The EU’s envoy to Ukraine on war, resilience — and Nordic walking

Summary

---

Brussels Playbook Podcast

Episode Title: The EU’s envoy to Ukraine on war, resilience — and Nordic walking
Release Date: February 20, 2026
Host: Sarah Wheaton (POLITICO Chief EU Correspondent)
Featured Guests:

• Katerina Maternova, EU Ambassador to Ukraine
• POLITICO’s Defense Editor, Jan Janczynski

---

Episode Overview

This episode provides an in-depth conversation with Katerina Maternova, the EU's ambassador to Ukraine, focusing on life in Kyiv amid ongoing war, the challenges brought by Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure during winter, and the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian people. The episode also spotlights the broader European debate over security, specifically questioning the viability of America's nuclear umbrella for Europe in the face of US unpredictability. The latter half of the episode explores Europe’s potential nuclear futures with defense editor Jan Janczynski.

---

Life Under Siege: Kyiv in Winter

[00:00–08:28]

Daily Survival Amid War

• Host Sarah Wheaton sets the scene: Air raid sirens are the new normal in Kyiv; residents are unfazed but constantly vigilant.
• Freezing temperatures and attacks on energy infrastructure have led to widespread blackouts, no heating, and families clustering in single rooms or setting tents indoors to keep warm.
• Despite conditions, daily life and diplomatic work persist—political conversations, including EU membership for Ukraine, continue.

Notable Quote:
"She [Ambassador Maternova] seemed more worried about the audio quality than anything else. That tells you something about how people in Ukraine now live through this war." — Sarah Wheaton [00:37]

---

Ambassador Maternova’s Personal Perspective

• Kyiv has experienced sustained, bitter cold; snow piles up, and the city faces repeated attacks (three major ones in both January and February).

• Diplomats, both expatriate and Ukrainian, are affected—some without heat or electricity for weeks after attacks.

  • "For me personally, I live in a hotel, international hotel, so it’s very much bearable. But that’s not the case for many of my colleagues..." — Katerina Maternova [03:17]

• Kyiv is now a frontline city in a new sense, not simply due to shelling but because basic utilities have become wartime targets.

Maintaining Diplomatic Work

• Air raid interruptions affect sleep, leading to cumulative exhaustion and PTSD symptoms for many (including the ambassador).

  • "The interrupted sleep is something that has a cumulative effect... We all have, or many of us have trouble sleeping. And yet you need to continue..." — Maternova [04:30]

• Despite the hardship, the resilience of Ukrainians is admired by diplomats in Kyiv.

  • "They keep going and keep the resilient, even if, as a friend of mine told me the other day is through tears." — Maternova [04:55]

---

Communicating Crisis

• Ambassador Maternova is active on social media; her posts during attacks serve to both show solidarity and inform the global audience.

• The ongoing humanitarian calamity is often underreported in international media:

  • Over 1,000 heating tents (some run by the Red Cross) serve as vital lifelines for warmth, power, and food.
  • "Because... the humanitarian calamity that has been unfolding here now for six weeks somehow doesn’t make it to the media or very rarely." — Maternova [05:55]

• Around 600,000 Kyiv residents have reportedly left the city for the winter due to the energy crisis.

• "It’s really, let’s make it very clear, this has been really a war crime to hit and freeze people in their own homes, ordinary civilians who have nothing to do with the military." — Maternova [07:40]

---

Europe’s Response: Hope and Frustration

[08:28–13:19]

Delegations and Perceptions

• A European Parliament delegation, led by Marie Agnes Jacques Zimmerman, visited Kyiv and experienced the crisis firsthand, helping bridge the information gap to the rest of Europe.

Munich Security Conference — Shifts in Tone

• The event is seen as a "turning point" with Europe showing more determination to take control of its own security.

