Iran Contra: Episode 5 - All Out

Summary

Fiasco: Iran-Contra – Episode 5: All Out

Overview

In Episode 5 of Pushkin Industries' "Fiasco" series, titled "Iran-Contra: All Out," host Leon Neyfakh delves deep into one of the most controversial scandals of the 1980s—the Iran-Contra affair. This episode intricately unpacks the complexities of the scandal, the internal strife within the Reagan administration, and the consequential fallout that threatened to undermine Ronald Reagan's presidency. Through a blend of historical analysis, firsthand accounts, and expert insights, Neyfakh brings to light the intricate web of deceit, loyalty, and political maneuvering that defined this pivotal moment in American history.

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Setting the Stage: Reagan’s Presidency Under Fire

The episode opens by highlighting the precarious position President Ronald Reagan found himself in during November 1986. Amidst a barrage of media scrutiny, Reagan's presidency was already beleaguered by two major scandals: the Hassenfuss crash in Nicaragua and the emergence of the Iran arms-for-hostages deal.

Peter Wallison emphasizes, "[...] Ronald Reagan was the Teflon president. In 1986, he was serving as White House counsel, a job that involved advising the President on what was and wasn't legal. [Reagan] was in the middle of a firestorm, caused by the ridiculous falsehoods the media has been spawning." (01:14)

The Hassenfuss incident implicated the Reagan administration in circumventing laws that banned U.S. funding to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Concurrently, reports surfaced alleging that the U.S. was secretly selling missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, a narrative that starkly contradicted Reagan's public stance against negotiating with terrorists.

The Dual Scandal: Nicaragua and Iran

John Poindexter states, "It has all the makings of a major new uproar. The US may have violated a ban on aid to the Contras." (01:53) This revelation coupled with the Iran missile sales allegations created a perfect storm that threatened to dismantle Reagan's carefully constructed image of integrity and strength.

Peter Wallison notes, "The arms for hostages story seemed to come out of nowhere. It flatly contradicted Reagan's stated policies of not negotiating with terrorists and opposing the sale of weapons to Iran. The outcry was unlike anything the Reagan White House had ever faced." (02:59)

Reagan’s Televised Address: A Misstep

Facing unprecedented pressure, Reagan, typically adept at maintaining his composure, decided to address the nation directly.

Peter Wallison recounts, "A week after American media picked up the arms for hostages story, Reagan agreed to deliver a televised speech." (04:10)

During his address, Reagan attempted to clarify the administration's stance:

Ronald Reagan: "I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran [...]" (06:29)

However, his initial denial of U.S. involvement in arms shipments to Iran was met with skepticism:

Ronald Reagan: "The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not." (07:10)

The reception was disastrous. According to an ABC News poll cited by Peter Wallison, "56% of Americans thought the President was lying when he said there had not been an arms for hostages deal." (07:36)

Internal Crises: Shultz and the White House

In the aftermath of Reagan's failed address, internal tensions within the White House began to surface. George Shultz, Reagan's Secretary of State, emerged as a vocal critic of the arms deals, publicly distancing himself from the administration's actions.

George Shultz: "Under the circumstances of Iran's war with Iraq, its pursuit of terrorism, its association with those holding our hostages? I would certainly say, as far as I'm concerned, no." (13:48)

This bold stance was a departure from the unified front typically presented by presidential administrations and heightened the perception of chaos within the White House.

The Diversion Memo: Evidence of Collusion

A pivotal moment in the episode is the discovery of the "diversion memo." During an internal investigation led by Attorney General Ed Meese and DOJ official Charles Cooper, the memo revealed how funds from the Iran arms sales were diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua.

Peter Wallison explains, "The document was a five-page memo titled 'Release of American Hostages in Beirut,' outlining how funds from the arms shipments to Iran could be diverted to the Contras." (27:37)

Oliver North, a key figure in the Iran-Contra affair, admitted to destroying an early version of the covert action finding that explicitly tied arms sales to ransom payments for hostages.

Oliver North: "I personally destroyed it. ... It was basically a coffee can." (25:06)

The revelation that top officials were involved in concealing the true purpose of the arms sales created a seismic shift within the administration. Ed Meese recognized the gravity of the situation and recommended that President Reagan publicly disclose the findings to prevent further damage.

The Fallout: Resignations and Public Scrutiny

As the scandal intensified, key figures like John Poindexter and Oliver North were forced to resign or were dismissed from their positions. Their departures signaled the administration's attempt to contain the scandal, but the damage had already been done.

Peter Wallison notes, "Within a month of the story becoming public, Reagan's approval rating had dropped by 21%. One poll found that 90% of the American people believed he was lying about what he knew." (40:29)

To further investigate the administration's actions, Reagan appointed the Tower Commission and an independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, who would oversee any potential criminal proceedings related to the affair.

