Iran revolt: What’s the endgame?

Summary

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Front Burner – "Iran revolt: What’s the endgame?" (January 16, 2026)

Host: Jayme Poisson (CBC)
Guest: Greg Karlstrom, Middle East Correspondent, The Economist

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Episode Overview

In this episode, Front Burner explores the escalating unrest in Iran following a brutal government crackdown on nationwide anti-government protests. With over 2,500 confirmed dead and thousands detained, the conversation focuses on the regime’s response, the broader context of Iran’s crises, prospects for regime change or survival, the possibility of U.S. intervention, and the roles of regional and global actors. Greg Karlstrom provides on-the-ground insights and analysis about the regime’s existential fears, the loyalty of security forces, the lack of a credible opposition, and why this moment may be pivotal for Iran’s future.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Scale and Brutality of the Crackdown

[02:50–05:43]

• Contextualizing Violence:

  • Karlstrom compares the current crackdown to previous protests (e.g., 2022, when 550 killed over two months). In the current unrest, “more than 2,400 protesters have been confirmed killed... that’s at least four or five times more people in a much shorter span of time” (Karlstrom, [03:36]).
  • Notable moment: Authorities are leveraging much greater force, with automatic weapons and sniper fire on crowds. Hospitals are overwhelmed and even targeted:
    • “Gunshot victims pouring into hospitals and then... security forces going into those hospitals and dragging wounded people out and taking them away. Their fate remains unclear.” (Karlstrom, [06:28])
  • Families are extorted for the release of victims’ bodies—highlighting the regime’s cruelty:
    • “On top of having your brother or your son... murdered by the police, you’re also then made to pay them to take that body home and bury your relative.” (Karlstrom, [05:54])

• Comparison to Historical Atrocities:

  • Death toll possibly exceeding 1988 executions (5,000+ disappeared or killed). This episode may become the regime’s most violent act.

Information Blackout and Fragmentary Reporting

[09:02–10:57]

• The government shut down the internet (to 1% of usual levels) making it nearly impossible to get reliable information.
• Information seeps out via landlines, illicit Starlink satellite terminals, or signals from neighboring borders, but all is “very fragmentary. We really do not have a comprehensive sense of what’s been happening in Iran because this blackout is ongoing.” (Karlstrom, [10:49])

The Regime’s Existential Fear and Mounting Crises

[11:33–13:17]

• Karlstrom believes the government sees this as an existential danger, leading to unprecedented violence:
  • “The regime sees this as a moment of existential danger in a way that it did not see previous rounds of protest... It’s the context... a year of economic collapse... environmental collapse... and a disastrous war with Israel... The social contract has completely ruptured in Iran. The regime has no answer for any of these problems. That is what has caused this outpouring of anger.” (Karlstrom, [11:33])
• The populace faces crushing inflation (>40%), food insecurity, environmental collapse (Tehran nearly out of water), and a recent devastating war.

Can the Regime Survive?

[13:17–13:32]

• Despite the violence, protests have temporarily ebbed due to fear and disconnection, not resolution.
• Karlstrom speculates:
  • “All of the root causes, all of the grievances... are still there, and again, they’re unfixable. The regime cannot fix them.” (Karlstrom, [13:40])
  • “It might still be around for a little while longer, but I do think this is the beginning of the end.” (Karlstrom, [14:32])

Security Forces’ Loyalty

[14:57–17:12]

• Jayme asks why security forces remain so loyal despite orders to shoot their own people.
• Karlstrom lists factors:
  • Intense regime propaganda casting protesters as foreign-backed terrorists.
  • The Revolutionary Guard’s vast economic interests in the status quo.
  • Fear of post-regime chaos, as has happened in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere:
  • “If there were to be political change in Iran, they would have a lot to lose... [the Guard] presides over an enormous economic empire... it’s about protecting their economic self-interest as well.” (Karlstrom, [15:51])
  • “A fear of the unknown, a fear of chaos. That the regime is heading for some sort of breakdown... Iran in the process might head for breakdown, civil war, state collapse...” (Karlstrom, [16:45])

Comparison with Syria

[17:12–18:58]

• Jayme draws a parallel with Bashar al-Assad’s rehabilitation and sudden collapse.
• Karlstrom agrees there are similarities in hollow institutions and unresolved root causes but notes important differences.

