← Brussels Playbook Podcast
Brussels Playbook Podcast
Can Europe quit American Big Tech?
00:38:41
The European Commission has finally unveiled its long-awaited tech sovereignty package
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B
Today we simply rely on non EU providers for over than 80% of our digital products, services and infrastructure. And this has to change.
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A
Hanna Verkunen, the EU's tech commissioner, didn't name Amazon, Microsoft or Google in her opening remarks. She didn't name the United States, but it was hard not to hear them in the background as she presented what's been cast as the tech sovereignty package this week. Because this package is about a very simple worry. Europe runs on technology. It doesn't control over 80% of the digital plumbing behind the EU's economy and public life is foreign, mostly American. For years, Brussels answer to US Big tech has been regulation. Now the commission says that's not enough. Europe also needs to build, buy and support its own technology. And Donald Trump has made that feel a lot more urgent. With his threats, his pressure on allies, his tech billionaire entourage, and his willingness to turn US Economic power into a weapon, Europe could no longer dodge the possibility that Washington might one day pull the plug on the tech Europe runs on every day. Think schools, banks, hospitals, ministries, businesses, even security, all cut off. The package for Kunin unveiled, carefully worded, not to draw Trump's ire, brings some new ideas and tools. But let's be real here. Does digital sovereignty actually mean independence from the US or just a better way of managing dependence? Can Europe really detox from American big tech? After decades of falling behind, has Europe finally understood that software is hard power? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of the Brussels Playbook. Weekender. To break it all down, I'm joined by Maricja Skaka. She's a former Dutch MEP and non resident fellow at Stanford's Cyber Policy Center. Here in the studio with me is POLITICO's Deputy Tech Editor Lawrence Rulis. All right, so I'm going to start with, I don't know, maybe a little, a little reality check. Both of you know this world inside out. Do either of you actually use European tech tools in daily life to replace American ones? Search, email, maps, messaging?
- [03:06]
C
Lawrence I've tried switching many times. Sometimes I've stuck to an alternative. Sometimes I've reverted back to the default technology. But I do use European search engines. I have Ecosia as my default on my phone, so essentially switching it up a little with Google search. So there has been successful attempts, but it is a struggle.
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A
Very true.
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B
Because I work at Stanford, I don't work there, but I have a fellowship there and I still have my IT email address and Zoom account through there that it's really hard to get out from the work sort of context environment. But it's on my list of things that I should be doing in the fall is to do a complete cut off and reset because I think there are more and more options and we should also not, you know, make the challenge of that process bigger than it has to be. It's sometimes a human factor that's risk averse or change averse, that's withholding most people, not so much the lack of options.
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A
Let me then start with a story about people who didn't have a choice about making some of these switches. So officials at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, some of them suddenly discovered that their Visa and MasterCard, their credit cards didn't work, nor did booking.com, amazon or Airbnb. And this was Trump's reaction to the ICC's arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged war crimes in Gaza. So, yeah, suddenly this wasn't just about a theoretical idea like cloud sovereignty, but it was a real issue. So Marita, why did this story send such a chill through Europe?
- [04:39]
B
Well, I think it made it very tangible what lever the U.S. government has on us Europeans. I mean, this notion of massive dependency, you hundreds of billions spent on cloud risks, making it so abstract and far removed from the individual that it's hard to imagine what that really means and why it's a worrisome thing. But the ICC example really hit home in Europe, but especially in the Netherlands, maybe because the ICC sits in the Hague. And people were just like, wow, one, is Trump really doing this? And two, are these companies not able to push back or reject this somehow? Right. It was pretty clear that we shouldn't only think about the companies and big tech as a growing concern, which I think has really landed in Europe, but also about the way in which the Trump administration sees tech companies as tools of power, geopolitics, imperialism even. And so I think it made it very concrete what that means.
