← Empire: World History
Loading summary
Transcript180 lines
- [00:01]
A
If you want access to bonus episodes, reading lists for every series of Empire, a chat community, discounts for all the books mentioned in the week's podcast ad, free listening and a weekly newsletter, sign up to empire club@www.empirepoduk.com.
- [00:20]
B
Starting a business can seem like a daunting task unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing to selling and beyond, Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz and Allbirds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into Sign up for your $1 per month trial@shopify.com SpecialOffer In.
- [00:48]
A
1979, the people of Iran took to the streets to topple the Shah. This year they're back again, but they're shouting, javed Shah. Long live the Shah. How did this happen? How did a country which so volcanically throw out the Shah in 1979 want the same family back again in 2026?
- [01:18]
C
Hello and welcome to Empire with me.
- [01:21]
A
Anita Anand and me, William Dalrymple.
- [01:24]
C
And we continue a conversation we sort of, I know some of you will feel like we sort of why did they stop now? Well, we're not stopping. We're going to continue with the conversation that we are having with our two excellent guests. And this is what Empire is all about. It's about whether we can learn lessons from history. And boy, are there some parallel histories here that we can draw upon. It is literally one of those serendipitous moments where you just happen to be in a place of great turmoil and the people you would most wish to to talk to about it are here in the room.
- [01:54]
A
We have two of the greatest experts on Iran with us today, Scott Anderson, whose extraordinary book King of Kings was last year's book of the year and which has been a major bestseller in almost every country in the world. And we have also Ramita Navai, who was born in Tehran, grew up in Iran, was the Times correspondent there, and whose City of Lies is a seminal reed of on modern revolutionary Iran. They are with us today to unpick the extraordinary parallels, but also the major differences.
- [02:25]
C
What is striking is that 79 was started, you know, the uprising started in the marketplace with those who were sort of on a hand to mouth existence, who suddenly didn't have anything in their hand to put to their mouths. And that's what has happened right now as well.
- [02:42]
D
That's right, yeah. I Feel everything is telescope now what took 14 months to happen in, in the 1978-79 revolution feels it's happening in a matter of well at most weeks, even down to days. And to go to this idea that numbers I'm hearing of the dead of the last 10 days in Iran are more than four times in total of the entire time of the Iranian revolution.
- [03:08]
A
Numbers will definitely rise. But at the moment I've seen a human rights watch of more than 3,000 verified deaths.
- [03:14]
E
And the videos I've been been looking at, there are piles and piles of bodies and you know, this is just Tehran. It's not even in the provinces where the regime kills in greater numbers.
- [03:24]
C
But to as to, you know, the, again the parallel. If you can describe what happened in 79 and compare it with those market uprisings that we're seeing today.
- [03:33]
D
Yeah, I mean I think that what. So I think the Shah had become more and more removed from the people. I mean that was very clear. He had no sense of. He lived in his palace, he was surrounded sycophants, palace toadies who told him just what he wanted to hear. And even though he was a very smart man, really quite brilliant in a number of ways, he fell victim to that. You can call it the Michael Jackson syndrome of surrounding yourself with yes people and other people's kind of standing up to you is. Are mooring to reality.
- [04:05]
C
And the one person who was telling him was his wife.
- [04:07]
D
His wife.
- [04:08]
C
And he wasn't listening to him.
- [04:09]
D
He wasn't listening to her.
- [04:10]
A
I didn't know that she was onto it.
- [04:12]
C
She was one of the only ones.
- [04:13]
D
Fara had his wife Farah much young had a.
- [04:17]
A
Still alive.
- [04:18]
D
She is still alive. I interviewed her for the book in Paris actually I interviewed in Washington. She goes back and forth between Washington and Paris. But she had a. Well a charisma certainly, but a common touch that the Shah absolutely did not have. And as far back as 1974 or 75 she was telling the Shah or at least once said I think the people are getting tired of us. And he just dismissed us. And even as the revolution was going on, he just seemed kind of frozen into inaction.
- [04:48]
C
So I mean one thing which I'm sure Ramita will have, you know the modern day view on is the relationship with the United States and the intelligence of the United States or I mean intelligence is such a misnomer for the fact that they were so lack of about this.
- [05:01]
D
Yeah.
- [05:02]
C
Now one of the problems was the CIA station in Tehran was staffed with non Farsi Speaking people.