  • "Europe is very much showing the signs of determination to play a much, much bigger role in its own security." — Maternova [09:52]

• Ukrainians have been telling Europe, "We think you are a lot stronger than you think you are." (a recurrent local slogan)

---

Zelensky’s Frustration & EU Support

• Recent public remarks by President Zelensky reflect exhaustion and frustration with Europe's delays in concrete support (such as frozen Russian assets).
• Maternova emphasizes viewing Zelensky’s comments in sequence, not as isolated snapshots, and points to swift EU provision of a 90 billion euro loan as a sign of serious support.
  • "One can always find ways to say could have, should have faster this, that. But I think the track record of delivery by the EU and its member states is quite impressive." — Maternova [12:52]

---

The Question of Peace Talks

[13:19–15:14]

• There is "mild skepticism" in Kyiv around ongoing peace initiatives, largely due to a lack of Russian willingness for real negotiations.
  • "Nobody sees any sign that Putin wants to see an end to this war." — Maternova [13:45]
• Ambassador signals strong desire to be proved wrong, expressing longing for any true breakthrough toward peace.
• The EU, Maternova asserts, will have a role at the eventual peace table; for now, it focuses on diplomatic, economic, and military support.

---

Ukraine’s EU Membership: Paths and Hurdles

[15:14–21:48]

Practicalities and Perceptions of Enlargement

• Ukraine cites 2027 as a potential accession horizon; EU leaders avoid an official date.

• Maternova to Ukrainians: EU integration is non-negotiable for Ukraine’s security and future; more important than fixed dates is the progress of reforms and political will on both sides.

  • "Ukrainian integration into the west and into the EU is part of their future security. There is no question about that." — Maternova [15:36]

• Discusses EU’s creative thinking: "variable geometry," "reverse enlargement," and institutional workarounds to get Ukraine inside the EU tent quickly, if not with immediate full membership.

  • "The analogy I like to use is that... we can have Ukraine in the house at the beginning and not all the rooms in the house being available immediately at the outset." — Maternova [17:20]

• Confidence that most Ukrainians, if properly informed, would support partial integration as a stepping stone.

• Robust progress on corruption and rule of law, even during wartime, driven by the desire to "break with the oligarchic past."

  • "They have built a whole chain of anti-corruption agencies... based on their independence. And as you could see, in July of last year, people, young people, came out to the streets to support and demonstrate for the independence of the institutions." — Maternova [20:31]

---

Resilience and Coping Mechanisms

[21:48–23:19]

• Despite everything, Maternova maintains morale through personal rituals—cheerful clothes, dinners with friends, and exercise, notably "Nordic walking."

  • "Wearing cheerful clothes is one way of fighting the situation... I picked up Nordic walking and go to the botanical garden..." — Maternova [22:08]

• As the conversation ends, a siren interrupts; Maternova calmly explains the standard procedure.

  • "That’s the air alert. So we have our daily dose of sirens here nightly as well..." — Maternova [22:08]

---

Europe’s Nuclear Dilemma: A New Security Era

[25:26–34:34]
(Segment with Defense Editor Jan Janczynski begins [25:26])

Setting the Stage: Europe’s Nuclear Umbrella

• Historically, NATO’s American nuclear umbrella has underpinned European security; US and Russia each have thousands of warheads.

• The guarantee has been to deter Russian/Soviet attack by threat of catastrophic retaliation.

• France and UK have independent nuclear arsenals (UK: 225, France: 290 warheads).

• US deploys bombs in allied countries, but control remains American; France rejects nuclear sharing.

---

The Trump Factor and Nuclear Anxiety

• Recent US unpredictability (especially under Trump and the looming US election) creates doubts about US willingness to defend Europe—a crisis of confidence in the deterrence system.
  • "What Trump is doing by adding doubt into this whole equation is that it sort of destroys the basis of deterrence." — Jan Janczynski [27:16]

---

Munich Security Conference: Europe's Nuclear Future

• European leaders (Macron, Scholz) are openly debating Europe’s post-American nuclear options.

• France is engaging Germany and Sweden on the scope and purpose of its nuclear deterrent.

  • Macron expected to clarify French nuclear posture in an upcoming speech.

• France unclear about extending its nuclear protection beyond national interests; the alliance implications remain ambiguous.

---

The Money and Politics of European Nukes

• Expanding French arsenal or developing new bombs is enormously expensive—20% of Paris’s defense budget goes to nuclear forces.
• Germans wary of funding expansion of French arsenal without shared control, which Paris refuses.
• Other states (like Poland) timidly broach the possibility of developing indigenous weapons, though that remains unlikely for now.

---

NATO’s Official Position

• NATO and American leadership stress the current umbrella is in place and sufficient; pushback against talk of alternate European nuclear architectures.

  • "Rutte mentioned 10% of GDP, double what the spending goal is now if they were to build up their own nuclear arsenal outside of the United [States]." — Janczynski [32:40]

• Technical incompatibility: European countries cannot easily share or adapt each other's nuclear weapons, making any rapid shift impossible.

