
On this episode of “The Kylee Cast,” Federalist Senior Editor John Daniel Davidson joins Managing Editor Kylee Griswold to discuss the Trump administration’s bungled messaging on the war with Iran, differences and similarities between this conflict...
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Hi everybody and welcome to the Kylie Cast. I'm Kylie Griswold, Managing Editor at the Federalist. Please like and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. We have a channel specifically for the Kylie Cast on Spotify and Apple Podcasts. So if you are only subscribed to the Federalist Radio Hour or you're wrong with Molly Hemingway and David Harsanyi, two of our other great Federalist podcasts, be sure to subscribe to the Kylie Cast as well so you never miss an episode. Leave us a five star review. It is truly one of the easiest and best ways you can help out the show. And even better yet, if you're just listening to the show, go check out the full video version on my personal YouTube channel or the Federalists channel on Rumble, and then of course like and subscribe there too. If you'd like to email the show, you can do so at radio@the federalist.com I would love to hear from you today. I am so pleased to welcome to the show my colleague and a senior editor at the Federalist, John Daniel Davidson. Today, John and I tackle the war in Iran. So whether you are really confused by the Trump administration's messaging, or you know exactly what you think and you have a fully formed opinion, or you're still trying to figure out what exactly you think about the war, you are in the right place. John and I take the war, the messaging, all of it, head on in. It's an episode you will not want to miss. Send it to a friend, save it for later. Without further ado, please welcome to the show John Davidson. John Davidson, so great to have you on the Kylie cast. Thanks for being here today.
B
Hey, thanks for having me, Kylie.
C
Yeah, anytime. So we are now in a war with Iran. Came out of nowhere over the weekend. Also, we're recording this on Tuesday and the news is moving quickly, so we'll keep that in mind as we go. Things may change before this podcast is released, but I suspect that we will still very much be at war with Iran come Thursday. So, John, can I get just your initial reaction to the war and kind of how you're feeling in the days six since the weekend when this all launched?
B
Yeah, I think, like a lot of people, I was surprised. I was surprised because there had been no effort to prepare the American people for this. We just had the State of the Union last week on Tuesday, and there was no, no real mention of impending war plans with Iran. No talk of a regime change war in the Middle East. Which, know, we should be clear that this is a regime change war. Whatever the administration says, however, they want to kind of parse the language here. From the moment that they took out the Supreme Leader, ayatollah Khamenei, on February 28, it was a regime change war. And then today the news is that they took out this other group of Iranian leaders that had gathered to elect, for the first time, actually elect the next leader of Iran, who all those people were taken out as well. So, you know, so to answer your question, I was surprised because there had been no communication with the American people. There had been no effort by the administration to get Congress on board or to, to solicit input from Congress. It seemed to have come out of nowhere. And I think, you know, based on what we're seeing now, the kind of the information that's coming out and the things that the Trump administration is saying, specifically thinking of remarks that Marco Rubio and Speaker Mike Johnson made on Monday, that Israel was planning to take unilateral action, and that would mean that the Iranian response would target US Assets in the Middle East. So we just had to go ahead and go with Israel. You know, I think it's fair to say that we may have been sort of led by the nose into this war. And that's why there was so little preparation done on the part of the administration to kind of sell this to the American people, make the case that we have to strike Iran now and and also very little in the way of preparing, you know, evacuations for Americans who are now, in many cases, trapped in these Middle Eastern countries, at our embassies, at our military bases, also just, you know, civilians who are in these countries for business or whatever. I think President Trump was asked about the, the lack of evacuation plans today in the White House in his meeting with the German chancellor, and his response was very telling. He said, effectively, there was no time. This all happened very quickly. So that doesn't, like, I don't know, that doesn't inspire confidence in me when I, when I feel like the whole thing was kind of rushed. And it makes it feel like it was foisted upon us by, by Israel, by, by our ally who had their own set of strategic imperatives, who had their own agenda. And, and frankly, most of the things that the administration has said over the past 48 hours on this subject haven't inspired a lot of confidence in me.
C
Yeah, I completely agree. I want to dig into the being led by the nose aspect of this, because the Israel component is obviously a huge one. We're finally getting what seems like the why we had to get involved in this right away, which, I mean, maybe days ago would have been considered by some on Twitter who've been responding very rashly to this as an anti Semitic conspiracy theory. But now, oh, it's actually appears to be quite clearly the reason why we got involved. You wrote a great piece that's up on the Federalist this week where you use the term chain ganged, that the US Was chain ganged into, into this war. Can you explain what exactly you mean by that? And maybe I can kind of tee it up with this. This quote from a New York Times piece that ran on Monday. This is the lead of the piece. Quote, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel walked into the Oval Office on the morning of February 11th determined to keep the American president on the path to war. For weeks, the United States and Israel had been secretly discussing a military offensive against Iran. But Trump administration officials had recently begun negotiating with the Iranians over the future of their nuclear program. And the Israeli leader wanted to make sure that the new diplomatic effort did not undermine the plan. Plans. Those plans being plans to go to war.
B
Yeah.
C
So obviously, anything we see from the New York Times we should take with a grain of salt. And as when we saw this on Monday, I did take it with a grain of salt because it came from the Times, which cannot be trusted to report the truth accurately. And, I mean, these are the people who wrote Just a glowing obit for, for the Ayatollah. And yet then a day or two later, we heard directly from the horse's mouth, so to speak, Rubio out there and Mike Johnson out there basically saying the exact same thing that, oh, we had to take this action because Israel's going to take this action. Can you explain this concept of chain ganging and kind of how, how, how did this happen?