- [05:11]
D
Yes. So the entire American embassy which was massive, it was one of the biggest embassies in the world. And this is your most. Is America's most important ally between Western Europe and Japan, one of the largest CIA stations in the Middle East. Nobody was doing domestic intelligence. In fact the CIA, this is really hard to believe but all their domestic intelligence was coming from savak, the Shah's secret police. They were handing over to the Americans. No domestic intelligence whatsoever.
- [05:42]
A
We should also say that there was a famous example of the CIA greatly exaggerating its reach which was the whole Mossadegh.
- [05:49]
D
Right, right.
- [05:51]
A
The legend has gone out that the CIA brought down. That's right, brought down Mossadegh and that it was a British, a brilliant British American CIA operation single handedly got the whole people of Iran out onto the streets and topple this guy.
- [06:02]
D
Right.
- [06:03]
A
It's actually quite clear that the CIA guy, head of head of station did an incredibly self serving report.
- [06:09]
D
Yes, that's right. Way exaggerated.
- [06:11]
A
Was involved. The British were involved. But as at the moment the people took to the streets and it gives no agency to the Iranians to suggest that the whole thing was a brilliant western spy operation.
- [06:22]
D
That's right.
- [06:23]
C
So I mean, so that's interesting right now. So the CIA at the time was getting their intelligence from savak. SAVAK were part of this yes men cadre of nothing to see here. Everything's fine.
- [06:33]
D
Right, Yeah. I mean and the official narrative out of the embassy and this was not just under Carter, this goes back to LBJ Johnson, but really accelerated under Nixon. The Shah hated when foreign diplomats talk to even his nominal opposite political opposition. He'd call the ambassador and give them a dressing down. So the Western ambassadors just told their people, don't talk to any opposition. And this became an established pattern on top of that with the, with the Americans in particular. And they're guilty of this wherever they go. Virtually nobody spoke Farsi. Out of an embassy of 300 people. You could probably count the Farsi speakers on one hand. Certainly two.
- [07:11]
C
Astonishing. Really astonishing.
- [07:13]
D
Yeah. And they have Americans.
- [07:15]
A
The same happened, didn't it in 9 11. On the night of 911 they were looking around Washington for Arabic speakers.
- [07:21]
D
Right.
- [07:22]
A
And they found again a handful in the capital.
- [07:24]
D
And, and Americans bring this tremendous amount of Americana with them. They have American club, a commissary, a px. A lot of people live in housing.
- [07:36]
C
Sounds like Jim Carters during the Raj.
- [07:39]
D
So you could. I make the point in my book that you know, an American diplomat in the mid-70s could, could serve Two years in Tehran, and the only Iranians he would ever speak to would be the foreign nationals working in the embassy and his gardener. And, you know, that's not much of an exaggeration. So they really knew virtually nothing about what was going on inside Iran.
- [08:02]
C
Now, I'm desperate to know, because you're so, you know, you're very well plugged in to some of those who have been fighting the regime before. Do they have any contact with the Americans? Do they have any feelings about the Americans? Are the Americans doing what they did in 79, which is just presuming to know what's happening without talking to the opposition.
- [08:22]
E
The activists I know are not in touch with the Americans. I was sent. I think I already mentioned this. I was sent a load of videos from an activist friend of mine a few days ago. And they're really shocking. I've never seen anything like them in Iran. You know, it's piles of bodies, and this is from Tehran.
- [08:39]
A
Zipper bags that they're piling them into.
- [08:40]
E
Oh, that. That was. That was. Yeah, that was one, Morg. These are other videos, and I'm not sure if they've been published yet, but deeply shocking. You know, the Internet is down. There's an absolute Internet shut off, which the Iranians do. They've done this before. In every single protest, the Iranians do this. But I think this is the longest that they've ever shut down the Internet. But there has been some contact. Some people there have managed to get onto Starlink, have sent messages via Starlink, and every now and again, there are periods where Iranians can phone through using their landlines. And I've got a message from an Iranian, actually.
- [09:19]
C
See, this is what is extraordinary about having you here right now.
- [09:21]
D
Yeah, this just came in.
- [09:23]
C
This is just coming in.
- [09:24]
E
I mean, listen, it's really hard to tell the temperature of the country. It's really hard to say most Iranians think this or feel this. However, you know, it's all anecdotal at the moment.
- [09:35]
C
Sure.