Media and Public Reaction

The media played a crucial role in unraveling the scandal. Reporter Jane Mayer provided insightful observations on the administration's handling of the affair:

Jane Mayer: "What becomes clear is that the aides most involved in this scandal are conspiring with each other to come up with COVID stories that will get themselves off the hook." (05:04)

Her reportage underscored the lengths to which Reagan's aides would go to protect the administration's image, even at the cost of public trust.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Iran-Contra

By the episode's end, it becomes evident that the Iran-Contra affair had profound implications for presidential accountability and the limits of executive power. The scandal not only eroded public trust in Reagan but also set precedents for how covert operations are managed and overseen within the U.S. government.

Peter Wallison reflects, "Something's happening here that looks a lot like Watergate." (09:28)

The episode concludes by emphasizing the lasting impact of Iran-Contra on American politics, highlighting the delicate balance between national security interests and adherence to constitutional principles.

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Notable Quotes

• Dalia Lithwick: "The new Trump regime is taking a brick bat to norms, the Constitution and the law, seemingly saying to the US justice system, make me will the courts hold?" (00:30)

• Peter Wallison: "The Hassenfuss crash seemed to confirm that the Reagan administration was yet again evading the law that prohibited the US Government from funding the Contra rebels." (01:59)

• Jane Mayer: "Nixon was always seen as a schemer. You know, his nickname was Tricky Dick. Reagan was the opposite. He was sort of sunny." (08:13)

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Key Figures

• Ronald Reagan: 40th President of the United States whose presidency was marred by the Iran-Contra scandal.
• Peter Wallison: White House staffer involved in writing Reagan's speeches.
• John Poindexter: National Security Advisor implicated in the scandal.
• Oliver North: NSC staff member who played a central role in the arms-for-hostages operation.
• George Shultz: Secretary of State who opposed the arms sales to Iran.
• Ed Meese: Attorney General who led the internal investigation.
• Charles Cooper: DOJ official assisting in the investigation.
• Jane Mayer: Reporter covering the scandal for the New Yorker and the Wall Street Journal.

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Production Credits

"Fiasco" is a production of Prologue Projects and is distributed by Pushkin Industries. The episode was produced by Andrew Parsons, Madeline Kaplan, Ula Culpa, and Leon Nayfakh, with editing by Camilla Hammer and research by Francis Carr. The episode features music by Nick Silvester and was mixed by Rob Byers, Michael Rayfiel, and Johnny Vince Evans.

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Conclusion

Episode 5, "All Out," of the "Fiasco" series provides a comprehensive and engaging exploration of the Iran-Contra affair, shedding light on the intricate dynamics within the Reagan administration and the broader implications for American governance and political trust. Through meticulous research and compelling storytelling, Pushkin Industries delivers a poignant reminder of the fragile nature of presidential integrity and the enduring quest for accountability in the corridors of power.

Transcript

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[Dalia Lithwick]

The new Trump regime is taking a brick bat to norms, the Constitution and the law, seemingly saying to the US justice system, make me will the courts hold?

[Peter Wallison]

What you're seeing right now is a fundamental disregard of basic constitutional principles.

[Dalia Lithwick]

Join me, Dalia Lithwick on Amicus Slate's podcast about the courts and the law to hear from the lawyers, judges, advocates and analysts who have the answers. Search Amicus that's Am I C U S? Wherever you listen to podcasts because legal knowledge is power.

[Peter Wallison]

Pushkin On Thursday, November 13, 1986, Ronald Reagan opened his maroon leather bound diary and jotted down a few thoughts about his day. He was in the middle of a firestorm, he wrote, caused by the ridiculous falsehoods the media has been spawning. The firestorm had been ignited by two separate scandals. First, there was Eugene Hassenfuss, the former Marine whose plane had been shot down over Nicaragua by a Sandinista soldier.

[John Poindexter]

It has all the makings of a major new uproar. The US May have violated a ban on aid to the Contras.

[Peter Wallison]

The Hassenfuss crash seemed to confirm that the Reagan administration was yet again evading the law that prohibited the US Government from funding the Contra rebels.

[John Poindexter]

The White House has had full knowledge.

[Oliver North]

Of this Contra cargo plane operation for.

[Ronald Reagan]

More than a year.

[Peter Wallison]

Then, about a month later, the White House was hit with a seemingly unrelated story about arms trafficking in a different foreign country. According to an article in a Lebanese magazine, the US Was selling missiles to Iran. Subsequent reports alleged that the arrangement was part of an arms for hostages swap.

[Ronald Reagan]

Iran has helped the United States free.

[John Poindexter]

A hostage from Lebanon, and the US Is helping Iran in its war with Iraq.

[Peter Wallison]

In his diary, Reagan referred to the controversy as the Iran incident. That was a lot more innocuous than what people outside the administration were calling it.

[John Poindexter]

A very dangerous precedent. Negotiating with terrorists escapades, and I think that is the word, is simply a misreading of Iranian political realities and therefore it's dumb.

