Former Israeli Intelligence Officer On the Prospects for Peace in Iran

Summary

Podcast Summary: Fareed Zakaria GPS – “Former Israeli Intelligence Officer On the Prospects for Peace in Iran”

Date: May 10, 2026
Host: Fareed Zakaria
Guest: Danny Cintrinowicz, former Head of Iran Branch, Israeli Military Intelligence; Senior Researcher at INSS
Additional Guest: Beverly Gage, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian

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Main Theme & Purpose

This episode of Fareed Zakaria GPS focuses on the aftermath of the latest round of US-Iran conflict, the prospects for a durable peace deal between the two nations, and the broader geopolitical rifts exposed by the crisis. Zakaria’s conversation with Danny Cintrinowicz explores the strategic calculations of both the US and Iran in a volatile moment, while historian Beverly Gage reflects on America’s complex history on the eve of the country’s 250th birthday.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why the US Struggles with Iran

[00:01–07:30]

• Zakaria opens with a game-theory perspective: in existential conflicts, the side with the most at stake (Iran) will be less likely to compromise than the more powerful but less invested US.
• The US approach to Iran has always been conflicted: wanting both regime change and negotiated concessions. This creates policy whiplash, as demonstrated by Trump’s oscillation between threats and negotiation overtures.
• Historical parallels with US–Soviet relations (“Does Washington want to change Iran’s behavior, or change Iran itself?”).

Notable Quote:

"If the stakes for one side are existential and for the other much lower, the side with those bigger stakes usually prevails... For Trump, it would be a bad weekend at Mar-a-Lago. For the Iranian regime, they end up toppled and slaughtered."
—Fareed Zakaria, [02:00]

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2. Interview: Danny Cintrinowicz on US–Iran Prospects

[07:43–22:05]

A. Who Needs to Move Next?

• Cintrinowicz says the "ball is in the US court"—Iran sees little room for compromise unless the naval blockade is lifted first, before nuclear talks even begin.
• The US must decide between seeking regime change (war) or compromise (accepting some Iranian demands).

Notable Quote:

“The US Administration need to decide whether he wants to topple this regime... or he wants to compromise... it’s all gotten back to the White House, to the president.”
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [07:56]

B. Iran’s Leverage: The Strait of Hormuz

• Iran is now openly weaponizing control of the Strait to pressure the US to lift sanctions, threatening to bar ships belonging to sanction-enforcing countries (even after deals).
• The blockade is unsustainable long-term; friction will likely escalate unless resolved, as Iran "won’t accept the status quo."
  —[08:32–10:01]

C. Content of a Possible Deal

• US has dropped previous demands on ballistic missiles and proxy support (the major criticisms of Obama-era nuclear deal) from the table.
• Iran adamantly refuses to negotiate on missiles or proxy activities; these are "pillars of the regime’s security doctrine."
• Any deal will thus focus on control of the Strait and enrichment rights—basically returning to the stalemated contours of the JCPOA.

Notable Quote:

“There are not going to be any agreement with the Iranians if President Trump will insist on limitation on missiles and on proxy aid... for the Iranians, those are the pillars of the regime.”
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [10:28]

D. Negotiation Gaps and Strategic Impact of War

• Iran’s stance on enrichment before and after the war remains unchanged—no underground enrichment, offering “face-saving” mechanisms but not substantial operational concessions.
• 39 days after war, “nothing has changed.” The war granted operational but not strategic gains.

Notable Quote:

"This raises a question whether this war was beneficial. Definitely there were operational achievements, but strategically there was no change."
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [13:39]

E. US Demands for “Zero Enrichment”

• Trump’s team insists on Iran stopping all enrichment and exporting materials—Cintrinowicz sees no chance for a deal if this remains the demand.
• Iran may accept restrictions but not outright dismantlement. Assuming pressure will force surrender is “an illusion.”

Notable Quote:

"This regime that is willing to sacrifice its own people, you don't have a leverage against it... It's an illusion."
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [15:41]

F. Regional Implications

• Gulf Arab states are splitting over Iran policy; the UAE and Saudis are at odds, undermining prospects for Israeli-Arab normalization.
• Without progress on Palestinian issues, no broader normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is possible, irrespective of the Iran crisis.
  —[16:11–17:28]

G. Israel’s Stance

• Israel prefers “no deal” to a “bad” US-Iran agreement, as any deal limits Israel’s freedom to strike Iran’s infrastructure.
• Netanyahu is constrained—unlike during Obama’s term, he cannot openly challenge Trump.

