Week Ender: Why Europe can’t avoid Erdogan

Summary

Brussels Playbook Podcast

Episode: Week Ender – Why Europe Can’t Avoid Erdogan

Date: July 10, 2026
Host: Sarah Wheaton (POLITICO)
Guests: Aslı Aydıntaşbaş (Brookings), John Kampfner (author)

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Episode Overview

This Week Ender special dives deep into Europe's evolving relationship with Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, against the backdrop of NATO’s Ankara summit and shifting geopolitics. The discussion explores why Europe can neither ignore nor fully embrace Erdogan’s Turkey, the recalibration of strategy in Brussels and beyond, Erdogan’s interplay with Trump, and what a transactional EU-Turkey relationship means today.

In the second half, author John Kampfner joins to spotlight his book Braver New World, profiling cities and countries where governments are actually delivering on big challenges—offering hope and lessons for a worried democratic West.

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Section I: Why Europe Can’t Avoid Erdogan

Guest: Aslı Aydıntaşbaş (Brookings Institution, former journalist)
Starts: [02:01]

Setting the Stage: Erdogan Hosts the West

• Context: For decades, Turkey has “walked a tightrope” between Europe, Russia, and regional rivals.
• Quote:

  “Europe's relationship status with Turkey—it’s complicated. The country is too important to ignore and too different to fully embrace.” – Sarah Wheaton [00:52]

• Turkey's Role:
  • NATO’s second largest military, critical geography (bordering conflict areas Ukraine, Russia, Middle East) [03:45]
  • Simultaneously a NATO member, frozen EU candidate, partner in migration/security/defense—yet sliding on democracy.

Turkey’s “Return from the Cold”

• Reset Moment: The Ankara NATO summit represents Erdogan’s attempt to reassert Turkey as a Western player after years of strained relations.
• Quote:

  “This moment is important because it marks Turkey's return to the transatlantic community—or desire to return.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [03:49]

• Factors Driving Relevance:
  • Ongoing wars (Ukraine, instability in Black Sea/Middle East)
  • Turkey's defense industry
  • The emerging Trump-Erdogan relationship.

Shifts Since the “Aspirational” 2004 Era

• 2004 vs Today:
  • Then: Turkey “poster child” of EU transformative power, pro-reform, keen on accession.
  • Now: Democratic backsliding, “permanent outsider”, aspirations for EU membership essentially over.
  • Quote:

    “Turkey was the poster child of Europe's transformative impact ... an Islamist government dedicated to the reform agenda. The language from Erdogan and advisors was: We're just a Muslim version of Christian Democrats.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [06:22]

Europe’s Torn Approach to Turkey

• Change Is in Brussels, Not Ankara:

  • EU willingness to “park” concerns over democracy for strategic engagement.
  • EU sees Turkey increasingly as a “partner” not a “future member”. [08:21]

• Internal EU Division:

  • Ursula von der Leyen's comment (lumping Turkey with Russia/China as a threat) upset Ankara; Commission later walked it back. [09:23]
  • France, Cyprus, Greece: favor distance, wary over Eastern Mediterranean disputes and defense ties.
  • Germany, Poland: favor “pragmatic” engagement, see Turkey as key regional stabilizer.
  • Sweden: resentful over Turkey blocking its NATO accession.
  • Quote:

    “The Turkey question is not settled in Europe ... At the NATO summit, it was striking: Greek PM Mitsotakis openly opposed the US sale of F-35s to Turkey, saying they're still under threat of war.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [09:56]

What Does Erdogan Want?

• A Partner—but on His Terms: Erdogan seeks respect and a role as regional powerbroker without political conditionality from Europe.
• “There is an undeclared consensus to keep the accession process frozen but still ‘on the books’... That works for Turkey and Europe.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [12:55]

The Erdogan Balancing Act: Russia, Ukraine, Trump

• With Russia:

  • Turkey: “pro-Ukraine without being anti-Russia”.
  • Condemned the invasion and sold drones to Ukraine but maintains robust economic/energy ties with Russia and keeps channels open.
  • Quote:

    “Turkey did close the Turkish Straits to Russian warships, but continued to trade with Russia ... Erdogan is keen to keep good relations with Russia—and that’s not too far from where Trump is.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [13:49]

• On War Outcomes:

  • “Where Ukraine’s eastern border passes through is inconsequential for Turkey. As long as Odesa, a major trading port, remains, that's what matters.” [15:53]

The Trump-Erdogan “Bromance”

• Trump’s Admiration:
  • Trump “infatuated” with Erdogan—values strength, transactionalism, willingness to use hard power.
  • Quote:

    “He’s almost infatuated with Erdogan … strong man, strong leader. … He is not bogged down by language on values or alliance loyalty. That feels empty to Trump, clearly." – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [16:39]

• Mediator Role?:
  • Erdogan has “positioned himself as a Trump whisperer”, but won’t use that rapport to benefit Brussels—instead, he plays both sides.