[Peter Wallison]

The Iran news instantly eclipsed Eugene Hassenfuss and Nicaragua it just wasn't that surprising that Reagan still wanted to support the Contras. The arms for hostages story, on the other hand, seemed to come out of nowhere. And it flatly contradicted Reagan's stated policies of not negotiating with terrorists and opposing the sale of weapons to Iran. The outcry was unlike anything the Reagan White House had ever faced. For six years, Ronald Reagan was the Teflon president. That's Peter Wallison. In 1986, he was serving as White House counsel, a job that involved advising the President on what was and wasn't legal. Wallison says that scandals just didn't seem to stick to Reagan through most of his presidency. But the Iran story was different. There was so little official information coming out, only leaks from various places and people who had some know of it either abroad or in the United States. So it was an enormous media firestorm. Initially, Reagan tried to just ride it out. Even his advisors urged him to publicly address the controversy. Finally, a week after American media picked up the arms for hostages story, Reagan agreed to deliver a televised speech. First order of business, he wrote in his diary. I will go on TV at 8pm tonight.

[John Poindexter]

President Reagan is addressing the nation this evening to set the record straight as the White House put it, on relations with Iran and efforts to free US hostages.

[Peter Wallison]

Peter Wallison was one of the White House staffers responsible for writing the speech.

[John Poindexter]

We were supposed to explain what all.

[Peter Wallison]

These newspaper reports were about, all this media coverage. But the idea was to try to explain, I suppose, what it was that happened in a way that showed that it was innocent. But as Wallison and the other speechwriters discovered, the facts of the arms shipments were not easy to nail down. Here's Jane Mayer, a reporter at the New Yorker and co author of the book Landslide.

[Jane Mayer]

What becomes clear is that the aides that are most involved in this scandal are conspiring with each other to come up with COVID stories that will get themselves off the hook. But in order to do that, they need to kind of get the President to lie for them.

[John Poindexter]

Some sources within the administration tell a somewhat different story than the one the President will tell tonight. One such source familiar with the President's speech said, we are now engaged in rewriting history.

[Jane Mayer]

This is all putting the President in great peril. And it rings a familiar bell to at least a couple people. They remember Watergate.

[Peter Wallison]

Here's Peter Wallison again.

[John Poindexter]

After Watergate, we all understood that the.

[Peter Wallison]

COVID up could be worse than the crime itself. Reagan's speech was going to be an opportunity to send a clear signal he was not trying to cover anything up.

[John Poindexter]

NBC's regular Thursday night schedule, beginning with the Cosby show will be seen immediately following President Reagan's address on most of these stations.

[Peter Wallison]

At 8pm on Nov. 13, Reagan sat down at his desk in the Oval Office, looked into the camera and tried to explain himself.

[John Poindexter]

Good evening.

[Ronald Reagan]

I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state sponsored terrorism and subversion and to effect the safe return of all hostages.

[Peter Wallison]

There it was. Confirmation of the arms sales to Iran to effect the safe return of all the hostages. Except a minute later Reagan also said this.

[Ronald Reagan]

The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not.

[Peter Wallison]

The speech did not play well with viewers.

[John Poindexter]

It is a new experience for the President. He goes on television to tell the nation he has never sent any arms to Iran in exchange for American hostages. And 24 hours later the country is far from convinced.

[Peter Wallison]

An ABC News poll found that 56% of Americans thought the President was lying when he said there had not been an arms for hostages deal. Suddenly Reagan was in an unfamiliar position. People just didn't trust him.

[John Poindexter]

There was criticism of the President's explanations from both Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

[Peter Wallison]

Is the President lying?

[John Poindexter]

They may think there was no quid pro quo. I can't believe that the Iranians didn't think there was any quid pro quo.

[Peter Wallison]

This was not how people usually talked about Ronald Reagan. It cut against everything that was appealing about him as a politician in Watergate.

[Jane Mayer]

Nixon was always seen as a schemer. You know, his nickname was Tricky Dick. Reagan was the opposite. He was sort of sunny. And he didn't seem like the type who'd be able to come up with this incredibly complicated scheme and lie to the American public.

[Peter Wallison]

In the wake of Reagan's speech, White House communications director Pat Buchanan. Yes, that Pat Buchanan decided to reach out to a former colleague he thought might have some advice.

[Jane Mayer]

And he called up Nixon himself and asked Nixon for his advice. What should they do?

[Peter Wallison]

Yes, that Nixon.

[Jane Mayer]

Nixon said, don't do the COVID up. Get out the facts as much as you can and say you've made a mistake and the public will accept that.

[Peter Wallison]

Buchanan brought Nixon's advice to the White House. But Reagan was not prepared to admit that he had made a mistake. There wasn't anything to apologize for. He insisted he hadn't done anything wrong. I'm Leon Naifak from Prologue Projects and Pushkin Industries. This is fiasco Iran Contra.

[John Poindexter]

The country is being asked to believe some things that are hard to swallow.

[Peter Wallison]

Something's happening here that looks a lot like Watergate.

[Leon Nayfak]

There'd been a complete orgy of shredding.

[Jane Mayer]

I realized that I'd missed the whole story.

[Ronald Reagan]

I directed the Attorney General to undertake a review of this matter.

[John Poindexter]

The President knew nothing about it until I reported it to him. I alerted him yesterday morning. Who in the administration knew what was going on and when?

[Peter Wallison]

All out how the Reagan White House tried to stop their Iran problem from becoming a second Watergate. We'll be right back.