- [09:35]
E
And this message seems to echo what many others are saying, so I'll read you some of this text. So a significant number of Iranians are now saying that peaceful protests alone cannot topple the regime. They're increasing calls for outside assistance to level the playing field against a state willing to use unlimited violence. You know, and this marks a big shift. A big shift.
- [10:03]
A
Can we also just clarify there? There were reports on Twitter and some leaks seem to be coming from the Israelis, including Channel 14 Israeli news that the Israelis were arming the opposition yet on the ground there was no sign of guns. So what's going on?
- [10:23]
E
When they say the opposition, who do they mean? Anyway? You know, what's extraordinary about these protests is these are ordinary Iranians.
- [10:30]
D
Ordinary Iranians.
- [10:31]
E
These are a lot more sad Asians.
- [10:32]
A
Streets being shot down.
- [10:34]
D
And, you know, hearing this idea of people of Iranians today, you know, maybe asking for American aid to come in. I think one of the really important things to understand about the overthrow of the Shah was, of course, it was a religious counter revolution, but there was also really strong elements of kind of anti colonial uprising. The Shah was seen as a product of the Americans going back to the 1953 coup. Even his supporters called him the American Shah. And how that played out during the 79 revolution was if the Shah tried to make reforms, he, you know, he promised parliamentary elections the following summer. He got rid of the imperial calendar. He got no credit for these reforms. Everyone was like, oh, the Americans are telling him to do that. So he was really caught in this wedge. And because of his ties to the Americans, there was kind of no escape. Ultimately, anything he did, if he ordered his troops to machine gun people in the streets, it's like the Americans are telling him to do that. If he said he's calling for democracy, the Americans are doing that. So it's so weird to come to.
- [11:33]
C
This moment, but it is weird because only again, and it's the same speed. So again, I'll draw another parallel between 79 and now. The speed of change is dizzying here. So I know I, I was speaking to some Iranian dissidents who said, you know what? When America comes out and says, we've got your back, we're coming to help.
- [11:51]
E
Personally, I feel terrified by US intervention because we've seen where it's gone so wrong every single time anywhere in the region.
- [12:00]
B
Yes.
- [12:00]
E
But, you know, as an Iranian, as well as terrified as I feel living outside Iran, I also feel that I'm not the one to have the say. And it's for, you know, my fellow Iranians living under that regime that should have the say.
- [12:14]
C
The souls of many of those dissidents just died because they said, hang on a minute, please don't stand it. Apart from the fact we don't want you to bomb us, we do not want to have anything. This is our uprising. This is not.
- [12:28]
A
And it is a country with many hundreds of years of suspicion of outside.
- [12:33]
D
That's. Oh, absolutely.
- [12:34]
A
The whole colonial period.
- [12:36]
D
Yes.
- [12:36]
A
Was a period of predatory colonial.
- [12:39]
D
That's right.
- [12:39]
A
Whether it was Britain or France, Or Germany and Russia, particularly Russia, all wanting a chunk of.
- [12:47]
D
That's right.
- [12:47]
A
Of Persian eating up all the northern Persian territories, which are now Georgia and so on, but places we now think of as entirely different countries which were originally under Persian rule.
- [12:59]
F
Right.
- [12:59]
C
Sometimes, you know, when you have this sort of pattern bias, you think, oh, there are parallels and everything you see is a parallel.
- [13:04]
D
Right.
- [13:04]
C
You guys, tell me if I'm wrong or right about this, but one of the catalysts for the end of The Shah in 79 was the controversial then measures. Because of what you were saying about this sort of religious grouping in the rural areas, a powerful religious lobby was giving Iranian women the right to vote and agrarian reform. That. That was a massive thing. It is. I mean, just speak a little bit about, you know, particularly the giving the women the right to vote. How did 1770s Iran chafe at that and react to that?
- [13:39]
D
So this was really where. So the Shah started what was called the white revolution in 1963. And it was 19 different platforms, everything from reforestation to women's emancipation to agrarian reform. Most arable land in Iran was in the hands of aristocratic landowning families or of the mosques that they had huge land holdings. So when he called for agrarian reform in 1963, it directly threatened the wealth of the. Of the mosques. And so really with Khomeini.
- [14:13]
A
Just to clarify that.
- [14:14]
D
Yeah.
- [14:14]
A
So this is the waqf, the waqt, yes. Which is land owned by the religious establishment.
