Is Iran becoming a 'forever war'?

Summary

Front Burner (CBC) — "Is Iran becoming a 'forever war'?"
Release Date: July 23, 2026
Host: Jamie Poisson
Guest: Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute

---

Episode Overview

In this episode, Jamie Poisson explores the rapidly escalating military conflict between the United States and Iran, following the breakdown of a tenuous ceasefire. Together with Trita Parsi, an expert on US-Iran relations, they analyze how diplomatic efforts unraveled, the toll on both sides, and whether the ongoing fighting risks devolving into a "forever war." The discussion spans the origins of the latest flare-up, military strategies and capacities, political constraints, economic consequences, and the haunting specter of a protracted, unwinnable conflict.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Collapse of the Ceasefire and Renewed Escalation

• Ceasefire Fragility: Despite efforts, a temporary ceasefire between the US and Iran unraveled after only 12 days of renewed fighting ([00:37]).
• Ambiguities in the MoU: Parsi criticizes the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was supposed to uphold the ceasefire, citing unclear and overly ambiguous language—especially Article 5, concerning control of the Strait of Hormuz ([02:09]).
  • Quote: "Sometimes you need ambiguities to make sure you have an agreement. This one had perhaps too many and too large ones." — Trita Parsi [02:12]
• Conflicting Interpretations: US tried to ensure Iran could not use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, while also claiming Iran bore sole responsibility for its security, leading to misunderstanding and growing tension ([03:00]).

2. Provocations and Escalations in the Strait of Hormuz

• American Actions: Simultaneous pursuit of negotiation and militarization in the strait undermined trust. Sending ships through a newly established 'southern corridor' without Iran’s coordination—often with military escort—was seen as direct provocation ([04:29], [05:33]).
  • Quote: "They're going to cancel each other out. They're going to sabotage each other. And that's essentially what happened..." — Trita Parsi [06:27]
• Trump's Rhetoric & US Position: President Donald Trump’s tough talk on imposing taxes for safe passage and responding to provocations with severe military force is highlighted ([04:22], [05:25]).
  • "We're going to hit him very hard tonight and we're going to hit him hard tomorrow. And there's not a damn thing they can do about it." — Donald Trump [05:25]

3. The Broader Toll of the War

• Damage on Both Sides: Renewed attacks included Iran’s missile strikes on US bases (notably in Jordan, killing three US soldiers) and counterstrikes on Iranian assets ([07:28], [07:50]).
• Iran’s Military Strategy: Iran, lacking the capability to strike US homeland infrastructure, instead focuses on regional US bases and allied infrastructure to raise the cost of continued US presence ([08:04]).
  • Quote: "They're trying to convince regional states that hosting American bases makes you less secure rather than more secure. You become a target." — Trita Parsi [08:42]
• Regional Suffering: Both sides targeting civilian infrastructure (e.g., desalination plants in Kuwait) raises grim concerns, as regional allies bear disproportionate hardship ([09:09]).
  • Quote: "The difference though, this time is that it's not the American public that is paying the immediate price for it, it's the regional states." — Trita Parsi [10:48]

4. Military Capacity & Political Constraints

• American Limitations: While the US has significant long-term military strength, political and material constraints are mounting, such as dwindling munitions stockpiles and public resistance ([11:41], [12:11]).
  • Quote: "The Iranians can build missiles faster than the US And Israel can build interceptors... the math is against the United States and Israel." — Trita Parsi [12:22]
• Lack of Public Support: Unpopularity of the war both in the US and even among Trump's own supporters makes funding and sustained involvement difficult ([13:12]-[14:15]).
  • Quote: "If this was a necessary war, if Iran had attacked the US, we would be in a completely different situation." — Trita Parsi [13:12]
• Comparisons to Afghanistan: Unlike after 9/11, this war lacks a rallying incident to sustain domestic support ([14:15]).