- [05:38]
A
And you mentioned that you're affiliated with Stanford, so you know Silicon Valley pretty well, but you're also a former member of the European Parliament, you know, Brussels, and you wanted to bridge those worlds. But you've said that your own position has shifted and that European digital sovereignty is now the most urgent task. What was kind of the tipping point moment when you realized that the bridge building isn't enough anymore?
- [06:03]
B
I'm trying to think of the tipping point. I mean, I think we still need bridges, but Europe first and foremost needs to really start thinking and acting in its pure self interest. And I think Europeans have not really learned and trained how to do that. We like soft power, we like economic relations, fundamental rights, the single market and so on. And where I've changed is that I'm just more and more aware of how naive that has been and how dangerous it is for not just defense, which has had quite a bit of attention, but also for our democracy, you know, for our self determination as people, for our way of life, for, for the way in which we design our social contract, we access information and for our security. And so I would love to see Europe more self confident the way that Tech Bros in California can talk and think about themselves as being capable of doing anything, solving any problem. We are now in a very uncertain moment in Europe and that needs to be overcome.
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A
Lawrence, I want to come to you to kind of help us get a sense of when this tipping point occurred for others. Our colleague Matthieu Palais argued in an article just before the commission unveiled this package that Donald Trump may have done what years of speeches from Paris and Brussels couldn't. And that is to convince European leaders that tech dependence is a vulnerability. Can you remind us what that debate looked like before Trump?
- [07:27]
C
I think what we've seen is that the discussion around Europe's tech sovereignty and essentially Europe's tech sector and how it can compete with other parts of the world, that isn't new. I remember going back 10 years, going back even longer than 10 years, the discussion in Brussels about should we have a European. Google was very prominent, for instance. Obviously Europe never really found the solution to that question. I think what's changed now is it is that the world has changed around Europe. And so Europe is having to adapt to a new geopolitical reality. And so what we are increasingly realizing is that technology effectively is a strategic asset of governments, of powers in the world. And it is something that Europe needs to have to have power. It is something that Europe needs to have to have healthy trade relations. And so that is prompting sort of this shift in Europe thinking. And obviously the big driving force here is the return of Donald Trump to the White House. The incidents that we've seen in the transatlantic relationship since Donald Trump took office. It ranges from, you know, sort of the US Government railing against European tech regulation, but all the way to threatening annexation of Greenland. You can really feel that, like the antagonism in the transatlantic relation that we've had in sort of the first year of the Trump administration has driven Brussels to really push it and come up with new solutions to essentially old problems. And that is what they're doing this week.
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A
And Marita, you know, thinking of your book the Tech Coup, it seems like it isn't necessarily just Trump. And you talked about these tech bros. You've warned that tech CEOs and billionaires are becoming political actors in their own right. So how do you see this deeper issue of the merging of big tech power and political power playing out here?
- [09:10]
B
I think that has woken up Europeans, but still there's a reluctance to call a spade a spade. It has taken Europe way too long to appreciate the power dynamics that are at play that were already becoming a challenge when these big tech companies were taking decisions about infrastructure, about cybersecurity, about war and peace, about civil liberties, you know, really core roles and matters that used to be the exclusive domain of states. And so the wake up call of that power came far too late. But when it merged Silicon valley power with U.S. state power in the form of Donald Trump, who indeed broke the west as we've known it, is very aggressive vis a vis the European Union trade wars, but also using AI and other technologies as an instrument of state power, asking for stakes in companies like the sell off of TikTok, a stake in IBM, giving out executive orders that impact companies. And yet this narrative that Europe regulates the US Deregulates is sort of persistent. And so I think we're still seeing too slow a response, too much of a spin from Silicon Valley as to what is going on. While indeed the double whammy for Europe between Silicon Valley abuse of power and Washington's abuse of power is a significant one. And I can only hope that this is the last wake up call we'll have.
- [10:38]
A
I know that this idea that Brussels regulates and the US Innovates is grading and that there's eagerness here in the European capital to get beyond that. But the efforts to sort of deregulate and free things up are really cast in the frame of competitiveness. Marita, what you're talking about is more really existential. And going over to Lawrence, you know, from talking to commission officials, is this push still just really about again, kind of the market or competitiveness, or do you feel like their tone is also changing.
