B (3:10)

For Israeli weddings.

A (3:11)

For Israeli weddings. But the Hartman is that you're allowed to have 50 people at a wedding, and this is the third wedding this week of faculty at the Hartman Institute whose children's weddings were canceled. Hartman Institute. We have a shelter. We have a shelter. And right upstairs in our Bateme gallery,

B (3:28)

we just had to provide the rest of the wedding facilities. The shelter we have.

A (3:35)

So we're the perfect shul for people to pray in now. We're the perfect wedding hall. We're all set. And so upstairs. And, you know, as we were coming down here, the. The bride was running in the hallways and all excited with her friends. It was just like, you almost felt that we were in her world. And it was absolutely beautiful. And so let's start with.

B (3:54)

It is beautiful.

A (3:55)

Let's start by wishing her, Ruth Kra, the senior fellow here at the institute, her and her whole family, mazel tov. A huge mazel tov and a great life. And so as that new world is starting, we're being confronted with a potential new reality for ourselves. We've gotten used to this reality with war. We're walking with the United States in profound cooperation. And now there is possibly a conversation. The conversation is not about giving up on the goals of removing enrichment, removing Iran's capability to produce nuclear weapons. It includes, at least ostensibly, handing over the famous 440 kilo of enriched uranium that are still there. It speaks about missing. It speaks about Hormuz. But from the negotiation, from what said, nobody knows anything right now. And part of the experience in Israel is we're hearing it from different statements of President Trump, which aren't always fully consistent and not always fully articulate.

B (5:04)

Fair to say.

A (5:05)

Fair to say. And for his advocates, that's part of his genius strategy. And for his. His critics, that's part of his flaws. But either way, whether it's a strategy or a flaw, it's our life, as we say here in Israel. And so, Yossi, how do you feel about this news of the negotiations?

B (5:26)

When I was walking to the studio this afternoon, I passed an apartment that had hung out a makeshift flag that combined the Israeli and American flags into one.

A (5:40)

Merged in.

B (5:40)

Merged.

A (5:41)

Not like the side by side.

B (5:43)

No, no, no. A seamless flag. As if, you know the old joke about Israel being the 51st state. It kind of looked like that. Or. No, not even that. It was a merger of two equal countries. That's what you felt looking at this flag. And this moment, these last few weeks has been the high point in the history of the American Israeli relationship. And Israelis who have been so besieged these last two and a half years have felt so alone. Suddenly, we're attacking Iran together. Israeli and American pilots who, according to reports, have developed this tremendous camaraderie. The planners on both sides are sitting and working together. There's been seamless cooperation. That flag has really taken shape in this war. And I think that one of the reasons that we're also nervous here is we know this is coming to an end. That in this war, we have been more or less on the same page. There have been a few blips, but on the whole, we have been fighting together as allies as if it were World War II again, and Israel is now in England's place and there's total harmony. And that's been such a relief for Israelis. And we know it's coming to an end because we don't have the same goals in this war. Our goal at this point is regime change. Nothing less than that will be considered by the Israeli public after three weeks of running back and forth to shelters as a victory. And so there are several layers to this. First, there's just this emotional angst, you know, this feeling of we're about to part ways with our ally, we're going our separate ways. But there's also a very complicated history that we have with America during our wars. And this is something that Michael Oren, who was not only Israel's ambassador to Washington, but actually was first a military historian. Something that Michael pointed out to me, which was that America has intervened in every one of Israel's wars and stopped us just at the moment when we were either on the verge of victory as we were in the Yom Kippur War and America stopped the war, or when we wanted a little more time in the Six Day War, we wanted it actually to be an Eight Day war. America said it ends now, and it ended In Lebanon, the 1982 war after the Sabra Shatila massacre of Palestinians. America said the invasion of Beirut ends now, and it ended. And then, of course, the 12 day war. In June, we had planes on the way to Iran. And Trump publicly humiliated Netanyahu and demanded that he recall the planes. And of course he did. And so there's a pattern here. For the most part, I think that Israelis felt that American intervention led to the next war. It stopped us in the middle and didn't allow us to finish the job. We certainly felt that way in the Yom Kippur War, although in retrospect, I think that one can justify Kissinger and Nixon because by not completely destroying the Egyptian army, Sadat preserved a measure of his self respect, remained in power, and four years later made peace with us. So it's a complicated picture. And so to answer your question about how I'm feeling about the possibility of America unilaterally ending this war, because we know it's going to be unilateral, he's not going to care what Bibi says. It's going to be Trump's decision. When you look at the pattern of America's interventions and our wars in the past, there's grounds for feeling uneasy. So that's one side of it. But I feel ambivalent. And the reason I don't feel categorically against Trump ending this war is because there are so many variables here. We don't know how much damage we've inflicted on Iran. In a way, Daniil, it's similar to the conversation that we had a few months ago about Gaza. When is it enough? How do we know that it's enough? Did we destroy Hamas? It turned out it wasn't enough. Should the war have continued? Now we know that the Israeli public could not sustain this war. Can we sustain two or three months of running to shelters, sometimes a few times at night? Can the world economy sustain another month of this war? And if the economy starts to crash, we know who's going to get blamed. So from an Israeli calculus, it's very complicated.

