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- [00:00]
A
I'm Ryan Grimm with dropsite news. Good Tuesday morning and welcome to our live stream. The two week expiration of the ceasefire agreed to by the United States and Iran comes tomorrow. Negotiators from the United States are headed to Islamabad. It's unclear yet whether the Iranians will join them. So on today's live stream, we're going to talk about the latest on the moves toward final negotiations, toward perhaps an extension or, or perhaps the resumption of hostility. Is going to be joined by my colleague Jeremy Scahill. Jeremy, earlier this morning interviewed Hassan Ahmadi and the University of Tehran professor on the, the state of play and we're going to play extended clips from that interview and discuss them. Also this morning, President Donald Trump did at least a 40 minute phone interview with CNBC and touched, you know, significantly on his relationship with the Gulf states, how the Gulf states are feeling about the war, his position or his, his current position on the, on the negotiations, which, you know, may change by the end of this live stream. So joining me now is my colleague Jeremy Scahill. Jeremy, how you doing?
- [01:23]
B
Whiplash, man. It's, it's, this is, this has been a very intense few days.
- [01:28]
A
Yes. And so you, you and Martazi Hussein reported on Sunday that the, that while the Western press was suggesting that the Iranians were kind of eager to get back to Islamabad, that they in fact had not yet agreed to do so and were, you know, had a, had kind of side plans if, if talks fell apart or did not come together to renew the war with renewed vigor. What before we get to Trump and his CNBC interview and I'll play some clips and get your reaction to them. What, what is, what is your sense of how things have evolved over the past few days?
- [02:07]
B
Yeah, I mean, on Friday it did seem as though there was going to be some sort of a breakthrough because you had the foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Arachi, posting on Twitter that the Strait of Hormuz was going to be open again to commercial traffic. And what I'm told by Iranian officials is that this wasn't just, you know, Arachi, the foreign minister deciding to post this kind of, you know, freelance, but that there had been an agreement between the United States and Iran of kind of a tick tock of how this would unfold, that Iraqi would post, that Trump would then post something affirming it, which Trump did in fact. And in his, in his post on Truth Social, Trump actually called it the Strait of Iran and he thanked Iran for that. And then, you know, clearly something happened in between whether it was Israel intervening or others within the White House or Trump watching how everything unfolded on social media. Then he started to just go, you know, bonkers, erratic, and revert back to, you know, lunacy. And he starts saying, oh, no, our military blockade is going to, you know, remain in place. And then that culminates with US Forces shooting the engine room of an Iranian vessel and then seizing the vessel and posting video of that. The Iranians then said, we're, we're reverting back to our previous position and that, you know, what had, had been announced, the United States violated by reimposing or keeping this blockade and by shooting at this Iranian vessel. And, and, and so then it deteriorated from there over the weekend on one level. On another level, there's then these reports, oh, J.D. vance is imminently going to be landing in Islamabad. And certainly the Pakistanis have been in the middle of a huge security operation clearing large swaths of the area around the hotel where we believe another round of talks will be held if the Iranians decide to go forward. But what's clear is that, as we've reported for many weeks, it's been the United States that has been desperate for an off ramp and to have talks with the Iranians. And it's not the other way around. It's not that the Iranians have been begging Trump. And the evidence of that is just as plain to see right now with Trump once again going back to saying he's going to bomb their civilization, that if Iran doesn't make a deal with Trump according to his, you know, ultimatums, that he's going to bomb every bridge, he's going to bomb their power stations. And so while the Western press over the weekend was reporting that, you know, these talks were going to be happening, we spoke to a senior Iranian official who said, you know, we had an agreement. And this is actually a bit of news here, Ryan. They said, we had an agreement that there was not going to be any of these threats as we started to work out the details of a second round, and that this had been communicated directly to Vice President J.D. vance when they sat across the table, the United States and Iran, that there wouldn't be these kinds of threats by, by, you know, from Trump during this period. And Trump just couldn't help himself. And so what happened then is that there's been a standoff over the issue of what's going to happen in the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians have said two things. One is they recognize the Israelis are violating the, you know, 10 day agreed upon so called ceasefire in Lebanon. And the other is that the US Continues to maintain this military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. And the Iranians have said that in order for talks to go forward, there has to be some movement on that front. I think they want an entire end to the US Military blockade. I'm not sure what their bottom line would be, but the last I spoke to Iranian officials, they said that they're not going to be commenting right now on their deliberations. As of this moment, 9:40am Eastern Time, the Iranians had not put forward a formal response on whether or not they're going to send a delegation to Islamabad. My sense is that the most likely scenario is that there will be some kind of a resolution that meets the minimal Iranian sort of requests and that there will be talks. But it's always possible that the United States and Israel just decide to start bombing again. That, however, would come with great risks and likely very great cost to the United States. And the final thing I'll say on this is that the Iranians told me that if Trump and Israel start bombing Iran again, that Iran is going to cut off all diplomatic channels and focus entirely on fighting.