- [11:08]
C
The whole discussion around tech sovereignty kind of is both. On the one hand, it is about the dependence that we have on the United States and on US Technology. And so there, there's a lot of discussion, but at the same time, there is this question of can Europe actually have the economy that creates these kind of players? Can Europe create leaders and champions? That is a question of competitiveness and whether Europe's regulatory framework plays against that. Obviously, we've heard from the Commission, we've heard a very, very active narrative over the past year and a half that some of Europe's laws effectively hold European technology back. Right from the start, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen came to office, she had the Draghi report to go off on. And Draghi singled out the AI act and the General Data Protection Regulation, the privacy law, as problems, as problems as holding European business back. So I think it is sort of both. It is the reliance on foreign technology, but it is also the question on whether it is our own regulatory framework has held us back from creating alternatives. And we're seeing that the solutions that Brussels comes up with, they somehow try to address both problems at once.
- [12:18]
A
Well, Lawrence, that's actually a perfect segue into talking about what the Commission is actually proposing this week. So as to the package itself, we have the Cloud and AI Development act. And part of that is about what governments need to take into consideration when they're choosing cloud providers for sensitive sectors like health care, defense. Just tell us more about what the Commission wants to do here.
- [12:42]
C
This is really one of the cornerstone proposals, if not the most central proposal. At the heart is the realization that US cloud providers account for over 70% of the market. There's rough estimations that 70% is taken up by the US three biggest cloud providers, so that's Amazon, Google and Microsoft. And European players only account for about 15% of the European market. Obviously, that's a big problem for Europe because cloud means data. It means having sort of, you know, the in house capabilities to run technology, including artificial intelligence. A lot of the technology sector hinges on cloud. So the Commission wants governments to assess how reliant they are. They want to look at their services and look at the cloud providers that they're using. How risky is this? How dangerous is this in terms of foreign intervention? And they're proposing sort of four levels of European taxography sovereignty that they want governments to assess their services against. And then from there they're asking governments to, for some services, switch to higher levels of European tech. Sovereign services. Another big element of their response in the cloud sector is that the Commission itself wants to reserve the power to white list foreign countries, so effectively make its own assessments of whether US Service providers are risky or are safe. That is a right that will be very controversial. It will lead to big discussions with the United States, big discussions with US Cloud players, but also big discussions with national governments. Because if there's one thing that national governments like to do, it's make decisions on their own, not having to delegate them to Brussels. And so the caveat here is that what the Commission presents this week, it's up for negotiation, it'll get watered down. And so the eventual outcome might be very different from this. But essentially what Europe is looking for here is to sort of create a shift in the cloud market where through its own public procurement, it is actually starting to boost its domestic alternatives and therefore sort of create European alternatives to the big US Cloud providers.
- [14:54]
A
And there are, you know, some examples that I can see the Commission using to kind of make its case that countries should get on board with this. For example, in 2025, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration signed a 20 year contract with a US firm called Fast Enterprises to run VAT collection. But critics have warned that Washington could, in theory, you know, just freeze it in a conflict. And that would put around one and a half billion euros a week of government revenue at risk. So there are some real threats. But at the same time, Europe has tried versions of this kind of European cloud before. Gaia X was meant to kind of serve that role and project kind of failed. Marita, what went wrong and why am I different this time?
