B (4:00)

Yeah, that Lindsey Graham comment, which was in an interview that was together with Senator Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal, who's a very staunch Israel supporter like Graham and Dropsite, was actually the first to find that interview clip and post it, which was really, really enlightening and illuminating. Clip. Because in that clip Lindsey Graham is essentially trying, this was back during the Biden era and he's under the Biden administration and he's making the case to the Israeli people for why they should be supporting essentially a Palestinian state and why they should turn away from the path of, of ethnic cleansing or genocide and should actually allow for a Palestinian state. And of course, what he focused on there was that it will not actually be a democratic Palestinian state. It will be more of an emirate where the dictators of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, MbS and MbZ, as he mentioned in the clip, will come in and create an emirate in the Palestine, as he said. And the idea there is, you know, that Israelis, you know, should accept this because, you know, you're not going to have to continue this repression. We're going to hand it over to your friends, the Saudis and the Emiratis, who have very elite security, you know, monitoring and establishment, and they're going to take over that for you. And so this, and, and this was part of his vision. And this really squares with the long standing plan that was also pushed by, you know, Brett McGurk and Tony Blinken and Jake Sullivan under the Biden administration. And so it really demonstrated a consensus view in Washington, though the Democratic folks side of things. They never outright said it was going to be essentially a dictatorship or managed an emirate controlled by the Gulf regimes. But Lindsey Graham did say that. And, and so I think that was when we see the new Trump plan today, you can really see that that's continuing to be kind of the guiding principle for what they're trying to implement today.

A (6:05)

You know, so it's interesting because during the course of the war over the past two years, there were very vocal voices inside Israel and were never really disclaimed by the government that were demanding effectively the total evacuation immediately of the population of Gaza and even maybe the west bank shortly thereafter and settlements in Gaza to be implemented by the end of the war and things like that. And, you know, it seemed like they were pushing forward with that during the conflict. They were actually moving the population in a way which suggested that they could be permanently displaced. They were destroying the housing stock. They're still destroying the housing stock as well, too. And it seems like there's a sense of relief among people that, you know, now it's being said that that's not on the table. And Lindsey Graham is telling the Israelis, you can't do that. And the Emiratis are saying no. But, you know, I think that from things that, you know, you've mentioned before and that we've also discussed, there's something disingenuous about this or sort of like a. It's almost, I don't want to say the word, it's a trick, but it's a structured messaging which allows the Israelis and the US to accomplish something that they wanted anyways while, you know, doing a rope, a dope, so to speak, with a more harsh, threatened outcome. So, you know, I was curious what you made of those threats to evacuate everyone. And then is the Trump administration actually standing up to Israel now by putting them down? Or is there something else here that they always wanted, which they're getting coming.

B (7:34)

Out of the anti war, you know, kind of the anti war movement or progressive foreign policy spaces. I think, you know, everybody, you know, actually on the right or on the left is concerned about the influence of AIPAC and the way that AIPAC and its, the other related organizations are aligned with the most extreme fringe elements. You know, not fringe, because this Netanyahu obviously represents this, this wing, but these extreme voices in Israeli society that are, that are actually taking such an extreme position that they're setting Israel on a course that, you know, many people, including, you know, argument, you know, groups like J Street would argue is endangering Israel's ability to really exist as a Jewish state going into the future. But, you know, and then, you know, a lot of these national security thinkers in the US including, you know, Brett McGurk and his top advisor, Daniel Motan, who wrote a really interesting piece back in 2023, just a month after October 7th. You know, they're really explaining how Israel on its present course is not really sustainable. And the, the reason that they think that is because it takes a lot for the US to be able to manage the sentiment in the region. When the vast majority of people in the region absolutely despise US Israeli policy, and with pretty good reason, there's not a whole lot you could say to defend US Israeli policy in the region, it becomes an incredibly challenging affair to maintain governments that have some appearance of legitimacy, but also are primarily in the business of serving U.S. and Israeli regional interests. And so that's really where this concern comes from, is the serious national security thinkers in the United States believe that in order for Israel to be sustainable and for the US to be able to defend it, they need to find a way to get a normalization between Israel and its other partners. So that's where you saw some of that in the Abraham Accords. But this goes beyond that. This is, you know, really finding a final status kind of solution. And the way that they have figured that out is, you know, the way they've envisioned this is essentially to. To have a Palestinian state that is, you know, you declare it to be independent in some way, but you manage it with the US and the Gulf partners so that, you know, when there is repression, you know, it doesn't. Israel's not on the hook for that. And it doesn't continue to continue to bring Israel a lot of pressure on Israel from the public here or from the public in the region. And so, you know, so I think that's really the model that they're looking for. And yeah, I guess I'm not sure trying to think where to go with that.