- [14:19]
D
That's right.
- [14:19]
A
Which was he thought going to waste and not being properly.
- [14:22]
D
That's right. And he wanted to break them up.
- [14:24]
A
Way he thought we could just get new amounts of land for these landless people and we can.
- [14:29]
D
That's right.
- [14:29]
A
Sort this all out. But it went badly wrong.
- [14:31]
D
It went badly wrong. But the two things that really brought Khomeini out and no one had heard of Khomeini until the White Revolution was women's emancipation and the agrarian reform. Those were the two things he went against. The Shah with his militancy sparked clerical riots in 1963 in which several hundred people were killed. A year later, Khomeini had become such a lightning rod that the Shah sent him into exile in 1964, and that began the Shah's Khomeini's exile in Iraq. Weirdly enough, that is also the time that the Americans finally thought the Shah had a backbone. In the 1953 coup, the Shah got on a. He was a pilot. He got on his own private airplane with his wife. Because the revolt, the coup was undecided for a couple of days. And he first flew to Iraq and then with things still uncertain, he went on to Rome. So when the word came back that this coup had actually succeeded, he was having lunch at the Excelsior Hotel in Rome and he came back with his tail between his legs two or three days later. So from the 53 coup, this is one of the great ironies. The Americans actually saw the Shah as a coward. I mean, who leaves their own coup? And it really wasn't until 63 putting down the clerical riots, which was not the Shah, it was his prime minister ordered it, and then the exiling of Khomeini that they finally thought, oh, he actually has a backbone after all. And that's when you start seeing the embrace of the Shah hardcore by the Americans.
- [16:03]
C
So, I mean, Ramita, it's I suppose, a parallel that women are at the center of this political battlefield once again. But I mean, I feel, and I'm an outsider, so you tell me if I'm wrong. I feel that actually it is the brutal way they crack down on women asking for more freedom and to express themselves that has actually alienated a great number of Iranians. Am I right or wrong about that? First of all, that women are a catalyst for where we are now. And second of all, that actually, rather than saying, no, push them back, push them back. Being the causes, Bella, back then, in 79, sorry, before that even that, it is now actually a catalyst again. But pushing forward against the regime.
- [16:46]
E
Yes. I mean, this is a more recent development. So I would say, Scott, that what's interesting when the revolution happened is that more women, especially from working class and religious families, ended up in universities. Women from traditional families.
- [17:02]
D
That's right.
- [17:03]
E
Because of course, universities during the Shah's era were seen as kind of dens of Western influence and iniquity. So that was one of the plus points of the revolution, of the Islamic revolution, is that it allowed many more women to be educated and to go to universities. Then what you had throughout the 2000s. And when I was there, you had this growing women's movement. And I went to many women's protests where Basij, the Islamic militia would turn up with chains, you know, and start beating the women and any men with them.
- [17:36]
A
An important point to note is that not only was the Basij, but also many. They used to fly in Hezbollah and non Iranian supporters, particularly during the women life and freedom movement.
- [17:50]
E
Yes, that's been happening more recently that happened. There was good evidence in 2009 that there were foreign militias who were Meting out the violence. But yeah, so I'd say were willing.
- [18:01]
A
To crack down on ordinary Iranian civilians in ways that Persians would not exactly.
- [18:06]
E
But Certainly through the 2000s, women's activists and women's rights groups grew stronger and stronger and more prominent and they became the thorn in the side and of the Islamic regime. And what happened in 2009 with the Green Movement is that the women's groups were pretty much obliterated. The women were mass incarcerated, and there was an absolute crackdown on any women's groups. Now they have been reforming and as we know, they played a vital role in the Women Life Freedom protest. So there's this been this really interesting kind of rise and fall and rise again of women's groups and women now at the forefront of all these disparate activist groups.
- [18:52]
C
Look, we're going to take a break. Can we just all agree with ourselves? It's sort of same but different. You know, you've got women as catalysts, but in very, very different ways. In these two years, I just want.
- [19:01]
D
To add one small thing to that of women being catalysts. That Farah, the Shabanu, the Queen, some of the hardcore clerics, I think Khomeini among them, probably hated her even more than they hated the Shah because she represented everything she made a point of never astonishingly glamorous. Yes, glamorous. Never wore a headscarf going on construction sites and being photographed with, you know.
