A (3:07)

Adding a bit later, right now, we're

B (3:09)

a country that's more respected than we've ever been respected before.

A (3:13)

Having destroyed Iranian air defenses, he and Israel can and are methodically working their way through a target list of dismantling a state.

B (3:23)

And then I think we're seeing something a bit similar on the Iranian side, where they continue to fire missiles and drones at neighboring countries in the Gulf and at Israel as well. But the targeting in the Gulf looks more and more to be aimed at economically important targets, bits of critical infrastructure. You know, oil refineries, gas plants, things like that.

A (3:46)

A government building in Kuwait City could be seen small bouldering on Sunday after catching fire the previous night from a drone strike. Fuel tanks at Kuwait's international airport were also targeted by drones. We're also getting reports of attacks in

B (3:59)

Saudi Arabia and the uae.

A (4:01)

We have not attacked our neighbors. We have not attacked Muslim countries.

B (4:06)

We have attacked Americans targets and Americans

A (4:10)

bases, Americans installations, which are unfortunately located in the soils of our neighbors. So we have made.

B (4:18)

So it's almost the test of, you know, which side can endure not just military pain, but economic pain and damage

A (4:26)

to infrastructure, the decision by the US And Israel to set those fuel depots ablaze. What's the strategy behind targeting the fuel infrastructure in Iran?

B (4:39)

I mean, I think a few things about that. One is probably just the impact on the population. I mean, it was apocalyptic scenes that we saw in Tehran overnight. These flames shooting into the sky. And when the sun rose in the morning, it was basically dark in Tehran because there was a cloud of black smoke just hanging over the city.

A (5:00)

We contacted one resident still in the city for her safety. This is not her voice. The situation in Tehran is extremely dire. The air has become heavily polluted. This morning, my friend went to the city center for work and said that when it rained, our faces felt oily and everything turned black.

B (5:22)

So the consequences of it are quite stark, quite catastrophic for people who are now worried about breathing in toxic fumes and whatnot in Tehran. I think it also gets at again, this idea that they are striking not just at military targets, but at the economic foundations that underpin those military targets. The oil industry. The fuel industry in Iran is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. So striking at that, it's not just about the impact on fuel availability on oil in Iran. It's about the economic consequences. But then, obviously, it raises concerns about will Iran start to retaliate in kind with these sorts of strikes against countries in the Gulf as well.

A (6:07)

Iran said that a desalinization plant in the Strait of Hormuz was hit, affecting water for 30 villages. If true, how significant are strikes like this both practically and politically?

B (6:20)

And we don't know. I mean, beyond these statements from the Iranian foreign minister and other officials, we don't know exactly what was or was not hit and what the damage was, but that's what they're claiming. And I think what's significant is the Iranian foreign minister, when he announced this, said that the US had set a precedent by allegedly striking this desalination plant. And then we saw the next morning, Sunday morning, a drone attack on a desalination plant in Bahrain, which caused some damage. It didn't interrupt the water supply, I'm told, but it caused some damage there. This is a very arid region. I mean, especially the Gulf. The bulk of the drinking water in the Gulf comes from desalination plants. And if those things become fair game for both sides, it's catastrophic. I mean, in years past, I remember speaking to officials in the region, anytime you talked about the prospect of conflict breaking out, their worst case scenario was a successful strike on desalination plans because that would very quickly make the cities of the Gulf uninhabitable. And so if this becomes a regular thing, it's a very, very ominous development for all of us who live in this.

A (7:40)

The attacks on neighboring Gulf states, have we seen them let up at all? Since kind of the earlier days of

B (7:49)

the war, we've seen the volume of attacks let up, but I think the significance of what is being targeted has actually increased. It is shooting less, but it is aiming at economically and politically important targets in Gulf countries. Airports have been repeatedly targeted, with Australians among the thousands. At Dubai International, Iran strikes right near the main terminal. War witnessed by shocked passengers inside the building and stuck waiting on planes. We've seen, obviously, huge disruption to flights. We've seen attacks on oil refineries, gas liquefaction plants, desalination plants now as well. So it's not the sort of, you know, seemingly, I don't want to say random, this is all targeted, but somewhat inexplicable shots at, you know, the Fairmont Hotel in Dubai that we saw on the first day of the war. It's much more deliberate in terms of trying to go after things that are of vital importance to Gulf countries.

A (8:56)

And this strategy, which, you know, I think is kind of ultimately designed to increase the risk and cost to the United States. Right. That essentially, if Iran burns the rest of the region burns with it. Do you think it's working?

