Veronika Melkozyrova (4:48)

Well, it's pretty challenging, but interesting in a way. I need to basically plan my day according to the schedule that the authorities sent every Ukrainian power cut schedule because we have limited energy and power supply because of Russian shelling. Of course it's stressful, but when shelling happens, that's even more stressful. You have to sleep in the corridor, on the floor or in a shelter. That's my life now.

Nick Vinicour (5:20)

When was the last time you had to sleep in a shelter or in a corridor?

Veronika Melkozyrova (5:25)

It was basically yesterday night because Russians massively attacked Ukrainian power grid and also now they're sending drones straight into civilian residential buildings and one of the drones hit an apartment building which is next to the building where my mother in law lives. So I would say the war is getting closer and closer to me and.

Nick Vinicour (5:51)

Despite these conditions, you're still working with us like one of our everyday colleagues and we're following the peace negotiations. I just want you to get get you to weigh in on the big story of the day, which is this leaked transcript of a call between Steve Witkoff and Ushakov Russian official, where Witkoff essentially appears to coach his Russian counterpart on how to deal with President Donald Trump. How is this going down in Kyiv?

Veronika Melkozyrova (6:26)

The reaction is quite different when we're talking about the politicians. They are trying to stay cautious because what Donald Trump taught us all is that when you're a Russian, you can do everything and he will still tolerate you. But when a Ukrainian and you say a little bit harsh or emotional word to him, he, he might cut all aid intelligence, he might do everything. So the politicians are pretty cautiously silent about it, while military activists, different watchdogs, journalists are pretty shocked. And at the same time they aren't because we sort of understood that Vidkov was pretty friendly towards Russians from the very beginning. So what is frustrating to us all is that Donald Trump protected Vit, didn't seem to see anything wrong, and the American citizen, he gave this crucial role to end the war in our country, actively helping the attacking side, while Ukraine needs to sort of find new and new ways to win back Donald Trump. Every round of these negotiations that we had so far. So yeah, it's not fair.

Nick Vinicour (7:44)

We think there's a lot of fast moving diplomacy. But what can we pull out of this that is clear compared to the original 28 point plan that included all kinds of concessions by the Ukrainian side? Are there any red lines that Kyiv has been able to impose, any problematic points in that original plan that we think Kyiv has now been able to get pulled out of there?

Veronika Melkozyrova (8:12)

Russians tried to push this framework through Trump as the peace plan that Ukrainians have to agree or else. But Ukrainians managed once again to get out of this Trump Russia trap in Geneva when they negotiated several points to be out of the plan. There are some issues that were sort of pushed out of the plan to the level of presidents because Zelensky keeps stating that giving any territory to Russia, especially the territory that Russia does not yet control and will take lots and lots of lives of Russian soldiers and lots of resources to take. That is a red line for Ukraine. Another red line is any kind of army limits. Because we understood from what we have heard from our European allies, from our American allies, that the best security guarantee that we can have is our own strong army. So limiting our almost 1 million army to 600,000 troops is another red line. And another thing is not letting Russia decide any of our political alliances such as European Union or NATO.

Nick Vinicour (9:32)

And seen from Kyiv, it's been presented as a US Russia negotiation. Do you have the impression that Europe is having any influence, influence on this process? Are they helping to establish these red lines? Do they have any weight we already.

Veronika Melkozyrova (9:48)

Joke here in Ukraine about that actually Russia and United States decide to decide for Europe and Ukraine. Ukraine protests, Europe wades in, Russia and that's again, again, again. So it's basically what happens now is that it seems for us that both Ukraine and Europe have been sidelined from the negotiations that basically deciding the fate of Ukraine and Europe, which makes Europe sort of seem the same kind of object, not subject of negotiations as of now. And while Ukraine still believes that Europe can be sort of like this spoiler of all the bad plans that US and Russia have for us, Europe cannot come up with strong influence tools on United States that could sort of stop it from this pendulum swing back and forth to Russia, then back to Ukraine, then to Russia and Europe and nobody can stop this as of now I think. So Europe must come up with some strong, strong decisions such as reparation loan, I think.

