Israel’s open nuclear secret

Summary

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Front Burner – Israel’s Open Nuclear Secret

Date: May 21, 2026
Host: Jayme Poisson
Guest: Avner Cohen, Professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies and author of Israel and the Bomb

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Episode Overview

This episode delves into Israel’s long-standing policy of “nuclear opacity” regarding its unacknowledged yet widely known nuclear arsenal. Host Jayme Poisson speaks with Avner Cohen, leading expert on Israel’s nuclear history, to explore the origins, logic, secrecy, and geopolitical implications of Israel’s nuclear status. The conversation also examines recent political developments, including a U.S. lawmaker request for official acknowledgment of Israel’s nuclear arms, and considers the impact of Israel’s unique posture on the broader nonproliferation regime.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Nature of Israel’s Nuclear Opacity (“Amimut”)

• Definition: Israel deliberately avoids officially admitting or denying possession of nuclear weapons—a stance called “amimut” or nuclear opacity.
• Reasoning: Cohen argues Israel adopted this for regional stability, not wanting to spark a Middle East nuclear arms race or formally introduce nuclear weapons in the region.
  • “Israel did not want to initiate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, did not want to introduce and to open the Middle East to nuclear weapons.” (Avner Cohen, 01:51)
• U.S. Understanding: During the Nixon administration, the U.S. agreed not to challenge this ambiguity, provided Israel refrained from tests or declarations.
  • “What you do know is that we're not going to declare, we're not going to test. So this is the situation and the United States was reasonably okay with that.” (Avner Cohen, 03:15)

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2. The Elusive Arsenal: What Does Israel Have?

• Dispersed Control: Nuclear weapons (or their components) are not under army control, but in a semi-assembled, quickly deployable state overseen by agencies reporting to the Prime Minister.
  • “In some sense, nuclear weapons do not exist as a fully assembled thing. It could be put together very, very quickly...the US called it...screwdriver away from the bomb.” (Avner Cohen, 04:37)
• Numbers: Widely cited estimates (90-120 warheads) are plausible but unverifiable; Cohen himself avoids confirming figures.
  • “It's interesting that the country chose to be on the line, not to cross the line maybe inch before the line as a permanent position.” (Avner Cohen, 05:13)

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3. Historical Logic: “Never Again” and National Survival

• Holocaust Memory: Cohen stresses the program’s roots in collective trauma, citing founder David Ben Gurion’s determination to guarantee Jewish survival.
  • “The project was an obsession essentially of one man and the man is Israel father founder David Ben Gurion.” (Avner Cohen, 06:45)
• Smallness and Hostility: Early Israeli leaders saw nuclear capability as a necessary deterrent for survival amid a hostile, larger Arab world.

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4. Clandestine Development & U.S. Relations

• U.S. Attempts at Oversight: Kennedy tried (and failed) to restrict Israel’s bomb. Nixon and Golda Meir later formed a tacit deal for ambiguity.
  • “Nixon is the one who made a deal with Golda Meghir that don't ask, don't tell. Essentially we know.” (Avner Cohen, 08:32)

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5. Dimona & Myths of Secrecy

• Dimona Reactor: The heart of Israel’s secret program, shielded from international inspectors.
  • “Shrouded in secrecy, this facility is closed to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. And that's because Israel has never signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.” (Narrator, 09:39)
• Textile Plant Ruse: The supposed “textile plant” cover story was, according to Cohen, an on-the-spot improvisation by an Israeli treasury official during a helicopter tour with the U.S. ambassador.
  • “It was born out of accident, out of circumstance...So that's what he improvised on the helicopter because he had to say something to the American ambassador with him.” (Avner Cohen, 10:02)

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6. Espionage, Punishment, and the Code of Silence

• Mordechai Vanunu Case: The one significant whistleblower, Vanunu, exposed details and images of the nuclear program, paying with 18 years in prison for treason and espionage.
  • “It was self imposed. It was a sense of we are part of something which is much larger than what...It's kind of amazing that over the years...only one person came out.” (Avner Cohen, 15:05)
• Enforcement: Secrecy held more through mutual commitment than law, though penalties exist.