A (10:21)

No, that makes sense. That makes sense. It's fascinating because it seems like what they would like. And the use of the word emirate has come up repeatedly regarding future Israeli plans for the Palestinians, not just in Gaza, but there was also a Wall Street Journal story allegedly showing that, or an op ed in the Wall Street Journal claiming that in even Hebron there were Palestinians who wanted to give up on a state and just have an emirate instead. Which, you know, what that meant exactly is not clear. But he seems to be imagining some sort of UAE like, undemocratic political entity, probably with Israel enjoying full security control of the area at minimum, as the ideal Israeli solution. So it's funny because you're mentioning that they're telling the Israelis, that, you know, you can't have this maximalist goal of a territorial Greater Israel immediately because it would make the country indefensible and both, you know, in a practical standpoint and also politically. But they're giving them something they also really want, which would kind of neuter the idea of a Palestinian state. And, you know, it's funny because there's been so much suffering, unbelievable amounts of suffering and genocidal levels of suffering that have taken place in Gaza and also tremendous violence in the west bank in this time as well, too. So it's almost like. It's like. Almost like an abusive situation. Because what they're saying is, well, we'll give you something which is, you know, basically political eradication in the sense that you will not have. Be able to decide your political destiny, but there will be a temporary, at least, or foreseeable future secession of direct violence, per se. So it's very bleak. It's kind of like saying, well, you know, we'll stop the. At the outcome of the genocide. The reward will be dictatorship, and then maybe people just want the genocide to stop, so they'll agree to that. So it's interesting that that's been the proposed solution. Can you talk a bit about the connotations of this? What we know about the plan that's envisioned for a future Palestinian state, or whether it even is a state. We had these, you know, obviously the comments about Graham, but also their letters have been circulating in Capitol Hill about this. What do we know about what the actual plan is for a future Palestinian political entity?

B (12:27)

Yeah, so under the Biden administration, you know, McGurk and his advisors were very clear that, you know, that essentially they plan to seek something that would be called a Palestinian state and would appear to have sovereignty, but that would be run by Palestinians that are approved by the Gulf regimes and by. With implicit or explicit support from Israel. And that was really the plan that was being sought, and that was important because, you know, the Gulf regimes have been, of course, kind of informally aligned with Israel over the decades, but in order to really be able to integrate with Israel politically and economically and militarily, which is a really important thing for the US to have that. That integrated military and economic zone where there aren't these. These. These fictions, these divisions that prevent that sort of integration, you know, in order to see that, you know, of course, MBS and MBZ have really impressive security architecture, and they can repress quite a number of people, quite a large number of people, quite effectively, but with the level of opposition there is to Israeli genocidal policy at this point. You know, even those dictatorships don't feel that they could repress all of that opposition and maintain their legitimacy. So what they're looking for is some sort of sign from Israel, you know, essentially so that they can say to their people, look, we pressured Israel and we got something. We got a Palestinian state of some sort, or we got a progress that we pressured from Israel. And so. And you see across Washington, which essentially has, you've seen a lot of the opposition to the Saudi regimes fade in recent years as the rise of, and concerns over China have grown. And so you, you're definitely seeing, you know, in Washington, really across partisan lines, support for this idea of, you know, eliminating Hamas militarily and eliminating their military capacity and then essentially imposing a deal on the Palestinians. You know, you know, when I was growing up, you know, as a Jewish American too, you know, the idea was you want a negotiated agreement, like leading to a two state, you know, and that means both sides have to give something and they come to a mutually beneficial agreement. But unfortunately, the US And Israeli defense establishments never saw it that way. And what they're opting for in this situation is essentially to essentially demilitarize Gaza and with it eliminate any source of leverage that they have in talks and then impose a two state solution on them. And, you know, the terms of it, if they don't like them, they don't really have any way to resist because they've been so weakened. And so that's. That is the kind of the broader concept of where they've been going with this. And so, and I think, you know, that was the plan under Democrats. And then when Trump came in, he didn't really have any concept of this. He didn't have a concept of, you know, why US grand strategists thought it was so important to integrate the Middle east behind one security architecture, which they had been saying needed to be done so the US could pivot to Asia. But Trump wasn't super bought in on that being much more transactional. But so that is where the Gault. You saw, the Gulf regimes were very close and have paid huge sums to Jared Kushner. They got involved with Jared Kushner, and he became kind of the. The heir of that plan. And he sort of is the one who has brokered an attempt at ushering that same plan, which originated in the Biden administration through the Trump administration.

