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- [00:05]
Luke von Mittelaar
No migrants more in no Europe without Christianity. An alliance also with Russia.
- [00:14]
James Kantor
Welcome to EU Scream, the podcast that guides you through stories coming from the eu. We talk about the news a bit differently and with people who really know what they're talking about. James I'm James Kantor. This is episode 124, a Machiavellian moment in the Arctic with Luke von Mittleaar, author of several books on Europe, speechwriter to former European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, and founding director of the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics. Luke, you founded the think tank big the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics in October 2022. This was some eight months after Putin's full invasion of Ukraine. It was three years after the EU for the first time labeled China a systemic rival. And it was a full six years since Donald Trump began his first term as US President, threatening European security and then eventually Greenland. Now, there hadn't been such an EU think tank specifically wholly dedicated to geopolitics and strategy before you and your co founders came along and opened one. Why did it take so long?
- [01:35]
Luke von Mittelaar
Why did it take so long? James maybe because earlier it didn't seem necessary. Perhaps it's good to stress that it's the whole world which we are entering, that of geopolitics and geostrategy is really at odds of what the eu, of course, wanted to be and stood for ever since it was founded in the 50s, 60s, and even in the 1990s, EU was all about building a market, regulation, a world of rules, and, and it wanted to do away the previous world of power politics, which had obviously brought the European continent to the brink of destruction in two world wars and all of that. So all these concepts which are at the center of geopolitical thinking, interests, strategy, power, they were taboo within the EU machinery.
- [02:38]
James Kantor
Great power politics are now fully back in the open. We have Trump on the warpath with his doctrine of hemispheric control. And beyond, think even Iran. But Venezuela. And now threats to Colombia, Cuba and of course, Greenland. And we're going to get to Greenland. But just a bit more on when you founded BIG the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics. You, you initially had the support of the Dutch, the German and the French governments. Others have joined Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain. Airbus, the successful Franco European aircraft maker and defense contractor, also a member, but interestingly, far as I know, not the Baltic states, not Poland. And it's here, I'd say, that we start to see the feasibility problems, if you like, of a truly Geopolitical Europe. Right.
- [03:35]
Luke von Mittelaar
So we are open to all states and other partners and backers who want to, together with us, further this mission of a Europe that is better at defending and defining its interests in this geopolitical world. We are nonpartisan in a way, non ideological organization. But I think we all share that conviction that it is urgent to step up Europe's game.
- [04:05]
James Kantor
Sure. But again, I mean, it's going to be tough to get some other countries on board that have been traditionally skeptical of giving Europe an army or making it more geopolitical. And that's the kind of Poland and Baltic states question.
- [04:19]
Luke von Mittelaar
Poland has been very interested and also was part of our institute for its presidency in 2025. But you know, it's not only worldview, sometimes it's also about prosaic budget lines and things like that. So they found some money during the presidency and they will find somebody maybe in the future again. But for now they're no longer with us. At the same time, things can move very quickly. You know, I'm a historian by training and the, let's say the field of the historian is, is time. It's about the whole interplay between continuity and change. Things are staying the same and then suddenly they can change very fast. And I think we are living a period of epochal change. And some people will be surprised the things that they will be saying and doing and deciding 12 months from now, which today they think are unthinkable. If you only think back 12 months about everything the EU has done, even some of the more reluctant players, as you just mentioned, in terms of European defense, it is massive positions which, which seemed kind of consolidated or red lines. Think also, by the way, about the Germans and, and the financing, collective financing, one way or another of defense. Some of these position may just change because the forces out there, by the combination of Putin to our east and Trump to our west makes that kind of strategic convergence and realization that changes afoot will only gain ground nonetheless on.
- [05:53]
James Kantor
This kind of East Europe, Baltics and Poland a little bit at odds, often very much at odds with Western Europe. And there's long been this kind of circular doom loop logic to the question of creating an independent European defense. You know, there's this idea, particularly in the east, that NATO must be preserved because there is no alternative. But if you think that way and you're wedded to that, then no alternative can be developed because that would undermine NATO.