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Section II: Braver New World—When Government Gets It Right

Guest: John Kampfner (journalist, author of Braver New World)
Starts: [20:08]

“Looking for the Good:” The Premise

• Optimism as Therapy: Kampfner admits starting as a pessimist, often “betting on the bad news and almost always winning.” Decided to “look for governments doing things well” instead.

• Quote:

  “I had in my kitchen quite a nice array of bottles of wine that I was winning off people … This is dumb. This isn’t a way to be a responsible journalist. … How about looking for the good?” – John Kampfner [21:17]

• Thesis: Democratic values are at risk due to governments’ failure to deliver. The book documents places where governments show “resilience, imagination, and courage.” [21:46]

Bravery in Policy: What Does It Mean?

• Not Rhetoric: Bravery is candor with voters, not empty rhetoric or top-down imposition.
• Quote:

  “What bravery means is reckoning with your electorate ... coming up with solutions, or at least routes to solutions... being candid... thinking long-term, which is a real challenge for democracies.” — John Kampfner [22:24]

Vienna and Housing Success

• Mixed Public Housing: Emphasis on high-quality, mixed-income public housing ensures equity, reduces stigma and social ills.

• Quote:

  “People rent are of a very high quality... It requires long-term planning, but the benefits in health, public order, and social cohesion offset the outlays.” – John Kampfner [24:12]

• Far-Right Context: Vienna’s success contrasts with Austria’s far-right surge—showing the difference bold local policy can make.

Dilemma: Bravery vs Political Backlash

• Poland/Macron Cases: Raising retirement age in Poland, fuel taxes in France—brave but poorly sold to public, triggering revolt.
• “If you include the people in those discussions … you’ve got a better chance of succeeding.” – John Kampfner [27:59]

Finland’s Education Miracle

• Prestige for Teachers: Masters or doctorates required; high status despite average pay.
• Local Control: Schools and teachers involve parents and students in curriculum and policies, fostering buy-in.
• Quote:

  “Autonomy, responsibility, communitarian participation … the results are remarkable.” — John Kampfner [29:53]

“Isn’t Finland Just...Better?”

• While copying is not plug-and-play, lessons on policy approach and consultation are transferable.

• Failure of Curiosity:

  “Europe … is reluctant to learn from others. There is a failure of curiosity.” – John Kampfner [31:57]

Estonia: The Digital State

• Radical Digital Transformation: Almost all government services, including marriage and divorce, fully online.
• “An extra week of free time per year” for citizens thanks to digitization.
• Estonia built trust using strong privacy safeguards and citizen empowerment.
• Quote:

  “In Estonia, you control your data … you also make demands of the state: ‘Why has my passport not been delivered in 48 hours?’” – John Kampfner [34:55]

Constraints and Opportunities for European Transformation

• Radical Change Follows Crisis: Estonia’s digitization, post-Soviet, reflects how crisis enables innovation. A “never let a good crisis go to waste” moment.
• EU’s Dilemma: Transformation at EU level is “complicated”—27 countries lead to “watery compromise.” A more ambitious, “inner core” and “outer core” approach could help.
• Quote:

  “I cannot think of a single person … who does not think [Brexit] was … a crazy thing to do. … European institutions must become rocket boosters for competitiveness and shoring up democracy, or we’ll fall behind.” – John Kampfner [37:41]

Final Word: Is There Room for Hope?

• A Call for Voter and Political Mindset Change:
  • “Encourage politicians to take risks, think long term, and be candid—not reckless, but radical in a sensible way.”
  • Kampfner closes optimistic: “Right now, there is an absolutely clear route to optimism—because the alternative is so dreadful to contemplate, the demise of what we hold dear.” [39:58]

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Notable Quotes & Timestamps

• Turkey reset:

  “There is no doubt that the summit is an attempt at a big reset with Europe and the West on the part of Erdogan.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [03:49]

• On EU pragmatism:

  “What's changed is not in Turkey. Turkey continues on its illiberal, authoritarian path. What's changed is that the geopolitical issues … made Europeans willing to overlook criticism.” – Aslı Aydıntaşbaş [08:21]

• On Vienna’s housing:

  “Housing is a visible manifestation of equity … and what the Viennese do is an emphasis on public housing, very mixed.” – John Kampfner [23:55]

• On EU transformation:

  “The European Union must be rocket-boosting innovation and competitiveness, or we are in trouble.” – John Kampfner [38:27]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Turkey and NATO Summit context: [02:01]
• Return from the cold/Erdogan’s balancing act: [03:45]
• Comparison: Turkey 2004–2026: [05:28]
• EU’s “parked” democracy concerns / diverging member state views: [08:21]
• Trump-Erdogan dynamics: [16:25]
• Interview with John Kampfner begins: [20:08]
• Vienna housing policy: [23:30]
• Finland education system: [28:11]
• Estonia’s digital transformation: [32:08]
• EU’s capacity for bravery: [36:48]
• Optimism for democracy: [39:58]

