New and Improved Antitrust Whistleblowing Incentives with Julie Bracker and Dan Mogin

Summary

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Emerging Litigation Podcast

Episode: New and Improved Antitrust Whistleblowing Incentives with Julie Bracker and Dan Mogin
Date: October 4, 2025
Host: Tom Hagy
Guests: Julie Keaton Bracker, Dan Mogin

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Episode Overview

This episode delves into the fresh landscape of antitrust whistleblower incentives, focusing on the new DOJ Antitrust Whistleblower program announced in 2025. Host Tom Hagy brings together acclaimed whistleblower attorney Julie Bracker and widely respected antitrust litigator Dan Mogin for a practical, history-aware, and strategic discussion about how whistleblower laws have evolved, how antitrust law operates, and what the latest DOJ initiative means for legal practitioners, corporations, and insiders considering stepping forward. The dialogue touches on litigation mechanics, legal incentives, challenges, constitutional controversies, and why incentivizing whistleblowers is critical to both fraud detection and market fairness.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Whistleblower Law 101: Origins and Mechanics

[04:22] – [19:31]
Speaker: Julie Bracker

• Historical Roots:

  • The False Claims Act (FCA), also called “Lincoln’s Law,” was born in the Civil War era to combat rampant fraud against the Union Army. Insiders—sometimes even accomplices—were incentivized to report fraud, as “it’s often set a thief to catch a thief” ([05:41], Bracker).
  • “Insider” meaning has broadened—today’s whistleblowers can be “naive employees just doing their job, not knowing it’s fraud” ([06:33], Bracker).

• Qui Tam Explained:

  • The FCA’s qui tam provision uniquely lets private parties sue on behalf of the government; “[It] empowers someone else to file suit on behalf of the government. The case still belongs to the government. The government is still the injured party. But you are relaying to the government that there’s been fraud, which is why you’re called a relator” ([07:15], Bracker).
  • “Some people say ‘qui’ some say ‘kwee’ – it really doesn’t matter. It’s a dead language. Say it however you choose” ([06:49], Bracker).

• Insider Risks & Retaliation:

  • Many whistleblowers face retaliation before even filing: “That’s got to be a very dicey time for an employee… often, they are fired before they ever find us” ([11:35], Hagy & Bracker).
  • The FCA protects against retaliatory job actions, but practical remedies are retrospective—a suit can compensate for wrongful termination; it cannot always prevent it.

• Process & Challenges:

  • FCA cases start “under seal,” meaning only the court, DOJ, and relator’s counsel know—defendants may be unaware for months or years ([12:11], Bracker).
  • Investigations can move “glacier slow: there’s slow, litigation slow, and FCA slow—slower than that” ([14:25], Bracker).
  • Criminal investigations (which take precedence over civil ones) can further delay FCA cases.

• State Laws and Scope:

  • More than 40 states now have their own False Claims Acts, often focused on Medicaid or state spending. State-level whistleblower provisions are gaining traction ([18:35], Bracker).

• The Key Role of Whistleblowers:

  • “Without qui tam, the federal government often would never find out about fraud at all.” ([19:04], Hagy)
  • “Amen… Hallelujah. That’s the whole idea. We’re bringing in insiders, you know, people… unless someone tells you.” ([19:11-19:15], Bracker)

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2. The Fundamentals of Antitrust Law

[20:04] – [39:42]
Speaker: Dan Mogin

• Core Principles & Statutes:

  • Sherman Act is considered the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.” ([20:21], Justice Thurgood Marshall, cited by Mogin)
  • “If you’re going to have capitalism, you gotta have competition. And if you’re going to have competition, somebody’s got to police it. And we do it through the antitrust laws.” ([20:04], Mogin)

• Where Antitrust Law Comes From:

  • Sherman Act: Section 1 (“concerted action in restraint of trade” – price fixing, bid rigging, etc.), Section 2 (monopolization).
  • Clayton Act: Authorizes private enforcement.
  • Federal Trade Commission Act: Prohibits unfair methods of competition and provides for administrative courts and merger review ([22:39], Mogin).

• How an Antitrust Case Comes Together:

  • Cases are expensive: “Money. First and foremost, these are expensive cases.” ([24:44], Mogin)
  • Analysis Method:
    • Context/History: Industry background
    • Structure: Market organization (monopoly, oligopoly, competitive, etc.), pricing dynamics
    • Conduct/Behavior: What allegedly anti-competitive behavior occurred—collusion, horizontal/vertical restraints
    • Antitrust Injury & Standing: Demonstrate actual harm relevant under antitrust law
    • Damages: Econometric/regression analysis, lost profits, etc.

• Market Definition:

  • Proving a “relevant market” is essential in most cases—functional and evidentiary hurdles are high.
  • “We must use economists and their tools to establish a relevant market… there’s no such thing in the field of economics. They don’t have it. So… we have imported a principle that the economists themselves don’t recognize.” ([38:17], Mogin)

• Challenges for Plaintiffs:

  • “Imagine that’s the government… now imagine what a private antitrust plaintiff has to go through” ([36:24], Hagy). Private claims are daunting against well-resourced defendants.

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3. The DOJ Antitrust Whistleblower Program: What’s New?

[39:42] – [45:59]
Speakers: Hagy, Mogin, Bracker

• New DOJ Program Highlights:

  • Announced in summer 2025, this program is an expansion from corporate leniency to individual whistleblower incentives.
  • Offers monetary rewards “up to 30% of any criminal fines that are recovered”—parallel to FCA, SEC models ([41:30], Mogin).
  • Initial focus is on “postal-related antitrust claims” but expected to broaden; overlaps with mail fraud are common in antitrust cases.

• Leniency Program Examples:

  • Historically, DOJ’s leniency policy led to high-profile cartel busts (Vitamins, Christie's & Sotheby's, marine construction, DRAM memory chips). Many involved international conspiracies ([42:59–44:47], Mogin).
  • Whistleblower incentives and leniency are “template cases for enforcement,” often making the difference in exposing hidden cartels.

• Recent Example (FCA):

  • Omnicell settled for $4.4 million for government overcharge; whistleblower received $700,000 (“just an example of the other type where the whistleblower has the incentive and collects something recent” [45:59], Hagy).

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4. Strategic & Ethical Considerations in Whistleblower and Antitrust Litigation

[46:52] – [53:30]
Speaker: Julie Bracker

• Where to File?

  • Choice between FCA, SEC, or now DOJ antitrust whistleblower programs is increasingly complex: practitioners must navigate multiple potential remedies.
  • Simultaneous filings may cause overlapping investigations; coordination with government agencies is key.