- [06:24]
Luke von Mittelaar
So yeah, a kind of vicious circle indeed. We cannot do nothing because it will scare the Americans and they will walk out on us. I think the responsible thing to do is to consider that, and that has been my position for years, that one day the Americans will walk out on us. And that was, let's say, for decades that was the nightmare for a country like the Netherlands, where I'm from, or Denmark or other Atlantic states, was that the Americans would go home, that they would leave us to ourselves, alone against Russia, and also alone, let's not forget, among ourselves as Europeans, to keep up the peace among ourselves. Now, I think that is, of course, happening with Trump. The Americans are going home, retreating on their own Western hemisphere, which also gives rise to all kinds of acts of imperialism. But I would say that we now have another nightmare. It's not only that of strategic abandonment of Europe by the US we now also have to reflect on the situation, that the Americans will actually come after us, that they are going in attack mode, as this administration has done ever Since Vice President J.D. vance's famous speech in Munich.
- [07:45]
James Kantor
The threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China, it's not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with the United States of.
- [08:04]
Luke von Mittelaar
America, but also in the national security strategy of December 25, where clearly it is now the official program of this administration to undermine EU centrist governments, to attack rule of law frameworks, to try and destroy the European Union from the inside by backing extremist radical right and nationalist populist parties from Poland to Germany to Hungary and France. We are therefore in a completely different situation than, let's say, 18 months ago. And I think that realization still has to sink in more.
- [08:47]
James Kantor
It's kind of hard to see the light at the end of the tunnel, not least because Trump says he'll do something bad, and then he often seems to do something just so much worse. It's a very unwelcome form of over delivery, if you like. What I'm saying here is that we're already very deep into this new era that you're describing. And you have been sounding the alarm, of course, for a while, and not just with the foundation of big of the think tank. The alarm is also sounded in your books, including the 2021 book Pandemonium, which uses the hook of the EU's response to the pandemic to discuss the EU's place in the world. And here you say that the EU is facing a Machiavellian moment or moments, and I just want to look at that term Machiavellian moment, because it's really interesting. It was coined by the academic J.G.A. pocock. What Pocock says very roughly is that polities tend to run up against these Machiavellian moments, where they must become more amoral, more Machiavellian to survive. Can you take me through this idea a little bit as it applies to Europe and Europe's lack of Machiavellian reflexes?
- [10:01]
Luke von Mittelaar
That's great you picked it up, James, because it is fascinating stuff by Pocock. The idea of a Machiavellian moment is that it is the moment when a polity, a political order, discovers that it is actually mortal, that it can disappear. And that is, of course, a frightening moment. But the interesting thing about it is also a moment which can, in that, let's say, mortal fear, almost existential fear, can also mobilize a kind of new energy, can kind of bring forward a will to live and assume a place in time. And for the European Union, and I'm talking here especially about, let's say, the EU here, the Brussels bubble, the whole mindset here in Brussels, you could say that it almost lived outside time. It felt itself a little bit away and above the fray of other actors on the world stages. They're regulating it's almost outside space and territory as well. This whole idea that borders are outdated and level playing field. And the moment of existential shock like Brexit was like the election of Trump was like the attacks by Putin. Okay, we can actually disappear. We, we can actually face a moment when the EU no longer exists and we have to act, we have to do stuff, we have to decide things right now, even if we may get it wrong. It leads also to what I call improvisation, often one actor among other actors, that you don't have to feel guilty if you want to defend your interests, defend your territory. Of course, there's a lot in European history to feel guilty about, but that's not the point. Not a single power in the world feels guilty, or when it affirms its interest, or when it draws a line in the sand and says, this is us. And that kind of almost liberating moment can also arise from such dangerous situations, which Poko called Machiavellian moment.
- [12:15]
James Kantor
You would use some language there about Europe having a certain guiltiness, perhaps, about seizing the Machiavellian moment.
- [12:25]
Luke von Mittelaar
Well, I think that it comes in different shapes and forms, as of course, Germany with its guilt about the Second World War, Holocaust, and which is all pervasive, not only in its Middle east, and Israel politics, but also in the way it relates to the United States as its post war savior and the way it operates in the world and its sphere of power. But more broadly, of course, there's also a number of particular western European states and southern European states who have been colonial powers. Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, France. And there is a kind of lingering colonial or post colonial guilt which is I think quite present in our societies and our political systems. I guess it influences debates on migration, influences debates on how we relate to Africa, to Latin America and Asia. So it's kind of hampers the self confidence to stand up there and say, okay, there are some black pages in our history, we acknowledge that, but we are Europe and we feel that it is important that we also have our place under the sun and there are certain things we want to do or defend and that's just who we are.