Absence of a Credible Opposition

[18:58–21:08]

• Unlike Syria’s organized rebels, Iran’s opposition is fragmented and largely ineffective inside the country.
• Reza Pahlavi, exiled opposition figure, tries positioning as neutral broker:
  • “I’m not here to advocate for a republic or a monarchy... making sure... we have a fully transparent democratic transition.” (Pahlavi, [19:55])
  • However, he lacks real influence and has not convinced regime figures to defect, nor established a credible government-in-exile:
  • “It’s going to be very hard for him to come back... if he can’t find allies... This is the problem. You have a lot of people who talk a good game in the Iranian opposition, but it’s very fragmented and their influence inside the country tends to be quite limited.” (Karlstrom, [20:52])

Prospects and Limits of U.S. Intervention

[21:08–24:06]

• Trump warned Iran against executing protesters, promised “help is on its way”, later claimed the killings “have stopped.”

• There are signals the U.S. is considering military action (relocation of personnel, allied sources think a strike is imminent), but options are poor.

• Karlstrom’s analysis:

  • “Trump tweeted himself into a corner... Now that the regime has killed thousands... Trump is under a lot of pressure to make good on those threats. But he doesn’t really have good military options.” (Karlstrom, [22:03–22:52])
  • “None of those things are really going to stop the regime from its crackdown... he’s stuck between Iraq and a hard place here.” (Karlstrom, [23:15])

• Comparison with Maduro/Venezuela:

  • Stake of Supreme Leader in Tehran, logistical and intelligence challenges, and the botched 1980 hostage rescue cited as warnings ([24:12–24:51]).

Regional Powers’ Reactions

Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar)
[25:01–26:44]

• More nervous than pleased at regime collapse or U.S. intervention; worried about regional spillover and instability.
  • “If the US carries out a strike... what will Iran’s retaliation be? The Gulf will probably be on the front line... So they're worried about the prospect of regime collapse... and having a failed state just 200 km away...” (Karlstrom, [25:41])

Israel
[26:44–28:08]

• Israel’s response has been “very subdued” to avoid fueling regime propaganda.
• They’d welcome regime change but are skeptical it would yield stability or a friendly government:
  • “The Israeli view is... if there is regime change, the Revolutionary Guard are going to take over, which isn’t necessarily a good thing from Israel’s perspective, or Iran is likely to tip into chaos and perhaps civil war...” (Karlstrom, [27:34])

What’s Next? Key Milestones to Watch

[28:17–29:16]

• Karlstrom warns that protest movements are nonlinear; just because protests have ebbed, doesn’t mean the movement is finished.
• Important upcoming milestone: Shi’a 40th day mourning customs (in 6 weeks), which have historically reignited protest waves.
  • “You will have potentially thousands... of these memorial services. Will they be a focal point for renewed protest? We haven’t seen the last of this.” (Karlstrom, [28:40])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On regime violence:
  “It’s likely to go down as the worst act of state violence committed by the Islamic Republic.” (Karlstrom, [04:25])

• On the regime’s fears:
  “The regime… can’t fix the economic crisis. It can’t fix the environmental crisis… The social contract has completely ruptured.” (Karlstrom, [12:24])

• On loyalty of security forces:
  “It’s not about just protecting the regime, it’s about protecting their economic self-interest as well.” (Karlstrom, [15:59])

• On US options:
  “He’s stuck between Iraq and a hard place here. He feels like he can’t do nothing. And I do think he’s going to do something militarily in the coming days. But… he just doesn’t have that… one off, easy, quick, showy win.” (Karlstrom, [23:30])

• On the possibility of renewal:
  “We haven’t seen the last of this. So even if for now things seem to die out… it’s only a matter of time before this flares back up.” (Karlstrom, [28:50])

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Key Timestamps

• [02:50] – Scale of latest crackdown compared to past protests
• [05:23] – Accounts of mass deaths and grim mortuary scenes
• [09:20] – Internet blackout, how information gets out
• [11:33] – Regime’s existential crisis and compounding Iranian crises
• [13:40] – Prognosis for the regime’s survival
• [15:13] – Loyalty of security forces explained
• [17:39] – Iran compared to Syria’s collapse
• [19:07] – Absence of effective Iranian opposition
• [21:08] – U.S. posture, options, and limitations
• [25:01] – Gulf states’ nervousness over instability
• [26:44] – Israel’s subdued stance
• [28:17] – Upcoming memorial services as likely flashpoint