B
Yeah, right. Yeah, it was actually the same day. It was, it was later in the day that New York Times piece came out on Monday morning. And later in the day on Monday is when Rubio gave his remarks. And then I believe Speaker Johnson gave similar remarks. And then either last night or this morning, I don't know because I don't know when what time of day Sean Hannity show is on because I'm not a boomer con and I don, But I saw the clip on X and Senator Tom Cotton basically said the same thing. You know, and then we had, we had President Trump in the Oval Office today making similar remarks. So this has now been repeated several times, very similar language about Israel going to take unilateral action against Iran and then us knowing that we, that our bases would be targeted in the Iranian response. And that being something that pushed, like, pushed events forward, essentially. That's not a radical thing to say. That's not a misinterpretation of what Rubio said. And by the way, that doesn't mean that it was, it was the wrong decision to go to war. It doesn't mean that the, that President Trump and his administration won't be able to pull this off successfully. Doesn't mean any of those things. We're being descriptive here. We're trying to say why, why did we do this now? What were the events that happened that triggered this seemingly sudden launching of a, of a regime change war against Iran over the weekend? And, and so to your question about what chain ganging is or what it means to be chain gang, this is a term of art in international security studies that refers to the power dynamics between a stronger ally and a weaker ally, where the weaker ally has security commitments and strategic imperatives that do not align with the interests of the stronger ally. And, and this is something that, you know, scholars of military history and international studies and war studies have, have actually kind of looked at and, and described in the past how this is how this has worked out. I mentioned in my piece that a lot of scholars attribute a, a chain ganging effect to the outbreak of World War. The European powers had such a complex web of alliances between them, that smaller, weaker powers like Serbia or even in that case, Russia, that their actions compelled the actions of larger, stronger nations like France and Britain, essentially constraining them and entrapping them in a situation where they were, to use the term chain ganged into a war that they may not otherwise have chosen. And so this is a phenomenon in international relations, in the power dynamics between coalitions, between allies and military partnerships that has it, it has a history. It's something that's been studied. And I applied it in this case because this is something that scholars have already looked at in the US Israel relationship vis a vis Iran. And the article that I cited from a 2018 Texas National Security Review piece about the 20112012 dynamic between the U.S. israel and Iran. This is when Iran was hardening its nuclear program and Israel, under then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, came out essentially and threatened unilateral military action, created a war scare that the Obama administration had to respond to. And that was an example of when chain ganging didn't work because the United States was not drawn into a war in that case. But, but, but it didn't totally fail either. Right. Because Israel was able to influence US Policy toward Iran and actually get the Obama administration to do some things that it otherwise wouldn't have done. Now, again, you can argue that the Obama administration was wrong. I tend to think the Obama administration was wrong. And if we had been much tougher on Iran 15 years ago, we wouldn't be in this position now. But the point is that the dynamic of a weaker ally, in this case Israel manipulating a stronger ally, the United States, into doing things that the United States might not otherwise do if it were just pursuing its own national interests, is a phenomenon in international relations. And I think it's one that we have, we are seeing play out in this Iran war. And I, and I say that not, not to throw stones at the Trump administration. I'm saying that because of what the Trump administration officials themselves are saying about how this started.
C
Right. Right. So why in your estimation, did it work in this case? I mean, why did we have to bend to, to the desires of Israel? I understand that there are ally, but they are the weaker ally. You know, why couldn't, you know, if, if Trump and Netanyahu are in deliberations and, and Bibi basically says we're going to do this, so, you know, it's, your embassies are going to be hit if you don't strike first. You know, why can't we leverage our being the weaker ally over Israel to say, well, if you do this, then we're gonna, you know, counter, counter measure with this. Like, if we knew about it ahead of time, why did we decide to strike instead of using our more powerful position over Israel to try to get something that was more favorable to us?
B
That's a good question. And I don't. I don't necessarily have the answers, because I don't. It's very opaque kind of what was going on behind the scenes and how this process played out. And honestly, the botched communications from the Trump administration have not contributed a ton of clarity to how this happened. I think one thing, though, I, I do know that we know, which is that the Trump administration, from the outset, and this was true in Trump's first term, and, and it's true, now has a very different approach to Iran and Mideast politics than the Obama administration or the Biden administration did. So, you know, in the first Trump administration, one of the first things that Trump did was get out of the jcpoa, the Iran nuclear deal, right? He ended that. He withdrew the United States from that. He said, thought it was a bad deal. I think that was the right. That was the right call. So from the outset, you have an administration that has a much more kind of aggressive posture towards Iran, has much less tolerance for Iran being a nuclear power or even being a regional hegemon. Obama's whole idea for Iran going into, you know, from, from Obama's first term was that Iran should be the regional hegemon in the Middle east, and that would, that would contribute to stability and order and predictability in that region. And this was sort of Ben Rhodes and Obama's grand idea to revise what previously had been the US Strategic posture towards Iran and the Middle east, which was that Iran is a pariah state, it's a hostile power, it's a revolutionary terrorist regime, and it's not to be sort of encouraged in its regional hegemonic ambitions. Right? So from the outset, in the Trump administration, you had a completely different posture towards Iran. So that is to say the Trump administration and Trump himself was more disposed to go down this road than previous Democratic administrations were. They were more inclined to accept that action, kinetic action had to be taken. And we saw this in his first administration when he took out Soleimani, the IRGC general. We saw it last June in the 12 days war, when we hit three nuclear sites, including the mountain fortress of Fordeaux underneath that mountain. And so there's already an appetite there to take kinetic action against Iran. And I think in this case the restraint that you might have otherwise seen in a different administration just, just wasn't there. You know, maybe it was that Trump was just, he just needed, he just needed a reason to kind of be done with negotiations. He felt, he's saying now that he felt that the negotiations were going nowhere. Maybe it was that, you know, Israel taking unilateral action, you know, convinced Trump that now is the time. You know, we just don't know. But, but, but what is true, what has been true in the past is that for the most part the United States has been able to avoid being chain ganged in to military conflicts by weaker allies. All of our allies are weaker allies. We don't have any peer allies. So this dynamic that I'm talking about where there's a, there's a danger of, of a stronger ally being manipulated into taking actions that it otherwise wouldn't by weaker ally is something that we as the United States, as the military, you know, superpower in the world for the last 70 years have to deal with all the time with all of our allies. And, and we, we generally have been successful at that. In this case it looks like maybe we weren't so successful or that we were pushed into doing something maybe not that we didn't want to do or that Trump didn't want to do, but that this wasn't the timeline on which he wanted to do it. And as I mentioned earlier, some of these indications like lack of communication, no evacuation plans, suggest that maybe this was, that the timeline on this was pushed up against us and we were forced to kind of act in the moment.
C
Right. Right.