- [13:46]
James Kantor
I mean, it's such a difficult needle to thread, isn't it? Because these colonial era crimes and the racism associated with them and some of the imperialist impulses of that period in European history, I mean, it's quite understandable that there should be some hesitancy. It is about asserting, I should say, that's why, and especially about asserting some sort of civilizational vision which can be highly, highly charged. A sort of white, civilizational, Judeo, Christian, European form of dominance again. So getting that right, getting that balance right is very difficult, very difficult. If not, I mean, a really, really tall order. And you know, I guess it will be incumbent upon those who are in the business of geopolitics, in the business of promoting Europe as a geopolitical entity to, to respond to those people.
- [14:43]
Luke von Mittelaar
But if, but the thing is, not doing it risks condemning us to powerlessness. We feel paralyzed. There's no action. We're just waiting, hoping or relying on the Americans who have maybe less feeling of guilt to do things for us. So one way or another, I perfectly see the risk you are sketching and I'm deeply aware of it. But there's also the risk or the disadvantage of doing nothing. Any political community wants to survive and thrive in today's more and more multipolar order, needs the minimum self awareness to say we who we are, a community. Over time we are changing, including thanks to migration or whatever kind of development, different views of family and science. But we have an existence in time as a nation or maybe also as Europe. I think that is the bare minimum I'm talking about. And that is already better than only thinking about being European in terms of universal rules and values of democracy and human rights. Because it is more than that. It is more that defines us as Europeans and which binds us as Europeans. And when you go again to India or China or Brazil or even to the us it is clear to any outside observers that all these small countries here living together, they have something in common which is European.
- [16:32]
James Kantor
One of the main buildings, one of the main EU buildings is named after a 16th century Dutch humanist who also, like Machiavelli, took a rather practical view of how to preserve societies and polities in turmoil. Here I'm referring to Justus Lipsius. The Justus Lipsius building is where you used to work as a speechwriter for former European Council President Hermann van Rompuy and where government ministers meet to do EU business. Now, as I say, Justice Lipsius, the. Not the building, but the 16th century humanist, he downplayed moral universalism, norms and idealism, and he instead sort of put the accent on realism and state interest. And with that philosophical branding, you'd think the EU would be closer to the kind of Machiavellianism that we've been discussing. At least that's my thinking.
- [17:24]
Luke von Mittelaar
Well, I think Justice Lipsius is not the biggest name in the pantheon that the EU has created for itself and which usually filled by characters which have more cosmopolitan or universal worldview, like Erasmus or Victor Hugo, who was pleading already in the 19th century for the United States of Europe. The EU has put all its money. I'm talking here again about the EU founders and the kind of Brussels outlook on indeed a kind of utopianism being the avant garde of a new form of living together as states and peoples. And we were even hoping back then, even as late as the 1990s, think about Francis Fukuyama, the end of history, that what we were achieving in Europe, that it could be a model for the whole world. Right. Well, there was this book at the.
- [18:23]
James Kantor
Time, you think about Jeremy Rifkin and all these books about the European model.
- [18:28]
Luke von Mittelaar
But this is obviously not where we are today. I mean, we have to deal with the world as it is, where the rest of the world is not following that great model of Europe and where we have to fight and defend what we have achieved internally and where we can no longer hope to export our idea of these norms and values abroad, because that has obviously also come with quite a price. And I think there is nothing to be ashamed of to say we want to protect what Europeans have achieved within our continent. And it does not necessarily have to be a universal utopia. It's already quite impressive what in the EU, 27 states we have managed to achieve.
- [19:19]
James Kantor
But then you have, you know, you look to the present moment and you have people like Jean Noel Barrot, the French Minister of Foreign affairs, insisting, quote, we are no longer in the era when you could buy or sell Louisiana. Okay. That's a swipe at Trump's appointed envoy to Greenland, Governor Jeff Landry of Louisiana, who said he would work to make Greenland a part of the US and.
- [19:45]
Luke von Mittelaar
Also a reference to his own French history. Because, of course, the French at the time were at the selling side of Louisiana in the way Denmark does not want to be today.
- [19:55]
James Kantor
Indeed. But to me, what Barrot said still feels a bit Pollyanna ish. It makes me wonder, does Jean Noel even have a tv? Because, yes, we are at least with Trump kind of back in that era, Right?
