David Solomon (2:25)

So you write the book that at one point, escaping your childhood neighborhood was Your primary ambition in life. Tell us a little bit about kind of your childhood and the journey that kind of led you not too far from the neighborhood to Goldman Sachs, you

Lloyd Blankfein (2:38)

know, two parents and relatively, you know, relatively crazy but stable background. But I did grow up in public housing in Brooklyn. And it was kind of struggle. It was always, you know, my father was unemployed for a while. And one thing I didn't have to do and one of the advantages and the first chapter of the book I call Advantages, which is I never had to source my motivation. I knew that I really wanted to get out, to get away. You know, we lived very tight quarters in the projects, you know, public housing. And always shared a room alternately with my sister, who was a little older than me. And she had a kid very young. And for me, getting away meant going to an out of town college. If I got to an out of town college and I got away and I broke, I'd be able to go like it was like watching old TV show, like Father Knows Best or one of those TV shows where the guy has. Where the people live in a house and there's like grass in front of the house and stuff, as opposed to concrete and broken glass. And that's what I aspire to. And then I went to a college night at a different high school. Cause nobody from my high school went to college. Or very few did, you know, I went up to a booth and there's a guy from Harvard sitting behind it. He gave me an application and I filled out the application. Like you'd fill out a landing card when your plane was coming in. You know, I'd ask the question like, what was the, you know, what was the greatest thing in your life? I'd say the greatest thing in my life was, you know, and I would just fill it out like that. That was easy breezy. And I got in.

David Solomon (3:57)

Did you go right to law school after Harvard?

Lloyd Blankfein (3:58)

I did. But at that time you had to take out big loans. Loans start to come into effect unless you keep going to school. So it kept going and going to school. I worked at a law firm. Yeah, Donovan and Lee after.

David Solomon (4:07)

So you got a job there?

Lloyd Blankfein (4:08)

I got a job mid March to partnership, if that ever were gonna come. Which used to be about eight or nine years, right around year four or five, which I was in. Everybody sort of looks around and. So what else do you do when you live in New York? You apply to financial firms. And I didn't know very much and I didn't do the work that you need today. And Even when I was. You'd interview people. They'd know more about the firm than I did when they were interviewing, because that's what you have to do. I didn't do that. I didn't know you were supposed to do that. And got turned down by everyone, including Goldman. But I did get a job at J. Aaron while Goldman was acquiring Jay Aaron. And that's how I got into the firm.

David Solomon (4:41)

What was it like joining J. Aaron in 1982? What was J. Aaron like in 1982

Lloyd Blankfein (4:45)

when I got the job? I was interviewed by Dennis Susskind, who's a big personality, big guy and big personality. And he kept calling me at the interview, college boy. I realized at the time that he didn't go to college and a lot of other people didn't. I realized that the uniqueness of me is that I went to college. And you walk into a trading room today and you can hear a pin drop. People sitting next to each other, talk to each other digitally. In the old days, people shouted across the room. I used to interview people later on by putting. At the last interview, I put somebody at the opposite end of the trading floor. And I'd stay here and say, let's continue the interview to see if they can actually yell across the room. And that's what you did. And in those days, it was like this. And I remember Dennis said, hey, college boy, do you think you can work in a place like this with the screaming around? And I said, work in it. I go home to it every night. And that's a true story. And he remembers it. And that's. And then I got the job. And I was so pleased with myself. And then when I actually showed up, somebody pointed out to me which is appropriate for firm that traded gold. They regarded the interviewing process as their words mud down a sluice. You know, a sluice. They would hire 30 people and hope out of the 30, they'd get one nugget. So the idea was that they'd hire a lot of people and they'd see if any were left at the end of the year. I didn't know that. I thought I survived this process. And there I was. And so that was that kind of wild and woolly, you know. It was. The Hunt brothers were cornering the market, and gold went from like $35 to $850, which, by the way, took only about 35 years to get back to. And they were doing really well. And it wasn't a terrific business. It just. They got caught up in that. But the shrewd traders that they were at the tippy tippy top of their opportunity. You see Dave, and shaking his head at the tippy tippy top at the opportunity, they extrapolated that out to infinity and sold it to Goldman Sachs, thereby establishing the relative trading acumen of the two organizations. That was Jay Aaron. It was a really tough crowd. And ultimately J. Aaron was saved because some of the people from Mark Winkleman and a few other people from Goldman proper got moved down and basically reshaped it.