- [19:24]
C
Wearing a hard hat and wearing Iranian couture. That's important. She didn't do the French couture thing.
- [19:30]
D
No, she did not. But, you know, I just. She represented everything that the ultra right clergy despised and were afraid of. And, you know, she lived for probably 25 years under a death sentence. I mean, they were trying to kill her desperately.
- [19:45]
C
Well, look, let's take a break now. Join us after the break because actually, one story that I'd love to know is that one of us in this room was there in 79. And I don't know how many memories we can. We can share, but I'm looking forward to asking. Join us in a moment. Close your eyes.
- [20:09]
D
Exhale.
- [20:10]
C
Feel your body relax and let go of whatever you're carrying today. Well, I'm letting go of the worry that I wouldn't get my new contacts in time for this class. I got them delivered free from one 800-contacts. Oh, my gosh, they're so fast. And breathe. Oh, sorry. I almost couldn't breathe when I saw the discount they gave me on my first order. Oh, sorry. Namaste Visit 1-800-contacts.com today to save on your first order. 1-800-contacts.
- [20:39]
G
Where's your playlist taking you? Down the highway to the mountains or just into daydream mode while you're stuck in Traffic? With over 4,000 hotels worldwide, Best Western is there to help you make the most of your getaway, wherever that is. Because the only thing better than a great playlist is a great trip. Life's the trip. Make the most of it at Best Western, book direct and save@bestwestern.com.
- [21:14]
A
Welcome back. Well, we are now in the 1979 revolution and we are finding the extraordinary parallels, sometimes inverted parallels, but parallels of some sort or other between the revolution to oust the Shah in 1979 and the revolution now, where people are shouting on the streets, javed Shah, long live the Shah again, unimaginable to many of us even a year ago. So, Ramita, you alone of the people in this room were at the revolution. I got in there about five years afterwards. I still could see displays of the spectacles of the martyrs. In my first day in Tabriz. I remember in this museum, they cleared out the exhibits and put the martyrs spectacles and it was all fresh. But you were there. You are actually there.
- [21:56]
E
You have got a great Khomeini speech story of why Western media was so taken by Khomeini speeches because there were.
- [22:03]
D
So few people at the embassy and journalists who spoke Farsi. Certainly by the time Khomeini got to Paris, the people right around him who were acting as his interpreters knew they needed to soften Khomeini because, I mean, this is a man out of the 14th century. And there was this one great moment where Khomeini had given the Shah an ultimatum. This was probably in November, November, maybe even December. He'd given the Shah an ultimatum of when he had to leave Iran. And the journalist asked via Ibrahim Yazdi, the translator, if the Shah doesn't leave on this day, what will you do? And Khomeini's answer was, I will call for rivers of blood to flow. And the way Yazi interpreted it to the Western journalists was, he'll be very upset. And this happened again and again.
- [22:53]
A
Just to jump ahead, Romanians today blame Western liberals for, for, in a sense, letting the, letting the Khomeini back.
- [23:03]
D
Right.
- [23:04]
A
And, and promoting him and leftist intellectuals.
- [23:08]
C
Yeah, I mean, you went as far as to say they thought he was like Gandhi.
- [23:11]
D
That's right. This idea. Well, I mean, again, I think this parallel right now with the Crown Prince, this idea that you need the spiritual guide and the. And I, you know, mentioned these three Western educated Islamists all in exile that were around Khomeini in Paris and prior. I think they all thought, oh, he's an old man, he's going to go back to home, the holy seat of home. Certainly he's not going to try to, you know, have political power.
- [23:35]
C
No, he's a friendly grandpa.
- [23:36]
D
I mean, he's friendly.
- [23:38]
C
I mean, that's how he was being portrayed.
- [23:40]
D
That's right, that's right.
- [23:41]
C
I've seen articles and photos of him saying, you know, sort of like, you know, avuncular grandpa.
- [23:45]
D
Right, that's right. No, yeah.
- [23:47]
E
And we were talking about this, weren't we, Scott? I actually interviewed that, that man, Khomeini's right hand man in Tehran.
- [23:54]
C
Oh, come and tell us.
- [23:55]
E
Ebrahim Ryazdi, who was an original revolutionary.
- [23:58]
D
That's right.
- [23:59]
E
And actually the man behind the Revolutionary Guards now realized that the Islamic new Islamic regime couldn't trust the army and needed an army that was loyal to them and answers only to them.