- [06:26]
A
And Morani just posted, let me, let me put this up because, you know, he's kind of often an interesting signal of, you know, where, you know, certain factions are headed. So he says this is this morning, an hour ago, less than an hour ago. He says everyone should immediately leave the uae, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi and Kuwait. Sailors on all ships in the Persian Gulf must also prepare to evacuate their ships. This is especially urgent for ships near the Strait of Hormuz, which will be destroyed first time is running out. What should we, what should we read from that? And how does, how does that fit into what your understanding about what the Iranian response would be if the US And Israel attack again?
- [07:10]
B
You know, what I'm, what I'm hearing from Iranian diplomats that are involved with the negotiations is that they actually are open to talking with the United States. I don't think that the preferred Iranian route is to continue the war. I think that Iran is saying what their position is, and that came in the form of public statements from Gal and others that they're not going to bow to the dictates of Donald Trump, that they're going to enter it as a nation that fought back against a superpower and Israel, you know, over the course of six weeks. But what I think that that post is indicative of is the messaging from Iran of what is going to happen if there aren't talks or if Iran is struck, because what Iran is saying is that they have other cards that they haven't played yet. You could see the Bab El Manda Straits also blockaded by Ansar Allah in Yemen. You could see much wider attacks at oil infrastructure and further military action with Iran's speedboats in the Strait of Hormuz. I think if, if the United States and Israel do start attacking Iran again, there is great reason to be very concerned. If you are a resident of one of those Gulf countries that Professor Morandi is, is mentioning. I don't think that we're at that stage, stage right now. I think that what he's saying, you know, and I'm not speaking for him essentially, is if this goes the route of continued war, you're going to see a very, very serious Iranian military response that is primarily going to be focused on US Related infrastructure in the, in the Persian Gulf.
- [08:52]
A
And last thing before we get to some of these Trump comments, help me understand the who, who benefits from this, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Because you, you now have people like President Trump saying, aha. The fact that the Iranians want the strait opened before the talks begin proves that actually it's the Iranians who want it open and that we, the United States, are comfortable with it being closed. Yeah. At the same time, Trump says the goal is to open it. And there's a, you know, there's an asymmetrical relationship to how long each can suffer economically. So what, what's your, what's your sense of how this plays out with both sides blocking the same thing?
- [09:41]
B
I mean, I, I think this is epic spin on the part of Trump. Let's just break it down into pieces. What the Iranians are saying is that the US has imposed this military blockade. And of course, they've said that this is illegal laws and regulations, which is a separate discussion. But this is a micro negotiation that the Iranians are referring to. What they're saying is that they had an agreement on how the ground was going to be set for the next round of talks and that Trump violated it by, you know, going on this rant and rampage where he's threatening again to bomb Iran back to the Stone Ages and, you know, says we're going to actually keep this military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. So it's not that the Iranians are coming, you know, crying to the United States, you know, oh, you're hurting us by blockading the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians believe That what they've done in the Strait of Hormuz and forcing the United States to come and impose what they believe is an illegal military blockade is evidence of the strength of their position. They're not asking for this because they're saying, oh, we're losing money. They're saying, if you want to have talks with us, you need to do this. So, you know, Trump is sort of, you know, it's an apples to, you know, oranges, you know, framing that Trump is, is engaged in here. Certainly on a strategic immediate level, Iran benefits the most from the situation in the Strait of Hormuz because there was all this focus about Iran's ballistic missile capacity. And Iran hasn't had to fire a single ballistic missile or launch a single drone over this two week period to show that it is able to, to impact the decision making process of the United States government and cause widespread panic among the allies of the United States around the world. So from a strategic short to medium term perspective, this benefits the Iranians. On a long term perspective, you know, if, if Trump was to essentially abandon ship on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and you have some kind of a deal that is fragile, very vague, but results in no more bombing happening between Iran and the United States, then it sort of shifts the discussion back to what is Iran going to do about this right now? Because many of the nations that depend on the transit through the Strait of Hormuz are actually allies of Iran. I put this question to a senior Iranian official because I saw Joe Kent, the former director of the National Counterterrorism center, who resigned in protest a few weeks ago. He was saying there's this third option for Trump which is to walk away and essentially just declare victory and let other countries sort out the Strait of Hormuz. It's interesting because it's consistent with Trump's line on this where he's saying, you know, we don't need this, which actually isn't true, but let's run with it for a second. So let's say that they do that. I put that question to Iranian officials and said, wouldn't this then create a serious problem for Iran if they tighten the economic sanctions, you don't get any substantive unfreezing of your assets. The Strait of Hormuz. Trump essentially says, let Europe figure it out, let China figure it out. And what the Iranian official said is, we've been engaged in a parallel set of discussions with our strategic allies and partners, including some nuclear powers, by which I assume he means China and or Russia and is saying that we're confident in the alternative arrangements that we've already shared proposals of with our allies. So it's an interesting question. I mean, if Trump were to leave the Strait of Hormuz sort of vague, I don't think that's going to happen, but it could. You know, then Iran is saying we're, we're working on alternative structures to address that. I would emphasize two things, though, just in closing on this. One is we have to remember that twice in a year the United States bombed Iran when it claimed to be engaging in negotiations. We should never, you know, forget that aspect of it. But the other is that Iran's, Iran has said it's a red line to hand over enriched uranium. The Iranians are saying under no conditions are they going to do that. They're willing to dilute it. They're willing to accept a oversight mechanism of international nuclear inspectors that does appear to have the potential to go beyond the JCPOA where there were certain sites off limits. I don't know what the Iranians are going to do about that. So, you know, there, there are issues here that the Iranians have drawn as a red line and they happen to coincide with what Trump has said are his red lines that it has to be that we get the, you know, the dust, as he, as he put it. The Iranians are saying they never made any agreement to do that. So the idea that there's going to be a comprehensive agreement in a matter of hours, I think is highly, highly unlikely. Iran seems to think that there may be some messy resolution that somehow meets its basic minimal standards and that Trump decides he doesn't want to do this anymore.