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Takeaways & Implications

• Turkey remains an indispensable, complicated partner for Europe; tensions are managed, not resolved.
• Erdogan’s growing leverage derives from strategic geography, regional conflicts, and a transactional bond with Trump—a dynamic making EU unity all the more fragile.
• Even as the EU parks its democracy concerns, a consensus for strategic partnership (not membership) has emerged.
• Across Europe and globally, bold, brave policymaking can foster equity and resilience—if leaders (and citizens) are open to trust, experimentation, and learning from success.
• The politics of caution and incrementalism are under siege; the window for courageous governance is open, if only leaders and societies are willing to seize it.

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[End of summary]

Transcript

[A]

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[B]

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[A]

Why wait? Ask your doctor, visit botoxchronicmigraine.com or call 1-844botox to learn more. Europe's relationship, status with Turkey it's complicated. The country is too important to ignore and too different to fully embrace. A NATO member with the alliance's second largest military, but also a country that insists on keeping decent ties with Russia, an EU candidate country but one whose membership bid has been frozen for 20 years. A partner on migration, security and defense, but also a country where democracy has been sliding backwards. Free media and political opposition are under pressure, and President Recep Tayyip, Erdogan's main rival, is still in jail. Add to that the decades long dispute with Cyprus and tensions with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean. And yet this week, Erdogan was not outside the room. He was hosting the party. NATO leaders gathered in Ankara at a pivotal moment. Trump's America is unpredictable, Russia is still waging war in Ukraine and instability stretches from the Black Sea to the Middle East. And Europe is rearming. So what does Europe do with Erdogan's Turkey now? Can EU countries look past the problems and take advantage of the military powerhouse next door? And is it even up to Brussels? Or is Erdogan suddenly the one who's actually the power broker? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of the Brussels Playbook Weekender. To discuss all this, I'm joined by Asla Identashbosch, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and former journalist. We break down Erdogan's Ankara moment his relationship with Donald Trump and whether Europe can build a serious partnership with Turkey while still confronting what's happening inside the country. Later in the show, we'll embrace a much more optimistic governments doing big things well, believe it or not. John Kampner, author, broadcaster, politico contributor and longtime observer of European politics, joins me to talk about his new book, Braver New World. But first, let's talk about Turkey. Well, Asla, as we speak, European and NATO leaders are in Ankara for the NATO summit. And just before that, we had three EU commissioners, Kaya Kallas, Marta Kos and Magnus Bruner, also there for high level talks. What is Erdogan trying to project with these meetings right now?

[C]

Well, Sarah, as you know, Turkey's long been the permanent outsider, almost seen as a Trojan horse because of its relationship with Russia. Erdogan's balancing act, Turkey's own democratic backsliding, which of course is well documented, and lots of problems with Europe in particular. If we go back to 2018, 2019, Turkish and European leaders were hurling insults at one another. And I guess this moment is important because it marks Turkey's return to the transatlantic community or desire to return to the transatlantic community via the Trump administration. So there is no doubt that the summit is an attempt at a big reset with Europe and the west on the part of Erdogan. And for Europe and United States. It is also a recognition of Turkey's ascendancy in its own region, but also rising geopolitical relevance with geography that is caught in between hot wars. It's essentially between Ukraine, the Middle East, Iran bordering Russia, and with its own big military. Let's not Forget this is NATO's second largest military. I think Turkey's strategic value has just gone through the roof. Add to that, of course, the Trump Erdogan relationship and Turkey's own defense industry. It just became very clear that this is a moment marking Turkey's return from the cold.

[A]

I want to go back even further. You were actually at the NATO summit in Turkey in 2004. And as you said, Turkey's now sort of coming in from the cold. In 2004, it very much was not

[C]

in the cold exactly. You know, Turkey is one of the oldest member states and it joined NATO in 1952 and has used to be a loyal supporter of the transatlantic community and seen as a frontier border state, a bulwark against the Soviets. And of course, that started changing particularly very different tone in the country and very different relationship with the west over the past decade or so. But back in 2004, the NATO summit was in Istanbul. I was a journalist at the time and living in the US So I actually flew in to cover the summit. Turkey was very big on being an upstanding citizen of NATO. Also close relationship with the United States. You had allies discussing how to stabilize the Middle east, how to jointly fight terrorism. What Turkey's importance and relevance at the time was that it was, once again, because of its location, geographically close to Iraq, and therefore its bases, its presence, its own efforts were much needed. So the tone in the country was very different. Turkey was also an aspiring EU member state at the time. You will remember that it was very keen to engage in reforms. I would say Turkey was the poster child of Europe's transformative impact on its neighborhood at the time of success story. You had an Islamist government that was dedicated to the reform agenda. And basically the language from Erdogan and his advisors was, we're just a Muslim version of Christian Democrats. We want to be in Europe, we want to be a democracy, we just want conservatives to live at peace. And that was a very attractive message in the post 911 climate. But it was an entirely different story from what you have now.