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“It might still be around for a little while longer, but I do think this is the beginning of the end.”
— Greg Karlstrom ([14:32])

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Transcript

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[A]

Hi everyone, I'm Jamie Poisson. So, as spotty Internet has returned to Iran in recent days, a somewhat clearer picture is emerging of the absolutely brutal crackdown on widespread demonstrations across the country. Rights groups are saying more than 2,500 people are dead, including one Canadian citizen. And the death toll is likely much, much higher. Thousands of protesters have been detained. Iran had promised to execute some of those demonstrators, which prompted threats from US President Donald Trump.

[B]

We will take very strong action if they do such a thing. We will take very strong action.

[A]

He had also promised Iranian demonstrators that.

[B]

Help is on its way.

[A]

You saw that, which has been widely interpreted to mean some kind of military strike. Then on Wednesday, we were told that.

[B]

The killing in Iran is stopping. It's stopped, it's stopping. And there's no plan for executions or an execution or executions. So I've been told that a good authority will find out about it.

[A]

Are the remarks from the US President an off ramp, A strategic psycho? Will Iran's regime be toppled from within, knocked over from outside, some combination of both? Or will it yet again weather widespread protests like it did in 2022 and 2018? To talk about all of this and more, back with me again is Greg Karlstrom. He is the Middle east correspondent for the Economist. He's covered the region for more than a decade, and today he's in Riyadh. Greg, hey, it's great to have you. Thanks for being here.

[B]

Thanks for having me again.

[A]

So just before we start, I want to timestamp this conversation because this story is, of course, moving. You and I are talking at 11am Eastern time on Thursday. I believe it's 7pm where you are in Riyadh. And I know that the lack of Internet has made it very difficult to ascertain exactly what has been going on. But what do we know at this moment about just how brutal this crackdown over two weeks of antigovernment protests has been?

[B]

Well, I think what helps is to put it in the broader context of past rounds of unrest or violence in Iran, so you get a sense of just how enormous the scale is here. In 2022, the last big wave of protests, about 550 protesters were killed by the security forces. In the span of about 2 months.

[A]

Women in Iran set their headscarves on fire in fury. They are tired of the morality police beating them up and the Islamic Republic leaders who police their every move. Their protest is sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini. She was arrested by the morality police in Tehran. A few days later, she's dead.

[B]

Anger echoes through Tehran's Sharif University and on the streets, where security forces are quick to strike back. When night falls, anger is released from from apartment windows. To challenge the regime from the confines of one's home is one of the only options left for protesters. It's still a punishable offense, but not as risky as gathering in the streets. Compare that to what's happened just over the past two plus weeks. More than 2,400 protesters have been confirmed killed. That's not the final death toll. The final death toll will be, I'm sure, considerably higher than that. That is just the number that human rights groups have been able to confirm and verify. So we're talking about, you know, at least four or five times more people killed in a much shorter span of time. I think it's likely to go down as the worst act of state violence committed by the Islamic Republic.

[A]

Iran's rulers are fighting back at speed as protests spiraled more quickly than previous waves of unrest. The authorities move faster, more forcefully, too.

[B]

The death toll from this will probably be even higher than the mass executions in 1988, when the regime sent thousands of people to the gallows. 5,000 people, mainly young political activists, were forcibly disappeared or executed in 1988, according to Amnesty. They say the true number could be much higher, for Tehran has never admitted to the killings.

[A]

I was seeing the BBC, for example, reporting on videos from a mortuary in Tehran they say are too graphic to show.

[B]

Several videos believed to have been filmed on Friday have emerged showing rows and rows of dead bodies in a mortuary in Tehran.

[A]

We've counted at least 180 bodies from just one mortuary. What appeared to be friends and family members walk through the bodies to identify their loved ones. And just. Could you tell me more about the scenes and the accounts?

