A (2:57)

going to ask you about exactly that, Ali.

B (2:59)

Yeah, but, yes, no, I mean, just to be. Absolutely. Just to be. I mean, I see this as a tragedy of, you know, decades in the making. I mean, I don't see this as something that is, you know, you can just sort of focus, you know, particularly on Trump or this administration. I mean, this is a product of U. S, Iran relations going back decades, and I'm sure we'll discuss it, but it's something that I think has to be seen in that wider historical context. And what I, I think in the same way as you, you know, what I, what I sort of lament about really, is, is the number of people who see this really in the short term, as if it's something, you know, very, very immediate. It's things that I've been warning about for years, you know, and decades, that, you know, this is a distinct possibility that it would always emerge, and that's the tragedy. So I, you know, I, I really don't think in very dark times, of course we are. And for anyone with any interest or love of Iran, it's really distressing to

A (3:51)

look back on the longue, on the deep history of Iran. You've been arguing in some of your recent pieces that Iran is one of the most revolutionary countries of the 20th century, that regime after regime rise and fall, and that a key pattern of these regimes collapse is internal weakness rather than pressure from outside. Maybe pressure from the outside has the opposite effect, that it gathers the Iranian people together back to back, this sense of nationalism, which is never very far from the surface in Iran, and people bury their differences when confronted by outside threats. Do you think the best thing Trump should have been was just to leave it alone and not have invaded and to have let the weakness of this regime?

B (4:30)

I mean, I certainly think there were better options. I mean, there are certainly different ways of dealing with it, but the point is that this was a running saw that few people in the west seem to have a serious policy about. I mean, this is the problem, and I think A couple of things I will just say there. I mean, one is, obviously the Iranians themselves have agency, and I think we often forget that. We often sort of think that everything that's going on is either to do with the White House or Downing street or whatever else, and we don't see, you know, what the Iranians themselves are doing or what they want. The other thing that I think we need to take care of, by the way, is that a lot of Iranians read back through their history, you know, through a very strong nationalist lens.

A (5:07)

I've never met a prouder or more nationalist people anywhere in the world.

B (5:10)

And it's a trope, of course. I mean, you know, it's like they say, you know, there are no people that are, as you say, prouder or more resistant or more this, that, the other. I mean, you could say that about almost any country, to be honest. You know, I've yet to find a nation that feels very humble.

A (5:22)

No, but Persians are particularly pleased with their history.

B (5:24)

They are.

A (5:25)

It is a fact.

B (5:26)

Yeah. But I also think that's a consequence in some ways of the sort of legacy of the building of the national state and nationalism in the early 20th century. I mean, they're basically inheritors of that. And I think from a historical point of view, however, as historians, we need to see through that, you know, beyond that lens, it's fine for Iranians to go around saying, oh, we've had a history of, you know, 7,000 years of organic nation. All this.

A (5:46)

Tell me about Cyrus.

B (5:48)

Yeah, exactly. And it's complete. You know, it's. It's from any sort of serious scholarly level. It's complete nonsense. So they. They can. They can talk about that if they want, but I mean, we need to interrogate that a little bit more and see what it means, because I think it also has led them to a number of fairly serious mistakes.

A (6:03)

Overconfidence, do you mean?

B (6:05)

Yes, overconfidence. Maybe. 1. You know, my point is, is that there are many people, and I think you're quite right to be bring out with your friends and others who sort of look at Netanyahu and Trump with horror. But they. They don't share any particular love for the Islamic Republic either. I mean, that's the point.

A (6:18)

No, none at all.

B (6:19)

Yeah, it is an extraordinary situation to be in where they sort of say, well, you know, we can't stand these two gentlemen, but frankly, you know, we think the Islamic Republic's a waste of time, too, and if they can get rid of it, you know, all the better.

A (6:30)

They'd love to.

B (6:31)

We find ourselves in this extraordinary situation where even if I was sitting with you six months ago, I honestly would have to say I don't think I would have found any Iranian who. Who would have said, oh, you know, please, Mr. Trump, come and bomb the Islamic Republic. I mean, I still find myself slightly speechless at it, as you can tell. I mean, it's an extraordinary situation.

A (6:48)

Another thing we should establish at the outset, Ali, is the, I think it's fair to say, paranoia that Iranians have about the West. And a lot of this goes back to something you told us wonderfully about in our episodes two years ago. The 1953 coup and the sense that the west wants Iran to fail, doesn't want a strong Iran again.