- [15:37]
B
The most important signal that this package gives is that Europeans want to focus on building and that we have a lot of leverage and that the single market procurement rules, our own spending, government spending, are very important levers there. So I think member states that want to complain that, oh, they don't want Brussels to coordinate have to really ask themselves, what else did they think the single market was? I mean, this is precisely what the EU was set up to do, to have the same treatment across the union. Think about educational organizations, schools, universities, hospitals, local governments that have to make decisions about IT contracts. You mentioned the one about the Dutch tax authority, but there are others. The discussion about sovereignty is happening everywhere. A lot of organizations want to untangle their dependency. They're just not comfortable of spending that money to U.S. companies. Not because they don't like the philosophy and the behavior of big tech, not because they don't want to be an instrument in the hands of Donald Trump, it's pretty plain, but they're looking for guidance from the European Commission because they know that European procurement rules are rigid and they're important and that they sort of keep that single market alive. So I think this kind of package is exactly what we need. But we need to avoid a sort of waiting for Europe to act in the sense that without EU action, member state governments can do so much more. The Dutch government has, in its coalition program, for example, the ambition towards more sovereignty. The city of Amsterdam has put targets out of decreasing its dependence on foreign tech. So I think it's important that people start acting in their own capacity while respecting what the EU can do and appreciating that the critical mass that the EU can bring about is really what makes the difference. And so I'm very happy to see this focus on building from Brussels right now. Whereas the examples that Lawrence gave, you know, the read of the Draghi report, the focus on derail regulation in Brussels right now, really risk spending time and energy on yesterday's problems once more. I think the EU has been way too reactive. And the challenge with AI, but also the opportunity with AI, is that a lot of people are very worried about what this technology is doing. They're not embracing the stories that are coming out of the big labs like OpenAI or Anthropic. They're actually worried for their futures. They're worried for the environment, they're worried for fair treatments for future income generation. And so what I really hope Europeans will do is not to now try to copy whatever is the success story of the big AI labs, but that it will really look towards its own social contract, its core fundamental values, and build tech success on top of that to really carve out unique areas where we can very well succeed. Applied AI, trusted AI, secure AI.
- [18:27]
C
I think it's great, quite interesting because it sort of, it sets up an alternative vision of technology almost. Right? You know, we've seen the technology world move into a space where increasingly, you know, the big companies have become bigger and alternative supply chains, alternative ways of building technology have become scarcer or sort of more challenged. Some of the sounds we've heard come from European officials and European Commission evolve around sort of what's called open source. So essentially that's technology that is open and, you know, sort of jointly built by communities of technologists. It's not built on the idea that you create giants, owning a lot of the tech stack at the same time. Like, I do feel there's a bit of a tension here, because what Europe is looking for, indeed, it is sort of for its own place in the technology sector. And maybe that is a different way of building technology. It's a different type of technology provider that we would see come out of Europe. But it is also really keen to have its own giants. It is also really keen to have its own sort of big, powerful technology crown jewels, because they also come with a type of power in terms of trade, in terms of geopolitical relations that you also want to have as sort of a trade bloc. And we do have some big power players. Oftentimes, people single out asml, it's a Dutch company that makes printing machines for microchips. And ASML is a typical example of sort of a big player in the tech world precisely because it does something that no one else does. And so it is not the model of building sort of alternatives and having lots of options and having lots of choice. No, it's the model of having one big player that does something that no one else in the world does and that everyone in the world needs.
- [20:07]
A
All right, hold on for just a second because we need to take a quick break, but of course, we will be back. Stay with us.
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C
So good, so good, so good.
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- [21:06]
C
The first one failed miserably. With the first Chips act, there was a very clear ambition from the European Commission that Europe's share of the global market in chips of the value chain, as it's called, was below 10% at that time. And they said, well, our ambition is we're going to get it up to 20%. Now we're seeing that actually the European Chips act didn't really move the needle. They're still at around 10% of global market share. And so now Brussels is sort of revising its plans and pivoting and the big change here at the core of the proposal is that rather than look at the supply side, rather than look at can Europe supply and manufacture chips, they're looking at the demand side. And so they say we actually want to be creating demand in the European market for chips, which in itself will then create a space for Europe to also make its own chips and sell, you know, to its own players. At the same time, there is a interesting element which is that the Commission hasn't actually given up on this dream of building what's called a megafab. A megafab is a state of the art microchips manufacturing plant. It's where the most sort of complex chips are being made. This time they're looking at European players to provide it. They're working with a Belgian research facility called IMEC and with a German player called Sprint, and they want to be building this kind of mega fab on European soil. So you do feel that, like even if the Commission is saying they've learned the lessons from the first version of the CHIPS act and they're actually focusing on demand in the second version of the CHIPS act, they haven't given up on that dream to build their own sort of super facility to build microchips on European soil.
