A (4:16)

So let's talk about that. What I heard you say there is Iran had that nuclear weapons program that in 2003, according to US intelligence, was halted. But as you know, there's this debate over whether Iran's nuclear program actually did have a weapons ambition. You were never quite able to say yes or no.

B (4:38)

Well, because we are not analysts or people having opinions. We are the iaea. So whenever we say something, it has to be based on actual inspection. But we were as precise as we could be in terms of characterizing what we were seeing. And one important conclusion of that was, and I think I have repeated that in view of the conflicting narratives that are out there, especially here in the United States, they have it, they don't have it. And in particular, people tend to like part of a sentence I pronounce and not the other, or forget the two thing is and continues to be one. Yes. Like you say, yes. We haven't seen a systematic program like the Ahmad plan with offices, people reporting to people and an array of places where you are doing stuff. But there were many, many concerning things, many unanswered questions, and especially since 2019, 2020, when I became more or less when I became Director General, where. Yes, in 2015, in when the JCPOA, the previous agreement, you remember the Obama era nuclear. Exactly when that started to be applied, Iran was complying with a number of things, but we started seeing new stuff. We started seeing and getting new elements that gave rise to concerns and we were talking about them with Iran. You've seen me many times go to Tehran, sign declarations and see commitments on their. Then it came a point, very important point, when I said, you know, in view of this, I have to say that I'm no longer able. I'm no longer able to say that everything is in order because you were

A (6:46)

finding uranium in places it wasn't supposed to be because they weren't allowing you unfettered access. You couldn't say clearly one way or the other.

B (6:53)

Exactly. That.

A (6:54)

So let's come back to that. I, according to what you did know and did, were able to declare in these IAEA reports, Iran had uranium enriched up to 60%. Weapons grade is 90, as I understand it.

B (7:07)

Yeah.

A (7:07)

And if that material remains now in Iran after combat ends, will it still have nuclear capabilities if it has the enriched material and the centrifuges?

B (7:20)

Well, you remember, and for this I would quote or partially refer to things that have been said in Iran by Iranians. You remember very important officials saying, we have all the elements of the puzzle. You remember that?

A (7:36)

Yeah.

B (7:36)

So of course. And not said by a journalist or a newspaper, important people that had been working in the program. So when this is said, we were telling them this is unhelpful, or at least you should explain what is meant by that. It's a vast program. So, albeit the physical distraction that has been operated, acted upon these facilities, there's a lot going on. And don't forget something, Margaret, when we talk about centrifuges, when we talk about these kind of facilities, this is an activity that can be relatively. I wouldn't say easily, but it is very possible to reconstruct this effort. It's metallurgy. It's a sophisticated washing machine, if I can put it like that. You have rotors, bellows, but it's about metal. The ability to curve metal in a certain way, the ability to weld it in a certain way, the ability to have it spin at great speed, membranes, etc. It's nothing. And you cannot unlearn what you've learned.

A (8:51)

Right. You can't bomb away the knowledge. So that capability will exist after coming.

B (8:55)

Exactly. And it was very sophisticated. Let's not forget, again, referring back to jcpoa. JCPOA was based or predicated upon a very primitive type of centrifuge. Now, Iran has the most sophisticated, fast and efficient machine that exists. And they know how to make that. They know. And on top of that, there may be places out there which are not nuclear places. I mean, it could be a workshop, dozens of workshops that exist and this capability exists. This is why what I say is that we still need to find a framework, an agreed framework that is going to be providing us with the necessary provisibility and sense of a clear idea of where they are, what they want to go.

A (9:56)

Because this war will not destroy Iran's nuclear ambitions and capabilities.

B (10:01)

I would say any war, any war, unless it was nuclear war and you go for destruction in an unfathomable way, which we hope, of course, will never be the case.

A (10:12)

Well, talk to me about the options that we know are being discussed by the United States right now, including President Trump and Israel have talked about the potential of sending special forces in to secure some of this enriched material. You have been to Isfahan. You have seen some of the underground facilities. How difficult would it be to move these cylinders that are there full of chemicals?

B (10:33)

Listen, of course I'm not a military expert and I don't know what kind of abilities there could be out there. And I have no doubt that looking at the efficiency of military operations that the United States has been performing this year in particular from the beginning of the year, perhaps there, there are ways that they can do that. I would not enter into that assessment, but I have to say that we're talking about cylinders containing gas of highly contaminated uranium exofluoride at 60%. So it's very difficult to handle. So much so that, for example, in terms of this negotiation, we might perhaps discuss that a little bit that did not bear fruit. One of the things that we were discussing was down blending because of its difficulty in terms of handling in the scenario, for example, of a ship out of the material exfiltrating the material. So it is very difficult. Then of course, I guess there will be a number of decoys, a number of distracting cylinders, materials over there which would make it very difficult. I'm not saying it's impossible. I know that here there are incredible military capacities to do that. But it would be a very challenging

A (12:01)

operation for sure, for special for military operation to be carried out after combat ends. Iran's foreign minister on this program last week told us their nuclear material's under the rubble and they'd be willing to deal with your agency just like they were negotiating before the US started bombing. Have you talked to the White House about this idea that your inspectors can go in and gather that material and take it out?

