Anne McElvoy (4:05)

So broadly speaking, you seem to align your position with where Friedrich Mertz was, at least in the first days of the war and when he went to see Donald Trump and gave support. Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbal, leader of the Social Democrats in the coalition government, said, however, this is not our war. And now seems to be expressing even greater legal concerns of the potential of, of doing very testing legal cases over these strikes and any support from Germany. How then do coalitions in the European model, often thought to be quite desirable, these grand coalitions that two different parties can get together, how do they handle this kind of disagreement?

Norbert Röttgen (4:50)

I would say it's more about nurses, but of course nurses are also important. And I would say nothing is wrong with what Lars Klingwald said. However, my view is that it's only half of the story. This attack is not compliant with international law. And this is rightly to be stated. And it's not a German decision, not a European decision. It was decided by Israel and America. However, there has, if you, if you share this view, then you have to answer another question. So you have to respond to the other side of the same coin. And this is, if you propose that your conclusion and that the American and Israeli conclusion should have been not to attack, what would it mean for international law and what would it mean for the existence and the brutality and the illegality of the Mullah regime? And what would it mean for the suffering of the Iranian people, having in mind that it's only a few weeks ago that 30,000 people Iranians were killed by this regime. So if the view were that America behaved wrongly by attacking and Israel as well, then you have to deal with the consequence that not by intention, but by effect, it would mean safety for the illegal regime in Tehran. And this dilemma has to be considered. So my view is that it's about weighing the consequences and you have to see both sides.

Anne McElvoy (6:35)

But unless you were pretty Certain that you could get a material change for the better in the regime in Tehran along the lines that you described. Democratisation, restoration of human rights, less lessening of the abject repression to which Iranians are subjective. Well, on those grounds, you could just have a go anywhere where you find a regime to be oppressing people. And it doesn't seem to be a very good balance, maybe of likely outcome to the risk and to the fact that you are flouting, and you do accept that you're flouting the concept of law in. In these matters.

Norbert Röttgen (7:14)

Absolutely right and justified question, because it cannot be that generalized way that you deal with these questions. So you have to work out the specific case that is here that we have to deal with. So you have to have in mind that there is, for so long a time a brutal regime that is torturing, killing, executing the opposition. This is number one. The number two is that there is not. This is not about a kind of civil war, so that you have 50, 50 of the population against each other. You have more or less the entire population. So 80, 85, 90% of Iranians want to see this regime gone. They are totally opposing this regime. This is number two. And then you have number three.

Anne McElvoy (8:10)

It's quite. I'm only going to interject, say, it's quite hard to measure Iranian public opinion exactly as you.

Norbert Röttgen (8:18)

You can't really. I agree, you can't really measure that, but you can see who took to the streets last time and time and again, who was it? It was over the. Across, over the country. It was not only the young ones, it was across generations, across professions, across territories. So you have strong, strong indication, pretty much everybody. And the third element is this is not only internally a brutal regime suppressing and killing and torturing people. This regime also undoubtedly constitutes a threat to international peace. It was working, has been working on the nuclear program. Its clear intention was at least to become a nuclear threshold state. It had produced in a short time, in a short period of time, a huge amount of missiles in order to protect the nuclear program. And it has been organizing terror and war across the region. It is supporting the illegal war of attrition of Russia against Ukraine. So this regime is both a brutal dictatorship against its own people and a danger to international peace. So there are very specific circumstances that make also, under the aspect of international law, this case very special and perhaps a point of justification where you can act. Because I would mention this as a fourth point. There is one institution that has the legitimacy and authority to order a foreign intervention and this is the United Nations Security Council. But given that this institution is paralyzed, it's a fourth element that is very specific here.

Anne McElvoy (10:11)

We want to focus here, I think, specifically in this conversation with you on the European response and the strains that this has put on European governments and how they're responding. So I'll stay with Friedrich Merz for a moment, but I'd like us to widen out a bit. Do you think that the Chancellor effectively altered his position? He initially gave support for the American attack. He used a similar kind of analysis to what you led off with there, that these were very specific circumstances. He was not going to be critical and he was not going to cite international law the way a lot of people do, like a cudgel, I think, is the word to stop the debate. He said that if it doesn't really work, then it's not fit for purpose and. And we should think differently. Donald Trump liked that, even patted his knee when Keir Starmer didn't say that. He did not get his knee patted. He got a lot of.

