
When Europe’s biggest political family crosses the aisle to vote with the far right, something fundamental shifts in Brussels.
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Official Brussels has spent the past year and a half telling itself a reassuring story. Yes, yes, the far right surged in last year's European election, historically so. But the numbers still allowed Ursula von der Leyen to declare that the center is holding. There remains a majority in the center for Strong Europe. In other words, the center is holding. The belief was that a broad pro European coalition, the European People's Party, Socialists Renew and Greens, would keep running the show. But the cracks showed up early. The EPP flirted with the far right on a few files, hinted at cooperation on others. And then last week in the vote on the omnibus simplification package, the shift wasn't subtle anymore. The far right firewall didn't bend, it crumbled. The EPP looked to its left, didn't get what it wanted, turned to its right and passed a major piece of legislation with hard right and far right support. And suddenly the far right wasn't just louder, it was better prepared, more disciplined, more coordinated, sharper suits, cleaner haircuts. A far right block that suddenly looks confident and effective in the hem. So what happens when the far right quits the role of protest movement and starts competing for real power? And what does it do to Europe's centrist coalition when its largest party decides? The old no go zones are not so off limits anymore. And if this is the new normal in Brussels, what does that mean for ruling mainstream parties around the continent that are already on shaky ground? Sarah? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of EU Confidential. Later in the episode, we'll head to Denmark, where this week's local elections delivered a very different kind of political shock. A left of center government found itself punished by its own voters in Copenhagen, who instead wanted to go even more to the left. It's a counter trend worth watching. But first, Brussels, the far right and the moment Europe's political center realized that holding might no longer be enough. I'm joined here in the studio by Marianne Gros, our sustainability reporter, Max Guerrera, our European Parliament expert, dialing in from Place Luxembourg and via Zoom in London by Tim Ross, our chief political correspondent. So, Marianne, last week's vote on the so called omnibus package showed the Parliament's far right firewall cracking and maybe even collapsing. We saw the center right EPP teaming up with the far right, while most of the centrist MEPs opposed the package. So before we get into the politics, can you just remind us what this omnibus is actually about?
B
Yeah, sure. The Sustainability omnibus is a package of laws aimed at reviewing environmental regulation for companies. The Commission would like to cut red tape and simplify these rules and broadly speaking, reduce the number of companies that would be legally obliged to report on their carbon emissions and other environmental impacts.
A
And so politically, how did we get to this breaking point? Back in late October, there was a centrist compromise on this file on the table, and then a secret ballot blew it all up. What happened?
B
Yeah, indeed. So the epp, the centre right in the European Parliament, led the negotiations on this file and had managed to secure a deal with the Socialists as well as the Liberals and to some extent the Greens on a version of these laws that rolled them back, but was a version of simplification that everyone could get along with. In parallel to that, the EPB had also reached an agreement with groups from the far right on a different version that rolled these laws back even more and sort of threatened to use that package should the Socialists and Renew decide to vote against this deal that they had designed. In the end, because the far right requested the vote to to be a secret ballot, there was enough members from the Socialist side who voted against the deal, and that meant that the file did not get enough support in plenary to pass on to this next step. And so we were sort of back to the drawing board and that's why there was a second vote.
A
And. Yeah, and so once that October vote failed, the EPP faced a choice. Try to rebuild the centrist alliance or turn to the right. They chose the latter, passing the omnibus with far right support, and that effectively ended what we call the cordon sanitaire in the European Parliament. Max, what were the immediate reactions?
C
Well, the reactions were mixed. Right. On the one hand, you had Liberal, Socialist, Greens, they were outraged. They were really sad that this has actually happened because it was the first time that such an important legislative file had passed with the right wing majority. I remember I was outside the hemicycle and before the vote happened, Rappassi and Warborne, they were the lead negotiators. They were coming out of the room and they were having a little chat, right? And I saw how they shook hands and then I asked them like, oh, what's going on? Was there a deal? And then Rapassi later on said no. That was in fact the sign that there's no more negotiations ongoing and that they will go to the far right. And it was then that he said, look, this is reminding me of what happened during the Weimar Republic in Germany when the conservatives teamed up with the Nazis and that's what led to the rise of Adolf Hitler. Right. He said it in those so this is sort of the gloomy picture that the Socialists were giving. The Greens were also outraged. We have the co chair of the Greens, Terry Reinke, saying that this is a shitty day.