---

Memorable Moment

• "Well, I thought as a, as a late stage millennial that I'd avoid all these nuclear discussions of my boomer parents, but apparently not." — Sarah Wheaton [34:25]
• "Duck and cover under the desk." — Jan Janczynski [34:34]

---

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian resilience is matched by acute material hardship, yet life and work—diplomatic and otherwise—continue in Kyiv, even as attacks escalate.
• EU support for Ukraine remains resolute, though frustration from Kyiv is palpable; the debate over how fast and how creatively Ukraine can be integrated into the EU is ongoing.
• Europe faces tough soul-searching over security, with growing doubts about America’s nuclear umbrella accelerating debate over homegrown solutions—none of which offer easy, quick, or consensual fixes.
• Above all, the episode powerfully humanizes the daily costs and quiet stoicism of those living and working through war.

---

Timestamps for Major Segments

• [00:00–08:28] Life under war in Kyiv: Daily realities, diplomatic resilience
• [08:28–13:19] Europe’s response, international perception, and Zelensky’s frustrations
• [13:19–15:14] Peace talks: Skepticism and the EU’s role
• [15:14–21:48] Ukraine’s EU accession: Political reality and reform
• [21:48–23:19] Coping, morale, and a siren interruption
• [25:26–34:38] Europe’s nuclear dilemma: Security, deterrence, and alternatives

---

Notable Quotes

• "These are people and suffer through it, but we are all here… and continue supporting this heroic country through the war." — Katerina Maternova [04:50]
• "The mayor of Kyiv, Mr. Klitschko, has asked residents to temporarily leave for their friends and families and their dachas… an estimate that around 600,000 people left Kyiv to survive the winter." — Maternova [07:10]
• "Europe is very much showing the signs of determination to play a much, much bigger role in its own security." — Maternova [09:52]
• "We think you are a lot stronger than you think you are." — favorite Ukrainian slogan [10:21]
• "What Trump is doing by adding doubt into this whole equation is that it sort of destroys the basis of deterrence." — Jan Janczynski [27:16]

---

Tone

The episode is clear, urgent, and conversational—blending first-hand testimony of life under siege in Ukraine with high-level analysis and candid reporting on Europe’s geopolitical crossroads. The perspectives are direct, empathetic, and pragmatic, with a focus on real-world consequences for both Ukraine and the wider continent.

---

Transcript

[A]

Today's episode is presented by Nesta, the world's leading producer of sustainable aviation fuel and renewable diesel, which enable customers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Learn [e-mail] change when a siren goes off in Kyiv, people don't exactly freak out or even react all that much at all. They pause, they assess, and then sometimes, depending, they carry on. At the very end of my conversation this week with the EU's ambassador to Ukraine, Katerina Maternova, an air raid alarm began to sound outside her office. She acknowledged it calmly and kept speaking. She seemed more worried about the audio quality than anything else. That tells you something about how people in Ukraine now live through this war. This winter, people in Kyiv have been enduring freezing temperatures while Russia targets energy infrastructure. That means apartments without heat, rolling blackouts, families sleeping in one room, sometimes setting up tents indoors just to keep warm. And yet daily life continues. Diplomatic work continues. Political decisions continue. The conversation about Ukraine's future continues, including EU membership. As we approach another anniversary of the full scale invasion next week, we wanted to understand these things better. What does daily life in Kyiv actually look like right now? How resilient is Ukrainian morale? What would peace talks mean from Kyiv's perspective? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of EU Confidential. Later in the episode, we'll turn to another debate, one shaped partly by Russia's war in Ukraine and partly by growing uncertainty about the United States long term commitment to Europe. It gained fresh urgency at the Munich Security Conference last weekend, with leaders contemplating whether Europe needs to develop its own homemade nuclear umbrella. But first, my conversation with Katerina Materanova. She has been the EU's ambassador to Ukraine since September 2023. Before that, she spent years at the European Commission working on enlargement and Ukraine policy. Here's our conversation. All right, Madam Ambassador, thank you so much for joining us. We're connecting with you through zoom. You're in Kyiv. It's minus 10 degrees Celsius today. And this winter has been about survival in freezing temperatures while Russia continues targeting energy infrastructure. So what has this winter in Kyiv actually been like for you personally? Day to day, night to night?