- [20:11]
Luke von Mittelaar
We are in that world. We are in a 19th century world of great power politics. I think Trump has been very explicit about this ever since his second inauguration about a year ago. What we are now talking about as the return of the Monroe Doctrine, the idea that the US should be the only boss in all of the Americas, north and south, all the way from Greenland down to the Andes, keeping all other foreign powers out. And of course, when Monroe said this, back in the 19th century, this was about keeping the French and the Brits and the Spaniards out of the Americas. And today it's about keeping the Russians and the Chinese out. And that was clearly written on the wall in the inauguration. It has now also been theorized neatly in the national security strategy. And I think as Europeans, we really have to get to terms with what it means for us, because the fundamental point is that the United States has underpinned. In fact, after 1945, a lot of what we hear in Europe have been able to do in terms of EU integration, not least every single US President ever since Truman, all the way until Obama and Biden, has supported EU integration, at least up to a point, excluding defense integration, and with some reluctance when it came to the euro. But basically, the Americans have always supported this. Trump is the first president already in his first term who wanted to and still wants to destroy the eu. But it's more fundamental than that the fact that the US no longer wants to uphold the multilateral order which itself it built after the Second World War with, for instance, had the United nations in the center of that whole system, United nations with the headquarters in New York. Not a coincidence. It's an American institution in that sense as well. Trump is leaving that order which served the US well. For 80 years. And he and his administration want to replace it with a new kind of global order for, as they say, quote unquote, the next 100 years. And that is an order. You can call it neo Westphalian or whatever you want, but which is again, a return to the great power politics of the 1970s century, respect for sovereignty of your adversaries. So the Chinese can do what they want more or less in Taiwan, the Russians in Ukraine and America, the US in the Americas, north and south, leaving Europe to fend for itself. Because today Europe is no longer part in that America first view of, let's say, the American sphere of influence in the way it was in the transatlantic era.
- [23:07]
James Kantor
But let me say that the entire era that you're describing, where the post war era, the era of the United nations, if you like, for Europe, indeed that was underpinned by American defense power. And the problem with Europe meeting its Machiavellian moments, if you like, is that Europe doesn't have that power, it doesn't have that military force. So how advanced do you judge the transition being undertaken by European industry, for instance, to produce armaments, to create a much more European centered defence industry?
- [23:48]
Luke von Mittelaar
That transition is on its way. It's taking time, but I think the Europeans have more power, including military power, vis a vis Russia, than they think. Sometimes we are talking ourselves down unnecessarily.
- [24:02]
James Kantor
Clearly they have more power now than they think.
- [24:05]
Luke von Mittelaar
Europeans, European states collectively have more power than sometimes we make the public believe. It's not like Russia will tomorrow get its way and run over all the way to Warsaw or wherever. I mean, after we are soon, unfortunately we'll be four years into this war. They have not been able to cross the Dnieper and have seized like 20% of Ukraine territory with huge losses, of course. But it's not like they would any day soon be in Berlin as they were in 1945.
- [24:41]
James Kantor
They've been relying on American. Well, the Ukrainians have been relying on American intelligence and our ability, Europeans ability to buy American weapons.
- [24:51]
Luke von Mittelaar
But Europeans have bought them the last year, at least for the Ukrainians, from the Americans and are also gearing up production for ourselves, but also for Ukraine. So it really, it boils down to the transitional period. How much time does Europe need to be able to defend itself without the military support of the Americans? And of course, that transition could be uncomfortable, that we have to be honest about that. But if you never do it, if you never do it right, you will end up on the periphery of Trump's empire, powerless and of an empire of which you currently do not know what turn politics will take domestically. But it doesn't look great. It's not a place where you want to live. So I think it is important for Europeans to realize that however painful this is, after 80 years of transatlantic marriage, that's also about parting ways and making sure that we can defend ourselves. Earlier you mentioned the Poles and the Baltic states, who are maybe more reluctant than some in Western Europe. And I completely understand that in view of their history and their fear of Russia. But if you look for instance, at Denmark and what that small country, a very loyal ally of the US Ever since the foundation of NATO, which has participated in all these military operations, including Iraq and Afghanistan, all these stories, they were always there.
- [26:28]
James Kantor
The highest losses apart from the Americans in Afghanistan were sustained by the Danes, I think.