B (7:09)

It's deeper than that in the sense that we can go back to the constitutional revolution, as we discussed earlier, but also 1953, as a sort of a locus point. It's a reference point for many sort of the nationalist constituency. Now, one of the striking things that I think, you know, we need to be aware of is that in the last five years, I would say there's been an absolute sea change in public opinion in Iran about its recent history. Now, if you look back to the protests that took place at the end of December, beginning of January 2026, there was no mention of Mossadegh at all. I mean, one of. One of the striking things is that everyone started chanting about the monarchy.

A (7:40)

Did that surprise you as much as it surprised me?

B (7:42)

Well, yeah, I mean, to the extent, yes. I mean, I had written about this, and I think we discussed it about this sort of cult of the monarchy and this sort of nostalgia.

A (7:51)

We did.

B (7:51)

But the idea that, you know, you'd get people out on the street on such a wide level, you know, chanting for Reza Pahlavi and stuff like that, I thought was, you know, was quite striking. I mean, it was an extraordinary indictment on the Islamic revolution and Republic that 47 years after the overthrow of the monarchy, there are people shouting javid Shah, you know, long live the Shah. In the streets again. I mean, again, yeah, I have to say the Islamic Republic hasn't helped itself by restoring the hereditary principle and. And making sure that Khamenei Jr succeeds Khamenei Sr. So, again, that has a strong historical basis, of course, and I'm slightly puzzled at all the pundits and commentariat going out there saying, you know, this is simply a consequence of the war. Of course it's not. They've been planning this succession for a decade at Least.

A (8:32)

So, Ali, take us on a gallop through three supreme leaders, if you would. So we've did this obviously at length in our big series, but just to refresh people. So Khomeini, Khamenei and his son Mojtaba. Yes, give us a quick sort of character sketch of these three and give us the backstory.

B (8:52)

Well, I mean, I think, you know, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic, although there's a lot of debate about whether he wanted a republic or not. But be that as it May, that's what, 10 days? Obviously, the austere senior cleric who made his name in the opposition to the Shah was able to bind a wide range of rather disparate, has to be said, we always think about leadership in the revolution. I mean, he was quite late to that in some ways because many people on the left did not automatically side with him, but they did. By 78, a lot of them were coming in and leading under the banner of Khomeini. And of course, when the revolution happened, a lot of people had somewhat delusional notions of what Khomeini represented. I mean, even in America, if you remember, there were people that called Khomeini the Gandhi of Iran and that he would bring some sort of liberal democracy. Khomeini never had any intention about this, and he'd written about this in his own lectures in 1971.

A (9:41)

He was quite good, though, at leading the French, you know, those French interviews.

B (9:45)

Yes, absolutely.

A (9:46)

He did pull the wool quite successfully over the west and the left's eyes.

B (9:50)

I mean, I'm still amazed, you know, and you make a very good point there, because, I mean, I talk to, you know, you see, again, the commentariat saying, ah, but Ayatollah Khamenei, the. The second Supreme Leader had always denied or something. He never publicly done it, by the way, but always apparently denied that he wanted his son to succeed him. And I sort of said to someone, I said, is it possible that he may have lied? I mean, I mean, it's not, you know, it's not such a unusual circumstance happen. So, I mean, I think Khomeini, when he died, you know, in 1989, he'd basically been leader during the war, the Iran Iraq War, an incredibly traumatic period.

A (10:23)

Obviously, the original, the original, the original

B (10:27)

One died in 1989. And then, of course, Khamenei, who was then president of the Islamic Republic, was then sort of basically engineered by certain allies, including some more. What we might call pragmatists into becoming Supreme Leader, but he had never been an ayatollah, so they had to sort of basically elevate him rather quickly, make him an ayatollah, really.

A (10:46)

I didn't know he hadn't been an ayatollah before.

B (10:48)

No, no. The key factor in understanding Khamenei and his own paranoia and the way he consolidated power was that actually nobody took him seriously when he started out. I mean, he was someone who had greatness thrust upon him, if he, if you can put it that way. And he was always very paranoid that a lot of the senior clerics thought him, that he was a bit of a fraud. And when you are basically a bit of a fraud, Ahmadinejad is a similar figure, you have two conclusions. You know, how did I get elevated to such an enormously important position? Either it's, you know, luck, or it's divine providence, you know, and basically he decided the way to bolster his confidence. A bit like the Shah, actually, before advertising Trump too. Well, yeah, you can. Yes.

A (11:27)

I mean, it's a mirror image.