Norbert Röttgen (11:03)

To say the least.

Anne McElvoy (11:03)

Yeah, to say the least. Ask you about that in a second. But in recent days, Friedrich Merz says that he doesn't support endless war. He doesn't believe the collapse of the Iranian state is in Germany or Europe's best interests. Are you seeing a shift in position there? As we've seen the extent of the Iranian scattergun response across the Gulf, the seizing up of the Straits of Hormuz, the problems for shipping, the risks to bases of American and other bases. Just read maths for me here, Norbert. You know your CDU colleagues inside out. What's he doing?

Norbert Röttgen (11:43)

There is no shifting in his view at all, because I would claim that I have not shifted in my view on this war and on the goals of this war. And it's also my view that nobody, I would say it's quite banal to say nobody can be in favor of endless wars. But war and an attack on this country, on this regime, of course, is only just justified by a specific goal. And the goal has to be achieved and achievable. So endlessly of a war would of course, lead that such a war could not be justified in any way. So he's right on that, although being quite banal in what he has stated. And the second element, the second argument. Yes. That nobody does like to see and that it's not in our European interest and nobody's interest from outside to see the collapse of statehood or fragmentation of the country. This is, for example, why I have publicly opposed to finance and fund Kurdish groups in order to send them against the regime forces? Because this would be, in my view, a step that could lead to the fragmentation and internal war of the country, which is not our interest, which this should not be our goal. It should not be a part of foreign and American Israeli policy. So neither the country nor the, nor, of course not the people are our enemies in any way. But it says this regime and the military tools it has acquired and is ready to apply.

Anne McElvoy (13:24)

Let's broaden it out a bit. I mean, as you know, European politics well and those difficult bridges and hinges both inside the eu, let alone with countries outside the eu. Britain prominently. But did you feel that Fridge Meadows and others should come to the aid of, say, Keir Starmer when Donald Trump lambasts him for saying, well, we will be involved, we are there doing air support, but it has to be defensive. Spain felt even more strongly that they weren't defended sufficiently by the chancellor and said, you're your fellow EU country, you're not even the naughty Brits, and you still didn't defend us. Do they have a point, these critics?

Norbert Röttgen (14:07)

The critics, they are demanding that and criticizing that Friedrich Mad should have got into an argument with the American president in the Oval Office meeting. And I would say we can talk. The cases and the arguments of both, I would say very different regarding Spain and Britain. But I completely appreciate and support the way of behavior of Friedrich Merz in this room because I think now we have some experience with these meetings, and this is a very special show that is very much dominated by one person and his supporters willingly sitting there to support their president. And to have an argument between a European leader and the American president in under these specific circumstances, in my view, is certainly not advisable. So what is advisable is the way Merz acted, and you could see it in his face even, and how he behaved. His intention was to refrain from engaging very much in this show, in this Donald Trump show, and I would say rightly so, you have to be a part of it, but you have not to be an active element in this, in this show. And I would say this was the way he behaved, and it was in his and in our interest to behave in this very refrained way.

Anne McElvoy (15:47)

Do you think Angela Merkel, in whose government you serve prominently, you headed Foreign Affairs Committee, you were a minister, you know her well. There's a lot of controversy still about her legacy, what she got right, what is perhaps proved to be less right about her style. What do you think Angela Merkel would have done in this situation.

Norbert Röttgen (16:06)

So nobody knows. Of course it's hypothetical, but I'm quite convinced knowing her and having seen her as a refrained person in general, I would say I think it's a clever way to behave under these circumstances. It's a restrained way of behavior.

Anne McElvoy (16:22)

But I do think she, you know, she did make great play of the international rules based order, which I know has gone a bit out of fashion these days. A lot of people can't quite tell you what the rules were when you ask them. I think she might have pushed back a bit harder on the rules side. That this is in the end, you know, this is many decades of only supporting even if you couldn't get the votes through at the UN but that the major democratic countries should only support purely defensive action. And the defensive case, I think that's the problem Keir Starmer has had, is harder to make.