- [14:22]
A
You know, one of the themes of Trump's conversation on CNBC this morning was him again expressing his surprise at how Iran responded to being hit the first time, know, six, six weeks ago. And it feel, it almost feels like we're back in, like another deja vu moment where it's like they're, they're being very clear that if an agreement isn't reached and they're attacked again, that they're, you know, going to hit these countries very hard. And it's almost feels like Trump is set up to be surprised once again. He also said he was surprised at, at how the UAE is responding to things. Let me play this clip here. So he was asked by Joe Kernan about the reporting from the Wall Street Journal that the United Arab Emirates had asked Treasury, U. S. Treasury and the Fed for some type of a potential bailout. It's not a, not, not clear exactly what it is. Some type of currency swap arrangement, something to help the financial difficulties that they expect as they're going through this. Let me play this. And Trump's reaction to it, which is
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C
interesting all your time, if you have time.
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B
I want to ask you one more question. And you know, we have allies now in the Middle east. Maybe some are we can maybe count on more than allies in other parts
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C
of the world, but they're much better allies than NATO that I can tell you.
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B
The UAE asking the US for some type of financial lifeline.
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A
I don't know if it's a solvency problem.
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B
It's more of a liquidity problem. And I know we did Secretary Bessant did something with Argentina that worked out. Is there some type of swap possible to currency swap with the UAE to help if they need it? And do you think there would be backlash because it's such a wealth or perceived to be such a wealthy country? Is that under consideration?
- [16:12]
C
It is, but it's been a good country. It's been a good ally of ours. And you know, these are unusual times. They were more than anybody else. I mean, it was shocking because we thought that they shoot missiles at Israel but not every other country in the area. And, you know, UAE got hit with 1400 missiles. Now, fortunately, they had the Patriots and they had a great defense and they were able to shoot down most of them. But they did get hit hard. They were hit the hardest of the group, actually. And they're really led by incredible people. And yeah, I mean, I'm surprised because they are really rich. You know, they invested. A year ago I went there and I got them to invest $1 trillion in the United States. They're building a tremendous plant in a great state called Oklahoma. Aluminum plant, melting plant, beautiful, incredible. Top of the it'll be the best anywhere in the world. You know, they're very good for this country. So yeah, if I could help them, I would. I mean, we're helping them much more with what we're doing with the war because, you know, the bully of the Middle east was Iran. Iran was a bully and bullied all of these countries around and they threatened them all the time. And they threatened about the hormones strait. They threatened sometimes some people call it the Strait of Hormuz, which is actually a more beautiful wording.
- [17:32]
A
All right, so a lot to unpack there. You know, first again, he's expressing his surprise that they we thought they were only going to strike Israel, but they hit all these other places he Says they hit the Emirates the worst. That's not my understanding. I would, I would think that Kuwait and Bahrain took it worse. But what's your sense. But that's kind of a, like, that's a trivial matter.
- [17:56]
B
Yeah, I mean there's, there's no question that Iran hit the United Arab Emirates quite hard. But, you know, Kuwait certainly has, has borne the brunt of a lot of these attacks and it's the place where it appears the largest number of American soldier casualties took place. But let's remember too that the United Arab Emirates is, has normalized its relations with Israel. It's the crown jewel of, of the initiative of the so called Abraham Accords that, that Trump cooked up in his first run at the presidency. And, and the UAE is widely perceived to be a kind of Arab Zionist outlet in that region in the, in the Persian Gulf. And it, you know, it's, it, it speaks with utter disdain for Iran. It also is often zeroed in on by the Palestinian resistance as a collaborator with Israel during the, the genocide of the Palestinians. But I think in the, in the broader, so not, you know, it's not, it's not surprising that the UAE would be, you know, praised by, by Trump in this capacity.
- [19:07]
A
They shower him personally and his family with money.
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D
Right.
