Canada’s Venezuelan oil problem

Summary

---

Front Burner (CBC): “Canada’s Venezuelan Oil Problem”

Date: January 6, 2026
Host: Jayme Poisson
Guest: Evan Dyer, CBC Parliamentary Bureau (foreign policy/LATAM specialist)

---

Overview

This episode unpacks the fallout for Canada after the dramatic U.S.-led ouster of Venezuelan President Maduro, focusing on the possible economic and geopolitical impact of renewed U.S. access to Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves. Host Jayme Poisson and guest Evan Dyer analyze whether Venezuelan oil truly threatens Canadian interests, the state of Venezuela’s oil industry, and what changing balances of power mean for Canada’s domestic politics and place in a seemingly more aggressive U.S. sphere of influence.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

---

1. Why Venezuelan Oil Matters to Canada

[02:07 - 02:52]

• Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves (300 million barrels), similar to Canadian heavy oil.
• Its oil is geographically close to the U.S. Gulf Coast refineries, making transport cheaper and easier than Canadian oil.
• Historically, Canadian oil replaced Venezuelan oil in U.S. supply chains after Venezuela’s production collapsed under Chavez and Maduro.
• Evan Dyer:
  “To go back to depending on Venezuelan oil… you would have to reverse all of those flows” (04:07).
• The current Canadian advantage is tied to decades of infrastructure redesign and refinery adaptations favoring Canadian supply.

---

2. The Shambles of Venezuela’s Oil Industry

[04:22 - 07:11]

• Current output: down from 3.5 million to ~1 million bpd, most sold under sanction-evasion schemes.
• Infrastructure is severely dilapidated: pipelines leak, roads are hazardous, and maintenance is virtually nonexistent.
• Some technical advantages remain: Venezuelan oil is easier to extract and closer to ports than Canada’s bitumen.
• A vivid analogy:
  “You can't just milk, milk, milk the cow and never feed it … you can actually abuse [an oil reservoir] to the point that it can't be revived.” — Evan Dyer (04:54)

---

3. The Prospects for Rapid Venezuelan Oil Recovery

[07:13 - 09:45]

• Trump’s claims about quick U.S. oil company investment are at odds with industry reticence.
• Experts estimate it would take $100 billion and a decade to return Venezuelan output to pre-crisis levels (~4 million bpd).
• Foreign investors demand consistent rule-of-law, contracts, and safety—historically lacking in Venezuela, which nationalized and expropriated assets (notably expropriating ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips in 2007 and still owing billions in arbitration).

---

4. Timeframes and Real Threats to Canada

[13:15 - 15:06]

• If all goes perfectly, Venezuela could double production in 4-5 years, reaching up to 2.5 million bpd.
• This would spark competition for U.S. refineries, especially on the Gulf Coast, threatening some Canadian oil exports but not triggering an immediate crisis.
• The scenario strengthens the U.S. negotiating hand—even the prospect of Venezuelan oil becomes a bargaining chip in trade talks.
  • “It also gives the US a negotiating card even before a single barrel of Venezuelan oil starts to flow.” (15:13)

---

5. Shifting Trade Leverage and Political Optics

[15:31 - 16:58]

• U.S. officials (and associated figures like Katie Miller) declare that America no longer needs Canada (“Free trade is over”), which is exaggerated but underscores a hardening U.S. posture.
• Example: Trump seeking alternative suppliers to erode Canadian leverage—not only for oil but also for potash (signing with Belarus).
  • “This is the same thing being done with oil, in effect. And sure enough, it does weaken Canada's hand potentially.” (16:49)

---

6. Canadian Government’s Diplomatic Dilemma

[17:56 - 19:10]

• Official statements from PM Carney and FM Anand on Maduro’s removal: cautious approval, calls for international law and democracy—avoiding direct criticism or praise for U.S. intervention.
• Canada’s bind: supports democracy but relies on international law—a system threatened by U.S. behavior, yet risks retribution if critical.
  • “When governments don't want to condone something but are also scared to criticize it, they tend to use similar language, like, ‘we're watching the situation closely’” (17:56)
• Subtle support for the Venezuelan opposition shown through a call to Maria Corina Machado, the leading opposition figure, implicitly challenging Trump’s dismissal of her.