A (10:48)

It's really complicated.

B (10:49)

What's your sense?

A (10:49)

I'm in a strange position right now because I also have an ambivalence, but it comes from a different place and I don't trust it so much. I just came back, just landed today. I spent three nights in America.

B (11:05)

A Daniel Hartman vacation A denial Hartman

A (11:09)

I was on two rescue planes. The rescue plane taking people out of Israel and the rescue plane taking people back to Israel.

B (11:17)

I love that we call the planes coming back into Israel also, also rescue planes.

A (11:24)

And it was very interesting in my connection in Kennedy Airport. The pilot and the steward asked me, I was the first one on. And they said, hi, welcome. How are you, sir? And I said, I'm tired. Said, why? I said, I've been flying now for 18 hours. He says, 18, with all the connectings. Where are you coming from? And I said, I came from Israel. And the pilot looked, he says, what they're flying?

B (11:47)

This was where from Florida to.

A (11:49)

No, this is. I was in Kennedy Airport connecting my flight going down to Florida. And he said, what they're flying? And the steward said, yeah, not only are they flying he says, I was in Miami last week, and there's people flying to Israel. He says, like. Like this is the most insane thing that he could.

B (12:07)

He could have done. You did something even more insane. You flew out and then you flew back.

A (12:11)

I flew out and I flew back, and the whole thing was just. So I had my phone on so that I could hear every alert that's in southern Israel. You know, you can program your phone. So anytime Adina or the kids were being bummed. So even when I was there, I was constantly listening to my phone and right in the middle of the Friday night dinner, like every good Jew.

B (12:32)

So you saw.

A (12:33)

So I still saw. And Friday was a bad day.

B (12:35)

We had four alerts in Jerusalem.

A (12:37)

Friday was a bad day. So I wasn't completely disconnected. But as we spoke about the last time. There's this normal that you get used to, and I'm not yet used to it right now. Literally, I just landed a few hours ago. I'm not used to it. And I remember as I was going to the airport, the minute I was leaving the house, the first siren went off and the driver had to come into my steps. Then there was another siren on the way, but I was still in my resilient mode. As we're driving and I'm telling him, no, continue. You don't have to pull over the side. And the siren welcomed me back. As I landed on my way from the airport to Jerusalem, another siren, and I didn't feel as resilient.

B (13:17)

It was a bit of a shock.

A (13:18)

The word is not shock. Remember, I don't have such. You know, my emotions are. I'm very struck.

B (13:24)

You're settled. You were unsettled.

A (13:26)

I was aware. I was aware as I was reflecting, you remember, as I coexist with my emotional and intellectual and rational at the same time, I was aware that a siren was going on. And we're trying to plan whether we stop or not stop and. But I was aware that it's not the same within three days.

B (13:47)

Isn't it amazing how quickly we adapt? You go away for all of three days, and you adapt to a new normal, to the American normal, and you come back and suddenly the Israeli normal seems jarring.

