Empire: World History

Episode 331: The Iranian Revolution: Will The Shah Return To Iran? (Ep 2)
Hosts: William Dalrymple & Anita Anand
Guests: Scott Anderson (author, King of Kings), Ramita Navai (author, City of Lies)
Date Recorded: January 17, 2026
Date Published: February 5, 2026

Main Theme & Purpose

This episode delves into the striking parallels—and crucial differences—between the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which saw the dramatic removal of the Shah, and the present-day uprising in Iran, where, astonishingly, many are now chanting for the Shah’s family to return. The hosts and expert guests analyze the underlying factors driving both uprisings, examine the role of outside powers (especially the US), and consider what historical lessons apply to Iran’s explosive current moment.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Parallels Between 1979 and 2026 Uprisings

(Timestamps: 00:47, 02:25, 03:07, 08:38, 09:23)

• Both revolutions were fueled by grassroots discontent, beginning with economic distress ("those who were sort of on a hand to mouth existence, who suddenly didn't have anything" [02:25, Dalrymple]).
• The current revolution is unfolding at breathtaking speed—"what took 14 months... in the 78-79 revolution feels like it's happening in... days" [02:41, Scott Anderson].
• The scale of violence is even greater now: "the dead of the last 10 days in Iran are more than four times in total of the entire time of the Iranian revolution" [02:41, Anderson]; verified deaths already exceed 3,000 and likely to rise [03:07, Anand].
• The regime’s response is brutal and technologically advanced—mass shutdown of internet, suppression tactics seen during previous protests but now sustained for longer [08:38, Navai].

2. Disconnect of the Shah & US Intelligence Failures

(Timestamps: 03:32, 04:47, 05:01, 06:33 – 08:02)

• The Shah's increasing isolation: surrounded by "sycophants," missing warnings from his wife Farah about public discontent [03:32-04:18].
• Farah Diba (Shah’s wife) was "telling the Shah... I think the people are getting tired of us" as early as 1974, but he dismissed her advice [04:17, Anderson].
• The US embassy and CIA’s ignorance: “Virtually nobody spoke Farsi. Out of an embassy of 300 people, you could probably count the Farsi speakers on one hand. Certainly two.” [06:33-07:11, Anderson].
• CIA overestimated its role in historic Iranian events (e.g., Mossadegh coup—where they “greatly exaggerated” their reach [05:41-06:10]).
• The Americans received all their local intelligence from SAVAK, the deeply compromised Shah’s secret police [06:02, Anderson].

3. The Roots of 1979: White Revolution, Women’s Rights, and Clerical Backlash

(Timestamps: 13:03–16:45)

• The Shah’s White Revolution (1963): sweeping reforms including agrarian change and granting women the right to vote, threatening both clerics and landowning elites [13:38-14:30, Anderson].
• Khomeini became a revolutionary lightning rod after opposing these reforms—"women's emancipation and the agrarian reform... his militancy sparked clerical riots" [14:30, Anderson].
• The White Revolution's legacy: unintended radicalization of the clergy and traditional classes, setting the stage for Khomeini's exile and eventual return [15:13, Anderson].

4. Women as Revolutionary Catalysts: Then and Now

(Timestamps: 16:02–18:52)

• In 1979, traditional/religious women gained new university access post-revolution, a surprising positive [16:45-17:02, Navai].
• During the 2000s, women’s rights activism surged; crackdowns (notably after the 2009 Green Movement) targeted women leaders and groups [17:36–18:06, Navai].
• The current revolution’s "Women, Life, Freedom" campaign places women at its forefront, following cycles of repression and resurgence [18:52, Navai].

5. Foreign Actors, Conspiracies & Perceptions of Agency

(Timestamps: 10:02–11:32, 12:00–12:39, 33:34–34:43)

• Persistent suspicion of foreign intervention—debate over unproven claims of Israeli or American support for the opposition; "These are ordinary Iranians" [10:22, Navai].
• The 1979 uprising had a deep anti-colonial streak; the Shah was seen as a Western puppet—"Even his supporters called him the American Shah" [10:34, Anderson].
• Presently, some Iranians see outside support as essential, others fear “US intervention because we’ve seen where it’s gone so wrong every single time" [11:50, Navai].
• Regional powers “do not want a strong Iran” (Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis), and some even push for the country’s fragmentation [34:33–34:43, Dalrymple].

6. The Shah’s Complex Relationship with the West

(Timestamps: 26:18–29:58)

• Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s journey from being dismissed as a “taut little boy” to asserting oil control and quadrupling OPEC prices [26:18–27:18].
• His psychological need for Western affirmation—he “could never get enough affirmation from American presidents in particular” but remained “deeply resentful” [27:24–27:44, Anderson].
• Nixon’s 1972 “blank check” moment and its diplomatic consequences—followed by the Shah’s raw economic assertiveness towards the West [29:16–29:58].

