U.S.-Iran talks: Who’s got the upper hand?

Summary

---

Front Burner (CBC): U.S.–Iran talks: Who’s got the upper hand?

Release Date: April 10, 2026
Host: Jayme Poisson
Guest: Vali Nasser, Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University

---

Episode Overview

In this episode of Front Burner, host Jayme Poisson explores the high-stakes negotiations between the United States and Iran taking place in Islamabad, Pakistan. As the two countries approach a possible transition from fragile ceasefire to peace, discussion centers on who holds the strategic advantage, the impact of the war on Iran, the significance of recent U.S.-Israeli strikes, and how major players—including Trump and Iran's new leadership—are shaping the process.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Context and Stakes for the Islamabad Talks

• Participants: U.S. represented by Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner; Iran by Parliament Speaker Mohammed Bagher Kalibaf.
• Goals: Move from ceasefire to substantive peace; address nuclear enrichment, sanctions, and passage through Strait of Hormuz.
• Notable Quote:

  “I think the level of participation in these talks is the highest that the Trump administration and Iran have had before. …The core issues that they have to deal with is the nuclear issue…and then under what terms would there be cessation of hostilities between the two sides.”
  — Vali Nasser (02:27)

---

2. Who Has the Upper Hand?

• Vali Nasser’s Assessment: Iran has a slight strategic advantage.
  • Trump’s original strategy faltered; war did not topple the regime or incite rebellion.
  • Iran’s closing of the Strait of Hormuz caused “the worst energy shock in the history of the oil market,” disrupting 20% of global oil supply.
  • U.S. brought to the table not out of strength, but necessity.
• Notable Quote:

  “The only reason that President Trump is entertaining these talks is because of the Strait of Hormuz. He knows the war produced a strategic advantage for Iran that it didn’t have before the war.”
  — Vali Nasser (04:40)

---

3. Maximalist Demands on Both Sides

• Iran’s Proposals: Outlined in a 10-point plan—recognition of nuclear enrichment, lifting all sanctions, payments for ships through Hormuz.
• U.S. Counterpoints: A 15-point proposal described as a non-starter for Iran (“essentially a surrender demand”).
• Room for Negotiation: Both are opening with maximum demands but signaling willingness to bargain.
• Notable Quote:

  “Now, the very fact that the President signaled to the Pakistanis...that he’s willing to go to Islamabad with his own 15 point plan, but also accept Iran’s 10 point plan as a starting point. It already is a massive concession to Iran.”
  — Vali Nasser (07:46)

---

4. Trump’s Miscalculations About Iran

• Overestimated: Iranian popular opposition to the regime and the likelihood of regime collapse under pressure.
• Underestimated: National resilience, strategic planning, and Iran’s ability to turn U.S. escalation into its own leverage.
• Effect of Extreme Rhetoric: Trump’s genocidal threats united even regime opponents in patriotic defense.
• Notable Moment:

  “When he said that I’m going to send Iran back to the Stone Age, that’s exactly what the Iranians understood. …This became essentially a form of popular level defiance of a superpower…”
  — Vali Nasser (10:40–11:30)

---

5. Destruction of Iran’s Cultural and Civilian Infrastructure

• World Heritage Impact: Several UNESCO sites and cultural institutions damaged or directly bombed.

  • Golestan Palace, Chel Sotoun Palace, Falak-ol-Aflak Castle, Pastor Institute (medical research), Sharif University of Technology (“Iran’s MIT”).
  • Even a synagogue bombed, leading to widespread outrage.

• Legal & Symbolic Weight: Targeting of cultural sites is prohibited by international law and has rallied domestic sentiment.

• Notable Quote:

  “Hitting them in this case actually directly really communicated that this is a war on the country. It’s not war on the regime, it’s not about the nuclear issue. This is really going after some fundamental things.”
  — Vali Nasser (17:52)

• Result: Damage estimated at several billion dollars. Attacks generated further resolve among Iran’s people and leaders to obtain concrete gains from negotiations.