A (16:12)

Yeah, it's interesting the way that the political and personal and financial interests all intersect in a Seamless manner. So you know, what I'm hearing is that effectively the broader US Security establishment, the NATO security establishment wants to, to put an end to this conflict for the time being so that they can integrate the Middle east and then they can focus on what they see as the main issue for the coming decades, which is I guess containing China or confronting China in some way in the Southeast Asia. You know, the one thing that I find interesting about this plan, and you alluded to this as well too, is that, you know, it's a very unpopular idea at the moment to kind of forcibly impose something on the Palestinians. You know, and also normalizing at this point is not really, it's like probably the least popular time it's ever been to normalize for many countries because of the genocide and so forth and which is hasn't even really ended at this point. One thing that you know, has been interesting to watch. Well, it's a two fold question I have for you. First, you mentioned like this need to repress political opinion. It seems like there's like a zero tolerance policy for, you know, opposition to Israel or voicing opposition to Israel and that's going to extend to countries which joined the Abraham Accords and their population. So how do you expect countries to manage that, you know, in the situation and what's kind of the idea that they'll be able to do to manage it? And secondly, you know, now there's also this discussion of like an international security force being deployed to Gaza that it consists of countries like maybe Indonesia and Azerbaijan and there have been some talks of Pakistan and Turkey as well. Is the idea that that's going to fight Hamas then and maybe disarm Hamas for Israel? So yeah, I'm kind of like very curious in your perspective on both those aspects. How are these other leaders going to sell to their own populations this Abraham Accords agreement with Israel? And secondly, what is the role or the envisioned purpose of this isf international stabilization or security force for Gaza?

B (18:10)