---

7. U.S. Motivation: Stability or Control?

[21:27 - 23:09]

• Discussion of whether leaving much of the Maduro regime in place is meant to avoid upheaval.
• Dyer is skeptical; notes the lack of U.S. pressure for release of political prisoners or respect for election results suggests disregard for democracy.
  • “Trump mentions all three of those things and then says and then have elections. Well, when would that be? That's years and years down the road.” (23:09)

---

8. Canadian Political Reactions

[24:10 - 28:38]

• Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre’s statement: bold in congratulating Trump, unequivocal about ousting Maduro and installing the opposition, explicit anti-socialist rhetoric.
  • Contrasts with more cautious Liberal/NDP positions.
  • Criticized for ignoring the risk of U.S. interventionism (both for Alberta’s oil industry and for Canada’s sovereignty).
  • “Perhaps his statement could be criticized as naive for believing in good intentions of the Americans, which we are not seeing play out. We're seeing something quite different play out.” (27:26)

---

9. The Specter of a “New Monroe Doctrine”

[29:06 - 33:51]

• Dyer warns the real threat is not only to Canadian oil, but to the international order if the U.S. now feels entitled to unilaterally seize resources across the hemisphere (Greenland, Canada, Colombia, etc.).
• Denmark is bracing for similar U.S. pressure over Greenland and is expected to raise NATO’s Article 5 if invaded—“but no one wants to go to war with the United States… that is the end of NATO… the Western alliance falls to pieces.” (31:19)
• Pretexts used against Venezuela (drug trafficking claims) already deployed against Canada (re: fentanyl), setting the stage for future justification.
• Quote:
  • “Most of the pieces are already there. For Trump to do the same thing to Canada that he's done to Venezuela… the Don Roe Doctrine, as he's called it… is a big topic of conversation [in allied capitals].” (32:03–33:51)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the legacy of expropriation:
  “ConocoPhillips, I believe, is owed something like $9 billion, but they haven't been able to collect really very much, if any of that money.” — Evan Dyer (10:40)

• On Canadian government’s cautious statement:
  “I think fear is the simple explanation for that… It doesn't want to become a target of this kind of behavior by the Trump administration.” (17:56)

• On U.S. disregard for Venezuelan democracy:
  “It did appear that Canada was mildly pushing back on that.” (20:57)

• On NATO’s vulnerability:
  “If Denmark invokes Article 5, which it would have no choice but to do, NATO is done and the Western alliance falls to pieces.” (31:19)

---

Key Timestamps

• [02:07] — Why Venezuelan oil is a structural challenge for Canada
• [04:22] — State of Venezuela’s oil industry: physical decay, workforce flight
• [07:44] — Billions and a decade needed to restore output—industry’s skepticism
• [13:15] — Timeline for Venezuela overtaking its current output
• [15:13] — Venezuelan oil as a new U.S. trade bargaining chip
• [17:56] — The diplomatic bind in Canada’s response to U.S. intervention
• [24:10] — Pierre Poilievre and partisan Canadian reactions
• [29:06] — Domino effect: New Trump Doctrine and its threat to the global order

---

Flow, Tone, and Final Takeaways

The conversation is informed, detail-rich, and combines technical oil market insight with sharp political analysis. The mood is uneasy, with an undercurrent of worry about the new, forceful posture of the United States. Both participants express uncertainty, but Dyer is particularly direct in warning that Canada and other U.S. allies are entering a dangerous new era where old assumptions about economic and geopolitical security no longer hold.

Final line:
“This is the new world that we live in, and that's the real threat of what happened in Venezuela. This world where the United States is willing to just go out and grab resources, use force against weaker partners, and treat itself as basically the king of the Western Hemisphere.” — Evan Dyer (33:51)

---

For full context, listeners get:

• A technical explanation of oil industry logistics
• Key political history between Canada, Venezuela, and the U.S.
• The likely medium- and long-term risks to Canadian interests—both economic (oil competition) and broader (diminished sovereignty, alliance breakdown)

This episode is essential listening for anyone concerned about how North-South politics, resource security, and global order are rapidly evolving as 2026 begins.

Transcript

[A]

Before we had AT&T business wireless coverage, our delivery GPS wasn't the most reliable. Once our driver had to do a 14 point turn to get back on route. A 14 point turn, an influencer even livestream the whole thing. Not good for business. Now with AT&T business wireless routes are updating on the fly and deliveries are on time. And the influencer did get us 53 new followers though. AT&T business wireless connecting changes everything. This is a CBC podcast.