Norbert Röttgen (16:56)

I can of course I am free to discuss the foreign policy of both European partner countries and leaders and I would not approve of neither of the way the both have acted. So firstly, the international law. We discussed the aspect of international law. I think it's a dilemma and I would not accept that there is one right way to act compliant with international law because you have to weigh the consequences and you have to see what it means, an asymmetry of the ones who follow the immediate imperative of international law. And then you have the countries who have complete disregard for international law, like Russia, like Iran, like North Korea and also China because China is only in favor of international law when it suits its interest. So this, and we are in a very specific period of history where a new order is going to evolve and we have to take into consideration what that would mean. And for that reason I consider it a mistake by Starmer that he did not offer the two British bases for American use and surprisingly, I would say unfortunately not an exception in his policy. He made a 180 degree U turn also on this piece of policy. And regarding Spain and the Spanish Prime Minister, I think it's fair to say that he is campaigning and campaigning for his political domestic survival and this is what dominates his statements on foreign policy. It's not about foreign policy, it's about a campaign mode that he is applying and I think it is realistic to take this into consideration.

Anne McElvoy (18:55)

I'm smiling because I know you well and I know also what a good politician you are. And I'm thinking you can decline that, can't you? I have a conscience. You have a campaign. He has no principles. I'm teasing you a bit. I was going to ask you if you felt sorry for Keir Starmer. It sounds like you don't. And yet isn't there a defense of the UK's position, however unfashionable that may be, because we don't know how this plays out. It may be that those who hope that there would be a huge change in Iran, including yourself, are ultimately disappointed. And then, you know, the best you can say is, oh, well, it was worth a go, but we created chaos and massive oil price spikes and lots more untoward consequences. And I think Starmer was trying to walk a line between not doing that. He does take the rules based argument perhaps a bit more seriously that as you say, than the other 50% argument that you put very well. But then he did say, well, you know, in the end we are providing air cover and you have a lot of countries perhaps telling off Britain who don't have planes in the air doing a very dangerous job shooting down drones. And I think that seems to be, is it a bit unfair on him? You know, he's got all the risk of the crisis, but he's getting blamed for just taking a day to form a different argument problem?

Norbert Röttgen (20:13)

Yes, it's, you have to weigh consequences and you have always to weigh the consequence of action and very often the consequences of inaction and action. And if I were him, I would have set this problem into a broader context to which I alluded earlier. And this is that we are in a very specific period of history. We are past the old post war order. We have not seen the establishment of a new order. So there is a struggle, to say the least. What are the elements, the principles, what is the architecture of a new global order? And I would say there is an imperative. I have not given up on the west and if we were to give up on the United States, we were to give up on the West. And I think we need the West. And so I have an inclination, if it's possible, to follow the policy of the United States, and I would say at least the two cases and the consequences are so close together and given the fact that it's beyond doubt that it's an American decision and you have not taken the responsibility for deciding that case, you can be supportive of what America and Israel have decided. I would have chosen this as a foreign policy if I were a Brit.

Anne McElvoy (21:36)

We'll be back shortly to discuss the wider impacts of of the war and its effect on the Atlantic alliance.

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Anne McElvoy (22:24)

it leaves the EU? Not speaking with one voice as far as we can see at the moment you've got the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen saying Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old world order. It's gone. It won't return. As of a long the lines that you describe maybe a quiet endorsement, a VDL ish endorsement of a real politic adopted by the other great blonde haired one, President Trump. When we saw the European Council President Antonio Costa saying we must defend the rules based order, uphold the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and that violations couldn't be accepted whether it was in Ukraine. Interesting comparison. He was pointing to or in dealing with Gaza or indeed with the Middle east now. So it sounds like the European Union itself is starting to come under strain along the lines of the division that you laid out.