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C
So I mean you, you got into some of this in your answer but it do you think it was actions taken during the Biden administration that that is what mostly changed things between Trump 1 and Trump 2? I mean because during Trump's first term he, he did reverse Obama era policies in pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal and Kind of changing the focus from making Iran the, you know, regional hegemon to. To empowering Saudi Arabia to be that, you know, in the Abraham Accords. And all of these things, like Trump's policy toward Iran seem to be very effective in Trump's first term without starting any new wars, without, you know, doing any of these things. And then, you know, even when we saw these strikes on Iran's nuclear sites in 20. In 2025, you know, we were assured. Everything was taken out, our objective was achieved. This mission was so successful. It's the most successful mission there ever was. And then fast forward less than a year later, and, oh, now we're at war. Like, what? You know, and maybe it is just the. The chain ganging that's happening here that we were kind of rushed into action that we. That we weren't otherwise wanting to take. But it just seems to me that, you know, we actually did have a very successful policy in the Middle east during Trump's first term, which is why we saw this historic piece. You know, what changed? It's only been a few years. I mean, was the Biden administration, did they so. So help Iran and their proxies in the Middle east that, like, this had to happen now?
B
Well, a couple of things did change during the Biden administration. Obviously, you had October 7th, the Hamas attack on Israel in October 7th, 2023. That was an Iranian proxy attack. Right. Iran was one of the main sponsors of Hamas, and this was the biggest action Hamas had ever taken. And it triggered a war that is going on still. Right. In some ways, you can almost see this as one continuous war from Israel's perspective from October 7th to now. You also had, during the Biden administration, the arming and the missile attacks by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. These are Shiite, you know, rebels that are armed with Iranian missiles. They launch missiles at Israel. They launched missiles at ships in the region. And that became a real problem during the Biden administration that these Iranian proxies were emboldened, they were taking action. And so I think that changed the calculus somewhat, certainly October 7th and certainly the Houthi sort of, you know, missile attacks as well. And when Trump came into office, you know, that had kind of shifted the landscape in the Middle East. It certainly had shifted the strategic priorities for Israel.
C
Right.
B
This. Getting back to this question of chain ganging or entrapment, during the Biden administration, Israel's strategic priorities changed. And I think that there was a decision made. I'm. I don't have any special insight, but I'm speculating that based on Israel's actions since October 7, that that was the point at which Israeli leadership decided, we can't tolerate this Iranian regime any longer. We have to deal with this once and for all. It's too great of a risk to allow the Iranian regime to persist in its, in its funding and arming of proxies in the region in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. And so you had, you had the operation last June that, where, where Israel and the United States took out most of the nuclear facilities. And then I think, but, but, and here's where the communication part comes in. I don't think that that was ever going to be the end of it for Israel. And yet the Trump administration communicated to the American people to mollify, I think, the MAGA base that's very suspicious of regime change, wars in the Middle East. No, this was just, these were just perfect airstrikes, perfectly and totally obliterated the nuclear program. And one and done. And you don't have to worry about a protracted engagement in Iran. We destroyed it. Everything was perfect. I think they overplayed their hand there because any reasonable person, you know, you and I, we're not necessarily like, you know, nuclear proliferation experts, but it doesn't take an expert to say, you said eight months ago that their nuclear program was obliterated, that it was, that not just their facilities, but their capabilities, their enrichment facilities, the future of their program is destroyed. And they said that over. And Trump said that over and over. He said it essentially every month up until a few weeks ago. Was saying this about what about the operation last June? Well, then if you come in and then tell us, oh, Iran was only a couple months from, from having immunity in its nuclear program because it was protected by all these short range ballistic missiles. I'm, I'm sorry, someone in the administration has to address the disconnect there in the messaging from last June and all of last year to what they're saying now. And it's fine. Just tell me the truth. Just, just explain it in a way that makes sense. I am maga like, I'm pro Trump. I want to support the President. I want our foreign policy to succeed. I think Iran was a malign actor. I think the regime was illegitimate. I think we should have taken action against their nuclear program a long time ago. But make it make sense, communicate in a way that doesn't insult my intelligence. I think that's all a lot of us are asking.
C
Yeah, I think the messaging has been the most infuriating Part for people. Because, you know, before you had the Rubio admission, we heard numerous reasons, rationales for, for this strike. It was, it was regime change, it was freedom for the Iranian people. It was nukes. Even after, you know, we were previously assured that Operation Midnight Hammer was such a wild success. Meanwhile, not even from the administration. But then you have Senate Republic out here, Ted Cruz saying he's not aware of any intel indicating that Iran was close to getting nukes again, at the same time that Tom Cotton is claiming that Iran has posed an imminent risk to the US for 47 years. Make that make sense. Yeah, classic warmonger. You know, comparing Trump and Netanyahu to Roosevelt and Churchill. I mean, he's not even worth taking seriously in any way on this. And then you have the White House comms team tweeting out NR review or National Review articles, basically saying that Rubio did not say what he did say. And it's been kind of frustrating, too, because, you know, I have a lot of respect for Pete Hegseth and what he's doing at the Department of War, but I, I was frustrated by the press conference he gave this week because it all seemed so condescending to very reasonable questions that, that conservative media were asking of him that are exactly the concerns that are on Americans minds. How long can we expect this to last? What are the risks? How many troops are we planning to send there? What's the manpower? What's the cost? I mean, these are like very accountability questions that the American people who've been burned by decades of war in the Middle east have. And the response from the administration has been either confusing, contradictory, or condescending kind of at every step of the way. And that's been really frustrating, I think, for most of the people watching.
B
Yeah. Did you not hear my remarks?
C
Right.
B
Yeah, I did hear your remarks. And your remarks are the problem. That's where the confusion is coming in. Secretary Hegseth, we did hear your remarks. We've all heard what the administration has been saying. And, you know, and again, you know, so much of this is speculation now, but it seems like, it seems like Trump is he, you know, because of Trump's ego and because of his personality, he is not going to want anyone to say that he was forced into anything, that he was, you know, led to act before he was prepared to act or that he was not the initiator. So any suggestions? You know, so even if it is the case that he was, you know, his hand was somewhat forced, even if it is the case that the timeline was pushed up and we, we were responding to Israeli actions, and that's what, that's why this war started when it did. I don't think Trump is going to allow that narrative to take root because it's going to make him look weak. And so, for better or for worse, I, I think that he is trying to take ownership of the initiative here and say, no, if anything. And he said earlier today in this, in this White House appearance with the German chancellor, in response to a question, he said, no, if anything, I forced Israel's hand. Okay. That doesn't make sense based on what everyone else in the administration is saying. It also doesn't make sense based on how this is, is playing out, but,
C
you know, doesn't make sense based on what Trump said because, you know, his reason for not evacuating people ahead of time was that, oh, this all happened so quickly. Well, if you were the one calling the shots, it wouldn't have happened too quickly for you to evacuate Americans.