[B]

And this is one morgue in Tehran, and I'm sure similar scenes have played out elsewhere, and we just haven't seen the pictures yet. But, you know, bodies stacked up in the courtyard, families desperately going from one to the Other to try to identify their loved ones. In some cases they find them, in other cases they don't. And then sometimes being compelled by authorities to pay hundreds or thousands of doll to secure the release of their bodies. So, you know, on top of having your brother or your son or whomever murdered by the police, you're also then made to pay them to take that body home and to bury your relative. So we've seen that. We've heard stories of hospitals that have been overrun with gunshot victims over the past week since authorities started opening fire with automatic weapons into crowds of protesters. In some cases, snipers on the rooftops were doing that, that. And so gunshot victims pouring into hospitals and then in some cases, security forces going into those hospitals and dragging wounded people out and taking them away. And their fate remains unclear. There are more than 18,000 people so far who have been confirmed to have been detained. And again, the real number might be higher.

[A]

On those detained. Earlier in the week, Iranian officials were signaling, right, that they would be holding these fast trials and executions for protesters. For example, there is this case of this 26 year old protester, Irfan Sultani, and his family was told that he was going to be executed on Wednesday, but then they were informed that it had been postponed. And just what do we know at this moment about whether the regime still plans to go ahead with these executions?

[B]

I think we don't know anything for certain yet. But I think based on both the comments that regime officials have made in recent days and their history in recent years, I think there's a very well founded fear that they are going to go forward with executions. I mean, Donald Trump did say yesterday that he has it on good authority that he's heard from someone in the regime that there won't be executions. But not long before he made those comments at the White House, the head of the Iranian judiciary was speaking in public in Tehran, visiting a Tehran prison where arrested protesters are being held. Iran's chief justice said speed in judging and penalizing those who, quote, beheaded or burned people was critical to ensuring such events do not happen again. Then he promised that there would be executions. That's the head of the judiciary vowing that. So the regime has made it quite clear that that's what they plan to do at some point. And again, if you look to history there, there is precedent for carrying out executions, not just after waves of protest, but, you know, even in the weeks leading up to these protests, even when there weren't protests going on on January.

[A]

8, the Internet fell to 1% of its normal levels and stayed there for many days. The government shut it down. And the information that we're getting out of Iran right now from the people there, are we able to get it because the regime has allowed the Internet to come back on?

[B]

No, it hasn't switched it back on yet. It's been a full week now that it has been all but impossible to get in touch with people in Iran. What's been coming out over the past week, it's come out through a few ways. One is that landline calls aren't completely cut off. They've been patchy, they've been difficult. It's hard to get through from outside the country. But I know some Iranians in the diaspora who have been able to reach friends and family occasionally on landlines over the past week. The second route by which people are getting information out is Starlink, the satellite Internet system. In the years leading up to. To this, there's been an effort by, again, by Iranians in the diaspora to send thousands and thousands of Starlink terminals into Iran. They're illegal there. The government bans them, but they're smuggled in. And some people have been able to use those terminals to get information out over the past few days, although it's dangerous when they do that. If you share a video that you filmed somewhere and then you share that with the world over Starlink, there's a risk that the regime might try to track you down after the fact. And I think that's been happening in some cases. And then the third route is just people who are close to the borders. Either they live near Iran's borders, or they've traveled to the borders and they're close enough that they're able to pick up a mobile phone signal from a neighboring country. That's the other way they've been able to get information out. But all of this is very fragmentary. We really do not have a comprehensive sense of what's been happening in Iran because this blackout is ongoing.

[A]

Messages sent to the BBC's Persian service reveal much more. Tell your audiences there isn't the slightest trace of humanity left. Tell them it doesn't matter if someone is old or a child. In their eyes, everyone is a terrorist. We certainly do know at this point that this crackdown is even more brutal and far more deadly than what we have seen in recent kind of living memory. And I just. What does that tell you?