"For Israel, no deal is a better than a bad deal... Netanyahu cannot challenge President Trump out of the open like he did to President Obama." —Danny Cintrinowicz, [17:47]

H. Accidental Regime Strengthening

• The crisis and US policy shifts have, paradoxically, saved the Iranian regime at a moment of internal weakness.
• Killing Khamenei led to an even more hardline succession and greater IRGC power. Hardliners who opposed negotiation were emboldened after Trump quit the JCPOA.
• The regime moved further from compromise, and the window for reform closed.

Notable Quote:

"Instead of changing Iran for the good, we change Iran for the bad... after President Trump decided to leave the JCPOA, all those in Iran that supported negotiation with the U.S... weakened dramatically."
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [19:18]

I. Advice & Strategic Assessment

• Israel and US overestimated their ability to coerce regime change in Iran; underestimated regime resilience.

"We created a worse strategic reality than we started with... underestimating the Iranian resilience and overestimating Israel and the US ability to topple this regime from the air."
—Danny Cintrinowicz, [21:27]

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3. America at 250: Reflecting on the Nation’s History

[22:07–29:46]
Guest: Beverly Gage

• Gage’s new book (“This Land is Your Land: A Road Trip Through US History”) explores the intersection of celebration and protest in American identity—much like Woody Guthrie’s iconic song.
• She warns against an “uncritically celebratory” version of history, but also against narratives that focus only on America’s flaws. Her book attempts to hold both sides in tension.

Notable Quote:

“We shouldn't celebrate uncritically... this book just tries to put those stories in tension with each other and...be celebratory and critical at the same time, which is a long American tradition.”
—Beverly Gage, [24:15]

• She highlights places and stories from overlooked parts of US history (e.g., Medora, North Dakota, River Rouge plant in Dearborn).
• On academia’s loss of public trust: cost, perceptions of value, lack of transparency, and heated political discourse all contribute to a sharp decline in faith in higher education.
• Her committee’s report calls for universities to return to first principles, focus on intellectual rigor, and improve communication with the public.

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4. The Imperial Presidency: Preview

[29:48–31:54]

• Sneak peek of Zakaria’s CNN special on the ever-expanding power of the US presidency.
• Illustrates how, beginning in the Cold War, the president’s role grew—often at Congress’ expense—and how Trump has tested the boundaries of executive authority.

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5. Last Look: Russia’s Muted Victory Day—Putin’s Weakened Grip

[31:54–38:54]

• Russia’s scaled-back Victory Day parade (absent heavy military hardware) signals deepening insecurity over drone attacks and potential threats to Putin’s regime.
• Ukrainian attacks are making the war more real for ordinary Russians; economic woes and labor shortages compound Putin’s woes.
• Souring approval ratings, paranoia among elites, and increased security point to a leadership under increasing strain.
• Despite oil revenues buoyed by US-Iran conflict, endemic demographic decline and criticism from influencers threaten regime longevity.
• Zakaria concludes, echoing external analysts, that a protracted, inconclusive war could ultimately threaten Putin’s position and Russia’s future.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “If the stakes for one side are existential and for the other much lower, the side with those bigger stakes usually prevails...” —Fareed Zakaria, [02:00]
• "There are not going to be any agreement with the Iranians if President Trump will insist on limitation on missiles and on proxy aid..." —Danny Cintrinowicz, [10:28]
• "This raises a question whether this war was beneficial... strategically there was no change." —Danny Cintrinowicz, [13:39]
• "If Trump thinks that he can threaten them or continue the blockade, hoping for some sort of Iranian capitulation, it's an illusion." —Danny Cintrinowicz, [15:41]
• "Instead of changing Iran for the good, we change Iran for the bad..." —Danny Cintrinowicz, [19:18]
• "We shouldn't celebrate uncritically...be celebratory and critical at the same time, which is a long American tradition.” —Beverly Gage, [24:15]

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• [00:01–07:30]: Fareed’s “My Take”—US policy dilemmas with Iran
• [07:43–22:05]: Interview with Danny Cintrinowicz
  • [07:56]: Who needs to move next, US or Iran?
  • [08:32]: Iran’s use of the Strait of Hormuz
  • [10:28]: Missile and proxy issues; limits of negotiations
  • [13:39]: Effects of war, strategic stagnation
  • [15:41]: Regime resilience and futility of maximum pressure
  • [16:41]: Divisions among Gulf states
  • [17:47]: Israeli calculations and US politics
  • [19:18]: How US actions hardened the Iranian regime
  • [21:27]: Strategic lessons for Israel
• [22:07–29:46]: Interview with Beverly Gage on America’s history and academic trust
• [29:48–31:54]: Preview of “The Imperial Presidency”
• [31:54–38:54]: Russia’s Victory Day and Putin’s regime stress test

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a sobering analysis of the Iran crisis, highlighting deep-seated dilemmas in US foreign policy and the challenges of dealing with resilient adversaries. The discussion with Cintrinowicz is especially trenchant about the limitations of pressure and regime-change fantasies. The pivot to America’s upcoming semiquincentennial and institutional trust issues provides a reflective, human dimension to the episode, while the closing look at Russia’s predicament reinforces the theme of unpredictable global power shifts.