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B
And going back, I mean, this is a different issue, but going back to the first Trump presidency, you know, the UAE was also deeply involved with this, the attempt to try to get Trump in his first term to go to a full, full blown, full scale war against Iran. You had the Saudis and you had the uae. UAE is also very deeply connected to Jared Kushner, the President's son in law, who is, you know, absolutely swimming in money from these Gulf states, which is a huge factor in this that often doesn't get talked about when you have Jared Kushner being the person that in, in large part has been in charge of the quote, unquote, negotiations that the US has been engaged in with the Iranians. But in, in a bigger picture, I mean, it, it is both totally false and almost laughable that Trump continues to refer to Iran as the bully of the Middle East. First of all, right after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the United States armed and supported Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq and the Iraqis launched a war against the Iranians that was entirely fueled, funded and armed by the United States. The United States invaded and occupied Iraq, killed a million Iraqis, was deeply involved with the total destabilization in Syria, did regime change in Libya, has been the chief facilitator of the premier issue in the Middle east, which is the Palestinian, you know, the genocide of the Palestinians by Israel. The United States has facilitated massive wars and has engaged in repeated bombings. The idea that Iran is the, quote, unquote, bully of the Middle east is one of the greatest, just on its face, farcical lies that is being told about this situation right now. And yet that is also the narrative of almost every single Gulf Arab country, with the exception of Oman, and on occasion, Qatar will make sort of diplomatic statements. But in general, this line that Iran is the aggressor has become the kind of official talking point of Trump and all of his Gulf Arab allies. If you flew in from another planet and just listen to the pronouncements of most of these GCC leaders, you would think that Iran woke up one day and decided to just launch a war and start firing ballistic missiles at all of its neighbors. Because they never mention Israel. They never mention the United States. They try to hide from the fact that the United States has military infrastructure in all of their countries. And no matter how much they protest this claim, it is absolutely true that infrastructure has played a key role in, in the US and, yes, Israeli wars against Iran. So for Trump to say this is par for the course, but it's important to just say this is an absolutely outrageous lie, and it's an attempt to manufacture consent for Trump's threats to bomb Iranian civilization and to justify this war that was concocted on lies and probably will end with terms that are similar to those that were on the table. And in February, when the US Launched this war at the urging of Israel, and because Trump somehow was convinced that it would make him go down in history as the great man who destroyed forever the Islamic Republic, well, he failed to do all of that. And so this is something that should be really subject to prosecution in terms of international war crimes, if we lived in a just society.
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A
So he talked about Saudi Arabia as well. Let me play a little bit of this for you. Get your
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C
that. And actually, they'll need us. They need us desperately because they're a paper.
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B
The Saudis are not. Are they taking it economically on the chin to the point where they want you to end this, or are they
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C
saying, right, I spoke to him yesterday. He wasn't asking for anything. He wants to. They're fighting. You know, they're helping us. They're helping us on the straight. They're helping us. The ones that aren't helping are NATO. You know, NATO said to me, no, we'll send somebody as soon as it's over. I said, that's not really, you know, we don't need them. We'll never need them. They'll need us. They need us desperately because they're a paper tiger. But I've said that, by the way, I've said that for a long time. Before I was in politics, I used to say it. I was, I was not in politics, but I sort of enjoyed it and I liked watching things. So I always said they were a paper tiger. Europe. Europe has to straighten themselves out between energy and immigration. They have to straighten themselves out or they're not going to have a Europe anymore.
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A
All right, so Saudi Arabia, according to Trump, they're, they're doing great, they're fighting, they're fine. What's your sense of where Saudi Arabia fits into this?
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B
Yeah, I mean, relative to some other countries like Kuwait or Bahrain or the Emirates, the Iranian retaliatory strikes on Saudi Arabia have been fairly low intensity. It's not that there have been none. There's also some, some suggestions that Saudi Arabia may have a current understanding with Ansar Allah in Yemen. You know, and a wild card here is if the war becomes a wider war. You know, of course, the Saudis were spearheading the U. S. Backed massive bombing of Yemen for many, many years. And I think it's important to remember that context. And you know, we're also really trying to prevent Ansar Allah from consolidating its power in the parts of Yemen that it controls. But there has been a kind of detente between those two sides, at least on a military level. And when Ansar Allah did some weeks ago enter this war, they did so just by launching missiles at Israel. And if you had a wider conflict and Ansar Allah started to militarily attack Saudi Arabia, that could change the factors here. The Saudis also are in an interesting position because China, when it started to really assert itself more as a regional diplomatic power, brokered an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And one of the sort of not so often mentioned dynamics here is that prior to the start of these US Israeli wars against Iran and prior to the start of the Gaza genocide, there had been an intense level of diplomacy on Iran's part in trying to repair relationships with several Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia. And of course, Netanyahu and Israel were not happy about that. And you have Netanyahu was for a long time demonizing Qatar, portraying them as terror sponsors. Now, of course, Turkey, many analysts believe is going to be increasingly in the crosshairs of Israel. So when it comes to the Saudis, I think that they're happy to have Iran bombed. I think they have no objection whatsoever to constant attacks against Iran. But it does raise the prospect of starting to harm Saudi interests. And, and to that extent, I think if this goes back to war, I think we'll start to see Saudi paying a much higher price
- [26:32]
A
otherwise in this thing. Trump complained about interest rates, that they're too high. He said that he talked about his ballroom, he talked about Vietnam, said that if he had been running the Vietnam War, it would have been over in 45 minutes, would have been just like Venezuela, just like the Ukraine war.
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B
It ended within an hour of him taking office.
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A
Day one, day one, he was gonna, gonna take care of that. Let's I want to play a little bit of your interview with Hassan Ahmadian as well, for, for an American audience who hasn't picked up on kind of the, the new star that's been born in the Gulf. Can you talk a little bit about, you know, who he is and how he kind of surged onto the scene?