5. Iran’s Military Adaptability and Domestic Pressures

• Iran’s Resilience: Despite Western claims of having rendered Iran’s military ‘combat ineffective,’ Iran’s missile and drone capabilities have surpassed expectations ([16:43]-[17:13]).
  • Quote: "We have now clearly seen that a lot of the statements that came out of the Pentagon were false and that the Iranian capacity is far beyond what the Pentagon has said." — Trita Parsi [17:46]
• Intelligence Sources: Speculation that Russia, China, or Jordanian insiders might be providing Iran with timely intelligence ([19:09]).
• Leadership Losses: Despite targeted killings, Iran’s military-political apparatus is structured to rapidly replace fallen leaders, minimizing operational disruption ([20:22]).
• Potential Weaknesses: If the war drags on, domestic economic strain could build significant pressure on the regime, as seen during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war ([20:22]-[21:46]).

6. Strategic Geography and Economic Leverage

• Strait of Hormuz as Leverage: Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz provides significant regional leverage—impacting the world’s energy supply chains and regional economies more than the US economy itself ([25:13]).
  • Quote: "The Iranians have managed... to have the weaponization of geography be used in their favor in a manner that the United States fundamentally... underestimated." — Trita Parsi [25:18]

7. The Logic and Risk of a 'Forever War'

• Defining Forever War: Parsi details two key ingredients: unattainable objectives and political circumstances making it harder to end than continue ([26:36]).
  • Quote: "Forever war usually happens when you have a combination... unattainable objective and a political circumstance that makes it more politically costly to end the war than to continue a losing war." — Trita Parsi [26:36]
• Trump’s Posture: Parsi suggests Trump’s willingness to ‘declare victory’ and depart at a political cost is higher than other presidents, providing an uncertain but possible off-ramp ([27:20]).
• Still Disastrous: Even at ‘just’ four months, the length and outcomes are "already a disaster," raising fears of protraction if the conflict drags into future administrations ([28:00]).

---

Notable Quotes & Timestamps

• On the MoU:
  "Sometimes you need ambiguities to make sure you have an agreement. This one had perhaps too many and too large ones."
  — Trita Parsi [02:12]

• On escalating provocation:
  "They're going to cancel each other out. They're going to sabotage each other. And that's essentially what happened."
  — Trita Parsi [06:27]

• On impact to regional allies:
  "The difference though, this time is that it's not the American public that is paying the immediate price for it, it's the regional states."
  — Trita Parsi [10:48]

• On US military-industrial constraints:
  "The Iranians can build missiles faster than the US and Israel can build interceptors... the math is against the United States and Israel."
  — Trita Parsi [12:22]

• On popular support for the war:
  "If this was a necessary war, if Iran had attacked the US, we would be in a completely different situation."
  — Trita Parsi [13:12]

• On Iran's military resilience:
  "We have now clearly seen that a lot of the statements that came out of the Pentagon were false and that the Iranian capacity is far beyond what the Pentagon has said."
  — Trita Parsi [17:46]

• On the risk of forever war:
  "Forever war usually happens when you have...unattainable objective and a political circumstance that makes it more politically costly to end the war than to continue a losing war."
  — Trita Parsi [26:36]

---

Key Segment Timestamps

• Ceasefire breakdown & MoU ambiguities: [01:51]–[04:13]
• Strait of Hormuz confrontations: [04:13]–[06:27]
• Escalation & damage inflicted by both sides: [07:28]–[10:48]
• US capacity, domestic constraints: [11:41]–[14:15]
• Iranian military strength and adaptability: [16:34]–[18:57]
• Domestic and financial pressures on Iran: [20:00]–[23:47]
• Strait of Hormuz as economic and strategic lever: [25:06]–[25:46]
• Defining and diagnosing ‘forever war’: [26:36]–[28:06]

---

Conclusion

This Front Burner episode presents a sobering analysis of why the US-Iran conflict, after months of failed diplomacy and escalating attacks, carries all the hallmarks of becoming a protracted "forever war." Trita Parsi draws on history, strategy, and political dynamics to illuminate how ambiguous agreements, mutual provocations, and the weaponization of geography have combined with political gridlock to create a volatile, unresolved quagmire. He ultimately warns that unless there is a serious shift toward diplomacy, both sides—and most critically, the region—may face many more years of violence and instability.