- [24:14]
A
And I think the Revolutionary Guards.
- [24:15]
E
Yes, I was the founder of the Revolutionary Guards and I sat in his garden. He died in 2017 and we were discussing his regret. He didn't tell me that he regretted his role, but he told me that he was really angry with what the regime had become, that it had lost all its values and that, yeah, the regime had turned on him. You know, the regime ended up eating its own children.
- [24:43]
D
Right, right.
- [24:44]
A
And licking its own coffers.
- [24:46]
C
I feel like we left. I feel like we left a little girl in the middle of a protest riot. I mean, can you describe for us what it felt like and how old were you and just paint us a picture of what it was like five years old. Right.
- [25:00]
E
My dad was in the navy and my mum, unbeknownst to my dad, my mum took me out to the protests. And I remember the revolution really well, especially the tracer fire and when the violence started, so we remained.
- [25:16]
A
Were you at the back or where were you?
- [25:18]
E
No, we just, you know, there was curfew so you had to be home by a certain time. But I remember my parents describing everything that happened to me. And there were lots of men with guns and there was shooting and you know, it's the period where it got pretty bad. My mum was a teacher and she. We stayed on after the revolution and my mum was then teaching secretly because then you had the cultural revolution when all schools were shut down and universities and every single Time she teach secretly, somebody would snitch and she'd be busted. And so it just got more and more dangerous. And in the end, we managed to get out, but my father stayed because he was in the navy. He didn't have Swiss bank accounts like lots of rich Iranians and tarangalis money squirreled away. And his whole family was in Iran, so he always wanted to be able to come back. So he didn't want to abscond. So he had to wait in order for the regime, the new regime, to accept his resignation, which they did just before the Iran Iraq war. So he got really lucky and he joined us in London.
- [26:19]
C
So look, I mean, we're sort of coming to the end of this. And it's just so interesting again, going back to the past. What to me was fascinating is that Mohammed Shah Pallavi, the father of the current crown prince, who is in Washington, was described at the beginning as a taut little boy. You know, he was completely dismissed. And then as a coward, as you say, he goes off to dinner during a revenue revolution, and then he sort of surprises the United States and the rest of the world by saying, you know what? That oil, that's ours. We're kind of more interested in it than you might think. So sort of the reading of the.
- [26:55]
A
Man, important point that he. That he saves Iran's oil revenues and that these are what, what. Absolutely. Superpower.
- [27:03]
F
The.
- [27:03]
A
The amazing. I mean, today we don't think of Iran as a rich country at all. We think of Saudi Arabia or Qatar or dubai. But the 1970s Iran was that it.
- [27:12]
D
Was the rich oil country and the Shah engineered it. He was the one who engineered the quadrupling.
- [27:18]
C
Well, he had a great place in OPEC to do it. I mean, and OPEC listened to each other at that time. So, you know, it was.
- [27:24]
D
This gets to this interesting idea of the psychology of the Shah. In some ways, I feel it's almost a kind of a personification of the average Iranian's view of the West. I think that the Shah, he was always. He could never get enough affirmation from American presidents in particular.
- [27:42]
C
Oh, he liked the Queen an awful lot, didn't he?
- [27:44]
D
Yes.
- [27:45]
C
Yeah, he liked Queen Elizabeth. Yeah.
- [27:47]
D
But he never fully trusted the Americans. And he was very aware of. And again, it's almost like Persia with the west, very aware of how they'd been taken advantage of wanting to emulate the west, but also deeply resentful of what they'd done in the past. So the Shah, the first president he met was FDR. At the, at the Tehran Conference of 1943. It was the first meeting of Churchill and Stalin and Roosevelt during the war.
- [28:13]
C
This is pre Yalta, which we did a whole pre alta series on.
- [28:16]
D
So this was the 10th in Tehran. The Shah is not even invited to the conference. He's the official head of state of this country. It was held at the Soviet embassy in Tehran. The Shah begged to meet with Roosevelt. In particular, he got a 10 minute meeting with Roosevelt. They had just made him the Shah. They had kicked over his father. And there's a picture of the Shah sitting on this couch with Roosevelt looking like a little schoolboy. There's not even a recording of what was said during that 10 minute meeting because the Americans in the room, they thought this meeting was so inconsequential. Nobody took notes. That burned the Shah and it stayed in his mind. He talked about it for years later. He hated Kennedy. Nobody really gave him any time of day up until lbj. But really then he was really anointed by Nixon. And Nixon finally in 1972 said, Short of nuclear weapons, you have a blank check. You can get any weapon system you want, no questions asked.