[B]

Hey everyone. Jamie here. As promised yesterday, today on the show, we're going to focus on the implications for Canada of what we just witnessed in Venezuela. First, there has been a flurry of concern about what Venezuelan oil could mean for our economy, considering that oil is our biggest export. Is American access to Venezuelan oil a major threat to us? Have we lost leverage with the US as we move forward this year in trade negotiations? Also, this new age of American imperialism is becoming more real. Over the last few days, Trump has threatened Cuba, Greenland, Iran, Colombia, Mexico, not to mention the 51st state stuff. What are Canada's primary concerns as we navigate this new reality? My colleague Evan Dyer out of our parliamentary bureau is here. Evan has a lot of experience covering Canadian foreign policy, specifically in Latin America, including a past reporting life in the region. Evan, hey, it's great to have you.

[A]

Nice to be with you, Jamie.

[B]

So let's start with the oil. Hey, weeks before Trump toppled Maduro, you were writing about how the US Gaining control of the Venezuelan oil sector can impact Canada in a pretty big way. And just why is Venezuela's oil such a threat to Canada?

[A]

Well, there's a lot of it, I guess would be the first thing I would say. There's over 300 million proven barrels of reserves in Venezuela, the number one country in the world in proven oil reserves. And then there's just the location of it and the nature of it. It's very similar to Canadian heavy oil. And it is in geographically located right across the Caribbean from the refinery row of the United States, which is the Gulf coast, the Louisiana and Texas coast. And of course, moving oil by sea is easier than moving it by any other means. So for all of those reasons, it potentially does pose a threat to Canada down the road. But I would like to emphasize down the road, this is not something where you can simply turn on the T and displace Canadian oil.

[B]

Yeah, I want to get into why you say that is in a minute, but just first, I know you've covered how Canadian oil essentially replaced Venezuelan oil since Hugo Chavez came to power in 99. And just can you tell me more about that story?

[A]

Well, Canadian oil really started to grow at the beginning of this century and displace the oil that was coming from Venezuela just before Venezuelan oil went into a decline. So essentially the old pipeline network in North America was designed to receive oil from tankers on the Gulf coast, refine some of it there, and then send the rest of it up into the Midwest to be refined further inside the United States. So those pipelines used to flow from south to north as Venezuelan oil declined and Canadian oil grew. And not only Canadian oil, I should say, also the US's own oil, like the Bakken oil field in North Dakota and so on. But in the northern states, we saw a reversal of pipelines and a refitting of certain refineries. Refineries were refitted to handle Canadian heavy crude in the Midwest, for example. So now the pipelines mostly flow from north to south. And that process has continued right up until just five years ago. We, for example, we saw the Cap Line pipeline reversed. It flows now from Illinois to Louisiana instead of from Louisiana to Illinois. So, you know, to go back to depending on Venezuelan oil and especially to ship it further into the United States to those Midwestern refineries, you would have to reverse all of those flows.

[B]

Again, how would you describe the current state of Venezuelan oil production?

[A]

Well, everyone who's worked in Venezuelan oil production and maintained context to that country says that it's a complete mess. I mean, and we can see that in terms of the levels of production. Essentially, Venezuela used to make about three and a half million barrels a day, and it's now making perhaps a million, perhaps a million, most of which is traded on the black market to China and carried around the world by kind of a shadow fleet of tankers under various flags of convenience because of the sanctions situation. A small part of it, about 15%, is still being produced by Chevron, the US company, and shipped to the US under a sort of a waiver, a sanctions waiver. But the problem with Venezuelan oil is total lack of maintenance. I mean, one of the Venezuelan engineers who, who left Venezuela following the strike there, where Hugo Chavez essentially fired a very large number of Venezuelan oil professionals and some of them were picked up by Canadian companies like Sunoco that were developing the oil sands at that time. He described a reservoir of oil as being like a cow. It's like milking a cow. You can't just milk, milk, milk the cow and never feed it. You've got to take care of the cow or the cow will eventually stop Producing milk and an oil reservoir can be like that. You can actually abuse it to the point that it can't be revived. So there's some concern that that may have happened to some Venezuelan oil fields. But even the oil fields where the reserve is still there is still accessible. The infrastructure is in terrible shape. And it's not just the wells themselves that are in terrible shape, but also the whole country is in terrible shape. So, for example, pipelines that once would have carried oil are now filled with water or they're leaking, and so the oil has to be trucked, and the trucks themselves are in terrible shape with bald tires, driving on roads full of potholes where you can get held up by bandits. I mean, that's the condition of the Venezuelan oil. Essentially, it's a shambles. But it does have some advantages over Canada that are sort of always going to be there. And the oil is very similar. Actually, another engineer who came here and worked for Nexen and ran a Canadian refinery said that the bitumen that he was dealing with in the Orinoco belt in Venezuela and the bitumen here are identical. Chemically, there's no difference. There are some differences, though, in the ground, you know, Venezuela, in terms of the permeability of the ground, the temperature of the ground. It's easier to get that bitumen out of the ground in Venezuela than it is here, partly because it's warmer there, and so therefore it's less viscous. And there are some other advantages, too, that the Venezuelans have. Their oil is closer to the coast.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

