Jeffries for leader and thus he's not with the black community. And it's, it shows the desperation. They're using the same identity politics that the corporatist Democrats have always tried to use to discredit progressives and populist candidates. But the one thing they're forgetting is, guys, Chris Rabb is black too. So the desperation is really showing. And like you said, they're coming up with these weird, catchy phrases that are, that are biting them in the butt there with Cory Books. And, and yeah, obviously there's clear Hypocrisy there. It's blue no matter who. Unless the candidate supports policies that sort of return political power and wealth to the working class as opposed to transferring wealth upward to their corporate donors and their consultant friends in D.C. so if it's Mamdani. No, no, no, of course I can't get into that race. It's in New York. That's way too far away. But if it's a corporatist in Philadelphia, oh, I'm all in. I'm traveling down immediately.
F
Right. We also saw, I remember after our investigation dropped on Stanford, do you remember her, her Instagram posts where genocide suddenly wasn't, wasn't all bold and it had its own, you know, place in Feed. So it also goes to show that it's, it's not something that they're doing unknowingly or by chance. It is, you know, on purpose.
G
Yeah, her policy platform is captivating. There was one slide that said technology is evolving.
F
Yeah, some people don't know that.
G
Yeah, it's good stuff.
F
We also have Chris Rabb, who we're seeing a lot of the same discourse that we saw with Zoron, right. Where it's like he's, he's a Democratic socialist. All he, he really knows how to do well. He's good at his speeches. We don't really have any, any evidence that he can, can do anything. Can you talk a bit about him? And we saw the AOC went out to support him yesterday as well.
D
He's a state representative. Has, has been for some time. He's got a, he's got a serious record, you know, in the Pennsylvania state legislature would. Although because of the tilt of that of in Harrisburg, it's difficult to get, you know, much, much done over the years. But yeah, so he is, you know, he, you know, he, he chose, he chose the kind of mom, Donnie Lane, in this race. It helped that he had, you know, a record for a, for a very long time to back that up. West Philadelphia, this district is as far as, as far as I understand, the most Democratic district in the country.
B
Yeah.
D
And so a lot of these, A lot of these very Democratic districts have for a long time kind of been captured by, by corporate interests because there's a lot of apathy. They're low, low, low voter turnout. And it's like, what's, what's the point? There's going to be, there's. Republicans don't even have somebody on the ballot in the fall. So, you know, a lot of, so a lot of voters are checked Out. So it's been difficult for people to kind of marshal energy. But, you know, if, if they can't do it in this Philadelphia district, they can't do it anywhere because, you know, this is a, this, this is an area that is, you know, extraordinarily, you know, populist and progressive. And there's a lot of anger at the, at the Democratic establishment and at the, and at the machine in particular in Philadelphia, which everyone understands is, you know, one of, one of the more corrupt that is out there. And in fact, over. Over just the last couple days, the, a massive universe of Democratic voters got a text message that was trashing Chris Rabb that was not signed about, you know, who paid for it, where it was coming from. Turns out it was the. It was a Democratic machine that illegally, that illegally sent this out. Maybe there will be some type of a fine at some point. Now, the road that they end up paying, but they, but they know that it's, it's more important for them to kind of get that out and then pay the fine later if maybe they end up not even paying fine that it is, follow the rules and go down. It's an interesting dynamic because Stanford was the front runner. He completely collapsed, and there was some fear that she might even drop out. But because she had, has had more than $3 million poured into boosting her name identification, that, that hopefully, from Rab's perspective, gives her some type of floor. Now, on the other hand, if you were, if you were supporting Stanford instead of street, there's a decent chance that you were supporting her because she was, she's a physician and she was, she, she became kind of a heroic figure in the city during COVID Right. And she's not a typical politician. And so if that's who, if that's why you were supporting her, then it's not obvious that you're going to Sharif Street Jr. You know, who's a scion of street family and, and famously just a couple years ago, tried to redraw, you know, worked with Republicans to redraw congressional districts. Put two Democrats, White Evans, who, who's vacant, who vacate, vacating the seat, and Brendan Boyle, who represents the rest of the city, tried to jam them into the same district so that they'd fight each other, reduce the number of Democratic seats across the state, but it would produce a seat for Sharif Street. And so Sharif joined up with Republicans to make that happen. Courts ended up, you know, getting in the middle of it, so it didn't happen. That's become that's become fodder for an attack ad lately on Street. So, you know, we'll, we'll see. It's, you know, it's, it's anybody's guess whether or not all the attacks on Rab are enough to kind of, you know, let street kind of sneak in at the, at the last minute. From the machine's perspective, they're, they're frustrated. They, they feel like Rab hasn't really been hit hard enough and that there was, you know, all of the money that was spent on Stanford was spent kind of boosting her rather than tearing down Rab. And so then when she collapsed, famously, she couldn't answer who, who should do immigration enforcement. Just incredible moment.