[A]

So we discussed some of the changes since that sort of aspirational period when they were trying for EU accession. Last time you and I spoke was a year and a half ago, more or less, and it was just after Ekrem Emomoglu, the mayor of Istanbul and Erdogan's main political rival, had been arrested. At that time, it was super awkward because there was this, you know, severe democratic backslide. But we were also seeing Trump's hostility towards the EU and NATO really building up, and it was making Brussels look towards Turkey. So what has changed since then?

[C]

Well, what's changed is not in Turkey. Turkey continues on its illiberal, authoritarian path. What's changed is that the geopolitical issues concerns has made, I think Europeans willing to overlook the criticism on Turkey's domestic conduct, which had basically shaped European policy to Turkey over the past decade. Now they're willing to not think, they're willing to forget it, but they're willing to park that question for now and engage with Turkey as a critical, important regional partner, ally, but not really as a potential member state. So I think that conversation is over. Accession, at least as far as Turkey is concerned, is no longer a reality. More often you hear European officials talk about Turkey as a partner, as a strategic partner. Partner is different than a future member state.

[A]

But we're still seeing this kind of mixed message from Europe. Ursula von Der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, recently caused anger in Ankara when she put Turkey in the same sentence as a risk like Russia and China. What do you see playing out there?

[C]

Yeah, I don't think the Turkey question is settled in Europe, and I don't think there is unanimity. You're right. Ursula von der Leyen very strikingly talked about Turkey as a strategic threat, as a threat on par with Russia and China. And the Commission had to walk back that assessment. But of course, I don't think anybody has forgotten it because it represents a certain viewpoint in Europe, but not everybody's view in France. You have a desire for a safe distance with Turkey, very much opposing Turkey's policies in Eastern Mediterranean, and also unwillingness to work with Turkey on defense industrial cooperation, which we can get to. But France is not being keen on including Turkey in terms of modernizing the free trade agreement with Turkey, including Turkey in safe mechanisms and so on. And Germany is clearly taking a more pragmatic line. They are thinking of Turkey as an indispensable partner and a country that they need in order to stabilize the region. They are more focused on the overlaps. Nobody's jumping up and down about Turkey's human rights record or trying to whitewash it, but there is a huge difference. Of course, when I spoke about this divide, it's not just Germany and France, right? I mean, with France, there is a set of countries, Cyprus and Greece, more notably, that want a safe distance, a more distant relationship with Turkey. And at the NATO summit, it was very striking. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis was asked about the potential US sale of F35 fighter jets to Turkey, and he very openly opposed it, saying that they are still under threat of war from Turkey. So that represents a sentiment that is different from the more pragmatic sentiments. If you go to Poland, they think Turkey is very important to push back against Russia, and they're buying drones, Turkish drones, and. And think Turkey is just like it was in the Cold War, is an important geopolitical player. If you go to a country like Sweden, there's bitterness about Turkey, either because of human rights record or because of the long delayed Turkey holding Swedish membership. So the question is not settled, I would say.

[A]

So you have this debate that you described within the EU about whether to embrace Turkey as a partner. Does Erdogan want to be a partner to Europe? Would he be a reliable partner?

[C]

Oh, he wants to be a partner. He wants to be accepted on his own terms with no political conditionality. To me, it looks like he wants a recognition of his role in the neighborhood. I'm the big guy here in this neighborhood, and Europe should recognize that. And he definitely wants a more transactional relationship. I think there is an undeclared consensus to keep the accession process frozen, but still in the books. That works for Turkey because they seem unwilling at this point to engage in a widespread democratic reform agenda, or I don't think they're even pretending. On the other hand, for Europe, the idea of ending the accession process is technically and politically almost impossible. So the kind of hypocrisy where you have Turkey as a candidate country but a candidacy that's not likely to move forward ever, is working for everyone right now.

[A]

I mean, part of my skepticism, though, is, you know, we have seen in recent years that Erdogan does kind of want to maintain relationships with lots of different sides.

