F (3:28)

Yeah. Well, these were very high stakes elections for Moldova. You know, you have a government that's campaigned on the basis of trying to take the country into the European Union as a full fledged member by 2030. You have an opposition that said, well, actually, no, we don't want that. What we want to do is realign ourselves more strategically with Moscow and have what they call a kind of pragmatic geopolitical posture, which is particularly difficult when you consider that the war in Ukraine is raging just, you know, a few hundred miles from Chishna, the capital. So the governing party of action, Solidarity, President Maya Sandu's pro European party, secured more than 50% of the vote. And that gives them around 55 out of 101 seats in the parliament, a pretty commanding majority. Meanwhile, the pro Russian, quote, unquote, patriotic bloc secured only about 25% of the vote. What this means, effectively, is that the pro European forces don't need to kind of beg, steal and borrow for votes. They don't need to start a coalition, and they can basically govern the country for the next five years.

D (4:27)

And Sandu's party's success was all the more remarkable given that we were just really hearing this drumbeat of concern about a massive interference effort from Moscow. And you were just kind of checking in with random people on the street on an election night. Did you get any, any sense of that?

F (4:44)

Yeah, we saw a really polarized country, actually. Not everybody knew kind of what all the respective forces kind of stood for, but the people we spoke to on the streets more often than not, said that they want the things that you'd expect them to want. They want prosperity, they want safety, they want liberty. The question was basically, who do you vote for if you want those things? You know, I spoke to an elderly woman who insisted that, you know, Sandu, the pro European president, was basically a puppet of America. And, you know, she couldn't explain why or what, what was so wrong with America. But this was clearly a line that was being hammered the whole time. You know, other people, they said that even if they didn't support Russia, support Russia's war in Ukraine, actually they wanted their country to stay neutral because they were afraid of the implications. And that message of fear was one that was kind of building up very heavily. But of course, the idea that the country should embrace its kind of Soviet heritage, turn to Russia, be close to Moscow again, clearly didn't cut through with the voters. That kind of nostalgia really only works with a very small segment of society. What I think we saw in the end was the majority of people, many of whom have Romanian passports as well, many of whom have, you know, lived and traveled around the eu, know what the EU is like. They voted for prosperity and security by voting for a pro EU government.

D (5:54)

And indeed, some listeners will remember that we spoke to you almost exactly a year ago after an EU membership referendum in Moldova. We were shocked how close it was with just over 50% backing accession. But now, you know, Sandu, as you mentioned, is pledging EU membership within five years. We've seen lots of congratulatory messages from EU leaders. Von der Leyen, Kallas, Zelensky, Tusk. But how realistic is that timeline?

F (6:21)

I think the answer depends more on the European Union than it does on Moldova, and specifically about how the EU deals with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's insistence that Ukraine cannot be allowed to join the EU because Ukraine and Moldova's applications are twinned. That means Moldova's application can't progress. I sat down early this week with Christina Gerasimov, the Moldovan Europe minister, and she told me that it's now on the lines that these guys have come out and they've said, we want to take the country into the eu. People have voted for them not once, but in two parliamentary elections, two presidential elections, and EU referendum, Moldovans have voted for Europe. So the pressure is going to be absolutely intense on Brussels to try and work out a way to get around this impasse, because I think the message has been pretty clearly expounded to them by candidate countries. Moldovans are voting for the eu, Ukrainians are fighting and dying for the eu, and the EU is kind of sitting around wondering, well, how do we get over these procedural hurdles to enable them to come in? So it's starting to become kind of almost a farcical situation where 26 EU countries are happy to go ahead with this, and just one is not.

D (7:26)

Well, there are some procedural solutions being discussed, particularly with Council President Antonio Costa. What are you hearing about the way to get around Orban's veto here?

F (7:38)

Well, officials and diplomats told Politico over the weekend that Antonio Kosta is the kind of linchpin of a series of discussions with national capitals trying to sound out the level of support for trying to change the rules. That would mean that individual negotiating kind of clusters as they're called, could be opened without the unanimous support of all 27 member states. You could do it by qualified majority vote. That would mean that those talks could progress. Officials could begin kind of working very proactively with Kyiv, with Kishnow on those reforms without having to wait for Viktor Orban to decide. He agrees, even if you would ultimately need unanimity at the end.

