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Brussels Playbook Podcast
Can the EU decouple from Trump's America?
00:38:11
Can the European Union really decouple from Donald Trump’s America — economically, politically, and strategically?
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- [00:01]
A
For years, words like decoupling and de risking were mostly used when talking about China. Now, increasingly, Europe is using them about the United States. Across European capitals, leaders are rethinking how dependent they want to be on Washington under Donald Trump. Okay, I mean, some of you might be saying, what took them so long? For the past year, the transatlantic relationship has only been getting worse. Trump's striking warmth toward Vladimir Putin and growing ambiguity about Ukraine, his threats over Greenland, his tariff wars, public attacks on European leaders. Those leaders finally seem to be getting conscious about this uncoupling. And here's an irony. The idea of strengthening the transatlantic relationship used to be just like the absolute baseline of EU foreign policy. But now people pushing to do that seem like they're the ones offering a fresh new idea. So this week, we're bringing you two very different visions of Europe's future relationship with the U.S. one reflects that view of mainstream European governments prepping for divorce. The other comes from a former Polish prime minister who says Europe should do the opposite. Tighten the bond, double down on the alliance, and. And stop worrying so much about Donald Trump. So how real is this shift in European thinking? And how far could it actually go? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of EU Confidential. Later in the episode, I'll be joined by my colleague Zoya Sheftilovich. This week, she helped pull together a major piece of reporting called Europe Begins Its Slow Retreat From US Dependence. It was very much a whole of politico effort, with colleagues from across Europe feeding in concrete examples from technology, defense, trade, energy and finance. We'll also talk briefly about something new and exciting, launching next week, the Brussels Playbook podcast, our new daily show, which Zoya will be hosting. That's all coming up, but first, the alternative vision. Former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki is now a leading figure in the European Conservatives and Reformists Party. That's the hard right faction that also includes Italy's Giorgia Meloni. So he's not a fan of regulation coming out of Brussels. But Morawiecki is definitely not a fan of Moscow either. Indeed, he's deeply pro American in the face of everything. Morawiecki was visiting Brussels and eager to talk about two big ideas he's now pitching to other European leaders and to audiences in Washington. You'll hear him argue that Brussels overregulates, that the EU imposes policies like the Green Deal and the migration pact on unwilling member countries, and that the answer to today's geopolitical chaos is more America, not less. You've been calling for an economic NATO and a looser Europe of strategic partnerships as a way out of what you call the current crisis that the EU finds itself in. Can you briefly break down these two concepts? Right.
- [03:22]
B
Economic NATO is a concept of creating free trade zone between the European Union and the United States and Canada, basically by the economic NATO. It's also about countries which are part of NATO and not part of the European Union, like Turkey. That's point number one. Number two, there are other free trade zones which operate quite effectively across the globe. And it is doable because many people ask me about tariffs. What happens with tariffs if there is an import coming to one country and then the goods from this country would want to be sold further to another member state of free trade zone. There is so called rules of origin. And the rules of origin help eliminating this trade which is from the third parties rather than the trade from the member states of any free trade zone. So it's doable. Point number three, probably the most important, there are lots of disagreements now between the European Union and the United States, as everybody knows. And this is a proposal how to escape forward or how to eliminate all those disagreements and find a common denominator, common platform which could connect us again. Us meaning the Western world. So I do realize that we are right now in a, in a different phase. But it's, you know, like in 1945, the United States and Federal Republic of Germany was, were at war and with Japan as well. And a couple of years later those two areas were allies to each other, the closest allies to each other.
- [05:04]
A
But that required pretty much a full defeat of two of those parties.
- [05:08]
B
Well, yes, but I believe that the United States, which is the country of free trade, the United States was very disappointed not only during the Trump 1 and Trump 2, but also Biden administration era about the disparity and discrepancies between the European tariffs on American goods as compared to American tariffs on the European goods. The European tariffs on American goods were on the level of 5.5%, whereas the American tariffs on the European goods were around 2.5 to 3%. And plus VAT tax imposed on American goods while sold into the member states of the European Union. So there were arguments, different arguments on both sides, but we now found ourselves in a very difficult situation. And how we can set aside how we can formulate a new system which can connect us this can be an economic NATO because this can be a system where we could eliminate all the tariffs and non tariff barriers between both sides, on both sides of The Atlantic. And we could create through this the biggest economic zone on Earth, around 50% of GDP, through which we could impose our will, our standards and norms and regulations on other countries, on other jurisdictions. And now China is imposing its standards in many areas on other countries across the globe, which is yet another signal of China dominating not only the manufacturing sector but also many other areas of the economy.
