C (2:48)

Exactly. So a lot of the countries that are now in the EU's waiting room, that's includes Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, these countries would be what they call net recipients to the EU budget. So they would be essentially on the take, at least for the first couple years before they join. And that's been the trend, as you were saying, for decades. Poor countries wanting to join the bloc to raise their living standards. Now that's now changing, right?

B (3:13)

Yeah. And this is the thing, because you and I, we love our enlargement stories. We've been reporting on this for a while, and there are now these moves in countries that are quite wealthy countries that would in fact, potentially be net contributors to the EU budget. So those are countries like Iceland, which is very wealthy per capita. It's got the fifth highest GDP in the world. Norway, also very wealthy. We all know about their Norwegian sovereign wealth fund and all of their riches from fossil fuels. There's even talk, Nick, about Greenland and Canada.

C (3:44)

Canada.

B (3:45)

Canada. Not quite geographically. In Europe.

C (3:48)

Front door.

B (3:50)

Well, indeed, shut the front door. But no one's shutting the front door to Canada. I reckon they'd like it. But look, I mean, it's kind of a jokey, jokey thing about Canada. And people have, you know, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney has said, look, we're not, we're not really joining the eu. But they definitely all want to get closer to the eu. And there's these deals that have been signed, you know, Australia clamoring to get in the door. We know there was this acrimonious 2023 breakdown in trade talks between Australia and the EU. All of a sudden, this trade deal has been done within the last couple of weeks. And there's also this agreement with Mercosur countries which has been ongoing. It's been a saga for 25 years. And finally that deal got done this year as well. It's all part of this trend of basically, in this age of Donald Trump, in this age of the various wars that we've seen around, there is this sense of like, okay, there is security and stability in numbers. And the EU is being Seen as this real bastion of rule, of law, of stability, of security for these countries.

C (4:49)

Yeah. And we've seen that kind of come across in some recent crises. I mean, the Trump Greenland threats, that was a real moment when a lot of these little countries, Greenland, Iceland, felt like, well, they could be next if the US is taking over countries. It's also brought up some concerns in Norway, one of the founding members of NATO. They have felt more vulnerable ever since. Trump kind of blew up at the Norwegian Prime Minister because he didn't want to give him the Nobel Peace Prize.

B (5:15)

Not that it's up to the Norwegian Prime Minister.

C (5:18)

Not exactly, but those are just details. And I had an interesting chat with the head of the Conservative Party, potentially an ex prime minister in Norway, talking about the appeal of the eu. And the first thing she mentioned, in fact was the security was the aspect of joining the EU as a sort of extra security benefit. She also talked about Norway transposes so many EU laws, but doesn't get a say at the table and how that was another incentive for them to join. Now they have a security and defense partnership with the eu, but the question is, do they want to go further and become a full fledged member?

B (5:53)

Yeah. And that's literally the conversation that I had with Iceland's foreign minister. You could be describing that conversation where she was saying something very, very similar, which is that, like, look, we have to eat all of these legislation, all of this, all of these laws, but we don't get a say in the process of drafting it. So, like, why don't we just cut the BS and get in there? So they're having their referendum in August this year and that's to restart EU accession talks. If it's a yes, they're going to do negotiations and after a while, you know, they'll have to vote again whether they want to get in or not. But there is also, like the key kind of element that you and I have both also been reporting on is this article 42.7 in the EU treaty, and that is this mutual defence clause, which is kind of similar to the Article 5 of the NATO kind of assurances, which is this mutual defense clause. And it's untested. It hasn't been used very often. I think the last time it was used was after the Paris attacks on the Battle Clan. The French triggered it. But it's an unknown clause, quite obscure, and now there's been moves to kind of figure out how it could be used. So I've been speaking with various folks and one of the People I spoke to was the Europe Minister of Cyprus, and she was telling me that there is this move now to figure out how this clause could be used, how it would work in. In practice. So definitely the EU is also realizing that it needs to kind of up its game on that security front as well.

C (7:17)

For sure, it's kind of a principle in search of a reality in a way, because there isn't a chain of command, there isn't a military command structure for the eu, but people are thinking about that. I would add a sort of, to be sure paragraph into this. As far as Norway's concerned, there could be a discussion about membership, but probably not for the next three or four years, as this government in power doesn't want to bring up the EU question. But of course, it could come up if there is a change in power in Norway.