D (8:13)

And without having to rewrite the treaties.

F (8:15)

And without having to rewrite the treaties, Exactly. I think it's a pretty open secret in Brussels that when it comes to enlargement, everyone's eyeing the Hungarian elections, which have to take place by April next year. Viktor Orban's party is massively behind in the polls, about 10% behind his rival, Petr Magyar. And I think many people, many kind of liberal pro European governments are hoping that Viktor Orban loses the election and then the next Hungarian government will be far more pragmatic about admitting Ukraine and Moldova. But obviously those countries themselves are worried that they can't just sit around and wait for that to happen and gamble their country's future on what Hungarian voters decide. So Kosta's intervention is a really important one. It just depends fundamentally on whether there's enough support from other member states to do this. And member states, as with sanctions, people have been very critical about Orban's use of his veto to try and block or slow down sanctions on Russia. But no one, actually, very few capitals want to give up their veto because they know that even if they're all together now, in the future, they might be on the wrong side of the argument. There are candidate nations like Turkey, so countries like Greece have serious reservations about the idea that maybe when the geopolitics looks different, their old rival could join the eu. So there's a real question about just how much power are European leaders willing to give up to get around Viktor Orban?

D (9:31)

All right. Well, indeed. We'll be watching. Gabriel, thank you so much for joining us.

F (9:35)

Thank you.

D (9:39)

And now we're turning to the Czech Republic, where another high stakes parliamentary election is underway. According to the polls, current Prime Minister Petr Fiala is on track to lose to Andrzej Babis, the billionaire and former head of government in Prague. And, of course, do stay with us until the end of that conversation. Anna Shavit is one of Techia's leading experts on election campaigns. She's a political marketing scholar at Charles University and a former campaign strategist who's even advised Babi in the past. You'll want to hear her Explanation of his remarkable shovel theory of leadership. Okay. It's actually even simpler than it sounds. So, Anna, we're just days away from the vote. What's the vibe like in Prague and around the country?

G (10:26)

Dramatic. A lot of people think there will be some dramatic change in the heading of the country. The whole atmosphere is rather polarized. And then you have people who don't really care. It looks like that one third of people is still not decided and that will change in the last couple of hours or in the same day when they will be voting. Electoral campaign is a special discipline and it's kind of always a little bit too much. But considering the geopolitical context, what is happening all around the world, this election feels a little bit different. Yeah, a little bit dramatic, I would say.

D (11:02)

What's the drama around? I mean, is it these global issues that are seeping in or is just the domestic situation very dramatic?

G (11:10)

It's both. For some, obviously it is the domestic issue of economy and well being. And for some it is the heading of the country itself. Pro Western orientation, NATO, EU support of Ukraine. People are always a little bit too dramatic.

D (11:28)

People are always a little bit too dramatic. Well, I mean, you mentioned that a lot of people haven't decided yet. Among those who kind of have already made a decision, are we seeing a lot of polarization or is it more kind of, you know, a fight for the middle?

G (11:43)

Yeah, the undecided voters should be the core of the campaign, but it seems more like mobilizing your voter base. And the rhetoric is very polarized. So let's say the biggest issue will be the capability of creating the coalition government, like the potential to create an actual government. And I would say there will be a lot of hurdles to do that. So.

D (12:08)

Okay, well, we're going to dive deeper into that first. But before we get into those nuts and bolts, maybe let's just for listeners who are not versed in Czech politics, who are kind of the main players.

G (12:19)

In this campaign, the favorite of the election, like a political party which is ahead with a stable support, actually is the leading opposition party of the ex prime minister, Andrei Babi, the political party or movement called anno, which means yes. And Andrei Babi, as I said, is the ex prime minister. He's polling highest. Then he's followed by the coalition called spolu, meaning together, which consists of three political parties and they are currently together in the government. And then there is the opposition bloc, which is very diverse. We have the movement of direct democracy, as per there, which is very focusing on the Czech sovereignty. They're advocating for the referenda about the EU and NATO and they are the protectors of the Czech traditions. Very anti migrant party in the country with literally almost non migrants, with the exception of the Ukrainian minority. We also have a new actor which is a coalition or movement called Stachilo means enough. And that is a mixture of Communist party and various more like Dan Party individuals who are popular bloggers or active figures. And they are fighting against disinformation and freedom of speech. And they are for the first time since the Velvet Revolution, since 1980. And this party is openly saying we need a change of the regime. So this is not about the exchange of government. They want to make like a complete.

