Don't aggravate Trump on Iran: Veteran US ambassador to NATO's friendly advice to European leaders

Summary

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Brussels Playbook Podcast – Episode Summary

Episode: "Don't aggravate Trump on Iran: Veteran US ambassador to NATO's friendly advice to European leaders"
Date: April 24, 2026
Host: Anne McElvoy (POLITICO)
Guests:

• Kurt Volker (Former US ambassador to NATO; former US Special Representative for Ukraine)
• Ian Wishart (POLITICO correspondent, reporting from Cyprus)

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Episode Overview

This episode explores the fragility of the ongoing ceasefire between the US and Iran, the broader implications for European capitals, and the delicate diplomacy required in managing both US-EU relations and collective security concerns. Anne McElvoy sits down with veteran diplomat Kurt Volker to discuss European strategy toward President Trump as war fatigue grows, and later checks in with Ian Wishart from an informal EU leaders’ summit in Cyprus to gauge the continental mood and EU unity in the face of geopolitical upheaval.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Fragile Gulf Ceasefire and Prospects for Peace

(00:30 – 02:09)

• The ceasefire in the Persian Gulf has been indefinitely extended, yet peace talks in Pakistan remain stalled.
• European capitals are anxious for negotiations to end Middle East hostilities.
  Kurt Volker:

“I think there will be a durable ceasefire…The US does not want a long war and a ground invasion…They want to make sure that shipping goes in and out of the Gulf unfettered.” (02:09)

Key Insight:
While a long-term settlement is likely, neither a quick nor easy resolution is expected—both Iran and Trump want to showcase strength before making concessions.

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2. Trump’s Leadership: Comparing Two Administrations

(04:21 – 05:27)

• Volker contrasts Trump’s first term (staffed with “competent, strong leaders”) with the current term (populated by loyalists executing Trump’s decisions with little debate).

“It is a group of people who are chosen only for the merit of loyalty, and they are there to do what Trump decides, not to provide advice, expertise, or anything else.” (05:00)

Key Insight:
The administration now centers wholly on Trump's instincts rather than institutional expertise, making US foreign policy “erratic and frustrating for Europeans.”

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3. European Diplomacy: Advice on Trump

(05:27 – 08:51)

• Volker criticizes European leaders (notably the UK’s Rachel Reeves) for public criticism of Trump, warning this only provokes Trump and weakens transatlantic ties.

“You might think that this is a huge folly and going to have terrible consequences, but you don’t have to say it.” (06:17)

• Praises Dutch PM Mark Rutte’s approach:

“He is doing them a service…I think European leaders ought to be thanking Mark Rutte for working with President Trump, being complimentary, being enthusiastic, because then they don’t have to.” (08:06)

Key Recommendation:
Engagement should focus on shared interests and respectful diplomacy, not “gratuitous shots” at Trump.

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4. Symbolic Diplomacy and Personal Touches

(09:33 – 10:31)

• Discussion of political symbolism and soft diplomacy: Inviting Trump to his ancestral German hometown for “sausage in a market,” likened to Bush and Rice’s public gestures.

“In this case, I would just make sure that President Trump comes away from it feeling that he’s been shown respect, because that’s what he craves.” (10:31)

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5. Nuclear Deal Skepticism and Iran Reluctance

(11:29 – 14:47)

• Volker distrusts Iran’s intentions; the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal) was, in his view, flawed from inception.

“[The JCPOA] only imposed a 10-year delay on when it was okay for Iran to have a nuclear program. And they were cheating on that anyway.” (12:51)

• He credits Trump with “physically destroy[ing] Iran’s capacity to build a nuclear weapon [in the short term],” but warns about Iran’s resilience and intent.

"If this regime stays in place, they will do it [develop a nuclear weapon]." (14:36)

Notable Moment:
Highlights complexity—hard power delays but does not solve the nuclear issue without fundamental regime change.

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6. Regime Change Realism and Risks

(14:59 – 15:35)

• Volker: Regime change in Iran “is possible, but it would require a massive commitment that President Trump doesn’t want to make,” possibly including US troops.

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7. Iran’s Missile Threat and NATO Preparedness

(16:11 – 17:55)

• Volker warns that Iran’s missile capability now ranges as far as London, urging NATO allies to prepare.