[B]

Well, thank you very much for inviting me. Indeed, it's minus 7 or minus 10 today. It feels in fact colder when we have the sunny days. Even when it's minus 20 and it's sunny and dry, it's bearable. When it gets like this today, it gets under your skin. But life has to go on. We have heaps and heaps of snow in Kyiv, and the cold temperatures have been going on For a while, which for me personally, I live in a hotel, international hotel, so it's very much bearable. But that's not the case for many of my colleagues, whether Ukrainian or expatriate. I have some colleagues who have not had heat and electricity in their own houses and apartments since the huge attack on 9 January. Some others were added later. We had three huge attacks in Kyiv in January, three already big ones in February. And the freezing temperatures with what you mentioned is the systematic attacks on energy infrastructure basically made Kyiv into a frontline city, something that was not the case for the first three and a half years of war.

[A]

And how do you kind of maintain diplomatic work, you know, as far as meetings, calls with Brussels, coordination with the government when nights are interrupted by air raid alerts?

[B]

Well, the interrupted by air raid nights, that's been with us for a lot longer than the freezing temperatures that's been all along. In June of last year, the big attacks on Kyiv restarted, and they have been very regular, including 28 August, when as a result, our own delegation, our own embassy was bombed by an explosion very close by directly with two ballistic missiles. So the interrupted sleep is something that has a cumulative effect. I mean, I feel it personally and I think we all suffer from PTSD by now, and we all have, or many of us have trouble sleeping. And yet you need to continue and you look at the Ukrainians and you admire them, how they keep going and keep the resilient, even if, as a friend of mine told me the other day is through tears. You know, it's not that they are super humans and terminators. These are people and suffer through it, but we are all here. We have 25 member states, resident ambassadors in town, and we're all here and continue working and continue supporting this heroic country through the war.

[A]

You regularly post on Facebook and on X about attacks sometime in real time. You're keeping score. What are those posts meant to achieve?

[B]

Well, I think it's twofold. One is to show solidarity and appreciation to ordinary Ukrainians. And I get a lot of traffic on social media with ordinary Ukrainians and also to inform the world, because one and I really appreciate you taking the time and dedicating this podcast to the situation in Ukraine and specifically the situation in Kyiv, because the humanitarian calamity that has been unfolding here now for six weeks somehow doesn't make it to the media or very rarely. You know, you have over thousand tents, some of them by Red Cross, around town where people come to recharge their electronic Batteries to recharge their body, batteries to get some hot tea. Some of them are even equipped with cots so people can sleep overnight. Road food, kitchen and curry tasks. Bring soup, warm soup and bread. Kids do homework there. People telework or simply come to get warm. Because, for example, on 3 February, during one of the biggest attacks with five ballistic rockets, the Russians hit one of the three biggest thermal electric power plants and destroyed it. It's destroyed now until it's rebuilt, essentially. So people who have been getting heat from there are not going to have any more heat until the end of the heating season. And we are talking about 350,000 people. So you have really calamitous situation in many households. Some of them are lucky that they have gas. Those that don't have gas in their kitchens have really, really a big problem. The mayor of Kyiv, Mr. Klitschko, has asked residents to temporarily leave for their friends and families and their dachas. There is an estimate that around 600,000 people left Kyiv to survive the winter. And if you talk to the Ukrainian government counterparts, the number one issue they talk to you about is energy. And it's really, let's make it very clear, this has been really a war crime to hit and freeze people in their own homes, ordinary civilians who have nothing to do with the military.

[A]

A delegation from the European Parliament recently visited Kyiv. It was led by Marie Agnes Jacques Zimmerman, and they also experienced the freezing temperatures and blackouts firsthand. Do you feel like that visit changed anything?

[B]

Well, I think that all the visits right now, first of all, are very much appreciated by the Ukrainians, especially in this sort of information fold fog, where the news about Kyiv don't get out. And so we hosted lunch for Madame Zimmerman, struck Zimmerman and her colleagues, and the heating stopped in the restaurant. So we were eating in 11 degrees temperature. So there is nothing like firsthand experiences like this to communicate it further. And with the strength and presence of social media, you can communicate very effectively separately.

[A]

You know, in parallel to these kind of personal experiences that people in Kyiv and people in Ukraine have been feeling on the ground. We've had these big kind of important gatherings in Europe. One of them, the Munich Security Conference, just wrapped, and you wrote that it felt like a turning point. You drew some historical parallels. What concretely changed for Ukraine after this session of the Munich Security Conference?