B
Yeah, no, yeah, exactly. You know, and, and, and maybe that's just how it's going to be and that Trump is going to want to take ownership of this, and this is the new, consistent, unwavering line from the administration. Fine. That's fine. But my concern about it is that we need to be honest with ourselves about what an America first policy means when it comes to our foreign policy. And I don't think that it's an America first foreign policy to be forced into major armed conflicts in the Middle east outside of a timeline of our choosing, in a manner of our choosing, and, and in a way where we are totally prepared and the administration is prepared to explain what it is that they're doing to the American people in a way that makes sense. And, and I actually think that the botched communications around this may become a problem, has the potential to become a real problem for the administration going forward if they can't figure out how to communicate in a, in a way that is consistent. Makes sense, and, you know, sort of give some, some dignity to the average intelligence of the American voter or the MAGA Republican right. Don't insult our intelligence and condescend to us the way Secretary Hegseth was doing in his press conference. Just answer the questions truthfully, answer them consistently. Give us responses that make sense. Don't torture the English language by saying that Iran has been an imminent threat for 47 years. That, that, that is, that, that is George W. Bush neocon stuff. I have no patience for that kind of, that kind of thing. And I think that people are understandably frustrated by it. So, you know, they have a chance to kind of right the ship here, but they need to do it quickly. And, and they also need to make sure and assure a nervous American public that this isn't going to be something that drags on and on for months or years that involves hundreds of billions of US tax dollars and, and a whole constellation of NGOs that we have to send in there to kind of reconstruct the country. That, that is not what we've signed up for. And frankly, some of the other things that the president has said about the Iranian people just kind of rising up and taking over are completely divorced, I'm sorry, completely divorced from reality. That is not how regime change happens. That is not how revolutions happen. The people don't just rise up in sort of a peasants revolt. So they need to stop saying things like that. I'm sorry. It's just, it's very frustrating. College underemployment is at crisis levels.
A
Almost half of recent college grads are
B
working in jobs that do not require a college degree. We have not seen numbers like these since when? 2008?
A
Check out the Watchdog on Wall street podcast on Apple, Spotify, wherever you get your podcast. Hey, it's Ryan Seacrest for Albertsons and Safeway. It's stock up savings time now through March 31st. Spring in for store deals and earn four times the points. Look for in store tags to earn on eligible items from Oreo, Haagen, Dazs, Charman, Tide, Sparkling Ice, Reese's and Special K. Then clip the offer in the app for automatic event long savings. Stack up those rewards to save even more. Enjoy savings on top of savings. When you shop in store or online for easy drive up and go pickup or delivery restrictions apply. See website for terms and conditions.
C
Yeah, you brought up George W. Bush. So let's talk a little bit about some of the, some of the analogs here. So we talked about October 7th a little while ago and I think it's safe to say, you know, Trump gets a lot of credit for his efforts during his first presidency and even many during the second here. I think it's safe to say that like October 7th wouldn't have happened if Biden were not in office like we had. We had a lot of foreign policy successes during Trump's first term that I think were so weakened that there was, we were not only were we funding both sides of that conflict and, you know, like enabling and emboldening Iran during, during October 7th, but, but you also Just had, like, no threat whatsoever from the United States during that period because we were so.
B
And it was the funding, too. It was that the Biden administration released huge amounts of funding to the Iranian regime, and a lot of the. A lot of those funds went straight to Hamas.
C
Yes, yes. So, you know, Trump gets a lot of credit in that regard. Like, if he had won in 2020, that, you know, October 7th may never have happened, and we may never be in this position. So, you know, of course, he's being forced to react to things that were not. Were not his fault here. But that said, you know, does Trump get the benefit of the doubt here? Like, I. I obviously lived through much of the war on terror and just the. The war in Afghanistan troops over there, but I was not, you know, politically sentient, shall I say, during the WMD lies and all of that. Like, I. I don't have, like, personal firsthand knowledge of all of that. Are the excuses from the White House recalling those types of things? Like, is this completely different from that? Is it the same? Another. Another line I've heard from the White House is like, you know, Iran is not Iraq, that this is not the same. Okay? But it's also not Venezuela. And like the Middle east is this idea that this is completely different from Iraq, that we can just. We can just waltz in, do regime change, get rid of their nukes and walk out, and everybody can just be unscathed and fine in a week or a month's time. Just seems to be so divorced from reality to me. And I just, I'm curious, like, is Trump going full George W. Bush here, or does he get the benefit of the doubt on this? Like, what are we looking at?