Nick Vinicour (11:01)

Is there a sense of frustration with Europe, the path to membership, the reparation loan, it is slow moving. Do Ukrainians understand, accept the way the EU moves or is there a sense of kind of little bit of irritation with Europe not being able to come to decisions faster?

Veronika Melkozyrova (11:20)

Of course there is an irritation. But at the same time we understand that Europe is doing everything it can. I mean they're even slower in the peace time. We know that, that Europe is highly bureaucratic. But at the same time we really still want to become part of Europe as we see that they don't have war there yet. But it seems to us that it's very convenient sometime times for European Union to hide behind this rogue states like Hungary or behind its own bureaucracy to sort of wait and see what happens instead of creating a real strategy. But in Ukraine we're here paying the highest price. And what we see is that we have to be perfect during war when we see countries like Hungary or Slovakia or others very far from being perfect, dictating us, stopping us on our level. And yeah, we, we cannot blame anyone because we do have our own corruption scandals even now, even in Zelensky's closest circle. But who doesn't have corruption? We are sometimes jealous because Russia has faster allies like North Korea for example, supplying weapons to it. And our allies who seem to be from the wealthiest part of the world, always have excuses, always have not enough votes, always have political problems and their dangerous.

Nick Vinicour (12:52)

When we're dying, you don't choose your family, as they say. You mentioned the reparation loan. You mentioned Europe's leverage on this process and the reparation loan, which let's recall is Based on frozen Russian assets being held here in Brussels at Euroclear. That is a big point of leverage that the EU could deploy here. And so far, Belgium is blocking it. I just wonder how that situation, how closely that's being followed in Kyiv and how you feel about it. Belgium is talking about fear of Russian retaliation, but you are experiencing Russian aggression every day. So how do you see Belgium's refusal so far?

Veronika Melkozyrova (13:36)

I think it's unfair. Yes, Russian retaliation will happen, possibly. But Belgium already has drones flying over its military bases and airports. And what we see there is, yes, it's fear. It's showing in Russia that its strategy of barrage in Ukraine, killing civilians without any retribution, without any punishment. This strategy of fear works on Europe. Europe sees what Russia can do in Ukraine. And instead of like in 2022, making some bold decisions to help the country to unite for Ukraine, Europe is now divided and scared instead of coming to help Ukraine to finish the job. So the frustration is there, but it's also hope because we, I see that in national polls. I see it on the streets, deep, deep disappointment in United States because we had like this image that United States is a big guy who has big guns and is good, democratic and he will come and save us with a big gun. Sort of like this. What we saw as a pretty Greek big guy who can just throw away all of its democratic values just in the click of a finger and just tell you that you no longer matter. You're not the country of interest. So pay us money or bye bye. So, yes, Europe is our frustration, but also our only hope that we still have.

Nick Vinicour (15:17)

Thank you so much. Veronica reporting from the midst of a power cut in Kyiv. Thanks so much for joining us, Veronica.

Veronika Melkozyrova (15:27)

Thank you.

Nick Vinicour (15:30)

Okay, we need to take a quick break now. When we come back, we'll go behind the scenes on the big story in Brussels this week, which is the reparation loan for Ukraine and why Belgium is still blocking it. Stay with us for that.

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Bjarka Smith Meyer (16:21)

Hi, I'm here to pick up my son, Milo. There's no Milo here who picked up my son from school streaming Only on Peacock.

Wouter Vershelden (16:31)

I'm gonna need the name of everyone.

Nick Vinicour (16:32)

That could have a connection.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (16:34)

You don't understand.

Veronika Melkozyrova (16:34)

It was just the five of us.

Apple Watch Narrator (16:36)

So this was all planned.