[C]

I don't think Turkey will see eye to eye with Europe when it comes to Russia. Erdogan has been very proud of his geopolitical balancing act between Russia and Ukraine. We saw a version of this with Iran, which somehow doesn't anger Donald Trump at all. But Italy, not wanting its bases to be used for strikes on Iran, is angering him. But when it comes to Russia, Turkey is leaned on stability. And the way they talked about it is we're pro Ukraine without being anti Russia. So, sure enough, Turkey did close the Turkish Straits Bosporus and Dardanelles to Russian warships and continued to sell weapons to Ukraine, but has also continued to trade with Russia. I think diverges from the European consensus on some existential level, because the way President Erdogan has talked about it is the war has happened because Russia was provoked. That, of course, is not the consensus in Europe. And Erdogan, for reasons that have also been shaped by Turkish history, having fought Russian empire for about 300 years, Erdogan is very keen to continue to have good relations with Russia. Also, a big economic component still relies on Russia for natural gases, the Turkish stream, and, of course, a very robust trade relationship. But that's not too far from where Donald Trump is. So that's also the difference now. I mean, Trump is like. Erdogan has long wanted a settlement in the conflict, a ceasefire, but also sort of a peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine. He wanted to shut the war down, even if it means. Even if it comes at the cost of territorial compromise from Ukraine. So I think what is different now is you have Erdogan's thinking very much also reflected in the US Administration. I don't think Turkey wants Ukraine to lose at all. I don't think they want Russia to lose either. And where Ukraine's eastern border passes through is inconsequential for Turkey. As long as Odesa, a major trading port, is on the side of Ukraine, as long as Ukraine retains some part of the Black Sea. Whether Donbass is entirely under Russian control or 70% is under Russian control, I think is irrelevant to Turkish policymakers.

[A]

Yeah. And we've alluded to it indirectly a few times. But tell me more about the Trump Erdogan relationship. I mean, they seem like they're staking out similar positions. And Trump tolerates it from Erdogan.

[C]

Trump tolerates it from Erdogan. He's almost infatuated with Erdogan. I mean, here in Washington, not a week goes by without him praising Erdogan. Strong man, strong leader. We're working great. He's got a big military. So I am very mesmerized by this bromance. And what is it that draws him to Erdoan versus the contempt he has for many European leaders? I think the sense that Erdogan is strong, not just a strong man, but also strong both domestically and externally, but also that he's willing to use hard power, that Erdogan is transactional and open to deals in ways that Europeans are not. He is not bogged down by some sort of language on values or alliance loyalty. That feels empty to Trump, clearly, which. Which is everything that the European Union is about. Right. But Erdoan's transactionalism, his willingness to put boots on the ground if he thinks it's going to further Turkey's interests, his disdain for liberalism in liberal Europe and liberalism in general, I think these are all aspects of Trumpism and of Donald Trump that seem to bring the two men closer.

[A]

Given his simpatico with Trump and his strategic relationship with Europe, does Erdoan have potential to be a mediator between the two?

[C]

He definitely positioned himself as a Trump whisperer, and there's a certain reality to that. But Turkey is not going to use its credit with Trump to further European interests. President Erdogan will create these venues, like the NATO summit, where there's potential for goodwill and no drama, unity. But, you know, we've seen that there are limits to that. We've seen that in Ankara, that President Trump is difficult to control. And he has kept praising Erdogan but continued to criticize Europeans. So Trump Erdogan relationship, I think, will move in a bilateral axis.

[A]

All right, Asla Aydin Tasbash, thank you so much for joining me.

[C]

Thank you, Sarah.

[A]

We need to take a quick break. Stay with us. Starting a business can seem like a daunting task unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing, to selling and beyond, Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz and Allbirds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into sign up for your $1 per month trial at shopify.com specialoffer. And now onto my conversation with John Kampfner, author of Braver New World. It's a book about places where political leaders have actually managed to implement successful policies on fundamental issues, from education and climate change to health, housing. So what does it take to tackle those problems? Well. And can successful ideas travel from one country, city or system to another? Let's ask. So, John, thank you for being here.

[D]

Pleasure.

[A]

And I'm really glad to be talking to you because one thing that I have been fascinated about really for the past couple of years looking at elections, is voter anger and how they are just getting really frustrated with mainstream governments not doing things. And yet you have written a book where you specifically looked for governments and countries and cities where policymakers were doing things. It's really quite an optimistic book. For a pessimistic moment, were you consciously trying to write an antidote to the gloom about democracy and governments or did it just kind of play out that way?

[D]

No, I was consciously trying to do that. And also I was embarking on a bit of therapy, I think, as well, because I had become a professional pessimist, particularly starting with Brexit in 2016. And then you had the first election of Donald Trump and then more populists and then Trump, too. And pretty much every time I forecast gloom and I got it right. So I had in my kitchen quite a nice array of quite nice bottles of wine that I was winning off people. I was always betting on the bad news and almost always winning. And then I thought, this is ridiculous. This is smug. This is dumb. This isn't a way to be a responsible journalist, let alone a responsible citizen. So how about looking for the good? Now? This isn't just some sort of Jeremiah book saying, oh, folks, we got it all wrong. Actually, it's a great world out there. Everything is fine, don't you worry. Not at all. This book is saying liberal democracy, the kinds of values that across Western Europe, the things that we hold dear are in grave Grave danger. And one of the reasons they are in grave danger is the failure of governments to deliver the failure of governments to display the three virtues, as I call them, resilience, imagination, and courage. And if they don't show them, it's over. But here, folks, are examples of 10 countries or cities, each of which are doing one thing well.