• Civil vs. Criminal:

  • Government chooses whether civil, criminal, or both types of action proceed; relators cannot control it.
  • Serious offenses (e.g., unnecessary cancer treatments) typically bring both criminal and civil cases.

• Ethics and Privilege:

  • Whistleblower counsel must vigilantly screen for privileged information: “We don’t want to build a case based on privileged information… The US does not want to see anything that has been even potentially tainted by attorney-client privilege because we would just wind up recused.” ([51:50], Bracker)
  • Particularly relevant for insiders in cyber-fraud or regulated industries who may encounter complex legal advice internally.

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5. Constitutional Controversies & Other Hot Topics

[54:15] – [60:42]
Speaker: Julie Bracker

• Constitutionality of Qui Tam:
  • Recent opinions challenge whether relators can act as “officers of the executive branch.” One order (Judge Mizelle, M.D. Fla.) questioned the appointment and authority of relators—potentially threatening “declined” cases where the DOJ does not intervene ([54:45], Hagy; [54:45–60:42], Bracker).
  • Consensus is that the challenge is legally weak, affecting only a narrow slice of FCA actions, and solvable via congressional mechanisms if necessary.
  • Notable quote: “Did I mention more than $700 billion returned to the United States through the statute…? Let me emphasize that.” ([55:54], Bracker)

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6. Future of Antitrust Enforcement: Market-Distorting Laws & Regulations

[60:42] – [61:57]
Speaker: Dan Mogin

• Market-Distorting Regulations:
  • DOJ/FTC reviewing 125+ laws and regulations alleged to stifle competition—an initiative spanning both Democratic and Republican administrations.
  • Example: Tensions between competitive effect and environmental regulation; agencies are “auditing the code of federal regulations and trying to ferret out those regulations that… stifle competition” ([61:35], Mogin).
  • “If done in good faith, it is an excellent use of government resources.” ([61:57], Mogin)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Whistleblower Incentives:
  “Whistleblowers are courageous individuals who expose fraud against the government. What more can—Amen.”
  — Julie Bracker ([04:09])

• On Why Antitrust Law Is Needed:
  “If you’re going to have capitalism, you gotta have competition. And if you’re going to have competition, somebody’s got to police it. And we do it through the antitrust laws.”
  — Dan Mogin ([20:04])

• On What It’s Like for Plaintiffs:
  “We get in our canoes, our little canoes, we paddle out into a mean sea, we try to slay a whale and bring it back to the village where we chop it up and eat for many, many moons.”
  — Dan Mogin ([36:24])

• On Market Definition:
  “We must use economists and their tools to establish a relevant market… there’s no such thing in the field of economics. They don’t have it. So… we have imported a principle that the economists themselves don’t recognize.”
  — Dan Mogin ([38:17])

• On Case Speed:
  “There’s slow, and then there’s litigation slow, and then there’s like glacier slow, and then slower than that would be FCA slow.”
  — Julie Bracker ([14:25])

• On How Important Relators Are: “Without qui tam, the federal government often would never find out about fraud at all.”
  — Tom Hagy ([19:04])
  “Amen… Hallelujah. That’s the whole idea.”
  — Julie Bracker ([19:11])

• On Recent Constitutional Challenge:
  “You don’t have anything like the powers as asserted in the Mizelle order… The constitutionality was well established previously.”
  — Julie Bracker ([56:21])

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Key Timestamps

• 04:22 – 19:31: Julie Bracker on FCA, whistleblower process, and risks
• 20:04 – 39:42: Dan Mogin on antitrust law, market definition, and litigation hurdles
• 39:42 – 45:59: DOJ Antitrust Whistleblower program and case examples
• 46:52 – 53:30: Strategic & ethical considerations for whistleblower claims
• 54:15 – 60:42: Constitutional challenges (qui tam under attack?)
• 60:42 – 61:57: Laws & regulations distorting competition—future enforcement dimensions

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Takeaways

• Whistleblower incentives remain essential: They help uncover otherwise invisible wrongdoing, recover taxpayer funds, and police corporate and government behavior.
• Antitrust enforcement is evolving: The DOJ has broadened opportunities for insiders—no longer limited to corporate applicants, now rewarding individuals directly.
• Private enforcement is formidable but hard: Cases are expensive, slow, and demand rigorous proof as to market definition, injury, and damages.
• Strategic navigation of overlapping legal regimes (FCA, DOJ, SEC) is more important than ever.
• Ongoing constitutional debates and regulatory scrutiny will shape the landscape of litigation and whistleblower protection going forward.

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For additional resources or to contact the host, reach Tom Hagy at [e-mail]

Transcript

[A]

Welcome to our presentation on the DOJ Whistleblower Rewards program. This was recorded both as an HB webinar and an episode of the Emerging Litigation podcast. I'm Tom Hagee, your moderator and host. I'll introduce our guests in more detail, but they are Julie Keaton Bracker of Bracker and Marcus, a recognized authority on whistleblower law, and Dan Mogan, recognized authority on all things antitrust. It was an informative session from two deeply experienced professionals. I hope you enjoy it. Welcome to our webinar or podcast. It's the DOJ Antitrust Whistleblower program that was announced this summer. And it's a legal education webinar, obviously featuring two experienced lawyers who know about two issues that we're going to sandwich together here. Julie Keaton and Dan Mogan. And I'm Tom Hagee. I'll do a little bit more of an introduction here. So Julie Keaton Bracker is a partner and obviously founder Bracker and Marcus. She's nationally recognized in this area of Keytam and FCA cases. You can see her credentials there. You know, award winning, highly recognized, obviously well educated. Vanderbilt University. I've heard of it and so, and obviously you obviously studied as well.

[B]

I'm from an, I'm from an Auburn family, so I'm the black sheep. Okay.

[A]

All right, all right. I'll pretend I know what that means, but I don't, so. But anyway, Julie, this is our first time working with you, so thank you for participating. It's been, been fun so far.

[B]

Yeah, my pleasure.