[B]

I think here people looked at it with sort of hope in their hearts and minds, because I think that. And I was not there in person, but I listened to many of the presentations by European and other leaders. And I think the sense that people have here is that Europe is very much showing the signs of determination to play a much, much bigger role in its own security. As President von der Leyen and others mentioned and other leaders, that this is something we have to do. And with our strength will come also stronger participation in various alliances and with various partners. And I think this is something Ukrainians appreciate. They've been telling us for a long time that we think you are a lot stronger than you think you are. Is there any their favorite slogan?

[A]

That's one way of putting it. But, you know, as we reach another anniversary of the full scale invasion, you know, at least from my perception, I've heard kind of a change in tone from President Volodymyr Zelensky in Davos, another one of these big, important gatherings this winter. He said Europe loves to discuss the future, but avoids taking action today. The time he was pretty angry about the failure to agree on using frozen Russian assets to help to help Ukraine. And he likewise just came out this week. He just came out of some of these Geneva talks with the Trump administration. He said in an interview with Axios that it's, quote, not fair that Trump pressures Ukraine to make more concessions than he does on Russia in pursuit of peace. What do you make of these kind of expressions of frustration from Zelenskyy?

[B]

Well, if you lived here throughout the war, I think that exhaustion, frustration, really sometimes feeling that we cannot continue like it is, is our daily reality, all of us. So I can only imagine that someone with the level of exposure and responsibility that he has, he feels them even stronger. But I would look at his various statements and his various pronouncements in sequence. There was the Davos speech, but you also had a very different tone in the Munich Security Conference speech. So I prefer not to judge it in a snapshot, but rather as a continuum. And you are absolutely right that I think every European leader has said, yes, we could have done this, we could have done that. But let's look at the reality. The frozen assets were not used, but they were frozen forever until Russia pays reparations. And we were able to put incredibly quickly on the table a 90 billion euro loan. So there is really, I think, mobilization, both by the institutions and member states who need to approve all of this, realizing that Ukraine needs help now. So, yes, one can always find ways to say could have, should have faster this, that. But I think the track record of delivery by the EU and its member states is quite impressive.

[A]

As for these talks that Washington is working on brokering aspirations of ending the war by summer. We've heard these, you know, White House timelines before. But when you hear peace talks, what do you know about the non negotiables from Keith's perspective?

[B]

I would comment on sort of the general mood, and I'm not talking about the mood in the negotiating team, but sort of the general perception that you hear from journalists, from people, from also officials in private conversation is a sense of sort of mild skepticism or not expecting too much simply because there doesn't seem to be any sign, nobody sees any sign that Putin wants to see an end to this war. And I think that's very much what was echoed also in Munich by leaders that there is no evidence that this would be the case. In fact, the reappointment of Mr. Medinsky to lead on the Russia side, the talks in Geneva would point in the same direction. But then again, I just, you cannot imagine how I wish to be wrong and how we all would be delighted should there be a breakthrough.

[A]

Should the EU be playing a role in these talks or given the perceived lack of fairness or seriousness, is it better that the EU kind of sit this one out?

[B]

I think that we are playing a role both in equipping and supporting Ukraine, in discussing the prosperity part and the day after kind of scenarios. And I am fairly certain that before conclusion of any peace deal would happen, then we will be at the table.

[A]

Let's switch gears to something precisely in the EU's wheelhouse. Enlargement. Ukraine speaks about 2027 as a potential accession horizon, but EU leaders have, you know, avoided naming a date officially as the EU's ambassador to Kyiv. What do you tell Ukrainians and what do you tell Brussels?

[B]

Well, I tell Ukrainians that whatever happens, you know, there's no question that Ukrainian integration into the west and into the EU is part of their future security. There is no question about that. I think that's the framing that is used by European leaders and that's very much what is perceived here in Ukraine, both in the official circles as well as when you talk people outside. You know, the question of dates is always a tricky one. I don't know how many times I have been asked about when the EU accession would happen and that was before it started featuring in the 20 point peace plan. So I think the continuation of some of the key reforms, as well as building the willingness and the understanding of the importance of Ukraine's integration into the EU in the minds of European leaders and European publics is more important than the day itself.