[A]

When I want to drill to one of those virtues and the virtue that essentially is in the title of your book, Brave or New World, what does bravery mean in this context? And what do these different places have

[D]

in common, bravery or courage mean? Well, first of all, what it doesn't mean. What it doesn't mean is easy rhetoric, promising things and telling people ought will be fine, and political trickery. What bravery means is reckoning with your electorate, trusting in your elected, being candid, and coming up with solutions, or at least routes to solutions that people can understand and people can follow even if they disagree with a specific policy recommendation. There are radical solutions, many of which are actually quite practical as well. And some governments are pursuing them. As I say, you've got to be candid. You've also got to think long term, which is a real challenge for democracies because you have these pesky things called elections.

[A]

And we'll get into that in a little bit later, but first let's talk about some of the specific examples that you really drill into. So starting with Vienna really stands out, as you say, for its. For its housing policy. But Europe is living through a huge housing crisis right now, so what is Vienna getting right?

[D]

So housing, possibly more than any other area of life, is a visible manifestation of equity or inequity in any society. People living in huge mansions versus people living on the streets and what the Viennese do. And it's very specific to a city, this one. But there are many other cities and many other places in the world, because when I was in Vienna, there are constant delegations of people, and from many American states too, but all over the world, looking at the secret of their success. It's basically an emphasis on public housing, some of which is subsidized by the state. It's very mixed housing. So you could be an architect and a lawyer, you know, your neighbors would be a plumber or a workman or a refugee recently arrived. And the quality of the housing is remarkable. There's very little social demand for home ownership because there is no stigma attached to renting, because the kinds of places that people rent are of a very high quality. And yes, it costs. It requires also a lot of long term planning. But the benefits of the outlay of costs and in the subsidization of rent are offset by the fact that criminality, antisocial behavior, public health, manifestations of poor housing cost the state far less.

[A]

As I said, I'm really interested in how the governing failures by the mainstream have potentially led to voters to embrace far right parties or far left parties. So the Vienna example is really interesting to me because we see in so many other parts of Europe that the housing issue and the migration issue are directly linked rhetorically, especially by the far right. And Austria has not been immune either. I mean, Austria, of all the European countries actually has some of the most ascendant far right political movements. So I mean, of course we're talking about a city of Vienna versus versus the country, but I mean, how do you kind of square that, that the capital city, the biggest city of Austria has solved this problem and yet mainstream politicians are still really struggling in that country.

[D]

It comes down to those same virtues again, imagination and courage. Now what you have all over the Western world and not everywhere there are exceptions. But if you think of, let's say the previous German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and you look of the soon to disappear British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, they to me personify the politics of caution and incrementalism. As soon as they win, they look over their shoulders and they say, oh my God, we can't do this. This constituency group will get upset. We can't do that. This part of the media will give us a hard time. We can't do that. Our political party, our members of parliament won't come along with us. And instead of saying, guys, we've got a mandate, we have been tasked by the electorate not just to be in power, but to do stuff. So let's get going and let's do stuff. And I'm a great believer. So says this leader in freedom of expression. It's great that you disagree with me. Protest disagrees, say rude things in the media and social media, great, that's all fine. I'm going to do it anyway and I'm just going to push ahead. And so if you're being optimistic, you could say the existential threat that decent mainstream politics is now facing from the far right and the far left is the wake up call that it's needed in order to say, okay, I may only have four or five years, maybe I'll get booted out at the end of that time, but I'm going to go hell for leather and I'm going to do all kinds of things in all these different policy areas. I'm going to seek to explain it really candidly to the population, including trade offs, whatever it is, but I'm going to go for it.

[A]

Well, yeah, so I'm actually going to fast forward to a question I was going to ask later in our conversation. What happens when people do try to do something brave and the voters rebel very quickly? Looking Donald Tusk in Poland, he raised the retirement age. His can't pay to political price. Emmanuel Macron, his fuel tax plans triggered the yellow vest movement. So are those examples of bravery?

[D]

They are examples of bravery, but they're within the context of not really, in my opinion, embracing the population and what I call input, not what I call what political scientists call input. Legitimacy, the sense that people have policies foisted on them from on high. I mean, Manuel Macron is nicknamed Jupiter. Just the idea of here I am, I know best and I'm going to tell you what the case is. If you include the people in those discussions, even if they disagree, I would argue you've got a better chance of succeeding.