- [29:16]
C
But there's a reason for that. Nixon had his hands full in Vietnam.
- [29:19]
D
Well, that's right.
- [29:20]
C
And so like, can we just leave you to, can you be a sphere of influence and just do what we do? Will you just take care of it?
- [29:25]
D
That's right.
- [29:26]
C
You just take care of this little local trouble for us.
- [29:27]
D
And this, this, of course. So this is what's very interesting. So now he's been, in 1972, he's anointed by the Americans finally after being in power for 31 years. And then two years later it's like he takes revenge by quadrupling oil prices. And he goes back to the west and says, you know what, saying, oh, we have a recession, people, there's gas lines. And the Shah goes, well, you'll get used to it. So it's this very complicated thing and I feel it was kind of, there was an element of revenge to it.
- [29:59]
C
So I mean that sort of starts me thinking about where we are today again and what is happening led us here. So you know, we've had, we've had this before where the west characterizes a leader, particularly in the east, in, in whether it be in the Arab world or Iran, you know, a taught little boy, somebody not to, you know, and then they get it so wrong. They got it wrong with Assad. You know, they thought this is a boy who's grown up in Our universities. He's someone we can do businesses, someone who could control. I mean, he's one of us. He's one of us. Can we talk about Reza now? This, the Crown prince? I mean, tell me about him because I suppose everybody wants to know, everyone's talking about him. What is he like? Have you met him?
- [30:41]
D
I have not. I tried to interview him for my book and he wouldn't. I interviewed his mother but he never would get in touch with me. What? I always heard that the younger son was the really smart one who, the one. He was one of the two children who committed suicide.
- [30:52]
C
He's the one who committed suicide, yeah.
- [30:54]
D
Tragic story. But of course it had to go to the elder, his son. But I mean, I've heard this again and again that one of the reasons why the Shah felt a crisis coming in Iran to the Duri he did was he knew he was very ill, he knew he was not going to be around in 10 years. He had very little confidence in raising, stepping in. He was trying to set things up for a different sort of monarchy for the son. Not a constitutional monarchy like in Britain, but, but something less kind of strongman than he had. I just want to add one thing, looking forward, when you look at how the Iranian Revolution of 79 finally worked, it was economics. They just shut the country down. The entire country went out on strike and was paralyzed for two months. And actually, well, a little bit earlier it was like November and so the gears just ground to a halt. And I think if the opposition movement now is smart or has this kind of self survival idea, that's the path they'll take. Now what do they have to lose economically? They're devastated. Just do a nationwide strike and freeze.
- [32:09]
C
The government, be done with it. Ramita, as an Iranian woman, I mean, what do you think? How is this all going to end, do you think?
- [32:17]
E
Well, I think we're agreed on this, Scott. I think, correct me if I'm wrong, I. My fear is that the Revolutionary Guard are not going to let go of power easily. Right. And we're talking about a criminal mafia state. They have done very well from sanctions, they control the black market, they have control of the charitable, the bonyards, the charitable foundations that are worth hundreds and hundreds of millions. You know, it is not for no reason that whenever there have been moves within the more technocratic and reformist parts of government, moves at detente, moves at sanction, lifting talks with the west, that the Revolutionary Guard at that point will grab a dual national as a pawn and imprison A dual national and scupper.
- [33:05]
C
Any talks that happen, I mean, Nazneen, Zagari, Radcliffe will have a huge resonance with British audiences.
- [33:11]
A
And you get the impression that these guys are really digging in. They're completely ruthless. They're happy to murder people in large numbers and they've got nowhere else particularly to go.
- [33:19]
E
Exactly. And that's my big fear. And I've heard that they have been sending messages to Trump and there are back channels and they will do anything. And that's what I'm worried about. You know, Trump is, you know, he's a businessman. He's not.
- [33:35]
A
I'm also very suspicious to see in things like the Wall Street Journal articles suggesting the breakup of Iran and other options like this, because there are many.
- [33:44]
E
That's what Israel wants, right? I mean, that would be an Israel friendly.