B (9:09)

No, I don't. I mean, you're right that that's the idea that the Iranians think the Gulf is the soft underbelly of the United States in the Middle east. And if we cause enough damage there, they think then Gulf monarchs will bow to the pressure and demand that Donald Trump end the war. And they haven't done that yet. I mean, the conversations that I've been having with people in the Gulf over the past week, they are not joining the war yet, but they're also not demanding that America stop. I think the intensity of Iran's attacks has actually cemented a view in this region that this is a very hostile regime they don't want to have on their borders anymore. There's a lot of anger. They feel like they spent years before this war pursuing detente rapprochement with the Iranians, trying to have a better relationship. They spent the two months before the war urging Donald Trump not to start it, not to carry out strikes against Iran. And they feel like the Iranians thanked us for this by bombarding us heavily for days and days and days. And so there's a lot of frustration. And there are some people in the Gulf who are privately telling Trump, we would like this war to end because it's doing economic damage to us, but we don't want it to end on any terms. You started it. Now, essentially, you need to finish the job.

A (10:24)

And do you think that they're all thinking in a cohesive block right now, like do Qatar, the uae, Kuwait, all have the same set of risks and potential benefits from this conflict?

B (10:36)

They don't all have the same view. I mean, they. They never do in the Gulf, even though they often want to look like they're acting as a block. It's a region where, you know, you have lots of petty political squabbles. But I would say the majority of the Gulf countries at this point are broadly aligned when it comes to Iran. I think the Emiratis are. They've been targeted the most, far more than any other country in the Gulf. They're quite furious about this, and I think they would prefer it if America and Israel stay the course. I think the Saudis as well, who have always been among the most hostile countries in the Gulf when it comes to the Islamic Republic, I think they're feeling quite martial at the moment, now, too. But I would say even the Qataris, who have typically had friendly relations with Iran, they share a giant natural gas field. They've been on very good terms in years past. Even the Qataris are sounding quite strident when it comes to Iran just because of how much they have been targeted.

A (11:42)

Foreign

B (11:46)

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A (12:19)

You know that feeling when you reach the end of a really good true crime series. You want to know more more about the people involved, where the case is now, and what it's like behind the scenes. I get that. I'm Kathleen Goldhar and on my podcast Crime Story, I speak with the leading storytellers of true crime to dig deeper into the cases we all just can't stop thinking about. Find Crime Story wherever you get your podcasts. You mentioned before that these countries had not wanted this war to start in the first place, though I was reading in the Washington Post or at the beginning of all of this, that the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, bin Salman, made multiple private phone calls leading up to the strikes, actually advocating for them, though I have seen some experts kind of throw cold water on this, and I just wonder where you stand on that.

B (13:11)

Yeah, I'm skeptical of it. I mean, with the caveat that, you know, private phone calls between Donald Trump, who's an unreliable narrator, and the Saudi crown prince, who never publicizes anything. Who knows what was said in these conversations. But my understanding of it, and I tend to think this is accurate, is that the Saudi position was a bit more nuanced than in the way it was presented. I think when the protests first broke out in Iran in December and in January and Trump started talking about sending troops to the region and America is coming to rescue the protesters. At that point, the Saudi view was this is a bad idea. We do not want to see American strikes in Iran. By beginning of February, middle of February, it started to seem to the Saudis and to pretty much everyone else that American military action was inevitable, that Donald Trump was not amassing this enormous force in the region. You know, two aircraft carriers, dozens of warplanes other ships. He wasn't doing this to then not use it. And so at that point, when the Saudis thought, okay, this is happening anyway, they tempered their criticism a bit because they wanted to have some input into if this is going to happen, we'd like to have a voice in what happens. So it's different than Saudi lobbying for an American strike or explicitly encouraging an American strike. I think their position just shifted from don't do this to we prefer if you don't do this, but if you're going to do it, do it the right way.

A (14:40)

Ultimately, how much do you think these actors will be willing to endure here?

B (14:46)

I think the question of how much they're willing to endure it depends on is that let's call it acute pain or chronic pain, if it's acute, if it's a catastrophic strike on a desalination plant this week that, God forbid, cuts off the water supply to a city in the Gulf, I think their reaction to that would be more strident. I think they would say, you know, the Iranians have crossed the red line here and this regime needs to go, and perhaps we're even going to get into the war ourselves. Whereas I think if this is chronic, I think if this war goes on for months and the economic disruptions associated with it go on for months, I think there's going to come a point at which the pressure from within just becomes untenable.

A (15:31)

I wanted to ask you about some comments made by the president of Iran, Massoud Peschkian. He apologized to neighboring countries affected by Iran's actions on Saturday. He said Iran would no longer hit other Gulf states. And this just seemed kind of extraordinary to me as someone watching it unfold. But then he got this enormous pushback from other hardline clerics who called his comments unprofessional, weak, and acceptable. And what are we to make of all of this? Does this show some kind of fracture within the regime or.