B (11:29)

It's a very common, you know, it's a very common theme in politics, isn't it, when, when someone who doesn't expect to be something suddenly becomes something. They say, you know, was this just good luck? And they go, no, no, God chose me. And, and of course, that, that suddenly gives you a certain sort of fill up, doesn't it?

A (11:43)

And we're getting this language, though, coming out of Washington now. This is God's plan, God's battle. It's going to help bring about Armageddon. All the stuff that they've been preaching to the American Army.

B (11:53)

Well, I mean, I, I, yeah, I think, I think the problem with the stuff coming out of Washington is we need to take care of. Although, you know, it's difficult in some ways because Trump likes to shoot from the hip, doesn't he? In more ways than one. But he can be very casual with some of his rhetoric. I'd be very careful. I mean, I have to say, reading too much into what all the things. Because he seems to change it every six hours anyway.

A (12:13)

Well, from interviewer to interviewer.

B (12:14)

Yeah, that's what I mean. And he loves to talk. He loves to talk. But, you know, as I say, I think if you look at some of the bombasts coming out of Iran, it's unfortunately just as bad and if not in many ways, worse. You know, Khamenei, the second Supreme Leader, was a much more measured speaker.

A (12:29)

So, yes, give us this because I don't have a very clear image of him in my head. What his policies were. Was he as every bit as puritanical and hardline as the Khomeini?

B (12:43)

The fascinating thing about him is he started out really as a bit of a sort of a. I hesitate to use this word, but softy. Yes. I mean, and the best example of this is that when Khomeini issued the fatwa against Rushdie, Khamenei, as president said, if Rushdie apologizes, we can forgive and forget. And it was Khomeini who said to Harmony, you know, buck up, young man. You know, we're not having any of this willingness from you. And basically Harmony was told to sort of fall into line. So when he started, Harmony was basically seen as a right of center cleric. He was certainly not on the left of the political spectrum, a right of center cleric who, you know, like good literature. You know, people say, you know, he reads Victor Hugo and this sort of thing and likes a bit of poetry and so on and so forth. But as people told him that essentially he was the Lord's anointed and this was all God's plan, he became increasingly hardline. And what is the statement they say, you know, weak men place an extraordinary emphasis on the fact that they don't change their mind. You know, stubbornness became this sort of like, you know, I'm very strong, actually. You know, his, his predecessor Khomeini obviously had drunk from the vial of poison to essentially end the Iran Iraq war. The reality is is that Khamenei, once he got lodged into a particular mode of thinking, found it very difficult to shift. So from a very early day, he was anti American on a grand scale. I mean, I, I know of successive Foreign Ministry and other officials in Iran through the 1990s onwards who said we need to build a rapprochement with the United States and end this. And he refused. I mean, he turned them all down. So this sort of idea that he was eminently flexible and people quote the nuclear agreement on this, the nuclear agreement was, from his perspective, I have to say, was principally to get UN sanctions off the country. I mean, he wasn't interested in building a rapprochement with the United States. And principally because of that and of other things to do with the agreement, I have to say the agreement didn't work. I mean, it didn't work because the American, you know, the key factor in it was actually integrating Iran into the global economy. But how can you integrate Iran into the global economy when you're blood enemies with the United States. I mean, you know, even the Chinese told them that. The Chinese said, said, you know, you think you're going to be the new China or something? Well, you're not, because you don't even have relations to the United States and you're not contemplating it, you know, and there was all sorts of ideological obstacles to anything really constructive going on. And this is why I say to people, you've got to look at the longer term and see what was feeding into these policies because, yes, plenty of blame to go around with the United States, Europe and whatever, of course there is. But I don't think we should forget or lose sight of the fact that there was some real idiocy going on in Tehran. I mean, and, you know, we have to, you know, there's a balance of power issue here as well. Of course, you know, Iran, it constantly plays the model. And this is a very historic, of course, as you know, that, you know, they are a great empire and frankly, you know, we can take on the world. Well, at the moment they are taking on the world, basically. They really are. And I don't think it's going to end well, I mean, not for anyone.

A (15:32)

It's not.

B (15:32)

I don't think it's going to end well for them either is my point, you know, and so this is the

A (15:36)

issue, Andy, just to continue with our rogues gallery.

B (15:39)

So you want the younger one now?