[A]

All right. And it's a pleasure to work also with, with Dan Mogan. And I have the, I get to work with Dan quite a bit in helping him out with the, the Mogan Law blog on antitrust and competition law. It's a fascinating area of law. Didn't know a ton about it when I started a few years ago or a couple years ago, but now I can see, I see antitrust everywhere and its impact on, on so many aspects of our society that we don. Realize sometimes. So Dan's got more than four decades experience in antitrust and complex litigation. He's been a lead counsel in some big cases. When I described Dan, he's like I describe him. He's, he's the real deal when it comes to antitrust. You know, he's been an author, a professor, he's recognized by all the, all the leading publishers out there and he's got his JD from University of San Diego. And I don't know if that makes you a black sheep or Any kind of sheep, but it's probably not. Yeah, probably not. So, Dan, I get to work with you all the time, and I'm glad to be working with you on this webinar to be here this morning. Yeah, yeah. Good to have you. So, you know, and my background is I'm mainly a legal journalist, always have been a legal journalist also for over 40 years. And I've got a podcast. Didn't have as much to say in my credentials, so I made up for it with having more badges about. About. So there you have. All right, so with that, the agenda we're going to talk about. First of all, Julie, we're going to talk to you. You're going to explain some background on whistleblower laws, litigation and enforcement. Dan, obviously you're the antitrust attorney, talking about all aspects of the, you know, the key laws and proving a case, developing a case. And then we'll jump into the 2025 antitrust whistleblower initiative. And then I've got some questions for. For you guys at the end. So, first of all, the whistleblower laws. And Julie, this is to you. I thought. I thought we'd start off with a. A quote from a highly recognized attorney in this area. If only we could get her on the webinar. Whistleblowers are courageous individuals who expose fraud against the government. What more can. Amen.

[B]

Amen.

[A]

Okay, that's. That's your addition is amen. And I. I go with that. So, Julie, over to you to talk about the whistleblower laws. I've got Honest Abe there because this kind of goes back to Lincoln's Law.

[B]

That's right. This is Lincoln's Law. We still call it that. The False Claims act was brought into. Came into existence during the Civil War era, which is unusual that it would be so venerable and yet still so volatile. But it is both of those things at this point. So Honest Abe had the situation where troops out in the field were receiving. He would. The War Department would contract for horses and uniforms and flour to feed the troops. You know, all sounds good so far. But what might show up would be lame mules, which, of course, don't breed flour that had weevils in it and uniforms made of the same kind of filter paper that we use for coffee filters. And this was not working well for the Union troops. So the problem was at the time, as fast as things move now, not so fast then. And by the time they realized they had been defrauded by the seller, the seller would be long gone with the money so the False Claims act prosecutes those who file a claim with the government that's false when made. It's intended to catch fraud, waste and abuse in government funds where someone's lying about it. But the important point there was that they realized to catch these folks, they were going to have to incentivize insiders who knew about the fraud. And the insiders, often in those situations would be people who were part of the fraud. And in fact, in the discussions when the law was passed, they referred to the Clayton provisions and said, it's set a thief to catch a thief or set a rogue to catch a rogue. And this is often, you know, nowadays insiders come in many, many flavors. They don't have to be part of the fraud. When it's a giant corporation, they may not have a clue that it's fraudulent when they first begin working at the corporation. So even in a smaller mom and pop shop, you might hire someone to come and do the billing who has no idea that they're billing fraudulently because they're just following the directions of someone else. So insider has a much bigger meaning now than maybe it did when it was all about testing rogues with rogues. But at the same time, it's important to understand that the statute does not preclude rogues coming in to claim a bounty on turning in, whether they've had a change of heart or whether they're just, you know, they're just willing to do it. The government wants its money back. It wants to know who the fraudsters are, and it's willing to pay that bounty to have those people come in and tell the government what it otherwise would have no way of knowing. We can quitam is very unusual. And I do say qui. Some people say qui. So if you're raised in the United States, you probably took Spanish or French. If you took Spanish or French, you probably learned Q U as k sound. But think about quid pro quo in Latin. So we generally pronounce it Q. You will hear some folks doing it wrong. No, I'm just kidding. It really doesn't matter. It's a dead language. Say it however you choose. But the cuisine provisions are unusual because most of the time, you know, if I want to sue someone, I have to do. I have to sue the person that's injured me? I can't sue because someone has injured you, Tom. You know, that's not fair. Now this specifically empowers someone else to file suit on behalf of the government. The case still belongs to the government. The government is still the injured party. But you are relentless relating to the government that there's been fraud, which is why you're called a relator. Okay. Some people will say relator and they are also wrong.

[A]

Ketem and relator, those are wrong.

[B]

Verbatim. Yeah, absolutely. Totally wrong. So it's very unusual in SCA law and we may get a chance to talk in a little while about the alleged unconstitutionality of this provision to allow someone to bring suit on behalf of the government. It was more common, interestingly enough, in the England Mary, old England where you were. The actual phrase that starts kwitan, it says it translates to he who sues on behalf of the king and himself. And that was again positioned at a time when if you didn't have an insider reporting it, who would know who to sue. Right. So this, this position of relator, of an insider who brings the information to the government about what has transpired and how the government's been defrauded, that's goes way, way back. It's not a, it's not a brand new thing by any stretch. Since the success of the, of the False Claims act and its Quitan provisions and I should add, the government can bring its own FCA action. So a company who's being sued under the FCA may be sued only by the government and in which case you'll see the suit styled, you know, US versus Smith as opposed to if I bring a relator to file case, then it would be US Exrail Bracker vs Smith. The X rail means on behalf of or brought by the relator to fill in the blank. So that's important to understand because when a company gets noticed that they're being sued under the False Claims act, they can't necessarily assume a whistleblower is involved. Okay? So since the success of that program and the government has recovered north of $700 billion since the renaissance of this statute in the late 80s, there have been several similar programs. The Dodd Frank, you've got them listed there. Dodd Frank, SEC and IRS whistleblower programs have also brought some measure of success. The big difference I will say between agency initiated programs like the ones that are listed here and the False Claims act itself is that the False Claims act was, was initiated by Congress. And so it puts burdens on both the Department of Justice, the agency that's running the program and the, so they have accountability to the court. When we file something with the Department of Justice, they do have to get extensions from the court. And so we're able to stay somewhat informed about what's going on with the case. By contrast, agencies tend not to put obligations on themselves. So the SEC program, for example, you can file the SEC program and maybe they'll let you know that something's happening. They will let you know if something's happening. They won't always let you know if nothing's happening. So you just kind of wander in a wasteland for a long time with those programs, which is. Which can be frustrating. Very much frustrating for the relator or the whistleblower, which is why I remain most fond of the FCA so far. Okay, when a relator brings us a case, are we going to talk about retaliation here? Totally up to you. Often an insider gets retaliated against. I would say that often happens before they've ever filed a case. You know, they say, hey, boss, I found out I'm not supposed to add this dash 11 to everything I'm filing here. In the medical charts, they said that might even be fraud. And they're like, yeah, shut up. Do what I say. And if they persist in that, then, you know, they often experience retaliation. A lot of times, that's why they find me. They find an employment lawyer because they're worried about losing their job because of what they're seeing at their place of business. And so they look for an employment lawyer who says, oh, this sounds more like fraud, and hopefully points them to me or one of my colleagues.