[A]

And we've reported at Politico that the EU is discussing, quote, creative paths to bring Ukraine in faster. Reverse enlargement is kind of one of the terms, membership lite, front loading, negotiation clusters, and even looking for ways around a Hungarian veto. What do you see as realistic versus fantasy?

[B]

The European Union is always and has always been very creative in terms of finding legal and institutional workarounds to difficult situations historically. And I think that we can look at the EU very instructively of having this variable geometry in place. Right. You have Schengen that didn't apply to everybody in the eu, and yet Switzerland, Norway are part of it. You have the Eurozone where you have a subset of member states applying. Others have an obligation to join some, others have permanent opt out. So working with variable geometry is not something that would be new. And I think that could certainly be used. The analogy I like to use is that, you know, we can have Ukraine in the house at the beginning and not all the rooms in the house being available immediately at the outset. Right. Sort of to work towards it with the ultimate goal of having a full membership. And my understanding is that this is what colleagues in Brussels are working on.

[A]

Would Ukrainians accept that?

[B]

I think that if we don't let various narratives and disinformation about it like this is, you know, not a full membership, et cetera. I think that if it's a matter of anchoring Ukraine in the EU as part of its peaceful future, I'm sure they would.

[A]

And as you noted, some reforms are certainly needed. As with any aspiring member state. And on corruption and rule of law, you've praised Ukraine's progress even during wartime, noting that some EU member states haven't made that type of pace and progress in peacetime. So what do you think is driving that change in Kyiv?

[B]

The desire to join the eu. The desire to break with the oligarchic past and be a modern, democratic and prosperous society. I mean, The Maidan, in 2013, 14, it was an equally freezing winter and people were waving EU flags. And the same thing is now, when you're crossing bay car, the the border with Ukraine, you have a Ukrainian and EU flag. So people really believe in it. And people look at entry into EU as anchoring their desire to move forward. I mean, until Maidan, Ukraine always played this in between east and west game. And since then, and even More so since 2022, since the full scale invasion, they are fully committed, they can't turn back. So their only option is to do whatever it takes to be able to Join the club.

[A]

And so what concretely have some of those steps looked like?

[B]

I have worked on Ukraine for the last 10 years, not only for the last two and a half that I've been living here. And in those 10 years, 11 in fact, by now there has been really a remarkable sustained progress. That doesn't mean that there is not a regress or sideways or backward jump. There's no question that there are instances like that. And I'm sure that there will be more. But what Ukraine has done is they went through a first round of systematic judicial reform. They changed the constitution for that. They moved from four to three levels court structures. They started with vetting of it. Now we need to continue and finish the second big wave of judicial reforms. They have built a whole chain of anti corruption agencies, one for prevention, one for investigation, one specialized prosecutor's office and one specialized anti corruption court. And these have been building their track record based on their independence. And as you could see, in July of last year, people, young people, came out to the streets to support and demonstrate for the independence of the institutions. And in November, the institutions delivered some disturbing and devastating notices of suspicion to some high level officials, including this week to the former Minister of Energy. So they are functioning even during a war and are delivering results. So this is something that is quite, quite remarkable.

[A]

And last question. You know, you talked at the beginning about the hardship that you individually and that others working there are facing, talking about ptsd. But at the same time, you know, I can see you're wearing kind of this bright, kind of cheerful mob colored blue laser. You know, anything else that you do to keep your spirits up and keep going throughout this winter?

[B]

Yes. First, sorry for the noise. That's the air alert. So we have our daily dose of sirens here nightly as well. I think wearing cheerful clothes is one way of fighting the situation. And for me, getting together with friends and chatting, going out to dinner and exercising, I picked up Nordic walking and go to the botanical garden or there is lots of places where you can go and run track exercise. And that's keeping us in more or less good spirits.

[A]

Okay, well, I don't want to keep you now, but what are you going to do now that this siren is.

[B]

Well, we are going to find out what is the reason for the siren and our security colleagues will tell us whether it's just a MIG somewhere in Belarus and Russia taking a training flight or whether there is a risk of rockets or drones flying in our direction, in which case we go shelter.

[A]

Okay, well, I will let you go now then, but please stay safe and keep us updated.

[B]

Thanks a lot. Thank you very much for inviting me and have a good day. Sarah.