A (15:40)

The younger one, Mojtaba so Muchaba came

B (15:42)

to prominence, by the way, in 2000, 2005 during the second of the seriously fraudulent elections that happened. And basically Mujtaba has been seen as the power behind the throne who orchestrated the elimination of all the moderates and reformists from Iranian politics. And his name came up in 2005 when one of the reformists, Mehti Karubi, highlighted him. And we know that Khamenei Sr. Was very offended that his son had been pinpointed like this. So they always kept him behind the scenes. But then he really came to prominence during the Green movement repression of 2009 and he was seen, I mean, he was there. Now, one of the reasons I say that Harmony Junior's succession was being, was being plotted from an early day was because from the early noughties onwards, Harmony Senior was being identified as the, what they call the Alley of the age. Now within Shia Islam, to be called

A (16:31)

the Alley of the age is a very very, is a very, very complimentary.

B (16:35)

Exactly, exactly. And, and basically it suggests that, you know, you are sort of a Mirror image of Imam Ali who was the found, you know, basically, basically the first of the Shia imams and the Shia mama, of course is hereditary. Therefore, you know, the implication there is if, that if, you know, the way they were presenting it was that Khomeini, the first supreme leader was the Prophet Muhammad was the equivalent of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali Khamenei was the equivalent of Imam Ali. And Muchtaba, of course is another name for Hassan, the second Shia imam. Therefore you had this idea. And the other side of it, of course, is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard who'd done very well out of financial contracts and other business and basically the corruption of the economy. Oh, it's an obvious choice for them to offer continuity to bring this young lad in who's not really got a power base of his own, but except through the irgc and it protects their financial interests.

A (17:28)

This is an important point just to dwell on that thing you just said financial interest. Now all my Iranians friends always say that one of the reasons that the Republican Guard are so entrenched and are not going to budge is that they're all making a lot of money, that they're very corrupt.

B (17:45)

Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

A (17:46)

Because their kids going to universities in America, in the West.

B (17:49)

But that is true, you see. So one of the reasons they say, I mean, I would say there are three overlapping reasons why the IRGC is proving a hard enough to crack for some people and not all of them are. You know, I think people get a little bit over obsessed with the Pat, you know, that we, we're sort of slightly in awe of, of the igc and they're not, they're basically, you know, if you want good historical parallel, they're like the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire. You know, they become a sort of business conglomerate.

A (18:13)

I never heard that. That's a very nice parallel.

B (18:15)

Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, that's exactly what they are.

A (18:17)

Just to explain to those that don't know, the Janissaries are the Christian and Jewish boys.

B (18:22)

Yeah, yeah.

A (18:22)

Taken at birth often from the Balkans, trained up to be an elite and then run the Ottoman Empire and, and head the army.

B (18:31)

And they were eventually slaughtered, of course by the Ottoman Sultan because, you know, he found them an obstruction to his policy. So they have three what I'd say overlapping concerns. One is that there's clearly an ideological, I mean, you know, let's not doubt it. When people say, oh, there's a 400,000 strong army and they're all ideologically convinced. I doubt it. Nobody, you know, these Things are never uniform in that sense, but clearly there's a factor there. The second, which I think is more important is the fact that they've made a lot of money, a lot of them are doing very well, and they know that, you know, if things go pear shape, that is going to be threatened, and they've always acted to protect their financial interests. The third one which people don't actually look at is obviously, if things go pear shape, I don't think their lifespan is going to increase. I mean, you know, they must be aware that there's a tremendous hatred in wider society towards many of them. And so, you know, that will also be weighing on their minds. And I think at the moment, the view is you knuckle down, you double down, and you protect your interests. But, you know, we're already seeing that. It's fraying at the edges, by the way. I mean, we're already seeing that. So we need to be a little bit more cautious in our assessment about how brilliant they are.

A (19:33)

One thing before we take a break, Alan, just, just quickly. I mean, there were, you know, some very dramatic reports coming out of Iran a few weeks ago of the number of people being killed and the scale of the uprising. Now, that may have been slightly exaggerated, but it was a very bad moment for the regime, presumably.

B (19:51)

Yes. And, and, and by the way, you cannot understand, and I cannot emphasize this more, where we are today without the slaughter that happened back in January. Now, this is the thing that you have to imagine that, you know, this is done basically in about two to three days in January. It's an extraordinary, an extraordinary thing. And it's not simply the numbers that matter. It's the way they did it. Going into hospitals, shooting people in their beds.

A (20:16)

Buckshot in the eye of, of civilian, unarmed protesters.

B (20:20)

Yeah, yeah. And maiming people. I mean, of the number killed. So that is the immediate context, by the way, and we, we should be very careful not to lose sight of it.