Transcript

[CBC Podcast Host]

If you're listening to this, I already know you have great taste in podcasts, but maybe if you're like me, you still wonder if you're missing out on the best stuff. That's where the Sounds Good newsletter can help you out. Every other Thursday, the audio files at CBC Podcast highlight one must hear show and lots of other new and noteworthy titles. They do conversation starters, they do hidden gems, and they also tell you about the stuff they love that they didn't make. Go to CBC CA Sounds good to subscribe.

[Trita Parsi]

This is a CBC podcast.

[Jamie Poisson]

Hi, I'm Jaime Poisson. On Wednesday morning, US President Donald Trump threatened to bomb one Iranian bridge or power plant. Every time a ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz gets shot at, it's more evidence that the ceasefire between the US and Iran has gone from tenuous to toast after 12 days of renewed military escalation. So as the fighting wades into its next phase, today we're going to look at how things fell apart, the damage toll on both sides, and whether anyone can expect a different outcome this time around. To answer those questions, I'm joined today by Trita Parsi. He's the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute, which advocates for diplomacy and military restraint in US foreign policy. He's also the award winning author of several books about the US And Iran, including Treacherous the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States. Trita, it's so great to have you on front burner. Such a pleasure. Thank you for making the time.

[Trita Parsi]

Thank you so much for having me. I appreciate it.

[Jamie Poisson]

So after months of fighting, the US and Iran had this temporary ceasefire in place while they worked towards a permanent deal. The attacks never stopped entirely. But there was, it seems, this real tipping point within the last week and a half and everything escalated. And just take me through how this happened.

[Trita Parsi]

So I think there's, you know, a justified criticism against the MoU because the language of it was in various areas very ambiguous to a certain extent that was by design. It was too difficult to get more precise language and making sure that all sides could sign onto it. Sometimes you need ambiguities to make sure you have an agreement. This one had perhaps too many and too large ones. And in particular article 5 was a problem because that's the one that handles the straight of hormones. And that's where this whole thing, at least on the surface, blew up. The varning interpretation was that they're solely responsible for the security and the traffic through the straightforward this period until a final solution is found. But they're not allowed to charge any ships, but they have to control it. They are, at the end of the day, the ones who mine the straight. And as a result, they're responsible for making sure that no ships go into areas that were mined. The American interpretation is that there's nothing in the language that solely gives that responsibility to Iran, although Iran is the only country that is mentioned as being responsible for this. And this created some tensions. But I think the real issue is this. The United States, prior to the MoU, was trying to create a fortified southern corridor through the strait that the Iranians could not close down, or at least could not fully close down. So if there was a return to war, the Iranians simply would not have the strata of hormones as a weapon. And I think one can argue that from a US national interest perspective, as well as the perspective of many countries in the region, that is a very legitimate interest to not allow the Iranians to have that leverage. But there's a problem. If you simultaneously sign an MoU in which you're supposed to resolve this issue through the mou, and then on the side, you're still doing things outside of the MoU to change the facts on the ground.

[News Reporter]

Trump proposing a new plan to keep the Strait of Hormuz open by charging a 20% tax on all shipped goods in exchange for safe passage.

[Donald Trump]

We'll become the guardian of the strait, maybe we'll call it the guardian angel of the strait and we should be reimbursed for that.

[Trita Parsi]

And this is what the Iranians reacted to, that there were efforts to send ships through the southern corridor without coordination with the Iranians. And on two occasions, minimum, they actually shot at these ships and they got a response from the US Side. And then it kind of escalated out of control. Maritime security expert Martin Kelly posted audio of a warning he says the Iranian military is issuing to ships attempting to cross the strait.

[Donald Trump]

If any vessel attempts to transit in the strait without our permission, it's responsible for any consequences, consequences of any danger.

[News Reporter]

The threat of a full blown return to war is looking like a very real possibility. Iran says it's launched fresh attacks on US Assets in the region. The US Struck an Iranian naval base among its latest targets, using for the very first time, it says, unmanned naval drones. With President Donald Trump promising more.