[A]

That's got to be a very dicey time for an employee.

[B]

Absolutely. And, you know, I have whistleblowers who are very naive to why they don't even connect the fact. They assume everyone wants to do the right thing, and they don't even connect their complaints to the retaliation until someone kind of helps them out with that. A good part of my speaking practice is making sure employment lawyers ask the question of, you know, what's going on with. If there's government billing, what's going on with that government billing? Because it's a lot of times someone comes in and you can see they've been treated differently and wrongly, but you can't really tell why, you know, and if it seems mysterious as to why, start probing whether there's, you know, some sort of reporting going on internally that could be causing that. But it's very dicey for relators. They or would be relators. Sometimes they are fired before they ever find us. Sometimes they're not. Sometimes they stay with the company even after we file. Sometimes they don't, you know, a wide Variety of different circumstances, circumstances come up. If they are retaliated against in the terms and conditions of their employment, which is key, then they do have a retaliation claim under the anti retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act. So I have to tell relators, are you protected? You have a claim. I can't stop them in that moment from doing whatever they're doing if that means they are, you know, there's no great sword of righteousness that I can say, aha, you may not fire Tom, he is doing the right thing. They can fire you and then we can sue them for firing you. But that is complicated by what we're about to talk about about mechanics, because False Claims act cases are brought under seal. So what that means. It sounds very official. I think it makes me sound super cool to say that they're fault under seal because the government gets a chance to investigate from its side the contract or relationship transaction that's at issue before it approaches the defendant about it. So if you think about it, if you were going to file suit against me for sell you something for fraudulently inducing you to purchase something for me, something like that, you already know all the facts before you file the suit. US has no clue. That's why we're coming in as a relator, right? We tell them what's going on, they get a chance to investigate and determine whether, you know, is the agency that's been harmed, are they upset by it, or do they already know about it? Is it something that maybe has been a loophole in the regulations versus an outright, you know, disregard of the regulations? How clear is it whether or not the defendants knew or should have known the right way to go about whatever the, whatever's on the table. So they, they take that time first covertly, while it's under seal completely, meaning that it's on the court record, but only the court and the Department of Justice and the relators counsel can see it. At some point, if the case is going forward, if it's not determined to be not something that the US will pursue early on in the COVID stage, then the investigation will go overt. And that just means they'll get a partial lift to the seal. The seal remains in place as to everyone else, but it's partially lifted as to the defendants. And the defendants are told you're being sued under the fca. They may or may not be told at that point that there is in fact a relator. They may or may not be given a copy of the complaint, but then they are well aware they're under investigation at that point. So they may have already gotten document requests from the government. A government subpoena is called a civil investigative Demand or a CID. They may be answering CIDs already, but they don't know what's what until that partial lift of the seal. So the role of relators is really getting everything to the government that it needs to conduct that investigation and then remaining available as questions arise during the pendency of the investigation. We don't have a lot of role once we've conveyed. My goal is to take everything the Vulcan mine meld, take everything from the rule, a leader's brain, share it with the government, and then stand back and assist as they need. If they need help from us with the law, we're happy to provide support there. We might as a law firm, we might provide support through reviewing documents that are collected through CIDs. There's a lot of things the lawyers might do, but I tell my relators, put it out of your head. It's going to be a while before you hear anything else. Because there's, I've said it before, there's like slow and then there's litigation slow and then there's like glacier slow and then slower than that would be FCA slow. It's a very slow process. And then one thing that slows it down would be the criminal potential criminal investigations that go on. If you're being charged criminally, you have a right to a speedy trial. It has to take precedence over the civil investigation if there's to be a criminal investigation. So throughout the country, when a U.S. attorney's office is served with a copy of a false claims at case at the very beginning, after I file, they take a look at both the civil side and the criminal side, take a look at the allegations. And the criminal side decides if they want to pursue anyone or the company itself in any kind of criminal capacity. If they do, that's going to take precedence. And we're probably going to be stayed like an administrative stay until the criminal side plays out. And then once it's resolved, there may or may not be continued civil investigations. I would say that's not super common, but you know, I'm going on a anecdotal felt sense of a 20, 25 year career.

[A]

Sure, that's worth something.

[B]

I've been stayed for criminal investigations. My partner would probably disagree with me 20% of the time or less. You know, you get a feel for cases that are maybe going to go criminal and it really has to do with that culpability mindset of the defendants and what they're doing and whether there's been harm, like physical harm to patients. You know, we. We had a case in Detroit that was not my case. It was initiated by the. By the office itself. And it was a case. Dr. Fata, he's on our website, he was giving unnecessary cancer treatments to people so that he could bill for it, which if you think that's a fairly repulsive thing to do, you're right. And we had a big case pinning at the same time against Beaumont Health Services, which was delayed significantly because the entire office was working on the Fata case instead of the Felton case. So Felton wasn't stayed, but the resources were all being put into the trial of Dr. Fata. So I say that just to say it's all very intertwined, and that's another reason why things can move very slowly.

[A]

Okay, wow. All right. Learning. Learning a lot here. You had alerted me to this. This article, you don't have to go into it, but about whistleblower programs under state securities laws. It was by somebody named Devon or Devon Eaton, who's antifraud advocacy fellow at the Antifraud Coalition. This is pretty fresh accounting of his article.

[B]

Whenever we're blowing the whistle, we're trying to see who's been harmed. And sometimes that's the state government as well as the federal government. Sometimes it's just the state government. Most of the. I think 47. Don't quote me. A significant number of states have their own False Claims Act. Some of those cover only Medicaid, as opposed to all types of government spending. But Devin did a great job in summarizing the securities law programs because obviously states have their own set of securities laws, some of which have whistleblower provisions.

[A]

Here's a quote to close this out. Without Ketam, the federal government often would never find out about fraud at all. Is that accurate?

[B]

Amen.

[A]

You're in with that.

[B]

That's. Hallelujah. There's a whole. That's the whole idea. We're bringing in insiders, you know, people. Things are very. This is something that's being done and deliberately concealed. So how would you know, you know if. Unless someone tells you?

[A]

Sure. Let's see. So now we're going to move on to. To antitrust. I'm very proud of this photograph. I took it myself. It's. It's one of my favorite statues in Washington. It's. I don't know if it's man or government. Man controlling commerce is the Statue and it's right outside the F. That's the FTC building. And Dan, you, you sent me this quote. Antitrust laws in general and the Sherman act in particular are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. You want to underscore that, that's the.