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7. The Burden of Opacity & Public Discourse

• Cohen’s Experience: He recounts government pressure and investigations around publication of his work, but ultimately was not prosecuted.
  • “It was threats, it was being stopped at the airport and being questioned...they were wise enough not to continue with that.” (Avner Cohen, 17:12)
• Demand for Debate: Cohen advocates for more openness about the nuclear reality, suggesting it is time for acknowledgment while recognizing social and bureaucratic resistance.
  • “I believe the time has come to look for ways to incorporate this issue into a way that the country find a way to acknowledge it.” (Avner Cohen, 18:06)

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8. Regional and Global Implications

• Arab States’ Response: Most Arab countries over time have tolerated Israel’s nuclear ambiguity, seeing it as “political symbolism” rather than a military threat.
  • “Israel does not treat it as military weapons...I think they tolerate it. So opacity...was a way for others to tolerate and to accept it and in most cases not to make a big deal out of it.” (Avner Cohen, 21:56)
• Parallel with Iran: Cohen sees irony and parallels in Iran now seeking a similar ambiguous status—something the rest of the world refuses to tolerate.
  • “I do believe that Iran has mimicked Israel very much so, wanted to have a similar opacity...their frustration is that...the world does not tolerate...” (Avner Cohen, 25:11)

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9. U.S. and the Politics of Opacity

• Recent Lawmaker Request: Thirty Democratic lawmakers asked the U.S. administration to acknowledge Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Cohen reads this as evidence of both the depth of the taboo and of Israel’s declining political standing in the U.S.
  • “Opacity could not have been survived internationally vis a vis the non proliferation regime without a strong support of the United States.” (Avner Cohen, 26:44)

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10. Double Standards and the Non-Proliferation Regime

• Exceptional Case: Israel’s nuclear exception underscores problems of double standards in global non-proliferation, fueling criticisms regarding enforcement with Iran.
  • “No doubt about it. When you have an exceptional case and you do not even...give reasons why...you obviously open yourself to double standards to all this, these allegations that why Israel is allowed and why Iran is not.” (Avner Cohen, 28:18)
• Pragmatism Prevails: Despite issues of principle, a “by default” consensus prevails: it’s in everyone’s interest not to force the issue, given the complexity and the deterrent’s non-aggressive posture.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Deterrence and Purpose:
  “He thought the only thing that Israel could compensate and could get some kind of long term deterrence...is to create a stable deterrence. Perhaps it would ultimately lead to peace by having the nuclear option.” (Avner Cohen, 07:14)

• On Opacity as a Unique Position:
  “It's a project to provide foundations for the existence of Israel, prevent another holocaust...the secrecy was very much part of that.” (Avner Cohen, 15:05)

• On Public Silence:
  “Most Israelis accept those rules of the games...Even though there is no formal acknowledgement that Israel has nuclear weapons.” (Avner Cohen, 18:06)

• On Double Standards:
  “So it is a problem. It is a problem for the regime as a whole...Israel is an exceptionalist case and people even refuse to talk about, to recognize it's exceptional.” (Avner Cohen, 28:18)

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Important Segment Timestamps

• 01:51 – Cohen unpacks the foundations of nuclear opacity.
• 03:15 – U.S.–Israel nuclear understanding during Nixon years.
• 04:37 – “Screwdriver away from the bomb” explanation.
• 06:45 – The Holocaust’s role in strategic thinking.
• 10:02 – The genesis of the “textile plant” cover story.
• 14:27–16:31 – Mordechai Vanunu affair and the rarity of leaks.
• 17:12 – Cohen describes governmental pressure over his scholarship.
• 18:06 – The public ritual of non-acknowledgment and call for discourse.
• 21:56 – Arab states’ pragmatic response to Israel’s bomb.
• 25:11 – Iran’s imitation of Israeli nuclear strategy.
• 26:44 – Recent U.S. lawmaker initiative as a sign of shifting status.
• 28:18 – Open discussion of global double standards.