[Donald Trump]

Well, we're going to hit him very hard tonight and we're going to hit him hard tomorrow. And there's not a damn thing they can do about it.

[Trita Parsi]

I think the Iranian reaction was too strong, but at the same time, it is a Question mark. In my mind, why some of the countries who have spent a lot of time trying to resolve this issue felt the need to send ships through the southern corridor without coordination with Iran and with their transponders off and escorted by military, American military ships. Undoubtedly this would be seen as a provocation by the Iran. Yes.

[Jamie Poisson]

Yeah. I mean, why? Why do you think they did that?

[Trita Parsi]

I frankly think that they did so because they were pressured by the United States in order to get this type of a alternative channel up and running. And again, if that would be the focus of the effort, I think that's understandable. You don't want to have the Iranians have that control. But if you at the same time have signed an agreement that said that we're going to resolve this issue through this negotiation track, then you either pursue that negotiation track or you pursue something outside of it. But not both at the same time. Because if you do both at the same time, they're going to cancel each other out. They're going to sabotage each other. And that's essentially what happened. That's not to say that the Iranian reaction was justified, but I do think that once you commit yourself to that negotiating track, then creating these facts on the ground that's outside of the MoU, it is unhelpful and it has created a very unhelpful situation because now we're back at war. There's absolutely nothing that suggests that the United States has a strategy that's going to work better than the previous strategy, which was a disaster, and that actually can end this in a satisfactory way.

[Donald Trump]

Honestly, they haven't seen anything yet. We've been nice. We've been nice.

[Jamie Poisson]

I want to talk to you about what kind of damage Iran has been able to inflict upon the US and its allies at this stage of the war. And these attacks that we have seen from the Iranians on American military bases. Iranian ballistic missiles hit the U. S. Base in Jordan, killing three US Soldiers.

[Trita Parsi]

The US Responding with force, targeting Iranian troops responsible for the deaths in Jordan. For more than a week, both sides have carried out daily strikes.

[Jamie Poisson]

What is Iran trying to accomplish there by hitting this base in Jordan?

[Trita Parsi]

The Iranians are being attacked from these bases. These are bases that the United States are using throughout the region. Of course, Jordanians say that this is not a US Base. This is a Jordanian base with US Soldiers in it. But these are bases that the Iranians argue are being used to attack them. And they don't have the ability of striking bridges or critical infrastructure in the United States that is what the US Is doing. It's hitting bridges, critical roads, even power plants, desalination plants. They don't have the capacity to do so, but they have the capacity of hitting the basis through which these attacks are occurring. So they're trying to raise the cost for the US to attack Iran. They're trying to convince regional states that hosting American bases makes you less secure rather than more secure. You become a target. And in the long term, they're hoping that this will eventually lead to a scenario in which the regional states themselves will opt not to allow American troops on their basis or allow the United States to set up bases on their territory.

[Jamie Poisson]

And when they hit civilian infrastructure in Kuwait, for example, a desalination plant, Kuwait gets 90% of its drinking water from desalination nation. A move to hit a power infrastructure in Kuwait, this is, this is part of the same strategy.

[Trita Parsi]

It's the same strategy. It's a tit for thoughts. And this is where some of these states are just in such a terrible position. It's not Kuwait that attacked Iran. The Kuwaitis make that argument. And I think it's a valid argument. They're not the ones attacking. Their territory is being used to attack Ivanhoe. So when the United States hits desalination plans, which is a war crime, the Iranians respond in kind by hitting a desalination plant in Kuwait, which also is a war crime. And again, the broader attempt here is to raise the cost for the US to conduct these strikes, put pressure on these states to not allow the US to use their bases or their territory for attacks. And to the extent that it may be working, yes. But at the same time, it is also going to make it extremely difficult for Iran to have good relations with its neighbors going forward because this is obviously not easily going to be forgotten. Of course, the Iranians make the argument that they're also not going to forget that their neighbors allowed US Forces to use their bases and their territory to attack civilian infrastructure in Iran, killing a large number of civilians. This whole thing at the end of the day is just totally unjustifiable. This was a war of choice. It should never have been started. And as we have seen in many other wars, once the door has been opened for these type of attacks that don't take much regard whatsoever to the norms around the use of force, then that quickly ends up becoming two way. And the difference though, this time is that it's not the American public that is paying the immediate price for it, it's the regional states. And even when it comes to the economic repercussions. It's not the United States because its economy is very insulated from these shocks. Not entirely, but still. But the shocks economically that countries in Asia are feeling are devastating.