[B]

What it tells me is that the regime sees this as a moment of existential danger in a way that it did not see previous rounds of protest. And it's not because the demonstrations are unprecedentedly large. They're not. It's not because we haven't seen big nationwide protests before. I think it's. It has more to do with the context in which these protests are taking place. They come after a really horrible year of economic collapse in Iran where the currency has lost about half of its value, where inflation is running above 40%, where people are really struggling now to afford food and other basic essentials. A year of environmental collapse. I mean, things got bad enough in November that there were real concerns that Tehran would run out of water and the capital would have to be evacuated because there just wouldn't be any water left in the Iranian capital. And then, of course, a year in which Iran fought a war with Israel, a disastrous war with Israel. So you have all of these interlocking crises happening at the same time. And the regime doesn't have any answer for any of these problems. It can't fix the economic crisis. It can't fix the environmental crisis. It clearly cannot protect Iranians from external threats anymore either, having now been bombed by both Israel and America in the past year. And so the social contract has completely ruptured in Iran. The regime has no answer for any of these problems. And that is what has caused this outpouring of anger that we've seen over the past few weeks. It feels like everything is broken, and the only thing that the regime can do is resort to this level of horrific violence to try and scare people into going back home.

[A]

I want to discuss the potential of a US intervention with you in a moment. But in the absence of some kind of U.S. intervention, do you think that the regime will still be able to survive this latest threat to their existence.

[B]

In the very short term? It's possible. The protests do seem to have ebbed over the past few days because of the violence of the crackdown, because people are scared and people are also disconnected from one another. And so the protests have ebbed. But I don't think that means that this wave of protest is over. Even if it takes perhaps weeks or months for demonstrations to grow in size again. All of the root causes, all of the grievances that caused these protests in the first place are still there, and again, they're unfixable. The regime cannot fix them. So it's possible that they muddle through the coming weeks and the coming months. But I think we're likely to look back at this as a really pivotal moment that I think just exposed the regime as having become a husk the hollow shell. It might still be around for a little while longer, but I do think this is the beginning of the end. Hi there, Steve Patterson here, host of the Debaters, the show where Canada's top comics take on the world's most important questions. This week we're asking, is shawarma the.

[A]

Best late night food?

[B]

All right, time to wrap this up. Listen wherever you get your podcasts, could.

[A]

You talk to me a little bit about the role of the security forces in this, why they remain still so loyal, so much so that they are willing to shoot with impunity their own citizens on a scale that we haven't seen in this generation.

[B]

I think it's probably a mix of factors. I mean, there's been a real propaganda effort on the part of the regime to paint these protests as being a foreign conspiracy to smear all of the protesters as being terrorists who are being armed by Israel. As the Iranian foreign minister said in an interview with Fox News, they came in, they used Daesh style terrorist, you know, operations. They got police officers, burned them alive, they beheaded them and they started shooting at police officers and also to the people. So as a result, for three days we had in fact fighting against terrorists and not, you know, with the protesters. Perhaps that propaganda resonates with some people. I think another factor in this for the security forces, particularly for the Revolutionary Guard, is that if there were to be political change in Iran, they would have a lot to lose if there was positive political change. This is not only a security force, it presides over an enormous economic empire where everything from the oil sector to construction to manufacturing, large parts of that fall under the purview of the Revolutionary Guards. And so it's not about just protecting the regime, it's about protecting their economic self interest as well. And then I think maybe a third factor, at least for some people, people is a fear of the unknown, a fear of chaos. The concern, which is not entirely unfounded, that as that the regime is heading for some sort of breakdown and that Iran in the process might head for breakdown, civil war, state collapse. I mean, we've watched that happen in numerous other countries across the Middle east over the past two decades. And I think the fear of that is a, is a powerful one.

[A]

Yeah, you know, I have been thinking about Syria and Bashar Al Assad here. He seemed to have kind of largely won. He was being rehabilitated by some of the Gulf states attending a summit on Gaza, for example. And then all of a sudden he was fleeing to Moscow. And I just like do you see the situation in Iran as fundamentally different than what we saw in Syria last year?