[A]

Thank you, Madam Ambassador. Bye. Be well. That was Katerina Maternova, the EU's ambassador to Kyiv. And don't worry, we heard back from them. Everybody in the embassy is just fine. But the ambassador's chill response reflects that for her, this is just the new normal. Yet for Europe as a whole, we're only in the infancy of making the big adjustments to to this new world order. Among the potential changes, the loss of security guaranteed by American nuclear bombs. On that note, we need to take a quick break. When we come back, I'll be joined by my colleague, POLITICO's defense editor Janczynski, to talk about the renewed debate over nuclear sharing in Europe. Stay with us. A message from neste. Despite the recent European political focus on geopolitical security, defense, as well as economic competitiveness and international trade, the need to continue to advance the energy transition hasn't gone away. Neste's renewable fuels are an immediately available alternative to fossil fuels. While they can also contribute to energy security in Europe, the world needs to keep moving, but with reduced emissions. Nest day sustainable aviation fuel and renewable diesel are available today. Let's fuel change. Learn [e-mail] Change so, Jan, we have you on today to talk about this concept called nuclear sharing. The discussion is prompted largely by Donald Trump's unpredictability, his Greenland threats, broader doubts about NATO, you know, this bigger discussion of decoupling from the U.S. but before we dive in to this concept, let's just set the stage a bit. What has Europe's approach to nuclear security been in recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War? Who has bombs? How would they use them?

[C]

So the core of Europe's security, and basically the core of NATO, is the American nuclear umbrella. America has about 33,700 nuclear warheads. The Russians have just over 4,000. So a bit more. But the core promise is that if the Soviets earlier and now the Russians ever attacked a NATO country, that America would respond with conventional and potentially with nuclear forces. And especially this is designed to prevent a Russian nuclear attack on Europe. The Russians know that if they bombed Tallinn or Vienna or Paris, that their Moscow and St. Petersburg would get flattened by American nuclear bombs. So that's the core promise that keeps the continent from falling into nuclear war. The current Trump administration has made many Europeans worry about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent. And the whole thing is a bit of a confidence trick. You want the other guy to think that you're going to do this, even maybe you're not actually going to do it, but he has to think, think that you will. And so what Trump is doing by adding doubt into this whole equation is that it sort of destroys the basis of deterrence. So the Americans continue to insist that the nuclear umbrella is as it always was, that the Americans are Europe's ultimate nuclear backstop. Europeans worry that that's not the case and so they're starting to explore other options. And there are two nuclear powers in Europe, the UK and France, with quite different nuclear postures. The Brits have about 225 nuclear warheads, all based on submarines. So they have submarine launched missiles. Their boats are hidden deep underwater. If there ever is a world ending crisis, they would fire these missiles and they would go up above the atmosphere, come down into Russia and then destroy Russia. The British nuclear deterrent is firmly part of NATO. It's part of NATO's force structure. And the missiles are designed together with the United States. The Brits have firing control over them, but the technology is shared with the United States. The French have never trusted the Americans, which maybe now seems not such a bad idea. And so they developed their own nuclear bomb without American or British help. And they've developed their own technology for delivering those weapons, not relying again on the Americans. And so the French have, like the Brits, they have nuclear missiles aboard submarines and they also have air launched cruise missiles and they've got about 290 warheads. So the current force posture is that the Americans protect Europe. They have lots of bombs. They share some of those nuclear weapons with a host of European countries. Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Greece and Turkey.

[A]

Yeah. So now with this nuclear umbrella in doubt, this topic came up a lot at the Munich Security Conference last weekend. You were there. How are European leaders adjusting?

[C]

The German Chancellor and President Macron of France both talked about this in their very sort of important speeches on the first day of Munich. And what's happening is that the French are opening conversations with allies. At the moment it looks like it's Germany and Sweden to more precisely define what the French nuclear deterrent is for. France has always been kind of ambiguous about what their nuclear deterrent will be used for. They say it's to protect France's vital national interests. And Macron has said that those vital interests have a European dimension. That's not as clear as the American nuclear umbrella. That means if the Russians attack Estonia, is that a national French interest? Would the French respond? We don't know. And so Macron is giving a crucial speech on French nuclear posture next month at a French actually nuclear submarine base. And he's expected to address that and give a bit more precision about what the French have in mind.

[A]

And you said Merz also weighed in on this?