- [33:46]
A
There are many powers in the region that would benefit by that, have benefited over the last 30, 40 years from a weak Iran. Iran is potentially the strongest state in the Middle East. It has brilliant people, it has high education, it has enormous oil wealth still and properly run, it could be the great power again in the Middle East. Many, many powers. Not just the Israelis, but Dubai, Qatar, Saudis, they don't want that. They do not want a strong Iran. And the idea of either a hobbled Iran with the mullahs, a damaged mullah government still clinging on, or an Iran which is broken up with, with maybe a sort of Kurdish enclave or something. These are Iran's enemies have all sorts of options that they would, would prefer to a resurgent, democratic, free Iran with its people liberated, to rise up and take over the region. Right.
- [34:44]
C
So, I mean, look, in conclusion, we don't know because we're right in the middle of it at the moment, but it has been so extraordinary at this moment in history to have you both in the room. So very grateful for your.
- [34:55]
D
Thank you.
- [34:55]
A
Pleasure to be here and particularly thank you for doing this so quickly. This has been turned around very, very short notice. Neither of you knew this was happening in this form a few hours ago?
- [35:05]
C
No, we didn't either.
- [35:07]
E
To be fair, we just met on a bus.
- [35:09]
C
We met on a bus. This woman is utterly fascinating, but it has been a real pleasure and an insight. Thank you both very much indeed. Until the next time we meet, it's goodbye from me, Anita Anand, and goodbye.
- [35:23]
A
From me, William Durand. We recorded these episodes on January 17, 2026. As of January 30, 2026, the US based Human Rights Activist News Agency has confirmed that 5,459 protesters in Iran have died and the organization investigating 17,031 more. Two senior figures of Iran's Ministry of Health have reported that as many as 30,000 people have been killed in such a volatile situation. Predictions are difficult to make and these figures are ever changing, but relentlessly rising.
- [36:06]
H
Big tax changes this year could mean a bigger refund and Jackson Hewitt knows how to get you your biggest you'll get 100 just to try us. That won't make you filthy rich, but definitely gas plus groceries rich. And since we know all the new tax codes, you could get thousands back, which would make you low key, loaded or at least wealthy adjacent. Go with our trusted pros and get a hundred dollars to switch. Rest easy. Jackson Hewitt's got your taxes guaranteed limited time offer for new clients. Participate in locations only. Details@jacksonhewitt.com.
- [36:38]
F
Hi there everybody. It's Dominic Sambrook here from the Rest.
- [36:41]
I
Is History and Gordon Carrera from the Is Classified.
- [36:44]
F
Now. Over the last month or so, the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been pushed to the edge, having seen the largest protest for a generation ripping across the country. Tens of thousands of people have been killed by the Ayatollah's forces since the uprising began, and a lot of people outside Iran are asking, is this the beginning of the next Iranian revolution?
- [37:06]
I
And Goal Hanger is covering every element of this. On the Rest Is Classified, David and I have looked at the role of intelligence agencies in this conflict. With the Internet blackouts and so much unknown, we've been looking at whether spies are best placed to judge whether the regime is truly at risk of falling.
- [37:22]
F
Now on the Rest Is History, we have been looking at the origins of the Iranian regime at the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which saw the fall of the last shah and his replacement by the rule of the ayatollahs. Now, given that the last shah's son is being touted abroad as the man who might, just might, save Iran, you can't understand what is happening now without understanding what happened back then at the end of the 1970s.
- [37:50]
I
But it's not just our own two podcasts that are covering Iran. If you want to know whether Donald Trump's military buildup in the region means it's likely he's going to wade in and force regime change. Here Alistair Campbell and Rory Stewart cover the latest developments in the Rest Is.
- [38:05]
F
Politics and our dear friends at the Rest is Money have been looking at the economic collapse, the corruption and the impact of the sanctions that have been eating away its social cohesion in Iran over recent years and have pushed so many people onto the streets and on Empire.
- [38:22]
I
They've been looking at the similarities and differences between 1979 and today. How is it that a country that less than 50 years ago forced the Shah out of power is now seeing crowds chanting Long live the Shah?
- [38:35]
F
So whatever happens next, to the people of Iran and to all those brave souls who've turned out on the streets to protest, stay tuned to Goal Hanger for all the context and the answers and the analysis that you need. Find the rest is history, the rest is classified Empire. The rest is politics, and the rest is money. Wherever you get your podcasts.