David Solomon (6:59)

And reshaped it. Something more. You talk in the book about the fact you were able to rise through Goldman Sachs because you were better at managing down than managing up. Describe what you meant by that. Yeah.

Lloyd Blankfein (7:09)

And I think this is kind of a universal thing that people should know in this firm. I can't tell you. That applies everywhere. When you're rising, even as a leader or a manager in the firm, you really need the support of people under you. People can technically support you. They can comply with your request, but they could do it grudgingly, answer the narrow question that they're being asked, give you a hard time, in other words. Or otherwise they could support the heck out of you, tell you things before you ask the question, give you a real answer, see things and support you. And there's kind of a contract between people that, you know, when you're a leader, you're going to advance their interests and you're going to support. And I don't mean just be their agent, I mean advance their interest by teaching them, investing in people. And usually. And that gets reciprocated by support the other way. But if I had to push a button and choice between the two, I'd rather have the support of the people that were working for me, working with me, than people above me hoping that I succeeded. I'd rather have the people under me wishing that I succeeded.

David Solomon (8:08)

One of the things that you spend a bunch of time in the book that's obviously hugely important to all of us as a firm is the partnership culture. And you talk about how hard the firm fought to preserve it through the ipo. And you and I had a discussion yesterday when we were on the phone just talking about how miraculous it is 27 years after the IPO that this public company still has this deep, deep partnership culture.

Lloyd Blankfein (8:30)

Yeah. What's a partnership culture? It's a sense of ownership. Somebody in investment banking in Tokyo screws up, you pay the price. Reputationally, if you're a bond trader in New York, and so you have Big ears. Being a partnership means, you know, as a leader, you're talking to people who kind of own the firm and have an expectation. They expect to know more about what's going on the firm, not just in their narrow area. They have a sense of. A sense of entitlement. There's a feeling, you know, sometimes things go a little slower because when you're managing that, you know, you socialize things a little bit more. It's not like lightning bolts radiate from your fingers. You tell people what you want to do, you wait for the reaction, then you say it again. You wait for the reaction, guess what, maybe even change your mind. And you have to adjust or you postpone things. And that's not the way in a much more hierarchical corporate setting. In a partnership, almost as a legal definition, you're mutual agents for each other. It's not commands and control. And in order to make that work, you actually have to believe it and you have to perform that way. And you have to really do socialize it and really do listen and really change your mind and really think you can't do something if your partners are against it. And sometimes it could be frustrating and slowly and you want to do things and you kind of know where you're going to end up, but you take the time doing it. And as a result, you get more of an ownership culture where everyone feels responsible for the whole. Everybody has big ears, everyone listens, everyone throws in. And as a result of that, you have a much better, coherent, stable organization. And Hank did that, I did that, and I know that you do that. And it's very different. If you spent your whole career here, you may not know that how things work in other places where I'm in the blippity blip division, you ask them about another division of the firm or somebody four offices down. They have no clue and are surprised that you think they might. That's not their job here. It's your life. You own it. And as a result of that, a lot of things come from it, like the loyalty and commitment of people for their whole lives, even beyond your career at the firm. I'm outside the firm now, and I can tell you I always thought this, but people have been out of the firm for 20 years. And when somebody asks them, you know, sometimes your situation go around the table and somebody has to explain themselves, they start with, I'm a lum of Goldman. They were Goldman Sachs for five years. They worked somewhere else for 22 years. And they self identify as ex Goldman. And there's value to that. There's a lot of other elements. I talk about this in the book. What I think are the elements of a partnership culture and what it takes. And again, you know this and you live it. And it's just. It's just. It's just different. And the result of that is, you know, what we have here.