A (20:27)

But, Ali, just again, just before we take the break, do you think there's some sense in which Trump pressing this button and attacking from outside with the Israelis, with the other Satan?

B (20:39)

Yeah, yeah. The little Satan. Yeah, yeah.

A (20:41)

In the eyes of, of the Iranians, do you think in some ways that has consolidated and saved the regime that was about to collapse?

B (20:49)

I always think, and I'll tell you this, I always think that a regime has, can get a bit of a bounce from this sort of thing. And if you go Back to the 12 Day War War last summer, you saw a little bit of a Bounce, because, you know, obviously let's, you know, a. A truism, if you will, is that when you have bombs landing on your head, you know, you tend to think in a slightly different way. I mean, you know, you do. There's an adrenaline rush. People sort of try and sort of. There's an element to rally round. I think the regime last time, of course, overdid it and, and, and didn't understand that, actually, you know, simply bringing out a statue of Sharpel the first, you know, forcing the Emperor Valerian to, to kneel in front of him. While people liked it, you know, very few people in Iran actually said, oh, you know, the Islamic Republic's had an epiphany and we're all now going back to the Sasanians. You know, I mean, this wasn't the case. And I think some people in the west took this a little bit too literally. And we saw the result of that, obviously, at the end of the year, national solidarity didn't last too long. And what I'm getting now, actually, from people is that, yes, of course there's anxiety. Of course people are feeling dreadful about it, as, you know, as I think any sensible person would, but they're also very suspicious of this idea about rallying around the flag because they don't want the regime to take advantage of it. I mean, it's been this thing, and by the way, to go back to the fiasco and catastrophe in Gaza that I know you've followed very closely, it's exactly this, that many Iranians were very reluctant to come out in support of the Palestinians because they didn't want the regime to take credit.

A (22:11)

My Iranian friends refused to feel strongly about the Palestinians because they feel they've had it rammed down their throats by the regime.

B (22:18)

Exactly. And this is the thing, and what I always say to people, I mean, if there's a lesson of history, okay, and we have lots of lessons of history, don't. We will. So if we have a lesson of history is that everything is contextual and everything is contingent, and you have to look at what's going on in Iran. You know, you have to look at the domestic thing.

A (22:35)

We're going to take a break, okay. And we'll be back with Ali Ansari to talk about the present crisis. Move on from the history after the break. This is an advertisement from our old friends at Betterhelp. History remembers emperors, conquerors, men on horseback. Yet every empire has depended on the quieter strength of women who steadied households, brokered survival, and on the women in your life who still do the same quietly every day. That quieter strength has never disappeared. It simply wears modern clothes. The expectation to be capable, calm and to absorb strain without complaint. To carry work, family, relationships and to carry them well. The weight may be contemporary, but it is no lighter therapy offers a disciplined space for reflection, to examine what you've been carrying and to examine how you've carried it alone and whether you should be carrying it alone. BetterHelp matches you with fully qualified therapists in the UK or working to a strict code of conduct. You start with a questionnaire to find the right fit and if it doesn't fit, you can change your emotional well being matters. Find support and feel lighter in therapy. Sign up and get 10% off@betterhelp.com Empire that's better. H-A L P.com Empire welcome back Ali to now look very much at the present and the state of the regime. You have written consistently that it is internal crises that usually brings down Iranian regimes and that 20th century Iranian history is full of regimes that have collapsed because of internal crisis. Tell us a little bit about the economic crisis and meltdown which has immediately preceded the, the January uprisings.

B (24:29)

So I mean, this is an excellent point, by the way, that again gets lost in the sort of the smoke and fire of, you know, the current conflict and that is that, you know, the Islamic Republic has been facing a crisis of economic management for several years now. And you know, we can all talk about political legitimacy and, and I, you know, I've said to people ad nauseam that they lost their political legitimacy some time ago. But if you manage an economy well, you know, you can sort of probably sustain that. You can say, well at least we provide the basics and this, that the other, what we've seen actually over the last years and it's a crisis that's decades in the making again because it's a reflection of a the kleptocracy that basically is the political economy in Iran, but B the complete lack of investment in infrastructure. So we don't have the sort of infrastructure to supply gas, electricity and crucially water. I mean water is that every Iranian state from the archaeominids onwards have basically survived on the basis that they can manage to the water resources of the plateau. Well, as Iranian ministers, ex ministers, I have to say, who were doing vast mea culpas online said, you know, the biggest catastrophe that faces us is that we have completely overused the water supplies and the water table in Iran has collapsed. Now think about that for A moment. I mean, the water table in Iran has collapsed. And under Isfahan, for instance, there is now an air cavity. I mean really, it's, it is shocking. I mean, this is, you know, his words, not mine. And you know, he says the threat of subsidence is very, very real deal. Now the immediate cause of course, of this kleptocracy and the crisis we saw in, in January was that a bank collapsed. And I hesitate to say that the, the chap responsible for the bank collapse is someone called Al Ansari. Not me. You'll be pleased to know an oligarch