A (13:59)

Say I need a siren or two to get me back. It's like a Chas Vashalam. But I just need a little. I'll get back. So right now, when we're reflecting on how do I feel about the negotiations, there's also a lot of feelings, but one of them is, yeah, I think maybe if I don't know if there's a 15 point plan. I don't know. Nobody knows yet, or some people do, but it's neither you nor I. But if it entails the things that we care about, why not? Why not? It's true regime change is not happening, but I think part of the growing recognition both here and around the world is that regime change is not something that looks like it's going to be imminent. It's going to take longer, and therefore bombing another day or another two days is not going to make a difference or even another month. And we'll talk about that more maybe later on. But short of the regime change messianic aspiration, that's not going to happen now. Just like, you know, the Jewish statement, we want Mashiach now, you're not getting him now, you're not getting her now. Mashiach is not coming now. Come soon. The Jewish Messiah always tarries very, very slow. So if that's case, part of me, again, I don't feel as resilient. I feel the weight. I see the wedding upstairs and I say, you know, let's take this round and come to an end. At the same time, when you mention that, you feel it, that there's this special moment that's unraveling, this camaraderie, partnership, allyship at this moment. And I recently heard Dan Sinore speak about that America has never had an ally of this intensity since the Second World War in any of its wars, ever. But we've been talking about this and I also experienced it again in my travels. There is an allyship, but that allyship on the one hand is strong in certain places and is very weak in other places. You hear the criticisms of the war or you know, when you're in trouble is not when you listen to Tucker Carlson and everybody's going to argue how much does he represent MAGA and who represents. And everybody has these polls and all of the above. And it seems that the MAGA base is still for the war. Republicans are divided, Democrats are against whatever it might be. You know you're in trouble when you hear comedians, when it is something to laugh at, that Israel pushing that this is Israel's agenda and that really not taking seriously how significant this war is for American interests. So even though there's a sense of this moment of allyship being unraveled, that's an Israeli sense of allyship being unraveled. I'm not so sure that it is such a common prevalent perspective. And so I'm aware of that. Too, in my ambivalence, and maybe I don't want to keep on testing that. And the final thing goes back to point which it's interesting that America always stops our wars. It says something unique about our relationship, that we're the only country that actually listens. All the time, we listen. There's something about our independence, our independence and dependence, independence as a country and dependence on America for our existence, that America knows it and we march by their tune. And part of me wonders whether right now, for a whole plethora of reasons, we know how to end our wars. I think our wars may start for well thought out reasons, hopefully most of the time, not all the time. And as I've said before, I don't fault Bibi or Trump for not having an absolute clear, worked out strategy and endgame. I think wars begin for a confluence of reasons, not always perfect and they're not always at the right time, but they begin when you think you have a chance of making a significant difference in achieving victory and the process of the war evolves. And what are the dangers? You might have thought about Hormuz, you might have thought about economy, but you thought it might be more manageable. And it is manageable, but it's 10% unmanageable. It's not a science. And everybody who thinks it's a science has no idea about the chaos of war. So I don't fault them for that. But I don't know if right now, because Iran is such an existential threat for us, whether we know how to end this and take whatever it is that we achieved till the next round, because if the points are true, maybe it's time. Maybe it's time. So I have that ambivalence, but I'm a little questioning whether that's also because I'm not as comfortable with the current reality. I need another four hours.

B (19:06)

What if Trump decides to continue the war? Would you be upset? Would you oppose that decision? See if, see, we're totally dependent on him.

A (19:16)

You see, for me, the issue is not whether we fight another day or not. The issue is what is achieved. Could I live without regime change? I think every one of us has to live with it. Could we live with if we get the enriched uranium or it gets buried to such a degree this time it gets completely obliterated somehow. The 440 kilo, we don't destroy their nuclear capacity, we destroy the uranium we discovered after the 12 Day War, or everybody knew this, in any event, that the issue is not whether we obliterate their current capacity. The problem is their future capacity. Because once you have the intellectual capacities, you can dig new holes in the mountains, you can build new centrifuge. It'll take time. The price goes up. So therefore we need to make the price higher. We've damage their missiles, all of the above. I could live with that. It's not whether I need to fight again. I think there is a larger issue, and if you hear the analysis, Iran is a destabilizing force in the world, and especially for Gulf nations and Gulf states. And today there's reports denied by Saudi Arabia that MBS is telling Trump keep on fighting. Because to stop now without some control of Iran would be to leave this destabilizing evil force in power to continue to recapitize.

B (20:43)

It's worse than that because this destabilizing evil force is now wounded. It's a wounded animal. And we've seen how Iran has behaved in the last couple weeks. It's more dangerous than ever.