[C]

He did. He said that there's a need to start talking about the French nuclear posture. France is very clear that it sees no scenario in which it would hand over control of firing its nuclear weapons to any ally. So the decision to launch rests purely with Paris. They're also not particularly interested in nuclear sharing. Nuclear sharing is what the Americans do with a bunch of allies, including Germany, where some bombs are put on allied airplanes, but Americans control the final decision as to whether to launch them or not. France is not really interested in allocating its bombs. There's some talk that France might send its own nuclear equipped aircraft to station them in other European countries, but they would remain French aircraft under French control.

[A]

So what are some other models on the table for a kind of post US European nuclear deterrent?

[C]

The problem with France is that nobody knows if France is really reliable because the French have a presidential election in 2027 and they may end up with a populist nationalist government which is kind of pro Kremlin and becomes super unreliable. And so the Germans are very aware that they may be looking for an alternative to America. And that alternative isn't any more reliable than the, than the US under Trump. Some countries are very delicately starting to talk about potentially developing their own nuclear weapons. The Polish president a couple of days ago mentioned this possibility. At the moment it's more in the realm of retired military officers and think tankers. Europe is very advanced. Many countries, like Sweden, like Germany, have nuclear reactors, nuclear potential. They could absolutely build a bomb if they wanted to, for example, for legal and political reasons. They haven't done that. But if the American nuclear umbrella disappears and there's no sort of satisfactory relationship with the French, then some countries may well start thinking about developing their own bombs.

[A]

Well, so then that gets into the money question. You know, who would pay for expanding French capacity or for countries to develop their own, their own bombs.

[C]

So this is a key issue that the French have, as I said, have 290 warheads. That's much less than the Russians. Some strategists feel that if you want to have a credible deterrent, you need to have many more nuclear weapons. They're super expensive. About 20% of France's current defense budget goes on its nuclear forces. France is bankrupt it's not bankrupt, but it's very stretched financially. And so it doesn't have the billions and billions of euros needed to develop more nuclear weapons and different kinds of nuclear weapons. The Germans. We talked to some very senior German officials in Munich. They're very allergic to the idea of the French hitting them up for billions to develop nuclear weapons which would remain under French control. So that's going to be a big issue. If the decision is that the arsenal needs expanding, who pays? The French would be sort of keen on the Germans to pay. The Germans don't want to do that without getting control. The French will not give them control.

[A]

And have we heard anything from NATO's actual formal leadership?

[C]

Mark Rutte had numerous speeches in Munich and then the European Parliament just a few days ago. And he is adamant, as are top American officials, that America is still committed to NATO. There is no need to be thinking about any kind of an alternative to the existing security architecture of NATO and of Europe, that what we have works fine and that Trump has actually succeeded in getting European countries to spend more on their defense, that it would be insanely expensive for Europe. Rutte mentioned 10% of GDP, double what the spending goal is now if they were to build up their own nuclear arsenal outside of the United. So the official view in NATO and in Washington is that this is a needless discussion, that, that everything is fine.

[A]

We were having an interesting discussion kind of on the sidelines of an editor's meeting. And you were explaining why even if European countries do decide to, to work together, maybe using French nuclear bombs, that you can't just kind of load a French bomb onto a German plane.

[C]

This is why the cost is enormous, because you have to test these things. It's very technologically difficult. And for example, the French system, they've got their submarines. Well, they're not going to share submarines with somebody else. Nobody has that type of capability. Their aircraft are specifically equipped to carry these long range cruise missiles. German airplanes, the ones that do carry nuclear bombs, carry gravity bombs, which is a Dr. Strange Gloves style bomb that drops out of an airplane and falls straight down. So they can't carry the French weapons. You'd have to rebuild the German airplanes to be able to carry the French missile. So that makes the whole process a long one. This is not going to be a really quick fix. And if any country in an emergency decides that they want to develop nuclear weapons, that's a long process. None of these things happen very quickly.

[A]

All right. Well, I thought as a, as a late stage millennial that I'd avoid all these nuclear discussions of my boomer parents, but apparently not. Jan, thanks for joining me for that

[C]

duck and cover under the desk.

[A]

Okay, that's it from us this week. Make sure you subscribe to the Brussels Playbook podcast. That's the feat EU Confidential now lives in. From Monday to Thursday morning, we bring you shorter episodes focused on what's driving the day in European politics. And on Fridays, it's us with a longer, more analytical look at the big stories shaping the continent. Thanks to. Thanks to Zoe de Joy for production support and to Deanna Sturris, our senior audio producer. I'm Sarah Wheaton. See you next week.