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[Dalia Lithwick]

The new Trump regime is taking a brickbat to norms, the Constitution and the law. Seemingly saying to the US justice system, make me will the courts hold?

[Peter Wallison]

What you're seeing right now is a fundamental disregard of basic constitutional principles.

[Dalia Lithwick]

Join me, Dalia Lithwick, on Amicus Slate's podcast about the courts and the law to hear from the lawyers, judges, advocates and analysts who have the answers. Search Amicus that's Am I C U S wherever you listen to podcasts because legal knowledge is power.

[Peter Wallison]

After the President's speech from the Oval Office, the White House scheduled a follow up press conference about the Iran issue. Maybe his first speech had just been too confusing.

[John Poindexter]

It is argued in this very political city that President Reagan's televised news conference tonight in the midst of the Iran affair will be the most important of his presidency. There are many unanswered questions about the most visibly difficult problem since he was elected.

[Peter Wallison]

Once again, Reagan's aides were divided over how he should present the facts. Should he say as little as possible and keep insisting that everything had been above board? Or should he admit that the missile sales were part of an arms for hostages deal and apologize one of the people Advocating for the come clean approach was Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz.

[George Shultz]

Get it all out, as I said, warts and all, and then it'll gradually get behind you.

[Peter Wallison]

Shultz died in 2021 at the age of 100. When I interviewed him, he was 98 and living in California. And though he served under Nixon, he insisted to me that his advice to Reagan wasn't informed by his experience of Watergate.

[George Shultz]

No, I wasn't really thinking about Watergate. President Reagan's standing was totally different from Richard Nixon's. People loved Reagan and respected him a great deal, and they knew he was a man of principle.

[Peter Wallison]

As Secretary of State, Shultz had strongly opposed the idea of selling missiles to Iran. He had advocated against it during multiple meetings with the President.

[George Shultz]

I was opposed to it from the beginning, and I always felt somehow it would wind up leaking out. My fear was that we were selling arms to Iran and Iran was up to no good. It was a mistake.

[Peter Wallison]

Clearly, pushing back against the arms deals in private had not worked. Now that the story was out, Shultz was surprisingly willing to push back in public, too.

[John Poindexter]

Secretary of State Shultz continued distancing himself from the trading of weapons for hostages. Shultz said he thought that not negotiating with terrorists is the right policy. Asked about official silence on the reports of dealings with Iran, Shultz later said, I don't particularly enjoy it. I like to say what I think.

[Peter Wallison]

As the scandal intensified, Shultz went on Face the Nation. In an interview with Leslie Stahl, he made clear that he was out of sync with other members of the administration.

[Jane Mayer]

Will there be any more arms shipments to Iran, either directly by the United States or through any third parties?

[George Shultz]

Under the circumstances of Iran's war with Iraq, its pursuit of terrorism, its association with those holding our hostages? I would certainly say, as far as I'm concerned, no.

[Jane Mayer]

Do you have the authority to speak? Speak for the entire administration?

[George Shultz]

No.

[Peter Wallison]

Shultz's interview enraged his colleagues in the administration and set off another round of speculation about chaos in the White House.

[Oliver North]

You're not going to resign, are you?

[John Poindexter]

At the State Department, they're saying the Secretary wants a firm commitment. No more arms will be sent to Iran, and Schultz will be included in future deliberations.

[Peter Wallison]

Now Reagan wouldn't just have to clear the air about arms shipments. When he gave his press conference, he would likely face questions about whether his administration was coming apart under the weight of the scandal. To prepare, the President enlisted the help of some of his top aides, including National Security Advisor John Poindexter.

[Oliver North]

We knew from the beginning it would be difficult to explain to the American people the detailed rationale. The problem in my mind was associating the arms with the hostages.

[Peter Wallison]

Poindexter wanted the President to explain that the missiles weren't really a ransom payment for the hostages. They were part of something bigger. As you'll remember from episode four, Poindexter believed that the ultimate goal of the initiative was to make inroads with moderates in the Iranian government. The point of the missiles was to show the Iranians that the US was operating in good faith. The release of the hostages was supposed to show the US that the Iranians were too.

[Oliver North]

Our sale of arms to Iran was an indication, we thought, to Iran, that the President was serious about this, and their causing the release of hostages by a proxy was an indication of honesty and earnestness on their part.

[Peter Wallison]

One problem with Poindexter's explanation was that Reagan cared a lot more about the hostages than he did about the broader geopolitical strategies. Another problem was that the President didn't seem to have a firm grasp on what had happened or what he had personally approved.

[Oliver North]

Before the President's press conference, we had what we called a murder board. In the White House theater.

[Peter Wallison]

The murder board was essentially a rehearsal for the press conference.

[Oliver North]

And at one of these murder boards, the President would be on the podium. The press secretary would play the role of the media asking questions.

[Peter Wallison]

As Poindexter watched Reagan practice his answers, he became very concerned.

[Oliver North]

That was when I first noticed that the President's memory was failing because the President would give an answer and he would not have remembered the details of what had transpired. So I would correct the President, tell him, this is what I think you ought to say. And the President would say, right. And then he would come back to the first question. And the President would not remember what I had suggested to him to say. So at that point, I knew it was going to be difficult.