[B]

I mean, without sort of overdoing the comparison, because they are different countries in different contexts in different times. But I think the similarity, the very strong similarity between the two is, you know, you're right to say that Assad in his final years was being rehabilitated. He was welcomed back into the Arab League. There were efforts to try and rehabilitate him in the west as well, with the US And Canada and Europe. That effort didn't go so well, but that effort was underway. You know, so he was coming out of his diplomatic isolation. But the problems that caused the Syrian uprising in the first place, the corruption, the economic inequality, the feeling that a tiny, privileged minority was running the country for their benefit to the exclusion of everyone else, none of these problems had been fixed. In fact, they had gotten much worse during the 15ish years of uprising and then civil war. And so this government that seemed to be on a rehabilitation tour around the world, that actually turned out to be quite, quite hollow, and once it was pushed, it collapsed. And I think that is the similarity here with Iran. Again, going back to this idea that the regime can't fix anything. And even if it manages to endure for a little while longer, the foundation is rotten.

[A]

In Syria, there was a pretty organized rebel force. Right. And is there a credible Iranian opposition in the wings?

[B]

Not. Not really. I mean, this has been the problem for many, many years now where we see these waves of protest. And clearly, you know, a huge number of people in Iran feel the Islamic Republic has failed and would like political change, but there is no viable alternative. We've seen over the past few weeks Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, trying to position himself as the leader of the opposition. He's always been an opposition figure. He's always had some support inside of Iran, but trying to portray himself as now the leader of a transition. He's given a number of interviews, including to us at the Economist, where he's portraying himself as, you know, ready to come back to Iran and oversee what he says will be a democratic change. I'm not here to advocate for a republic or a monarchy. I'm here to be the honest broker above the fray in complete neutrality, making sure, however, that we have a fully transparent democratic transition. The problem is, it all sounds great. I mean, he says the right things, and his Office sends out PowerPoint slides about how he plans to oversee the transition. And it all looks good, but he doesn't have influence on the ground. He hasn't been able to, for example, convince members of the regime, members of the security forces to defect and join him. And it's going to be very, very hard for him to come back after half a century away from Iran if he can't find allies on the ground there to work with. He hasn't built any sort of a viable government in waiting or government in exile. So this is the problem. You have a lot of people who talk a good game in the Iranian opposition, but it's very fragmented and their influence inside the country tends to be quite limited. Foreign.

[A]

Of course, what the United States may or may not do here is hanging over all of this. Like earlier this week, as I mentioned, Trump sort of talked about how the killings have stopped, which was interpreted as a bit of a step back from his earlier comments that help was on the way. At the same time, though, we saw reporting in the New York Times and Reuters, for example, laying out that he is still considering a range of options. Reuters was quoting yesterday, so Wednesday, European sources saying that they thought a strike was imminent and that the Israeli assessment is that the US Is going to do something. The US Moved non essential personnel from their air base in Qatar. And you know, worth mentioning here that right before Trump struck Iran in June, he was saying that he was going to make up his mind in two weeks, right? So, like, how are you reading all these signals and bits of information?

[B]

I think Trump tweeted himself into a corner here. He spent a couple of weeks making these very strong pronouncements on social media, right, telling the regime not to kill protesters, saying that if it did, America was ready to swoop in and rescue the protesters and make the regime pay hell and so on and so forth. Very tough language. Look, one death is too much. But I hear much lower numbers. And then I hear much higher numbers, but I say save their names because they'll pay a very big price. And now that the regime has killed thousands and thousands of protesters, Trump is under a lot of pressure to make good on those threats. And I'm sure there's a part of him that does not want to be compared to Barack Obama in 2013 when he laid down a red line telling the Assad regime in Syria not to use chemical weapons. Assad used them. And then Obama didn't carry out military strikes against the Syrian regime. So Trump doesn't want to do that. He doesn't want to be compared with Obama, and that's not acceptable for him. But at the same time, he doesn't really have good military options. And I think what he's been hearing from the Pentagon when he's met with his advisors in recent days, is that, yes, there are symbolic things that America can do. It can blow up, you know, bases affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard. It can strike at bits of their economic empire. It could even try and assassinate key figures in the Iranian government. But none of those things are really going to stop the regime from its crackdown. They're not going to deter the regime from ruthlessly crushing protests that are seen as an intolerable existential threat. And so Trump is. He's stuck between Iraq and a hard place here. He feels like he can't do nothing. And I do think he's going to do something militarily in the coming days. But he doesn't really have the sort of Trumpy option that he would like. Something that is a one off, easy, quick, showy win. He just doesn't have that here, probably.

[A]

I mean, I'm thinking about Venezuela. Right. And so I think what you're saying is that this is a very different situation.