B (12:29)

We are considering these options. Of course our relationship with Iran is a treaty based obligation because even in the context of this war and the situation that we are in, Iran is signatory to the treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. So they have a contractual obligation to allow our inspectors in. Of course there's common sense, nothing can happen while bombs are falling. But yes, I've been having important conversations here at the White House and also with Iran. There are some contacts and we hope to be able to reestablish that line.

A (13:10)

Do you think you can revive parts of that deal that were being put together before the bombing began where Iran would downblend? I Mean Oman's foreign minister on this program said that Iran had agreed to zero stockpiling, that they had agreed to send that material out and to dilute it down, down, blend it.

B (13:29)

Yes.

A (13:30)

Was there really the possibility of a deal because it was just hours before the bombing began? Yes, yes, that he told us peace was possible.

B (13:41)

While there is a negotiation, there's always a possibility of an agreement. We cannot deny that.

A (13:46)

But you believed Iran truly was offering an option.

B (13:49)

There was a discussion, but there was no agreement.

A (13:53)

There was no agreement that Friday that the bombing began. The Omani foreign minister said he needed another 90 days. Would a real deal have been done?

B (14:01)

Well, maybe. I think I praise his efforts. I respect him enormously. I think he was really trying very, very hard. And we had long discussions. He invited me in, of course, together with the two belligerents today. So we were having very frank and very deep discussions. So one cannot deny the nobility of the effort, someone who's trying to prevent a war. And I applaud that as a diplomat and as a citizen. But there was no agreement at that point. So much. So remember this, you remember that we had agreed to have a technical meeting on the Monday after the weekend where operations started. That should tell you that there were very significant, if not disagreements, there was no alignment or what many of the things that were discussed that really meant. And this is why I offered, I said, well, let's technical level, please send me your people to Vienna. We will go through this and see what this or that may mean.

A (15:13)

You wanted to keep talking to avoid military action.

B (15:17)

Well, I felt that that was my obligation. I was invited to provide my technical support.

A (15:23)

Well, let's talk about that because, you know, Iran disputes that they have a weapons program now, but they do have a nuclear program, including a research reactor in Tehran for medical isotopes. President Trump told reporters that this was, quote, a complete and false pretense to hide the fact that they were stockpiling. He meant nuclear fuel. The IAEA monitors that location. Is that what Iran was doing? Secretly stockpiling material?

B (15:54)

Let's try to clarify, unpack that a little bit, because there's also a lot of confusion that I see in characterizing what the Tehran Research Reactor is, what is happening there. The relevant point for and in terms of this negotiation and what could have happened is that this research reactor, and in general, research reactors require for their fuel a level of enrichment which is

A (16:25)

20%, which was permitted under existing agreements.

B (16:31)

Yes, but, yeah, it's permitted in general. But the thing is that we were in the middle of a negotiation which was proceeding from the assumption that there wouldn't be any enrichment. Zero enrichment, zero or something very, very limited. So when you talk about 20%, you are exceeding that amount. Forget about if it was stockpile or not. The concept, and this is what I would like your audience to grasp, that the idea that if you go for an agreement that presupposes that you can have 20%, this is three or four times more what the JCPOA was permitting. You remember, the level of enrichment agreed in The JCPOA was 3.6.

A (17:18)

In general enrichment, there were allowance for these medical. I should just clarify. I said President Trump, I meant President Trump's officials, his representatives said that. But for you, you did have questions about this Tehran research reactor. I'm bringing it up because these Trump officials keep pointing to the IAEA as providing information that made them say, wait a second, Iran's not being honest. Is that what you were telling the US not about.

B (17:47)

We don't discuss honesty or dishonesty. What we discuss is technical capabilities and what technical capabilities may allow you to do or not. Intentions are legitimately discussed at the national level. And I won't get into that discussion because every country and the United States and the president of the United States has every right to believe that they were going to do something or that they have an intention. My job is a different job, is to explain on the basis of the technologies that are there what can happen and what is the impact vis a vis the negotiation you are trying to get. And 20% is a lot of enrichment.

A (18:25)

So then was it correct for those Trump officials to say that the agency, your agency, provided the US Information that Iran never once used that material to make even a single medicine, that everything that was being done there was a cover for what could be a nuclear program?