[Ronald Reagan]

Good evening. I have a few words here before I take your questions, some brief remarks.

[Peter Wallison]

At 8:00pm on November 19, the President walked out to a podium in the East Room of the White House. He delivered a brief statement in which he echoed Poindexter's talking points about the diplomatic opening to Iran. Then he opened the floor to questions from the press.

[John Poindexter]

If I can follow up, if your.

[Jane Mayer]

Arms shipments had no effect on the release of the hostages, then how do you explain the release of the hostages at the same time that the shipments were coming in?

[Ronald Reagan]

I said that at the Time I said to them that there was something they could do to show their sincerity and if they really meant it, that they were not in favor of backing terrorists, they could begin by releasing our hostages.

[Peter Wallison]

Even as he pushed Poindexter's high minded rationale for the arms sales, Reagan struggled to explain how the hostages fit into it and who exactly the US had been dealing with in Iran.

[John Poindexter]

How did you know that you were reaching the moderates? And how do you define a moderate in that kind of a government?

[Ronald Reagan]

Well, again, you're asking questions that I cannot get into with regard to the answers, but believe me, we had information that led us to believe that there are factions within Iran and many of them with an eye toward the fact that they think sooner rather than later there is going to be a change in the government there and there is great dissatisfaction among the people.

[Peter Wallison]

Something else happened during the press conference too. Reagan repeatedly denied any US involvement in the two arms shipments that took place in 1985. These were the shipments that had started it all, the ones in which Israel had served as the middleman. George Shultz, the Secretary of State, knew the President's remarks had contained inaccuracies. The next day he confronted Reagan about it face to face.

[George Shultz]

And I always had a pattern with him. Whenever he gave a speech or a press conference or something, we'd have a talk afterwards and I'd give him my reactions. And my reaction was, you told a lot of things that weren't true. You think they're true and they've been fed to you by your staff and they're not true. If you would like, I will come over to the White House and go through them with you. And he invited me over.

[Peter Wallison]

Shultz met with Reagan in the White House residence and I went through specific.

[George Shultz]

Things that he said and then pointed out why they weren't right. And he was baffled because he thought his staff had given him his factual information and he assumed they were right, which it wasn't true. I never thought I'd talk to a President of the United States that way.

[Peter Wallison]

While the President tried to contain the scandal in public, his administration was trying to take control of it behind the scenes. The effort was led by Reagan's Attorney General, Ed Meese. Meese was a longtime member of the President's inner circle. He had been at Reagan's side back in the 60s when Reagan was the Governor of California and he had followed him to the White House in 1981. Meese's decades of experience as a Reagan whisperer made him A uniquely powerful advisor. Reagan's alter ego.

[John Poindexter]

It is true that first and foremost he's loyal to Ronald Reagan. Ed Meese, whether by instinct or by.

[Ronald Reagan]

Design, is Ronald Reagan's man.

[Peter Wallison]

Here's journalist Jane Mayer again.

[Jane Mayer]

He was kind of the keeper of the flame of the kind of conservative values that Reagan served and supported. He was a loyalist extraordinaire.

[Peter Wallison]

Toward the end of Reagan's first term, he nominated Meese to be Attorney General. It was a controversial choice. What if Meese ended up having to investigate his friend?

[John Poindexter]

Meese came under sharp questioning from members of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerned whether he would be the President's or the people's lawyer. We have learned the evil lesson of Watergate. Alan Dershowitz, a professor of criminal law at Harvard University. When you have a political operative in the position of Attorney General, it creates an inherent conflict of interest.

[Peter Wallison]

After more than a year of questions about that and other controversies, Meese was confirmed by the Senate. In the closest vote for an attorney general in 60 years.

[John Poindexter]

Edwin Meese was finally sworn in today as the new U.S. attorney General. The Senate voted 63 to 31 to confirm Meese on Saturday.

[Jane Mayer]

The vote came after a filibuster ending agreement.

[Peter Wallison]

In January of 1986, shortly after the first two weapons shipments to Iran. Mies was asked to provide a legal opinion about the initiative. Some of the President's advisors have been preparing a so called finding for the President to sign. A finding was a kind of document that formally authorized covert actions, in this case the secret arms sales. According to law, the White House had to notify Congress whenever the President signed a covert action finding and they had to do it in a timely fashion. But Mies concluded it was fine to hold off on telling Congress about the arms sales until after the hostages were released. Nearly a year later, Congress still had not been informed. Two days after Reagan's press conference in the East Room, Mies undertook an internal investigation to figure out the facts. The President could not afford to keep making public statements based on incomplete information. It would be Mies job to cross reference everyone's stories and brief Reagan on what he learned. Mies would later testify that he conducted the investigation on an informal basis as Reagan's counselor and friend rather than as the Attorney General. Nevertheless, he staffed the project with officials from the Department of Justice. That included Charles Cooper, a 34 year old attorney who oversaw the Office of Legal Counsel.