[C]

General principle that underlines the antitrust laws is that in order to protect free enterprise, we have to protect competition. In order to protect the capitalist system that the United States of America is founded upon and very much supportive of, we're the number one capitalist country in the world. If you're going to have capitalism, you got to have competition. And if you're going to have competition, somebody's got to police it. And we do it through the anti trust laws.

[A]

There you go. And thanks to Justice Thurgood Marshall for that, for that quote. So Dan, taking it over to you, speaking of the Sherman act and the other acts, can you give us an overview of the core principles?

[C]

Just like the K tam statute is Lincoln's law, one could make an argument that this is the Sherman Law in the sense that this is John Sherman, who was a congressman, a senator, secretary of treasurer, secretary of State, a vice presidential candidate, et cetera. But he's not the one who burned Atlanta. That would be his brother, William Tecumseh Sherman. So the Sherman act and the Sherman tank are unrelated. I just wanted to make that clear. But we do have of common roots, I guess, with the fca. So what are the three major legislative acts upon which antitrust private enforcement is based as well as public enforcement are the Sherman acts, which are 15 USC Sections 1 and 2. Ed. Sec. If you will. Section 1 prohibits concerted action in restraint of trade. That's your basic price fixing, bid rigging, group boycott and those sorts of violations. So that's concerted action. Section 2 of the Sherman act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize, et cetera. So yes, Section 1 relates to unilateral action, whereas relates to concerted action, whereas section 2 relates more to unilateral action. So yeah, they kind of messed up in the numbering of the statutes and one should be two and two should be one. But be that as it may, I.

[A]

Always thought that, but I thought that's, that's really, you know, that's just me.

[C]

And then because the courts in the, in the beginning of the enforcement of the Sherman act were so reluctant to actually apply the statute, Congress got a little angry. And in 1914, after Wilson and his band of progressives came into power, they passed the Federal Trade Commission act, which was the primary section. There is Section 5, which prohibits unfair methods of competition throughout the economy. And the FTC act also provides for internal administrative courts, which the FTC can use from time to time. And under some circumstances, it also gives the FTC a say in merger enforcement, et cetera, et cetera. But the core principles are really, when it comes to private enforcement, we sue for violations. So the Sherman act, as authorized by the Clayton Act.

[A]

I'm not an attorney, but I've just written about law for 40 years, so I've picked up a few things. And so. But people ask me questions as if I'm an attorney. I always say, you know, I'm not an attorney. And I get all these questions, I'm sure you guys do, too, about everything from divorce to a tree fell on my neighbor's house. One question I always get is, oh, can I sue for that? I'm like, well, I can answer that. Yes, you can sue for anything you like. It's all about what's the law say, what are the facts? You know, were you really hurt? What are the damages? Do you, you know, all these things. In working with you, Dan, you've. You've put together a lot of antitrust cases, and it's not a. It's not as easy as, oh, somebody's acting badly, we're going to collect. Obviously, you've got to. You've got to build the case, prove the violation. So if you could just talk about what goes into building a solid antitrust case.

[C]

Money.

[A]

First and foremost.

[C]

First and foremost, these are expensive cases. Anybody who's interested in pursuing one should be aware of that up front. How do we build a case? Well, for those of you who are lawyers, when you were in law school, you probably learned a method of case analysis called irac, which is issue, rule, application. Conclusion. We use a similar device in building antitrust cases and in analyzing antitrust cases, but it's different. So first we look at context, or history, if you will, to identify what's the context in which this particular restraint arose. And we are focusing on restraints of trade. So first we look at context. Then we look at structure. Structure basically means, well, there are two components to structure. Component one is structure, in the sense of how is this industry organized? Is it an oligopoly with, say, a limited number of large firms competing? Is it a monopoly, which would imply that a single firm has a market share upwards of 70%? Is it a loose oligopoly? Is it a tight oligopoly? Is it an atomistic or competitive industry. Those are the first things that we look at in determining structure. Second part of structure has to do with pricing. What are the dynamics of of pricing and what are the dynamics of output in this particular industry? In other words, what are the primary factors that drive both of those things? So that's the second part of structure. Then we look to conduct or behavior which is what is it that the party is complaining about? What is the nature of the restraint? Now the nature of the restraint, if you're in a Section 1 situation, could be collusion among what we call horizontal competitors. That is companies that are on the same level of competition. By same level of contribution. We mean, for example, that they're all manufacturers or they're all something else. They're all distributors, they're all wholesalers. The next thing that we do is we move on to conduct. What is the offending conduct? Is it collusion among horizontal competitors? Is it a situation where a manufacturer has imposed restraints on a wholesaler that are anti competitive or vice versa? Are they in collusion to somehow block others from entering a particular market or what have you? So then we focus on the conduct. Then we must go to what's called antitrust injury, which is pretty much a way of proving causation. That is that just because there was a violation doesn't necessarily mean that there was damages or antitrust injury. So the first thing we have to get to is antitrust injury. And that is, is the nature of the injury something that was contemplated under the antitrust laws. And I'll give you an example that seems self evident. But let me give you an example. Once upon a time, a bowling swept the nation. Bowling alleys appeared and popped up everywhere, much as the nation was suburbanized. And one of the reasons for this was because the Brunswick company had invented the automatic pin setting machine which made it more feasible to have mass bowling events because the pins no longer had to be set by hand. And the company also found a way of financing the the bowling alleys purchases of their machines. So Brunswick would both manufacture the pinsetting machines and would provide loans to people to buy their machines, et cetera. Somewhere in New Mexico, one of the bowling alleys got in trouble financially and Brunswick came along and essentially took over operations as a secured creditor. The other bowling alleys in the New Mexico area thought this was anti competitive and so they sued under the Sherman Act. Now the allegations or the conduct that they focused on had to do with some mergers that they viewed to be anti competitive that Brunswick had undertaken. And had improved their market share, but said the Supreme Court will. Well, wait a minute. Your true complaint here is not about competition or anti competitive moves. Your true complaint is about the fact that you're having to compete with a strong competitor. And that's Brunswick. And that's what's implicating your profits. Well, that's not a violation of the antitrust laws because there's no, there's no causal effect of these mergers on the competing bowling alleys profits. And hence was born out of a kind of a unique situation, the antitrust injury requirement, okay. Which can also be traced to the statute itself, which does have a causal element to it. So we have to prove that antitrust injury. We also have to go through and prove antitrust standing, which is somewhat different from judicial standing, the typical judicial standing. And then of course you have to prove damages. And proving damages in an antitrust case can take several different forms. For example, if you're in a class case, typically the allegation is that the collusive conduct lent to an overcharge and therefore the damages are the difference between the overcharged amount or the super competitive amount and the competitive amount, which is generally calculated by economists using various forms of regression and other tools of econometrics. Hence, getting back to my very first statement about money, it's an expensive type of case to prosecute. Frequently economists need to be brought in as early as the complaint drafting process. So there is that. The other type of damages that are typical, of course, are lost profits. Those are typically in competitor versus competitor cases because lost profit cases are not well suited to class actions. And then of course, in addition to damages, we have injunctive relief, which is also possible. I should also note that in going through the analysis of context, structure, conduct and injury, that we also have to go through the classic elements of the case. So if you're in section one, there has to be some sort of agreement, understanding, concert of action. It must be in interstate commerce, it must be in restraint of trade, and it must have caused injury to a person's business or property. Those are the elements of a Section 1 case. For Section 2, there must be monopolization of a relevant market. Monopolization is a verb form, it is not a noun. So that implies monopolistic conduct. One can. And the forces of darkness are very fond of quoting this. But there are many lawful ways of achieving a lawful monopoly that cannot be reached by the Sherman Act. For example, patent law grants limited monopolies, as do trademark and copyright and other forms of intellectual property. So Those monopolies are essentially untouchable by antitrust law because they don't imply monopolization. Also, one can achieve a monopoly by just being a really good business. That is, you have superior product, you have superior management, you have superior financial structure, all those things that are part of the competitive process. If that is how your monopoly noun was achieved, you have not monopolized verb and therefore section two would not apply. If it does apply, however, you still, if you're in a private damages action, you're still going to have to prove antitrust injury, causation, antitrust standing and damages as I've previously described. So, so that is how we build a case context, structure, conduct, injury, and then go through the classic elements of the offenses.