G
Then tried to pause a live interview. Yeah, she goes for a second, it's like, that's not how this works.
D
Yeah, that was, is like one of the worst weeks of politicians has ever, has ever had. It was that local, local TV interview which DropSite picked up on actually were the ones that posted that first. So. Gonna be a lot of anger at us too.
G
She's not gonna like us. Yes. You know what's interesting is, is with Sharif street, it's similar to the reporting that I did with Angie Craig, actually while we were covering the Senate run, the APAC bundlers, you highlighted this maybe a month ago, were creating fundraisers on their website for him. And the, and he's been saying he doesn't take money from apac, but the implication there is that you wouldn't have known if they were holding these fundraisers or bundling for you. But as you highlighted, you have to pay a fee through the portal. So his, his campaign had paid fees that allowed them to rake in that money from the fundraising page that APAC uses. So you've got like these two pro Israel candidates who are sort of using these back channels that you and I have highlighted in our reporting to take the money without associating with the toxic name.
D
All right, well, polls close in Philadelphia at 8pm I think in what, Kentucky earlier, maybe even. Don't take my word for it. Search yourself. Everybody elections in Georgia as well. You know, go out, go out and vote. Do your civic duty. But. So Mesa, Julian, you know, thanks so much for, for doing this, of course,
F
closing out this two hour stream.
D
Oh, wow. Well, that'll, that'll do it for us today. Appreciate everybody watching as always. If you can support us, you can do that over@dropsitenews.com either. Become a subscriber, become a member here on YouTube. You can go to donate.dropsitenews.com if you want to make a tax deductible contribution. On behalf of all of my colleagues here at Dropsite, thank you for watching and we will see you soon.
Air Date: May 19, 2026
Hosts: Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Grim, and the Drop Site team
Guests: Negar Mortazavi (Center for International Policy), Nathaniel Raymond (Yale), Misan Harriman (Photographer/Activist), Catherine Lederber (Andean Information Network), Julian Andreoni, Mesa Mustafa
This episode of Drop Site News dives deep into the escalating US-Israeli war with Iran under President Trump, analyzing diplomatic and military stalemates, regional impact, and current negotiation prospects. The show features a substantive interview with Iran analyst Negar Mortazavi, followed by a major segment on the ongoing war in Sudan and its humanitarian and geopolitical stakes, then covers Bolivian political turmoil, and ends with updates on high-stakes US Democratic primaries.
This wide-ranging episode illustrates the global crisis points where US foreign policy, wars, and moneyed interests intersect with grassroots resistance and severe humanitarian consequences. In Iran, the Trump administration faces hard limits to escalation; regionally, the Gulf states and Israel may not find the war they wished for. In Sudan, activist experts urge the leverage of sports diplomacy to choke off the UAE’s support for atrocities, while urging a broader culture of solidarity. Bolivia and the US primaries signal echoes of elite impunity and popular pushback, with the establishment’s desperate tactics on display.
For more, see: www.dropsitenews.com