B (7:46)

Yeah, absolutely, Nick. For our next story, we're Talking about the EU's BTE Noir, Viktor Orban. This is ahead of the Hungarian election. That's on April 12th. Today we've got a couple of interesting stories. The first is this one by our colleague Jamie Detmer, who is basically charting Viktor Orban's rise. Interestingly, he started out as this liberal, kind of centrist, cool, hip guy, activist, anti communist, and now he's kind of mega man in Europe.

C (8:17)

Yeah, he's become one of the protagonists of our drama here in the eu. We see Viktor Orban as the disruptor at EU council meetings. We see him as Putin's best friend, but we don't have the kind of full story. And Jamie had some really fascinating conversations with people who knew Orban when he was younger and talking about how he said there were no signs that he would become an arch conservative, sort of social conservative.

B (8:42)

He used to go to raves, apparently, Mohawk. I mean, I don't know about the Mohawk, but he sounds like a real rager.

C (8:49)

Exactly. And they say what was there from the start was overwhelming ambition and a kind of search for power. And that seems to be the sort of driving force in him. And then there's also the switch to Moscow. Jamie, he sort of pinpoints a moment in time when Orban turns back to Moscow and he says it's a deal. He reports that it's a deal with the Kremlin that He signed in 2014 for a massive loan to expand Hungary's pacts to nuclear power plant. And this is kind of the tipping point for Orban, where he goes from being more on the EU track to much more leaning toward Moscow. And just six months after that, he outlines this vision of an illiberal state, citing Russia as a model. And then we're in kind of our current timeline.

B (9:34)

Yeah. And of course, 2014 is the year of the invasion of Crimea. So that is like Putin. He knows what he's doing when he's finding friends via, you know, giant loans to expand nuclear power plants. So that's definitely an interesting point to point out. But that's not the only Hungary story we've got today, because our colleague Gerardo Fortuna and also Jacob, but I got. They have written a story today basically looking at the fact that the EU is now trying to prepare for if Orban wins this election despite being behind in the polls.

C (10:05)

Yeah. And this is a scenario that you hear from a lot of people. He's very behind, but people say, look, Orban, you know, this is a state that they shaped, and it's totally possible that they would produce an election result that sees him reelected. And the question is, well, what happens after that? Orban has been ramping up his blockades, his defiance of the EU in recent months. His blockade of the 90 billion loan for Ukraine is possibly his biggest act of defiance against the eu. And some of the diplomats I've been speaking to in recent weeks say, well, this obviously crosses a red line, and what we need to see is if he maintains this veto.

B (10:43)

If.

C (10:43)

If he doesn't, we're getting into a different conversation. And Gerardo breaks down some of the options that they're looking at.

B (10:50)

Yeah. And there's a bunch of things on the table. Antonio Kosta, who is the European Council president, he has been looking into Article 4.3. That's that article that says that EU countries have to have sincere cooperation with each other. And the idea there is basically, Orban agreed to the 90 billion euros loan for Ukraine at the European Council summit back in December. And now by going back on his word, he's undermining this sincere cooperation obligation. And so there's a few punishments that are options for Antonio Costa, and he's looking into that as one option. And that's, you know, that's. That's an option that can take some time, though.

C (11:25)

Well, they would have to find them in violation, and they would have to bring them to court to the EU's highest court, which would. Which would find them in violation of this principle. And then there's options that the EU can. Can take to limit Hungary's voting power around. Around the table. Another option is rule of law conditionality, which is basically saying, if you want to receive EU funds, you need to respect these rule of law stipulations. And obviously some of Hungary's funds have already been blocked this way. But I remember speaking with the rule of law commissioner not too long ago and saying, well, we're looking at building even tighter conditionality into the next long term budget. And Orban has come out and said, if you try to do this, I will veto that.