Veronika Melkozyrova (16:37)

What are you gonna do? I will do whatever it takes to get my son back.

Nick Vinicour (16:42)

I honestly didn't see this coming.

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These n killing each other.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (16:46)

All her fault. A new series streaming now only on Peacock.

Nick Vinicour (16:55)

Now I'm joined by Wouter Vershelden, Author of the W16 Daily Newsletter on Belgian politics, and Bjarka Smith Meyer, our very own finance reporter who's been following this story more closely than anyone else. Bjarka, we were just with Veronika just now, talking about the mood in Kyiv and their sort of reliance on Europe to finally put some leverage to weigh on this peace plan. And the biggest piece of leverage seems to be the reparations loan. Can you just tell us a little bit about what we're talking about, how the loan would actually work, as in.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (17:35)

The financial engineering behind this bad boy?

Nick Vinicour (17:38)

Just the Cliff Notes, the TLDR version.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (17:41)

Okay, so the reparations loan, which is kind of earmarked for about 140 billion, is made up of the cash value of frozen Russian state assets. Now, I have to say cash value, because these assets, I promise I'm not going to get into the absolute specifics, but these assets are largely bonds, which by now have matured into cash. So we're effectively talking about sanctioned cash. And the general argument within the Commission is why are we just letting this money sit there when we could actually be using it to finance Ukraine's defense? Now, the way that that works is that eurclear, which is the financial depository, which basically is the guardian of this money, they would effectively issue a loan to the eu, which eventually they would have to repay, and that loan would then basically be sent on to Kyiv.

Nick Vinicour (18:37)

Yeah. To be super clear, would the assets themselves be seized, at least temporarily?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (18:43)

No. I mean, it depends on what legal scholar you ask about this. But generally speaking, the argument is that because we're talking about, at the end of the day, a loan from Euroclear to the eu, then the assets are not seized. And that's a very important distinction that the Commission is making in order to make sure that the world and all these international investors and other governments that want to invest in Europe don't feel threatened with their own investments.

Nick Vinicour (19:10)

Right. That's a pretty hard distinction. In any case, very briefly, why is this money so crucial for Ukraine at the moment?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (19:18)

I'd say probably it's crucial on both sides The European side and the Ukrainian side. On the Ukrainian side, it's as simple as it's running out of money. Basically by April, it's really going to need a fresh injection of funds if it's going to keep the lights on without having to make cuts elsewhere. From the European side of things, they need this money, this sanctioned Russian money, because they've kind of run out of it. Europe is hugely indebted after a very intense pandemic where governments were spending crazy amounts of money to keep their economies afloat when there were lockdowns. And so they don't have that much money to sit there and splash around. So why use your own when you can use the enemy's?

Nick Vinicour (20:00)

And now bring it all back to Belgium, because this is where it's all happening. We were awaiting a green light on this loan. In October, we had the President of the European Council announce we had a political deal. And then Prime Minister Barto Weber said, no, that's actually not what I want to do at all. So, Wouter, could you walk us through his thinking? The Belgian position, The main reason why.

Wouter Vershelden (20:27)

The waiver objected, the whole structure, was not so much because they're against loaning Ukraine. On the contrary, they want to support the war. But they're very worried about the exposure legally and obviously at the end, financially, because the whole explanation that Bjork gave about the structuring of the loan is obviously backed by a collateral, which is the assets itself, because Euroclear can't loan 140 billion if they don't have something to show for, which is the money that is frozen. And that's where the concerns of the Belgian government start. The whole assumption of the loan and the repayment by Ukraine is obviously that Russia, at the end of the day, will do installments as a compensation for all the damage done in the war. But this is an assumption the Belgians are saying that you can't take for granted. It's hard to see how Russia at some point will be forced to do billions of repayment for Ukraine. And that's the whole underlying problem here.

Nick Vinicour (21:20)

But just to drill down into it, what is the specific fear that Russia would sue Belgium, but sue them where? In what court?