“This is a matter for defense investment, air defense, anti missile defense, anti drone defense. Nobody in Europe has taken those threats seriously.” (17:09)

• However, he doubts Iran seeks wider war:

“They would rather isolate the United States and Israel, try to get on with everybody else…play the long game.” (16:54)

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8. Ukraine’s Evolving Position and European Burden

(18:47 – 20:24)

• US support for Ukraine has waned; Europe is carrying the bulk of financing and weapons transfers.

“Ukraine has become increasingly self reliant…60 to 70% of the defense production that Ukraine uses in the war is produced domestically.” (19:20)

Key Insight:
Despite shortfalls, Ukraine’s capacity and European assistance limit damage from slackening US support, but continued vigilance is required.

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9. Zelenskyy’s Warnings and Defensive Realities

(20:24 – 22:24)

• Volker is more optimistic on Ukrainian resilience than President Zelenskyy, noting Ukraine’s success with indigenous technologies and Gulf State partnerships.
• On Zelenskyy's public urgings for more Patriot missiles:

“His job is to demand and seek the best for Ukraine that he can do…he needs to go out and say we need as much as we can get.” (21:05)

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10. Trump’s State of Mind: Fitness to Govern?

(22:24 – 24:13)

• Anne presses Volker on speculation about Trump’s cognitive decline, citing legal and media commentary.

Volker responds: “He is trying to use harsh rhetoric and extreme positions to demonstrate strength and toughness…But I don’t think it’s, you know, I think people who make the comments about his faculties, the fact is he’s there. He’s the president. Nobody else is in control of those faculties. So we’ve got to deal with what we’ve got.” (23:07)

• On the prospect of a 25th Amendment cabinet coup:

“That’ll never happen. The cabinet is all there because they’re loyal to him.” (24:04)

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EU Leaders’ Summit in Cyprus: Assessment (Ian Wishart)

11. EU’s Limits on Geopolitical Influence

(25:28 – 28:09)

• Cyprus hosts an informal summit; leaders celebrate newfound unity (Hungary’s obstruction is gone) and €90bn Ukraine loan progress, but feel geopolitically “impotent.”

“What can they actually achieve when there’s war on their doorstep but they’re not actually involved in it…If anything, that’s what will come out tonight is just impotence, really.” (26:45)

12. Mutual Defense: NATO, the EU, and Article 5

(28:09 – 29:31)

• Some EU states want to explore formalizing mutual EU defense, particularly if Trump’s US becomes unreliable. Others, such as Poland, resist, fearing NATO’s authority would be undermined.

“Once the EU even starts questioning NATO, you’ve got a problem there.” (29:31)

13. Vulnerability and Anxiety in Cyprus

(30:03 – 30:43)

• Cyprus feels exposed to Middle East instability:

“Tourists aren’t coming and we’re feeling a little bit paranoid about how close we are to things that are going on in the Middle East.” (30:03)

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14. Volker’s Advice Echoes in EU Corridors – and Divides Remain

(30:43 – 32:28)

• Volker’s counsel—to avoid publicly antagonizing Trump—resonates but European governments still differ on tone and tactics, reflecting divergent electorates and political cultures.

“They want to say this is what Europe stands for. But it’s very difficult to do that when they all have different opinions.” (31:39)

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Memorable Quotes & Moments

• Kurt Volker, on European critique of Trump:

  “You might think that this is a huge folly and going to have terrible consequences, but you don’t have to say it.” (06:17)

• On the shifting NATO balance:

  “We are now living in an administration...where one person is deciding everything and directing everything based on his gut instincts.” (05:00)

• On Iran's nuclear ambitions:

  “If this regime stays in place, they will do it [build a nuclear weapon].” (14:36)

• On EU impotence:

  “What can they actually achieve when there’s war on their doorstep but they’re not actually involved in it…just impotence, really.” – Ian Wishart (26:45)

• On local tension in Cyprus:

  “We’re feeling a little bit paranoid about how close we are to things that are going on in the Middle East.” – Cypriot local, relayed by Ian Wishart (30:03)

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Structure and Flow of the Conversation

• Opening: Context – US-Iran ceasefire; European uncertainty

• Main interview:

  • Volker on US intentions, European responses, US administration changes, Iran’s threat, Ukraine
  • Practical and symbolic diplomacy (“show Trump respect”)
  • Realism about defense, arms transfers, and domestic political messaging
  • The limits of European critique and proposal of alternative EU solidarity/diplomacy

• Summit reporting:

  • Ian Wishart brings mood, street views, and the challenge of EU unity to the fore

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Takeaways for Listeners

• The US’s shifting and unpredictable policies under Trump necessitate careful, respectful engagement from European allies.
• Symbolic and personal diplomacy can make a difference in dealing with the current US administration.
• Iran’s regime still poses substantial risks; any settlement may be shallow, and military threats remain regardless of paper agreements.
• Ukraine is increasingly self-sufficient, but European support (financial and political) is now the cornerstone of its defense.
• The EU’s geopolitical influence remains limited—policy consensus is easier at home than on the world stage, despite increased unity post-Orban.
• Anxiety at Europe’s periphery (esp. Cyprus) highlights the lived impact of distant conflicts.

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For those who missed the episode:
Expect a nuanced, candid discussion on how best to handle President Trump in a dangerous geopolitical moment, grounded assessments of Middle East risks, clear-eyed realism about Ukraine and EU internal challenges, and a strong emphasis on strategic, not performative, diplomacy.

Transcript

[A]

Some follow the noise.

[B]

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[A]

The fragile ceasefire in the Persian Gulf and the aborted peace talks between the US And Iran this week have cast a long shadow over European capitals hoping for an end to hostilities in the Middle East. Will they have any say over what follows? I'm Anne McElroy, and my guest this week on the EU Confidential interview is Kurt Volker, whose job it was to manage relations between the US And NATO allies as a former ambassador to the organization in the first decade of the 21st century. Later, he'd go on to serve as U.S. special representative for Ukraine, handling difficult negotiations during the first Trump administration. So he knows what's at stake and he knows what the main players are like. Later in this episode, too, I will be talking to my Brussels colleague Ian Wishart, who's in Nicosia covering the informal summit of EU leaders giving solidarity to Cyprus, currently the holder of the presidency of the Council after Iranian attacks on British bases at the start of the war. First, Kurt Volker. Welcome to this EU Confidential.

[B]

Thank you so much. It is great to be with you, Anne.

[A]

You're talking to me from Europe this week. You're in Warsaw, so you're getting a sense of how it feels this side of the Atlantic. The ceasefire in the Persian Gulf has been extended indefinitely, but the second round of talks in Pakistan have haven't started yet, as we speak from the perspective of Europe and capitals here, they want negotiations to bring home a result and finish this war as soon as possible. Do you foresee that happening in the

[B]

medium term, say a few weeks or a few months? I think there will be a durable ceasefire and the conditions here are that the US does not want a long war and a ground invasion. The U.S. i think, will accept that the same regime stays in place. They want to make sure that shipping goes in and out of the Gulf unfettered. They could probably live with some kind of navigation regime of which Iran is a part, but not a military control regime. So now we're talking about nuance in what does Iranian government role really look like? So I think that we will get there eventually, but not in the near term. I think Iran wants to show that it is a player holding a lot of cards that they're Very decisive here, and Trump wants to show that he got something for it. As you mentioned, I'm in Warsaw. I was in Frankfurt yesterday. Spent most of the last month in Europe in different capitals. Europeans find President Trump incredibly erratic. That one day it's this, the next day it's that he's complaining that the Europeans aren't doing anything, but then he says, we don't need you. And it's very unclear what exactly the US Wants. So that's. That's one thing that's very erratic, and then secondly, that's very frustrating for Europeans. I think we are heading towards a situation where some military support, an operation to support freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf would make sense. We're not there yet, and it would only be with Iran and the Gulf states agreeing. But I think we might end up there, and that might be something that both European states and President Trump would welcome and think is a good idea.

[A]

Well, having served in the first Trump administration and in a pretty difficult role. Ukraine, and anything to do with Ukraine and Russia in the first Trump administration, indeed, in either of the two administrations, it's not the easiest way to earn your daily bread. You might agree with me.

[B]

Definitely, yeah, it's different. There's a vast difference between the first term and the second term.

[A]

Okay, just tell me about that.