[Jamie Poisson]

I want to parse with these though some restraints that the United States does seem to be under and how important you think these are. They're currently sending more aircrafts and refueling tankers to the Middle east, but there's also reporting from the Washington Post about how they have a dwindling stockpile of air defense and long range munitions, as well as limited ability to send more troops and aircrafts into the region. How much capacity does the US have to keep fighting at the moment?

[Trita Parsi]

So the United States, at the end of the day, has a tremendous amount of capacity to continue the war. But continuing the war and providing force protection are not necessarily the same thing. So when it comes to its ability to keep a pace with Iranian missiles, the math is against the United States and Israel. The Iranians can build missiles faster than the US And Israel can build interceptors. You need more interceptors per missile on average. And of course, US Has a much stronger industrial base than the Iranians have. But it also have other priorities. This is not an existential fight for the U.S. this is a war of choice. This is part of the reason why, you see, the American public was never in favor of it. And now you're even in a situation in which amongst Trump's own base, only one third believe that this war was worth the cost. It was much higher just weeks ago.

[Donald Trump]

Well, Americans aren't against the war. The, the a just came out. Americans don't want high gasoline prices, but they're not against the war.

[Trita Parsi]

If this was a necessary war, if Iran is an attack, the US we would be in a completely different situation then. We have seen that the American public is willing to make significant sacrifices, but they're not willing to do so for a war that they don't believe should have been started in the first place, and understandably so. So from that perspective, the Iranians have an advantage and they're obviously trying to take advantage of that benefit as much as they can. But it is not so that the US Cannot sustain a war. Or I mean, we saw, unfortunately, the United States could sustain a war in Afghanistan for 20 years, even though it was very difficult to justify it beyond the first year.

[Jamie Poisson]

Do you see this as maybe even more challenging than that? Like, for example, the Pentagon is asking for a record 1.5 trillion defense budget and they're currently pushing to get 60 billion in funding to make up for money spent in the Middle East. But given the unpopularity of this war, do you think that they'll have a hard time getting the funding that they need? And if so, could that affect their ability to kind of move forward?

[Trita Parsi]

So politically, you're absolutely right. Politically, the US's capacity of continuing this war is obviously far more limited than its military capacity to do so. And again, because the starting point is one in which there wasn't much support for this war at all. I mean, the opposition to it was overwhelming. It has gone really badly. Trump is not even trying to sell the war domestically. The money and the cost on the American public for a war that they don't want is very different from Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, we're talking about a very significant level of support to start off with, because at the end of the day, Al Qaeda had attacked the United States in a massive terrorist attack, and many of their core elements were in Afghanistan. We have nothing of that kind here. We have a situation in which first the United States or Trump was saying that he had already obliterated the nuclear program and then yet again decided nevertheless to start over. So given that the political Runway, until you have support translating into opposition, there was no Runway at all. There was opposition from the outset. And the only support level that we can point to was relevant and went down is the support amongst his own base in which it was high in the beginning, but also that one has now started to drop off dramatically. And as a result, yes, politically, this may not prove to be sustainable. But we have seen before as well that even when a war is politically very unpopular, costly, difficult to get the funding, it can still go on for a couple of more years.

[CBC Podcast Host 2]

Okay, so there are millions of podcasts, and maybe you're cool to stick with the ones you already know you like, but if you're just a little paranoid about missing out on the best new stuff, we can help. Every other Thursday, the Sounds Good newsletter will bring you one must hear show from CBC Podcasts. And because we're true audio nerds, we'll also tell you about shows that we love that we didn't make. Go to CBC CA Sounds good to subscribe.