B
So what happened with George W. Bush and the first Iraq war? Gather around, children. I will tell you of the before times. I was in college at the time, and I was pretty dumb. So, you know, it's not like I had a great beat on things at the time. The Bush administration put forth this huge effort to make a case, not just to the American people, but on the world stage, right at the un, Colin Powell presenting this, you know, to the United nations, the evidence of weapons of mass destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime. There was a. There was a big push to sort of make this Cassis Belli that. That Iraq had WMDs and that after 9, 11, a. A rogue terror regime could not possess weapons of mass destruction. There was, you know, they tried to make a case that there was all these connections to Al Qaeda inside the Iraqi regiment, and then they sold the war on that basis. Right. It was a huge effort leading up to the invasion of Iraq. And once we got in and there were no WMDs, or at least there were no WMDs of the kind that they had told us there were. And this was. The CIA was involved with, this is George Tenet, the director of the CIA at the time. His famous phrase to President Bush was that the intel was a slam dunk on WMDs. And then, of course, it all turned out not to be true. And so what the administration had to do, because we had already committed, we'd already toppled the regime, we had affected regime change. We had a massive army in Iraq, ground forces. We had a civilian administration appointee who was basically sort of in charge of Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military, which in retrospect was a huge mistake. And so they had to come up with a new, like in the moment, a new justification for why we were doing this. If there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, why have we invaded the country? Why have we decapitated the regime? What is the purpose of our mission here? And they had to cobble together a new justification for it. And that was this neocon nation building, all people's yearn for democracy claptrap that justified our ongoing nation building efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan, you know, for years and years and years after that. That was not, you know, that was not part of the initial rhetoric to sell the Iraq war to the American people, that the Iraqi people were yearning for freedom and that we, and that, you know, there, there was talk by Rumsfeld and some others, I believe that we would be greeted as liberators, which was a complete fantasy, right. And totally misunderstood, you know, Middle east political societal dynamics. But, but the, but the justification that we have to make, you know, the Middle east safe for democracy and the way that the, the Iraqi people deserve, you know, freedom. And, and they're going to be, it's going to be just like the United States and they're going to have elections. That was all post facto justifications that were cobbled together once it became obvious that there were no weapons of mass destruction. And so in that sense, so you asked about what are the similarities. We keep being told this is not Iraq, and in that sense, it's not. In contrast to the Iraq war, the Trump administration has made no effort to communicate anything to the American people ahead of time. They haven't tried to sell this on anything. They, you know, barely told us about it before it started happening. So, so it's unlike Iraq in that sense. And maybe it is just the case that President Trump does not feel that he, he needs to explain or justify these things beforehand because it all works out in the end, like with Venezuela or with Operation Midnight Hammer last June, and maybe that will happen again this time. And Trump is just sort of the golden boy and everything works out for him. However, these kinds of things tend to take on a life of their own. Events spiral out of control. Things don't go according to plan. The other thing about this conflict is that Iran is a big country. You know, it's, it's not Venezuela. And to your point, it's not Iraq either. It's a big country. It's not as fractious of a country as Iraq was. Iraq was a, was a, was a cobbled together kind of false country that was created at the aftermath of the two world wars. It was, it was ruled by Saddam Hussein's sort of like, tribal group. There were a lot of other ethnic groups and tribal coalitions in Iraq. It was a very unstable conglomeration of peoples that made up this and that still make up the nation state of Iraq. That is not quite the same in Iran. It's much more of a cohesive nation state. There's more of an ethnic majority there or at least an ethnic plurality there. And it's not simply the case that we're going to be able to sort of, I think, really control what sort of regime takes charge in Iraq. And maybe the Trump administration doesn't care what kind of regime takes control as long as they're not a revolutionary terrorist regime bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, you know, and, and maybe that's as good as it gets in this part of the world. Again, it remains to be seen. I'm not instinctively against our aims here in taming the Iranian regime, in changing it, in ensuring that it can't threaten the United States. But I think that there's a lot of unknowns and I don't have confidence that the administration sort of has a real plan for what comes after this series of strikes, however long they last.
C
Right, Right. Well, especially because it all happened so quickly, John. We could, we couldn't have done anything to prepare for this.
B
Can't evacuate anybody.
C
Right, Right. Is there anything to be learned here about, like, the role of embassies or other U.S. presence in the Middle East? Like, should we be taking any lessons about this? Would it be as easy to be chain ganged by a weaker ally if we didn't have people just kind of permanently stationed in The Middle east that are such easy targets for terrorists.
B
Yeah.
C
And the Iranian regime. Like, like, what should we take away from that?
B
Right. Yeah.
C
And what can we do?
B
How exposed we are?
C
Right, Right. Like, has the, has the train totally left the station on that? Or like, is there a world where we actually could change the status quo as it relates to our presence in the Middle East?
B
Yeah. This is a larger question about American hegemony and the unipolar world versus the multipolar world. You know, the reason that we have military bases all over the world is because after World War II, we were the global hegemon and especially after the Cold War, you know, and so you kind of have to take a,
C
kind
B
of, have to choose a strategic road, so to speak. Right. You know, if you, if you want a unipolar world where under American hegemony, then you are going to need US Military bases all over the world. You know, one of the reasons that we have a military. And this, this gets lost in the discussion about NATO and our European allies who are totally kind of militarily incompetent. They, they don't, they don't really have military capabilities to speak of anymore. That's not, that's, that's a feature, not a bug, of the post World War II system. Right. The idea is that by imposing American hegemony on Europe, you prevent a general European war from breaking out again. You make it impossible for something like World War II to happen again. And so, you know, the response on the other side of the aisle to that is like, well, you know, we don't want to spend our tax dollars and our military resources policing Europe in perpetuity forever. And that's, you know, and you can make that argument. And that's sort of like, that's the other sort of strategic road that we go down. That, that, that is sort of a fortress. America. Doesn't matter what happens in other countries, doesn't matter, you know, what happens in the Middle east or other regions. We just need to take care of our own and, and, and not quash small wars as they come up in, in these other parts of the world and conceive of American interests narrowly. And I have some sympathy for that view after, you know, 20 years of nation building and, and sort of neocon interventionism in places like Afghanistan. You know, it's just like, insane. It's like the worst place in the world that we could have spent 20 years and untold trillions of dollars trying to turn that into something other than what it is always going to be so, so, so all that to say it's a larger question. Our exposure in these different parts of the world, our exposure in the Middle east because of all of our embassies and our military bases and personnel there is part of global US Hegemony and maintaining that as a, as a strategic framework for how we interact with the world. The US Led kind of rules based international order. Right. And, and I think that there's, there's, you know, there's room to debate whether that has, has been a good thing for the American people. And, and I think that, that in the end is the standard by which we need to judge all of these stores. Strategic options, what is best for the American people. If global American hegemony serves the interest of the American people, if it creates prosperity and, and success and peace for the American people, then I'm all for it. To the extent that it doesn't, then I see no reason to maintain that order and that strategic posture for the sake of NGOs and international bodies and institutions that have little interest in the prosperity and peace and security of the American people.
A
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C
So let's talk perception of the American people because I mean I don't trust a whole lot of the polling coming out about who, who thinks what about about the administration and their actions right now because it's also, it's meant to shape public opinion and it's just also too, too early to know. But if past is prologue, then the longer this carries on, the less appetite people will have for it because that's just how war works. But it also seems, I mean, which is to be expected, that there is far, far more appetite for this in the Acela corridor and in the Beltway than there is in any of the rest of the country, specifically among younger Americans who I think are so tired of hearing about war in the Middle East. I mean you've got, you've got boomer cons who just this is what they live for. But then you have a lot of other people who are like, hey, I'm over here trying to buy a house and we're, you know, talking about freedom for the Iranians. Like, what the heck is going on? Can you just speak to maybe some of that generational divide? But, but even more than that, I mean, we have midterms coming up this year, and I would love to get your take on what you think the implications of this will be in November, because the way I'm looking at it, there is a whole lot of potential political downside and not a whole lot of upside. And so, you know, like, what's the political calculus here?