[B]

Yeah, well, in the first term, he deliberately had lots of people in the administration who were competent, who were experts, who were strong leaders in their own right, and who knew how to work the large machinery of the U.S. government. So you had people like H.R. mcMaster, John Bolton, General Mattis, Jim Mattis at the pent, Mike Pompeo. These are really capable people at the cabinet level. And then, you know, I was in doing Ukraine negotiations, and I felt that we had a lot of latitude in how to shape what we did in the second term. It is not that at all. It is a group of people who are chosen only for the merit of loyalty, and they are there to do what Trump decides, not to provide advice, expertise, or. Or anything else. So we are now living in an administration, or if you can call it that, even one person is deciding everything and directing everything based on his gut instincts rather than expertise, knowledge, information, the operation of an entire government.

[A]

Let me ask you, then, from a perspective of European leaders, or what your advice would be, knowing that, you know, that there's been that shift and the Trump administration is where it is. Donald Trump as a person is in a different place. What do you think European countries should do them? Because we've heard Rachel Reeves, a very senior chancellor, finance minister in the uk, hitting out recently the folly of the decision by Donald Trump to go to war against Iran without a clear exit plan. So starting to use that on the nose language we've had. Friedrich Metz in Germany nuances it a bit more, but he has also made pretty clear that he doesn't see any mileage and this being a scheme that he wants to join. Do you think European capitals are playing Donald Trump well in this crisis or not?

[B]

No, I don't. I think they're making some very big mistakes. You might think that this is a huge folly and going to have terrible consequences, but you don't have to say it. And I think by saying it, you alienate Donald Trump and you run the risk that he will then link your unhappiness with his policies to his unhappiness with some of your policies and fragmenting a transatlantic relations that is actually still valuable to both of us. So I don't think that's a wise way to handle President Trump.

[A]

Isn't it pretty typical, though, when in the case of Rachel Reeves is speaking on behalf of the UK Government? Donald Trump's had a fairly insistent, even slightly compulsive week on week, we had about four or five verbal sallies against the UK Isn't it hard? I mean, you know, diplomacy could, but you also know politics, for a leader to just sell, know, come and punch me again and we won't hit back.

[B]

Yeah, but you don't have to frame it that way. You're absolutely right. Public opinion in the UK is something that any political leader is going to want to pay attention to. But there are ways to be proactive and try to shape where things go without getting pushed into things that you're simply not going to do and without, you know, taking gratuitous shots at President Trump that don't actually help. And I know that Mark Rutte comes in for a lot of criticism in Europe. Frankly, I think European leaders ought to be thanking Mark Rutte for working with President Trump, being complimentary, being enthusiastic, because then they don't have to. He is doing them a service, and it's important that he does that. And I think that other European leaders, they should. You don't have to go out and compliment President Trump's choice of shoes or his hair color, but you can go out and say, okay, we have a vested interest in security in the Persian Gulf and the free flow of energy we're prepared to contribute to a regime that would ensure that that remains free and Fair and open. We don't have that yet. We need to see a more stable situation, so we know where to pitch in. But let's work together. Let's talk about that. I mean, that's not that difficult. And European countries have done that several times, but then they intersperse it with all this gratuitous critic as he.

[A]

I think it's British Merz who does nuance it a bit. He said relations are just difficult. How would you feel about that? That's not slightly more taciturn in the middle. It's not as far as Rachel Reeves using the word folly, which I think he didn't approve of. What do you think?

[B]

Yeah, Merz is facing the same thing. He has a domestic public that would like to see him, you know, do that, that Hugh Grant moment and stand up for Germany. But, yeah, I think he is a little bit more circumspect in the way he. And unlike Keir Starmer, where President Trump seems to like to go after him a little bit, to poke him a little bit, he doesn't do that with Merz personally.

[A]

Yes. Now I think they're even going to try to. Mertz invited him to Germany, though He. He did admit it could be an eventful visit. I think we might both like to be on the sidelines of that.

[B]

Yeah. Yeah.

[A]

I think the plan is they're going to go and eat sausage in a market in the birthplace of Trump's grandfather.

[B]

If I. Yeah, that would be the smart thing to do. President Bush did that.