D (13:56)

Change or like a revolution.

G (13:58)

Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a new part of the society expressing big dissatisfaction with the status quo.

D (14:05)

And as you mentioned, polls suggest a likely defeat for the current coalition led by Prime Minister Pedro Faiala and a rebound for Babish's Anno. From a campaign perspective, why is the government losing ground?

G (14:19)

Like Ano is a great campaigner. Andrei Babi likes it. He likes the door to door campaign. He is extremely active. They are investing in polling. They are very good in reading the moods and the trends in the society. The movement of Petrofiala, they were a little bit slow in catching up, but this is sort of typical when you're in the government, you have to govern. And their campaign is now getting a momentum, but it might be a little bit too late. They're also facing a lot of criticism. Their meeting very often interrupted also, which is very surprising. Czech context by pro Palestinian protesters. Like dozens of people expressing their opinion and criticism. Additional criticism of the Czech government.

D (15:02)

That's interesting because the Czech Republic is known in Brussels as one of the main defenders of the Israeli government.

G (15:08)

Yes, hardliners supporting Israel, but you know, the conservative voters or the center right voters are very much more critical. There was a lot of ongoing debate criticizing the current government for not delivering on necessary economic reforms. And their strength is the foreign policy and the pro Western orientation and of course the remaining in the EU and NATO and the pro Ukrainian stance. So this is the main mobilizing thingy. But then of course the elections have won by the domestic issues, which is the economic situation. And there is a prevailing feeling in the country that we are not performing very well. It doesn't matter that the actual economic data are showing something else. If people are dissatisfied, you have to sort of respect it and work with that.

D (15:57)

Yeah, I mean we've seen this trend Kind of in Western democracies where people just seem extremely angry at whatever party has been in power for a little time. And so every election becomes like a big change election. Are you seeing a similar trend in the Czech Republic?

G (16:11)

Oh, yeah, the change. And now it will be all good and we will introduce all the reforms and we will do it. At least with the Babish, he can say, you remember how it was when I was the Prime Minister and you will get the same. So there might be some continuity, at least in it. So it's not that much about the change. Most likely he's going to win the elections, but he won't have enough seats to create a minority government. So he will need support to get his government approved. And then he will have to lean on parties which are unpredictable and which might not want to be in the government, but they won't mind the introduction of, for instance, of the referenda for remaining in EU or NATO. And that's new. And this is kind of, you know, like scary for some people, but I mean, I honestly hope that our democracy is strong enough to handle this well.

D (17:01)

Yeah, Anna, actually, let's jump off from there back to this coalition question. As you said, it's going to be a real challenge to build one. How do you see some scenarios there?

G (17:09)

Well, our parliament has 200 seats and for approval of the government you need 101. And what is written in the constitution is that the president will appoint the winner of the election to create the government. And then the other scenarios, the most likely is some kind of minority government with the support either from the motorist, if they make it to the parliament, it's another party, automobile party, anti green deal. Like we will fight for you to keep your old diesel. Oh, we have this ex communist mixture, Stachilo. And then we have Tomio Okamura, his Direct Democracy, a party. With the exception of the Automobile Party, the two other parties are not necessarily willing to be in the government. They would much rather be a strong, demanding opposition. But the process can be difficult. If Babish will fail to create a government, then president can ask somebody else with the coalition potential. But the most likely scenario, Saturday afternoon when all the votes will be counted, is that Mr. Babis will be in charge of creating the new government of the Czech Republic.

D (18:18)

Yeah, so Babish is going to be a familiar figure to some people who've been in Brussels for a bit of a longer time from his time when he was prime minister before. How has his political brand or approach evolved over the years? And how should we expect this to play out in Brussels?