A (26:08)

in Iran who basically never trusted Ali Ansaris.

B (26:12)

I know, I know. Well, it's amazing the number of people who come to me for funding. I said, no, no, it's, you know, this is the, is the rich.

A (26:19)

Ali answer.

B (26:19)

Sorry, exactly. Is an oligarch who is actually, interestingly enough, generally known as Mujtaba's banker. I mean, he's basically regarded as the young harmonized banker. And he, you know, the banking system in Iran is a vast Ponzi scheme. I mean, you don't know what sort of capital assets they have. What they did is they sort of borrow from one place, lend to another, but nobody has really a huge amount of money. And what happened at the end of October, if I'm not mistaken, end of October is one of the banks collapsed precisely because, you know, they couldn't recoup any of the debt loans.

A (26:49)

It was a kind of Ponzi scheme, didn't you?

B (26:51)

Right, yes, exactly. Ponzi scheme is. Exactly. And now what's happened now, by the way, a bit like Lehman Brothers in 2008, is because this bank has collapsed, four other banks are now on the verge of collapse. I mean, there's a lack of liquidity and all that the Central bank of Iran is doing, of course, is it's just printing money like mad. Well, you know what is what happened, as we know, if you print, if you do quantitative easing on that level level, inflation, corruption, the whole works. And this is the sort of, the short and long term triggers. The short term trigger is this sort of banking collapse. The longer term trigger is the fact that what you're dealing with is a vast kleptocracy with no accountability. I mean, remember, and this goes back to a comment I made earlier about the whole sanctions relief and all this sort of stuff. After the nuclear agreement, Iran is one of three countries that remains on the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. Blacklist, not great blacklist. And the other two In Myanmar and North Korea. It's a great gang to be part of. And, and this is, this is the problem, you see. I mean, when they say financial bad boys. Yeah. You know, if they say we need to be integrated, integrated into global economy. Well, if you want to be integrated in the global economy, you've got to have to make some reforms. But of course, who's against that reform? Ah, in comes the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard, who are doing rather well out of sort of, of smuggling and all sorts of other things. The whole thing is rotten.

A (28:14)

And so do you think it would have collapsed? That's the crucial question. If they hadn't held their hands and Netanyahu hadn't bullied Trump to march in? Do you think he's wrecked the, he's given the regime another lease of life?

B (28:27)

Well, I don't think it's given them another lease of life. I think what's happened is, I think it's given them a new focus. It's given them a new focus, certainly, and people are focused. But exactly as you happened after the 12 Day War, once the bombing stops, the old problems come back. Do you see what I mean? I mean, you know, the bombing stops, everyone says, oh my God, we survived great victory. And then they go, we still can't pay the salaries of our staff. And this is the problem, you see, of course. And what Trump and Netanyahu are doing is they're making a bad situation considerably worse, is all I can say. Now they may come out with a sort of sense that, oh, we survived and we've done jolly well, but none of the fundamental problems, problems that has existed will have been solved by, and will have been made considerably worse, including currency depreciation and all these sort of things. I mean, obviously, you know, one of the things you have now because of the war is money exchange has been suspended. So we don't have a sort of, you know, the currency is not depreciating currently. But the minute you get back to, quote, normal, and I don't think normal is an option anymore, they're going to face exactly these problems.

A (29:27)

And normal, normal's not happening anytime soon.

B (29:29)

No. And that's the problem. So, I mean, I, I wouldn't say really that this has been a fill up to the regime in the longer term. It might be a fill up in the shorter term, but I would say very short term.

A (29:40)

And Khamenei, I mean, he was one of the most hated figures in Iran for many people. Certainly senior, senior has the fact that he has been, he's got the martyrdom that he often talked about. Is that going to save his reputation in some quarters?