Yes. So the idea of why these, these regimes such as Saudi and UAE and even other regimes, why they've been so insistent on some sort of two state solution is exactly because, you know, Israel has never been this widely, you know, this is a whole new generation of young people who have seen really the darkest side of Israel which is really saying something given its, its history. And so that is why they've been absolutely firm in demanding that you need some sort of two state solution that they can really sell to their people as having pushed Israel and pressured Israel into something that is just for the Palestinians. You know, these are repressive societies. They've obviously there's been pretty widespread reporting on, you know, limiting protests for Gaza. So they've tried to keep it under wraps, but it's just such a widespread sentiment in their countries that, you know, even these regimes can't manage to, to repress that many people and still maintain their legitimacy and work with Israel. So you've seen it in recent days that the Saudis have really laid down in the last few weeks and really consistently over, over months that the Saudis have been been very clear that they need a very solid plan towards a Palestinian state. And unfortunately, you know, for them, you know, Trump is so, so close with Netanyahu, you know, so reluctant to put the pressure on the Israelis that he's not understanding what is really needed for this regional integration to move forward. You know, he thinks that just the force of his personality and his friendships and connections with these Gulf regimes can get it done. But they're sending very clear signals to him, the Saudis, in terms of the pathway to a two state solution, that they need to see that or they're not going to be participating in this plan in the uae. Also recently, you know, talking about the international stabilization force that's being proposed, they made clear that they're not willing to participate as it's currently structured. And their concern is going to be largely over the fact that they don't trust Trump to constrain the Israelis. And so they don't. You know, what these regimes are picturing is really the Lindsey Graham plan, Which is the McGurk plan as well, which is essentially you truly hand off control of Gaza to this US led Gulf, you know, US Gulf partnership where the Israelis are truly pushed out, which that is something that they part, they envision as being something they can sell to their people as a win. And you know, in a certain sense it would, you know, entail pushing Netanyahu and the super extreme Israeli factions, you know, stopping their goal of annexation and full ethnic cleansing or genocide. But in reality, what, you know, what they're envisioning is what amounts to essentially a regime change in Gaza, which is you go in, you have Netanyahu do a brutal war that demilitarizes Hamas, maybe you know, some 90% of their military capacity or so be gone from this genocidal war. And then instead of having an Iranian aligned Hamas resistance movement, you would have a US Gulf controlled Palestinian essentially neo colony. So essentially the vision that they have, which makes a lot of sense from Their perspective is transition the kind of the colonial nature of Gaza and the Palestinian territories into more of a neo colonial arrangement that's more in step with, you know, how powers control countries this day and age. So that, that's their vision is, you know, have Palestinians with Gulf support and US Support doing the repressing so that Israel can no longer have this bad press and you can essentially claim Israel has turned the page, and that will create the space for the political and military and economic integration. And according to these grand strategists in the U.S. you know, the way they see it, this, this economic integration is really important because, and Biden also mentioned this in one of his interviews off the top of his head. You know, they have a vision for the, the IMEC corridor, which is the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, which they see as the primary way that you could create an economic counterweight to China. And, but in, but in order for that to be successful, you have to have an integrated Middle east, because the corridor runs right through Israel into Saudi Arabia and out through the uae. So that's their, their vision for it. And, and, and, and, and, you know, even though Trump ended up, you know, essentially delaying this plan because he didn't appear to understand it, you know, Kushner is back, you know, kind of guiding it back in that direction, but he hasn't been able to secure enough, enough commitments from Trump to restrain Israel to make the Gulf partners feel comfortable with the arrangement.

A (23:24)

You know, one thing I'm curious just looking at Israeli politics, because there's tremendous, I guess, polarization or this. Like, you know, Netanyahu has a coalition to hold together, and he has people in the coalition who are even further to the right of him or pushing him on the subject. You know, if there's a situation where, you know, a deal is forced on the Israelis to some degree, that creates a Palestinian state, which I think several members of his cabinet, even Netanyahu himself has said before, they'll never allow to be created, and they're very against. Is that something that the Israelis may veto? And do they have the capacity to veto it, in your view?

B (24:00)

Yeah, from our perspective, you know, when Trump, you know, Trump and the U.S. i mean, this goes back to the last, some of the previous wars, too. I mean, when the US President gives an order, it's very, very difficult for Israel to hold out and make another decision. So, you know, our sense is that. And that's particularly true when it is someone like a Donald Trump who very few in the US Are going to go to his right and be more more aggressively pro Israel than Trump. So if essentially Trump has total ability to control Israel if he understands and chooses to do so. But there's long been partners in the Israeli national security establishment for this plan. It was mostly just the extremists like Netanyahu and Smotrich and Ben GVIR that were not on board. But a lot of the Israeli national security establishment and most of the opposition parties are also on board. Even Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was very much in line with this proposal, which is one of the reasons that the Biden administration, in my view, one of the reasons they reacted so strongly to him being named as a war criminal, because he was actually, you know, they had hopes at that time to create, you know, create a distinction between the extremists on the Netanyahu side and the more pragmatic super hawks represented by people like Gallant who were understanding the need for a two state type arrangement to make sure that Israel could be sustainable.