[Jamie Poisson]

Let's talk about Iran. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has previously claimed to have, quote, functionally defeated Iran's ballistic missile production.

[Trita Parsi]

Mr. Secretary, you stated four months ago that Iran's military had been rendered, quote, combat ineffective for years to come. Has Iran's military been, for the last four months, combat ineffective? It's been set back not just years, but likely decades.

[Jamie Poisson]

During the first wave of fighting, there were questions about whether the country's large stockpiles and missiles and drones would last the duration of the fighting. How would you describe Iran's military abilities at the moment?

[Trita Parsi]

With the current type of a war that they're fighting, which is one in which they use drones and missiles? Their capacity has partially taken the United States and Israel by surprise, and partially. It's not that it was a surprise. It was that there actually was a deliberate effort to downplay Iran's capabilities in the sense that in order to get Trump to agree to this war, a narrative had been created that the previous war was a real success, that the Israelis really defeated the Iranians in June of 2025, that Iran's missiles were haphazard, not effective. They were striking the wrong things if they ever got through. All of that was false. That's not to say that there wasn't a successor shooting down a lot of them. But the Iranian missiles already back in October 2024, which were missiles that are far less effective than the ones they use today, were already proving that they could go through all levels, all layers of Israel's air defense system. So we have now clearly seen that a lot of the statements that came out of the Pentagon were false and that the Iranian capacity is far beyond what the Pentagon has said. We're seeing that very clearly right now. Moreover, their intelligence, whether it's their own or whether they're managing to get it from somewhere else, is also something that has shifted. The attack on the base in Jordan was significant, not just because they struck Jordan with precision, et cetera. It's just that something apparently had happened there, and the Iranians found out very quickly and struck very quickly.

[Jamie Poisson]

Do we have any indication of what changed and where that information might have come from? I know kind of earlier in the summer, there was reporting on Russia giving intelligence to Iran.

[Trita Parsi]

I can only speculate, of course, but there's essentially three. Three potential explanations. Either is that they're getting the intelligence from the Russians, who probably have it and have an interest in providing it. They're getting the intelligence from the Chinese that also have it, but are more reluctant to give it, but for whatever reason may have provided them with that now, or what the Iranians themselves are hinting at in the media in Iran, which is that these were sources in Jordan that provided that information. That may have been a deliberate attempt to divert attention away from where the actual source is. Or it may be true. We just don't know, but it's hard to see any other explanation except for those three.

[Jamie Poisson]

We talked before about the potential constraints politically that the US Administration is on. I wonder if you could flip that for me. What about the Iranian government and, and the IRGC that is perpetuating this war? I mean, they have lost a lot of really high level guys. Has that affected any kind of decision structure negatively?

[Trita Parsi]

I, I don't think the political constraint on the Iranian side is necessarily because of the people they have lost at the higher echelons. Not to say that that is unimportant, but because they have a system that is designed to be able to withstand these type of hits and immediately replace them. And it has actually been stunning to see how fast they have replaced them and how little impact, if anything, it has had on their ability to fight. So I don't think that is where the restraint likely is going to come. It's more of the fact that if this continues to be a situation for another six months or so, the population is not going to be particularly happy. Of course, they're very unhappy right now, but the economic pain is going to start to become intolerable. Now, of course, we saw that in the Iraq Iran war. It went on for eight years, and even though the population was very unhappy, there was still a very strong level of support for the war because the country had been invaded. And again, here there's, there's no nuance in the debate in Iran. This was a war of aggression by the United States and worse than Saddam's invasion in 1980. This is an existential threat because Trump made it very clear that he's looking to get rid of the regime. But at times he even said, you know, Iran's map may end or change at the end of this war, meaning that the territorial integrity of Iran is at stake.