---

6. The Lebanon Factor

• Ceasefire Dispute: Iran sees ceasefire as including Lebanon; U.S./Israel disagree.

• Test of American Commitment: Iran views U.S. control over Israel’s actions as a bellwether for any future deal’s credibility.

• Notable Quote:

  “The second issue is that Lebanon is a test of whether President Trump can control Israel...That’s going to be key in any deal that Iran makes with the United States.”
  — Vali Nasser (22:02)

• Implication: “If the U.S. cannot basically control the actions of its partner, then that changes the entire dynamic of the conversation.”

---

7. War of Endurance: Can Iran Sustain the Fight?

• Limits on Stamina: Iran cannot sustain this war indefinitely, but its endurance may outlast U.S. economic pain thresholds.
• Global Stakes: Continued closure of Hormuz risks deepening worldwide recession and inflation.
• Notable Quote:

  “Already, this war…is not about the munitions. This war has become about endurance. And ultimately, just because the United States is bigger and more powerful, it doesn’t mean that necessarily it has greater endurance than a weaker party here.”
  — Vali Nasser (24:20)

---

8. The State of Iran’s Leadership

• Post-Khamenei Shift: Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei now leads after his father’s assassination.
• Wartime Cabinet: Current regime prioritizes military strategy. Domestic stability and political reforms remain uncertain.
• Challenges Ahead: Economy is shattered, regime widely disliked, and trauma from suppression of 2026 protests remains raw.
• Notable Quote:

  “So all that we are right now seeing is wartime management of a military campaign. …The political fate of the Islamic Republic is far from certain going forward.”
  — Vali Nasser (26:49)

---

Memorable Quotes — Quick Reference

• “Iran has a slight strategic advantage…” (03:25, Nasser)
• “This is already the worst energy shock in the history of the oil market.” (03:49, Nasser)
• “This war will not end with Iran being in the same box that it was before the war, under maximum pressure…” (06:16, Nasser)
• “You begin to ask yourself what is basically in the mind of those who are conducting the bombing.” (18:52, Nasser)
• “If the U.S. cannot basically control the actions of its partner, then that changes the entire dynamic of the conversation.” (22:31, Nasser)
• “This war has become about endurance…” (24:20, Nasser)

---

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Opening context and analysis of Islamabad talks: 00:35–03:18
• Who has the upper hand? Iran’s tactical strengths: 03:18–05:41
• Demands and negotiation positions: 05:41–08:13
• Trump’s miscalculations and effects of rhetoric: 08:13–14:25
• Cultural and civilian destruction in Iran: 15:17–20:06
• Lebanon’s significance in negotiations: 20:06–23:20
• Iranian endurance and war sustainability: 23:20–25:24
• Iranian leadership and domestic challenges: 25:24–27:51

---

Conclusion

In this episode, Vali Nasser makes clear that the current negotiations were shaped not by overwhelming U.S. military advantage, but by Iran’s calculated endurance and ability to leverage global economic vulnerabilities. While the outcome remains uncertain, Iran’s resilience, the scale of national trauma, and shifting region-wide allegiances suggest that any peace will be hard-won—with deep consequences for both Iranians and the international order.

---

Transcript

[Progressive Insurance Announcer]

This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever think about switching insurance companies to see if you could save some cash? Progressive makes it easy to see if you could save when you bundle your home and auto policies. Try [e-mail] Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates. Potential savings will vary. Not available in all states. This is a CBC podcast.

[Jamie Poisson]

Hey everyone, it's Jamie Poisson. High level delegations from the US and Iran are set to meet in Islamabad, Pakistan this weekend to talk about turning a ceasefire into a peace deal. One of the biggest threats to this process has been Israel's post ceasefire strikes on Lebanon which have killed hundreds. On Thursday, Israel announced it would enter into separate talks with Lebanon and Trump said the the attacks will be, quote, scaling back. Whether any kind of real agreement can be reached on both of these two tracks remains to be seen. The US and Iran are extremely far apart in their demands. When we had Vali Nasser on the show at the beginning of the war, he said that the Islamic Republic wouldn't back down easily because for them this is an existential fight. Vali is a professor of International affairs and Middle East Studies at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and he is the author of Iran's Grand A Political History. He's back again to talk about why Iran remains steadfast on their demands about taxing passage through the Strait of Hormuz and a nuclear enrichment program, despite the serious toll the war has taken. Valli, thank you so much for coming back onto the show. It's great to have you.