[A]

So you like that? I mean, I've sort of been making a bit of a joke about it, but your idea of diplomacy about the person, the family. Yes, he went into some detail, I mean, literally to take him down to the market and Rhineland faults. So this is. This is a. A serious approach. Yeah, yeah.

[B]

Jack Straw was from Birmingham, and so he invited Condoleezza Rice, who was from Birmingham, Alabama, to Birmingham, uk, for a little visit. And I think they even went to a sports match.

[A]

This is going to be the Kurt Volker recipe for world peace. And if it doesn't work, I'll have you back on the podcast to explain why.

[B]

Yeah. In this case, I would just make sure that President Trump comes away from it feeling that he's been shown respect, because that's what he craves.

[A]

You talked about some deal that could emerge through a glass darkly over time. It has been reported that European allies fear that this US negotiating team perhaps desperate to get to a framework pretty quickly. I mean, after all, we're in Midterms year. There's assumption, I think, in Washington that the administration too would like to be out and clear of this in a certain timeframe, that it could engineer a diplomatic win for President Trump. But it could be a very superficial agreement on the nuclear program and on sanctions relief. A lot could be traded away. You said yourself that some of that expertise and that sort of deep knowledge, deep state expertise, might not be there. That was there in the first administration. Is that a fear that you have as well?

[B]

Well, yes, and I would, I would be even more direct, perhaps the Iranian regime is a problematic regime. They do want to build a nuclear weapon and they have been trying this for decades. And even if they agree that they won't do it, they probably will do it anyway. And the U.S. is going to have to face the reality. We're going to have to be vigilant on ensuring that they don't actually develop a nuclear weapon no matter what, even if there is an agreement. So this, this is just the nature of the regime and the, the nature of the problem that we have.

[A]

But how seriously then do you take the fundamental problem, which is the, the state, one of the major issues here, the, the state of the nuclear program and the Iranian enrichment program? Because I think in the past you've been slightly more hawkish, just to use the shorthands, than some of your fellow senior American statesmen on this. I heard John Kerry, for instance, last week, sort of saying, there's really nothing wrong with the gcpoa, that previous deal that just got suspended when Donald Trump came into power. Now, did you have the same faith that the ways of trying to restrain Iran on its nuclear ambitions was working?

[B]

No. I know. I have to say I agree. The JCPOA only imposed a 10 year delay on when it was okay for Iran to have a nuclear program. And they were cheating on that anyway. So they were not, they weren't even waiting the 10 years that the JCPOA gave them. So in that respect, I think that was a flawed agreement and should not have been entered into. I want to go back to the 2000s, where we had three unanimous UN Security Council resolutions unanimous with Russia saying zero enrichment for Iran. And it was the very end of the Bush administration and then Obama where we allowed some enrichment and once you go from zero to some, then you're in the bazaar, then you're how much and for how long and what degree of enrichment and what's the storage regime? And on and on and on. So Iran got us into that and then we were kind of stuck with that. And the JCPOA was a manifestation of that slippery slope. What Donald Trump has done, I would argue positively, is physically destroy Iran's capacity to build a nuclear weapon. In the short term, that's good. We are still faced with enriched uranium, probably buried under a lot of rubble. What condition it's in, we don't know. But, you know, it comes out of the earth to begin with. You refine it and then that's what it is. So it's re achievable and we still have the scientists and the know how and the determination of the regime. So we have kicked this back a long time. There's a lot more difficulty there. And I think it is right for Trump to insist on as many measures as he can to prevent them redeveloping a nuclear program. But I'm also saying that we need to be realistic. If this regime stays in place, they will do it right.

[A]

So that doesn't sound like there's a, a way out of this without the regime being changed. And have you given up if you ever thought it was possible to change the regime or did you not think it was possible?

[B]

Well, it's possible, but it would require a massive commitment that President Trump doesn't want to make. And it could involve, and you have to not rule out ground troops from the United States. Hopefully you could work with Iranians to neuter the Revolutionary Guard, empower others, form a government of national unity of some kind. But you can't, you can't set limits on what kind of military force you're willing to use because the moment you do, then everyone knows what your limits are and then they work around that and the regime stays in place.