- [22:47]
A
Okay, well, so we have this dream of the Mega Fab. The other kind of dream that's been floating around, not specifically from the Commission, is called the Eurostack. That one's supported by MEPs and outside experts. Maricha, can you help us out with that one?
- [23:02]
B
Well, the whole idea is that all the technologies that we use sort of add up, you know, along different stacks, from infrastructure to apps, to other kinds of elements that, that we all need in order to connect, to develop AI, to be on social media, to work, etc. And the strategic vision of the people behind Eurostack is that we need European alternatives in every layer of the stack. And I think it's a helpful way to think about it because the dependencies in cloud, indeed, as Lawrence has laid out, are significant. But in other elements of the stack, there's much more room for Europe to quickly advance. And the idea of needing European alternatives to not so much decouple industries, but decouple, the risk of being subject to the extraterritorial impact of laws, for example, the Cloud act or the Foreign Intelligence Act, FISA that the US has, which really allows US authorities to access data of citizens anywhere through US companies. And that was something that was a concern when I was a member of the European Parliament, which is A while ago now. But it's become a greater concern the more we see the Trump administration abusing its power, instrumentalizing US Institutions for his own political agenda. And so this idea that data can be accessed by US Authorities just doesn't sit well with people. And so the idea of making sure we have European alternatives that are only subject to those European laws would put us in a much better place. But Eurostack is not so much a policy program, it's really more a vision of where Europe should be. And I think the tension with what Lawrence describes and the ambition of having chips, industry or other kinds of industries is that, of course, governments don't create big business successes, usually companies do, and we all contribute to it by making consumer choices. And what I see as a problem that I just don't understand why it's so hard, is that while regulation is now seen as the villain of why Europe hasn't succeeded, we still need regulation to have the Savings and Investment union, what used to be called the Capital Markets Union, to have greater access to capital, which is really the complaint that every startup and scale up has about why it is that they move to Silicon Valley. It's not because they think life is better there, it's because they think business can more easily. And so I think the conditions need to be created for many players in a Euro stack to succeed, to grow, to have optimal conditions in Europe. And hopefully that will be a sort of bigger picture that doesn't get lost as this package gets presented that's so focused on sovereignty. Because ultimately what we want is for a sort of ecosystem the way it exists so well in Silicon Valley, between higher education, capital and innovative companies to be successful. And it doesn't have to be the sort of same all or nothing blitzscaling as an ideology that we see in Silicon Valley. It can be done with more respect for a social contract and so on. But we do need Europeans to feel that when they have a successful company, that they can just stay and make it grow in Europe. And that's a task for all of us. And I think businesses are craving that. And at the same time, they are attacking regulation while they need regulation in order to have that access to capital. So I think it's also helpful to not make caricatures out of the role of government versus the role of business. And I hope that this moment in time, where the lines are really sharp across the Atlantic, this can also bring European businesses and European governments closer together to more constructively work together.
- [26:56]
A
Well, yeah, I mean, on that point, about Capital. Let's talk numbers, because some of these figures are enormous. You know, 120 billion thought to be needed for chips, 200 billion for data centers. So is any of that like real money or is it more just kind of hoped for private investment? Lawrence?