B (29:57)

No. I mean, I think those who loved him will love, continue to love him, and those who hate him will continue to hate him. I mean, I think there's a lot of guff written about this as well. And I'm going to refer to this wonderful man, Nasser Din Tusi, who, when he was asked by the Mongol commander Hulagu Khan what will happen if we kill the Caliph, we hear that there will be earthquakes and, you know, the world Armageddon, and Nasser Dinushi just says, no, not really. We've killed a few of them before and nothing's ever happened. And now, you know, Satan. It's that classic Iranian bureaucratic humanism coming and cynicism actually coming to the fore. And I think that's basically here, you know, this idea that, you know, something dramatic is going to happen. I think, I think, you know, the true believers will think that, but I think for the vast majority, I mean, history tells us that nothing actually will particularly happen.

A (30:41)

But Ali, one thing that surprised me and I, you know, I was following, as you were very closely, the protests in the streets, the massive crowd shouting to, to my surprise, certainly Reza Palavi, Reza Pavli, which I thought was a thing of the diaspora. I didn't think it was a big thing.

B (30:55)

I know, that's what I agree.

A (30:57)

I thought it's all the guys on the Internet in California, but not the actual people in com or Mechan. But there they were, they were doing that. But what we also saw, and unless those pictures were fake, was very large crowds turning up to mourn Khamenei the day after. And it seemed equally large crowds.

B (31:16)

Well, if you think that 10%, I mean, I would say now put it at 10% of the population of, say the adult population are supportive of the regime. And maybe let's make it higher. If you, if you look at some of the bureaucrats that might have been bust out, you're still talking of million.

A (31:29)

It's a big country, 90 million people, 92 million people.

B (31:31)

And then, you know, the adult population is around probably 60. If you take, you know, 10% of that, you're still talking 6 to, 6 to 10 million. And you're talking Tehran. I mean, I, I think some of the pictures have been manipulated. I saw another picture of Isfahan.

A (31:45)

Yes, the pictures in Isfahan were, it were of these enormous crowds.

B (31:48)

I know, but, but when you actually looked at some videos of it, it was slightly less enormous than the, than the still picture was showing. So, I mean, I, I, I, you know, I, I, I don't deny, by the way, that it has supporters. Of course it does, which is why

A (32:00)

it survived quite as long as it has against all the odds.

B (32:03)

Yeah. And this is why I always say that any post Islamic Republic settlement has to recognize this, by the way. I mean, this is part of the problem is that, you know, the society in Iran has become so polarized that neither side is willing to cut the other side any slack at the moment. You know, Islamists are the ones with the guns and keep threatening to shoot everyone. I mean, this is the other thing which I found quite, you know, I wouldn't say entertaining is the wrong word. You know, sardonic maybe, you know, that here we are in the middle of this war in which, you know, national solidarity and the head chief of police says if anyone comes out on the streets, we're going to shoot them.

A (32:36)

I mean, yeah, treat them as the enemy.

B (32:38)

I know, treat them. And that was exactly. And I thought, crikey, you know, that that shows real support. And there's another guy who's come out on television and also said that, you know, if you do this, I'm going to make your mothers mournful. I mean, I have to tell you, I tell you what it reminds me of. It reminds me of a sort of a mafiosa sort of vendetta structure. I mean, that's basically what it is, is there are people in Iran whose sole justification, in a sense, is brute violence. I mean, that's it. And that, to be honest, will is the core of the problem. If they had come to some sort of like, consensus, And I think 20 years ago there was a sort of a steady, how should we say, not entirely happy consensus, but there was a sort of consensus building about the way the country should go forward after 2009 in the green movement that began to shatter. And I think this is, you know, why we are seeing, you know, where we are at the moment. And that's why ultimately, by the way, for me, the Islamic Republic and the leadership of these I Republic is primarily responsible for the mess that Iran finds itself in at the moment.

A (33:34)

So, Ali, every historian hates being told to look at the crystal ball and gaze, gaze forward. But it is something that we always ask historians. Here's your pitch. Turn Mystic Meg on us. If you're looking forward, what are the most likely options? What would you say happens next?

B (33:50)

So, I mean, I think there are several, there are several options going forward. I don't see the Islamic Republic as its current, currently configured, surviving as anything else than a sort of a crippled structure. I mean, I, it's going to find it extremely difficult.

A (34:03)

Why? Just, just say why that you think that?

B (34:06)

Well, because the, because the level of the pounding, by the way. I mean, this is something that I don't think people in the west have fully sort of comprehended because it's obviously very distant. But the, the sort of pounding that the Israelis and the Americans are giving to the political fabric of the country is enormous.