[Charles Cooper]

It was not a publicly known or announced investigation. It was in fact very much in keeping with the fact that the material of the investigation that is the essential facts, the transactions. The subject matter of the investigation remained classified.

[Peter Wallison]

It came to be called the weekend investigation. The idea was that Mies and Cooper would do some digging and be ready to present the facts to the President the following Monday.

[Charles Cooper]

And the mission was to just get the facts, get the truth. The worst thing that the administration could do was advance a false narrative about all this. Once the truth did come out, it would be exponentially worse, politically and otherwise, legally, for the president, for his administration.

[Peter Wallison]

The plan was to interview the people most intimately involved in the arms sales and look through memos and other documents that could shed light on how the initiative had evolved. Meanwhile, two of the people closest to the Iran weapons program, John Poindexter and Oliver north, set about getting their affairs in order. Poindexter was concerned about the earliest covert action finding that Reagan had signed to cover the arms sales. The document had plainly stated that the purpose of the initiative was to rescue American hostages. Later, Reagan would sign other findings that listed other reasons for the arms sales, reasons that were more in line with Poindexter's talking points about improving U.S. relations with Iran. But Poindexter still had the first version, and he was worried that it would become a political liability.

[Oliver North]

I decided that the first version of the finding, you know, which was not a complete explanation of what we were doing, was not important. And so I personally destroyed it.

[Peter Wallison]

How did you destroy it?

[Oliver North]

Burned it outside, out in the back.

[Peter Wallison]

Like a coffee can or something.

[Oliver North]

Essentially, it was a coffee can.

[Peter Wallison]

That feel momentous?

[Oliver North]

Momentous? No, not really, because I hadn't liked that version of the finding to begin with, and it was good riddance.

[Peter Wallison]

Oliver north had similar instincts. He had been informed that DOJ officials working with Ed Meese and Charles Cooper were planning to come to his office to look through his files. Here again is Jane Mayer.

[Jane Mayer]

Mies didn't just rush in and seize their files as the FBI might have, which gave them notice that if there was anything in there, maybe they better take care of it.

[Peter Wallison]

North would later testify that his priority during this time was to protect government secrets. One of those secrets was the diversion of profits from the Iran arms sales to the Contras. As part of his effort to conceal some of his activities, north asked his secretary, Vaughn hall, to help him alter documents, like retype them with entire sentences deleted. But some documents were apparently beyond redemption.

[Jane Mayer]

They fed so many into the shredder that was in the NSC that it jammed. It was just, you know, just a complete obstruction of evidence party taking place as they shredded Everything in sight.

[Peter Wallison]

The next day, two DOJ staffers working on Ed Mies weekend investigation came to North's office. North himself wasn't in yet when the staffers, Brad Reynolds and John Richardson arrived and started going through a stack of folders. Here's Anne Rowe, an editor, the economist and author of Lives, Lies and the Iran Contra Affair.

[Leon Nayfak]

They're trying to be very quiet, actually. They've imbibed this air of sort of high secrecy that goes around North. I mean, they're behaving a bit like secret agents themselves. These two officials, they're writing notes to each other. They're not actually speaking to each other or just whispering.

[Peter Wallison]

Reynolds and Richardson planned to go through the folders in North's office flagging important documents they wanted to photocopy as they went.

[Leon Nayfak]

So they're looking through the folders and they're about three folders in and they suddenly come upon this manila folder with WH written on it. It's quite a thin folder, not much in it, and a close type document, no spacing. And they have a look at it.

[Peter Wallison]

The document was a five page memo titled Release of American Hostages in Beirut.

[Leon Nayfak]

There's a paragraph in there that says residual funds allocated as follows. $12.2 million to supply the democratic Nicaraguan resistance.

[Peter Wallison]

The document would come to be known simply as the diversion memo. It laid out how millions of dollars generated by the arms shipments to Iran could be diverted to the Contras in Nicaragua. Reynolds and Richardson were taken aback.

[Leon Nayfak]

They both had the same reaction to this. That it's too spectacular, that it's too extraordinary to think it ever happened.

[Peter Wallison]

Reynolds hid the memo in the stack of papers he intended to copy.

[Leon Nayfak]

You might wonder at this point why north was so happy to leave these two folk in his office when there was something as explosive as a diversion memo just sitting there. The reason was that there'd been a complete orgy of shredding going on in this office.

[Peter Wallison]

Reynolds and Richardson hurried to tell Ed Meese what they had found. On their way out of the office, they ran into Oliver north and told him they were about to take a break for lunch. Then they met Meese and Charles Cooper at the Old Ebbott Grill, about a block away from the White House. Here's Cooper again.

[Charles Cooper]

We were in a booth. Our voices were lowered. We took care to make sure that our conversation wasn't overheard. I vividly remember Ed Meese's reaction because as we all listened to him, we immediately understood the potential import of what Brad was telling us. And so we were all wide eyed and jaws dropped. Ed simply said, oh shit.

[Peter Wallison]

The next day, Mies met with north at the Department of Justice to confront him with the smoking gun.

[Leon Nayfak]

Mies had been a prosecutor for years and he knew how to do this. And so they go all over the arms sales and chat about this and that and so on and north is very relaxed in answering the questions. And then Mies suddenly says, what about this? And hands him over the diversion memo.