So it's easier to get on a tanker. Those advantages are there.

[B]

You know, listening to Trump, he's saying.

[A]

That we're going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.

[B]

And I take your point that you can't just turn on the taps. But, like, how realistic is that and how long could conceivably something like that take?

[A]

Well, I guess the first thing I would say is that while I've heard President Trump make that claim, I haven't heard that from the oil companies themselves.

[B]

They're saying nothing.

[A]

They're saying nothing about that. And oil. You know, market analysts and people who study the oil industry have estimated that the total cost of getting up to, let's say, 4 million barrels a day, which is more or less where Venezuela used to be. It's where Canada is, too, by the way, would be over $100 billion spent over a decade. So you're talking about an enormous investment to put Venezuela onto the same kind of footing as a producer that Canada is on today. I mean, Venezuela today has perhaps about 17, 18% of the world's reserves, but it's producing less than 1% of the oil per day. To get it up to a higher level would be an enormous investment. And that's just the direct investment in the oil industry. Forget about the ports, the roads, and then all of the other changes that have to happen in Venezuela to make it attractive to the oil industry.

[B]

Because capital likes stability. Right. And there are risks of investing in a country like Venezuela, which the oil industry knows very well.

[A]

Absolutely. And the oil industry is a risk tolerant industry. Right. I mean, if you look at where oil is in the world, it's often in fairly difficult places. You know, we've had Canadian oil companies, for example, operating in Sudan in the middle of a civil war. So it is a risk tolerant industry. But one thing that the oil industry really doesn't like is juridical insecurity. You know, it's like they want to be sure that contracts are going to be honored. They want to be sure that their equipment and their fields won't be expropriated and that things won't be nationalized out from under them. And they've had bad experiences with their fingers getting burned in the past in Venezuela. So they would want to see, I think, a new regime, a new government. Oil companies don't care if it's a democracy or a dictatorship. That's not their concern. But what they would want to see is a bit a track record of a government that respects its contracts with foreign energy companies, for example.

[B]

Tell me more about some of the historical memories some of these companies would have.

[A]

Well, Venezuela's not unique in having nationalized its oil industry. I think that that happened in every country that has substantial oil deposits. I mean, actually, Venezuela was quite a leader. Venezuela is the founding member of opec. OPEC was Venezuela's idea. Right. So it was the first country to really start to try to organize the Middle Eastern producers and say, listen guys, our oil giving it up for too little. We need to get more out of this resource. And then that developed into nationalization. Actually, it's 50 years ago this week that Venezuela nationalized its oil industry and it began to get much more from its own oil than say, the 25% that it had been getting basically of the value of the oil in the ground back in the 1950s became half, became 75%. And finally in 2007, following that strike in 2003 where Chavez fired half of his own state oil company's workers, he in 2007 then expropriated a bunch of foreign companies as well, the big losers being ConocoPhillips. ExxonMobil. They went to courts to try to get international arbitration in their favor, and they won some rulings. I mean, ConocoPhillips, I believe is owed something like $9 billion, but they haven't been able to collect really very much, if any of that money, so they're still owed large amounts. Mom I like to propose a dinner.

[B]

Optimization plan for 2026. Soccer practice every week, get back late and you're stressed out about making something fast but actually nutritious for dinner.

[A]

When Ashley's mom picked me up, I.