[A]

Welcome to our law school lecture on anti. Trust. That's really. No, that's excellent explanation of it. Even I understood it. Dan. I, I also, as I'm listening to you talk about this, I'm like, why do you do this? This is so complicated.

[C]

It's a question I ask myself on a regular basis.

[A]

But, but, you know, anyway, we recently had a blog post. You alerted me to a, a speech given by Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater, who's head of the Antitrust division. And she was lamenting about how difficult it is for the government to enforce antitrust laws against big companies like the Googles, who then go out to the big law firms, all of whom have enormous resources. To your point about the resources needed to bring cases. And then your point to me was imagine that's the government with all their power and authority. And then imagine what a private antitrust plaintiff has to go through.

[C]

Well, we get in our canoes, our little canoes, we paddle out into a mean sea, we try to slay a whale and bring it back to the village where we chop it up and eat for many, many moons.

[A]

Okay, all right, all right. Well, thank you. Thank you for that. Also, the market definition, I think was, that was always something as talking to you and working on the blog. That is always a key factor and not an easy thing always to establish.

[C]

It applies in both Section 1 and Section 2 cases, and that is the need to define a market. However, there is a category of antitrust cases known as per se cases, and that is per se wrongful. It's things like price fixing violations, bid rigging, et cetera. We'll just call them naked restraints or unsubtle restraints. For those restraints, the need to define a market as a pleading standard is highly, highly relaxed. However, in other cases it is not. And it is a major. The threshold over which a plaintiff must climb, and that is to define a relevant market. Anybody who's practicing law understands in some way, shape or form the concept of relevance. So defining a relevant market is a way to cabin the evidence so that we're only talking about a limited market where the restraint has its bite or its effect. And we're not just talking about markets generally or the economy generally. But over time, the judiciary has narrowed or expanded, if you will, either way. But they have put more and more and more emphasis on the need to prove a relevant market or to establish a relevant market. Now, even though a relevant market is in fact, and to some people this may seem whizzical, but relevant market is in fact an issue for a jury nonetheless. Many cases get caught on the rocks of trying to prove relevant market or try to plead relevant market, I should say, because of ever increasing judicial scrutiny of that aspect of the case. And that's one of the reasons that it may be important to involve an economist at a very early stage in the proceedings. Notably, even though we must use economists and their tools to establish a relevant market, there's no such thing in the field of economics. They don't have it. So in our attempt to impose relevant economics on antitrust, we have imported a principle that the economists themselves don't recognize. Okay, Tricky. Wow. Putting that aside, and thank you very much to the late Professor Bork for all of this. I say that sarcastically. Anyway, that's the situation with respect to relevant markets.

[A]

This takes us over into our. The core discussion here is the antitrust Whistleblower initiative from the doj. Now, Dan, I would. I'm not James Earl Jones, but you envision sort of a scrolling slide like Star wars, but I'll just read it. Long ago, in a galaxy far, far away, the Supreme Court found that in complex antitrust litigation, motive and intent play leading roles. The proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. Interesting quote from 1962.

[B]

Sounds like fraud.

[A]

There you go.

[C]

So recently, several months ago, the Department of Justice announced a new whistleblower reports program in the Antitrust division. And so this is an extension of what previously existed with respect to leniency program that was authorized by statute. That's called aspera. This is now a form of whistleblower protection and whistleblower incentives that focus on individuals rather than on corporate leniency applicants. So a whole host of whistleblower protections and incentives are now being offered for the first time directly by the doj. For individuals who come forward with postal related antitrust claims, the postal relation is a little bit of a puzzle, but I think that represents the fact that this is a pilot program at the moment. And over time I believe that the postal relationship will go away and it will be a more generally targeted program. But I do also think that as it currently stands, if one can meet some of the elements of mail fraud which we frequently see overlap with in antitrust cases, because of the use of the facilities of the mail as specified in that statute, we can get to the postal relationship fairly easily. And they're offering monetary rewards of up to 30% of any criminal fines that ultimately are recovered. So this is a new thing for them, but it's also an extension of an existing program. And just yesterday, the chief of criminal enforcement in the antitrust division talked about the relationship of these two programs and the likely expansion, including placing greater burdens on both whistleblowers and leniency applicants.

[A]

And so Dan, you had shared some of the leniency cases in action. I don't know if you want to say anything about these, but obviously these are some pretty high profile cases where a leniency was granted.

[C]

Yeah. So these are leniency actions under SB era. So once upon a time in a galaxy far, far away again. And not so, actually, it wasn't so long ago, but the DOJ had a very robust program of attacking international cartels. And that was for a whole host of reasons. That's truly inside baseball. But it was very successful in terms of breaking up international cartels that had been operating in the United States. One of the first of these cases which involved a leniency applicant was the vitamins case. I'm not talking about the vitamin pills that you're going to buy at your local grocery store or drugstore. We're talking about massive boxcar loads, train car loads of vitamins at extreme wholesale level. And this was a. A giant international cartel, mostly out of Europe that was broken because of a leniency application to the doj. Huge fines, big deal template case for leniency. Fine art auction cases was Christie's and Sotheby's got together to rig bids on bid rigging on bidding. It was, it's confusing, but essentially they were colluding in order to keep their auction fees up and to avoid higher fees to sellers.