A (20:56)

I don't think what's more dangerous is the fact that it's a wounded animal. What's more dangerous is that it's not acting like a wounded animal, is that it could be threatened and there are no rules. The United States threatens to destroy all of their electrical infrastructure and their response is, okay, if you do that, we're going to destroy everybody else's energy resources, really, like a normal country would feel somehow threatened. There's something about Iran which I don't know. I can't say the world is waking up to because I don't know what people wake up to. I'm leaving out the world. But the reality is, and I think the Gulf states feel it. So to what extent we could hamper that, whether through war or through negotiation, that's the issue. It's not whether we fight again another day or not.

B (21:43)

The west doesn't know not only how to deal with religious fanaticism, it doesn't understand, doesn't quite believe that it exists.

A (21:54)

I don't either. By the way. Forget the world. Do you believe that after everything that they've suffered, they wouldn't be open to negotiations?

B (22:03)

Oh, I don't think that's their goal at all.

A (22:05)

See, for me, it's. You're living with this insanity. From our perspective, there's an insanity which you have to adjust. So what would it mean in the midst of all of this? You know, there's so many ways, and by tomorrow, everything we said could change. But could you answer this, like, what would it mean For Israel, with this reality, if the war would stop now,

B (22:27)

I'll speak first of all, personally, I can accept an end to the war now, provided that it's a ceasefire. And it's a ceasefire in which other forms of warfare continue. Economic pressure, of course, intensifies. We encourage the resistance in Iran. Maybe we'll need to start arming certain groups. This is something that, for all we know, might be happening already. Now, there are rumors about that I

A (23:00)

want to ask, not what you're ready for, which is an interesting list about what you're prepared for. What would it mean for Israel now, not just for you personally, but for Israeli society in the midst of all of this conversation, in the midst of understanding the evil and the extension of also.

B (23:15)

I hear you, but it's also related to what I think Israeli society needs to feel, or at least many people in Israel. Let's not speak about Israeli society.

A (23:26)

Yeah, they're not monolithic.

B (23:27)

Many Israelis who see this threat clearly need to feel that the sacrifices of the last few weeks weren't just one more round. We need to feel that there's some momentum in this war. And by continuing the war through other means, after a ceasefire, by continuing to work for regime change, it puts the last few weeks into some kind of a bearable perspective. Because otherwise, also, in six months, we're also going to be running back and forth to shelters for God knows how long. We celebrate and justifiably, Israeli resilience. But Israeli resilience is not inexhaustible. People are resilient when they feel that there's a purpose to being strong, to toughing it out. Toughing it out for what purpose? For just another round and another round. And here Netanyahu made a major mistake when he promised nizakhon mukhlat total victory, first in Gaza, then in Iran. Now, again, he's using the same language with Hezbollah and he can't deliver on total victory. You're building expectations in the Israeli public which will inevitably be disappointed. And rather than bolstering resilience, you're ending up weakening it.

A (24:55)

Yeah, I agree with you. And I think, though, there's another level which makes it even more complicated for Israeli society. And I think Netanyahu is partially responsible, but not just. And I think since October 7th, this has been accentuated. The reality of Israelis, as distinct from most people who live in liberal democracies, is an awareness that we are living in the presence of and alongside of something that is evil. And what is evil? Somebody who wants to kill us. And part of the reason why war is such a self evidently acceptable part of Israeli life is not that we valorize war and it's not that we want to capture another kilometer somewhere. Some Israelis do, okay, you know what I mean? And so the anti, they happen to sit in government. Not even. They're not. They're part of the government. It's a small segment of Israeli society. And Tuckle Carlson will find each one of them, you know, and find the one Chabad rabbi who speaks about his desire that the goal of the war is that we should get rid of Al Aqsa. And that then becomes, you know, literally the anti Semitic libels.

B (26:13)

And it's, you know, it's also an expression of how since October 7th we've been living under a microscope. Any statement, everything gets immediately amplified and used against us, right?

A (26:25)

And our enemies. So we have some of those. But it's not that war is something that we desire. It's the opposite. It's so alien because we pay the price. It's not someone else who goes to war for us. It's our kids, it's our mothers, it's our sisters, it's our fathers, it's our brother. It is such a horrific reality. It's not that we love it, it's not that we're embracing it as Sparta nation. And yes, our whole existence is to fight, but because we know that evil is there, it forces us to see military options in a completely different manner.