- [27:14]
C
I mean, I think this is the big hole in what we've seen this week, because both in the Cloud and AI Development act, and especially in the CHIPS Act, a lot of this hinges on does Europe have the cash, does Europe have the money to put forward to help boost sort of this domestic industry? And the reality is right now we simply don't know because the European Union is right in the process of negotiating its next multi annual financial framework, so its next long term budget. And so what we've seen come out this week, European Commission officials are fairly open about the fact that they're kind of flying blindly here. And so the negotiations on the long term budget will determine just as much whether these plans in chips, in cloud, in AI will actually become a reality. Another important element to mention here is that I think when it comes to sort of successful industrial policy, European Union also has quite a mixed track record. And so a lot of sort of the industrial policy that we've seen over the past decade or so hasn't really resulted in strong players, hasn't really resulted in strong market power. It does help with keeping innovation going, it does help with creating skills, with creating excellence. But, but in terms of market power, it's fairly disappointing. And so when you look at some bits of the revised European CHIPS act, when you look at parts of the CLOUD and AI Development act, one, this will hinge on the money. And also there's a big competition, sort of the defense sector is asking for a lot of investment. At the same time, we still have sort of the ambitions when it comes to greening the economy, that's still asking for a lot of the investment at the same time. So there's a big competition for that money inside Europe. Yeah.
- [28:57]
A
And let me ask another big question. It's a bit of an annoying one, but maybe a practical one. Goes to the point I started with. People don't use Gmail or Google Maps or Microsoft Office because they are ideologically pro American. They're using them because they work, they're integrated, they're relatively cheap, familiar, it's convenient. And this kind of echoes the discussion last week that we had about Chinese electric vehicles and other products. Like is there risk that, that, you know, pursuing quote, unquote, European sovereignty basically becomes a political slogan for forcing people into More expensive tools that they don't want.
- [29:34]
C
Lawrence I do think people get used to technology and therefore the technology that they use, they're more comfortable with using. Even simple things like tweaking a software app usually creates the biggest annoyance with users. And so try do that on a massive scale, right? Like that's, that's going to come with a lot of frequency, a lot of what we're looking at here. It's the big investments, the big projects, right? It's where a government invests in a cloud service for the next ten years or something. And so these are big projects. That means one, it takes a lot of time to shift to sort of pivot to new technologies. At the same time, I do feel there's political and there's societal drive here. When you look at governments, but also private players and also citizens, people are really interested in this. People are really turning to new technologies and new solutions. And so yeah, there is a clear drive, but it's one that will take time.
- [30:27]
A
Marita, you're the politician here. What's your slogan? To get people to actually do this, even if it's annoying?
- [30:32]
B
No, I think it's not as annoying as people make it out to be. I mean, don't romanticize the functionality of big tech, first of all. I mean, it's often really not functioning well and there's a lot of lock ins that people really struggle with. It's hard to get out of certain contracts. I think people have been sick of that for a long time. But the momentum to really challenge the status quo has also gained a lot of energy. So I fully agree with what Lauren says. There's societal energy here and I think people in organizations, businesses, governments are looking for guidance as to what they're permitted to do without breaking rules, such as procurement rules. I actually think there's much more energy in society and that this is a huge moment of opportunity for Europeans. And that is what politics, politicians need to tap into what needs to happen now. A package. It's fine, policy is fine. But we really need political champions who are going to embrace Europe's momentum with a lot of positive vision, who are going to think this is not complicated, this is not technical, this is about a moral stance at this moment in time, a momentum that opens up with a lot of concern about AI the way it's been going so far for Europe to sort of be the third mover or whatever you want to call it and do it its own way, where people's ways of life will be central, people's Quality of life. What we have seen with defence, when we spoke about the resources that are needed, the investments that are needed a little bit earlier, is that Europeans can move when they feel a sufficient sense of urgency. Of course, there is a lot of money in Europe, but a lot of that money is also invested in corporate tech stock elsewhere. So thinking about the leverage that investors have to also invest in European tech and shrinking the space between defense spending, digital sovereignty and democratic resilience, I think is what we need. Because why is it that it's a done deal? There's not much controversy about the defense spending that has been done, which is significant. Then there's a big gap, and now we're beginning to talk about digital sovereignty. While you cannot see the defense of your own society as separate aspects, tanks on the one hand, European tech alternatives on the other, and then thinking about governance as yet a separate issue, they're so integrated, it. I'm really rooting for the politician that takes on this issue as an opportunity for Europe that paves the way, ensuring that their country can actually lead in this European success story that citizens are craving, that businesses are craving. And I think Europe's momentum is right here.