Norbert Röttgen (23:22)

Yes, unfortunately you are quite right with what you outlined. You were quite polite to the European Union to say that we speak and are not speaking with one voice. If it were only not with one voice. There are very voices that have been have become vocal in this area. One has to say that the Middle east has always been, I would say the weakest point of agreement on foreign policy within the European Union. However, we have to face this reality. We are as I try to explain in this very specific historic moment and I think everybody shares the abstract insight. We Europeans have to put our act together in order to be a relevant actor in this era and in this area of foreign defence policy. But we are far away from it and contrary to the reality that is more and more pressing us for more unity. We are not achieving more unity. But but I would say more it's going into the other direction and this is a part of a reality. We have to deal with a new partnering I would say when it comes to foreign policy. But the more we are, the stronger we are. This is absolutely clear.

Anne McElvoy (24:45)

Isn't there a different order problem here? For they talk about hawks and doves very crudely, but some people say you should never do it. Some people say you should go straight for it that it's complicated by, when you talk about Europe, by the position of Ukraine and the fact that Russia is steadily undermining Ukraine by violating every potential and existing interpretation of international law and most reasonable people's idea of what that would be, even if it wasn't written down. So it does mean that Russia gets new resources to fund the war against Ukraine. President Costa of the Council, European Council made this point. It benefits from the diversion of military capabilities. It's a really tricky one that, isn't it? For people who might otherwise decide. Yes, I'd like to support what is happening here, even if I'm not always convinced by Donald Trump or by the Israeli case. I don't think that's one of the most difficult moral and political choices that has to be made.

Norbert Röttgen (25:46)

Yes, you're right. There are of course, implications also. So everybody sees the oil price is spiking and this means something for oil producing countries like Russia. So they are benefiting from that. This is one consequence that has to be brought into the calculation of contradicting consequences. Yes, this is a benefit for Russia. I would say it will be certainly a temporary benefit for Russia and I hope Russia is in a lasting way losing a very valued ally which was or is the Iranian regime. So if I were to weigh this in, I would counter it with the prospect of seeing both Russia and China are losing after Syria, now a second reliable, valued, potent ally in their effort to reshape world order in their interests. So hopefully a lasting disadvantage for Russia. However, seeing the temporary advantage for Russia,

Anne McElvoy (26:59)

the economic cost could be very high indeed for Europe. Not just the fact that the Strait of Hormuz and the difficulty once that's been jammed and closed and declared too dangerous for commercial shipping or uninsurable, has costs, of course, for all trading partners, but broadly speaking, the economic cost to a Europe that is already struggling for growth, struggling to support its welfare states and to satisfy its, its citizens. Again, you know, another potential knock on is that in, in the aim of trying to do the right thing in this moral maze, that you end up actually in a situation where you make things worse foreseeably for citizens and that they take a dim view of this.

Norbert Röttgen (27:44)

Yes. And I have ever always said we don't know the end and there is a broad range of outcome. And of course, I cannot exclude that after some time it turns out worse than it was before. However, it's still open and we can shape this development. What I would say this argument of economic costs and so on gives Evidence that it's so why it is so important that politicians, governments and of course for most the American and Israeli government. But I would say the American government first and foremost have to be clear and should be clearer in their goals and their strategy, why they want to achieve which goals. And of course there is room for improvement on the communication side at least. I always would say and would make my case consider a better outcome than the reality previously was. Then you might even have in the best case the liberation have freedom again for the Iranian people. So imagine only for a second we were to see perhaps in a few years time we were to see Iran with 93 million people becoming again a respected part of the international community. There would be huge positive economic impacts of this changed reality. If we were to assume Iran would have stayed as it was acquiring more and more missiles and bringing forward the nuclear program, it would have certainly constituted a major threat to international peace. Imagine it would have acted when perhaps China had come to the conclusion to attack Taiwan, when simultaneously and in a coordinated way Russia would have decided to attack a Baltic country and then Iran would have attacked Israel. This would have been a coordinated attack and war in three theaters. That would perhaps that would certainly be overwhelming even for the United States. So there is a broader strategic context in this what we are discussing you

Anne McElvoy (30:11)

mentioned communications could maybe improve in terms of the position perhaps of of the German leadership. So might electoral outcomes. Both your party and the Social Democrats were defeated roundly by the Greens. The vote in the southern state of Baden Wurtenberg last Sunday. Polls suggesting further losses in store in two big East German states. Bastions of the alternative For Deutschland, the AfD vote later this year. There is is also potential this does drive more backlash. Whether you're inclined to see these parties, you know, as something that as a part of the administration in the US do a sort of wake up call telling sleepy Germany and other states that no more politics as usual, it's not working well or whether you see them as a danger in the far right ends of the AFT might well be conceived to be and are thought to be. What do you consider that we take away from that? Are we going to see the AfD may be the beneficiary.