- [06:52]
A
Well, so would the US adhere to European standards under this idea?
- [06:56]
B
No, this idea is that the Europeans and the United States should work out common standards within the free trade zone. And then it could be a difficult process, but the benefits of this could be enormous because we could then shape the standards for the rest of the Globe. Having only 1 billion citizens altogether, roughly speaking, we could impose standards on the rest of the globe, which is quite powerful instrument.
- [07:26]
A
Have you been in touch with anybody in Washington about this? Would this get any purchase in the White House?
- [07:32]
B
Yes, with the advisors to President Trump and with senators and congressmen. I talk to them. I go to the United States in a couple of weeks to discuss this. It's probably for you and for many people who listen to this concept, quite unlikely to happen because of the current disagreement and rows between Europe and the United States. That's quite understandable. But let's look not only what is going to happen tomorrow, but also what can happen the day after tomorrow. And with such a huge dominance of China and the Russian Chinese tandem, it's such a threat to the rest of us that I think we should look for other common denominators. And this is one economic NATO. And of course it means reprioritizing lots of what we do in Europe. It would mean reprioritizing something, what they are doing in the United States. But. But this is what the compromise is about, finding common ground for the future challenges. And the challenges of the future is the global South. It's China, it's the Chinese manufacturing sector, is the AI race, it's Russia, it's nuclear power of Russia and nuclear power of Russia in tandem with China. If we go apart, if bad forces are going to drive the United States out of Europe, then we will find ourselves as the Europeans alone vis a vis huge other powers. And this is not good for us.
- [09:05]
A
Well, is the US a reliable enough partner? I mean, it's not malicious powers that are driving the US out of Europe. It seems to be the US that's deciding to leave Europe.
- [09:15]
B
I can very clearly see that my successor, the current Prime Minister, is trying to push the United States out of Europe. And this is a huge Mistake. Because without the support of the United States for the foreseeable future, I would want Europe to be militarily strong enough to be able to fend off all the Russian aggression and all the other aggression. But this is not the case and this is why we need the United States. And if you ask me about the reliability of partners for me from all the member states of NATO, we can rely mostly on, first on ourselves of course, but second, on like minded countries like Sweden and Finland, the countries which recently joined NATO, but also those states of the eastern flag of the European Union which are on the same hymn sheet with regard to the Russian threats. And the third aspect of the security triangle, if you want, is the United States. We cannot rely on France, we cannot rely on Germany, we cannot rely on Italy or Austria or the Netherlands or Denmark as states which are going to support us just in case we are attacked by the Russian Federation. The only potential partner in such a case is the United States and other countries of the of the eastern flank.
- [10:41]
A
Just very quickly, when you said that your successor is trying to push the US out of Europe, what do you see Prime Minister Tusk doing?
- [10:48]
B
First of all, he's himself very nasty towards President Trump, which his language, which he actually said that President Trump might be a Russian agent. Which means that for the White House all the doors are closed for the Prime Minister of Poland, which is very bad for Poland. That's example number one. Number two, he is doing lots of small things to lots of his ex tweets are anti American simply and this is bad. I want to bring the United States and the European Union as closely as possible given that there are not as many nations as Poland which are equally pro European and pro American. And we shouldn't nurture all those phenomena which bring the US and the EU farther from each other. But we should do the opposite.
- [11:41]
A
Okay, well let's get to the other pillar of your proposal. This Europe of strategic partnerships. Tell me about that one.