Wouter Vershelden (21:29)

Well, there's obviously, that's the irony of international politics. In the 90s, Belgium signed a trade treaty, actually with the former Soviet Union, that then Republic of Russia, making sure that foreign investments, AKA Belgian investments in Russia, would be protected. But that obviously goes two ways. So now Russia, from a legal, international legal point of view, does have a Stick, they can attack Belgium in international courts. So you have an aspect where, from legal analysis within the Belgian government, they would actually have a serious chance of winning that. Secondly, they're threatening Belgian companies and Belgian assets in Russia.

Nick Vinicour (22:08)

So Belgium has not divested from Russia.

Wouter Vershelden (22:11)

Well, some of the investments are there for decades, I'd say. One example is AB InBev, one of the biggest brewers in the world, or maybe the biggest. Obviously they have production sites in Russia still, and there's a lot more. It's not just that they're afraid of what's in Russia. It's also countries like China or others that would, from a legal perspective on international law, be bind if Belgium would lose this case. You can have debates on whether the risk, the legal risk is real or not. The question that Belgium posed at the last European summit was, can we share that risk? Can we at least make sure that all the EU states, the 27, are involved and not just us? And that I think, from a political perspective, was accepted by the other leaders. They said, okay, it's fine. The real issue is how can you underpin it now? Can you do it just by saying, in the European Council, we agree, we will back you? Because the next step is if national parliaments wouldn't go so far. I mean, there's not a treaty, there's not something sealed and locked in. It's flimsy, to say the least for Bell.

Nick Vinicour (23:11)

So let's go back to Bjarke on that. This is a question that Belgium's asked from the beginning. What guarantees does it get from other EU states?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (23:19)

I think one thing we should also point out is, I mean, the Commission's take is that the legal risk is very limited. What does create some concern about this bilateral investment treaty from 1989 is the fact that there is a oligarch who is suing Luxembourg 15 billion under this treaty for having his assets frozen. But that is private, that is not state. And that's an important distinction which constantly comes up in this arena of the EU bubble. The thing that the Belgians obviously want, they want to make sure that there's some type of insurance policy, that they're not left holding the bill, the legal bill, if Russia do come and successfully sue them, whether that's then in a Russian court or whether it's through international arbitration or a European court, whatever. But the way that they're suggesting that we do this is that every country comes up with some kind of a financial guarantee which would only be triggered if Belgium or Euroclear need to pay out immediately. Now, generally speaking, if you share the load, that makes it somewhat acceptable. The question is, how quickly can you get these guarantees to pay out? Normally, that takes a little bit of time. That's a big sticking point. Then the other side of it is, if these guarantees are triggered, do they immediately count towards the debt piles of some countries that are hugely indebted? The answer is yes. So, for instance, if France, which is hugely indebted, or Italy or Greece, if their guarantees were triggered, then their debt piles would increase as well. And that's a look that they don't want to have.

Nick Vinicour (24:55)

These countries offered formal financial guarantees to Belgium that they would back them up financially. Have they said that? Is there a document or.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (25:05)

You can always accuse countries of lip service. At the end of the day, we don't have a legal text in order to stand on. So right now you have the general political reassurances that EU leaders give. And yes, generally speaking, everyone's game. It wouldn't exactly be solidarity at EU level if you were to sit there and go like, no, unless you're Hungary, who actually has said that they wouldn't do that. Slovakia have also said that they probably wouldn't do that either. So you do have a couple of outliers. But generally speaking, throughout the rest of the European Union, there is support for this.

Nick Vinicour (25:36)

They've just said that they would do it. I spoke to the Swedish foreign minister last week and she said, yes, absolutely, we will back up Belgium, but we're waiting for a legal proposal from the European Commission to formalize that, and it hasn't come yet. Obviously, this whole debate about the Russian assets is colliding with discussions about the Belgian budget, which was just sealed this week. And I wonder, Wouter, if you can tell us whether it has factored into those talks the idea that we'd potentially be seizing a large amount of assets at a time when, well, the Prime Minister is asking Belgians to make cuts and to cut back on public spending.