- [26:34]
Luke von Mittelaar
Exactly. So they feel horribly betrayed is the word used by Prime Minister Matthew Fredrickson and other senior Danes, by Trump's attitude. And this is already language which they used, let's say early 2025. And of course today with all the threats over Greenland, that sense of disarray and betrayal is even stronger. So you see that Denmark, which as we mentioned was so loyal, has always bought all the US Equipment it had to. It has in its recent big spending splash on strengthening its own military. It has bought, I forget the exact number now, but I think it's in the order of 67 billion euro, European equipment, French, German, Italian, etc. And it is no longer opposed to European defense integration because it understands that where we are today, this is the reality. You have to be pragmatic. If America is coming after you or your own sovereign territory, you cannot rely on them.
- [27:47]
James Kantor
So we've seen this transition in Denmark, this important transition. But you mentioned also this idea that the transition will be uncomfortable and not just from a policy perspective, but for example, there are those who say, well, the situation is such, and it might make some economic sense for Europe's car factories to be converted to armaments factories and for military purposes. So these are the kinds of quite far reaching suggestions that we're hearing.
- [28:22]
Luke von Mittelaar
I think the dynamic is very interesting in terms of jobs and you mentioned the car industry, where it could indeed be helpful, but also in terms of technological spin offs. If you think back about all the money that from the Europeans as buyers has gone into the US Defense industry and the spin offs that has resulted in all the way to Silicon Valley and AI today, then I think this kind of reassessment of a reprioritization of the Europeans to say, okay, well, we need to get serious about this. We have been, in a way, a little bit childish, a little bit spoiled. We have outsourced this basic requirement of a state to be able to defend your territory to the Americans for too long. And we're doing it now. But as I say, it may bring extra benefits.
- [29:30]
James Kantor
Greenland is kind of Schrodinger's European Union. It's not in the union, but it kind of is. Greenland left the European Communities in 1985, so Greenland isn't really part of the EU's legal order. Plus there's the US which has been eyeing acquisition of the island since 1867 to jump ahead. Trump has bad poll ratings ahead of November's midterm elections, assuming he holds them.
- [29:56]
Luke von Mittelaar
Indeed, assuming he holds them. It's one of the big questions for me of this year 2026, will the midterm elections actually take place?
- [30:03]
James Kantor
And a Greenland snatch could be part of his game plan for jingoistic mass distraction. This is high stakes stuff and I understand why one might get philosophical at such moments. Ursula von der Leyen has called for European Stoicism. At this time she was on Cyprus and she name check the Cypriot born Zeno of citium from the third century B.C. and who is credited as a founder of Stoicism.
- [30:29]
Luke von Mittelaar
Stoicism teaches us not to fear the challenges, but to meet them with clarity and resolve, to turn challenge into opportunity, to turn adversity into strength.
- [30:44]
James Kantor
And it is what Europe must do now. But you know, the acceptance of fate part of Stoicism, that sort of seems at odds with the goal of keeping.
- [30:56]
Luke von Mittelaar
Greenland and having some agency over your.
- [30:59]
James Kantor
Life and having agency. What, if anything, is von der Leyen actually saying here about European geopolitics?
- [31:06]
Luke von Mittelaar
Well, I don't know about Stoa, but if I were a European leader, I would rather quote than Marcus Aurelius. The Roman emperor who was a big fan of Stohanner, wrote some quite readable books about that as well.
- [31:18]
James Kantor
Marcus Aurelius, Yes.
- [31:20]
Luke von Mittelaar
Yeah. This being said, I think von der Leyen as president of the commission is in a difficult spot because of course, this is this Greenland story. Annexation, it's a matter of war and peace. Military invasion is not really the kind of thing that's part of the commission's competences. And maybe the EU is not the best vehicle to deal with this situation. What you can see is that, and I think that's good, that Denmark is speaking to fellow European NATO allies or fellow European states and see whether it can maybe cobble together A kind of coalition of the willing 2.0 for this specific purpose of helping Denmark out in Greenland. Germany has announced it will send troops to Greenland for the first time along with other European countries as part of measures to boost defense on the Arctic island. As US President Donald Trump insists the Danish territory is essential for US national security, that could be one way of dealing with the situation for Europeans.
- [32:31]
James Kantor
Sweden and Norway have also announced similar moves following demands from Donald Trump that Washington takes control of the island.
- [32:40]
Luke von Mittelaar
What struck me when reading this New York Times interview with President Trump where he was theorizing that not a single treaty or a bit of piece of international law could stop him in his foreign actions except his own morality, quote, unquote. Well, not very reassuring prospect, but he also kind of weighed the options of, yeah, it would be nice to have Greenland, but then maybe I would lose NATO. But is it so bad to lose NATO? Because it's also really nice to possess Greenland as a bit of real estate. So this kind of distance, I think he had to this issue, that must have been shocking to many Europeans and by the way, also many American diplomats and former NATO ambassadors, because like, okay, you're throwing away an 80 year old or 75 year old alliance which has served US military and economic and strategic interests incredibly well, and he might indeed just do it. So what can the Europeans do to deal with that situation?