- [33:10]
A
Just quickly, I mean, is there a politician out there who is leading that call that you're aware of in Europe already?
- [33:16]
B
Not sufficiently. I'm cheering on my own Prime Minister, Rove Yette, because I know him well from my own political party. And the coalition agreement of the Netherlands has a lot of solid building blocks. But what I'm hoping we will see more of, and I think von der Leyen could perfectly well have done this, but it would require a sort of different stance also vis a vis the United States. I mean, you cannot on the one hand, be super diplomatic, super nostalgic vis a vis the United States and rally your own population. And I think what's been happening too much is that this discussion has been been held on the abstraction level of investments and policies and so on, and far too little guidance and sort of vision has been shared with European citizens who are all right and ready to go, but who are looking for that vision.
- [34:06]
C
There is obviously one politician that has driven this narrative in Europe, and it's Emmanuel Macron. The whole philosophy of strategic autonomy, yes,
- [34:13]
B
France really shows what a difference political leadership can make in putting out that vision. The French story shows the power of political leadership. Not so much policies, not so much industrial choices or whatnot, but to really just say, this is our vision, we're going to roll out the red carpet for talent. We're going to make it easy for you to do business in France. We want European and French success stories in AI. And I think the moment is also there for new political leader or new story that a politician tells that is optimistic, boosts Europe's momentum and doesn't just treat this as a sort of necessary evil.
- [34:54]
A
You're calling for this more confrontational stance towards the US but the reality is indeed that this tech sovereignty package is coming out basically at the same time that the US Is pushing this kind of Pax Silica thing, pushing for Europe to link arms with the US on things like. So, Lawrence, how are you seeing diplomats and other policymakers kind of navigating this?
- [35:19]
C
Yeah, I think, Marie, I hear your call for a strong political figure to stand up. I think the reality is Europe is being a little bit more pragmatic right now, a little bit more sort of on the realpolitik side. And so what we're seeing from Brussels and from von der Leyen and sort of the European Commission, when it comes to engagement, engaging with the US Side, it is clearly more pragmatic. We're also seeing this in the details of the tech sovereignty package, where it is effectively about reducing dependence on US Technology. But they're not going to single us out. They're not going to sort of name us by name or when they do, be extremely cautious not to sort of ruffle any feathers. And I think this is sort of part of Europe's soft approach here. And so, yeah, I think the big thing to watch now is how will the US Respond and lobby the way that these proposals are being finalized, because obviously now this goes to the European Parliament, goes to the Council of the eu. There's a lot of bargaining, a lot of sort of politicking around these proposals that's going to happen. And the way that the US Responds to this is really the key question here. You mentioned Pak Silica. This is sort of part of Europe and the United States trying to reimagine their relationship on technology. And so obviously Europe is saying we want to be more independent, we want to have more of a stake here. We want to have more of a voice in the global tech sector. That is great as long as that matches the U.S. agenda. And so there's been some common ground there, for instance, working together in the microchips supply chain. But yeah, I think the way that sort of Europe finds its common ground with the United States on technology will really define how far Brussels goes in rolling out this package.
- [36:58]
A
All right, well, we'll be watching Mar. Thank you so much.
- [37:01]
C
Thank you, thank you.
- [37:07]
A
That's it from us this week. If you have any questions, or actually, if you want to send us your pro tips for how you made the switch from American big Tech to some European replacement, we'd love to hear from you. Send us a voice note or a message on WhatsApp. Sorry, we're sticking with the American one there. You'll find the details in our show notes. While you're at it, please follow, rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. The Weekender lives in the Brussels Playbook podcast feed, so subscribing there really helps. You can also always write to us at podcastolitico eu thanks to Deanna Sturris, our supervising audio producer, and to our audio producer, Sagaringmar. I'm Sarah Wheaton.
- [37:48]
B
See you next time.
- [37:49]
A
Next week.