A
Well, it's a shitty sign for pro European majorities. It's a shitty sign for Europe. It's a shitty sign for the fight against climate change and child labor protection.
B
This is a very, very bad signal.
A
For the cooperation for the next four years.
C
But then on the other hand, you have the Patriots cheering Right. They consider this day was finally the day they managed to leverage their influence in the European Parliament. I had the chance to have a chat with Jordan Bardella, the chair of the Patriots, after the vote. He was really happy. He was saying how, you know, like, this is the result of months of hard work and of their increased presence in the hemicycle.
A
And that's a great point that we're going to delve into a little bit more later about how the right is really getting better at working the levers of power. But before we do that, Tim, you went to a very different frontline. You went to Jwig, which is a small seaside town in England. Why go there? And what does Jwick tell us about British and European politics?
D
So Jwick is a fascinating place. It's actually the most disadvantaged, the most deprived little area neighbourhood in the whole of England. And it is right in Nigel Farage's new constituency. He was elected as a member of Parliament in the UK last year for the first time. He tried seven times previously and failed every one of those times, but got elected finally last year to represent this area. And what fascinated me about it was really talking to people there in the local pub, walking their dogs along the beachfront about why they were sympathetic to Farage, why they liked him, why they felt that he was the answer really to a lot of the problems they face in terms of economics and the sort of cost of living issues they're struggling with, but also migration, crucially, and racial integration. Nobody there I spoke to was unfriendly. They were a very sociable, welcoming bunch of people I met. And quite a few of them, I have to say, they had pretty strong and pretty racist views. Some of them even were very willing to admit that their opinions were basically racist and they used that word when they were talking to me. And I think it's a real lesson on how it comes to be that a lot of places like JWIC that are remote, economically remote geographically as well, from the big cities where all the power is and where all the Decisions are taken are now moving in the direction of supporting right wing, far right, hard right political parties like Nigel Faroese. And I think that's true in the UK as well as in Germany and France and lots of other parts of Europe too.
A
Well, for now we are also still seeing centrists win elections. Looking at the Netherlands, Romania so far, the uk how do you reconcile that?
D
Well, I'd say watch out, because if you're a centrist, you might well remember von der Leyen's words from the summer of 2024, right after the European Parliament elections when she said there's still a majority in the centre for a strong European. In other words, and this is her quote, the centre is holding. Now, we've just been talking about exactly what's going on in the European Parliament where the centre looks like it's doing anything but hold as she takes on board the votes of the far right groups there. And I think you can say look at what else is happening. You mentioned the Netherlands and of course Rob Jetton won that election, but actually Wilders with his far right Freedom Party got the same number of seats. So he's not faded away at all. In fact, it might well suit him to spend a bit of time on the sidelines where he's unconstrained by needing to govern the Netherlands and can say what he likes and be as inflammatory and anti Islam as he always has been.
A
And Marianne, you know, we heard Tim talk about the frustration in places that are kind of disconnected from power centers. Certainly a lot of anxiety about the economy. How much of that mood is showing up in debates around simplification and competitiveness.
B
Oh, I'd say it's pretty central to that conversation for sure. The simplification agenda has become a cornerstone of Wonderland's second mandate. I think she's threading the needle between going far enough to respond to the criticism that she's received from other EU countries and from lawmakers from all sides of the political spectrum, whilst also sticking to some of her core objectives and legacy from her first mandate, which is mainly the European green deal, this massive package of environmental laws that she helped craft and is now helping undo. And I think that we can tell in the way that the EPP talks about this topic, that itself trying to make sure that it remains the voice of simplification and red tape cutting so that that campaign doesn't fall within the hands of the far right as well. You know, it's also trying to hold to maybe not the center as we know it with the centrists and the Socialists, but at least as the biggest and most powerful political group in the European Parliament.
A
And Tim, you argue that the far right isn't just rising, but it's also getting more professional. What does that mean in practice?
D
Well, I've had some great help on this piece I'm putting together from Max and Marianne, so thank you both for your contributions, but among other things, and Max can probably tell you a bit more about this, but we've seen in the European Parliament that the Patriots and others have got organised. They've got a whipping operation now. They are vetting their candidates more than they used to, so that, you know, some of the wilder potential MEPs in those groups are not allowed in. But elsewhere in Europe, you just have to look at Germany, where the AFD has been trying to clean its own house as well, and distance itself from Moscow. And then in France too, Marine Le Pen actually has been at this for a while, trying to make sure that the National Rally Party actually is a more palatable prospect for mainstream voters. And she had a strategy after her party won big in 2022 of making sure they all adopted the right kind of dress code. And that meant wearing a suit and wearing a tie. And this was called the cravat strategy, I think the tie strategy. And a similar kind of picture of people looking slick, taking to TikTok, improving their images. Fewer drunken lunches, in the case of some people in Reform uk. Nigel Farage always liked a long lunch and he's doing fewer of those these days too. So it's a general cleaning up of the IM and also getting serious about parliamentary and political tactics.