B (18:43)

Well, there you're putting words that relate to intentions, and I don't get into the COVID or something like this. What I can say is that this is a reactor that potentially could be used for radioisotope production. That was very, very limited. We were inspecting this facility. We are inspecting it, actually. So there was limited use. Of course, Iran has every right to say no, but we are going to have a big program for radioisotope. This is what is used to detect and sometimes cure cancer. So that is the

A (19:24)

iaea. Is, is the UN Is this supposed to be just calling balls and strikes, as we say here? Just calling it as they see it?

B (19:33)

Yeah.

A (19:34)

As you saw it, Iran might have

B (19:37)

been cheating, I think, again, to come to that judgment, we have to have certainties. What we. And I go back to what we were discussing at the beginning of the conversation, Margaret. There were many unanswered questions, many unanswered questions, many concerning facts. And what we were asking Iran is give us the clarity that we need. If you say that you have a fatwa that prohibits the country to develop nuclear weapons. Well, let us check. If you don't have anything to hide. And this is, by the way, what we tell everybody in the iaea. Let's say operation, you don't have anything to hide, show us.

A (20:15)

Right. And you want that access now. U.S. the U.S. director of National Intelligence told Congress yesterday that Iran's enrichment program was obliterated, that the US has seen no efforts to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. Do you agree with that assessment? Do you have any indication that the new supreme Leader would want a weapons program?

B (20:37)

Well, I don't disagree with that. We don't see major activity, which is logical because there is a military campaign ongoing. Whatever, you're not going to start, you know, bringing cranes and workers.

A (20:52)

But they weren't doing it in the lead up to the war either, according to the Secretary of State.

B (20:56)

Maybe, by the way, what we have is satellite imagery. All right, so at least the iaea, maybe others have other technical means or personal means to check what is happening. As far as we are concerned, we haven't seen. But as I was saying, a lot has survived. They have the capabilities, they have the knowledge, they have the industrial ability to do that. This is why we need to go back to a negotiating table. It's going to be needed.

A (21:34)

And the US has bombed twice in nine months during the course of diplomacy. Who has the credibility to lead negotiations now? Do you think it needs to be a regional conversation?

B (21:47)

I don't think a regional conversation would be. Anything can happen and the IAEA will help. But this is about a national program on a highly sensitive national security issue like a nuclear program. So I don't see how a regional conference or conversation could be more effective than what is needed. We need the United States, of course, and Iran at the table. The IEA can help, maybe, I don't know, the Omani effort could be revised. I don't know. That is not my discussion, which is a political discussion. But I don't think anybody would disagree even here in Washington, that for a durable, long standing solution, we will have to see each other again around the table.

A (22:35)

And Iran has reached out to you. Their foreign minister has said he's interested in a negotiation.

B (22:41)

I Wouldn't say that. It would be unfair to him. But there are contacts.

A (22:47)

Let me just ask you about one other thing. You've said about half the nuclear material was around Isfahan.

B (22:53)

Well, it's a little bit more, but the majority of the material is there. And this is not a secret because I've seen a lot of hype about it. This has been in our reports. The vast majority is there. There is some in Natanz as well, and some other parts.

A (23:11)

There is focus on these other undeclared facilities President Trump has brought up. There's a facility called Pickaxe Mountain, for example, that comes up. Are you concerned about those other.

B (23:20)

Well, we should visit those. They were not operational. So this is why we hadn't. You may remember that on the eve of the June 2025 campaign, Iran announced that they had a new enrichment facility in Isfahan. On the same day, I issued a request for an urgent inspection, which was granted. And the inspectors were there. And the morning were the, you know, late night when the attacks happened. So we never got to see the place. We will have to go there eventually.

A (23:58)

But just final thought here. Do you think President Trump supports what I heard you say, which is that a military campaign cannot destroy Iran's nuclear program and that the only way to understand what they're really doing is to be on the ground inspecting it? And that can't be done by the United States military fully either.

B (24:25)

Well, I think, I don't know whether he would endorse this or not, but he has said also that of course diplomacy is the preferred option. I think that is encouraging and we have had a very constructive conversation in the past.

A (24:43)

There's a lot going on right now. Mounting economic inequality, threats to democracy, environmental disaster, the source of stench of chaos in the air. I'm Brooke Gladstone, host of WNYC's on the Media. Want to understand the reasons and the meanings of the narratives that led us here and maybe how to head them off at the pass that's on the media specialty. Take a listen wherever you get your podcasts. I'm back.

B (25:12)

I'm really back. School Spirits returns.

A (25:15)

Why am I here? Not dead, right? This place is an absolute death trap. We need to get out of here.

B (25:22)

School Spirit's new season now streaming only on Paramount. And now, have you spoken to him? Not to the president? No, I haven't had the honor, but I was talking to people that I had been talking in the past. And we continue, we continue this effort. I think the essence of this is that in the bleakest hour. We should never lose hope.

A (25:47)

Director Grossi, thank you for your time.

B (25:48)

Thank you very much.