B (16:02)

I think we shouldn't make much of it, honestly. He was allowed to win the election in 2024 because he was a relatively weak pragmatist who would put a veneer on the regime. But he never had much say in decision making in Iran. And so I think this statement that he made, I'm sure it reflects his own personal opinion that he feels bad about this and that this is a mistake, because these strikes are actually in some ways pushing Gulf states closer to America and not further away. But the criticism, the fact that he was made to almost apologize for his apology, saying that it was taken out of context and then the fact that these strikes have continued. So with this and with anything else, he says, I think during this war we shouldn't treat it as anything more than the opinion of one man in Iran.

A (16:53)

Iran's state media is reporting at the moment that the body in charge of selecting the new Supreme Leader has made

B (16:58)

their choice and they have now chosen. Just over a week after the assassination of the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, they have chosen his son Mojtab Al Khamenei as his successor. He is a 56 year old.

A (17:12)

What do we know about what position they will take towards the war in Washington and other neighboring states?

B (17:21)

Is a very unpopular figure in Iran. He doesn't have much of a public profile. He's not loved by the population at all. He doesn't have solid religious credentials. He's not an Ayatollah, He's a mid ranking cleric at best. And I think even some regime supporters would be unhappy about his selection because it's dynastic, it's hereditary. And there's a view that, you know, did we overthrow a monarchy in 1979 only to replace it with another monarchy that would be very unpopular even with regime supporters. So that tells you, I think, something about elite dynamics. It tells you that they want continuity rather than change. He has strong relations with the Revolutionary Guard, which is the main power broker in Iran at this point. And so that would tell you that the Revolutionary Guard is really calling the shots right now and they are the ones who are going to determine Iraq, Lebanon's future trajectory.

A (18:19)

I'd like to work my way towards the big powers here, China and Russia. But before we do, I wonder if I could ask you about Lebanon. Israel has been waging a campaign in Lebanon after Hezbollah fired rockets into Israeli territory, ending a ceasefire that has been in place since 2024. Israel has hit a hotel in central Beirut, reportedly killing four commanders of the Quds Force, a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guardian. Lebanon's health minister says Israeli strikes have killed nearly 400 people as of Sunday, including 83 children and nine rescue workers. How does what is happening in Lebanon connect with the broader war here in Iran?

B (18:58)

The reason Hezbollah fired these rockets at Israel almost certainly is because Hezbollah, or at least the faction within it, was asked to do so by the Iranians, by the Revolutionary Guard. Otherwise it's impossible to imagine why they would have wanted to join this war. It's at a moment when they are militarily quite weak because they were so badly damaged in that war. In 2024. And they're also very unpopular in Lebanon, including with their own supporters, with the Shia population in Lebanon. People have not received support for reconstruction. They've not been able to go back to their villages in the south and rebuild their homes since the end of that war. And so even many of Hezbollah's voters at this point are very, very unhappy with it. And no one wanted Lebanon to be dragged into yet another conflict. I mean, there have been heartbreaking scenes of people fleeing the south, tens of thousands, close to 100,000, I think, people that have been displaced who can't find anywhere to stay, you know, sleeping in parks or in their cars in Beirut because there's nowhere else to go. So there's a lot of. Of anger and unhappiness at this. And again, I think the only reason they did it is because Iran, which has been their patron for decades, wanted them to do it. Now, the Israelis had been preparing for this since the end of the last war. They expected that at some point they were going to have an opportunity to wage another war against Hezbollah. And they have an opportunity now because Hezbollah fired a series of rockets at them.

A (20:45)

Let's widen the lens even more here. And now talk about the other big power. So Russia and China, Russia and Iran have been aligned for a bunch of reasons. Countering US Influence, bypassing sanctions, supporting Assad's regime in Syria. Iran supplies drones for Russia's war in Ukraine. And again, the Washington Post is reporting that Russia is giving intelligence to Iran, targeting information for them to attack American forces in the Middle east, notably the US Administration. I saw kind of downplaying these reports saying it doesn't matter, but does it?