- [11:47]
B
Right now the European Commission and the other institutions try to create a one size fits all policy in many instances. And if we talk about the freedom of providing services or freedom of free movement of goods, free movement of capital people Schengen. That's great achievement of the European Union, called the European Economic Community back then before 1993. But later on the European Union started to deal with lots of other areas which are not part of the treaty, which is the constitution of the European Union. And this is why more and more member states found themselves in a trap of being forced, being pushed to Implement solutions which first, they didn't want and second, which were not in the treaty. So why are we going to implement those rules of green deal or the migration pact or any kind of gender related ideology? Let's deal with all those based on the subsidiarity clause. On a one layer below the European institutions level. And on the opposite side there are member states which want to connect closer to each other because they want to deal with some specific issues. I can give you one or two examples. One is Russian threat. Why would Portuguese Prime Minister or Spanish Prime Minister be interested in putting lots of efforts in fending off Russia from this part of war if they are 4,000 kilometers away from Moscow? I understand their position, but they should understand my position. And this is why we need the Europe of strategic partnerships as I call it. We need to allow, enable and even support countries dealing with some specific regional, sub regional issues on their own, rather than saying we have to harmonize everything across the European Union with 27 countries, it's more and more difficult. And if we don't, I will risk such a hypothesis. If we don't do my direction, there won't be any European Union in 10 years time or 15 years time because there will be huge centrifugal forces tearing apart the European Union. You know, if there are countries which want to synchronize their policy in the area of, I don't know, green deal, let's stick with this example, let them do so. That's at their peril, that's at their risk, that's their business. But many other countries, including people in Germany at least, I don't know the German government, they and Poland, they see the risks of the Chinese green deal related goods flooding Europe, the electric vehicles, the electric batteries, PV panels, wind turbines and so on. We shouldn't pay the European taxpayer money for Chinese goods. And Chinese sectors. Many people in the European governments, they do realize that we have to change something. But there is huge inertia of the European institutions, the European Commission, the European Parliament in particular. And this is why the things are changing slowly, too slowly.
- [15:20]
A
One interesting parallel. I think that sort of philosophically you two might be opposed, but the argument actually seems similar. We heard Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister who has also been charged with focusing on competitiveness. He recently called for what he called a pragmatic federalism. And he made the argument where Europe has not united on defense, on industrial policy, on foreign affairs, we're treated as a loose assembly of middle sized states to be divided and dealt with accordingly. He Said look, much like we did with the euro, we should all unite on these big issues. If you want to get in, you can get in, you can opt in or you can opt out, but if you're going to opt in, you have to kind of follow the rules. Are you actually also in favor of sort of a pragmatic federalism?
- [16:12]
B
No, the word federalism does not sound good in my ears. But I like lots of what Mario Draghi wrote in his report on the European competitiveness, on innovativeness, on defense. And this is why I was proposing even prior to his report that we have to decide ourselves in the context of the impossible trinity on two out of three major areas. The Green Deal policy consumes some 700 to 800 billion euro per annum. The defence policy across the member states of the European Union consumes only 300,400 billion euro per annum, much less for all of us to be independent of the United States and to stand on our own footing vis a vis the external threats like Russia in particular or Islamic world and so on. And the third element of this trinity is maintaining a welfare state and innovativeness of which Mario Draghi was writing many pages. And I argue that it's impossible to. And by the way, Mario Draghi proposed to find additional 800 billion euro per year for innovativeness, for defense, for dual use goods. And I myself, I remember 2020 when Covid started how tortuous the process it was to work out a budget of the Recovery and Resilience Fund which was in the range of 750 billion euro for seven years. And we would want now to negotiate between each other 800 billion euro per year. It's simply impossible. So this is why we have to completely reprioritize the areas which we are dealing with in the context of the impossible trinity and in the context of the Europe of strategic partnerships. Let's make step back to the moment where the European Union was very successful. The the four freedoms, goods, services, free people and capital, plus the competition law. And that's enough. The European Union in such a shape would survive next hundred years. If the European Commission wants to stick its nose in delicate issues which are so different between different member states, I don't believe that the European Union is going to survive.
- [18:38]
A
And you know, this Europe of strategic partnerships, isn't this the multi speed Europe that Poland has objected to in the past?
- [18:46]
B
This is not the same. This is now in a completely different situation. Last 10 years I don't remember discussion about Europe of different speeds or what you call it for last five or 10 years. It was a topic 10 or 15 years ago. I reckon that's that. I admit. Yes, but it, it was mostly discussed in the context of the Eurozone. Eurozone, by the way, is a. Europe is such Europe of strategic partnership. Some countries decided to create common currency. It's good for Germany, it's good for the Netherlands and for the Benelux countries. It's very bad for Italy, for Spain, for Portugal and for France. But if Spain, Portugal and France wants to still be as part of the eurozone, it's their business. It's not up to Polish citizens or Polish government to decide about this. So it's another example of Europe of many roads. And this is why I don't treat this as part of the discussion from 15 years ago. It was then and now is now. We have completely different challenges. Last 10 years, last 12 years, it was the European Commission trying to impose its will on sovereign states, creating lots of animosities and lots of anxieties all over the place. And this is why I looked for solutions to get out of this trap. That's my point.