[B]

Noticed that she made Blue Apron. It came in like a little kit and by the time it was ready I still had shin guards on and it was real food. Fresh veggies, protein, actual flavor taker from the younger generation. We're innovators giving a couple Blue Apron meals around. Not the worst idea. Get $50 off your first two orders plus free shipping with code STIR50. Terms and conditions apply. Visit blue apron.com terms for more. Okay, so there are millions of podcasts, and maybe you're cool to stick with the ones you already know you like, but if you're just a little paranoid about missing out on the best new stuff, we can help. Every other Thursday, the Sounds Good newsletter will bring you one must hear show from CBC Podcasts. And because we're true audio nerds, we'll also tell you about shows that we love that we didn't make. Go to CBC CA Soundsgood to subscribe. I take your point that there are enormous hurdles here that would need to be overcome and that this isn't an imminent risk to the economy in Canada. But you know, at the same time, there's a lot of money to be made here and I'm sure will to do this right. And so I was reading this op ed by this guy Sean Barber in the Globe and Mail, who's a longtime public servant and former head of the Economic Security Task Force at Public Safety Canada. And he referenced estimates that suggest Venezuela could more than double its oil production and basically reach pre sanction levels of 2 to 2.5 million barrels a day after four to five years of sustained investment. I guess if everything kind of goes in the direction that the United States and the companies want it to go, but that's not that Long of a timeframe?

[A]

No, I mean, that would only get them about half of the way to where they would ideally like to be able to go. But yeah, I mean, by focusing on the lower hanging fruit, the easier fixes, they could probably start to expand production more rapidly once the investment begins. You know, once the conditions are there for the investment to begin, I think they'd then get into some diminishing returns as they tried to get up to 3 million, 4 million, it would get more expensive and take perhaps a little bit longer to get to 3 million 4 million barrels a day. But yeah, there is a definitely, if everything were to go the way that the Trump administration envisions and hopes and the oil companies were to play ball and Venezuela were to provide the conditions that allowed for that kind of investment, then in five years, you could indeed see, let's say, an extra million million and a half barrels per day being produced out of Venezuela.

[B]

And what could that do to us?

[A]

That wouldn't necessarily be fatal to the Canadian oil industry, partly because most Canadian oil is refined in the Midwest of the US So the obvious market for the Venezuelan oil is the Gulf refineries. You know, there would be already. There would be a beginning of competition, though. There would be a beginning of competition. You would have situations where Canadian barrels are competing directly with those Venezuelan barrel barrels in some U.S. refineries. And of course, this is just another incentive for Canada to look for new markets. And that's why the timeframe is very important, because of course, there's also a timeframe to build infrastructure, such as pipelines to the Pacific or Atlantic coasts of Canada, which can be done faster. This is really the question, I think Canada is already on a path, has already recognized the need to diversify, and so that's the solution to this problem as well. And it's just a question of how fast can it be done and then how fast can the oil companies get Venezuelan oil up and running. The potential for competition is absolutely there.

[B]

Fair for me to say, this is kind of probably going to ramp up our conversations around pipelines even more. So in 2020.

[A]

Yeah, yeah. And it also gives the US a negotiating card even before a single barrel of Venezuelan oil starts to flow. New oil, let's say they can hold it up as something that could happen and therefore a way to potentially reduce their dependence on us and strengthen their hand in any negotiat.

[B]

Right. Just related to that, I was seeing this post from Stephen Miller's wife, Katie Miller. She was reposting these comments about how Canada Just lost all of its leverage with the US And Carney overplayed his hand. And she said, the US doesn't need anything from Canada. Free trade is over. Which obviously isn't. Is not accurate. But, you know, I guess I. Trump doesn't always buy into what experts are telling him about reality. Right. Like, there's no shortage of economists, for example, telling him that his tariffs are a bad idea. So just like, if he is convinced that Venezuela's oil is America's, you know, it could easily make him act in a way that could be very harmful for us over the coming year.

[A]

Right. Whether it's true or not, if he believes it, he will act as if it's true. And, you know, there may also be reason to believe that Donald Trump is deliberately looking to reduce Canada's leverage over the United States. I mean, another example of that would be potash. You know, we saw Canada point to its potash as a kind of a monopoly. Oh, look, you really depend on this to fertilize your farmland. And what did Donald Trump do? He turned around and he signed a deal with Belarus to get one of the world's other major suppliers of potash. Yeah.

[B]

These are our two biggest cards. Really.

[A]

Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, this is the same thing being done with oil, in effect. And sure enough, it does weaken Canada's hand potentially.

[B]

Yeah. Okay, I want to broaden this out a bit more here and talk about Canada's response to the operation in Caracas over the weekend. Carney and Foreign Minister Anita Anand both released statements after Majoro's capture. They were pretty similar. They were both very cautious approval of Majoro being removed from power, which is not very surprising. That is in line with Canada's position on this. For many, many years, there was a call for all parties to respect international law and for the democratic will of the Venezuelan people to be respected, but a real reluctance to criticize Trump. It doesn't even mention the US the statement. Very different, for example, from the NDP statement, which called the attack in Caracas illegal. So why do you think the Liberal government put out the statement that they did?