David Solomon (11:01)

Are you surprised we've been able to do it? Because if you step back and you said at the time and you were here in 1999, that's when I arrived at the firm. It certainly was hard to imagine that 27 years later. It's very unique. There's no other firm that I can think of that's a public company that has this unique.

Lloyd Blankfein (11:18)

Nobody rolls their eyes or acts cynically when somebody says he or she is a partner of Goldman Sachs. Right. How can you be a partner of Goldman Sachs? They're not really partners of Goldman Sachs, but really aren't. You act that way and you live it, but it only happens because you live that way.

David Solomon (11:33)

You stepped down as CEO in late 2018. Talk a little bit about how your view of the firm has evolved with the passage of time. And also as you've lived, you lived so intensely inside Goldman Sachs for so long. Now you live not so intensely outside of Goldman Sachs. Or maybe just as intensely. But I don't think so.

Lloyd Blankfein (11:50)

For one thing, when I left the firm, it's clear to me that the firm should increase its dividend.

David Solomon (11:57)

Well, we did.

Lloyd Blankfein (11:58)

Yeah. No, but all things considered, I will say that you and I represent. If you think of the three people associated when public. It happened during the Hank years. I did it. Now you're here, I think, and this is a way of thinking about it. There was a process really, by which the firm became a public company in a way. And Hank was clearly running a partnership. I mean, because even as a public company in those years, the partners controlled it. In fact, the board of directors was still a majority Goldman Sachs partners. Over time, people left, people settled down. And over time, it becomes more and more real. And it kind of gets reflected. You know, private company's different than a public company. A private company. You cared about your capital account. You didn't care about whether you earned the same amount of money at the firm every year. You know, if there were 10 years and you had four super duper years and three oh, so, so years and two years, you lost money. I don't know if that adds up to 10. But anyway, who cared? It's sort of you work for your Career, you didn't get any money until you retired and you got. Your capital account got emptied out and nobody cared that. But in a public company, you don't own the firm. You own a little bit of the firm, but we don't control the firm. The shareholders do. It's their firm. And they want smooth earnings, smoother earnings, not totally smooth earnings. Because the value of the firm to the public shareholders is the earnings multiplied by a multiple. And that multiple is affected by the predictability of and the likelihood that those earnings would continue to grow. And that wasn't something that Hank Paulson wore that much. And it was something that was starting to emerge that way. And I'd say in a lot of ways, David, you sort of completed the IPO process in a way because you did some things that I wouldn't have done. And guess what? I'm not sure the firm would have had the same multiple today if I was still there, because I really was grounded in a firm that bore a lot of the risk itself that, that did things on balance sheet, and I would have kept it there. And I thought it was a big part of the mojo with the firm. And it was. But you sort of calibrate that against what having a lot of investment assets on the balance sheet of the firm would create in terms of volatility of the firm. And so you can make spectacularly more money. But if you're trading at a multiple of 10 and your competitors are trading at 17, you give up a little bit of E for a little bit more pe. And that was something that, you know, you get a little bit trapped in your own kind of worldview. And somebody once said when I was there, and they meant this to flatter me at the time, you know, things were going crazy and we had to be very risk conscious and the world was blowing up. And financial crisis, you know, one of the 17 crises of the century that I lived through, they said, you know, it's a good thing you come from the risk side of the business. And isn't it wonderful that Goldman Sachs gets the leadership it needs when it needs it at the kind of time? And I said this at the end of the book, I said, I can't say that hasn't been repeated now, because I may have delivered what the shareholders wanted, but I would have done it with greater reluctance because I was used to the private partnership where you just tried to maximize the earnings of the firm over time and you didn't care in what order and to what kind of consistency it came in and it's a much different world than running a public company. And the challenge, of course, is to run the company as a public company and still preserve all those elements of, you know, we're a risk oriented firm and all those other things that make us good risk takers over time and not just when the sun is shining and do that and still be responsive to the public, which kind of tends to be a little bit more short term and amnesiac.

David Solomon (15:17)

But you started to touch on the financial crisis a little bit. You know, I want to go there. You became CEO in 2006. The world certainly changed in 2008. Two years later, we were full on in it. I remember those days very, very well. Talk a little bit about that period, talk a little bit about the firm during that period, and just talk about some of the biggest lessons that come out of that.