[A]

Let's look at another European example, Finland. You focused on education there and one headteacher told you, we don't have oil or diamonds, we have forest and snow. The only way we can be successful is through education. You know, how does that mindset kind of fuel their success in that department?

[D]

It's an extraordinary. Well, it's not even an experiment. It's been going on now for a long time. The bottom line of it is a respect for education and a respect for educators. To become a teacher, even a primary teacher in Finland, you need minimum, a master's degree, if not a doctorate. And there are more people who apply. A lot of people apply two or three times just to get a place as a teacher in a regular school. Because everybody wants to be teachers and the pay is no better than the European average. It's the social status attached to it. And alongside that also, it's not just the state telling you what to do. It's not just your regional government or your town government, and it's not just your head teacher. Power and authority is devolved to individual schools and the head teacher devolves it down to individual teachers. And individual teachers consult parent groups and pupil groups about what kind of curriculum do you want, how do you think the last year went? What are your ambitions for next year? And as a result, you have much stronger buy in. You have obviously the main subjects, the language of the country plus mathematics, plus science. But then they talk about what are the subjects that you really want to learn. And there are three that are particularly popular at the moment. One is democracy, one is business skills, and the third one is media literacy. And it's basically around this sense of individual autonomy, individual responsibility vis a vis society. And I think sociologically, the one common denominator about all of this. You could go back to my Vienna housing chapter, is a slightly different relationship between the state and the individual. The individual not only makes more demands of the states, but they don't sit grumpily, arms folded, just like I'm doing, but hopefully not grumpily. And there are responsibilities that are required of them. The sense of doing things within your community and in school, it's kids helping each other out. It's a much greater sense of communitarian participation. And the results in Finland are remarkable.

[A]

But I mean, hearing about this part of me is like, okay, on the one level that's inspiring, but it's also like, okay, well, maybe the Finnish, and I'm sure my Finnish friends would agree with this, like, maybe the Finnish are just kind of better and have a better society. And like, given that it's not really so top down, like, how can we transfer this elsewhere?

[D]

I've actually tried very hard to ensure that what I'm proposing or what I'm seeking to illustrate in these chapters are transferable. That doesn't mean you simply go to Finland and you cut and paste its education system and you plonk it in the United States or Britain, France, and everything will be fine. Far from it. Every country has its own specificities and its own legacies and history and culture and geography. But there are certain aspects of policymaking that, yes, I would contend you absolutely can transfer. And I think one of the proofs of this is in each of these countries and in each of these areas, I was witness to a constant stream of delegations of politicians, local councillors, policymakers, whatever, visiting and attending conferences, and in the other direction as well, and people trying to learn from each other. Because I do think one of the great weaknesses of Europe is in. We are both kind of resentful of the fact that the rest of the world is catching up with us, but at the same time, we are reluctant to learn from others. There is a failure of curiosity.

[A]

Let's just go right across. We can basically take a ferry from Finland to Estonia, another country that you highlight. You open that chapter with a funny line. The only thing you couldn't do online was get divorced. And now even that has changed. So tell us about this, like Estonian state.

[D]

So Estonia, 1.3 million people, tiny state. And before people say, oh, yeah, but you know, your recipes are small countries. The other country that I look for amazing digital examples, but we won't necessarily go into is India with 1.3 billion people. And what is really fascinating is that those two countries consult a lot about digital policy and digital reforms. Now in Estonia, a country that has been more often than not invaded and dominated by a neighbor, usually Russia, but also Sweden and Germany over the years is learning the hard way, and certainly since it gained independence from the, or it regained its independence from the Soviet Union, what is it that can make us both resilient as a society, but also wealthy? Because at the bottom line of everything, if you cannot produce economic growth, the public are going to struggle to come along with you. And Estonia absolutely has done that in this period through digitization. Now there is the kind of convenience factor. The average Estonian has gained an extra week of free time a year by not having to go through the drudgery of analog or badly constructed online state services. You can fill in your tax return in 20 minutes. All 3,000 state services you can now do online. They were holding out on divorce for the understandable point that could it be somebody being coerced into divorce? And what they now still insist on is one quite detailed face to face meeting with the individual separately and together, just to, just to check on that. But you can still do everything online. You can get married online. And that has completely transformed the provision of services. It also has increased GDP on average 2% a year. But the most fundamental question, and it goes back to some of the areas we've been talking about, is the relationship between the state and the individual. And in so many countries, for completely understandable reasons, and in Germany in particular, where I spend most of my time, particularly through historical reasons of the Nazi era and the East German Communist Stasi era, the idea of everything being online and your data being freely available, you would freak out because you assume the state or other non state actors would use it for malign purposes. What Estonia has done is built in incredible safety mechanisms. And the individual, you control your data, so you control your data, but also you make demands of the state. It's not like, oh, please, would you mind giving me a passport in two weeks? It is, why has my passport not been delivered in 48 hours?