[A]

I think fear is the simple explanation for that. I mean, we saw the same thing right across Europe. European governments, you know, when. When governments don't want to condone something but are also scared to criticize it, they tend to use similar language, like, we're watching the situation closely type of language. And we saw a lot of people saying that they were watching the situation closely. So, you know, Canada, as you point out correctly, did long advocate for the removal of Maduro from power. It hasn't recognized him since 2018. It was a founding member of the Lima Group, which was a coalition of American countries seeking to remove Maduro from power through negotiations, not through military action, I should say. But certainly it did not support Maduro's legitimacy. But at the same time, Canada is a believer in international law. Canada is a believer in the sovereignty of other countries. And it's very aware that as a, as a middle power, it depends on that, that framework of international law to protect it. So, you know, Canada's in a bit of a bind here. It doesn't want to encourage this kind of behavior by the Trump administration. It doesn't want to become a target of this kind of behavior by the Trump administration. It also doesn't want to annoy or irritate the Trump administration by being too critical. And that's why I think we saw the statement that we did.

[B]

Yeah. And certainly that statement itself has been critiqued from all sides I've seen of the political spectrum. Do you want to flesh that out for me a little bit more?

[A]

Well, I would say the thing that jumped out at me about that statement was that it did say that Canada supports a Venezuelan solution, a Venezuelan led solution. It did also point out that the Prime Minister phoned Maria Corina Machado, the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, and spoke to her, which is a sort of an implicit criticism of President Trump's dismissal of her in his remarks where he said that she doesn't have the support within or the respect within the country. She's a very nice woman, but she doesn't have the respect to which, I mean, is completely false. That is a completely false statement. There's really, I think anyone who understands the situation in Venezuela would tell you that Maria Corina Machado is the Venezuelan politician with the highest level of credibility among the Venezuelan population by quite a wide margin. So that statement by Donald Trump was false. And I think that by phoning Maria Corina Machado, Carney was sort of laying down a marker that Canada still supports the Venezuelan opposition taking power to replace Nicolas Maduro. And of course, the situation that we're seeing right now appears to be a continuation of the Maduro regime minus Nicolas Maduro. Every other part of the regime remains in place, including the army, of course, the police, all of which remain under the control of members of the, the Chavez regime, who then became members of the Maduro regime. So we saw, you know, a willingness by the Trump administration to completely throw the Venezuelan opposition under the bus. And it did appear that Canada was mildly pushing back on that.

[B]

Yeah, I'd be interested to hear your take. This is a little. A little off focus, but I was talking yesterday with John Lee Anderson at the New Yorker, and he was positing that, you know, he thinks that the Trump administration left elements of the old regime in place because he thinks that. That they think that that's the most stable way to move forward without kind of massive upheaval and violence. And I just wonder like. Like your take on that and what you think Carney might be balancing here.

[A]

Yeah, I heard. I heard his remarks, and I partly agree with them. I do think, however, that there's other signs here that the Trump administration just is not interested in Venezuelan democracy at all. And I'll give you an President Trump is claiming that he has complete leverage over Delsey Rodriguez, the new acting president, and that she'll do whatever she's told. And yet he didn't tell her to release political prisoners. You know, there are hundreds and hundreds of political prisoners in Venezuela, some of them facing torture and all kinds of harsh conditions. People die in custody. All of those people could be released if the US Administration was to apply pressure to Del C. Rodriguez, it appears, and yet they didn't bother to do that. So that right there tells you just how little interest, really, they appear to have in really respecting the will of the Venezuelan people, which was very clearly expressed in the election. You know, Maria Corina Machado's candidate, she was barred from running, but Edmundo Gonzalez, the presidential candidate for the opposition, which everybody recognizes is actually led by her, won about 70% of the vote. The United States then recognized him as President elect of Venezuela. On January 22 this year, Marco Rubio, as Secretary of State, called him and called him the rightful Venezuelan president. That was the words that he used in the statement that he put out. And yet now they're coming out. And Marco Rubio on Face the Nation yesterday said it was an illegitimate election.

[B]

And that's why he's not a legitimate president.

[A]

Right, but so it's simply rolling back a recognition that it already gave, which is very unusual in diplomacy. You don't roll back on recognition.