B (12:08)

And that's the problem, because Once again, the EU budget is something that requires unanimous approval from all 27 EU countries. Which brings us to another idea that we've heard bandied about lately. We heard Friedrich Mertz, the German Chancellor, mentioned this at his press conference after the last European Council summit. And that is the idea of expanding the use of qualified majority voting into other areas. So that's the thing where you don't have to be unanimous. You can have sort of this qualified majority of the majority of EU countries, representing the majority of the population, etc. It's a lower bar that you need to meet. And that is kind of an option. But again, in order to switch from unanimity to qualified majority, you need unanimity.

C (12:52)

It's the mother of all catch 22 situations. And that will bring us to Article 7. I mean, this is the real kind of Loch Ness Monster of EU policy as regards Hungary, because they did it with Poland. But Hungary seems to be more troublesome.

B (13:07)

And Article 7, that's where you essentially suspend voting rights in the European Council for a country.

C (13:12)

Exactly. And the issue is that Article 7 requires 26 out of the 27 countries. Now people say, well, some of the countries are going to resist that. Slovakia has been kind of Orban's buddy. What I hear consistently from diplomats is that what this takes is true alignment between Paris and Berlin to get fully behind the idea. And so far were not there, those countries are not ready to trigger Article 7 for Hungary. And it's unclear if that's going to change after the election.

B (13:43)

Yeah, look, watch this space, Nick, for our final story today, this one is quite the doozy. Ava Hartog, one of our colleagues, she has managed to get her hands on a case of messages and recordings between some intelligence agents who work for Russia and Yvonne, who is a student they were trying to use as an informant. And this stuff is super, super interesting because you see the way in which the Russian apparatus basically tries to convert dissidents or convert Russians abroad to become double agents effectively.

C (14:19)

Yeah, I mean, the story is just one of those kind of really easy to read ones. And it gives you insight into how Russian intelligence operates and how they kind of essentially put their talons into this young man and use a combination of intimidation, sometimes being more friendly, but basically forcing him to inform on the Russian dissident movement and also pushing him to go deeper into it and be more useful to them. But, yeah, fascinating story.

B (14:50)

And I've been reporting on Russian dissidents over the years for a long time. And the interesting thing that I found about this story is there's kind of this. It's like this adage that if someone has gone overseas, Putin doesn't care about them anymore. Now, that's patently not true, because if that were true, we wouldn't have the Salisbury poisonings. We wouldn't have the various times that people have been, you know, murdered while abroad. But there is this kind of perception that once you leave because of Russia's closed Internet, closed social media, etc. Etc. The Kremlin doesn't care so much about you anymore. Whereas this shows the extent to which the Kremlin still keeps an eye on all of the people who are abroad and really actively tries to either recruit them or potentially sort of hunt them down.

C (15:35)

And there was a line that stuck with me from the story saying they're particularly worried about the exiles, and they refer to the example of Lenin, who did come from outside Russia and started the Russian Revolution. So there see these people as really high risk, actually, for kind of instability or overthrowing the regime.

B (15:54)

Going all the way back to Lenin, my friend. I mean, that's. That's epic. All right, folks, you can read that story on our homepage right now. And it is a great one, folks. Thank you for all the messages you've been sending in. We've had one from a listener called Andrew from the uk. He sent in his favorite acronym. Nick. It's. It's not an EU one, but it may as well be. It's fubar. Do you know what that is?

C (16:17)

I know what FUBAR is because it was one of my favorite bars in Paris growing up.

B (16:21)

Oh.

C (16:21)

And I know it comes from a, I believe, a US army acronym, if I'm not mistaken.

B (16:26)

I think you're right. It's F'd beyond all repair.

C (16:29)

I heard F beyond all recognition. Maybe we're getting. Maybe it's lost in apocryphal stories.

B (16:36)

Indeed, indeed. We've got one from Lariana from Albania. She does have an EU one that she likes. It's Koella. Do you know what Koella is? Literally. He will never guess, Nick. But it's the Working Party on Enlargement and countries negotiating accession to the eu.

C (16:52)

Don't you love that?

B (16:53)

I just can't live without knowing that anymore. She said it reminds her of Cruella de Vil.

C (16:58)

It does. It does. Rolls off the tongue.

B (17:01)

Indeed. Well, folks, that's it from us. Rate us. Review us. Tell a friend, tell an enemy. We'll be back tomorrow.

C (17:07)

Thanks.