7. Current Prospects for Regime Change & the Role of the Revolutionary Guard

(Timestamps: 30:40–34:43)

• The exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, is discussed: some doubts about his leadership, tragic family losses, uncertainty surrounding his return [30:40, Anderson].
• Anderson posits absolute economic paralysis, via nationwide strikes, is perhaps the only viable revolutionary path—“Just do a nationwide strike and freeze the government” [31:50, Anderson].
• Navai and Anderson agree: the Revolutionary Guard is “not going to let go of power easily. We’re talking about a criminal mafia state” [32:17–32:43].
• Revolutionary Guard benefits hugely from sanctions, controls black markets, and consistently sabotages reformist gestures or negotiations with the West by arresting dual nationals [32:43–33:05, Navai].
• Multiple regional powers benefit from Iranian instability; a “hobbled Iran” or “Iran broken up” are preferred by some rather than a resurgent, democratic power [34:33, Dalrymple].

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the 2026 protest violence:

  “Numbers I'm hearing of the dead... in the last 10 days in Iran are more than four times in total of the entire time of the Iranian revolution.”
  — Scott Anderson (02:41)

• On foreign intelligence failures:

  “Virtually nobody spoke Farsi... out of an embassy of 300 people, you could probably count the Farsi speakers on one hand. Certainly two.”
  — Scott Anderson (07:11)

• On the Shah’s isolation:

  “He lived in his palace, he was surrounded by sycophants, palace toadies who told him just what he wanted to hear.”
  — Scott Anderson (03:32)

• On interpreting Khomeini:

  “Khomeini’s answer was, 'I will call for rivers of blood to flow.' And the way [his translator] interpreted it... was, 'He'll be very upset.' And this happened again and again.”
  — Scott Anderson (22:53)

• On far-reaching public sentiment:

  “A significant number of Iranians are now saying that peaceful protests alone cannot topple the regime... and this marks a big shift.”
  — Ramita Navai, reading a current message from Tehran (09:35)

• On the Revolutionary Guard:

  “They're completely ruthless. They're happy to murder people in large numbers and they've got nowhere else particularly to go.”
  — William Dalrymple (33:10)

• On women at the movement’s core:

  “They became the thorn in the side of the Islamic regime. And what happened in 2009 with the Green Movement is that the women’s groups were pretty much obliterated... Now they have been reforming and, as we know, played a vital role in the Women, Life, Freedom protest.”
  — Ramita Navai (18:06)

• On the West’s chronic misreading:

  “We've had this before where the West characterizes a leader... they get it so wrong. They got it wrong with Assad... someone we can do business with, someone who could control.”
  — Anita Anand (29:58)

Chronological Segment Guide

| Timestamp | Segment & Highlights | |-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 00:47–02:41 | Anticipating today's protests, context for uprising parallels | | 03:07–08:02 | The Shah’s isolation, Farah’s warnings, and US intelligence myopia | | 09:23–10:02 | Real-time reports from Iran: violence, internet blackout, Starlink communications | | 10:02–11:32 | Myths and realities of foreign involvement in 1979 and now | | 13:03–14:30 | White Revolution, religious backlash, and agrarian reform | | 16:02–18:52 | Women as revolutionary actors, rising/falling women’s movements | | 22:03–23:35 | How Khomeini courted (and fooled) Western media | | 24:43–26:18 | Personal recollections of 1979: revolution on the streets | | 26:18–29:58 | The Shah’s character, oil power plays, and tricky reliance on the West | | 30:40–32:43 | Reza Pahlavi: inheritance and uncertainty; the Shah’s hopes for transition | | 32:43–34:43 | The Revolutionary Guard’s stranglehold; regional powers’ calculations | | 35:22–36:05 | Humanitarian cost: latest verified death toll updates |

Conclusion & Tone

The conversation is urgent, reflective, and shot through with a hard-earned skepticism toward both foreign narratives and the possibility of easy outcomes. Both guests convey the depth and volatility of the current situation and argue that historical parallels offer insight but not certainty. Their firsthand experiences and scholarly rigor bring texture and authority to the discussion.

The hosts leave listeners with the sense that Iran stands at a crossroads as momentous as 1979—but with greater brutality, even higher stakes, and a wide range of powers invested in the outcome.

Summary produced for listeners who want a clear, detailed recap of this in-depth historical analysis and on-the-ground perspective on Iran’s current revolution.