[A]

That does sound very satisfying. And you know, I was just thinking, you know, Estonian is also a post Soviet country, so they had to overcome these kind of privacy concerns. It Seems like that they have done that, but on the other hand, they were kind of building their state from scratch. And people beyond just the digital context often talk about the Baltics, some of the newer EU member countries, as potentially being able to leapfrog as far as dealing with things like their healthcare systems and other entrenched systems because they're starting over, whereas other places need to deal with kind of, yeah, built in bureaucracies, people who would lose their jobs. So, I mean, it's an inspiration, but can it be copied? Really?

[D]

Yeah, no, I mean, I think it's a really interesting, and it's a legitimate point that most radical change in history occurs after a crisis. And the bigger the crisis, the bigger the change. So end of the First World War produced huge social change across Europe. Voter reform, votes for women, all kinds of social change. And you can argue the same previously on pandemics and on plagues and on all kinds of things. I do think our societies are at the verge of. It's not the time to talk about the Putin threat, but very much you get that sense of impending crisis in Europe. So in so many ways it is an opportunity now. And I don't wish us to be in a crisis, but never let a good crisis go to waste. And this is really for radical change.

[A]

Well, let me ask you about another radical institution that was forged in the wake of crisis, which is the European Union. Though it was once a complete transformation of a war torn continent, it's now, you know, Brussels is thought of as a place where, you know, one policy gets negotiated among 27 countries. It ends up with this, you know, watery compromise that often just triggers backlash without even necessarily creating a big transformative change across the block. So the bravery that you talk about, is that possible at a European level, or can it only happen kind of in contexts where the policymakers and the politicians are really close to the people?

[D]

So to your earlier question about what is bravery? Another thing that bravery is not is recklessness. And the Brits had their little silly moment of recklessness in 2016. And I cannot think of a single person I know, including some people who voted to leave, who do not think that it was, with hindsight, a crazy thing to do. Which does not mean that the European Union then or now is in good shape. We could talk forever about European institutions, but seems to me to be one way for Europe to go is to have an inner core of decision making and a wider core that will include Ukraine and others who do not have to be part of certain policies. But the Idea that Europe and the European Union has to be not just encouraging economic growth and innovation, but absolutely through an economy of scale, through the size of all the major economies coming together, rocket boosting and being a counterweight to the United States and to China seems to be a no brainer. I mean, whether it's Portugal or Italy or Latvia or the Czech Republic, none of these small countries or even medium sized countries, I would argue France on its own, Germany on its own are not going to be globally competitive without pooling resources in really important areas of innovation. So there is a role for the European Union and you know, its demise has been often predicted and you know, it has weathered huge storms and you know, it's still there and it's still trying to adapt, albeit in very difficult circumstances. And one of the things I learned in this book is that so many of the virtues and so many of the examples of imagination, courage and resilience are being shown outside Europe. And if we don't learn, and if we don't learn to be more like others in the global race for competitiveness, but also in our determination to shore up our democracies, and I think we're in trouble.

[A]

So I don't know, I'm almost sort of feeling guilty. Like you spent three years, you know, kind of cultivating your optimism. And I feel like this conversation is becoming a bit of a down note. I mean, what, what will you be looking for over the next three years to decide whether to, you know, keep making the pessimistic bet or what's the most optimistic bet you're willing to make?

[D]

Right now, there is an absolutely clear route to optimism because the alternative is so dreadful to contemplate the demise of what we hold dear. And it is also a mindset change among voters and among societies and among journalists, which is to encourage our politicians to take risks, not reckless risks, but sensible risks, to encourage them to think long term. Politicians who are learning, and there are a lot of them in Europe as well, to be candid, to be more open with their voters and to be more radical, but radical again, not in a reckless way. You know, I am much, much more optimistic now than I was before I started embarking on this global 10 country, three year odyssey.

[A]

All right, well, I will hope that my local politicians feel inspired by the Finns and the Viennese combined to provide a sauna in every rental. It's my wish as a citizen that I can register for online.

[D]

That is absolutely the most important task facing them all.

[A]

All right, well, John Kempner, thank you so much for joining us.

[D]

I really enjoyed it. Thanks for having me.

[A]

Before we go, regular listeners to the show know that we're huge book nerds, so we loved this discussion about Braver New World. And we're planning even more book Talk for later in the summer. So please send us a voice note with what you're reading or what you're excited to read for the summer. We would love to hear your recommendations and feature them on our books episode. You can find the WhatsApp number in the show notes, or of course, you can always send it to podcastolitico eu. And if you haven't already, please rate and review the show. The Weekender lives in the Brussels Playbook podcast feed, so subscribing there really helps. And with that, we're done for this week. Thanks to audio producer Saga Ringmark and to Deanna Staris, our supervising audio producer. I'm Sarah Wheaton. See you next week.