- [20:09]
A
Okay. That was Mateusz Morawiecki, former Prime Minister of Poland, arguing for tighter integration with the US at a moment when much of Europe appears to be moving in a very different direction. We'll hear more about that after a quick break. I'll be joined by my colleague, POLITICO's chief EU correspondent, Zoya Sheftilovich. Stay with us. Foreign. Thank you for being here. So, just earlier, I was speaking to former Polish Prime Minister Matthews Morvietsky. He's convinced the transatlantic relationship is basically fine, you know, a little off these days, but. But fixable. And not just fixable. He's saying we want more America, not less. And specifically, he wants this economic NATO thing where, like, there would sort of be a free trade zone among the NATO members, including the U.S. where everybody would align on their different regulations and everything. He wants to see Europe really tighten the bond with Washington. How do Europe's mainstream leaders see it right now?
- [21:16]
C
I think the idea of having such a, such an arrangement with the US is a little farcical when you consider the fact that they have unilateral tariffs on the eu. Look, I think it's a pipe dream, and I think it makes sense from the perspective of Poland has for a very long time been very reliant on the US they have really strong bonds, they have strong security bonds, they have strong financial bonds. There's a large diaspora in the US from the Polish community. So I think it's the default position of Poland to be very pro US but that's certainly quite far away from the position of the European leader. Mainstream thinking. What I'm picking up around town with diplomats from a really broad range of countries, even the Baltics to some extent, who have even more so perhaps than Poland, been very US friendly. I'm hearing people say we've got to de risk. We need to make sure that we can stand on our own two feet because the US Under Donald Trump. But also I think beyond that, people are thinking beyond that, cannot be relied upon to provide security, cannot be relied upon to be a predictable ally financially. So people are talking about ways in which they can de risk themselves from the US in the same way that we've been talking about de risking from China.
- [22:26]
A
Yeah, that's where we first heard that term, that de risking or decoupling. And indeed, that contrast really sets up the piece that you co wrote. It's worth saying it was a huge newsroom effort with reporting from lots of capitals and policy areas. But what were you and our colleagues trying to capture with the story?
- [22:42]
C
We were trying to capture a change of mood because I think, you know, there are those weeks where history happens all at once. And that's what it felt like happened between when Donald Trump first started raising Greenland again and his speech in Davos. It was within the space of sort of three weeks, really. I don't even think it was that long. And I think in that time, Europe got a taste of what life would be like with a recalcitrant and anti European leader in the White House who was willing to go so far as to even threaten military force to take a piece of land that does not belong to him and that belongs to Europe. And so I think that was such a wake up call. And various diplomats described it to me in different ways. People used terms like turning point. People use terms like breaking point in the relationship. So I think there's a real sense that this United States is a different beast from what we have been used to since the post World War II era. So, yeah, I think there is a real mood shift among EU leaders and they are starting to talk about ways in which we can decouple in all sorts of sectors from the U.S. well.
- [23:50]
A
Yeah, just last weekend we saw center right European People's Party leaders gathering in Zagreb for a strategic discussion. And one thing that really stood out was how openly they talked about defense, about the possibility that under Trump, NATO may no longer be a reliable guarantee. What came out of that meeting.
- [24:08]
C
So that was quite an interesting meeting. The European People's Party, it's the largest force on the European level. It's got the largest number of MEPs, it has the most European Council leaders. We've got German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz, who's the most powerful, probably leader among that bunch, also Donald Tusk from Poland. And so for them to start talking about amongst themselves, among these friendly leaders, start talking about ways in which the EU needs to basically act in order to stop relying on the US is pretty huge, because we know that they have the power and the numbers to really make this happen if they decide they want to do that. The other thing that happened in Zagreb is that the European People's Party has appointed two of their leaders. Now, we don't know who they are, they haven't been revealed yet, but two leaders have been told that their homework after leaving Zagreb is to go back home and to figure out how the EU's mutual defense clause might work. Because in the EU treaties there's this little known, kind of obscure clause that basically some say could be an equivalent to NATO's Article 5, which guarantees mutual defense among allies. So there is a clause in the EU treaties which says that an attack on one is an attack on all. In essence, it's not the quote, but that is the, the essence of it. And that has never been used. I think it's a lethal known clause, but we're hearing a lot more of it now. And so that's something that those two leaders are going home to figure out. How are we going to make this a bona fide deterrent and how do we make it as good as that NATO clause?