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Tone & Final Reflections

The conversation is measured, scholarly, and candid, led by Poisson’s probing but even-tempered questions and Cohen’s reflective, insider perspective. Cohen maintains a critical eye both toward the historical necessity of Israel’s policy and toward its present consequences—domestic and international.

Cohen concludes that while opacity has arguably maintained stability and eased acceptance, it poses unresolved ethical and political dilemmas, simultaneously enabling double standards and discouraging open, democratic scrutiny.

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Transcript

[CBC Host]

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[Jamie Poisson]

Hey, everybody, I'm Jamie Poisson. Earlier this month, 30 Democratic lawmakers sent a letter to the Trump administration with a remarkable request, and that is to publicly acknowledge that Israel has nuclear weapons, which is widely understood to be true. For more than a half century, Israeli and US Leaders have refused to officially say whether or not the country has nukes. In Israel, this policy has a name amimut or opacity. The story of how that policy came to exist is one of espionage, deception, secrecy, and underground facilities. So today we're talking to Avner Cohen. He's a professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and an authority on the history of Israel and nukes. His book Israel and the Bomb is one of the definitive texts on the subject. Avner, thank you so much for coming onto frontburner. It's really great to have you.

[Avner Cohen]

A pleasure to be with you.

[Jamie Poisson]

So before we get into how Israel built the bomb, can you explain the policy of nuclear opacity, or emimun in Hebrew, and why Israel came to develop this policy of non acknowledgment as it relates to nuclear weapons, despite much of the world frankly not believing them?

[Avner Cohen]

The policy has to do with the fact that Israel has not wishing to be openly a nuclear power. Israel did not want to initiate a nuclear arms race in the Middle east, did not want to introduce and to open the Middle east to nuclear weapons, and it became a nuclear weapon state in a very unique way, in a very special way, and somewhat ambivalently and definitely against the desire to own desire to make the region a nuclear region. The decision was to blur what is the definition of nuclear weapons. Israel is a very unique case. And in some practical sense, yes, obviously, Israel is a nuclear weapon state. In some other sense, Israel is not like any other nuclear weapons state. It's not just wording, it's not just talking. It's not just diplomacy. It's not just a wink and a nod.

[Chris (Interviewer)]

A yes, no question for you. Does Israel have nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons, yes or no?

[Israeli Official]

We've always said that we won't be the first to introduce it, so we haven't introduced it.

[Chris (Interviewer)]

But that's not an answer to the question, do you have them or do you not?

[Israeli Official]

It's as good an answer as you're going to get, but I'll tell you one thing, Chris, and I think, but

[Avner Cohen]

Israel organized its nuclear capability in such a way that it's difficult to say, and it depends on the definition, what it's like to have nuclear weapon and whether what she has, you call it nuclear weapons or not. And it was also part of the understanding with the United States long, long time ago, at the time of the Nixon administration, 1969, 1970, when Israel told the United States, look, we're not going to test, we're not going to declare, we're not going to see ourselves as nuclear weapon states. We have what we have. Essentially, you know, already what we have. It's very, very close to nuclear weapons, maybe micro nuclear menace, minus a few hours, but we are good in that. And for the sake of the general peace in the Middle east or the general atmosphere in the Middle east, it's better for you, for us, for everybody, not to be precise about what we have. What you do know is that we're not going to declare, we're not going to test. So this is the situation and the United States was reasonably okay with that.

[Jamie Poisson]

Yeah. Can you say more about that, like what you think Israel ultimately has? What does their nuclear arsenal actually look like?

[Avner Cohen]

The unique thing about the way that Israel organizes nuclear capabilities, in some sense, nuclear weapons do not exist as a fully assembled thing. It could be put together very, very quickly, as everybody understand that the US called it in the late 60s, screwdriver away from the bomb. And they were comfortable about it. They couldn't do much to stop it. And it was the by default, the kind of situation that everybody was reasonably happy about it because any other alternative would be worse.

[Jamie Poisson]

When people say that Israel has as many as 90 nuclear warheads, do you, do you understand that to be true?