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B
Hasan Ahmadian is an associate professor of Middle east studies at the University of Tehran. And he's, he's really a well respected academic and expert on the region. He's multilingual Arabic, Farsi and English. And during the, particularly during this Iran war, since February 28, he's emerged as one of the most prominent Iranians that is regularly interviewed on the most watched news channels, specifically referring to Al Jazeera Arabic. And what has happened is that his clips of him have gone viral in the Arab world because he often is put on set on the primetime shows on Al Jazeera Arabic, where it's literally this Iranian academic. And you'll hear his speaking style facing down against six or seven other panelists. Sometimes they're Americans and Gulf people, sometimes it's the host going after him. And they basically are laying out this kind of position of the GCC countries where it's like Iran is the aggressor. And then he's put in the position of then having to calmly explain Iran's position. And he has a very understated style. And at times he just like kind of quite quietly and suddenly sticks the knife in the jugular of his multiple opponents. So he's become very, very popular, very recognized. He occasionally appears on Al Jazeera English, but he really has become perhaps the most prominent Iranian commentator in the Arabic language media. And he speaks fluent Arabic and fluent English in addition to obviously, Farsi. But maybe we can see A clip of one of his debates.
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A
Yeah, yeah. I have a good example of. Of this. And with apologies, if you're out jogging and you're. You're listening to this. This is an Arabic with. With English subtitles. Here, let me. Let me get this. Let me get this playing.
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D
I didn't interrupt you. I didn't interrupt you, Lee. No. Sadh. Israel.
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A
And so my sense is that he has become extraordinarily popular with golf audiences. Not. Not golf elites by any stretch of the word, because he's, you know, coming right back at them. But with golf audiences, like the public, it seems like he's really catching on. What?
- [30:46]
B
Oh, yeah, no, no question about it. And. And one of the people he was debating there was actually a. An. A journalist for a US corporate media outlet. I'm forgetting who it was, but. Oh, absolutely. I mean, he's. And you have to. The context of this that you have to understand is that. And if you watch Al Jazeera English regularly, you also understand this context. If you really are paying attention and you understand the dynamics. The narrative in. On most of these Gulf news outlets is, is that Iran is the aggressor. It's not that they don't allow the Iranian perspective. It's not that they don't have correspondence in Iran. In fact, Al Jazeera actually has some quite good correspondence in Tehran. But in terms of the nature of the debate, if you watch closely, they do a more aggressive interrogation of Iranian academics than I have seen them do on a regular basis of the Israeli guests that they have on, just to give you a sense of it. And so for this Iranian academic who is very calm, reputable, credible, to sit there and in a language other than his native language, to be skillfully dismantling his debate opponents who are representing the consensus opinion of the states in these countries, means that the public that watches all of this, everyone is glued to their TVs, because it also is right in their front yards, the retaliatory strikes, et cetera. What it is, is he is disrupting the kind of propagandistic narrative just by simply offering the other side's perspective. And when they have to amass like five or six guests to argue against him, it actually is kind of unmasking the intellectually dishonest nature of the overarching propaganda campaign. And that has made him quite popular. If you look at it in the US Context, too. You know, when someone goes on to corporate TV and they are disturbing the good order, those clips go viral, you know, and people actually are attracted to that because they're saying, wait a minute, hey, hey. This person is saying something on CNN that we don't often hear or on any of the other networks, so that we have to think about it in that context. And so he's an epic star in the sense that he's doing something that largely has been disallowed on these networks.
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A
He's, he's Al Jazeera, Scott Jennings.
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B
Oh, God, that's, I won't even respond
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A
to that, with apologies to him. Brad, let's, let's roll a little bit of interview with where he dismantles. Jeremy.
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D
Well, I think trust is not there to begin with. I don't see Iranians trusting the United States, specifically this administration. And at any time in the future, I think they will basically bank on what they have in terms of power, military power, what they have of leverage over the Strait of Hormones. The Iranians moved past the international community as a protector. The UN Security Council did not stop two wars, illegal wars imposed on the country. And so the Iranians learned it the hard way. It's about power. If you don't have power, you will be subject to annihilation. Because they came with goals, bringing down the system. And some of them spoke about bringing down Iran, some of them spoke about partitioning Iran. So it's, it's basically Iran that is being targeted. And so the Iranian perception is that we cannot trust them and we cannot trust the international community to protect us against or shield us against aggression by Israel and the United States. Ergo, we need to bank on our power. And what is the power? It is an asymmetric power. The Iranians, of course, their power does not match that of the United States. Definitely not. I mean, the combination of US Israeli Air Force is basically way beyond what Iran has. Their military power is way bigger. I mean, if you look at the budget, military budget, Iran's is less than 1% of that of the United States. So there's no match there. There's no balance there. But what, what makes the balance, you know, what inserts the balance on the ground is the mere reality that Iran has an asymmetric capability to push back against aggression. And we saw that unfold in the 39 days of attacks on the country. And so back to what your question. I think Iranians do not trust the Trump administration at all. But what they're banking on is the fact that they stood against an aggression and forced them out of this aggression, short of achieving any of their goals that were stated. And secondly, they're building on the leverage they have. That includes control of the shipments through the stereotypormuz. And also, of course, other basically influencing variables, such as the nuclear program, such as Iran's capabilities in the region. That is the axis of resistance, all of these combined. The Iranians see that they can balance asymmetrically the power of the United States and can push it back. And so they don't trust it, though. They go for a negotiated settlement, because at the end of the day, you have to stop the aggression. And there are ways. Now, how the Iranians view these ways. I think we can talk about that.