Transcript

[A]

This is gps, the global Public Square. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York. Today on the program, after an Israeli strike killed the Ayatollah Khamenei, Donald Trump called on Iranians to take over their government. But instead of destroying the Islamic regime that's run Iran for almost 50 years, did the war save it? We'll Explore. Also, America's 250th birthday is less than two months away. The Pulitzer Prize winning historian Beverly Gage went on a road trip across the nation and into America's past, the good and the bad. Finally, I will bring you a sneak peek of my special the Imperial Presidency. Has the White House become too powerful over the centuries? The program premieres tonight on CNN at 8:00pm Eastern. But first, here's my take. Why is the most powerful country on the planet unable to get its way with a much smaller, weaker country that has been ravaged by economic sanctions and military strikes? At one level, the simplest way to understand America's problem in the Iran war is to use game theory. Donald Trump decided to play a game of chicken with Iran. Think of two drivers racing straight at each other. In these situations, if the stakes for one side are existential and for the other much lower, the side with those bigger stakes usually prevails for the Iranian regime. If they lose, there's a good chance they end up toppled and slaughtered. For Trump, it would be a bad weekend at Mar a Lago. It's easy to see why the Iranians would be more willing to lock their steering wheel in that game of chicken. But there's a broader reason why America has found it so difficult to handle Iran, one that is not just about Trump and this latest ill conceived war. Ever since the Islamic regime took power in Iran, America has been of two minds about it. On the one hand, the US has had certain issues it wanted resolved, from the return of the hostages to nuclear limits. On the other hand, it wants to topple the regime, not just negotiate with it. There is a tension in these two attitudes that has run through American foreign policy for almost half a century. Does Washington want to change certain policies of Iran or does it want to change Iran? If Washington negotiates with Tehran, inevitably there is give and take. There are concessions on both sides. There is some relaxation of hostilities. Above all, in engaging with it, the United States government is conferring a certain degree of legitimacy on the Islamic Republic, treating it as a serious negotiating partner and accepting that it represents Iran on the world stage. But that acceptance sits uneasily with some American elites who feel that the Islamic Republic is illegitimate, should not exist, and Washington's only policy toward it should be to overthrow it. And yet there are things Washington wants that only Iran can deliver. That is why even Ronald Reagan found himself secretly negotiating with the Iranian mullahs while publicly denouncing them. We can see the tension almost daily in Donald Trump's policy toward Iran. One social media post threatens to destroy Iranian civilization and bring an end to 47 years of evil. Another one that same day, speaks of the progress being made in negotiations with Iran. Trump enters negotiations and seems optimistic about a deal with Iran. And an in between rounds starts a war with Tehran and urges Iranians to overthrow their government. Less than a week later, he's back to promising that if they agree to his demands, Iran will have a very bright future. America had a similarly contradictory attitude toward the Soviet Union. After the communists took control of Russia in 1917. Washington broke relations with it and even tried in some small ways to overthrow took Franklin Delano Roosevelt about 15 years later to recognize its existence and exchange ambassadors with Moscow. The tension re emerged after World War II. In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger's policy of negotiation with the Soviet Union was pilloried on the right because it was seen as bolstering the standing of an evil empire. Kissinger's response was always that America stood in ideological opposition to the Soviet Union, but that it also had certain national interests, like the control of nuclear weapons, which could not be handled without agreements with Moscow. Kissinger's equivalent in the Iran debate was Barack Obama. Obama's was the one administration to make a choice. It determined that while America might prefer another regime in Iran, it had to deal with this one to tackle the greatest danger to America's national interest, which, as with the Soviet case, involved nuclear weapons. The Iran nuclear deal was an effort to take the one most dangerous element of Iran's foreign policy and neutralize it. And it succeeded at that. But for many on the right, the price was that it in some sense legitimized the regime. So Trump pulled the US out of the deal, which then led to the discrediting of then Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and and the return of the hardliners in Tehran who ramped up Iran's enrichment program. Which has brought Donald Trump right back to the same dilemma. Does he make a deal or take a stand? At this point, it's clear that Trump wants a deal, but in making it, he might end up giving the Islamic Republic what it has been seeking for 47 years, unqualified acceptance even from the most hard line elements of the United States. For Tehran, that is a prize worth many concessions. Go to fareedzakharia.com for a link to my Washington Post column this week. And let's get started. It's been more than a month since Washington and Tehran agreed to a seat cease fire. But in that time, the truce has been constantly tested as the two sides have continued to trade fire in the Strait of Hormuz, the vital waterway which remains all but closed. For more on what's next, I'm joined by a top analyst who has studied the Islamic Republic for most of his career. Danny Cintrinowicz served as the head of Iran's branch of Israel's, the Iran branch of Israel's military intelligence. He is now a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv based Institute of for National Security Studies. Always great to have you on. Danny, let me ask you at this point, you've just heard, I'm sure that the Iranians have said they have responded to the American proposal. Do you think that response is going to move this forward? I mean, who's the person really who has to move here, Iran or the United States?