[A]

No.

[C]

Marine construction. A lot of that had to do with hoses. Again, it was another international cartel that probably would not have been to detected but for the leniency program. And then of course, one of my favorite cases because I was a co lead in the private case, dram, which involved an international cartel in an industry that economists had told us was not susceptible to collusion because it was moving, it moved so quickly and it was an innovation based market. It could, couldn't be commoditized and therefore prices couldn't be fixed. Nonetheless, of course prices were fixed. Of course production was rigged in terms of throttle back artificially in order to maintain high prices, et cetera. And again, this prosecution and its discovery was based upon a leniency application. A little controversial because of the ringleader nature of the leniency applicant, but we'll fight that out another day.

[A]

Okay, good. And then in terms of, you know, I just put in one example of a whistleblower reward. You know, obviously the financial incentives are there, but the one case that was from this summer was against Omnicell overcharging the government for medical devices. The investigated False Claims act violations and in June reached a $4.4 million settlement and the whistleblower received 700,000. So there's just an example of the other type where the whistleblower has the incentive and collects something recent. Now, I don't know if we want to talk about. Julie, do you want to talk about this or the key considerations in litigation strategy?

[B]

I can certainly do that. You know, this is, I guess, at the outset of the case, one of the decisions we're making is where are we going to file? And with this proliferation of new whistleblower programs, that's become a much more complicated question. So we've had for a while choices maybe to file SEC or fca. If, if I've done a lot in the cyber fraud context, let's say that a publicly traded company has failed to report that it's out of reach, then that should be, that is clearly an fca, excuse me, SEC issue that can be reported to the SEC at the same time, if they have government customers, then it may very well be an FCA case as well. Up until recently, we would say elect your remedy. We're going to need to do one or the other. We don't want to create competing government investigations. And that concept for me came from the fact that when it was often, if you had a relator who had previously reported to, say, OIG directly for a Medicare case and had been working with oig, then you wanted to make sure that when you filed your FCA case and brought in the Department of Justice, that the Department was apprised of the fact that there was already an ongoing investigation so they could all speak. You know, it's actually quite possible to get pretty far down the road without that happening. And you have to wonder, will they step on each other's toes? Is this going to. What kind of problems might this create internally if you're pursuing it through two different avenues? But I would say since the, certainly since the advent of the DOJ's criminal pilot program, we're seeing more and more referrals to multiple programs. And I would certainly consider, I don't know that FCA or whistleblower is necessarily going to be a decision that's going to have to be made. I think that that is an open question. They've been very receptive to it with the criminal pilot program, and I expect the same with the whistleblower program. They are, you know, the omnicell case that you just had up certainly had both. They may decide to. The government may decide to elect its remedies and pursue one over the other. And that is the case with the civil versus criminal liability. We don't really have any control as relators or relators counsel as to whether they're going to be pursuing the allegations we make through the criminal or the civil mechanisms. And, you know, I talked about that a little bit before you can get a feel for criminal liability. A guy who is administering unnecessary cancer treatment to patients and making people sick is going to go to jail, not just pay money back. And that's going to be the dog, and the tail will be that civil liability of making him pay the money back. But in general, pursuing the criminal liability again doesn't preclude also pursuing civil liability, although you may wind up with no money left after criminal restitution, or you will certainly wind up with a much longer investigation period than if you hadn't had the criminal side involved. Although they are supposed to be speedy, you know, that's a relative term. So it will definitely slow everything down. Ethical considerations and privilege issues. I don't, I don't know that that really falls so much under this sort of binary. Do you do this or this or both? Certainly we want to be both ethical and obey privilege issues. But what can arise there? I can give you an examp example of a privilege issue that I'm encountering a lot right now with the civil cyber fraud cases. When company becomes aware, when someone within a company becomes aware that they're violating laws or regulations and they take that up the chain, you know, then the first thing they're going to do is ask the company's lawyers, either in house or outside counsel, are we violating the law? Maybe. Maybe it's going to be the first thing, maybe it's not. And you'd actually be surprised a number of companies that choose not to ask for legal advice on this kind of thing. But, but it often is, and especially when it's something as niche as cyber fraud regulations or cyber security regulations. Because most of the time the in house counsel, unless that's what the company does, may have no experience whatsoever in that and they need to bring in outside experts to help them assess where they are and what they need to do. Well, you can imagine a situation where George, the IT guy who's been there since 99 and runs the email system, has no idea about cyber security because that's no more so than you would go to your GP and ask him to take out a brain tumor. Right? There are different types of it, which I think a lot of people, they don't want to deal with computers so they just lump them all together, especially in C suites. So you may have George, the IT guy who's saying, I don't know, but I don't think what you're doing is right. And they may bring, may bring in, you know, Chris the cyber expert who takes a look and says, yeah, you're doing it wrong. And now you have two potential whistleblowers. And not only do you have two potential whistleblowers, you have two potential whistleblowers who may then be told different things. Maybe the expert is told, yeah, we're going to get right on that. And then they got, maybe George, the IT guy is told, we're not paying for that. George, you need to take on this new responsibility, which by the way, is the job of a team, not a George who already had a job, presumably for which you were paying him. So at some point you're going to get legal counsel involved there. And we're being extraordinarily careful. We've always been very careful. We don't want to build a case based on privileged information. Of course we don't. And the US does not want to see anything that has been even potentially tainted by attorney client privilege because we would just wind up recused, Right? We would be starting from scratch. And Lord knows that's the last thing we need in the FCA is to lose all that investigative time that's gone on before we realize something has been privileged. So we have to be really careful that when we're building our case, we don't include anything that the relator, I mean, George may not know that what he's being told by Chris the expert is coming from legal counsel. But if he does, you know, we need to be very careful about not sharing that and we need to be exercise due diligence to make sure we understand that. So that always comes up in every case. It's just an easy illustration in cyber fraud to make sure that your relator insider is not sharing information that properly belongs protected by the attorney client privilege.

[A]

Gotcha. All right. So we've been given a lot of information here in it in the time we have left left. I'll just kind of leave the key takeaways in there about the, the critical role of whistleblowers and uncover these things. And I think this slide about the amount recovered, I think we need to, you know, call back to Julie to your disclaimer about this, about these ranges. But and also that this new initiative does expand opportunities for reporting and account accountability. And obviously you've got an. To understand these whistleblower laws and antrust principles deeply or to work with somebody who does. If you guys know anybody, that's essential for effective litigation.