A (34:19)

Desalination plants, oil refineries, electricity.

B (34:24)

Yeah. And in a sense, you know, all this was under a lot of pressure. But I mean, what we're seeing now is complete destruction, by the way. I mean, this is, this is not.

A (34:31)

And there's no money to rebuild any of it afterwards.

B (34:33)

Exactly. So what happens is, is that, you know, the Islamic Republic comes out really with a Pyrrhic victory, if it comes out with anything at all, and, you know, settles into a period of, you know, what we might call the garrison state. But I don't see that lasting terribly long. I mean, I, Iran is a very different country to Iraq or Afghanistan or this, I mean, let's not get into exceptionalism, but there are distinct differences, differences that I think need to be taken to account, not least the geography. I have to say.

A (34:57)

All my Persian friends say as one, do not compare us to Iraq. We are a very different.

B (35:01)

We are not exactly. I mean, this is the point. You just can't, you know, you've got to look at the distinct historical inheritance, look at the ideologies, look at the, what the events that have happened. Look at the cultural cohesion of the plateau. You know, there are some people that talk about ethnic fragmentation. I just don't see it, actually, not on that sort of scale. But I think looking forward, we are in for a pretty tough time. I mean, let's not have any illusions about it. I'm not one of these people that, you know, has this prognosis and I, I, I avoid predictions. We, we. What was it someone said? Historians are into prophecy, not prediction. And I think prophecy is a better term. So, you know, when you look into the, into the distant future or the medium term, whatever, I mean, it's, it's going to be tough, and I think people need to understand that the situation will be tough. But I have, I have a little bit more faith, I have to say, in the capacity of the Iranians themselves to seize the agenda and seize the initiative.

A (35:51)

And you do think there is a clear Majority who wants, who want to change.

B (35:55)

Yes. There's no doubt in my mind an easy way to do this and nobody's picked up on it, is what Mir Hossein Mousavi said. You know, the leader of the Green Movement who's stuck under house arrest, he said, what we need is a referendum on the Islamic Republic. And he said it. And I think people should seize it and say, that's absolutely right. That's exactly what we need. We can settle this once and for all. And I think it should be a referendum under UN auspices or whatever it is, and it should be done properly. And we can see, and I'll put my money on it, that what, what you'll get is a secular republic. It may be dysfunctional for a while, but that's exactly. I think what people will vote for

A (36:27)

is not going to be giving us that anytime soon. He's not, he's not, he's not a big fan of referendums, by the look of him. Yeah.

B (36:32)

You know what I'm saying, And it's an important point, I think, is that there are people internally, part of the political fabric of the country, who have actually called for this and have actually said this. So there are people there. It's not that there are no leaders and there's nothing going on.

A (36:46)

And quite a lot of the people saying that are in every. In prison or under house arrest, as you say.

B (36:49)

Yeah, yeah, no, absolutely. They're in prison, they're under house arrest, they're. This, some of them have been released recently. But, you know, they're certainly not part of the political structure of the country at the moment. But I think that can change. And I, I don't think we should ignore that completely. I mean, I, I'm not a great fan of, of, of, of imposing anything on Iran, but I'm also not a great fan of thinking that the Iranians are completely incompetent or something, or completely unable to do anything unless someone else comes and does it, does it for them. Well, you know.

A (37:16)

No, no. Are they messianic idiots who.

B (37:19)

Exactly, exactly, exactly. And I, you know, I, that's where I look at. I mean, I'm very much a child, I suppose, in some ways, of Edward Brown, you know, who always said at the time, in, in the early parts,

A (37:29)

Constitutional revolution, the great, the great 19th century Persian.

B (37:32)

Yeah, yeah. Persianists who sort of said that, you know, you, in a sense, you know, the Persians, you know, are quite capable. And I, I think they are. I think it's a particularly traumatic and dark time but let's hope. Hope that there is a. There is a dawn on the horizon.

A (37:45)

I'd say that's the most optimistic take I've heard on this very dark moment for a while. So, Ali, thank you so much for slightly cheering us up.

B (37:52)

I know. Well, I'd like to try.

A (37:56)

Thank you very much. We will be back later in the week with Kim Gattas telling us about Lebanon.

B (38:02)

Excellent guest.

A (38:03)

Excellent guest. And she, at the moment, is herself displaced. She's had to leave Beirut and is sitting in an Airbnb where we'll be talking to her later in the week. Thank you very much. See you then.