[B]

Thank you, Freid, for inviting me. Definitely is the U.S. the ball is in the U.S. court because of the fact there is no much room in the Iranian eyes for compromises. Now they are demanding lifting of the naval blockade. They want to negotiate first and foremost the condition to end the war and only then to negotiate on a nuclear issue. And it goes straight to your column saying that the US Administration need to decide whether he wants to topple this regime and then he has to return back to war, a serious war, lengthy war, or he wants to compromise with the regime and then he has to show compromises in a way that he has to accept some of the Iranian demands. So I think it's all gotten back to the White House, to the president and what he will decide eventually will tell us whether we are going to escalation or some sort of a compromise in agreement.

[A]

Do you think that we are now witnessing the Iranians really flex their muscles on the weapon that they have, which is the Strait of Hormuz. I noticed yesterday they put out an announcement saying countries that are enforcing sanctions against Iran, those ships might not be allowed to get through the Strait of Hormuz even if there is a deal. So in other words, they are trying to use this new weapon. They have to actually reverse the sanctions that have been in place for decades.

[B]

Definitely. You're absolutely right. The Iranian wants to utilize Hormuz Straits for two main reasons. One is to get compensation for the attack. So they're going to charge every tanker that crosses the straits. This is one. And second, of course, they want to utilize that in order to create cracks within the sanction regime that US imposed on them. And this is something that's not going to change, unfortunately. We have to remember one other thing. The situation in Homose Straits is very unstable. So even if President Trump would decide not to decide, meaning he's not going to compromise or return back to war, eventually friction will lead to escalation. Because I think that from the Iranian standpoint, they won't accept the status quo. And in terms of when they come to a junction between capitalization or escalation, they will always choose escalation. The blockade, even if it will be effective, he won't lead to Iranian surrender.

[A]

So let's talk about what the shape of a deal could look like. I want to first ask you. It does seem like the American side from what we're hearing, has completely dropped the issue of the ballistic missiles that Iran has, the support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Those were the big criticisms of the Obama nuclear deal, that it didn't include those issues. My understanding is the Trump administration is not even proposing to discuss those either.

[B]

I will say that bluntly, there are not going to be any agreement with the Iranians if President Trump will insist on limitation on missiles and on proxy aid by the Iranians. It's not going to happen for the Iranians. Those are the pillars of the regime itself and it's a basic of the security doctrine and they're not going to forego that. So if President Trump wants an agreement, again, any agreement, probably be a problematic one, but looking at the other options that he has, maybe that's the best option. But any agreement will be focused on two main things only. One is the control of the straits and second, the right to enrich everything that is connected to missiles or proxies. The Iranians will want willing to negotiate, same thing as the jcpoa. And then we'll ask ourselves what is really the difference between what we have now and the jcpoa?

[A]

So from the leaks we got on the crucial issue of enrichment, it sounded like in the negotiations that were taking place when Trump began the war, the Iranians had been proposing some concessions. They had talked about no underground enrichment and they had talked about a 20 year suspension of enrichment. I'm struck by this because I think they clearly understood that what Trump wants is a deal that he can claim and is better than the Obama nuclear deal. And so he was looking for, they were offering, in a sense, some ways that you can say this is bigger than the Obama nuclear deal.

[B]

Well, Fred, when we're looking at the Iranian stands before the war and after the war, there is no gap. I'm sorry to say that. I'm not saying that the war didn't have an effective activity or pressure activity by the U.S.

[A]

danny, let's just, let's take a break. Your audio is cracking up. We'll fix it on the other side of the break. And we'll talk about your fascinating foreign affairs essay as well.