[Charles Cooper]

And Ollie was taken aback that Ed knew about it. His demeanor just betrayed the fact that he wasn't expecting that question.

[Leon Nayfak]

He says something like, I missed one. So Meese said, well, did this happen? And north said yes.

[Peter Wallison]

After his meeting with Mies, north tried to call Poindexter to tell him the diversion had been discovered. But Poindexter wasn't reaching. North then returned to his office where he stayed until 4:15 in the morning shredding more documents. Meanwhile, Ed Meese and Charles Cooper knew they were holding a time bomb.

[Charles Cooper]

The most important implication of this, and Ed Meese grasped it immediately, was that this information is something that the President must, number one, know immediately and number two, that the President must disclose publicly. It was inevitable that something like that was going to surface into the public domain that this had happened. And if it surfaced through any other means other than the President's public disclosure, it would be denounced as a cover up regardless of what the real facts were.

[Peter Wallison]

On Monday, November 24, Meese went to the White House to tell Reagan what his weekend investigation had uncovered. He told the President that Oliver north had been taking money from the Iran weapons sales and giving it to the Contras.

[Charles Cooper]

Ed made that report in a very tightly controlled meeting with the President and his firm recommendation that this information be made public as quickly as it reasonably could be.

[Peter Wallison]

Reagan wrote about the meeting in his diary. That night Ed M. Told me of a smoking gun. Our Colonel north gave the money to the Contras. North didn't tell me about this. This may call for resignations. It soon became clear that John Poindexter, North's supervisor in the National Security Council, had been in on the diversion too. Reagan and Mies agreed that the situation was so radioactive that the only option was to announce it publicly and force Poindexter and North out of the White House. It would be a huge news story no matter what, but maybe they could control the narrative. The next day, John Poindexter was asked to resign.

[Oliver North]

I knew that it would be controversial, that I had approved the use of the excess profits without telling the President. I wanted him to have some distance from that decision. And I thought the way to put emphasis on that was to resign. You know, I had taken a risk and had lost.

[Peter Wallison]

North drafted a resignation letter, too. But before he could leave on his own terms, he was fired from the NSC staff and reassigned to another job in the Marine Corps. It was decided that Reagan would deliver yet another public statement on the scandal that was now being called Iran Gate. This time it would be a press conference including both Reagan and Mies, and they would disclose the results of Mies weekend investigation. Just before the press conference began, Richard Secord, the retired Air Force general who had worked on both the contra resupply effort and the Iran weapons sales, called Poindexter on the phone. Secord begged Poindexter not to give up and resign, telling him he should force the President to step up to the plate and take responsibility for his actions. But Poindexter told him it was all over. You don't understand, he said, according to Secord's memoir. It's too late. They're building a wall around him to.

[Oliver North]

Isolate him from the use of the excess profits, which, again, we didn't think there was anything illegal about it. But it would be controversial. One of the problems that I saw at the time was that I was beginning to question whether the President could really defend the initiative, whether he could explain it to the American public.

[Peter Wallison]

We'll be right back. Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States. On November 25, 1986, Ronald Reagan gave a press conference to make public what he'd learned. He kept things pretty vague.

[Ronald Reagan]

Last Friday, after becoming concerned whether my national security apparatus had provided me with a security or a complete factual record with respect to the implementation of my policy toward Iran, I directed the Attorney General to undertake a review of this matter over the weekend and report to me on Monday. And yesterday, Secretary Meese provided me and the White House chief of staff with a report on his preliminary findings. And this report led me to conclude that I was not fully informed on the nature of one of the activities undertaken in connection with this initiative this action raises.

[Peter Wallison]

When he was finished speaking, Reagan stepped aside and Ed Meese took his place at the microphone.

[John Poindexter]

Why don't I tell you what is the situation?

[Peter Wallison]

And then Jane Mayer was covering the White House for the Wall Street Journal at the time, and she was watching the press conference as it happened.

[Jane Mayer]

It was an unusual thing to see this, you know, tubby barrel of a man come in with his pink face, and he goes up to the podium and he Kind of matter of factly lays out this completely astounding story.

[John Poindexter]

Certain monies which were received in the transaction were taken and made available to the forces in Central America. The President knew nothing about it until I reported it to him. I alerted him yesterday morning. We still had some more work to do. And then I gave him the detail that we had yesterday afternoon. General Mason, who in the NSC was aware that this extra amount of money.

[Peter Wallison]

Was being transferred to the so called.

[John Poindexter]

Contras or under their control. The only persons in the United States government that knew precisely about this, the only person, was Lieutenant Colonel North Admiral.

[Jane Mayer]

I mean, it was unbelievable. It was the craziest thing. And he was just sort of matter of factly running through it. We realized that, at least I realized that I'd missed the whole story.

[Peter Wallison]

Charles Cooper, the DOJ official who had worked with Mies on the weekend investigation, was watching the press conference with Secretary of State George Shultz.