G (18:36)

There's a lot of shades of the foreign policy at this very moment in the campaign. Babi would rather focus only strictly on the domestic issues. The current geopolitical situation is not really that much favorable for him. He would like to have the peace. He will say that the only one who can deliver the peace is Donald Trump. And he doesn't want to support, you know, like a stronger role of the Czech Republic, which now is the current president and the current Prime Minister Petru Fiala. Czech Republic was active in many initiatives focusing on the Ukraine. We will see how this will evolve. But Babi wants to play it safe with the domestic issues and protecting of the Czech citizens. The big question is what will happen with the 400,000 Ukrainians residing in Czechia paying taxes and actually bringing money. And I think they will do like a mixture of advocating for the common sense, you know, like efficient government, anti green deal. So yes, there might be some polarized rhetorics, but Czech Republic economy is very much tied to the Germany. So like being in the EU is a good position for us. And I don't think he will do anything dramatic about that. And I also don't see him going the Orban way. There's a big chance on top of that that Viktor Orban will lose the election possibly. Let's see.

D (20:03)

And you actually have advised him in anno campaigns. And so just on a personal level, what was he like to work with and did you ever have a sense that he had a specific ideology?

G (20:16)

Well, we have to go back to 2013. I was a member of a core team. Babish was extremely Dr. His personal ideology is hardworking. He's a person who would be successful in any political setup. I mean that's strictly my opinion. And also reflection of the year 2013 when this context even the national and geopolitical was much more different. His party started as anti corruption movement. His motivation was to work for the country and being extremely efficient. You know, like long before the doge of Elon Musk. He wanted to bring his experience from the business to governing. Of course that was met with certain resistance, democratic mechanism. But I mean as for ideology, his focus is the family. He thinks it's important to build the roads and feed people and the other things are extras. It would be very difficult to find like any values or some philosophical aspects of his personality. But he's a very hardworking person. He will work for you even if you don't want it.

D (21:20)

Indeed in your academic work. You've written about Babish's leadership philosophy, the shovel theory. It's a really interesting metaphor. Can you explain it a bit?

G (21:29)

This is his personal theory, is that the only successful leaders are those kids who take a shuffle in the sand pit and they hit the other kids on their heads. Those are the people who will achieve something. I remember when he told me, I was just staring at him in disbelief. So it's very much survival oriented.

D (21:48)

And what are the other kids in the sandbox doing under this theory?

G (21:52)

They're supposed to cry, run away, fight, or hail the great shuffle leader, but it's not elaborated. What happened to those who should, I don't know, show some submission to the leader.

D (22:06)

You know, Brussels is really driven on consensus. So I think that does help us understand a bit why people are anxious about his return here.

G (22:14)

Yes, and also he's transactional. Like, he wants to make deals, he wants to get things done very quickly. And I think why Trump is also very much appealing to him, because Trump is doing a lot of stuff. He gets things done. I think he likes this gutsy politics of Donald Trump.

D (22:31)

Okay, Anna, thank you so much for joining us.

G (22:34)

Thank you very much for having me.

D (22:37)

All right, we need to take a quick break. When we come back, we'll go from the Czech Trump to the real thing with a fresh take on transatlantic tensions as a culture war. Stay with us. And now my conversation with Pavel Zirka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank. Okay, Pavel, thank you so much for joining us. Really glad to have you here to talk about your report. It's called Reality why Europe Must Not Cave in to Trump's Culture War. You're arguing that Trump's America is waging a culture war against Europe. What do you mean by that?

E (23:25)

Thanks for having me, Sarah. I feel that many people who are wondering about the transatlantic relations today, they tend to think that it's mostly about tariffs or about security and defense. And a broader picture is often missing, whereby what Donald Trump's America is doing is also questioning European values and Europe's identity as an autonomous actor on the global scene. And for me, values and identity are part of a culture war.

D (23:55)

So when. When did this culture war start? I mean, you know, this is Trump's second term. Has he. Has this always been his game?