A (25:37)

There's one last question I want to ask you about this subject before we pivot to a few other things that I want to bring up with you. It's related to the sort of democratic and progressive sort of maneuvering around the subject. You know, obviously you're in touch with the progressive lawmakers. You kind of plugged into what's going on in the Hill on the subject. You know, what are people on the left kind of saying about this, or more people who are more sympathetic, the Palestinian perspective, saying about this proposed solution because, you know, you didn't describe it as a neocolonial solution. Basically, that's kind of what it would be. What are people saying and what do you think, you know, most importantly, people should be saying about this proposal and what should they be lobbying for or pushing for to see in the context of a final status solution which may be put forward to this conflict?

B (26:30)

Yeah, well, I think with everything the Palestinians have fought for, for years, for decades, and after everything they've gone through, I think the absolute bare minimum that any of us should be, that anyone who's reasonably fair minded should hope for, is that Palestinians will emerge from this with a sense of actual sovereignty and the right to democratically decide who rules them. And that shouldn't be a radical position. I mean, you know, as a Jewish American myself, I mean, you could look at what Israel and what Jews were, you know, how Jews were treated after going through the horrific Holocaust, and there was a sense that they deserved a lot of support. And so I think the absolute least that we should be expecting for Palestinians is, is that they would emerge from this not in a neocolonial situation. You know, not that they're going to be monitored by, you know, Gulf surveillance tech and not that, you know, there'll be an international stabilization force that will be, you know, abducting and assassinating alleged Hamas or resistance operatives. You know, that doesn't, that's not even, you know, that just is so far from what Palestinians deserve after this. And so, you know, there's definitely a push. And I think anyone, you know, fair minded would say we need to have a process that leads to genuine sovereignty for Palestinians, including democratic elections. You know, we know Israelis are continuing to imprison some of the leading Palestinian voices, you know, many of whom could, could run and win in elections if they were allowed to stand for elections. So, and you've seen some, some support for this in Congress. Obviously on one side you have people like Lindsey Graham and other national security kind of voices that are envisioning support for type of an emirate that doesn't have democracy and where education systems and political systems are imposed on them and they're told that this is the best you can get. But there are other indications that some are still thinking of democracy. We did have House Foreign affairs led a letter calling for a democratic Palestinian state and Ro Khanna led a letter of over 50 members of Congress calling for a Palestinian state. But lately we've seen other democratic groups start to walk back on that a bit and start to talk about a Palestinian state that was politically accountable. And I think that's a really dangerous place to be after all of this. To say, to not be able to stand up and say Palestinians should get to choose their leaders and be able to be represented democratically, I think is not going to. It's not going to. It's not really what the moment calls for. And I think anyone progressive should be, you know, demanding that, you know, we're heading towards a place that is genuine, that sees genuine sovereignty for Palestinians and not just another neocolonial arrangement imposed from, from the US and its partners in the region.

A (29:32)

You know, I wanted to ask you, obviously there are a few other issues which are on people's agenda at the moment, especially with foreign policy vis a vis, you know, war making. On the Trump administration specifically, I want to ask you regarding Venezuela. In the last few weeks, they've been increasing US Military deployments in the Caribbean, threats against Venezuelan leadership, and obviously, you know, several increased, growing and rapidly growing number of attacks on small boats in the Caribbean by US Forces which have killed several dozen people. We don't know the identities of those people as well too, in many of these cases. Does it look like the US Is preparing for an armed conflict with Venezuela at the moment? And what have you guys been tracking in terms of the preparation of a legal groundwork to make that happen? And also what the Democrats are saying about as well too, because obviously this is a. It would effectively put the US into another armed conflict without very little discussion, very little preamble to that. What are people on both sides of the aisle saying about it? And what do you guys foresee potentially happening?