[C]

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[A]

And we're back with Danny Centrinowitz, who served as the head of the Iran branch of Israel's military intelligence. Danny, I was asking you, do you think the Iranians in the negotiations that took place just before the war began, you know, Trump began the war in the middle of the negotiations, were they offering some things that Trump could have used to claim that he got a better deal than the Obama nuclear deal?

[B]

Well, definitely, in terms of freezing the agreement. But also the Iranian offered enrichment without actually accumulating material. So, so it's more or less like it was a safe face mechanism. So Trump could use that. The problem is that when we're seeing 39 days after the war that nothing has changed, Iranians actually offering more or less the same. This raises a question whether this war was beneficial. Definitely there were operational achievements, but strategically there was no change. The Iranian didn't change the red lines regarding their nuclear activities.

[A]

And the Trump people keep seeming to insist on zero enrichment and all the enriched material being moved out and that Iran, you know, does not have a right to enrich. Do you think that that' syou know, is there any prospect of an agreement around those lines?

[B]

Unfortunately, no. It returns back to your important column in a way that Trump need to decide. If you're asking the Iranians to stop enriching and taking out the material, you're actually asking for the capitulation, you're not asking to reach an agreement with them. Unfortunately, any agreement will be. They will have to. The administration will have to recognize Iran right to enrich and Iran will have to reach because otherwise there won't be an agreement. The Iranians are willing to restriction of their nuclear activity, but no dismantling. So if Trump will continue demanding dismantling and taking out the material to the US As a winning picture, no agreement will be achieved. That is a problem that we're having right now.

[A]

But Danny, a lot of people say they are under so much pressure. Their economy is in shambles. In any case, it's a very corrupt, dysfunctional economy. The sanctions are. And the blockade is hurting very badly. They are under huge pressure. What do you think?

[B]

I think, yeah, definitely they're under pressure, but this is not the question. The question whether the pressure will lead to capitulation goes back, for example, for the blockade. The blockade, yes, it's useful. We can see that Iran is struggling to find places to store the oil. But it's not the question. The question whether this problem will lead to capitulation. And it won't. This regime that is willing to sacrifice its own people, you don't have a leverage against it. So if Trump thinks that he can threaten them or continue the blockade, hoping for some sort of Iranian capitulation, it's an illusion. It's not going to happen. So if Trump wants to change things, he has to topple this regime. Otherwise he has to reach a compromise or else he will come to an escalation because of the friction in the Straits of Hormuz. This is a problem that we are facing. Yes, the regime has many problems, but I don't think they want or able or think they will capitulate in front of the US Dictation or they see that.

[A]

Let's talk about the regional implications. At the start of the war, there was a great hope that what this war had done had been to bring the Israelis and the Gulf Arabs together in a coordinated policy against Iran. But what seems to be happening is that the Gulf Arabs are splitting and you have the UAE and the Saudis completely at odds, the UAE quitting opec. How important is this, this rift within the Gulf states?

[B]

Well, definitely, if someone thought that you will see normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel because of this war, it's really a wishful thinking. There's no way that's happening against Iran will accept moving forward with Israel with those solutions to the Palestinian problem. Now, we cannot overcome the Palestinian issue by focusing only on Iran. It's not going to happen. Yes, we have our dear friends and the brave leadership in the UAE that also of course have diplomatic relations with Israel. But if the US Administration is looking for expansion of the Abraham Accords to Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, even if the Iranian regime will be toppled in the future, it's not going to change the basic fact that without moving forward on the Palestinian track, nothing will happen in terms of realization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

[A]

And what about the Israeli U. S relationship has how big, how big a rift is there now? Is there a real division between Israel and the U.S. s goals? Does Israel want an agreement or does it also just want kind of chaos in Iran?

[B]

The alignment now between the US Administration and Israel. Israel is hoping for no agreement. For Israel, no deal is a better than a bad deal. And I'm sure that Israel is trying to pressure the President not to reach a deal because a deal will block Israel path to an attack, continuous attack in Iran. But even worse than that, Netanyahu cannot challenge President Trump out of the open like he did to President Obama. So the problem that Netanyahu has, that if Trump will reach an agreement, then nobody will challenge this agreement in the future regarding the US Political sphere. So Netanyahu has problem in that regard. So he's trying to do his utmost to prevent any deal for Israel. Any deal between Iran and the US Is a very bad deal. So Israel hoping for no deal. And of course, if push comes to shove, returning back to war, then Israel can aim for the Iranian civilian infrastructure.