Wouter Vershelden (26:15)

Right. So for stars, I think there's a general consensus in Belgian politics that. That we should protect Belgian interests here, even if that means you have to be a little bit the bad boy in the European room. That's fine. The funny thing is he's been trying to build alliances in Europe. Macron was the big ally up to, I'd say, last week, where he would protect the Belgian point of view of. The Germans were more pushing. Once the French signed a deal to sell about 100 new Rafales in Ukraine, Macron all of a sudden shifted positions and started to push for loans for Ukraine to actually pay for his own planes, I would guess. That said, we have to get into the nitty gritty details again. So the 190 billion frozen in Belgian accounts with Euroclear has given Belgium a certain windfall profit in terms of taxes, because the 190 a year that is frozen has some revenue, let's say 6,7 billion a year. And from that, obviously, you have just company taxes that are levied about 25%, which means about 1.2, 1.5 billion a year. Additionally, for tax revenue in Belgium, which is a lot of money for the Belgian state, if the money somehow goes away, you can't obviously tax it anymore. There's no profit anymore. So it's another element in the quest for billions for the Belgian government to balance the budget. Every euro counts. This is an element in the whole discussion, obviously.

Nick Vinicour (27:38)

I think it's a really important point you just made, that the assets are creating revenue for Belgium.

Wouter Vershelden (27:43)

Exactly.

Nick Vinicour (27:44)

This is not something they put forward. And you can say, well, that tax revenue might be funding Belgium's contribution to Ukraine, but even so, if you take it away, it's going to create pressure elsewhere. So that is a factor and they.

Wouter Vershelden (27:58)

Don'T like to hear it. It was mentioned, I think, on the last press conference after the EU summit, and the waiver really pushed back heavily, said, you know, we're not free riders. But it's a clear fact that the 1.2, 1.5 billion every year they've been saying, the Belgian government has been saying ever since the beginning, the entire sum goes directly to Ukraine. But even if that wouldn't be the case, Belgium would have had to do their share, which is about the same amount.

Nick Vinicour (28:23)

So beyond the hook. Right.

Wouter Vershelden (28:24)

It's a bit potato patata, but at the end of the day, it would be fair to say that Belgium has been profiting from the whole Euroclear situation up till now. And the funny thing is, the Belgian Prime Minister referred to it, saying, it's the goose with the golden axe that we're gonna slaughter now. But the goose has so far delivered, really, for Belgium.

Nick Vinicour (28:43)

That's probably too honest when he said that. You watched the Prime Minister present the budget this week, finally arrive at this. Did this come up?

Wouter Vershelden (28:53)

No, it's not something he would speak about out loud. That said, it's constantly on his mind. If you talk about them, if you talk about this administration, the Belgians and what they're focused. It is only this. They need to get this sorted out. So guarantees from European countries would be great, but I think deep down they would hope for the end of the war and get this whole mess over with before loans are granted and the money just goes away.

Nick Vinicour (29:18)

Yeah, that's really interesting. Brings us back to Bjarka. Some people in Europe are saying, well, if we can achieve a peace deal, then we don't have to worry about these assets anymore. Would that be the case if Zelensky goes to the White House soon and signs a deal with Donald Trump? Would this question of financing for Ukraine be resolved?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (29:40)

I'm wondering who says that. I mean, at the end of the day, Ukraine still needs to have money to run everything. This is a country that's been at war for almost four years and is highly dependent on donors in what it's actually like to stay alive. And even if a peace deal is agreed now, there's no guarantee that that peace deal is going to hold all of the army, which is highly trained and sophisticated and understands the new warfare of drones and everything else, they still need to stick around and they need to be paid. So I can't see how we go into even a peacetime environment where the Ukrainians don't need money. And this is where the reparations loan still features, because from a European standpoint, they're saying this is an advance on the war reparations that Russia should pay in any case.