[B]

Yeah, yeah. And no talk of elections.

[A]

I'd say it's even worse than no talk of elections, actually. We saw Donald Trump on the plane yesterday talk about when elections might happen, and he said, right now, what we want to do is fix up the oil, fix up the country, bring the country back, and then have elections. Okay, well, we've just been talking about how long it would take just to fix up the oil. Just the first of those four things is a years long process. Fix up the country, what does that mean? Fix its infrastructure, fix its roads, its ports and so on. That's also going to take years. And then to bring the country back. In other words, to restore prosperity to Venezuela. This is a project of a generation. And yet Trump mentions all three of those things and then says and then have elections. Well, when would that be? That's years and years down the road.

[B]

Considering what we were just talking about. I do want to ask you about the statement that conservative leader Pierre Pollio put out quite quickly after the American operation in Venezuela. He congratulated Trump on arresting the quote, narco terrorist and social socialist dictator Maduro. He said Maria Karina Machado and her colleague Edmundo Gonzalez, who you were just talking about, should take office. And he ended the post with down with socialism, long live freedom. And just explain to me why you think we got that statement, which was quite different from both the Liberal government and the NDP opposition statements from the conservative leader.

[A]

Well, I'd say it was actually different in two ways. And most people have focused on the fact that it appeared more welcoming of the U.S. military operation. But I would also focus on the other difference between that and the liberal statement, which is that it's also more explicit in demanding recognition of the Venezuelan opposition. He names explicitly the legitimate winner of the most recent Venezuelan elections. Edmundo Gonzalez should take office, he says, which is a contradiction of what Donald Trump is saying. And it's a more explicit and direct contradiction of what Trump is saying than anything we've heard from the Carney government. So why is that happening? I would strongly suspect. Well, I know for a fact that his wife is a strong believer and supporter of Maria Corino Machado. She has expressed that frequently on social media and would probably, and I don't want to pretend to read her mind, but I'm quite sure that she would have been unpleasantly surprised to hear. Donald Trump's remarks about Maria Corino Machado, which really flows, were really for me at least one of the most shocking parts of everything that he said. Because I don't think anyone is all that surprised to hear that he has a different idea about the projection of US Power or even about his right to help himself to other countries resources than his predecessors. That's not so surprising. But it was somewhat surprising to hear him claim that Maria Corina Machado has no support in the country. I do agree with your guest yesterday that it would be difficult for Maria Corino Machado to impose her rule on the country, given the fact that there's the army that has been heavily politicized, Bolivarianized, if you like, by the Socialist Party, and is really an ideological force that would be opposed to her. So I do understand why there might be a temptation to delay a transition until the conditions could be put in place. But what we're hearing from Donald Trump, it's not just a mild delay to get things in place. It sounds more like an indefinite kicking of the ball down the road.

[B]

Yeah, just on the polly of statement, a little bit more on that first part where he congratulated Trump. You know, he has also received quite a bit of criticism for that from commentator, for example, Bruce Anderson, who wrote that it was foolhardy and looks worse with each utterance from the White House to congratulate Trump like that. And just, you know, do you think that Poliev is properly like reading the room in this country, reading the sentiment as we are watching what's happening and threats made to other countries in the Western Hemisphere?

[A]

I mean, I think there's two levels on which that statement was criticized. One is that Venezuelan oil poses a threat to the Canadian oil industry, and Pierre Poilievre is now an Alberta mp. And what about local interests? So on that level, it can be criticized. But I think actually, I mean, the biggest threat to Canada from what happened in Venezuela is not from the competition of Venezuelan oil, but rather from the doctrine that lay behind this attack. And it's perhaps on that level that Poliev's statement would be more open to criticism because he's welcoming a precedent that is a direct threat to Canada. It's a direct threat to Greenland. It's a direct threat, as we've seen, to Colombia, to Mexico, to every country in this hemisphere, which the Trump administration is now claiming hegemony over and saying, you're part of our sphere of influence. So on that level, yeah. At the same time, I do give him the credit for at least mentioning by name the legitimate president of Venezuela, Edmondo Gonzalez, and calling for him to. So perhaps his statement could be criticized as naive for believing in good intentions of the Americans, which we are not seeing play out. We're seeing something quite different play out.