[A]

So let's talk about your fascinating essay on foreign affairs. You pointed out that actually several years ago when the Iran nuclear deal was signed, Iran seemed in the midst of a. Of a possible kind of, maybe not a, not a, you know, real transformation, but significant reform for the first time. And then Trump's pulling out of the deal and now has saved a regime that was actually on the verge of either being forced to compromise and reform or perhaps even more even being toppled. Outline why you think that.

[B]

Well, we have to return back to January and to understand that the regime didn't have solutions to the problem that Iran is facing, especially on the economical side. And the war saved the regime because it gave him a lifeline, meaning that now they are fighting against the greater and the small Satan. And there is a cohesion among those who support the irgc. Even more than that, we didn't create a regime change, recreate, change within the regime, a very bad one. When you had Mujtab Al Khamenei elected only because his father was decapitated and together with the irgc, actually taking the Iran even to the more extreme stand that it has right now. So actually, instead of changing Iran for the good, we change Iran for the bad. I think maybe, you know, the blockade, we should have put it before the war, not after the war. Maybe then it would make a difference. So this is one problem. The second thing, of course, that after President Trump decided to leave the JCPOA, all those in Iran that supported negotiation with the U.S. like President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, weakened dramatically. They were the scapegoat of the Iranians for everything that happened after they left the agreement. So all the problems that we are facing now in terms of more extreme Iran, decentralized Iran, Iran with 440 kilos for 60% enriched Iranians, connect to the fact that President Trump decided to leave the JCPA, but with no counter strategy that allowed Iran to push forward on enrichment while weakening those in Iran that supported the deal.

[A]

I have to ask you, Danny, you are so wise on this and you've been so correct in your predictions. Are there people within the Israeli government who are, you know, you worked there for decades. Are they giving Prime Minister Netanyahu the same kind of intelligence and analysis that you are giving?

[B]

Well, I truly hope so. I don't know which kind of advisers they gave. I think that it's important to show in any recommendation also to be the devil's advocate, meaning to show the opposite. I don't know if that happened, but definitely Israel absolved or adopted a policy that was a very bad one. I'm not saying again that we didn't have achievements in the war. But we have to say one important thing, that we created a worse strategic reality than we started with. It is because of that we adopted a false strategy. False strategy. It's actually we're underestimating the Iranian resilience and overestimating Israel and the US ability to topple this regime from the air. And I hope that you will learn from that. Returning back to the drawing board and thinking about other more realistic way of thinking or policy regarding Iran, because the situation right now do not serve Israeli interests.

[A]

Danny, always a pleasure to have you on. We will keep reading you with interest.

[B]

Thank you very much.

[A]

And we will be back. July 4th will mark 250 years since the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. The storied history of America that followed is marked by heroism and triumph, but also dispossession and oppression. All packed messily together, the historian Beverly Gage went on a road trip across the country, visiting historic sites, museums, national monuments and more to better understand this complex history. She chronicles it all in her new book, this Land Is yous A Road Trip through US History. I should mention Beverly is also co chair of Yale University's Committee on Trust in Higher Education, which recently issued a damning report on the sharp decline of trust in higher education and academia's key role in that decline. We're going to talk about the report, but first, this book. Why did you call it this Land is your land? That is the title of a famous song, right?

[D]

That's the title of Woody Guthrie's song From the early 1940s, this land is

[A]

your land and this land is mine.

[D]

And what I like about his song is not only that it's familiar to so many Americans still and has a celebratory quality, but it was also a protest song in its day. And I wanted this book to really be at the intersection of those two things, celebration and protest, and put them together and think about them both simultaneously for the 250th.

[A]

It's an interesting way of trying to hold the tension together because there is a movement now of people who say there's too much about the bad things in America, there's not enough about the good things. President Trump says this all the time. In Florida, Ron DeSantis has put forward an alternative curriculum to the AP courses, one which is much more clearly celebratory. What's wrong with celebrating American history on its June 50th?

[D]

Well, I actually think we should celebrate, celebrate on the 250th, but we shouldn't celebrate uncritically. And I think that we've fallen into sort of a trap in our historical discourse at the moment, where either you're expected to be uncritically celebratory or you have a narrative that says the only things that matter about this country are the worst things that it ever did and so want nothing to do with the 250th. And this book really just tries to put those stories in tension with each other and to be celebratory and critical at the same time, which is a long American tradition in its own right.

[A]

What are some of the most. I mean, what were the places when you went, you were wired by. You'll never forget?