Nick Vinicour (30:26)

Right. And part of the original peace plan was that the assets would be directed towards, and I have to look at the language very closely, will be invested in US Led efforts to rebuild Ukraine. Now, that seemed to kind of raise the ire of some Europeans. What was the reaction to that particular point? Point 14 in the original plan, the.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (30:51)

Best bits of that point, you've obviously left out for dramatic effect. But I mean, the investment vehicle that would take this 100 billion, 50% of those proceeds would go straight back into US pockets. So that's part of it. The other part of it that is also controversial is that the point suggests that the Europeans then cough up a further 100 billion out of their own pockets to then contribute towards this. So not only are the Russian assets that's being taken out of their hands and making Americans richer, but the Europeans are poor at the end of the day as well by 100 billion.

Nick Vinicour (31:24)

And what effect has that had? Because I've had some conversations with people say, well, the peace plan has undermined the whole assets discussion. And other people saying, no, it's compelled the Europeans to come to a decision because the Alternative is this US proposal that gives them 50% of the profits and makes you pay 100 billion on top. How do you see that working?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (31:47)

I've heard both arguments too. I've had some very somber lunches where you sit there and talk about how basically all the money's going to go into American hands and the Europeans are going to be 100 billion euros poor at the end of this. But then, especially in Nordic countries that are very, very close to Russia, the first thing they'll say is, no, we got to act quicker as a result, before we actually lose all of this money together.

Nick Vinicour (32:12)

And are there any signs of movement? Because basically this came up in October. The story seems to have largely stayed the same since then. But we heard the president of the commission speaking recently about the loan to European Parliament. What did she say there? And what's your impression about where this debate is right now?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (32:33)

Because the movements are so incremental since the EU leaders summit in October, when De Wevre ruined the party for everyone, Every little point is feasted on by journalists in this town. And what's recent? As of Wednesday, van der Leyen stood up in front of a near empty plenary and said that she was going to be presenting the legal text for the reparations loan soon. She didn't say when, but soon. But that's important because we've arrived at a stalemate, a political deadlock with Belgium, where even the Belgians are sitting there and saying like, look, look, whatever you do, just put forward a legal text and we'll kick the tires on this thing and see if it stands up. That's where we are. So right now we're all just sitting around waiting for a text to drop.

Nick Vinicour (33:17)

And what would be the sort of ideal wish list in that text? It would be basically ensuring Belgium for the total amount plus some and full solidarity, legally binding from the other EU states. I mean, what would you imagine?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (33:33)

What do the Belgians want? It's almost Christmas. Okay, so the first thing are the financial and legal guarantees. So like, if suddenly Belgium and nuclear have to pay up for whatever reason because they lose in court or whatever, or the war ends and they have to send the money back, the rest of the EU is going to stand up there and send them that money within a week. That's the first big thing. The second thing is if you can't get countries to act that quickly, then you got to come up with some kind of a backup, right? Something which basically allows for countries to pay out, or maybe the commission pays out in advance and then gets repaid by A country. Those two things are super important from a Belgian standpoint. Then you start getting into other more international realms, like can you convince Japan and the US to actually start looking within their own territories to find Russian assets that they can then use to build their own reparations loans and send to Ukraine? Because at the end of the day, everyone wants to protect the reputation of Europe as investment destination or the euro as a currency. And the idea is that if you can get the whole Western hemisphere, so the G7 countries, then there is at least some kind of stable environment there where the largest parts of the financial markets have decided together that they're moving ahead with this.