B
Yeah, I tend to agree with you. You know, like, what concrete material improvement will ordinary middle class working Americans see in their lives as a result of us toppling the Iranian regime and taking out its missile capabilities and destroying its navy? I can't think of one. And even if there, even if there were one, I doubt that that is going to sort of be like what voters are thinking about when they go to the polls for the midterms. Right. They're not going to be going and be like, oh, man, that Iran war, that was awesome. I'm voting, I'm voting for the Republicans. It's just the downside. It seems like there's a lot of potential downsides. And again, you know, it remains to be seen, right, because we're only a few days into this. The downsides seem like. The potential downsides seem great. The potential upsides from an electoral perspective seem elusive, hard to articulate. My preference would be for this Trump administration to have had a laser like focus on domestic policy issues. I think that the coalition that elected Trump was reacting to what they saw in the Biden administration and among the Democrats. I think that having a laser like focus on deportations and immigration reform and securing the border and cracking down on the abuse of our visa system and our asylum system is a major concern for the people who voted for Trump. The economy you mentioned young people not being able to afford to buy houses. I think there's a reason that, like boomer cons get excited about like these foreign kind of adventures because they've kind of, they've kind of made it like the economy is, is built around benefiting them and not so much younger Americans who are trying to start families, who are trying to get established, who are trying to sort of enter the middle class and be self sufficient and maybe even, you know, sort of put some money away and do all the things that Americans would like to do. And so it is the case that administrations can be distracted by things or that attention can be. I mean, not even, you know, let's say you don't even want to use the word distracted. There's only so much attention and effort that can go towards certain things. And a lot of times in any administration, the thing that gets done is the thing that enough people within the administration are focused on. I think that's one of the reasons that Venezuela happened. It's not that it was the number one thing on anyone's agenda. It was that it was on enough people's agenda that it got done. And so when, when you embark on something like what we've embarked on here in Iran, nobody knows where this is going. Nobody knows how long this is going to last. Nobody knows how much it will cost. Nobody knows what the fallout is going to be in terms of U.S. involvement in the region. But I do feel pretty confident in saying that the administration is focused entirely on Iran now, and that is, unfortunately, to the exclusion of other domestic priorities that I think are way more important to Republican voters and are going to be way more of a motivating factor in the midterms. Especially if, you know, God forbid, we have a large number of casualties or we have some sort of terrorist attack where civilians are killed either here or abroad, that's going to sour people on this really quickly. And so there's a huge risk involved in committing so much attention and concentration and resources to something where the upsides, at least from an electoral perspective, are pretty elusive. It's pretty hard to see what the upsides are.
C
Yeah, I think there are very clear issues that are top of mind for the American people. Obviously the economy, obviously immigration. Also, apparently elections. I mean, there was one thing that Americans really wanted the Senate to just get done. They had the Save America Act. They, you know, they could utilize the talking filibuster and actually make some progress on this. And it seems that the only things, you know, the only things the Senate has actually worked hard on are doing interventionist messaging for the Trump administration. That's mixed messaging and, you know, getting all excited about war and doing all of the work they possibly can to extend the enhanced Obamacare subsidies a couple of months ago. I mean, it's like anytime there's an actual priority that Americans are like, hey, this is an 80, 20 issue, or this should be able to get done, it's like. Like there is no effort whatsoever. And it's just so frustrating when you had actual tangible things that could represent real wins. Like, you know, policy aims, campaign promises, these types of concrete things. And instead now all of the oxygen has once again been sucked out of the room by something that not only is not going to help Americans, but it's actually kind of a middle finger to Americans who actually have priorities that they want to see done. And it's just, no, no, we don't have time for that. We got it. We got to do war with Iran. So, and whether you even see the merits of that or not, it's like we have problems in our own country, you know, that people care about. And just to not see any movement on that is, is, Is incredibly, incredibly frustrating for a lot of Americans. On the congressional point, I'm curious what you think just about even, like, the constitutionality of this kind of military action. I think, you know, essentially declaring war on Iran seems to me to be very different than, like, targeted drug boat strikes or like even the Maduro operation. Do you think that this was above board? Was it, Were we wrong not to have congressional approval here? Like, it seems to me that this was a bigger declaration of war than, than some of the other actions the Trump administration has taken.
B
Yeah, I, I sort of have mixed feelings about that. I think that since, you know, World War II, we've kind of been in a, in a situation where the executive has broad latitude to use the military to protect American interests and, and, and to take action overseas as it sees fit. And, and so I think that that fits within that broader sort of post World War II framework. You know, obviously, if Trump had gone to Congress to seek a declaration of war against Iran, excuse me, he wouldn't have got it. And I don't think, you know, maybe the only administration that would have, you know, would have been able to secure an actual declaration of war since World War II was the George W. Bush administration in the wake of 9 11. Interestingly, in that case, they didn't even ask for a declaration of war. That was the, it was the aumf, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that was. That. That sort of stayed in effect for, for many, many years. I believe it's actually still in effect. And, and that was sort of like a half measure short of a declaration of war. So, you know, in some ways, the, just the, the way that the United States has conducted foreign policy since the end of World War II has rendered this a bit of an academic debate with not a lot of real world applications. I know that the Democrats sort of use that opportunistically, you know, every time the Republican administration does something overseas with the military that they don't like, they say, ah, this is illegal. There's no, you know, congressional. But of course, you know, Obama can go ahead and drone American citizens all over the world and Democrats won't say anything. Right. So it's a very cynical talking point that I think is deployed to some extent on both sides. Democrats seem to do it more often than Republicans. But, but in this case, I just think the, the, the fact is that was never going to happen. Like the. Even if this had gone perfectly and the Trump administration had made a case to the American people and had prepared us for imminent action against Iran, I still don't think that Trump would have gone to Congress to ask for a declaration of war. And short of some more basic structural changes to the way our three branches of government operate, I don't, I just don't see that, that any president in either party is ever going to do that in, you know, in the current environment that we're in.