[D]

Well, the book is 13 different places, each of which is a chapter. And so each chapter is both a place and a moment in time. We start in Philadelphia with The revolution, we end in California in the late 20th century, and then there's a lot of hopping around in between. I guess the places that spoke the most to me were the ones that I didn't know about before I went and where I was really discovering things on the ground. So the little town of Medora, North Dakota, which is a place that exists almost exclusively to honor Theodore Roosevelt and his time in the west, was really fascinating. I loved going to the River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, which was Henry Ford's great industrial masterpiece, was once the largest factory in the world. And you can still see that and still feel that kind of energy of the 1920s and 30s. So those were the kinds of places that I really engaged. But there are many, many of them in the book.

[A]

And it's so well written. You talked about how, you know, the effort should be to celebrate and criticize at the same time. And this sort of gets us to the Yale Report. The argument made about modern academia and modern history departments, of which you are a member, is that the problem is you can't get tenure today if you did a great residential history that you have to write about something about dispossession, about oppression, about, you know, some group that was victimized. I think that that's broadly been true. The question I have is, is it changing? Is the tide turning?

[D]

Well, I got tenure writing a big biography about J. Edgar Hoover, so I think maybe not the most representative example. I think there's some truth to that idea, but I also think it's a little bit exaggerated. Actually, within the historical profession there is a pretty robust set of conversation about how to balance all of these things. I did want this book to be an intervention in what I think is a bit of a growing divide between what the public is interested in and how the public engaging history and what academics and professors are thinking about. And particularly this question of what is this nation? What does it stand for? What does it mean? What ought it to be doing to live up to its best ideals? Those are questions that are a little sidelined in the world of academic history right now, but I think they are front and center for most people.

[A]

I gotta ask you one thing about the Yale Report, which is superbly done and really you deserve enormous credit for doing it. What do you think explains the stunning drop in public respect for four year colleges in America?

[D]

Well, that was the question that really drove the report. And it's not only this stunning drop in trust in higher education, but it's happening really quickly too. It's really the last 10 to 15 years, very distinctively. And there are a lot of institutions that have problems with trust right now. Some of them are much worse off than higher education, Congress, for instance, but it's not dropping in the same way. And so that's really the question that we were trying to take on. And I think there are a lot of interlocking issues, cost and value. I think, you know, you can pay a certain amount if you think that what you're getting is worth it. And so that cost, cost, value relationship I think has really been upended in recent years. For selective universities like Yale, the opaqueness of the admissions system, people's not understanding how it works or not liking how it works, that is a big factor. And then there are a whole set of questions that are about speech and politics on campus, about what happens in the classroom. We really try to center our report on returning to first principles. What are universities for? What are they good at doing? How do you create the most vibrant intellectual environment on a campus? And that involves a lot of different things, fixing grade inflations, having better communication, opening the doors, bringing more academic rigor in. And so we try to, to be really self critical, but on the terms that universities embrace and cherish and have stood for for centuries.

[A]

Well, I think both the book and the report are great credit to you and should be widely read. Beverly Gage, pleasure to have you on.

[D]

Thanks, Fareed.

[A]

Next on gps, I'll give you a sneak preview of my new special, the Imperial Presidency, which will air at 8:00pm Eastern tonight on CNN. And then what does Moscow's dramatically reduced victory day parade this weekend tell us about Vladimir Putin's grip on power? I'll tell you next. President Trump's actions in his second term have tested the limits of executive power, from dismantling government agencies to prosecuting political enemies to unilaterally launching a wall. But America's system of liberal democracy was carefully designed, with checks and balances meant to prevent any one of the three branches of government from gaining too much power. So how has Trump been able to accomplish all of this? Tonight, I will examine this question in my new documentary, the Imperial presidency, airing at 8pm Eastern right here on CNN. It explores the dangerous rise of presidential power well beyond what the founders ever intended, a trend that actually began way before President Trump. I want to show you a clip from the documentary that examines how presidents on both sides of the aisle dramatically sidelined Congress at the start of the Cold War. Take a look. The conflict with the Soviet Union was a never ending nuclear armed crisis. Leading presidents to claim vast inherent powers as commanders in chief.

[D]

Presidential power grows enormously in the 50s and the 60s.

[A]

Harry Truman launched the Korean War without even asking Congress. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and security survival. The first president to do so in such a large scale conflict.

[B]

Before the Cold War, that would have been unimaginable.