Nick Vinicour (34:49)

So, I mean, we've obviously heard from the institutions that this is the preferred option. It's the cheapest for EU countries. But there are also other options on the table. And now we're hearing talk of a bridging loan. Can you tell us a little bit about that?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (35:04)

There are basically three real options on the table. These are basically like, you issue grants, so it's just free money straight to Ukraine that comes from each individual capital. Or you issue Eurobonds as an EU and you borrow the money off of the markets and you send that to Ukraine as well. But is it likely to come back? The whole point is that you're making sure that Ukraine has a sustainable debt that won't hamstring it in the future. And then the third option is the reparations loan that we've been talking about all this time. The longer that this takes to get over the line, the more likely it is that we're going to have to put our hands into our pockets and pull out money from European taxpayers and basically front the bill until the reparations loan starts trickling into Kiev's coffers. So that only means that the European Union would likely have to raise debt, send that money straight to Ukraine, and then it'd be a question as to whether it gets back. But that's the bridge financing that we're talking about.

Nick Vinicour (36:04)

So EU countries funding Ukraine in the interim until we can get some kind of legal arrangement on the Russian assets.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (36:11)

Not even legal, it's just the payout. Because not only do you have to have this tax negotiated through the Brussels legislative machinery, but even at that point, if it includes national guarantees to Belgium, that also has to go through certain national legislatures as well, such as Germany, that can take months. My point is that the longer we wait, the longer this process will take, and we'll come to spring and there won't be any money in Kiev for them to continue fighting this war, if that is their situation, or to even keep their lights on. And if we want to protect them from making really difficult financial decisions like cuts, then we're going to have to come up with the money on our own. And that means dead and maybe to.

Nick Vinicour (36:51)

Bring it all home. Just how do you see this right now, Wouter? You know, the spotlights are all on Belgium. Yeah. How do you see the Belgian position evolving or is it not going to evolve?

Wouter Vershelden (37:04)

Well, what you mentioned, the whole context obviously changed with the Russian American peace plan. It changed the whole dynamic, as you said. And I think the Belgians are definitely feeling the heat in the kitchen where they know at some point the decision's got to be made. They're going to come under huge pressure from the rest of the EU to actually do something. I just don't see the fundamental change in the point of view from Belgium. They have built up this whole narrative on legal exposure. That's not something you can let go of without saving face on a domestic level.

Nick Vinicour (37:38)

So let's just take a tiny step back and talk about credibility. In this case, there's so much talk about having a seat at the table in the US led negotiations. What does this whole situation do for European credibility, Bjarke?

Bjarka Smith Meyer (37:55)

The fact that they weren't invited for the negotiations in the first place, they had to force themselves onto the table.

Nick Vinicour (38:02)

Well, they were invited to sit outside the room, if I understand correctly, in Geneva. So that was progress compared to before. But still in terms of leverage, in terms of really weighing on the process.

Bjarka Smith Meyer (38:13)

The old trope is that if you're not at the table, then you're on the menu. Right. And then we can see that through. Point 14, in the billions that we've been talking about, hundreds of billions that we've been talking about, the Europeans have made it abundantly clear to the Americans that you can't have a peace deal signed without the Europeans and the Ukrainians there to negotiate the terms as well. And they've set out red lines. It seems like they've been able to, even if it's outside the door, at least they have a seat somewhere. For the time being they've managed to get themselves into the discussion. But yeah, we have to see after Thanksgiving whether it actually proved to be useful or not.

Wouter Vershelden (38:46)

Well, I'd say everybody wants the war to end and I mean, there's no debate about that. Belgium just wants to avoid that. When this all is over, we'd be holding a huge pile of shit in our hands and nothing to deal with that.

Nick Vinicour (39:00)

All right, well, thanks, both of you very much. Thank you for joining us.

Wouter Vershelden (39:04)

Thank you.

Nick Vinicour (39:09)

And that's it from us this week. Please remember to follow EU Confidential wherever you get your podcast. Rate us, leave a comment or send us a Note@podcastolitico.eu thanks to Deanna Sturris, our senior audio producer, and to Ann McElvoy, POLITICO's head of audio. I'm Nick Vinicour. Delighted to be your guest host this week, but have no fear, Sarah Wheaton is back at the Wheel next week.