Lloyd Blankfein (15:34)

Well, originally for us, the financial crisis really started in 07. I'm looking at David here, who we had the office next to mine. We lived through a lot of this together. And I'm sitting in a movie theater middle of 2007, doing what I'm always doing, which is scrolling through the Firm's P&LS while the movie is going on on a BlackBerry. On a BlackBerry at that time. Very primitive. And then I get to something and believe me, it was a long movie. And so I went deeper into the P and L than I normally do. And I actually got to gsam, which I never really looked at because it had its own balance sheet, its own risk. It was almost a separate place firm. And there was this fund that on a busy, wild day would move 4 basis points and it moved 6%. And I go, whoa, that's not supposed to happen. And I said, I think it must be there with Laura, my wife. And I said, excuse me, I have to go to the bathroom. And I went out and I started calling what the? And that was really the first, you know, the verse sign. And that was sort of the moment like, you know when you watch August 07. Yes. You know, you're watching a movie, you know, western, and you know, nothing's happened, the sun is shining. All of a sudden the, the horses start to whinny in the corral and, you know, some sagebrush rolls across the screen and you say, geez, they're trying to let me know that something is going on. And so something was going on. And that was when some of those relationships and relative value trades started to go a little amok. And that was kind of an early sign. And by the way. I'm sure there were other early signs and I'm sure other people had them, but we were very good at responding early to early signs because we had this culture of mark to market, which not everybody had, and we were pretty severe about it. And we also had a culture where the people in the control department really governed what marks to use. And we would have traders arguing with controllers and controllers over one. But there was always an automatic appeal, go out and sell something and show that they had the marks wrong and you had the marks right. And when they went out to sell them, they looked for that bottom and it wasn't there and they started to do it. And it wasn't a function of us being so prescient and knowing what was going to happen. It was just a function of us really marking things to market. And even if we didn't have the discipline, the fact that it affected our P&Ls because we did everything mark to market forced upon you that discipline because you couldn't bear the P and L laws. And so they forced people to get out of things a lot quicker. The other thing we did very well is when we were in risk management mode, which is different from let's trade and make money mode, we'd go around the table and you're supposed to say, not what do you think is going to happen, but what could happen? And what contingency plans did you have if any of those things happen? And you'd go around and somebody would inevitably say, well, I don't think that's going to happen. And I'd say something like, I don't care what you think is going to happen. And then they'd say, well, if you don't care what I think, what do you think will happen? And I'd say, I don't care what I think is going to happen. We're in risk management mode, which is what means I only want to know what could possibly, even with a low probability, happen and what are we doing to protect ourselves against that tail risk.

David Solomon (18:36)

We've got a whole chapter on risk on this and the book we really

Lloyd Blankfein (18:39)

talked about, what are we doing? And I tell you, I think we were very, very good traders, but really what we were were very good contingency planners. And if you contingently plan well enough, when that remote contingency happens, you get off the block so quickly people think you anticipated the start, you anticipated the gun, when in fact we just heard the gun and acted quicker.

David Solomon (18:59)

We were definitely off the block faster. It wasn't an Easy transition in the fall of 2008, but we were definitely off the block. Faster lessons takeaways from that period as we came out of it in 2009.

Lloyd Blankfein (19:11)

Yeah, if the market's going to go down, be short. I have a respect for the fact that stuff happens. I was asked today, tell me about the bubble we're in. I said, if I can tell you about the bubble. We're not in a bubble. You just have to have a respect that things come out of left field. If everybody was prepared and expecting the bubble and staring at the watch, when is that bubble going to get here? It wouldn't get here.

David Solomon (19:33)

You don't know. You don't know. People are so sure they know. The one thing that you always taught me is we don't know, we don't

Lloyd Blankfein (19:39)

know and nobody knows and you just have to go around the table. We used to say look around corners. You have to look around. Can you see around corners? No, you can't see around corners. The whole point of that metaphor, that's why it's a corner, that's why it's a corner, is that you're trying to see things that you really can't see. But what you really are doing is you're preparing for things. Because guess what? Low probability events, forget it, throw that out. I mean, how many times during the financial crisis said, oh, this is a 13 standard deviation event. Well, guess what?

