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I upload United States Supreme Court Oral Arguments so that the average American can listen on their smartphone. I do not modify the audios. Each episode is identical to the MP3 file provided at supremecourt.gov. This podcast has no affiliation with the Supreme Court of the United States.
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First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin (2025)
Dec 301:22:27Tap to summarizeDocket Number 24-781Date Argued: 12/02/25
Transcribe →Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. (2025)
Dec 300:58:10Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-777 Date Argued 12/01/25
Transcribe →Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment (2025)
Dec 301:40:40Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-171Date Argued: 12/01/25https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-171_ap6c.pdf
Transcribe →Rutherford v. United States (2025)
Nov 1301:21:26Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-820Date Argued: 11/12/2524-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904QUESTION PRESENTED:The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act. The question presented is:Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025---24-860 CARTER V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5339852LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1115QUESTION PRESENTED:Congress empowered district courts to reduce sentences of federal prisoners for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Congress did not define the terms "extraordinary and compelling" but instead expressly delegated to the United States Sentencing Commission the authority to describe what types of circumstances qualify. Exercising that authority, the Sentencing Commission adopted a provision, Section 1B1.13(b)(6), that permits district courts to consider a sentence reduction where, among other things, the defendant has served at least ten years of an unusually long sentence and a nonretroactive change in law produces a "gross disparity" between that sentence and the one likely to be imposed at the time of the motion. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question presented here:Whether the Sentencing Commission acted within its expressly delegated authority by permitting district courts to consider, in narrowly cabined circumstances, a nonretroactive change in law in determining whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction.CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-820.CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-820_f2ah.pdf
Transcribe →Fernandez v. United States (2025)
Nov 1301:21:32Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-556Date Argued: 11/12/2524-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122QUESTION PRESENTED:Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is:Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compeling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS” THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U. S. C. §2255.CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-556_1bn2.pdf
Transcribe →GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal (2025)
Nov 1100:56:31Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-758Date Argued: 11/10/2524-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCALDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409QUESTION PRESENTED:Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity.The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-758_3f14.pdf
Transcribe →Landor v. LA DOC (2025)
Nov 1101:50:48Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 23-1197Date Argued: 11/10/2523-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONSDECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686QUESTION PRESENTED:Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq ., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq . In Tanzin v. Tanvir , 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/23-1197_3d9g.pdf
Transcribe →Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S. (2025) (Presidential Tariffs)
Nov 502:39:03Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-1287Date Argued: 11/05/2524-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMPDECISION BELOW:LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202QUESTION PRESENTED:The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here.The question presented is:Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025-----25-250 TRUMP V. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC.DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2490634LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2025-1812, 2025-1813QUESTION PRESENTED:1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.THE MOTION TO EXPEDITE AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-1287 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf
Transcribe →Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist (2025)
Nov 400:41:41Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-724Date Argued: 11/04/2524-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUISTDECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197QUESTION PRESENTED:Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it.The questions presented are:1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claimCERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-724_ebgj.pdf
Transcribe →Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton (2025)
Nov 400:35:42Tap to summarizeDocket Number: 24-808Date Argued: 11/04/2524-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTONDECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881QUESTION PRESENTED:Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).The question presented is:Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-808_k53l.pdf
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