E (24:02)

I remember Trump's first presidency, and what I do not recall is so much of an accent on Europe, whereas what makes real difference with his second presidency? And I think it's not just because of him. But. But also because of people around him like J.D. vance and his circles, is that Europe is really an issue for them. When you listen to JD Vance at Munich security speech, he's teaching Europe a lesson about what democracy, freedom, freedom of speech should be about. When you listen to Donald Trump, he's teaching Europe about our own security or how much we have been screwing up America when it comes to trade. Those issues of Europe's migration and climate policies that he's laughing at, I think it's also quite a novel element, and therefore the intensity of it is also something new.

D (24:58)

Let's look at that idea of Europe as an autonomous actor. How is Trump threatening that?

E (25:02)

I call it backstage level of the culture war because it's not very often discussed and treated as part of a culture war. But when I look at such events as, for example, the tariff tensions whereby European Union gets forced to accept a very asymmetric trade arrangement with America, or when I listen to Donald Trump at the UN openly mocking Europe's migration and climate policies, or when I see images from the NATO summit where not only European NATO members accept a certain number of defense spending because they want to placate the American president, but also you see a Secretary General of NATO calling the U.S. president Daddy. I feel these are all occasions where the US President is exploiting any opportunity to humiliate Europe.

D (26:00)

Yeah, I guess I wanted to maybe gently push back a little bit. You cast your argument as it being Trump waging a culture war against this sort of cohesive, overarching European culture. But in fact, in fact, we did see in the European elections, which took place before the U.S. election, that European voters backed in greater numbers candidates who are taking a harsher stance on migration, who are saying, hey, let's dial back our climate policy. And Viktor Orban, the prime Minister of Hungary, would certainly say that he's been waging a culture war against Europe on his own, even before Trump. So. So is Trump initiating this culture war? Is he more just kind of putting his thumb on the scale in a culture war that's already happening within Europe?

E (26:48)

Definitely, he's riding the wave of the culture war, which has already been there. And he wouldn't be able to be so efficient if there was not a phenomenon of European electorate being already attracted by the new rights alternatives across the continent. But also if the mainstream of European politics didn't, to some extent, lose its identity in the process by compromising so much on the migration or climate policies, for example.

D (27:19)

And what are some other examples that you've seen of Trump or his allies weighing in to help the new right.

E (27:24)

We talked already about this backstage level, which is about humiliation of Europe and questioning of its identity. But there is something much more visible which we could call a front stage. And this is most of all about the US Administration openly supporting allied actors in domestic politics across Europe. We've seen it in Germany, where JD Voss, as well as Elon Musk, who back then was part of the administration, very openly supported AfD, the far right party. We've seen it in Poland, where the current president, Karl Navrotsky, received a very strong support from the U.S. president. And you see this pattern across Europe, in Romania, even in Ireland. And therefore, I can see a pattern in which the US Administration wants to either increase the number of ideological allies who would then be sitting at the table in Brussels during the European Council, or at least to polarize a rising number of European countries so that leaders are more occupied with domestic politics and less able to show some sort of a coordinated assertiveness towards America.

D (28:41)

Let me turn back to Trump's engagement with Europe on European foreign policy. We've talked a bit about what you call scenes of humiliation, the EU US Trade deal, which was very asymmetrical. Ruta calling Trump daddy. Can you talk a little bit more about why you see these as more than just kind of clumsy optics?

E (29:01)

Mostly because of the effect that such events have on Europe's image in the eyes of both the European and the global public. I remember your conversation with Arancho Gonzalez during the summer.

D (29:15)

Former European trade official, former WTO trade official, now now in academia in Paris.

E (29:20)

Yeah. It was her who said that when she thinks of the trade arrangement between the US And Europe, she felt that by subscribing to such an asymmetric deal, Europe gave a signal to the rest of the world that it accepts the world of might is right, rather than standing up for something more important. For certain values that were governing international trade previously, the image that it gives is Europe simply doing things just for the things to stay the same, rather than being open to a certain change, which looks inevitable. Of course, I can have a more understanding reading of those developments. I can perfectly imagine that Europe is simply trying to appease Trump in order to buy time. Given the war in Ukraine, Europeans would prefer not to provoke the US President unnecessarily. But I miss this other element of Europe actually doing the homework in the meantime. And when I listen to various leaders, I. I still often feel that the impression is that we have managed to appease Trump and now we can again, rely on the US on trade and on security.