[Avner Cohen]

Well, it's not my number. I know this number is commonly circulated. I don't have a number of my own. And I tend to believe that most likely to read some sense of that. One way to understand it, Israel has 90 or whatever number you use, 120, whatever number you use, but it's not under the custodianship of the Israeli army. The Israeli army does not have those kind of weapons. It is under the custodianship of, so to speak, the agency which belongs to the prime Minister, the Atomic Energy Agency. And only when there is a very unique situation, those things put together end becoming nuclear weapons. So how would you call it? They have or they don't have. It's interesting that the country chose to be on the line, not to cross the line maybe inch before the line as a permanent position. And the public policy is we don't talk about it, we don't say a word about it.

[Jamie Poisson]

Can you talk to me about Israel's early logic and justification around the creation of this project? Why they wanted to do this in the first place? You've written, quote, they see the nuclear project as a commitment to ensure the country's future. A never again pledge shaped by memory of the Holocaust.

[Avner Cohen]

Indeed, indeed. I mean the project was an obsession essentially of one man and the man is Israel father founder David Ben Gurion.

[Unidentified Commentator]

He Medina

[Narrator]

on Friday 14 May 1948 in the City of Tel Aviv, David Ben Gurion stood behind the microphone and solemnly proclaimed the establishment of a state for the Jewish people in Eretz Israel, the land of Israel, who immediately after

[Avner Cohen]

the birth of the country started the conflict is long term, not easily to be resolved. Israel is tiny in terror. At the time less than a million people. 1949, 1950 and at the independence war about 650, 700,000 people. A big Arab world hostile. That hostility is not going to be removed. He thought the only thing that Israel could compensate and could get some kind of long term deterrence rather than getting into another cycle of violence, another cycle of violence is to create a stable deterrence. Perhaps it would ultimately lead to peace by having the nuclear option. In what circumstances would you, or could

[Unidentified Commentator]

you imagine using it as a deterrent? For the time being, I don't think under any conditions. But if they will get nuclear bombs from Russia or from China, then you will have to try also to get somebody else.

[Jamie Poisson]

You mentioned earlier that the US accepted this program, right? And accepted the opacity around it. But was that always the case? Tell me about that.

[Avner Cohen]

No, no, no, that was. John Kennedy was trying to harden, to struggle, to stop, to put limits, to inspect, to verify. Ultimately he failed. And ultimately Nixon is the one who made a deal with Golda Meghir that don't ask, don't tell. Essentially we know. To this day we do not know exactly what was said between the two of them. Most likely it was even walking outside the Rose Garden. At the White House certain understanding were made and essentially were confirmed and confirmed by every President, Israeli Prime Minister.

[Jamie Poisson]

And let's home in on Dimona, which was at the center, as I understand it, of Israel's clandestine nuclear weapons program.

[Narrator]

The Dimona reactor, which began its life in 1963, is one of Israel's most closely guarded secret installations. It's thought to have produced hundreds of kilograms of plutonium in that time, more than enough for the scores of warheads Israel is believed to possess, but doesn't declare under its policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Shrouded in secrecy, this facility is closed to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. And that's because Israel has never signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and was

[Jamie Poisson]

initially described to US officials as a textile plant when they were trying to hide this. And can you talk to me a bit about Dimona and how Israel was able to.

[Avner Cohen]

Well, the story of the textile plant, which indeed is a full myth, was never planted. In fact, only a few years ago I was able to get the guy who was the founder of that story of the textile. And like everything in life, everything major in life, it was born out of accident, out of circumstance, out of proposition. So that guy was to be was the senior treasury official in Israel. He flew with American officials, the ambassador on a helicopter to look some development sites. They came back over Dimona and they saw this excavation. This was I believe September 1960, before Dimona was openly known. The US embassy knew a little bit about rumors about that. They asked him what about that? He knew a little bit about that. He knew that he's not supposed to say, so he improvised. He had a relative who was architect who was building something in the morning that had to do with textile. So that's what he improvised on the helicopter because he had to say something to the American ambassador with him. And that's how the big thing about the textile plant was came into being an improvisation on a helicopter of an Israeli official. We didn't know what to say. So he had to make up something that's so interesting.