- [33:51]
James Kantor
First of all, we have this kind of coalition of the willing, a group of states that are backing Denmark. I'm not sure that in and of itself is going to determine Trump that much.
- [34:00]
Luke von Mittelaar
So, well, depending if they actually do something, I think what Trump currently feels, that if he says Drinan is mine, that is just enough or that he has, if he sends three and a half helicopters down the island, then he can claim it is his. So what Trump likes is low risk, high visibility operations. In a way, the Maduro kidnapping was very good example. He went in there, it was spectacular and they went out. No, no victims on US Side as far as I know.
- [34:32]
James Kantor
Yeah. I mean, possibly more than 100 on the Venezuelan side.
- [34:37]
Luke von Mittelaar
Yeah, but I mean, so that of course he doesn't care about. So from his point of view, this, this was low risk, very successful operation. And as long as he thinks, as long as Trump thinks that Greenmont is just as easy, easy ride, he might do it. So the first thing the Europeans should do preventively is maybe to send over, provided the Greenlanders and the Danes wanted a small mission, observation mission, military mission with, I don't know, the French, the Brits, Some Nordic states helping Denmark establish some kind of military presence on Denmark side in Greenland. That would immediately change the calculus for Trump because the risk goes up. He cannot just, again, as I said, send two helicopters. I'm not saying that the Europeans, any European state, would actively, militarily, except perhaps for Denmark, but fight the Americans over Greenlandic territory. I don't think so. But the fact of establishing some military presence there would raise the stakes. It would be a way in, maybe had to call Trump's bluff, so to say whether he really wants to do this, knowing that there's also some domestic pushback against this.
- [36:01]
James Kantor
Have you floated this idea? Have you discussed this idea?
- [36:04]
Luke von Mittelaar
Yeah.
- [36:05]
James Kantor
Well, Luke, you have amazing access to heads of state and government. Have you discuss this with them?
- [36:12]
Luke von Mittelaar
We have, with our institute. We. Yeah, we published on this. We, our great defense fellow, Claude France Arnoux, former executive head of the European Defense Agency, has published on this. We have advertised the idea and indeed pitched it also to our contacts where we could. But of course, Denmark is itself very prudent, and they still hope that with talking to the administration, to Rubio, Secretary of State and others, that they can prevent the worst. But personally, I think they need to do a little bit more than just talking and they need to show that they're serious about it.
- [36:57]
James Kantor
So that's the deterrence option. But then those who are interested in the option that you've just outlined, they might be wary that any confrontation whatsoever with the United States over Greenland, multinational force or otherwise, would pit two NATO allies against one another, Denmark and the United States. And, you know, that would be the end of NATO, as we've heard repeatedly. And to take that further back to the New York Times interview, that's why people say that if Trump and MAGA really want to sink NATO, then this might be what of the most convenient ways to do it, to have that confrontation in Greenland. And of course, there are going to be Atlanticist and pro NATO voices that are going to say, do not do anything, do not do any form of military brinksmanship on Greenland, find a way to placate the Americans, do not do anything that would lead to US Troop withdrawals, et cetera. And that's why there's talk of another scenario, this compromise scenario. Denmark would agree to give Trump full military access to Greenland and deny access to Russia and China. In other words, this idea is to offer the US A deal that gives the US what it wants, security, control, strategic access. And that would be at a lower cost, presumably for the Americans, than some form of Annexation. So that's another scenario. I mean, how would you weigh that against the deterrence scenario that you outlined earlier?
- [38:27]
Luke von Mittelaar
Well, the way I understand it is that the Americans currently already have all the access in the world. They have. They have a military base. They can have more via NATO. They have also been office for further presence of NATO allies in Greenland. So I'm not sure that adding, let's say that to that package, which already exists, will sway Trump to decide against full possession, because he sees it really the way he expressed it, that it's different from having some kind of treaty or cooperation framework, even if that would include unfettered access, from actually owning it, from. Maybe he just wants the flag or he wants to use Greenland for other purposes, be it military, be it real estate, be it. I don't know what. And he has that in his mind. He has had it in his mind for. For a long time already. Apparently, when Trump, probably during his first time in office, traveled to Denmark for the first time, he already was struck by the map his advisor showed him of the Kingdom of Denmark, which, with its three parts, Denmark, Faro Airlines, plus Greenland. And he was like, wow, that's an interesting piece of land they have.