[A]

I know you've expressed concerns that Iran has launched missiles capable of reaching roughly two and a half thousand miles, far beyond its long claimed 1200ish mile limit. It's been emphasized that these capabilities do put major European capitals within reach. And I think you've called it a bit of a wake up call for NATO allies that might have previously been tended to downplay the Iranian threat or just be busy with other things. Ukraine, not least. That takes you as far as London, I think you said somewhere previously. I mean for real.

[B]

Well, capability wise, could they launch a missile or two to make it to London? Yeah, they could. Can they do it in a sustained way and really carry out a war against the uk? I don't think so, not yet. It would take a lot more weapons production and, and improvement of the weapons systems that they have. And Then do they want to do that? I think very unlikely that they want to do that. Everything from the Ayatollah having all that real estate in London to simply not wanting to have a wider war with the world. They would rather isolate the United States and Israel, try to get on with everybody else, try to have weapon sales, you know, play the long game.

[A]

Do you think European allies in NATO, when I use London as an example, but I presume, you know, if we just measure the geography, it's. It means the same could, could be true of Berlin or Paris. Do you think European allies are not taking this threat seriously enough of weapons, ballistic missiles?

[B]

That's a tough question because on the one hand, it's clear that they don't take it seriously. They don't think the Iranians are going to launch a missile at Berlin or Rome or whatever. The fact that Iran could, they are really not taking seriously enough. This is a matter for defense investment, air defense, anti missile defense, anti drone defense. Nobody in Europe has taken those threats seriously. And indeed, there are more immediate and realistic threats from Russia than there are from Iran, and no one's doing anything about that. So in that sense, they're not taking it seriously. But as I said, I don't think Iran wants to attack European cities, at least not right now. They might be interested in a terrorist attack in a European city, but that would be against an American or an

[A]

Israeli interest on that score, as you've just taken us to Russia and that terrible balance, really, for those in power now to decide where to put their resource, their attention, etc. And also the risk analysis on Ukraine and Europe's ability to influence anything there about the future of Ukraine or guarantee it independence in the longer term, sustainability in the face of aggression, and from Russia in an ongoing war. Do you see a greater responsibility on your travels where we encounter you at the moment? You've been in Germany, in Poland. I know you've been in London because I saw you there as well. To take on the leadership, to take on the funding of NATO in the event that Trump gradually or even suddenly withdraws participation and leaves Ukraine even more exposed than it is.

[B]

I think we're already largely there. The US has provided minimal assistance to Ukraine over the past year. European leaders have stepped in to provide financing to cover budget shortfalls. In Ukraine, they have come up with this 90 billion euro loan to provide funding for Ukraine's defense industry and defense procurement. They have procured themselves American weapons and ammunition and provided that to Ukraine. And the U.S. is still allowing intelligence and logistical support to occur. But it is largely European who are driving the train right now. And I would stress, and I don't think this is understood in, in Europe enough at the moment, Ukraine has become increasingly self reliant. Yes they do need the finances from Europe, but 60 to 70% of the defense production that Ukraine uses in the war is produced domestically. They've developed the long range drones to hit Russia's oil export and refining capabilities. They've developed their own long range missiles. They developed the naval sea drones that have pushed the the Russian Black Sea fleet back to the Russian coastline. They have taken back territory along the front lines that Russia claimed last year using their own ground drones and air based drones that really make it impossible for Russian forces to advance. So Ukraine is doing quite well here. They do need some support, but they are far less dependent to than they were at the beginning of this war. So I'm very confident that this trend will continue.

[A]

You do sound a bit more upbeat than President Zelensky himself who was warning that Ukraine is facing a critical shortage of Patriot air defense missiles. The only means it has of intercepting those big Russian ballistic missiles that do such damage that global stocks of missiles are limited and a lot of them have been diverted into the Middle east since the attacks on Iran back in February. I mean you seem more upbeat in some ways than the Ukrainian leader I think was wanting the White House to listen to that concern and to say look, even symbolically try to come a bit more to his aid because the global situation is obviously difficult on weapons supplies at the moment.