B (21:19)

It's certainly going to anger the Americans. It's. It's significant. But I think it's also significant to think about what Russia is not doing in this conflict. So, yes, they are reportedly supplying intelligence to the Iranians. I'm sure they think that's fair play. The Americans are doing that in Ukraine. And so, you know, the Russians are doing that with the Iranians, but they're not doing much more than that. They're not sending military support, they're not sending financial support to Iran, partly because they're not in a position to. Because they are so bogged down in their own war in Ukraine that they don't have much support to send. And partly because I think it just shows you how shallow this relationship with Iran is. It's a transactional relationship, and you outline the reasons why and the areas where they've managed to cooperate but there's not much depth to that friendship. And so I'm not sure the Russians are either capable or willing to go much further than this. And then add to that also, it benefits them in some way if this war continues for a while. We've seen oil prices and gas prices go up. That makes Russia's energy exports more valuable. We've seen the US Temporarily waive sanctions on India purchasing Russian oil. And so the longer this goes on, the more money will pour into the Russian treasury and the more it will help deal with what looked to be before all of this, a worsening economic picture in Russia and the mounting costs of waging its war in Ukraine.

A (22:53)

As for China, both Venezuela and Iran are two of China's biggest oil suppliers. And now they've got problems with both of them. Right. China's foreign minister said this weekend that the war should not have happened. But China also hasn't canceled Trump's planned visit to Beijing and hasn't directly criticized the president. And so what is China ultimately weighing here?

B (23:15)

There are a lot of people right now in Washington trying to make the case that this is a major blow to China. You know, China's losing its principal Middle Eastern ally. And this is four dimensional chess by Donald Trump. And I just don't believe it. I mean, I think this is very exaggerated. China will pay a cost because of this war. It's the main customer for Iranian oil. Almost all of Iran's crude exports go to China and they're sold at a discount because of sanctions. So as long as this disruption goes on to energy supplies, it's going to have a cost for China. But I'm not sure it's a cost that they're not willing to bear. I think first, they're not entirely unhappy to see America bogged down once again in a war in the Middle East. Donald Trump joins the long list of presidents who talked about pivoting to Asia and focus on China and ends up fighting a war in the Middle East. That's one thing. Second, I think as with Russia, the relationship between China and Iran was never as deep as people made it out to be. They signed this overhyped 25 year strategic partnership a few years ago, but really the relationship amounted to China buying cut price Iranian oil and sending all sorts of consumer goods to Iran in return. But there was never much depth to it beyond that. And then I think the final issue when it comes to China is, yes, they have a relationship with Iran, they have a much deeper relationship with the Gulf states. They have tens of Billions of dollars of investment across the gcc. There's a big Chinese expat population working in the Gulf. And so I think if you ask the Chinese government, you know, you have to pick sides, Iran or, or the GCC countries, I think it's quite likely China would, would side with Gulf.

A (24:58)

So just to be clear here, you don't think Pete Hegseth is playing 40 chess?

B (25:03)

I don't think Hegseth is. I certainly don't think Donald Trump is. No, I don't think it's quite that strategic.

A (25:13)

You painted a complex picture right of, of the region. And when you look at all of this, the war inside Iran, what the Gulf states are, are currently being subjected to, what is happening in Lebanon, the considerations for Turkey and then the interests of China and Russia and even other players that we might not have talked about today. You know, would you say that what we're watching is the early stages of a wider war? Is this getting harder to contain by the day, or do these actors ultimately have too much to lose here? And do you think that the more likely outcome is that we're going to start to see some real attempts to off ramp this?

B (25:55)

I tend to think this is going to go on for a while. How far it escalates or how wide it escalates, I guess it's hard to say. I mean, a week ago I didn't have Iranian drone attacks on Azerbaijan on my bingo card, but that happened the other day. So the Iranians are quite interested, I think, in widening this. And the Gulf states also would like to see more of their allies get involved in their defense, if not on offense, against Iran. But I tend to think it's a Gulf war, it's a regional war. I'm not sure it's going to expand beyond that, but I think it will go on for a while. It's very hard to see what a political off ramp looks like at this point. It's very hard to imagine what Iran would be willing to offer at this point in the middle of a war. Having been now attacked twice while negotiating with the United States, I don't think they're in a mood to make major concessions. I don't think Trump can accept the narrow nuclear deal and sell that as a victory in this war. I think he needs something bigger. So put diplomacy to the side. It's also hard to imagine Mojtaba Khamenei bending the knee and surrendering. Even if doing that would save Iran a lot of damage, even if doing that seems like the logical move. It's very hard to see the next Iranian leader being deferential to the United States. I think the political incentives push in the other direction in Iran. And so I tend to think this will go on until someone realizes that the costs are just too high to bear. Whether that's Trump realizing that high oil prices and inflation are a problem politically, whether that's Gulf states eventually feeling like they can't bear it anymore, or whether that is, at some point, a faction inside the Iranian regime deciding to break away. But I think we're some time away from that still.

A (27:45)

Great. Thank you so much for this. Really appreciate it.

B (27:48)

My pleasure.

A (27:59)

All right. That's all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow.

B (28:13)

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.