[Charles Cooper]

I was in the kind of the control room just off the briefing room and I was watching it on a monitor in that control room. And I remember vividly after that was done, George Shultz basically turning from the TV monitors to standing right next to me and looking at me and saying, good job, and then walking out.

[Peter Wallison]

Things moved very quickly after that. On Thursday, November 27, Thanksgiving, the Los Angeles Times reported that Oliver north had shredded reams of documents that could have been used as evidence. It was starting to feel a lot like Watergate.

[John Poindexter]

Reporters attempted to ask Oliver north at his home today about published stories that he had destroyed documents which may have shed light on the Iran arms scandal.

[Peter Wallison]

At the appropriate time and in the appropriate form, I will make a full exposition and I will do so on the advice of my attorney. I would suggest that you all go.

[Charles Cooper]

Home and thank God for the blessings of a beautiful country.

[John Poindexter]

North later tried to visit the White House, but was told he could not enter under any circumstances.

[Peter Wallison]

On December 1, Reagan announced the creation of the Tower Commission, a group of three former political leaders who would investigate what went wrong in the White House chain of command. Then on December 2nd, Reagan convinced Ed Meese to request the appointment of an independent counsel, a move enabled by reforms that were enacted after Watergate.

[John Poindexter]

Attorney General Meese is turning over the case to an independent counsel. Lawrence Walsh, a former judge and former Deputy Attorney General, will be the man to search for any criminal wrongdoing. In appointing a special prosecutor and in ordering his senior staff members to appear.

[Peter Wallison]

Before it or Congress, Reagan was doing.

[John Poindexter]

What President Richard Nixon did not during.

[Oliver North]

Watergate, sweeping away all suspicion of a.

[John Poindexter]

Cover up.

[Peter Wallison]

Between the Tower commission and the independent counsel. The White House was under scrutiny on multiple fronts. Congress was starting up its own investigations too. And reporters were beginning to ask questions about Ed Meese.

[John Poindexter]

Mies may be the attorney general, but he is also one of President Reagan's oldest and closest associates. And what he says will be weighed here.

[Peter Wallison]

With that in mind, one of Mies colleagues at the Department of Justice complained that the criminal division and even the FBI should have been involved in the fact finding mission. Later, Mies would testify that his goal after the Iran story broke had been to, quote, limit the damage. And when you look at the way he went about the investigation, giving people an opportunity to destroy documents that could never be recovered, it's hard to feel like his top priority was to get the full truth. I asked Charles Cooper about that, whether the inquiry had been a good faith effort or just another attempt at damage control.

[Charles Cooper]

I don't think there's a difference between getting to the truth and controlling the damage, at least in my view, and I know Edme shares it. The one thing that would be most damaging and most inevitably discovered would be an effort to present a false narrative to Congress about something like this. So to my mind, you know, damage control and finding the facts were synonymous. You know, I reject very firmly the, you know, skepticism about the genuineness, I guess, of an effort to find the truth and to disclose the truth. That was our mission.

[Peter Wallison]

In any event, the administration's attempts to minimize the scandal seemed to have the opposite effect. Within a month of the story becoming public, Reagan's approval rating had dropped by 21%. One poll found that 90% of the American people believed he was lying about what he knew. Meanwhile, from his home in Virginia, cut off from the job he'd loved so much, Oliver north was adjusting to life as a public figure just two blocks.

[John Poindexter]

From the White House. After meeting with his new criminal lawyer, north again refused to answer questions.

[Peter Wallison]

I would refer those questions to my attorney.

[John Poindexter]

The questions center on reports confirmed by.

[Peter Wallison]

North was optimistic that once everything was out in the open, people would see that his actions had been justified, maybe even heroic. He said as much in a letter he sent to John Poindexter the night before he was fired. I remain convinced that what we tried to accomplish was worth the risk, he wrote. We nearly succeeded. Hopefully when the political fratricide is finished, there will be others who will agree. Warmest regards, Semper Fidelis Oliver north on the next episode of Fiasco. Olly Mania. He's coming off great on tv, we're getting flooded with calls. People love him and that's when they basically stopped asking difficult questions. For a list of books, articles and documentaries we used in our research, follow the link in the show notes. Fiasco is a production of Prologue projects and it's distributed by Pushkin Industries. The show is produced by Andrew Parsons, Madeline Kaplan, Ula Culpa, and me, Leon Nayfak. Our editor was Camilla Hammer. Our researcher was Francis Carr, with additional archival research from Caitlin Nicholas. Our music is by Nick Silvester. Our theme song is by Spatial Relations. Our artwork is by Teddy Blanks at chipsny. Audio mix by Rob Byers, Michael Rayfiel and Johnny Vince Evans. Copyright Counsel provided by Peter Yassi at Yossi Butler, pllc thanks to Sam Graham Felson, Soraya Shockley and Katya Kamkova. Special thanks to Luminary and thank you for listening. Binge the entire season of Fiasco Iran Contra ad free by subscribing to Pushkin Plus. Sign up on the Fiasco show page on Apple Podcasts or at Pushkin FM Plus. Pushkin subscribers can access ad free episodes, full audiobooks, exclusive binges and bonus content for all Pushkin podcasts.