[A]

President Dwight Eisenhower toppled Iran's government in a coup without going to Congress. Air action is now in execution. Lyndon Johnson's administration faked a crisis in the Tompkin Gulf. Hostile actions have required me to to take action and used a congressional vote on that skirmish as the rubber stamp for a war with a half million troops. The imperial presidency was in full swing. And then came Richard Nixon. Don't miss the imperial presidency tonight at 8:00pm Eastern on CNN. Next on GPS. This weekend marked the anniversary of Russia's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. So why were celebrations so muted? And what does that say about Russia's President Vladimir Putin? I'll explain all of it next. And now for the last look. Watching Russia's Victory Day parade this weekend, you might think that that country is as powerful as it ever was. But in fact, this year's parade was dramatically scaled back from years past. The event commemorating the country's World War II victory over Nazi Germany is considered a centerpiece of President Vladimir Putin's rule and it usually features a dizzying display of missiles and tanks. But this was the first time since 2007 that that hardware was absent. You see, Russia is in trouble. The Kremlin attributed the scaled back parade to Ukrainian terrorist activity. Many observers suggest that the change was due to potential drone strikes from Ukraine targeting military hardware. During rehearsals this week, a Ukrainian drone hit a high rise apartment building in Moscow A about 5 miles from Red Square where the parade takes place. And Ukraine has been stepping up drone and missile strikes deep into Russia's territory, bringing the war back to the country that started it. Late last month, the Ukrainian drone hit a high rise in Yekaterinburg, more than 1,000 miles from Ukraine. As Bloomberg notes, the city of 1.5 million people served as a base for industry during World War II. And because it was then considered too far for attacks from Europe to reach, Ukraine is also using drones to attack Russia's oil infrastructure, hoping to hurt its export revenues. As the AP reports, Ukrainian drones have hit the oil refinery and export terminal in the Black Sea city of Tuapse four times since April 16. Residents reported oily drops of black rain after the attacks and and oil from the explosions has seeped into the sea. These attacks and others like them are forcing more and more Russian people far from the front lines to grapple with the reality of war. That is, as the stalemate on the frontline itself continues. The Institute for the Study of War reported that in April, for the first time in nearly two years, Russia suffered a net loss of territory in Ukraine. That means that the territory it captured was less than the territory it lost to Ukraine in April. Now, none of this means that a Russian spring and summer offensive won't happen and won't eke back gains. But it suggests the difficulty in securing an outright victory in the war. And a war with no clear end could be a threat to Putin. Walter Russell Mead wrote this week in the Wall Street Journal that an agonizing stalemate would threaten Mr. Putin's grip on power and the future of Russia itself. The Financial Times reports that Putin's approval ratings have fallen to their lowest level since he announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September of 2022. European intelligence leaked to CNN and other outlets this month reveals that security around Putin has dramatically increased amid fears of a potential assassination attempt or coup coming from Russia's dissatisfied political elite. The report says that aides close to Putin have had surveillance systems installed in their homes. His cooks, bodyguards and photographers are forbidden from using public transport. Staffers working with him can only use phones without the Internet, and he spends much of his time in underground bunkers. These measures come amid a wave of assassinations of high level Russian military and security figures. In December, a senior Russian general was killed by a car bomb, presumably by Ukrainian agents. The FT reports that Putin's security fears have caused the Russian government to crack down on mobile Internet in recent months. Rolling mobile Internet outages and blocks on social media apps and VPNs may also be aimed at silencing dissent. But if that's the aim, the measures appear to be backfiring. Several Russian bloggers and influencers have criticized the Russian government for the crackdowns. One based in Monaco addressed Putin in a video last month viewed by about 32 million people. She said, the people are afraid of you. In an essay in this week's Economist, an anonymous former senior Russian official wrote, for the first time since the conflict began, Russians are starting to imagine a future without Putin. People are also reeling from economic woes. While Putin's Russia has benefited from rising oil prices amid the US war in Iran, it's also dealing with bruising labor shortages. As Ukrainian born Alexander Kolyander writes In the Spectator, though Putin touts Russia's 2.1 unemployment rate as a sign of a booming economy. It's really a sign that the country is running out of workers. Military conscription doesn't help, but the real culprit is long standing demographic decline. Of course, Vladimir Putin has time and again proven to be a wily and resilient leader, but it is becoming clearer and clearer that his aggression against Ukraine has cost his country dearly. Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I'll see you tonight for my special the imperial presidency at 8pm Eastern on CNN. And then back here next week. I'm Daniel Dae Kim. I'm going to South Korea to figure out how this small nation conquered the world with its culture. Join me and meet the artists and creators behind the phenomenon.

[C]

K Everything now streaming on the CNN App.

[A]

Influential journalist Kara Swisher is taking a hard look at the longevity industry.

[D]

There's so much bad information that the really good information gets drowned.

[A]

The new CNN Original series Kara Swisher wants to live Forever. Now streaming on the CNN App.