[B]

Absolutely.

[A]

And then I had some questions we've addressed. You've addressed some of these. I guess let me just tackle maybe just two of them here. The constitutionality of Qutam. I'm going to say it that way now. What are your thoughts on that? I mean, there was a, there was a decision that came out of the middle district of Florida saying, you know, these, these relators are officers of the executive branch. They have to be appointed under the Constitution. What are your thoughts on that, Julie? What do you think is going to happen?

[B]

So a couple of thoughts, a little inside baseball. You know, how now, you know, I'm obsessed with pronunciation. The case is Zafirov. A lot of people are saying Zakarov, But I know Ms. Zafirov is Zafirov. And this case is being litigated by a couple of dear friends of ours at Morganborough camp. And Judge Mazel is a former clerk of Justice Thomas. And Justice Thomas dropped a footnote in a recent Supreme Court opinion saying, you know, if these cases are even constitutional. Question mark. Not literally saying that, but that was the gist. And Judge Meiselle, you know, in what I would say is auditioning for a different job, I took the invitation to say maybe they're not and wrote this opinion that has, you know, caused quite a lot of stir. It's in my circuit, the 11th Circuit I sit in Atlanta. Judge Bunzel's in the middle district of Florida. We're both 11th Circuit. So we saw a rash of. Once her verdict, once her order came out, we saw a rash of moving to stay FCA cases in the. Particularly in the 11th Circuit based on this opinion, like this whole thing could be unconstitutional. We shouldn't have to spend any money litigating these cases. Even in some other districts, they. They tried that maneuver and largely unsuccessful. For the most part. No. Judge Mazel stands alone in the way she's analyzed this. This was all. Has previously been litigated. This is not a new argument. The constitutionality was well established previously. So we're revisiting it under some different theories. But did I mention More than $700 billion returned to the IRS, to the United States through the statute from bad guys who stole it? Let me emphasize that. And I'm sure there are a few people who were caught up in it accidentally. I don't know. No, really, these are. These are people who stole money and they had to pay it back. So it's pretty bipartisan that we support this statute. If I think an important thing to note is that what she said here, and I like reading the Mizel opinion because you read all of these great powers that Relaters have, and I think, why did no one tell me I could do these things? This would be really cool. You don't have anything like the powers as asserted in the Mazel order. She's talking about how a relator in declined litigation, where the United States has declined to go forward, but the relator is pursuing the case, which does happen and happens for good reason, not because the US Said it was not a valid case or that it wasn't a worthwhile case, but maybe because of effort and time, maybe because the US has recently done a case of that sort and they try to set policy with the cases they select. There are a lot of reasons. The return on investment. The US has to use its resources wisely to pursue the bigger cases. And if it's a smaller case, it may get. Get declined with the idea that the relators council will pick up the banner and take it forward, which we frequently do. But during the pendency of a declined litigation, Judge Mozel says we can bind the US which is just factually not true. I understand her reasoning. I'm not calling the judge a liar. It's all nuanced. But the question is, must we have congressional authority on an individual basis as a relator to go forward now, we already know that are not allowed to represent themselves. There's no pro se related. That's not permitted. Courts require you to have counsel because you represent the US If a declined litigation goes forward and the US Wants to stop it, they can always move to dismiss the case under C2A in the statute. So they always have the power to dismiss. So that's another check on a relator's power. But I think one thing that gets lost in this conversation is that we're only talking about decline litigation. We're not talking about the false False Claims Act. We're talking about the powers exercised by a relator and their counsel in a declined litigation. So I have a couple of solutions. You know, if, if to my surprise, and it would be very surprising to me, the 11th Circuit or the Supreme Court found that the contrary to the great weight of history, that there wasn't enough protection in place and that relators had to have congressional authority on an individual basis as a designated officer of the US in order to pursue these cases, then I think, number one, that would only affect decline litigation, right? It wouldn't really rejigger the whole statute. It would be focusing on this decline litigation piece. And then secondly, and importantly, I don't think there's anything to preclude Congress from creating such a mechanism. You know, we manage to commission every officer in the military forces. It doesn't, you know, bring the government to a grinding halt. They've created a mechanism for it. And it happens. I believe a mechanism could be created whereby relators are commissioned and therefore are authorized to go forward just as they're going forward now. And candidly, I would love that. I wouldn't mind if going into decline litigation. It would certainly stop the argument that defendants like to make in decline litigation that if this was really important, the government would be doing it. Relators wouldn't be, you know, they wouldn't have turned it over to you guys or the often heard thing at the beginning of a trial for a while there was, look who's sitting at the table. It's, you know, it's Julie, not the government. And having saying, no, no, no, I'm here because, look, see, I'm commissioned by the US to do this would not hurt my feelings at all. I think that would be an interesting and probably unexpected to the Zafiroff proponents. I think that would be an interesting and unforeseen result if we wound up with some kind of mechanism for that.

[A]

Thanks, Julie and Dan. I'm going to Using the time we have, I'll just give you, I'll give you a choice, one of two questions. You can either talk about forced arbitration and class waivers or these anti competitive laws and regulations that the DOJ and FTC are going after. What would you like to talk about.

[C]

The anti competitive laws and regulations?

[A]

Just to spell it out, the DOJ and FTC have identified 125 laws and regulations they believe distort markets and stifle competition. There's not a full list released yet, but Koso is it a committee in support of antitrust laws and other organizations have submitted comments during this investigation. So I guess the general question what types of laws or regulations might there be that are distorting markets or stifling competition?

[C]

Potentially hundreds of them. Well, this touches on a couple of things, one of which is the bipartisan nature of antitrust. I say bipartisan in the sense that, as you know, the Trump administration is a relatively conservative administration and you would think that their antitrust policy might reflect that, but it does not. I would say that their antitrust policy as revealed to this point, is generally in line with mainstream antitrust enforcement of the type that we would see from a middle of the road Republican administration and maybe even more aggressive than that, maybe a liberal Republican administration. So, so kudos to them for that. What happened is that a couple of years ago the Biden administration formed an all of government task force, if you will, to combat anti competitive activity across agencies, et cetera, et cetera. And the Trump administration has reformulated that and they've come up with this, this market distortion and stifling of competition regime. And what they're doing is they're going through any number of federal regulations to see if they have competitive effects, do they stifle competition. And there are many examples of it out there. For example, there's frequently tension between competition laws and the environmental laws. So that requires a certain balancing. Imagine, if you will, that they are auditing the code of federal regulations and trying to ferret out those regulations that they think distort markets and stifle competition. And it is, if it's done in good faith, it is an excellent use of government resources. Sam.