D (30:37)

Yeah, I mean, maybe it's not just buying time. I mean, look, if we look at sort of some of the elements of the various cultural identities and even, even veering into some stereotypes here, but just for the sake of conversation, I think that sort of measuredness, degree of finesse is certainly part of the, the Brussels self mythology, whereas, like, a certain transactionalism is kind of the American approach. Transactional Americans getting charmed by more refined Europeans is a classic story. And some would indeed argue maybe that's exactly what is happening. You know, at UNGA last week, Trump suddenly flipped and talked about Ukraine winning, called Russia a paper tiger. We hear about how he has a good relationship with Ursula von der Leyen. They're like, like on the phone all the time. So maybe that European, like, cultural diplomacy is actually paying off.

E (31:28)

Thanks for this provocation. When I first heard about the post that Donald Trump had on his social media a week ago where he suggested that Ukraine should be able to win that war and actually reconquer territory from Russia, I was afraid that this would give room for renewed complacency among European leaders and the public. This confusion that Donald Trump is spreading is provoking such a danger of Europeans simply choosing the nice words they are hearing from Washington in order to feel, okay, everything is fine. That was just a bad dream and now we are back to normal, rosy transatlantic relationship. I was actually super, well, surprised when I saw a message from the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, who in his reaction to Donald Trump's posts, said that reality is better than illusion and that what Trump was suggesting was simply shifting the responsibility for helping defend Ukraine from the US Towards Europeans. That shows that there are European leaders who are drawing the conclusions from what is happening and are not, not susceptible to hear only the nice words coming from the U.S. president.

D (32:47)

I mean, indeed. Interesting. Then that's. That. That's coming from Tusk, who, of course, with the Trump administration really intervening on behalf of Tusk's political rival, Karl Novrotsky, it makes sense that he would have kind of this very different view. But that's, that's elite opinion, of course. And you have also been looking at how regular Europeans see themselves. Your European sentiment compass shows that despite all the drama and humiliation, support for the EU is actually very strong.

E (33:16)

Yes. So the European sentiment compass is an opportunity to look every year at the European public and at the political sphere as well, to see what Europeans feel about Europe. In the project, we use the available public opinion polls as well as our own ECFR polls.

D (33:35)

What stood out most for you in that data?

E (33:37)

Mostly the fact that the trust in the EU is so strong is strongest since 2007, and also the fact that Europeans are increasingly looking at the EU as not just a market economic being, but as a political and strategic actor. I think that there is an appetite, not among the entire European public, but among an important plurality for a Europe that defends its values, its identity and dignity. And I feel that by accepting various humiliations, leaders risk losing that appetite among the European public, and that opportunity might not repeat itself again.

D (34:16)

But how do they win the culture war? How do they win the soft power back when they don't have the hard power?

E (34:21)

The war in Ukraine is the biggest litmus test. So if Europeans were to allow Ukraine to lose the war just because the US Support, for example, is no longer there, that would show that all that talk about Europe as a security and a geopolitical actor was nonsense. And perhaps European countries are not ready yet to replace America, and that's why we need to buy time. But still, European capitals and institutions should be very active in shaping the narrative about what the peace agreement should be about. They should be more assertive in those talks. And we could go from the security arena to the digital arena, where also the big question is whether European institutions and countries will be able to enforce the rules that they chose vis a vis the American tech giants, or are they going to simply compromise on the values which were the foundation of those regulations because they wouldn't want to provoke Donald Trump too much?

D (35:26)

All right. Well, Pawel, thank you so much for joining us today.

E (35:29)

Thanks a lot for having me, and see you soon.

D (35:34)

Okay, that's it from us this week. If you haven't already, please press that follow button on your favorite podcast app, Rate us and leave a comment or send us an email at podcastolitico EU thanks to Diana Sturris, our senior audience producer, and to Abigail Frison, our new trainee. And to Anne McAvoy, POLITICO's head of audio. I'm Sarah Wheaton. See you next week.