A
Yeah, and this is kind of a tangent, but it just made me think of this idea, it's more of an American idea of respectability politics as being practiced by black Americans, especially during the civil rights movement. You'd see people go and participate in a protest, expect to get arrested, but just always be like impeccably dressed in a perfect suit, making sure to speak in kind of very high level English. I mean, it does seem like a way for groups that have been marginalized, whether politically or due to, to racism, to force the kind of majority to reckon with their ideas rather than be distracted by other differences.
D
Yeah, and I think one line comes to mind actually, from Tom Van Glieken, the far right Flemish interest party leader in Belgium, who told us a little while ago that his rule was to be quotes radical but not trashy. And that's kind of the point, if you're a plausible vehicle for a Radical message. You might well win.
A
Yeah. And Marianne Max, as Tim said, you were kind of helping him understand how this is looking like in the European Parliament. What else have you observed in Brussels as far as these parties kind of professionalizing?
C
So as Tim was saying, indeed they've professionalized. They now have, for example, communications and press departments. Last term they didn't even have a spokesperson. So now they have increased their press game. They have a whipping operation. However, what I think was the key move that a lot of people in the bubble considered as, okay, this is proof that now the Patriots, our players, was indeed the secret vote. Right. They use this secret vote option to make the whole deal on the omnibus fall apart, which is what ultimately led to EPP voting with them. So this is the sort of, sort of master move that only people that really understand the rules of procedure and the games within the House can use properly, which is a game that all the political groups in this house, especially the center, uses. Right. But I guess until now, the Patriots were not fully, fully part of the game.
B
They're also coming up with ideas on big files. That isn't only to just oppose the files altogether or reject a commission proposal altogether. They are considering what the Commission is proposing, coming up with amendments that are technical. So I also think that shows that they're really more sophisticated than they used to be. They're no longer positioning themselves just as the opposition.
A
Yeah. Instead of just screaming, they're trying to actually influence policy. What other files are on the radar where this could come into play?
C
So, of course, this sort of rounding majority has its limits because the far right has always sought to sort of deregulate and, let's say, destroy a bit this EU integration idea that the centrist parties are pushing for. So, for example, on topics like MFF on the EU budget, it couldn't happen. Where it can happen, however, is in further deregulation efforts in other omnibuses. Also, in terms of migration, we have a couple of files in the Parliament to beef up the deportations machinery of the bloc. We also see it in terms of the combustion engine ban. The Commission soon will propose to revise this ban and the EPP wants to completely cancel it, while the center left wants to just maybe water it down a bit. And of course, the EPP has the majority with the far right and the right wing to reverse this ban. And what they say is, look, if we can get our objectives with votes from the far right, what we work on is content, not ideology. So we're going to put our position on the table. And if they vote for it, so be it. So that's their argument, while the argument of the center left is, look, but we have a coalition, we're working together. So, yes, sure, we will get close to your position, but you also need to give us something. But of course, this position in which DPP can go either to the right or to the center, has led them to say, look, well, we want what we want, and we're going to get it with you or with the others, we don't care, but we're not going to give concessions.
A
And Mariana, how are these sideline centrists preparing to react? Renee Rapazi told me before this all happened that they won't stay silent if the EPP keeps on working with the far right. Are motions of censure an option?
B
The Socialists have always publicly said that this cannot go on, that it's outrageous. They've always called on the EPP to come back to work with the coalition in the center. The parties that supported von der Leyen and the Socialists are not the only ones to say it. We've heard Renew MEPs say it as well. We've heard the Greens take on that kind of discourse as well, and yet it keeps happening. So I think they're also in a very difficult position where they want to hold on to power and they want to make sure they're still in the loop in some of the future big files that are coming up that Max was mentioning. I'm sure that a motion of censor against von der Leyen is possible, but whether or not they have enough support for that kind of motion in Parliament is always a little bit less clear.