[Jamie Poisson]

Another of the more remarkable chapters in this story and one which I think also captures the sort of clandestine and subversive nature of so much of this is a story of the New MEK or Apollo affair. And can you talk to me about the New MEK affair and what we know about it all these years later and how central it is to our conversation today.

[Avner Cohen]

The story was that a certain amount of hyline rich uranium was reverted to Israel. In the mid-60s. The CIA collected some samples of soil from the area of the Mona and it is believed that it was found that there was some traces that resembles or identical with a kind of traces of highly rich uranium that was produced in that could be taken from Newmec that was producing plant in Portsmouth, Ohio. The CIA believed in that. John Haddon, the agent who became a friend of mine, he was stationed. You believe in that? If it's true or not, the fact is that by that time Israel was able to produce already its own plutonium. And so whether if the united Israel did the hurt or not, it's intriguing, it's interesting. But to the big picture, I don't think it adds much because obviously the bulk of what Israel has is on its own, what was produced in Kimona itself.

[Jamie Poisson]

Foreign.

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[Jamie Poisson]

ask you about what it took to enforce the secrecy around this program. Because it wasn't just about diplomacy, right? It was also enforced by severe punishment. Israelis who reveal details about the weapons program can face lengthy prison terms. And this is exactly what happened to a former Israeli nuclear technician.

[Narrator]

The story of Mordechai Vanunu, the insider who had the guts to reveal the truth.

[Unidentified Commentator]

What I call in English whistleblower to inform the world about Israel nuclear secret because no one speak or no one reported exactly what's going there.

[Narrator]

In 1986, Vanunu duped Israel's vaunted security apparatus and smuggled a camera into the secret Demona plant. His photographs exposed the world's greatest nuclear cover.

[Jamie Poisson]

Now, when the Sunday Times expose finally ran, Vanuna was found guilty of treason and espionage and served 18 years in prison.

[Avner Cohen]

I think the unique thing about it is it's not because it's imposed, but because the people who were involved, and they were involved even in the formative years, thousands of people and tens of them, maybe hundreds of them, in position of knowledge, position of leadership. It was self imposed. It was a sense of we are part of something which is much Larger than what? Something larger than we are. It's a project to provide foundations for the existence of Israel, prevent another holocaust. And the people, that generation of people, most of them, generation of my parents, were part of that sense of mission commitment. And the secrecy was very much part of that. It was not just they felt the secrecy is essential. It's kind of amazing that over the years, even though thousands, most likely by now tens of thousand people were involved in one way or another, only one person came out. You refer to Mordechai Benunu, who openly talked about it to the world.

[Narrator]

Benunu fled Israel and set out across the world with his super secret on two rolls of unexposed film in his backpack. He travelled through Europe and Asia and ended up in Australia where he converted to Christianity in a King's Cross church. Then together with, with a friend, he touted his story.

[Avner Cohen]

Yes, from time to time I think there was also law enforcement involved. People were reminded about the penalty, involved talking. But by and large I think it was very much a bond of secrecy. It's kind of giving a sort of sharing something that we are privileged group that we have been engaged in, something that created Israel's short Israeli existence for the long run. That's the way the ethos of that project and the people who are involved in it, and I met tens of them.

[Jamie Poisson]

What about you? You've been reporting on this issue for what, over two decades now?

[Avner Cohen]

Almost four decades. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Jamie Poisson]

Has the Israeli government ever targeted you?

[Avner Cohen]

There was a decade when I worked on Israel and the bomb that there was a strong pressure on me not to publish. It was threats, it was being stopped at the airport and being questioned. And when the book out there was anger and there was investigation and I couldn't be sure that the Israeli government would not have mistaken, would arrest me and would decide to put me to trial. I mean, they could have and I took the risk and I faced it and ultimately they were wise enough not to continue with that. So I was indeed interrogated for some 50 days, not continuously, of course, and I should add with somewhat gloves of silk as opposed to others.