David Solomon (20:09)

There were a few of them.

Lloyd Blankfein (20:10)

Guess what? It's not, it's, you know, what happens is we are now in a place and now people have gotten it. They use the language, people say risk on, risk off. Because if it's risk off, two things that in a million years you never thought were correlated, guess what are now have a correlation of 1. They're absolutely correlated because everybody's getting out of everything that isn't a T bill. And that's the, and that's the kind of thing. And so here's a funny thing. As I always tell younger people, experience is a two edged sword. You know, if you're young and you're starting out and you're conversing in technologies that older people haven't had to rely on or get educated in, that's a huge advantage sometimes. That's why in a lot of businesses, the younger people have sway over the older people because they're much more conversant with the new stuff. And older people, dinosaurs such as we are, are a little bit slower and don't have that nettle. But there are just some things where experience does help. And one of those things is living through these cycles and these crises. So you could read about financial history, but it just won't register to you. The same way when we were living through the financial crisis, that really registered with us. And you can read about it. And having had it register, you're much more attentive to the sound of a twig crackling because somebody sneaking up on you and you jump higher in the air as opposed to let it go. And that's kind of what we are. Can that hurt you at times? Yeah, because you might find you might identify six financial crises that really aren't there. But I'd rather prepare for the ones that aren't there than be underprepared for the one that is there.

David Solomon (21:40)

Absolutely. Shifting gears, you launched during your tenure two programs that really have had an enormous impact. 10,000 women and 10,000 small businesses. The impact continues to grow today. Talk about the impetus behind those initiatives and kind of how you thought about them for the firm and why this was important to you personally.

Lloyd Blankfein (22:00)

Part of this. One of the problems that Goldman Sachs had in the financial crisis, people didn't know us. We were a wholesale firm, we didn't have a consumer business, we didn't deal with consumers. And so the consumers didn't know us. And other words for consumers are citizens and taxpayers. And that kind of hurt us in the financial crisis when people sort of knew the mythology and the, you know, I won't say fame, but let's call it notoriety of Goldman Sachs during that period. And you know, we wanted to do something that reached out and had contact with the real kind of world and also wanted to do things that people in the firm would appreciate that was on a human scale. And so one of the things we did, if you take these 10,000 women, 10,000 small business, taking people through the steps of the acculturation, the education that we would give our clients, that we got ourselves in business school, albeit in a 10 week kind of a course in partnership with real business schools and real institutions, help them line up capital and give them advice. But the most important beneficiaries obviously are client companies. The ten thousands were big beneficiaries, but so were our people. Because on that scale you could really see what you were doing, what it was accomplishing. And just taking somebody through the analysis of when you get paid back, financing it, what the return would be, how long it would take to recover, that was let people do something on a scale of real people. And I have no doubt, let me tell you what Goldman Sachs does is very, very important to the growth of the economy and the well being of the republic and the, and the commonwealth and wealth creation in general. But sometimes you're so remote from it because of the scale that there's a lack of appreciation. This gave people much more appreciation. Another thing that happened on the tail end of my tenure, which is much more prominent now, the analyst impact Fund, where they're going out and they're really kind of doing the same thing. They're raising capital philanthropies and they're doing pitchbooks and trying to sell to their investors, namely the audience and your senior people of Goldman Sachs, why this is a good investment and why the return will be there. And again, that's something that people compete in and do, but they can really see vividly the impact of good name of what they're doing.

David Solomon (24:19)

What prompted you to write a memoir and what do you hope for the people who read it?