A
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C
You brought up terrorism a couple minutes ago, and we saw this mass shooting over the past couple days in Austin that seemed like potentially had links to like, Islamic terrorism. It's hard to know exactly. We're not getting great information and it's a little bit mixed. But he at least had indications that, you know, he had a sweatshirt that was like pro Allah and, and some other things that indicated that maybe this was like a pro Iran attack. Who knows? But I think it's raised some questions for me about what we might be looking at in the near future, efforts to do refugee resettlement or like, you know, things like that. How can we make sure that we do not open the floodgates to a bunch more unvetted, unvetted foreigners? You know, we got a lot of nonsense rhetoric from the Biden administration about, you know, during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, how there were all of these vetted immigrants, all these vetted refugees who are resettled here. That turned out to be an absolute Load of junk. How can we ensure that this does not, does not result in the exact same thing where we're just opening the door to more terrorism?
B
I, it's very hard to see how it doesn't. I mean, I remember just not that long ago, it was one of those Afghanistan refugees, unvetted, who attacked the national guardsmen in Washington, D.C. i, I can't use December or January, not that long ago. And that was, that was part of this wave of people that we just let into the country because, because of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think it's a major problem. Anytime there's major geopolitical upheaval in the Middle east, you get it triggers waves of refugees. In 2014, 2015, the Syrian Civil war triggered the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe. The Muslim population of Europe over the past 10 years has exploded largely because of these waves of refugees that came out of the Middle east during this period of intense civil war in Syria. So the idea that we're going to go in and decapitate the regime that has ruled for a half a century in Iran, and it's not going to have second and third order effects in the forms of migrant crises, refugee crises, unvetted people making their way out of Iran into European countries, into the United States potentially. We already know during the Biden administration, if something like 1500 iranians were apprehended at the border crossing into the country illegally. Of those, 750 or so were released into the country. Those are only the people that we know about because of course, there were hundreds of thousands of what they call known gotaways, which are people who cross the border illegally of unknown origin. We have no idea who these people were. They were not apprehended and they got away. And that's also not counting all of the. So there's the known gotaways, and then there's also what they call the unknown gotaways, which is just the number of people who crossed who evaded detection. And we were not even aware that they had crossed. In other words, they weren't picked up on a camera, they didn't trip a sensor, they were able to cross into the border. And there's hundreds of thousands of those as well. And ICE and CBP have a way of calculating those things as well. So, you know, so there's, there's, you know, these are real concerns and these, again, these are the kinds of things that you would hope there would be some kind of like, public discussion of. There would be an effort by the administration to mollify the, the legitimate fears of the American people, especially after, as I said, we had one of the Afghan refugees, you know, attack our National Guardsmen in the nation's capital. Just happened. There's every reason to be concerned about that happening now when we know from the Biden administration era of the illegal immigration wave that came in that there are Iranians, there are Iranians who are on the terrorist watch list that came in. There are people from all kinds of other Muslim majority countries on terrorist watch lists that came in. Todd Bensman, who now works for Tom Holman Trump administration during the, you know, he, he wrote a bunch of articles for us about this very thing about people who are on these watch lists who are being apprehended at the border under the Biden administration. So this is another thing that you can't just hand wave it away. This is a real, a real security concern. And unfortunately it's something that we, you know, have to take into account when we launch these kinds of actions overseas. And I, I hope the administration has taken it to account. They haven't talked about it much. They haven't talked about a lot of things very much. So, you know, I, I hope that there's some, there's someone in the White House or someone in the administration who is at least preparing Trump and the other principal officials in the administration to resist accepting, you know, wave upon wave of Iranian refugees in, you know, a month or two.
C
Yeah, I think that also just adds fuel to the fire of why the condescension not only from the administration but also from people who are just instinctively pro strikes like this, why that condescension is so frustrating for Americans because it's like, you're not a rube for asking questions about the potential second and third order effects of this. And you know, it's similar to pharmaceuticals where it's like it has all these side effects. No, those aren't side effects. Those are effects. Those are just things that are going to happen. If you take this like, and you know, it's not that you can bomb, bomb another country, take out another leader and then act surprised when there's a refugee crisis. Like, no, this is actually foreseeable. So we need to know that American interests are being considered here because it's not just going to be contained over, over there. Like, we are going to feel the effects of that because of the second and third order effects that are predictable in a situation like this. And so the refugee implications are just one of those many things. And it would be really great to get A clear, non condescending answer from the administration and from people who are hawking the war on this as to why. Why, you know, that's not a concern here. So, John, before I let you go, you know, media coverage of this whole thing has been abysmal from how the Ayatollah is being, you know, heralded as this wonderful man with a nice smile and a bushy beard and all the rest. And of course, you know, we're only days into this and everybody already has an exact, fully formed opinion on, on everything. I love our colleague Chris Bray's approach, which is that I'm about a week away from starting to have an opinion on this. I love that, and I think more people should be that way. But just practical takeaways for Americans who are listening to this, who either have a strong opinion or don't know what to think about this yet. How can they say stay sane and not look stupid as they navigate conversations about this, as they take public positions on this? I know L. Purnell, one of our colleagues at the Federalist, has a really great article on this, but just practically like how people not look insane and not come out with a gut reaction that's going to look, that's not going to age well, shall we say?
B
Yeah. I think it's important for people to remember you don't have to have a super strident opinion about the Iranian war. Right. You don't have to be super passionate about it. You don't have to pick a side. You don't have to weigh in on it. You know, one of the great travesties of social media and the Internet in general is that everybody feels like they have to sort of, you know, have an opinion and broadcast the opinion. And, and that's simply not true. For one thing, not everybody's entitled to an opinion. Right. I, I tend to think you have to earn your opinions right, if, if you want them to carry any weight. And so it's okay to sort of reserve judgment. It's okay to wait and watch and see how things unfold. And I think that's especially true in this conflict since there really was no public debate about this before it happened. We haven't been kind of like in a discourse about Iran and what to do about it, you know, leading up to this action. I, I know that there's been a broader discourse that's been going on for many years about what to do about Iran's nuclear weapons, but this isn't something that, you know, we, we were all kind of talking about and debating and the ground had not been prepared for this. And so it's okay to take a breath, to take a beat and to watch and to wait and to assess, you know, what you think of the arguments that are being made of the statements that are coming out of the White House and the administration. I myself, you know, we commentate on this stuff and cover this stuff for a living. I'm trying to be measured in my response. You know, it may not seem like that from the headlines of my pieces, which I don't always write, but, but, but, but it's, it's okay to not have a super strident opinion about this and it's okay to change your opinion too, based upon, like, what happens. I, I think that the, the tribalism in our society, understandably so, is such that everybody feels like they have to kind of, you know, make a super strong statement or be in a camp on every issue that comes across the wire. And especially when it comes to foreign conflicts like this, especially when it comes to these major military actions, the better part of wisdom is to be conservative in your temperament towards what is happening. Part of the reason for that is because in an environment like this, there's a huge amount of propaganda, there's a huge amount of, of efforts to manipulate public opinion. There's a lot of false information out there. Social media makes it a million times worse, right, because you're, you're seeing video images, you're seeing clips, you're, you're seeing footage that may, may be taken out of context. You're seeing things that may be generated by AI and paraphrases of what people
C
said instead of actual.