[B]

Yes, because of course, the fear just, you know, is not necessary, is not that the United States will come and take Mark Carney and put him in jail here, but that you listen to Marco Rubio on these talk shows on Sunday, speak about putting the kind of economic pressure to bear on Venezuela through embargoes and also through military might to get it to do what it wants it to do. It is very scary.

[A]

It's even more direct than that. I mean, there's also a very direct personal threat to the new acting president, Elsie Rodriguez, that worse things will happen to you than happen to Maduro if you don't follow our.

[B]

And how could these threats play out in other countries, including Canada, you know, even if they were a little bit different in the, in the way that they materialized. So Carney is headed to Paris this week. He is meeting with the Secretary General of NATO, the Prime Minister of Denmark, of which Greenland is an autonomous territory, Macron of France, and that this meeting was pre planned. Right. Us to discuss Ukraine security guarantees. But you gotta think that this week's events and the doctrine that is kind.

[A]

Of.

[B]

Underpinning all of this, this kind of new Trump Monroe Doctrine corollary is, is a big topic of conversation as well. And just to finish today, what do you think the top line of business is here?

[A]

Yeah, I mean, and they're related too, right? Aren't they? Because Ukraine, of course, what the West Western allies other than the United States are trying to accomplish in Ukraine is the preservation of the post World War II order and the idea that you can't just invade and seize other people's territory. It's the same principle at stake in Venezuela, of course. And you have to think that one of the countries that's going to be vocal about this, and that has already been very vocal actually, is Denmark. Because what is the next logical target after Venezuela? It's Greenland. And we've seen these very explicit threats against Greenland, against Denmark, where not only do we see Donald Trump constantly talking about how the United States has to have it and will have it. We saw things like that tweet from Katie Miller, very, very aggressive threats against Denmark. We've seen Denmark responding much more vociferously than Canada. They appear to take the threats more seriously in Denmark than the Canadian political establishment ever has, partly because the threats are more explicit and they've seen things like JD Vance fly uninvited into the country and various other provocations. So you have to think that Denmark is going to be discussing what happens if Greenland is in some way invaded or occupied or pressured in the way that Venezuela was. What do we do? Obviously Denmark would want to invoke Article.

[B]

5 because they're a member of NATO.

[A]

They're a member of NATO but then what happens? Who shows up in Response to Article 5 I don't think anyone would show up, because no one wants to go to war with the United States. So right away, that is the end of NATO. That's the end of NATO. If Denmark invokes Article 5, which it would have no choice but to do, NATO is done and the Western alliance falls to pieces. And at that point, of course, the whole game, the rules become even crazier. They're already falling apart, but they completely cease to exist. And what would be the logical target after Greenland? I mean, it's Canada. Yeah, it's Canada. Canada has the exact same resource that Trump is trying to get his hands on in Venezuela. The exact same resource. And we also have the same justifications that he used against Venezuela, already being used against Canada. This drug trafficking allegation against Venezuela, which is really mostly made up. I'm not suggesting there's no drugs coming out of Venezuela, but the notion that the Venezuelan government is a drug trafficking cartel called the Cartel de Solis, this is made up. So the same pretexts have been used against Canada with regards to fentanyl. Everybody knows they have no connection to reality, but that didn't stop the Trump administration from using them to impose tariffs on Canada, to threaten Canada, to call Canada a threat to the US national security. So most of the pieces are already there. For Trump to do the same thing to Canada that he's done to Venezuela, you know, this has got to be tremendously concerning to everyone. And this, the Don Roe Doctrine, as he's called it, this idea that the United States is going to impose its will on everybody in the hemisphere. We got a taste of it. With explicit threats against Mexico. Mexico has to get their act together because they're pouring through Mexico and we're going to have to do something. Explicit threats against Colombia, a threat to that. You know, the statement that the leader of Colombia won't be there for very long. He has cocaine mills and cocaine factories. He's not going to be doing it. Very. So there will be an operation by the U.S. it sounds good to me. Trump referred to cocaine mills and cocaine factories in Colombia and suggested that Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, is personally trafficking cocaine into the United States. Again, delusional. But it doesn't stop him from making that allegation and backing it up with a threat of violence. So this is the new world that we live in, and that's the real threat of what happened in Venezuela. This world where the United States is willing to just go out and grab resources, use force against weaker partners, and treat itself as basically the king of the Western Hemisphere.

[B]

Okay. Really concerning stuff. Evan, thank you, as always.

[A]

Always a pleasure to be with you, Jamie. Thanks for having me.

[B]

All right, that's all for today. I'm JB Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow.

[A]

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.