- [25:36]
A
Yeah, I mean, quite a weighty homework assignments. And beyond the politics and the rhetoric, what would this shift that you've been describing mean in practical terms, especially when it comes to producing and buying arms?
- [25:49]
C
It would mean that Europe needs to really very seriously start funding, increasing funding to its arms industry. It would need to essentially find capital, find investment. The us. Not only does it provide a large number of the actual equipment, it's also the microchips that drive that equipment. And that is really a problem for Europe. It doesn't really have much in the way. Look, it does have some microchips, we do have some, some champions. But you know, it really needs to figure out what it's going to do on that because semiconductors are so vital for tech and for the defense industry that it's really difficult if you don't produce your own to de risk and decouple from anyone.
- [26:30]
A
Yeah, and I mean, beyond microchips, you know, technology is, is a huge area where we're going to see this shift play out of Europe, trying to divest essentially from the United States. So, you know, just reading your article, a few examples that stood out to me. In France, President Emmanuel Macron is planning to ban public officials from using American video conferencing tools like Google Meet Zoom and Microsoft Teams. He wants them to switch to Visio, which is a French alternative. In the European Parliament, some lawmakers are pushing to ditch US Software and hardware, including a US based travel booking tool. In the Netherlands, there's a petition signed by 140,000 people calling on the government to block a US company from acquiring a state identity verification tool. And at Davos, a German entrepreneur announced the launch of W. And that is the Europe based alternative to Elon Musk's X. So what does all that tell us about where Europe's head is right now?
- [27:33]
C
I think it tells us that basically Europeans are starting to think a little creatively, but the next step is actually developing tangible, real and good alternatives for consumers to use. So I think that's where we're at. It's going to be a difficult journey, I think, because W sounds great in theory, but starting from scratch and trying to get people on board is difficult. I mean, we've seen alternatives. It's not like they don't exist. We've got Blue sky, we've got Mastodon. You don't see a huge groundswell of people in the political kind of field using those social media platforms. So I think that's the challenge. We've got space to disrupt in Europe, but we don't necessarily have the companies that can do that disruption that, you know, we need to fund, basically. So it's a question of investment, it's a question of appetite for risk.
- [28:20]
A
Well, yeah, I mean, to that point, you know, we're also starting, starting to hear this phrase, buy European, and we're seeing it put into some, you know, public procurement provisions.
- [28:28]
C
Yeah, this is a Macron, baby. You know, French President Emmanuel Macron has long championed this idea of like, hey, let's buy European in weapons. That means buy French, well, of course, but also in cheese and champagne. But I think that's what this is. There is a growing realization among European countries. We had this previous mindset of for consumers, the cheapest thing is the best thing. And you can understand why that is because cost of living is a thing. So, you know, if you can get groceries cheaper because they've come from China or because they've come from wherever. That is an appealing prospect, but it's a sugar hit. And in the long term, what you lose is the capacity to have an industry. This deindustrialization that we're seeing around Europe now, it's a huge problem and it's a concern. So this is where this buy European thing comes in. There's this renewed will, a renewed kind of campaign to get Europeans to care about where their things are made.
- [29:24]
A
So we can have these buy European campaigns, but we're in sort of a zero sum situation right now, because if Trump gets wind of that, he, you know, is liable to retaliate. And there are some people who still hope to see ultimately things not totally deteriorate with the US and so the reality is that in some parts of Europe, people are being pretty cautious about voicing this.
- [29:47]
C
Yeah, I think people are cautious, and particularly countries that rely on the US More than others. But I do think there has been a general shift. We don't know what Donald Trump is going to do. He seems to take umbrage at a lot of things. So I think it's up in the air. But I think what Europe has realized and what it continues to kind of have to come to grips with is that it cannot make its policy based on what it thinks Donald Trump may or may not do.
- [30:12]
A
I mean, at the same time, though, Ukraine. Ukraine is still this big X factor here. How central is the war to this shift?
- [30:20]
C
I think Ukraine is a huge factor, and probably to some extent, it's what has kept Europeans from being more vocal and more strident in their conversations with Trump. And certainly some of the reporting that we saw when we looked at that Turnberry deal between Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen.
- [30:38]
A
The US EU kind of trade agreement.