Norbert Röttgen (31:18)

The AfD is totally split on this issue. They have absolutely contradicting positions statements on this issue. So they are in trouble. Some of them in favor of the American position, others massively criticizing the American policy. So they are totally divided. And I would say this is what my view is that we have to confront our voters and Citizens with the reality and with our leadership, how we want to have a positive grip and say and impact on how things are going to evolve.

Anne McElvoy (32:07)

But I should have said also I went to talk about the aft, but of course the big defeat was at the hands of the Greens, who also have more, you know, more people voting for them who are perhaps more skeptical about international interventions. I mean, it's, it's a naked deal. Not quite.

Norbert Röttgen (32:21)

No.

Anne McElvoy (32:21)

We were not divided by the Greens.

Norbert Röttgen (32:23)

So we have scored the same amount of seats in Baden Rothenberg. Our expectations were higher. That's, that's right. But it's not a defeat when you, when you, when you win the same amount of seats as the other, as the competing party, a few votes less. I, I, I, I. We are not satisfied with it.

Anne McElvoy (32:42)

It's, it's, it's a sort of score draw, isn't it? But where you'd want the party in power to be.

Norbert Röttgen (32:48)

The outcome did not meet our expectations, no matter of that. But I would say there was no. So the international development in the Middle east did not play in any way into the result of this regional election.

Anne McElvoy (33:01)

So what's the fundamental problem with Friedrich Matz then? What is he not doing enough of

Norbert Röttgen (33:08)

in this piece of international a policy as it is in others. For example, and mainly regarding the Russian war against Ukraine and our transatlantic policy, we are on the same page. So I'm supporting him and I think he shows the leadership in a European sense, a German leadership, leadership of a German Chancellor in a European sense, which is necessary to build up European strength and the conditions for our will to positively shape things. So I am very supportive of what

Anne McElvoy (33:44)

he's doing, but it's not cutting through to the electorate. I think Fredrick Mert is one of those characters, as you say, has some super fans who say, yes, that's my worldview and he represents it well. And maybe because you are a candid friend and because you are supportive, you can sort of speak truth to power there. You're not an opponent. What is missing, what is missing in the Merz recipe for power in Germany?

Norbert Röttgen (34:07)

We are doing different to the previous government and a good foreign policy. My general view is that you can lose elections with foreign policy, but you can't win federal elections in Germany in normal times with foreign policy and foreign policy issues, I would say where what is essential for the German political landscape and the prospect for winning elections is the economy. We have not seen growth over years now and this is coming closer. And not only coming closer, this has affected the lives of many, many people in Germany. And of course, we have some structural disadvantages like demography, but we have much too much red tape. So these are the issues and the challenges where we still and yet have to meet the challenge and give convincing answers, which has not been the case so far and which is absolutely necessary in the course of the next year because then we are coming closer and approaching already the next elections.

Anne McElvoy (35:23)

So rounding out, do you think Donald Trump has done Europe a favor in the short to medium term by launching the attacks on Iran?

Norbert Röttgen (35:35)

It depends on the outcome. It depends on how this attack is now being organized. And if the United States stick to a plausible definition of goals, they must not fall short before a crucial goal is achieved, achieved once they started it. So it depends on how they continue now, what is achieved at the end. This is part of the risk decision they have taken. And now they and we together have to do it in the right way so that one can see there is a difference now for international security and for the Iranian society that is given an opportunity for its freedom and self determination.

Anne McElvoy (36:29)

Thank you very much indeed for joining us.

Norbert Röttgen (36:31)

Norbert Redken, thank you so much for having this conversation with you.

Anne McElvoy (36:36)

Thank you for listening to this episode of EU Confidential. I'm Anne McElvoy and the senior producer with me is Peter Snowden.