[Donald Trump]

We killed all their leadership and then they met to choose new leaders and we killed all of them. And now we have a new group and we can easily do that, but let's see how they turn out. It's, we have really regime change. You know, this is a change in the regime because the leaders are all very different than the ones that we started off with that created all those problems. So this was, I think we can

[Trita Parsi]

say, Jason, those type of statements certainly makes it easier to sustain a longer term level of support for a war that is fundamentally seen as defensive. But you can have a scenario in which perhaps real negotiations begin, real efforts are made, an attractive offer actually is put on the table that is convincing. And if the Iranian government chooses to reject that, and it is a return to war. You can definitely see a scenario in which pressure from the population will become costly for without. That is not the scenario that we've seen so far. On the contrary, mindful of the fact that the United States has now attacked Iran three times in the middle of negotiations, there is a huge level of skepticism against diplomacy and against American promises and an almost, in my view, very dangerous perspective in which diplomacy is seen as a trap. And as a result, rather than pressuring the government to go to the negotiating table, there's a stronger pressure not to negotiate.

[Jamie Poisson]

And what about their coffers? Right. So, I mean, we talked earlier about the incredible leverage that they've been able to use when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, but also that's a massive revenue source for the irtc. And, you know, with it not being open, obviously, that revenue isn't. Isn't getting to the regime. Um, and so how could money be playing into Iran's, like, strength or. Or weak, like, really weakness as this goes on?

[Trita Parsi]

I think, again, it's really important to understand a significant difference here. That is always a relevant question, but it is far more relevant as a restraint or a constraint on a government at war. If the war was a war of choice, when the war is seen as defensive and existential, everything else will be sacrificed, and that opens up completely different pathways to finance the war. And again, this is part of the reason why it is extremely important how you communicate this war. At the beginning, and the administration was all over the place. They were talking about using ethnic separatist groups against the country, which just fuels nationalism. And under those circumstances, it's not that money exists in an infinite way, but it means that the capacity the state has to muster support to take money from elsewhere in order to continue the defenses is far more capable, far more permissible than if this was a war of choice that the population were gezza against.

[Jamie Poisson]

So given everything that we've gone through today, on balance, who do you think holds the power right now?

[Trita Parsi]

I think on balance, the Iranians have a capacity of withstanding this longer than the U.S. house. The Iranians have a capacity to withstand this much longer than regional states cap, whose economies are far more vulnerable to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz than gazes. And this is where the Iranians have managed, despite their, in many other ways, weaker position, of course, to have the weaponization of geography be used in their favor in a manner that the United States fundamentally is calculated and underestimated. We saw also that the Ukrainians were capable of using their territory very effectively against the Russians, a much more powerful military. At the end of the day, this is a repeat of that. And I think it's a reminder that technology and all of these different things, of course, are very important. But in war, geography, at the end of the day, seems to be the fact that matters the most.

[Jamie Poisson]

And just as a final question, I mean, even if Iran is able to withstand this much longer than the U.S. i mean, you're not getting the sense that the U.S. is gonna turn around and pull out in a couple of weeks, right? So, I mean, are we sort of headed towards some kind of forever war?

[Trita Parsi]

Forever war usually happens when you have a combination, many factors. But two factors that are really critical here is to have an unattainable objective and a political circumstance that makes it more politically costly to end the war than to continue a losing war. That's what you have with Afghanistan, for instance. The cost of pulling out was much higher for Biden than the cost for him to just continue it, even though it wasn't going anywhere. You have an unattainable objective here, thinking that the Strait can be opened up militarily or that the Iranians can be defeated at an acceptable cost militarily. I mean, yes, they could probably, if there was a full scale invasion, but we're talking about 500,000 troops a year of preparations, et cetera, et cetera. And then with Trump, it's very interesting, he has shown far greater willingness to end a losing war and take the political hit for it and just make up some stuff about how successful it was than other presidents. So I think there's still a chance here to avoid that scenario. But if this continues to the next president, then I think we're really in the territory in which this very well could end up becoming an endless war. The fact that it's taken four months is already a disastrous disaster development. It's not endless, but it's still disastrous.

[Jamie Poisson]

Trita, thank you so much for this. Really appreciate it.

[Trita Parsi]

Thank you so much for having me. I appreciate it.

[Jamie Poisson]

All right, that is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow.

[Donald Trump]

Foreign.

[Trita Parsi]

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.