B (30:41)

Yeah, the Venezuela issue has been a long standing one, going back all the way to George W. Bush when they supported a coup against the then very democratically elected leader, Hugo Chavez. So he was very popular at the time, but that didn't stop the US from supporting the couple. And that's progressed from, you know, there's been a long standing sanctions policy that Obama escalated and then was really escalated by Trump most recently. And now, you know, we have a Rubio who was very much, you know, the target of Trump's ire for years, but has kind of remade himself, at least in his approach to Trump, and has allowed himself to be a voice. And so, you know, Rubio is very much pushing for Trump to take the actions that no one else has felt comfortable doing over decades, which is to just assassinate Venezuela's leaders and install the long standing US Ally there, who was a very far right person who actually just praised Netanyahu openly, as many may have seen, Maria Corinna Machado. And so the way that given Trump's opposition to regime change, wars, it wasn't that easy to say. He was not very inclined to say, yes, let's go bring freedom. You know, that's not really his style. And so Rubio and Stephen Miller kind of jointly devised an approach that essentially says this is all about drugs, even though nobody serious thinks there's a significant amount of drugs coming in from Venezuela. If you eliminated all the drugs that transit through Venezuela, none of which are produced there, but there's some small amount that transit through. If you eliminated 100% of that, it would have essentially no impact on drug consumption in the United States. But this has still allowed them to begin this process of kind of inching towards that type of a conflict. And they've done that by striking boats, which obviously everyone has seen that, you know, they're just extrajudicially executing people for allegedly being drug traffickers. There's been interesting reporting that these folks are, you know, it's not, it's what anyone would know, which is many of them are virtually all low level people who are taking these jobs to try to get a paycheck, you know, coming out of an impoverished situation. But the latest news is that there has been some attention in Congress to this. We recently had multiple votes in the Senate, including the most recent one where Senator Tim Kaine and Senator Rand Paul forced to vote on the regime change question. And the day before, it appeared that Trump was going to lose that vote. So then Rubio and Hegseth came to the Hill and promised those senators that we're not going to attack Venezuela and we don't have authority to attack Venezuela. And at the same time, the reporting was published saying that Trump has concerns about attacking Venezuela. So right now it still remains very much up in the air. But the administration has promised to their Senate allies that they're not going to strike, but they've nonetheless moved the world's largest aircraft carrier, Gerald Ford, you know, to the Caribbean region. So, you know, there's a lot of questions, but the most, you know, one of the more likely scenarios is that the administration is hoping to encourage Venezuelan generals and military officials to defect and do a coup against Maduro using the threat of military action. But so far that has not been successful. And it remains to be seen whether Rubio will be able to push Trump to take that action but actually strike Venezuelan regime officials.

A (34:31)

You know, very quickly, I'm just curious your perspective on that because, you know, Trump campaigned on, you know, a slogan of being anti war per se, that was part of his electoral campaign. And he seems to be flirting with potentially starting a war with Venezuela. You know, really, again, without much, as you mentioned, the drug alibi is really not very substantiated by statistics and so forth. And it certainly was not something you mentioned during his campaign. Did you see that as just a cynicism on his part, or do you think that there's a power struggle inside the administration where certain figures may be more inclined to an action like that than others? And I asked this as well, too, because Dropsite does some reporting about Marco Rubio sort of being the driver behind this proposal to potentially depose the Venezuelan government. Your thoughts and you know, what you've been hearing or seeing on the subject?

B (35:22)