[B]

So first off, Patriot missiles are very, very useful for taking out the high speed, very expensive missiles that Russia is able to send at Ukraine. Most of what Russia is doing is not that. Most of it is the shahed drones and the Ukrainians can take out 95% of those with regularity. But it's the missiles that are difficult. So they really do want the patriots. In addition, of course President Zelensky's job is to demand and seek the best for Ukraine that he can do. Not to say okay, we're okay. No, he needs to go out and say we need as much as we can get. We have to do everything possible for our people. So of course that's what he's going to do. And I would say that one thing that we should bring up is his very successful diplomacy in the Gulf States where exactly what I'm talking about, this homegrown Ukrainian anti drone capability is actually more efficient and more useful for them than just the high end American systems that they have so far. So he's been able to turn that into building relationships with the Gulf Arab states, getting some financing from them and helping them see that Russia and Ukraine are really aligned. That's a big shift for the Gulf states and what Zelenskyy's been able to achieve.

[A]

I saved one of the most controversial questions to last, you might be delighted to know. Do you think President Trump, who, of course, you know, you think he's now in control of his faculties? An attorney who served as his White House counsel in the, in the first term, Ty Cobb, has raised concerns about his cognitive decline in the New York Times also raise that question and claim it's accelerated. Some people even saying Trump is showing signs of dementia, his vocabulary has shrunk. You know, the resorting to profanity a lot more, the impulsiveness. What's your view of that kind of analysis that says, you know, he's basically no longer fit to govern?

[B]

First off, I'm not a competent person to talk about that or to comment on that. You do see in the posts on Truth Social, as you mentioned, a bit more profanity, a bit more extremism, you know, threatening to commit war crimes, calling the Iranians, you know, bastards. And not just that, but with an adjective preceding that. Yeah, it's a bit extreme. There he is trying to use harsh rhetoric and extreme positions to demonstrate strength and toughness in machismo and get the Iranians to pay attention. Yes, but I don't think it's, you know, I think people who make the comments about his faculties, the fact is he's there. He's the president. Nobody else is in control of those faculties. So we've got to deal with what we've got.

[A]

Right? I mean, there are, there is this 25th amendment, isn't there, which president can be removed.

[B]

That'll never happen. That'll never happen. No, that. That requires the cabinet to turn against him. The cabinet is all there because they're loyal to him.

[A]

Kurt Volker, on that note, and thank you for joining me on that diagnosis. But also, more to the point, on looking around at Europe's response to the poly crises of our days. Thanks for joining me on EU Confidential.

[B]

It's a pleasure, Anne. Thank you.

[A]

We'll be back in a few moments to hear how European leaders are grappling with the fallout from the war as they gather in Cyprus for an informal summit.

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[A]

of $45 for 3 month plan equivalent to $15 per month required intro rate first 3 months only, then full price plan options available, taxes and fees extra. See full terms at Mintmobile do. The Gulf crisis has posed a raft of difficult questions for the eu, primarily over its influence and ability to mitigate economic fallout. POLITICO's Ian Wishart is in Nicosia covering a meeting of EU leaders. Hi, Ian.

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Hi, Anne.

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We're speaking ahead of the first session of the informal summit and on the agenda is how to deal with the situation in Iran and the energy crisis that that's caused and of course the broader security questions and the bloc's next long term budget. What are you expecting to see? Any movement on?

[C]

What the leaders want to see movement on? And what they're confident on seeing movement on is what they've managed to achieve on Ukraine. They've managed to finally get this big 90 billion loan to Ukraine approved. And that's because Hungary's Viktor Orban is no more. He has been blocking everything for years. And tonight's meeting is more of a celebration really, that they can do the things that they couldn't do before because Orban isn't there. Unfortunately, anything beyond that for them is much more difficult. And I think the crisis in the Middle east has just proved that. It's very difficult at an EU level to get anything done. And you've got 27 prime ministers and presidents talking tonight. But what can they actually achieve when there's war on their doorstep but they're not actually involved in it, They've got no influence over it. And I think if anything, that's what will come out tonight is just impotence, really.

[A]

Well, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is planning to join the EU leaders for dinner. And as you pointed out, there's that notable absence of Hungary's defeated Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and a sense of a reset around that. But it sounds as if you think that's restricted to making more progress on Ukraine and support for Ukraine. How come it doesn't translate into anything? You could say it's a chance for a new start for a lot of European countries who'd be attending. You think they would like to see it that way?