[B]

It is. I mean, if you want to, you know, focus on the supreme Leader, you cannot swoop into Tehran and abduct the supreme Leader as you did with Nicolas Maduro in Caracas. He is in hiding. He's been in hiding for months now. Tehran is, you know, inland. It's not near the coast. It's much harder to place assets there. The US probably has far less intelligence. I could go on and say it's a much harder military operation to pull off. And I'm sure his advisors have told him that if you want to try something like that, it's likely to end badly, much as it did back in 1980 when America tried to free the hostages from its embassy in Tehran.

[A]

This administration is particularly close to the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. They are no friends of Iran. What do these states want to happen here?

[B]

There are no friends of Iran, but they are more nervous than you might expect about the prospect of American intervention and regime change in Iran. Which is interesting, because if this had happened five years ago or 10 years ago, you would think they might have been applauding it at a time when Iran was seen as their main geopolitical threat, when it had this network of proxies across the region. But I think what's happened over the past few years, first, Iran has been greatly diminished by the wars that followed the October 7th massacre. Its proxies have been weakened. And then Iran itself was struck last summer. And so it no longer seems Quite the big threat that it once was. On top of that, Iran, the Gulf states are worried about, you know, if the US Carries out a strike in Iran, what will Iran's retaliation be? The Gulf will probably be on the front line of that retaliation. Qatar, the American air base in Qatar will probably be a target. The American naval base in Bahrain will be a target. But depending on how big the strike is, Iran could, could hit even harder in the Gulf. So they're worried about that. They're worried about the prospect of regime collapse in Iran and having a failed state just 200 km away across the Persian Gulf. So there's, again, there's no love lost here with Iran. Many of the Gulf countries see it as an enemy, but that doesn't mean that they are cheering the prospect of either American intervention or regime change. Foreign.

[A]

What about Israel? What do you think Israel wants to happen here?

[B]

I think Israel, their, their messaging has also been a bit interesting over the past couple of weeks where they have been very subdued. You know, we had an interview, we did an interview with Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, a little over a week ago, and he said, you know, if Iran attacks Israel, of course Israel will retaliate, but otherwise we're going to stay out of this. And what happens in Iran is an Iranian matter. And it's a real change of tone for Netanyahu. But I think they don't want to fuel this narrative that this, this propaganda narrative that somehow they are involved in the protests there. I think obviously they would like to see a change in the government. They would like to see an Iranian government that doesn't sponsor proxies around the region, that doesn't try to build a clandestine nuclear program. If that happened, if that sort of change happened, it would be transformative for Israel's security position in the region. But I think there's also skepticism that these protests are going to lead to that sort of government. The Israeli view is either that if there is regime change, the Revolutionary Guard are going to take over, which isn't necessarily a good thing from Israel's perspective, or Iran is likely to tip into chaos and perhaps civil war. And the consequences of that are very, very hard to predict.

[A]

Okay, just as this progresses over the coming hours and days, what are you watching most closely?

[B]

One thing I'm trying to remind myself of is that protests, uprisings, these things are not linear. Right. So the fact that the protests do seem to have ebbed over the past few days, again, that doesn't mean that things are over. There'll be a milestone coming in a few weeks. Traditionally for Iranian shia, on the 40th day after someone dies, you hold the memorial service. And those memorials have often been the focal point for protest in Iran, including in the run up to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. So you will have in the next six weeks, you will have potentially thousands now of these memorial services that might go ahead. Will they be a focal point for renewed protest? We haven't seen the last of this. So even if for now things seem to die out, even if there isn't some sort of dramatic American intervention, I think it's only a matter of time before this flares back up.

[A]

Okay. Thank you very much for this. Always good to talk to you. Thank you.

[B]

My pleasure. Happy to do it.

[A]

All right, that is all for today. Front Burner was produced this week by Shannon Higgins, Imogen Burchard, Matthew Amha, Lauren Donnelly, Joytha Shankupta, Matt Muse, and Mackenzie Cameron. Our intern is John Costello. Our YouTube producer is John Lee. Our music is by Joseph Shabazon. Our senior producer is Elaine Chow. Our executive producer is Nick McCabe. Locos. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening.

[B]

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.