Yeah, well, there is very much a split because you had Richard Grinnell, who's one of the more traditional MAGA types in the administration who had went down to Venezuela, did direct negotiations and secured the release of A number of U.S. citizens that Venezuela was holding. And, and also there's ongoing deportation flights, and there's ongoing. There's some minor, ongoing sanctions exemptions that still continue. And a lot of that is a result of the pragmatic approach of Richard Grinnell. From his perspective, it's better to get oil deals with Venezuela, have migration accords that allow the US to deport people and then do that to kind of limit China's influence in the region. That's been his perspective. But then Rubio has come in and said, you know, well, President Trump, wouldn't you like to get an even better deal? You just eliminate the leadership and then we'll have our close ally take over. She'll give us all the oil for very good, very good price. You know, so essentially that's been Rubio's pitch. But I think the challenge is, is that US Regime change, wars like that have such a terrible record. And Trump has never really shown an inclination towards taking those types of risks. I think he'd be very concerned about, you know, if it doesn't go well, that there would be coverage of chaos in Venezuela and that would be attributed to him. So, you know, I think it's very much an active fight within the administration right now with, you know, and as callous. Trump is obviously incredibly callous towards human life in general. You know, he's assassin, extrajudicially assassinating and executing, you know, nonviolent drug trafficker, you know, people transporting drugs at a low level and just, you know, with total callousness. So it's not really a concern of human life on his part, but more of an awareness of kind of the political consequences of when you bomb a country and then it descends into chaos, which is something that he has commented on over the years, whether Libya or Syria or Iraq. So he appears to have that awareness. So that's the current state of play. But the one good thing is at least Democrats in the Senate had all voted to block a regime change war, and a number of Republicans were very close to voting for that. And then, of course, the public polling is not good. There's very little interest among the American people, even among his own base, for engaging in regime change military action. So, you know, I think it's basically a case of Rubio and his small clique of South Florida national security extreme hawks, you know, versus essentially the entire Democratic Party, a good part of the MAGA base, and average working class Americans who want nothing to do with a new regime change war. And so that's a live question. And I guess, you know, were working to hopefully defeat Rubio and his vision and then return to a policy of engagement that could see, you know, an end to the policy of intentionally harming the entire Venezuelan economy, including all the civilians in it, you know, and lifting those sanctions, finally moving towards engagement, which will also help with the migration goals that the administration has.

A (38:40)

And, Eric, there's one last subject. There's so many parts of the world we can discuss, but I want to prioritize one particular country that, you know, we've covered quite a bit at dropsite, which is Pakistan and Pakistan. In the last two years, myself and my colleague Ryan Grim have done a lot of reporting on Pakistan related to the removal of the former prime minister, Imran Khan. He's still in jail, and in the past week or so, his, you know, successor, de facto successor, was a military dictator, Asum Munir. He's not the civilian leader of the country, but by all intents and purposes, he's running the country. He is pushing forward some constitutional amendments which would effectively make him dictator for life of Pakistan, if not worded that way legally, he'd be empowered to that level. So, you know, it's very fascinating because at the moment, you know, for those listeners who are not aware, you know, there was pressure, very, very strong pressure that we actually reported on and we got some documentation on 2023 to remove Imran Khan from power in Pakistan. He's currently, as I said, in jail. And the US has become very close with the Pakistani government since that took place, since they got what they wanted, that a civilian elected leader who was very critical of US Foreign policy had been removed from power and subsequently imprisoned. And now they have a very pliant Pakistani military regime which is undemocratic and increasingly authoritarian and even totalitarian in some respects, coming to power and cooperating them on various issues. And, you know, that backsliding is not really factored at all into the US Relationship with Pakistan. They're getting closer to Pakistan, the more dictator, dictatorial it's becoming. I'm curious your perspective or if there's any hope for a shift in this policy. I ask this because during the election, there was significant hope from a lot of voters who invested in the subject that they could play on the polarization in the American political system, because the Biden administration actually is the one responsible for pressuring for Khan's removal from power. And Trump had a pretty good relationship with Khan. So there was a hope that once Trump was in power, maybe he would leverage his good relationship with Khan and try to get him out of jail or try to push for some limits on Pakistan. And we had some reporting actually that Trump did bring it up with Munir in a meeting that they had. But, you know, it seems like nothing to date has happened on that score. And, you know, Munir is consolidating power more and more. The US Is fine with that, and they're even looking to have Pakistan join the Abraham Accords potentially as another partner. Is there any movement on a US Shift and position regarding Pakistan? And I know there are some members of Congress who have been quite sympathetic to subject, but I'm curious your insight on the state of play and whether democracy in Pakistan is anywhere on the agenda in D.C.