[Jamie Poisson]

Why is this an issue that you're so seized with? Why do you want to talk publicly about Israel's nuclear capacity?

[Avner Cohen]

There is nothing more fateful than nuclear weapons. This was a matter of foundations of the world during the Cold War. But it remains so even now when there is one issue which is by tacit agreement by the citizens of the country, agreed to be outside the public discussion. And essentially it has a unique status off limits, nobody talks about it. Obviously it serves the bureaucracy. It's created a certain kind of privilege to that topic and it deprived the discussion. The truth is that most Israelis accept those rules of the games and by now a great deal can be told within the rules of the games. Even though there is no formal acknowledgement that Israel has nuclear weapons. But the discussion in Israel outside has certain rituals. People say according to foreign sources, kind of smiling or having a nod and much can be said, but with no factual reference. I believe the time has come to look for ways to incorporate this issue into a way that the country find a way to acknowledge it. I understand the difficulties, especially given the situation right now with Iran. It's already quite years and it's not a trivial thing how to bring it to the open. And especially given the fact that the Israeli posture on this issue is so complex, is built on ambiguity, is so unusual. So the aminut is very inherent to a situation that it has some positive elements. It has eased, reduced, not prevented completely nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It helped to many Arab countries, maybe all of them by now to tolerate the Israeli capability, the Israeli bomb and to know that it's only political, that it's not truly a weapon, that Israel would never use it under virtually any circumstances unless Israel very existence would be in peril, which is unthinkable today's context. But how to untangle it is not a trigger thing. Most policymakers, including prime ministers do not fully understand the complexities and the multi layers. And it's so easy to live with that kind of area. It is a sensitive area, it's all secret, it's all off limits. We don't talk about it. And the fact that the public, the citizenry as a whole likes it, they feel comfortable with it. So I think fundamentally it manifests a profound Israeli ambivalence about nuclear weapons. And amimot opacity is a way to reflect it. And it goes historically from the very big decision when Maduri made that he wanted to have the capability, he wanted to have the technological resolve. But there was also element of caution. And the compromise between caution and resolve led to this very unusual, very remarkable, very exceptional and exceptional list position of Israel in itself in the region and even within the regime, the non proliferation regime as a whole.

[Jamie Poisson]

In the region. How has the fact of Israel's nukes been understood historically in the Middle east more broadly? Like what is the historical position on this been in Egypt or say Turkey for example?

[Avner Cohen]

Well, it's a long history. But when Israel was discovered to have the Dimona. And it was the allegation that Dorian said it's peaceful. There was immediate rumors it must be about weapons over the years, even though Egypt made from time to time noises about it and did not like to accept that kind of situation. They wanted, they wanted to have Dimona under safeguards. Has never been under safeguard. But I think over time, Arabs in Egypt, including Egypt and others Saudis, have realized that the Israeli nuclear ability, nuclear program is about political strength, it's about political symbolism, it's about being unique in the region. But Israel does not treat it as military weapons. And they realize that Israel is extremely conscious indeed more than in a sense, more than any other nuclear weapon state in the world today. There are nine of them and I think they tolerate it. So opacity, part of the virtues of opacity. It was a way for others to tolerate and to accept it and in most cases not to make a big deal out of it. And I think that's by and large our response.

[Jamie Poisson]

Do you think that this current government is thinking about nuclear weapons in the same cautious way that previous governments, Israeli governments have?

[Avner Cohen]

I think so and I hope so. You know, personally, I. I detest this present government in any possible way. And I think the head of this government, Prime Minister of Israel today is the worst leader Israel ever had, especially in his last few years in office. However, on the nuclear issue, so far, I believe that they, at least in terms of running and conducting that system, they have taken the same, they adhere to the same measures of responsibility. It was so embedded in the system, it's so in frame. So I cannot see any specific prime minister change. But I mean, MOOC is so engraved into the foundations of Israeli thinking about it, it would be extremely difficult for any Prime Minister to change it. So that's one thing. I do think, however, that this government allows various members in its periphery, including ministers, to talk loosely about this issue in a way that I believe previous government would not allow those loose talk. And in that respect, they allow it to go into the Israeli discourse in a way that I found quite negative

[Jamie Poisson]

and not very helpful looking at the region right now. Iran has long framed its need for nuclear weapons as an existential matter for national security. Do you see an ironic resemblance between Israel's logic in the 1960s and Iran's logic today?