- [36:55]
B
Yeah. I mean, it's true that while Iran is being militarily assaulted by the United States and Israel, that it has shown that it can certainly win in an asymmetric sense, because it can block the United States from achieving regime change, from invading and occupying Iran, from imposing a different form of government. And Iran has shown an ability to also respond on a symmetric level, because when the United States and Israel attack certain types of targets in Iran, Iran has shown that it can respond in kind in the Persian Gulf and also in Israel. But if that's taken away, if Iran is no longer in a state of war, which clearly it has, has shown an ability and a capacity to operate very successfully in, and there is some sort of a deal, then Iran risks, it seems, a scenario where if it then reimposes some new reality on the Strait of Hormuz, or if it launches strikes, that it would be portrayed, you know, as restarting the war. So I guess what I'm. What I'm asking is if Iran gives up in some form its highly enriched uranium, which it says right now, it's not going to transfer it out of the country, and it gets sanctions relief, it gets some funds unfrozen, those things can be reversed or gone back on by the United States. But Iran, it seems, would have to give up irreversible things, such as the enriched uranium. So I guess what I'm asking you is what does a fair deal and a realistic deal look like, given Trump's obsessive discussion about highly enriched uranium and wanting Iran to have irreversible conditions that it accepts?
- [38:37]
D
Well, many points there. I think the Iranians have made it clear they're not willing to let go of their highly enriched uranium. They are willing, though, to dilute it back to 20 and then below that, 20% and below that, but giving it up, that's not an option. We had the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry saying that the uranium is Like Iran's soil, We will not give it up to the United States or any other party. But there are ways to remedy concerns. If those concerns are real on the part of the United States and other Western powers, the Iranians are offering them that. They can dilute it back. They can bring in transparency through the iaea. You know, all the things they did, but still they were subject to aggression. But the reality is that, as you said, Iran can give up and then be subject to violation and then maybe aggression again. That's a very possible scenario. Taken into account the previous years, I mean, from 2018 till now, what the Iranians are thinking is quite different. I think the war, this war and the previous war, the 12 Days War, changed the strategic calculus in Iran in a way that I personally never saw, in the sense that we are to bank on the capabilities that we have and we have a guarantee. Now you're talking about, well, opening the strait, closing the strait. That can happen, but of course, can bring in pressure on Iran. But things have changed to no return to my understanding. The strait is the key and is the table of negotiations. Everything is being put on that table. You want to get into negotiations. The Iranians say to the United States, stop the war in Lebanon. You want to have free flow of shipments and goods through the strait, then you have to give Iran the remedies to what you did to the infrastructure and the sanctions, unilateral sanctions you imposed on Iran. So that's the key to all issues. It transformed into the key. And I think it's easy for Iran to use it now. Of course, there are, you know, different aspects to it, but the clear picture of it is that we will get sanctions relief. That's the fair deal. If there is any fair deal. We will get sanctions relief, we'll get reparation for the aggression on the country. And in exchange, Iran will. Will bring in the IAEA to provide transparency, dilute back its highly enriched uranium, and of course, try to remedy relations in the region with GCC countries. And of course, the United States can, you know, talk to Iran on different matters as well. That's the general sense of what a fair deal is. But we know that there is no trust, as I said. And so what guarantees for Iran? Again, it's this strait. You violate your commitments. There is something you have to pay here. And that I think changes the mentality. Iran didn't have much to offer back in 2018, when the United States violated its commitments in the JCPOA and in extension, the UN Security Council. 2022 31. But at this point, it has tangible leverage. That is, one is, of course, the main one is straight of Hormuz. But also the unity of the fronts. If you violate one front, the other fronts will be open automatically that they showed in this war. And I think they will stick to moving forward. So we're talking Trump's language now. It's not, not about international law. He, he, he never observed any law internationally. He basically when it comes to Iran, he violated each and every one of them. And also of course, towards the Palestinians, towards others in the region. But we're talking about Iran with regards to Iran. He violated each and every law and now the Iranians are talking his language. Give and take. That's a fair, that's, that's what brings up a fair deal. You can't just take and take and not give. You violated your commitments, now you have to pay for it. You attack the country and now you have to pay for it. If you don't do that, there is something that we can use against you and it's very effective. And it's as you target our people, we are targeting the pockets of your people in terms of oil markets and energy markets and in terms of global economy. That's the asymmetric balance based on reality and power projection that is not necessarily similar to that of the United States, but it's as effective as that of the United States.
- [44:04]
B
Well, you raise a number.
- [44:05]
D
Where state.