B (27:03)

Evil isn't there, it's here. It's so intimate we can live with evil. It's on our borders. It's 50 meters away from the northernmost homes.

A (27:14)

And that's why the whole notion of when is the war imminent or not the war is imminent. Like did they punch you? The notion of a just war is only after you're attacked. When you're living in the presence of somebody who wants to kill you. Any opportunity that exists to destabilize them you'll embrace. But part of the problem of what it will mean for Israel to end the war.

B (27:36)

But wait, I just want to sit on that for a moment because that explains a crucial difference in the mindset of Israelis and Americans in this war. Correct? Americans are not existentially threatened immediately. We are. And so for us, fighting the war has consequences and ending the war has consequences.

A (27:57)

Exactly. And that's why the critics of the war around the world who are asking and wondering, is this imminent? Does this qualify under the international standards of a war of self defense? In Israel, the notion of imminent changes when you Experience the presence of that threat while outside, when you deny that it's there and you don't see that evil, then you only see it after it hits you. And if it hasn't punched you yet, then, oh, then somehow you're the aggressor. So. But the challenge for what it will mean for Israelis if the war stops now is we know that the evil is still there. Hamas is still there, Hezbollah is still there. And I think a major challenge in Israel will be how do we shift from using our military might to combat evil to using political processes to combat that evil. And I think the case of Gaza is a perfect example to learn vis a vis Iran. Everybody knows that Hamas has reconstituted itself in Gaza. They're in complete control over the areas that they control up to the orange line. The orange line, we control from the orange line. They're in control. But because we didn't have any political processes to accompany our military processes, we lost. So, oh, we could go back and bomb again. It's not going to change. So the question with Iran, the regime change, was a notion that military might alone could create the transformation we want. Part of what we're going to have to do, what will it mean for Israeli society, is it's like you almost have to, you know, you remember when there were records, you had to turn over the record.

B (29:50)

I don't remember.

A (29:51)

You don't remember there was a record, yet there were two sides of the record.

B (29:57)

There's always two sides.

A (29:58)

Like, when do you turn how Israeli society adjusts to see? Because we're not starting this process. President Trump is starting this process. And again, if it doesn't achieve our goals, I'm okay. But it's going to be psychologically hard.

B (30:13)

You could have temporary negotiations for temporary arrangements, but there is no political solution. And this is where I think your analogy with Gaza doesn't hold. Because in Gaza, there were political alternatives you bring in. The Palestinian Authority may not be a great alternative, but there were political options. And that in turn might have enticed the Arab world to come into Gaza. With Iran, there are no options.

A (30:42)

No. But everybody knows the conversation that we're all having with ourselves, whether it has any relation to reality or not, is that we take a victory on. Forget the 15 points on 5 points, 4 points. Iran is still economically destitute. It's still in a horrific condition. And now the next process begins, the next process of regime change led by the Iranian people. But that leads to the final question that I want us to talk about. Let's say we don't get it all. You know, there's going to be a negotiation. And complete success will be declared, in theory, by both President Trump and by Bibi Netanyahu, in which the war not only achieved all of its goals, it surpassed any goal that anybody could have ever imagined in the history of humankind. It was the most remarkable thing that ever happened. But we know that that's not the case. So who's gonna be blamed? How do you, like, you know, how do they justify, you know, like your own ambivalence? How is it gonna get played out?

B (31:55)

Well, there are two opposite scenarios here. One is that they'll try to spin this as the greatest diplomatic achievement, as you put it, in history, even prehistory. And the other is that something's going to go wrong and they'll look for a fall guy.

A (32:13)

Who are the fall guys? Yossi, let's put them on. Or let's be gender sensitive. Who are the fall people?

B (32:18)

Well, in this case, I think we're looking at fall guys for Trump. The fall guy may very well be Netanyahu.

A (32:28)

What would that mean? How would that play out?

B (32:30)

He gave me faulty intelligence. He made certain promises, assumptions. He misled me. It's not the same move.

A (32:40)

We're already. We're already the fall person in. In many places. So.

B (32:46)

For pushing Trump into war.

A (32:47)

But it'll be the same thing. But it'll be the same thing.

B (32:49)

It's a variation.