B
It's very easy to be kind of led down the garden path, so to speak, in a situation that has always been the case. I think it's even more so now because of social media and because of our hyper connectivity. And so that's just that, that's just to say caution is even more warranted and, and conservative disposition is even more warranted than it might have otherwise been in, in, in previous American wars. Like, you know, in 2003 when we invaded Iraq, you know, thank God there was no smartphones and no real social media, right? There was, there were blogs, you know, how harmful could they be? So that's my, you know, that's my general advice, is to just be conservative in your statements and in your opinions. It's okay to withhold judgment. I may not know what my real opinions are about this war for weeks or months. And, and, and, and I think that's okay.
C
Catch John in a decade if you want to know what he thinks.
B
That's right. Yeah, that's right.
C
Well, in an effort to cut through the propaganda, go follow John on Twitter for his day to day takes on the Iran war. Go follow the Federalist on Twitter as well and be sure to read John's great article on the Federalist how Israel chain ganged the Trump administration into war against Iran. John, thank you so much for being on the Kylie cast today. It was great having you.
B
Thanks Kylie.
C
Thank you so much for tuning in to this week's episode of the Kylie Cast. If you haven't done so already, please like and subscribe. Wherever you get your podcasts, leave us a five star review. It'll only take you a second and it's such a good and easy way for you to help out the show. As always, I will be back next week with more. So until then, just remember the truth hurts, but it won't kill you.
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Episode Title: What To Make Of Trump’s War With Iran
Release Date: March 5, 2026
Host: Kylie Griswold (Managing Editor, The Federalist)
Guest: John Daniel Davidson (Senior Editor, The Federalist)
This episode delves into the sudden onset of the Trump administration's war with Iran. Host Kylie Griswold and senior editor John Davidson examine the surprise attack, messaging missteps from the White House, the role of Israel in U.S. decision-making (introducing the concept of "chain ganging" in international relations), and the domestic and political implications of the conflict. The discussion is nuanced, skeptical, and at times blunt, reflecting the Federalist's critical, conservative perspective.
Lack of Preparation and Communication
Regime Change as the Real Objective
Definition and Context of Chain Ganging
“A weaker ally has security commitments and strategic imperatives that do not align with the interests of the stronger ally...their actions compelled the actions of larger, stronger nations.” — John Davidson (10:28)
How It Played Out
Trump Doctrine vs. Obama/Biden
Mixed and Condescending Messaging
Rationale for war kept shifting: regime change, Iranian nuclear threat, freedom for Iranian people.
Administration officials contradict each other publicly, causing skepticism among supporters.
Press conferences and communication perceived as patronizing:
“The response from the administration has been either confusing, contradictory, or condescending at every step of the way." – Kylie Griswold (24:01)
Trump seeking to maintain image of strength:
"Trump is not going to want anyone to say that he was forced into anything, that he was led to act before he was prepared to act or that he was not the initiator." – John Davidson (25:46)
How Is This Like (or Unlike) Iraq?
“In contrast to the Iraq war, the Trump administration has made no effort to communicate anything to the American people ahead of time. They haven’t tried to sell this on anything.” — John Davidson (36:24)
Risks of Mission Creep & Realistic Expectations
Discussion of American Hegemony and Military Exposure
"Our exposure in the Middle East because of all of our embassies and our military bases and personnel there is part of global US hegemony..." – John Davidson (41:13)
Generational and Political Divide
“My preference would be for this Trump administration to have had a laser-like focus on domestic policy issues.” — John Davidson (46:53)
Constitutional Questions
Risks of Refugee Waves and Domestic Terror
“It’s not that you can bomb another country...and then act surprised when there’s a refugee crisis. No, this is actually foreseeable.” – Kylie Griswold (61:02)
Resist Rushed Opinions
“You don’t have to have a super strident opinion about the Iranian war. Right. You don't have to pick a side ... It's okay to sort of reserve judgment. It’s okay to wait and watch and see how things unfold.” – John Davidson (63:08)
On the suddenness and origin of the war:
“It makes it feel like it was foisted upon us by Israel, by our ally who had their own set of strategic imperatives, who had their own agenda.” — John Davidson (05:41)
On chain ganging and historical analogies:
“This is a phenomenon in international relations, in the power dynamics between coalitions, between allies and military partnerships that has...a history.” – John Davidson (10:58)
On administration messaging:
“Give us responses that make sense. Don't torture the English language by saying that Iran has been an imminent threat for 47 years. That is George W. Bush neocon stuff. I have no patience for that kind of thing.” – John Davidson (28:42)
On American interests and hegemony:
“If global American hegemony serves the interest of the American people, if it creates prosperity and success and peace for the American people, then I’m all for it. To the extent that it doesn’t, then I see no reason to maintain that order.” – John Davidson (44:01)
On opinions and public discourse:
“It’s okay to take a breath, to take a beat and to watch and to wait and to assess, you know, what you think of the arguments.” – John Davidson (63:21)
On the younger generation's frustration:
“You’ve got boomer cons who just—this is what they live for. But then you have a lot of other people who are like, hey, I’m over here trying to buy a house and we’re, you know, talking about freedom for the Iranians. Like, what the heck is going on?” – Kylie Griswold (44:58)
This episode offers a thorough, candid discussion of the complexities, risks, and unanswered questions surrounding the sudden U.S. war effort in Iran under the Trump administration. It highlights the dangers of “chain ganging” in alliances, calls out opaque or misleading messaging from leadership, and urges caution, skepticism, and patience both in public opinion and policy. The hosts recommend careful observation rather than rushing to judgment—sage advice in a rapidly changing international crisis.