- [44:09]
B
You know, Ryan, so what I think, I mean, it's. By the way, people can watch the entire hour long conversation that we had. It's on dropsitenews.com, we also posted it on YouTube. But in the interest of time, I also want to, I want to go to something else that Hassan Ahmadian was saying. I asked him about how the Iranians, how Iranian decision making is unfolding right now in the aftermath of the assassination of Khamenei, much of the political and military leadership, and also about Mohammed Bagar Kalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, who is the lead negotiator. And it's really interesting because there's an oversimplification about this discussion. There's this thing, well, the IRGC is really in charge, but these guys are all sort of puppets that are being sent to Islamabad. But the IRGC is really the one in charge. Trump saying, oh, we have this. We've changed the regime, the new people in power. We're talking to the right people. So I put that to Hasan and it's really the most comprehensive Explanation I've heard of sort of how decision making is unfolding right now in Iran. So let's roll that. I really would love to hear your understanding. I recognize you're not an official from the Iranian government, you're an independent analyst, but can you break down your understanding of who's in control and how decisions are being made?
- [45:34]
D
Yeah, of course. But first, Trump has been piling a lot of, you know, points suggesting that he made an achievement. I can, I mean, I mean, I've been following US Iran relations for. For decades now, and I can see that he didn't achieve anything. He actually was forced out of the war and he was trying to get an achievement. The Iranians denied him any achievement. His main achievement is the assassinations that he did in the. Israel did basically in the beginning of the war. And even that pales in comparison with what Iran achieved on a strategic level. And actually, the smooth way the transition of power happened in Iran is quite telling as to what extent this was an achievement for him and for Israel. Now, when it comes to decision making in Iran, and I think that's, you know, he has been on a. The Israelis and the Americans, the administration in the US have been on a cognitive warfare trying to talk differences or touch differences in Iran, if they exist. And I think that has been part of it. There's psychological warfare in parallel going on against Iran, but also the cognitive warfare that targets the internal politics of Iran is part of this. Rodriguez, you know, the Venezuela model, et cetera. I think it's very simplistic to think that way for basic reasons. The Iranian system, and I'm speaking as someone who taught political system, comparative political systems for years now, the Iranian political system is basically very institutionalized, namely name another system whose top echelon are assassinated and is capable on continuing or is capable of continuing, and also waging a retaliatory war effort against two big foes. I don't see any historical parallel to this that speaks volumes to the institutionalized level of the system. Now, when you look at the system, the system has many institutions, from bottom to the top. Everything happened after the assassination of the previous supreme leader went according to the book, according to the Iranian constitution, and the procedures put in place in the system according to its institutional capacity. And so you had the assembly of Experts choosing a new leader, and you had the leader appointing heads of or commanders of the armed forces, the assembly that the Iranian parliament working, the Iranian government, the judiciary, all of them. We had an interim leadership council that worked until the next supreme leader was elected. And the simplistic view of this institutionalized system is basically wishful thinking, because it's not only institutionalized. For every institution in Iran, there's a parallel institution. So if you wipe out institutions, the system will not collapse. It's basically designed to withstand collapse or withstand these kinds of shocks. And so you have a parliament, you have a guardian concept. That's the parallel thing. You have a judiciary, you have the revolutionary judiciary. That's a parallel thing. You have the Ministry of Intelligence, you have the intelligence of the irgc, you have the army, you have the irgc. So whatever you target, it's not only about figures, it's about institutions. Wipe out entire institutions and you will not get regime collapse or system collapse. That I think is not understood all in U.S. political debates. And so when looking at this institutionalized system, you could see that it's working according to plan, it's working according to the procedures and the constitution. The Supreme Leader was elected. In between, there was an interim supreme leadership council of three people. And then the new Supreme Leader was elected. Who's running the show? I think he's pivotal. He is not only the leader, he's the balancer. That's the tradition in Iran's political system, from Ayatollah Khomeini to Ayatollah Khamenei and now the new Supreme Leader. They are the balancers within the system. You have people from left and right in the system around them. They would try to balance the system, they would try to balance the politics in the country, and they have the final say. And how does that work in practice? It goes through the supreme National Security Council, the body basically that has two main tasks to do. First, to create consensus or build consensus on strategic issues. And second, to translate or bring in the buying of all power circles within the system. It has 13 members from the main stakeholders in the system to representing the Supreme Leader. The president is the head of that council, but also it has a secretary who was assassinated, Dr. Ali Larijani, and then was replaced by the Supreme Leader. And so creating this consensus and then deciding on strategic issues is the main thing this body does. And it does it on the behest of the Supreme Leader and to basically create a space for all parts of the system to have a say on the decision. And it's a tradition also that the Supreme Leader wouldn't oppose it, oppose its decisions because it's the consensual based mechanism of decision making. And that creates a bit of a delay in strategic decision making. In Iran, but it has worked to Iran's benefit because, you know, it's very much the bulk of, or the bulk of Iran's decision makers. Logic, way of, or rational way of rationalizing strategic decisions are gathered in this body. And so it's the rationalization of the decisions that is ongoing on a consensual base that the system observes and accepts, I think.
- [52:49]
B
Yeah, and he, we're cutting it short there, but people can watch the full thing. I mean, I then asked him about Mohammed Bagr Galiboff, the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, and he basically said that Galibaeff is well connected, well known, is in fact a powerful figure within Iran, but that nothing he's doing now would be possible if he didn't have the full endorsement of that supreme National Security Council. All of which is to say that it's important that we not engage in cartoonish narratives that, you know, there is, we also have a really interesting back and forth about is there debate between the IRGC and some of the political echelons. And you know, he talks at length about that. So I would just encourage people to watch the full interview@dropsitenews.com or on our YouTube channel.