[Avner Cohen]

Iran always talks about its right to enrich which is a symbol of proximity to the bomb. A few people would say about semi unofficially, but Iran officially never asked to be nuclear weapons state. And there was A fatwa by the previous, by the deceased, by the one who killed supreme leader against production of nuclear weapons. However, and I'm kind of anticipating what you were about to ask, I do believe that Iran has mimicked Israel very much so, wanted to have a similar opacity, wanted to have the proximity of the bomb and the kind of exceptionalist position that Israel had. And part of their frustration is that what they would be doing 30, 40 years after Israel, the world does not tolerate Israel does not tolerate and are treated in a very, very different way and rightly so. You know, for Israel it's a great deal of responsibility to find that kind of way. But I think that Iran is trying to mimic and to imitate Israel way towards opacity.

[Jamie Poisson]

You know, as we mentioned in the intro earlier, earlier this month, 30 Democratic lawmakers called on the Trump administration to publicly acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal for the first time. Why after all of this time do you think that this is becoming a political issue at the moment they raise it?

[Avner Cohen]

Because in my opinion it's a very much testimony how much this was a taboo not to raise poor Americans because in many ways America is part of that opacity. America by now is for years, for decades is a partner for opacity. Opacity could not have been survived internationally vis a vis the non proliferation regime without a strong support of the United States. Israel alone could not have kept apartheid international posture. And they know and they should know it. It's a testimony for the political decline of the Israeli status in the United States, for the standing of this Israeli government, for the standing of this Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. This was kind of poking finger into Israel and essentially it was a testimony of how much the very status of Israel in the United States has been in decline. Questions that would never been openly raised are now being asked even though the answer is the same. Israel is responsible. There is no any danger of use of Israeli nuclear weapons. And everybody knows that.

[Jamie Poisson]

Just as a final kind of question for you, do you not see the Israeli example as weakening the global non proliferation argument given the fact that the US is both like reifying Israel's nuclear ambiguity while waging a war to in part enforce transparency from Iran. So what would you say to that argument?

[Avner Cohen]

No doubt, no doubt about it. When you have an exceptional case and you do not even I did it with you right now, we're trying to do it right now to give reasons why is that his exceptionalist case and why there are grounds and reasons to keep that for the at Least for the time being when. But once there is a refusal to do so, you obviously open yourself to double standards to all this, these allegations that why Israel is allowed and why Iran is not. And people feel uncomfortable to give an answer for that. Because the answer to that would be the acknowledge that there is something unique in Israel and to acknowledge Israeli responsibility. So it is a problem. It is a problem for the regime as a whole, even for the Middle east, even for people who care about rule based principles. Israel is an exceptionalist case and people even refuse to talk about, to recognize it's exceptional. But I think at the context of today, it's a by default situation that nobody sees something better than that. So it became the interest of everybody, the region, Israel itself, even outside powers such as European powers, Russia and others, not to make a fuss of the Israeli nuclear case because what could it do? I mean, obviously Israel is not going to have safeguard. Israel is going to keep what it has. It's critical in the Israeli image and self image and sense of security and it's not a threat to anybody. So why to make something which is so complex, so subtle, so few people want to talk about it? Why to let it go? And some people really understand it, why to try to open it?

[Jamie Poisson]

Andrew, this was really fascinating. Thank you so much for this. This is great.

[Avner Cohen]

And we just hardly able to touch

[Jamie Poisson]

it, scratch the surface for sure.

[Avner Cohen]

It has been a pleasure.

[Jamie Poisson]

All right, that's all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow.

[CBC Host]

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.