- [39:51]
James Kantor
And this is very interesting, Luke, that you would lean towards the deterrence option, because that would be Europe and the multinational force that were to go there exercising a far more hard power option.
- [40:06]
Luke von Mittelaar
It would be good. It would be a sign of strategic maturity, especially if it could also, indeed be something together with the. With the Brits, the French, some. Some Nordic states, where you see that in this current context, we as Europeans share certain strategic interests. We do not placate the US President for every single of his whims and requests. And we are also able to draw a line in the sand.
- [40:50]
James Kantor
Luke, what do you make of EU Defense Commissioner Andreas Kabylius saying that the bloc now may need a combined force of around 100,000 soldiers to replace American troops in Europe and may need a European Security Council? I read that and I was like, oh, Lord. Another EU organ. Nonetheless, that could be made up of Italy, France, Germany and Spain. It would presumably be the kind of headquarters based in Brussels. That's also something that Brussels Institute for Geopolitics would favor.
- [41:26]
Luke von Mittelaar
I think this is an absolutely interesting line of thought to think anew about some of the structures, including institutional structures, to reflect and decide about security matters. These and. Well, this is a very recent speech by Coppelius, so I haven't read it in detail, but the way I understand it, he actually, because I Thought you.
- [41:49]
James Kantor
Might have written it.
- [41:50]
Luke von Mittelaar
No, I haven't. No. No, I'm not working as a speechwriter anymore. I'm happy to be a free man outside.
- [41:57]
James Kantor
Well, you know what I mean.
- [41:58]
Luke von Mittelaar
Yeah. But it's the kind of thinking with which I feel very familiar in the sense that part of the proposal, the way I understood it, is that this Security Council would be a little bit like in the un, would have a number of permanent members, let's say the Big five or Big six, perhaps the uk, I don't know, and a number of rotating members, which would be the smaller states. This has always been taboo in Brussels circles because of course you have equality of member states. It's a sacred principle. All 27 are the same. But when you talk about these kind of strategic military issues, it doesn't make sense, politically speaking, to say that Malta and Luxembourg should have the same weight and presence as France and Germany. That's not going to deter anybody or be efficient. So you have to find ways to deal also with the realities of that situation. Now, that's a very uncomfortable discussion and maybe it will go nowhere. But I find it refreshing that somebody from one of the Baltic states who is actually commissioner, floats that kind of heterodox ideas, which goes really against the traditional mindset of how Brussels thinks about these things. That goes back to one of the points we discussed earlier, that this is a moment in history when capitals and national governments discover that they are states, that we are, as we have been for a couple of centuries in Europe, a system of states living together. And the European Union is. Is kind of the most recent manifestation of that state system.
- [43:53]
James Kantor
I mean, I've never felt like you're a federalist at all. Nonetheless, I mean, what you're talking about kind of brings us closer to a sort of confederal vision of the European Union.
- [44:03]
Luke von Mittelaar
For some aspects, yes. But do not forget, you and I have the euro in our pocket. We have the internal market, we have a court of justice. So the European Union is federal in some of its manifestations. The currency, I think, is the most powerful symbol of that. And not just a symbol, it's a reality with the European Central bank as a very strong federal institution. But on a matter like defense, war and peace, what would the European Central bank be? These kind of decisions have to be taken by the governments collectively. So it really depends on the topic, and I'm pragmatic about this. I think we should do what works, what is credible. Because if you push too far on your federal blueprints, you will end up with Brexit and exits, losing all connection with national politics, which is also not a good thing.
- [45:13]
James Kantor
That's it for this episode. EU Scream is non profit journalism and is produced in association with the Brussels Times. It's your support and your feedback that helps us delve into this new, darker era in our politics, into how the EU should be responding, and into the thoughts and experiences of of people who really know what they're talking about. Small donations to large ones, that's all incredibly appreciated. It also helps when we get a five star rating at Spotify or a review at Apple. Podcasts and passing on episodes to family, colleagues, friends. That's yet another great way to show support. For more details and for more EU Scream, do please visit Brusselstimes.com and look for the podcast. Thanks for listening.