- [53:32]
A
Yeah, it reminds me a little bit of kind of the, the US which has parallel institutions all over the place. You know, we've got a Senate, we've got a house, we got 17 different, 27 different intel agencies, bunch of different divisions of, of the Pentagon and so,
- [53:51]
B
and plans of succession. Look at all the, look at all the series that, that there are about what happens if the president is incapacitated or killed. Etc. I mean, there's like tons of like fictionalized series because it's such a big thing of like, what happens in succession. People are obsessed with this. The Iranians have spent 47 years building those institutions.
- [54:09]
A
And so, you know, we, we would think it was cartoonish if somebody from the outside was like, oh, we're going to come in and we're going to bomb these, these, this meeting of these people and boom, the American regime will fall. Like, no, that's not, it's not, it's not how it works. Like the, these institutions are going to, you know, continue. If you have, if you have one more minute, I have one more question. I'm curious about this nuclear issue that he raised and that is at the centerpiece of this. On the one hand, nuclear power and nuclear enrichment is a, is an issue of dignity and sovereignty, you know, for the, for the Iranians. And it has been for a very long Time. They've also said for many decades they have no intention of building nuclear weapon. There's also been a lot of writing about the strategic value that they placed in pursuing their nuclear program to be used kind of in, in diplomatic channels to bring them back into the global fold. Like something that it was a, it was a chip that they could trade away in order to get back. They now have an almost more powerful nuclear weapon, which is, you know, they've shown the ability that they can control the straight of Horus. And why I say it's almost more powerful because it's easier to use. Like Russia has nuclear weapons, but they're not using them against Ukraine. Like, it's, you can, you can have it and, and you know, Israel has them, but Israel probably would love to be using them right now. But there's, there's something that holds countries back. You can have them, but using them, that's another threat, that's another step. But you can actually close the Strait of Hormuz as they've shown. So does that change the calculus a little bit? If, if, if, if part of the reason they had the nuclear program was to be able to get diplomatic benefits from trading away pieces of it and they now have something that's almost even more powerful than a nuclear program, don't they have an extraordinary amount of leverage to be able to say, okay, yes, we'll agree, 20 years, 50 years, like whatever, like what, what, what's holding back, kind of trading a heavy amount of that, given that they have so much other leverage now that they can deploy?
- [56:22]
B
Well, I think part of it is that Western leaders have, have hyped this up to such a degree that it has taken on significance. And certainly in Trump's narrative, where he's trying to manufacture a victory narrative here, if it doesn't end with Iran handing over, you know, some, the enriched uranium either to the United States or to a third party that is acceptable to the United States, then the entire framework for why Trump, where they've landed in the White House and what victory looks like has to do with the enriched uranium, the nuclear dust as, as Trump calls it. But I think there's also a lesson here which is that I think not just Iran, but other countries in the world have, have learned that it was probably a mistake for Iran not to have gone full blown to actually develop a usable nuclear weapon. And I'm sure there will be discussion also on possible efforts for Iran to acquire one in some capacity as a result of this. I mean, the Iranians aren't saying that publicly, I'm not saying any Iranian has said that to me. But, you know, Kim Jong Un, there's lots of memes about him sitting there in Pyongyang watching all of this and sort of patting the head of a nuclear warhead and knowing that the only reason that his government hasn't been subjected to the, to a military war is because he has a nuclear bomb. So this, this lesson has been taught because of the actions of the United States. As for the Strait of Hormuz, it's true that the Iranians have shown, you know, an ability to really shake the global economy and to push the United States into a conundrum with how to, how to respond to this. But I think, you know, Rob Malley, one of the top negotiators of the 2015 deal, said that this leverage is not infinite. And it, and it isn't on an indefinite timeline. When I put this question to Iranian officials recently in the last 24 hours about, well, what if Trump just kind of walked on this? They pushed back against it. But what they're saying is something interesting, which is that they've been engaged in their own track of diplomacy with Russia and China, I presume, because they said with nuclear armed strategic partners of Iran, and that they're also discussing what an alternative path to restoring deterrence and regional balance looks like, even if they don't get a quote, unquote, fair deal with the United States at this point. So I think that one of the tracks that we should be watching here is what do Iranian Chinese relations look like? What do Iran's relations look like with countries in Asia and Africa? And certainly, what does Iran's relationship with Russia look like? Because the message has been sent here that the only true way to keep the United States away from you is actually having a nuclear weapon.
- [59:05]
A
Yeah.
- [59:06]
B
All right.
- [59:07]
A
Well, Jeremy, thanks as always. This is, this has been fascinating. We'll see how this unfolds over the next 24, 48 hours and in the days to come. As always, we rely for our support from readers and viewers. We now have this thing where, if you're watching us only on YouTube, you can become a member over there. You can go to dropsitenews.com, sign up for our newsletter, which is free. All of our reporting is and always will remain free. You can also make a donation that is tax deductible to the fullest extent of the law. You can go to donate.dropsitenews.com on behalf of all my colleagues here at Dropsite News thank you for your support and thank you for watching. Until next time.
- [59:53]
C
Sa.