A
And, Tim, does the EPP's shift in Brussels mirror what national leaders are doing and does it work?
D
I think it certainly mirrors what national leaders are doing. I think the question about sentient emotions and how the Socialists and Democrats respond is absolutely key, because what you can see is a real dilemma, really, for centrists and for the left. And in some ways, the rise of the radical right is also radicalizing the left. Look at some of the success that you've seen in New York. I mean, Mandani's win in the New York mayoral race. Look at what's going on. Also in the uk, we've got a new Green Party leader who is to the left of Labour, who styles himself as an eco populist, and he's gone right up in the polls and is now within nudging distance even of Keir Starmer's Labour Party, which is doing Terribly badly. But I think actually the question of whether the sort of Epps move and whether that sort of adoption of far right themes and far right political priorities on migration, on climate rules and things, whether that's going to work is a real risk. It's certainly not clear that by trying to take on some of those policies, centrist parties are able to neutralise the threat. And if you look at what happened at the previous Dutch election a couple of years ago, when Mark Ruttes old party again tried to adopt some of the language of the far right on Microsoft, Gration and others, people didn't vote for that party. They voted for Wilders in big, big numbers, because as the phrase always has it, they didn't vote for the copy, they voted for the original. And I think you need to be convincing. And the most convincing people on those kind of issues are inevitably the people who have made them their own, and those are the far right parties.
C
I just wanted to add something to what Marianne had to say on whether the SMD will do something or not. Also, Tim brought that up, that what the Socialists do is key. Right. And I think it's true that we've seen a lot of threat from S and D in the last year. In the end, empty threats. So the question now is what will be the answer they give to this omnibus? They still haven't come up with an actual answer, an actual sort of measure, some sort of revenge. They haven't issued that yet. But what I think will happen is that nothing will happen. There's no way out of this. The nuclear option S and D has is to bring down the commission. But of course they wouldn't do that. Bringing down the commission would mean an unprecedented crisis in Europe. So the only option left for S and D, which is what I think will, is that they'll just have to swallow it. They'll have to come to terms with the fact that whenever EPP wants, they'll be able to pass laws with the right wing.
A
Yeah, well, to quote Barack Obama from a long time ago, elections have consequences and we are seeing that play out. Max, Marion, Tim, thank you so much for joining me.
B
Thanks for having us.
D
Thank you.
C
Thanks.
A
Okay, we need to take a quick break. When we come back, I'll be joined by my colleague Aitor Hernandez Morales, who's been covering the local elections in Denmark. Now, we don't often dive into local races on EU Confidential, but this one also seems to matter outside of Denmark. It shows a counter trend to some of the things we've just talked about. Stay with us.
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Okay, and now my conversation with senior reporter Itura Hernandez Morales. Itur earlier in the episode we talked about far right strength across Europe in parliaments and national polls, in public mood. But Denmark offers a counter trend. A left leaning government that moved sharply right on migration is now being punished for it. This week's local elections delivered a political earthquake. We saw governing Social Democrats lose Copenhagen the first time in over 120 years. Walk us through the results.
E
It was basically a thumping for Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. Social Democrats. What we saw was that the party, despite remaining the most popular political group and securing around 23% of all votes that were forecast, lost support in 87 of Denmark's 98 municipalities. And that's a big problem for them because it is a party that historically has been a center left party. It's been very, very strong in the cities. That's where their voting base has historically been. And meanwhile in major urban centers, what we've seen is the Social Democrats punish for being excessively centrist and support going over to far left groups like the Socialists and the Red Green Alliance.
A
So Copenhagen and other big cities, as you said, turned sharply against the Social Democrats. What drove the revolt?
E
Yeah, so it was really brutal because Copenhagen has always kind of been the crown jewel for the Social Democrats. And over the past century, it was a marriage that made sense. The party represented the blue collar workers that worked in what was then a bustling port city. But the reality is that Copenhagen is a very different place today. And that's partially due to the Social Democrats. They very correctly anticipated the decline of industrial activity that we've seen all over Europe. And in the late 1990s they began to invest on turning the Danish capital into this kind of glittering magnet for global companies, for urban professionals, for international students. The problem with that is that their voting base is made up of urban, unionized, blue collar and public sector workers. And you know, first and foremost, those people are disappearing across Europe as well. That is very much an endangered community. And they're precisely the people who have been priced out of Copenhagen as the city has become much more expensive because of the new population that lives there.