- [30:40]
C
Exactly, exactly. Made at Trump's golf course. That deal was the deal that set EU tariffs at zero and US tariffs at 15%. Quite lopsided. There was a lot of criticism of that deal, but ultimately it was. Ursula von der Leyen may have signed the dotted line, but it was the European Council. It was the leaders who decided that that was what they were willing to stomach. And one of the main reasons they were willing to stomach it was because they felt that they needed Trump to stay on board with Ukraine. Their fear is that US Weapons are central to Ukraine's ability to defend itself. They're buying them. You know, the Europeans are buying them, but Donald Trump still has to let them go. So I think that's one element of it. And from the perspective of who may be able to influence Putin to the negotiating table, there is a sense of like, well, again, Trump might be the guy who Putin. It's not even so much that he fears him, but I think he might fear his unpredictability because you never know what you're going to get with Trump. So I think that is the calculus that the EU's leaders have to make. It's on the one hand, keeping Trump on board for Ukraine and on the other hand, ensuring that in the long term, their economies are Trump proof.
- [31:46]
A
Well, yeah. So zooming out, Morawiecki, you know, his dream is quite opposite of Trump proof. His dream is this economic NATO. If that's the dream, how would you describe the reality Right now?
- [31:59]
C
I would describe that as less of a dream and more of an absolute fantasy. And I think ultimately where we're at is every man for himself.
- [32:07]
A
Okay, well, now, Zoya, after that intense discussion, we can switch to something a little bit more fun. So the other thing that I wanted to talk to you about is, as of next Tuesday, you will be even busier than you already are. You'll be hosting our new daily podcast that's called the Brussels Playbook Podcast. Tell us all about it.
- [32:26]
C
Well, it is going to be in your feeds in the morning, first thing, bright and early, and it'll set you up for the day, basically, the three stories generally that are driving the day in Brussels. And the plan is to really take our listeners behind the scenes. You know, Sarah, as a reporter, you're going around town, you're traveling to various places. You're in rooms that people wouldn't normally have access to. You're talking to people people wouldn't normally have access to. So the idea is to bring our listeners on that journey a little bit as well, because currently you can read the stories that we write, and obviously there's a limited real estate there, and you don't necessarily get a sense of how that story came together. But this podcast is going to show readers. Here's who we spoke to, here's how we learned the information we learned. Here's why we think this is happening. So it's really kind of a behind the news thing.
- [33:14]
A
Zoya, you and I in recent stages of our careers have been intimately involved in the Brussels Playbook newsletter. It's the must read morning tip sheet. Is this just going to be the audio version of Brussels Playbook or more like a companion?
- [33:27]
C
It's a companion. So in an ideal world, you'd be reading and Listening listeners, because that is what we would like for you to do. We are presenting you with a different type of product with the Brussels Playbook podcast. So you've got the Brussels Playbook, which obviously you're still going to need for its agenda for the in depth reporting. But these podcasts, they're going to be under 15 minutes and just a really nice setup to your day. So, you know, have it with your morning coffee, have it as you walk to work or as you get to work on. On the bus or the Metro or whatever you have. That's kind idea. Yeah.
- [34:00]
A
And I mean, you've been doing some trial runs with our producer, Dianis, also with some colleagues who'll be your co hosts. What's that been like?
- [34:07]
C
Well, you tell me, Sarah, because you were in that chair just a few days ago. It's been super interesting. It's such a new skill. So I have a renewed appreciation for both what you do and what Dionis does. Because it is a slog to put out a podcast. It's not just half an hour, you know, where you sit there and record. You've got to really do your research. You've got to figure out what is going to be interesting to the audience. So, yeah, it's been really cool to do it. I think I've mostly gotten better, but then sometimes you get worse again and you've got to figure out why.
- [34:36]
A
I think you're already great, I can assure our listeners. And they will get to hear you every morning, Monday through Thursday in the same feed that we use for EU Confidential. And then on Friday, same feed, EU Confidential will still be there, doing a bit of a deeper dive, as we're doing today.
- [34:51]
C
That's right. And we're going to hear from you, Sarah. We're going to hear from other colleagues on the Brussels team and the people who are doing the big stories that drive your day in Brussels here.
- [35:00]
A
All right, well, so glad we'll be hearing even more from you, but for now, Zoya, thank you so much.
- [35:04]
C
Thanks so much, Sarah. You're going to get sick of me soon.
- [35:06]
A
Impossible. So some things are changing and there's something new coming, but we're staying right here. Please keep visiting this feed. Subscribe if you haven't already. Rate us, leave a comment or write to us at podcast politico.eu thanks to Deanna Sturris, our senior audio producer, and to Zoe de Jorc, who's giving us an assist in the production studio these days. I'm Sarah Wheaton. See you next week.