[C]

I mean, it's a new start in terms of policy and, you know, as our listeners will know, the EU is very good when it comes to policy and it comes to decisions that they can take among themselves. What's more difficult is when it comes to big geopolitical world events. And unfortunately for the EU leaders, they are, are knocked this way and that by world events that they can't influence. And as much as they want, they can have a dinner tonight and they can talk about Iran and Trump and what to do and about energy prices. But at EU leader level, it's very difficult to actually make a difference. And they can celebrate the fact that they can get a Ukraine loan through. But, you know, that was something that actually they thought they'd approved in December. And where are we now? It's April. And that's what really comes down to

[A]

the host, President Nikos Christa Dulidis of Cyprus is saying EU leaders need to start preparing for what could happen if an EU country itself came under attack. Putting out a call for help there from block partners. Now, that sounds a bit like a NATO Article 5 scenario. Do you think that's likely to come to anything?

[C]

It's definitely going to be talked about, and it's being talked about in the corridors and behind the scenes in Brussels that actually, the more that Donald Trump questions his commitment to NATO and this, you know, NATO's got this Article 5, which means that all countries have to come to the defense of other countries when they're attacked. If that is being questioned, then the EU wants to step up and do something about it. And there is this clause that people hadn't really discussed before in the EU treaties, which is a very similar thing. It's not really ever been used in any major way, so nobody knows how it will work. And it's true that Cyprus and Greece actually are pushing for some exploration of how this can be used in an EU way. Unfortunately, what's difficult for them is that there are countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, like Poland, for example, who say, well, any, even any conversation about EU and mutual defense is the EU questioning NATO. And once the EU even starts questioning NATO, you've got a problem there.

[A]

And what about the general mood that you're encountering in Cyprus? I think the last time I was discussing it on one of our podcasts was straight after the start of the Iran war, in that sense, that Cyprus felt it had been left a bit in the lurch, certainly a bit in terms of defence by its UK defence and security partners. But generally they seem to be waving to the rest of you saying, do you know how close we are to all of this and the near miss sense that they'd had and a sense of vulnerability and a bit of anger about that. Is that something that you're finding reflected as you go there?

[C]

You just have to look at a map and you see how close Cyprus is to where the Middle east trouble spots are. And you definitely feel that here on the streets. We spoke to, you know, a few people in bars and shopkeepers yesterday and they said, you know, tourists aren't coming and we're feeling a little bit paranoid about how close we are to things that are going on, on in the Middle East. Whether Europe as a whole appreciates that perceived threat that Cyprus has and people, normal people in the street has, I'm not sure. And it's one of those things that the leaders can talk about mutual defense and NATO and whatever, but actually does that filter through to the person on the street? It's very difficult. Difficult, really.

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So I'm wondering whether overall, Ian, you think leaders gathering where you are in Cyprus will be heeding the advice from my guest earlier on in the podcast. That's Kurt Volker, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and other senior transatlantic roles with Europe. Now, he was warning that it's counterproductive seesaw to aggravate Trump on the way that the Iran war is being prosecuted and its fallout. He said if you basically go too hard against Trump. He was also, also sinking out a number of governments, but you could certainly say the UK on that. Spain is right out there against it. He said he preferred the more kind of lean back position. Friedish mad's Mark Rutte and I wonder whether you think that's a topic of conversation in the rooms that you will be in across this summer. Do you think that this is something that European governments talk to each other about? I mean, I get the feeling they say these things often to just to show their electorates that they're alive and breathing, I think.

[C]

Yeah. I mean, you know, the diplomats we've spoken to in governments across Europe, certainly in Brussels, you know, it's very clear that they think about this sort of thing all the time, how to present to their voters. But they are aware, and we know, don't we, that across the EU you've got 27 governments. They all come from different bits of the political spectrum. Some of them are quite pro us, some of them are very anti us, but it's really difficult to present a united front. And I think that's the sort of thing they discussing because they want to say this is what Europe stands for. But it's very difficult to do that when they all have different opinions. I don't think there is an answer to that. I don't think they think there's an answer to that. But they need to present something. They need to say, this is what Europe is.

[A]

Ian, Richard, thank you very much for joining us on your travels to Cyprus.

[C]

Thanks, Anne.

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Thank you for listening to this episode of EU Confidential. I'm Anne McElrovoy and. And the senior producer is Peter Snowden.