A
But housing wasn't the whole story. The election also became a sort of referendum on Frederickson's national shift to the right on migration. What exactly did her government do that alienated these big city voters?
E
Yeah, so I mean, it's an interesting thing because obviously these are local elections, so local issues dominated the campaign. So housing was very much discussed and it's a big problem in places like Copenhagen where prices have gone up by 20% over the past year. But you're absolutely right that lying behind it, and again, in a city like Copenhagen, it was obvious simply because the Social Democrats have been so dominant. Well, it was really this referendum on the national government and on Frederiksen herself with regards to migration. Basically, Fredriksen has made this a pillar of her leadership in the Social Democrats. She's really tried to respond to what we've seen with the far right groups that have grown across Europe campaigning on migration. She's responded to it by leaning in and by essentially taking an even harder stance in some cases. So to give you an idea, what we've seen in terms of the shifting policies is a limit on the duration of residence permits for refugees. They're now limited to two years. They've also toughened rules for refugees to be joined by family members. And there are new restrictions on access to social benefits. And then really controversially in cities, Frederickson has made clear that she considers areas where over 50% of residents are from non western backgrounds to be a problem. And she's really targeted them. And a law has been passed whereby the state can sell off or even demolish homes in that area. So that's been very controversial and it's been very problematic in urban centers where there is a huge immigrant population. In Copenhagen it's up to 20%. But in surrounding communities, 48% of the electorate has a non native Danish background. We actually saw Social Democratic mayors complaining about this in these areas and saying that the problem wasn't necessarily the policies. There's broad support in Denmark for trying to control the flow of migration into the country, but rather the harsh tone that was taken that honestly bordered on Demonization in some cases.
A
But meanwhile, you know, Social Democrats argue that their tough line on migration has kept the far right at bay nationally. But in these elections, they didn't lose to the far right. They lost to the left. So how do we read that?
E
Yeah, it's a really fascinating situation because the only parts of the country where we saw the far right grow were actually in rural regions in Jutland. So, for example, in Friedrichshaven, you saw the far right Danish Democrats gain up to 10% of the vote. In Lolland, the far right ended up performing so well that they won more seats than they had candidates up for election. So they had to scramble to find someone to take that spot. But in urban centers, what we saw was actually this trend toward the far left. And what we're seeing there are people who historically would have voted for the Social Democrats, but are increasingly considering that the party no longer represents them. And so they are going for groups like the Socialists, which performed spectacularly in this election, and for the Red Green alliance, which has correctly identified that one of these bridging issues in these urban centers that are pretty prosperous is actually the climate and the environment. And so the Red Green alliance, for example, focused a lot on. On issues like parking and limiting car access into Copenhagen, or the very controversial Le Neterholm project, which is this massive artificial island they're building in Copenhagen to try to control flooding and provide more housing. This was a signature policy of the current government. And just this month a report came out revealing that it's actually leaking cyanide into the port. It's really becoming an environmental disaster for the government. And the Red Green alliance really was able to campaign on this issue.
A
Yeah, I mean, this is reminding me of a bit the coalition that elected Mamdani in New York. A combination of, like, probably limousine lefties, rich yuppies who care about the climate, and communities with an immigrant background.
E
So it's exactly that. It's a really remarkable situation that at the same time that Copenhagen has become richer, it's also become much more leftist. I definitely think one thing that Social Democratic parties across Europe are going to focus on, as they did with the Mamdani win, is that the far left parties that have performed well are focusing on kitchen table issues. And the issue with the Social Democrats is that in places like Copenhagen, they were in power for so long that they were essentially trying to campaign against their own record, whereas these parties are coming in fresh and they really are trying to tackle the issues that are making life more difficult.
A
Okay, so how's Frederickson reacting to this. I mean, a general election where she will actually be on the hook is due within a year. She must be sweating.
E
Well, I mean, it's an interesting situation. Fredriksen did take responsibility for the debacle. She promised to really look into what was driving the discontent. But the fact of the matter is that when you talk to experts in Denmark, they point out that she really is the only charismatic politician in the country and that she probably will remain prime minister after the next elections. The real question is how she will remain prime minister. Will she enter into a coalition with leftist parties now? And it'll also be interesting to see if she backs down from any of her signature policies in the coming months.