A (32:50)

It'll be a variation. So, unfortunately, we could be the scapegoats.

B (32:53)

Yes. Now, then, Netanyahu needs a scapegoat, all right? And he's.

A (32:57)

He can't make Trump the scapegoat.

B (32:59)

No, no, no. He can't do that.

A (33:00)

He can't accuse Trump of stopping the war too early.

B (33:03)

No, no, no. That's the asymmetry in the relationship.

A (33:05)

Zelensky mistake. You don't.

B (33:08)

And Netanyahu knows enough not to publicly challenge Trump, but he will look for a fall guy, and it may be the Mossad. Look, there were reports this week that Netanyahu and Trump were disappointed by the intelligence assessment that they received from the Mossad. Who leaked that? Who wanted that known? Was Netanyahu possibly preparing the ground to blame the Mossad the way that he blamed the Shabak, the Shin bet, for October 7th there you had a better case.

A (33:42)

Right.

B (33:42)

But there's a pattern here.

A (33:45)

And, you know, before you get to that last one on this today, it was leaked. And again, we don't know who leaked that. The Mossad before The war said regime change is possible, but it will take a year. So if you picked up, it's not yet a public conversation.

B (34:00)

Mossad is already preparing either the send it.

A (34:04)

We don't know who leaked the first, and we don't know who leaked the second. And already the White House is saying, what do you mean? Of course Trump expected Hormuz and he didn't expect demonstrations because Trump himself said to the Iranian people, stay in your home right now. Wait. So he wasn't disappointed. So you could see the game being played out. Who told whom what. So they're looking for this fall guy, who could be.

B (34:29)

And it's interesting, before I try to answer that, I think that Netanyahu and Trump have been fighting this war reasonably well. There seem to be real successes, and it appears to be going more or less according to plan, whatever the plan is. Where you see their dysfunctional personalities possibly beginning to emerge is after the war, in managing the blame game, in taking credit for sure and making sure they don't get blamed. So who's the final fall guy? I worry it could be the Iranian people, the victims.

A (35:11)

The victims who can't defend themselves.

B (35:13)

Exactly. And we can start hearing disappointment. We handed them a golden opportunity, and they miss their historic moment. I worry about that. And there's something else that I worry about, Daniil, which is that if this war ends up being only about the nuclear issue and maybe the ballistic missiles and not about a murderous regime that's massacring its people, then the Iranian people will feel betrayed. And I spend a lot of time, far too much time these days on Iranian social media, both coming from expat sources.

A (36:03)

But these are all anti regime.

B (36:05)

Yes, all anti regime.

A (36:07)

You're not privy to pro regime social media conversations?

B (36:11)

No, except what I hear from Tucker Carlson. So the hope that these people have placed in Trump and Netanyahu in this war and the feeling that they had before this war began of being alone in the world, which, of course, was so eerily familiar to us. And how moving their gratitude has been, I can't tell you. You know, I mentioned in a previous podcast that Sarah hung up on our porch the Iranian flag and the Israeli flag, and we put this up on social media, Daniil. Hundreds, maybe thousands of responses. The love, the gratitude. We can't wait to host you in Tehran. Coming from not only expats from Iran itself. I can't wait to travel to your beautiful country with my passport. This sense of we have a stake in Iran, that's actually deeper than strategic interests. We have an alliance with the Iranian people. And I feel this so deeply. And you see it in Iranian social media. I saw one drawing that's very popular among Iranians. The first frame is King Cyrus, who is the king who allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem from in the 5th century BCE in Babylon, magnanimously greeting an old Jew in a prayer shawl who's just radiant with gratitude. The second scene is an Israeli soldier extending his arm to a beaten down Iranian. Of course it's kitsch, but there's something so powerful in these two peoples whose historic memories go back thousands of years. And we overlap and we share similar metaphors. And I feel that this is one of those moments where, yes, we have profound strategic interests and that's first, but it's not the only consideration.

A (38:31)

You know what you're saying? I resonate with it. See, we're not a superpower. United States is a superpower. But the discourse of going to war not for your own interests, but because somebody else is suffering at the hands of evil has sort of been removed from our political map. You know, World War II, United States didn't go in until Pearl Harbor. At what point is it in your interest or is there a notion of that there's somebody suffering who you have to come to their aid?