B (41:35)

Yeah. And you know, you guys reporting on that, but you know, with revealing the cable that laid out key details about the essentially the legislative, legislative coup or kind of the lawfare that removed Imran Khan, who is, you know, that was some of the most important reporting, you know, in Pakistan's history and really changed the entire trajectory of this, that pro democracy movement. And so that was phenomenal. But, you know, this story is also another one that incredibly is characterized by a battle between Grinnell, again, Trump's, you know, close ally and MAGA type operative, and Marco Rubio on the other side, who's representing in this case, more of a continuity from the Biden administration policy. You know, initially, you know, Grinnell had done huge outreach to the Pakistani American community, which is a really impressive growing community that is in recent years kind of getting its, you know, getting more deeply involved in politics and learning and learning some very tough lessons also, I think about, you know, about what their democracy, human rights, you know, how high of a value the US Government places on those things. But, but Grinnell had done great outreach and there was a huge hope that Trump, if elected, was going to put pressure on the Pakistani military regime, which, you know, because of their dependence on the US for support for IMF loans that keep the economy afloat, for the political support that the US Gives to the regime, and also for the military training that really provides legitimacy and power to the military regime. You know, the feeling is that the US could. Much of this is similar in the case with Israel, where the leverage is so complete that US Statement for them to do something, they basically have no choice but to do it. If the US Indicates seriousness. Unfortunately, what ended up happening was quite the opposite, which is that Rubio was able to work with his allies in the State Department apparatus that has long been coordinating closely with the Pakistani military elites and do the perfect pitch to Trump, which is essentially the most transactional pitch. You know, many of your listeners probably may have heard Trump just overflowing with just pride at the comments of the military backed regime leader in Pakistan praising him. He said that he saved millions of lives and Trump just could not have been more, you know, he just came off like he was just the most touched he had ever been. But those comments set off quite a firestorm in Pakistan because it's just a level of deference and of just subservience that even Pakistan had not shown in recent decades. But this is the place that that regime has gotten to because their popularity and legitimacy is so low, given that Imran Khan continues to have very high popularity. And even, you know, he's the number one political leader in the country and he's also the country's greatest sports star. He's just a beloved figure and it puts the regime under a lot of pressure. But for the current situation is that in this current fight, both for the sake of U.S. regional plans, they really want to have Pakistan as a partner for Israel in these plans that we discussed earlier. And what they really don't want is an independent voice like Imran Khan, who would not have been so, who would have been very unlikely to go along with US plans for creating an undemocratic Palestinian state in the region and kind of giving that control over to the US and the Gulf states. So, so, and then finally, I think there's also a concern in this late stage, much as is the case with Venezuela as well, that you don't want, you know, you're willing to sacrifice Pakistani human rights, you're willing to work with brutal military dictatorship as long as that means that that country will not become aligned with Russia and China. And so I think that is a major thinking of people like, like Rubio and was definitely a priority for the Biden administration officials before them. And so I think right now the state of play is that that Pakistani American community is, I think, working to build their political power, but they're going up against a national security establishment in Washington that is very happy with such a pliant regime and is, you know, which is of course the fifth biggest country in the world by population. And they're not, you know, it's going to be definitely an uphill fight to get the US to prioritize the human rights and dignity of Pakistani people over those geopolitical concerns.

A (46:27)

Eric, thanks so much for fighting the good fight in D.C. and this subject, it's very difficult and you have your hands on a lot of different, different subjects. But we really appreciate you coming on. We're going to have you on again sometime in the future as well to discuss more of the very upbeat and very positive world of pushing for us more ethical US Foreign policy. Eric, thanks so much for joining us.

B (46:49)

Yeah, thanks so much.

A (46:51)

That was Eric Sperling, the Executive Director of Just Foreign Policy. And that does it for this episode. Make sure to follow us on our new podcast feed by searching for drop site news wherever you get your podcasts. Also, please do leave us a rating or review. It helps other listeners to find us as well. Our show today was produced by Jose Olivaras. This episode was made in part with support from the Intercept. If you want to support our work, you can subscribe to dropsitenews.com if you have the money to do so. Please do become a paid subscriber. All of our content is free for anyone, but our paid subscribers are the fuel that keeps our engine running. Make sure to follow us on all social media platforms and please do share our work. Thank you so much for listening. Until next time, I'm Murtaza Hussein.