A
And then to kind of channel what the Brussels reaction is. I think everybody's pretty shocked because Fredrickson had just been treated as like, this prophet, especially when it came to the politics of migration. Many centrists have started embracing her hardline approach. And, you know, she was very publicly teaming up with Georgia Maloney on FM to make deportation easier. Do you see this causing any second guessing among other social Democratic and centrist parties around the bloc?
E
I think there's definitely going to be temptation within the party of European Socialists to look at this defeat and look at the only two prominent Social Democratic leaders in Europe right now who are Prime Minister Emette Frederikson in Denmark and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in Spain. Pedro Sanchez is kind of the mirror opposite. He really has leaned toward the left. He welcomes migrants. He's really leaned into these issues and pushed back, for example, against a hawkish position on defense. And there are certainly going to be people who are going to say, well, maybe that's the route forward. That said, Santis has plenty of problems in Spain, so I'm not sure we can really point to him as the panacea and all these things. But I think that it is worth noting that one of the things that has been driving the far right's growth across Europe has been precisely that they've been addressing the problems that people are feeling at home. And I think that these elections in Denmark really reinforce that idea of we need to focus on the kitchen table issues. We need to focus on the things that are bothering people at home. Ultimately, that's what they're voting on. And I would also add that, ironically, perhaps it's because Frederickson's policies on migration have been so effective that migration has become less of an issue for anyone who is not directly affected by them. So at that point, they do turn to things, things like housing, and they get very upset when the government isn't doing anything to address it.
A
Thanks to ITOR for that. And that's it from us this week. Please remember to follow EU Confidential wherever you get your podcasts. Rate us, leave a comment or send us a note at Podcast Politico EU thanks to Diana Sturris, our senior audio producer, and to Anne McAvoy, POLITICO's head of audio. I'm Sarah Wheaton, and next week I'm hoping to be dancing at a family wedding in Florida. Nick Vinicker will guest host.
Episode Date: November 21, 2025
Host: Sarah Wheaton (POLITICO Chief Policy Correspondent)
Panelists: Marianne Gros (Sustainability Reporter), Max Guerrera (European Parliament Expert), Tim Ross (Chief Political Correspondent, London)
Special Report: Aitor Hernandez Morales (Denmark local elections)
This episode of EU Confidential investigates the dramatic crumbling of the “cordon sanitaire” in the European Parliament, as the center-right EPP joined forces with the far right to pass a major law. The panel analyzes what happens when the far right shifts from protest to real power, the collapse (or recalibration) of traditional centrist coalitions in Brussels, and how these parliamentary shifts are mirrored – or contradicted – in national and local elections elsewhere in Europe. A special segment explores Denmark’s local elections, a counter-trend where Social Democrats lost to the left after adopting tougher migration policies.
Ursula von der Leyen’s “the center is holding” mantra is scrutinized as both national and European politics shift rightward (08:37–09:49).
EPP tries to absorb far right demands on issues like deregulation, migration, deportation, and rollback of Green Deal policies (09:49–14:48).
Traditional coalitions look increasingly fragile, with leftwing parties warning of consequences.
Mainstream parties risk electoral disaster by mimicking far right stances (“Don’t vote for the copy, vote for the original.”), as illustrated by the Dutch experience (17:25–18:56).
Counter trend: In sharp contrast to Brussels, Denmark’s urban voters punish the Social Democrats for their rightward shift on migration — losing Copenhagen for the first time in 120 years (21:21–22:33).
The Social Democrats remain the largest party overall but hemorrhage votes in urban areas to the far left: Socialists and the Red Green Alliance (22:33–23:35).
Local issues (housing), national policies (tough on refugees), and the party’s alienation from its traditional blue-collar base all drive the shift.
Highly controversial: Laws enabling demolition or sale of housing in non-Western majority neighborhoods (23:47).
Environment: Red Green Alliance boosts support by campaigning on failed government projects, like the toxic artificial island (27:00).
The episode captures an EU at an inflection point: the far right is not only louder but savvier, effectively undercutting the center by playing the rules of the parliamentary game. Meanwhile, governments that adopt hardline migration policies in hopes of neutralizing the right may find themselves deserted by their own left-leaning base, as seen in Denmark. The panelists maintain a tone of realism with flashes of dark humor and historical parallels, emphasizing that both sides of the political spectrum are recalibrating — and that “the center holding” may soon be a thing of the past.
For anyone looking to understand Europe’s current political earthquake—from Brussels procedural intrigue to Copenhagen’s surprising leftward lurch—this episode delivers sharp analysis, candid quotes, and a cross-continental perspective.