B (39:05)

Now it's interesting. We're doing it with the Druze in Syria a little bit.

A (39:09)

By the way, I've spoken to Druze and there was a lot of self congratulatory.

B (39:14)

Oh, is that so?

A (39:15)

Oh, absolutely. Far more complicated than the story we want to tell.

B (39:18)

All right, well, scratch that.

A (39:20)

Scratch that one again. You could tell your own stories. And even there, there's a lot of interest. The notion that if evil is there, somebody should not let them win. And the Iranian people, they're like the Kurds or like the Jews, like who stands with you? That's part of the story. If the negotiations bring about a solution to our strategic needs, but not to theirs.

B (39:45)

But whatever happens, Daniil, I hope that Jews around the world will seek out Iranian expat organizations, will stand with the Iranians at their demonstrations, the way they stood with us since October 7th. And that regardless of what happens in the war, there's another facet to this struggle.

A (40:04)

You know, this is the most naive, messianic statement. Your messianism, Yossi, is a messianism which looks for resolutions. My messianism is that the good will prevail, not that we're going to win in the world, but that moral obligations will guide us. And part of what we're confronting in this process now is that both of our messianic aspirations might be challenged and we'll have to come back and think about them. Yossi, it's a pleasure to be with you. Thank you.

B (40:40)

Great to be with you and wonderful to have you back in the land of the sirens.

A (40:44)

It's truly a joy. Thank you. Be well.

B (40:49)

I think the Hartman Fellowship has impacted me as a Jewish leader more than

A (40:52)

any other Jewish program that I've done

B (40:53)

because it's sort of broadened my horizon on what exactly it means to be a Jewish teen.

A (40:58)

You know, you're at Hartman when people

B (40:59)

are laughing and joking, but also the

A (41:01)

next second they're talking about some serious rabbinic texts.

C (41:04)

The Hartman Teen Fellowship is an opportunity for teens who want more from Jewish learning, more depth, more connection, more ideas worth wrestling with.

A (41:11)

You really get the opportunity to engage with your peers and run with content

C (41:16)

with Hartman's top faculty fellows. Dig into Jewish life, their relationship to Israel, and their own leadership development.

A (41:22)

There's just so much that could be going on that you can be pulled into any conversation and you know there's a space for you.

C (41:27)

Apply now for Cohort 5 of the Hartman Teen Fellowship, open to current 9th through 11th graders at Shalomhartman.org teens. That's Shalomhartman.org teens if you want to

B (41:38)

be in a place where you can learn about different types of people, meet hundreds of new people from different areas and experiences you never had before, there's no better place than being the Hartman Teen Fellowship.

C (41:48)

Here are some other things that are happening at the Sholem Hartman Institute. Congratulations to Hartman's Senior fellow Flora Kassen on the publication of her new book, Stained A Reflective History of Antisemitism. She draws on her upbringing in Antwerp, her family's Holocaust history and her later life in the United States as she considers enduring questions about identity, vulnerability, belonging and flourishing. We can't wait to read it. On Tuesday, March 24, Hartman senior faculty Masoa Sagiv appears on the show get yout Fill, an interview series from E. Jewish Philanthropy to explore the question has the Iran war strained the bonds between Israel and American Jewry? And if so, can they hold watch at the link in the show notes over 100 Jewish leaders gathered in Miami for our inaugural Florida Leadership Conference. Participants spent the day learning with Danielle Hartman, Tal Becker and leading Hartman faculty exploring the moral, political and spiritual challenges of this moment. Thank you to everyone who joined us for a powerful day of tech study, courageous conversation and community building

D (42:48)

for Heaven's Sake is a product of the Shalom Hartman Institute and ARC Media. It is produced by me, Daniel Goodman, with help from Miriam Jacobs, Adar Taylor Schechter and Aviva Kat Manore, and studio support from Go Live Media. Our episode was edited by Seth Stein, Meital Friedman is our executive producer and our music was composed by Yuval Sim. Pazda can be found@arcmedia.org where you can explore more of Arc Media's podcasts. You can watch the video versions of our episodes on our YouTube channel. Follow the YouTube link in the show Notes. Also, to receive updates on new episodes, please follow the link to arcmedia.org and subscribe to Arc Media's weekly newsletter. For more ideas from the Shalom Hartman Institute, visit our website@shalomhartman.org.