Lloyd Blankfein (24:24)

Well, there was kind of COVID boredom that had some involvement in it. I'm not encouraging people who are Goldman to make their afterlife sooner than it would otherwise be. But you know, once you get out, you know, you talk to people, you remain. There's anecdotes. I can't say it's an egoless decision. Anybody who writes an MWR can't, can't claim to be, oh, I'm just a humble guy. I just thought the world really needs to hear about my life. Let me bestow myself on the planet. So there's that kind of element too. But it was kind of fun. I didn't start out thinking that I would publish a book. My parents passed away, you know, when I was in my early 30s. Never got to chat. I wonder, you know, my kids, they're pursuing their lives now. There'll be a time. I mean, now I wish I could talk to my parents and I can't. And one day they may want to talk to me. And so I started writing. And the beginning of it, you know, when I'm talking about my childhood, went very quickly because, you know, anybody who could contradict me was either, you know, dead or institutionalized. And then once I progressed to the part of the story where people were alive and could contradict me, I sort of got bogged down. So one night when I got to one of those knotty things about how I should reflect something and I said maybe I should call some people and see how they remember it, I sort of put my pen down and then I picked it up again three years later. And that's what happened at that point. I got somebody to sort of help organize it a little better. And he was much more of a disciplinarian, saying, now we're going to write a chapter. And then eventually that's how it became a book.

David Solomon (25:49)

You know, you talk about in the book when you became a partner, the then chief of staff, John cone gave you a piece of advice that stuck with you. Can you share that?

Lloyd Blankfein (25:58)

John Cohn was kind of like the minister of Interior. And you know, in those days you became a partner, it was a real partnership and you had to have a meeting with someone where he would tell you how much money you had to contribute to the firm. You know, part of that meeting, you know, obviously there was the obligatory and very sensible things. And then there was an interesting part of it where he said, you should also, you should be philanthropic. And one of the things in those meetings was they helped you set up a private foundation. This was before there were donor advised funds. They actually set up a Parrot foundation for everyone. They said, you know, this will be very good for you. It'll be good for you because you should have a life outside of the firm. You should meet people from other businesses, other industries who are also interested in these things. It's broadening for you and you'll be a better person for it. And by the way, it's good commercially for you to meet these people and people to see you in those contexts doing things. And also as you grow up and become more important, you need to be a citizen of the city that you're in and make those kinds of contributions. And the other thing was a statement about balance. If at the end they write an obituary about you, and that obituary is nine paragraphs long, make sure that no more than three of them are about Goldman Sachs. So in other words, you should be doing other things while you're at the firm, but you should also. Inevitably, people have other chapters after Goldman Sachs. I may not have that many chapters after Goldman because I stayed a long time, but by and large that was that kind of advice. And when I think back of kind of people who became partners with me, many of them have big firms, some of them philanthropic, and other people, you know, go into government. And I think that that was life advice, to put it in that way, where it wasn't just an exceptional thing, it was part of an expectation. And you know, having that in your mind also has to determine about who is a Goldman Sachs person, who are the people you get. Because what people do at the end of Goldman Sachs has a lot of influence on the kind of people who select Goldman Sachs in the first place. I always thought it was very important who your alumni were, how you treat them, how the network performs as one of the best recruiting things we have for people coming into the firm in the whole place. When people see the value of what it is to not only work here, but to have worked here, that's a very, very important thing. And you know that. I know you know that. How many times have somebody come into you who you pinned your hopes on and broke your heart and said they're leaving, Then you go into a room, count to 100 or 10,000, how long as it takes you, and then you come out and say, how can we help you in your next chapter? Because you have to remember it's a long term thing. That's another important element of the culture.

David Solomon (28:34)

When you look back on your career, what's the thing you're most proud of?

Lloyd Blankfein (28:38)

I think I'm most proud of maintaining the distinctive Goldman Sachs culture despite the shift in context that we had, which we all thought was a very low probability.

David Solomon (28:49)

Yeah. And it's a huge part of what I think about, you know, sitting in this room.

Lloyd Blankfein (28:52)

Yeah, I know that.

David Solomon (28:53)

Well, Lloyd, thank you.

Lloyd Blankfein (28:54)

Well, thank you.

David Solomon (28:55)

This is great. You know, thank you for being here and doing this. And also thank you for writing a book that highlights so specifically the specialness of the culture. I mean, that's my biggest takeaway from reading the book is how it amplifies what's really special about the place.

Lloyd Blankfein (29:08)

Well, thanks, David. I feel that way. Thank you.

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