[Vali Nasser]

Thank you very much. Good to be back.

[Jamie Poisson]

So the situation has been rapidly changing. I'll just timestamp this conversation. I'm speaking with you at 1pm Eastern on Thursday. As I mentioned in the intro, they're going into these talks in Islamabad. The US Is sending Vice President JD Vance along with Middle east special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump's son in law Jared Kushner. Iran's delegation is expected to be led by Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammed Bagar Kalibaf. Knowing what you know about these figures, what are you expecting or looking for out of Islamabad this weekend?

[Vali Nasser]

I think the level of participation in these talks is the highest that the Trump administration and Iran have had before. And Iran was looking to go above Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner because largely thought that they didn't have grasp of the issues. And in the last round of negotiations in Geneva, they perhaps misrepresented what had been achieved in Geneva at the White House. So I think we're Seeing a higher level engaged. Both sides are speaking, if you would, for the principles, which is President Trump and Mushtaba Khamenei in Iran. The core issues that they have to deal with is the nuclear issue, which still is left over from before the war. And then under what terms would there be cessation of hostilities between the two sides?

[Jamie Poisson]

Which party, in your estimation, has the upper hand or any strategic advantage going into these talks?

[Vali Nasser]

I think Iran has a slight strategic advantage in the sense that it was very clear since two weeks ago that President Trump was getting desperate with this war. It had not unfolded the way he had anticipated. The war was not short, did not topple the Islamic Republic. There was no popular rebellion in Iran in support of regime change. And Iran had discovered the strategic advantage in closing the Strait of Hormuz and putting pressure on the economies of the Gulf and on global energy markets in a way that caught United States off guard. This is already the worst energy shock in the history of the oil market. The amount of oil that we've lost in the Strait of Hormuz is about 20 million barrels a day, which is about 20% of global supply. So we've just never seen anything even close to that. And President Trump found himself facing two, only two choices. One was to escalate vis a vis Iran, capture an island, threaten to send Iran back to the Stone Age, erase its civilization, or to go to talks and try to resolve this war where it was diplomatically. And the Iranians obviously understood that it's the President who really is at this strategic dead end. The strategy that they had unfolded, which was to absorb the attacks, not collapse, stay in a longer war, and then use the advantage that they found in the trace of hormones in a way that would actually create difficulties for the United States, had worked. I mean, end of the day, the only reason that President Trump is entertaining these talks is because of the Strait of Hormuz. He knows the war produced a strategic advantage for Iran that it didn't have before the war. So that has to be seen as a win, because end of the day, Iran was never going to defeat the United States militarily on the battlefield. The end game for Iran always had to be a negotiated settlement that would change their circumstances drastically compared to before the war. And now they have got the United States to the table. So this war is ending in a way that President Trump didn't want, but in a way that Iran wants.

[Jamie Poisson]

And just in this 10 point proposal that's being circulated from Iran, the concessions on the U.S. s part should they agree to them, are quite significant. An acceptance of Iran's nuclear enrichment program, the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, payment to Iran for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Are are these demands realistic? Do you see them as some kind of starting point?

[Vali Nasser]

I mean, they're definitely starting points, but it also tells you where Iran's head is. Where Iran's head is is that this war will not end with Iran being in the same box that it was before the war, under maximum pressure, sanctions open to Israeli and American attack at will whenever they want, and facing an angry population at home, essentially being in a straitjacket. So all the elements of this, if you condense it, suggest that Iran wants significant economic relief. In other words, the cordon of sanctions around it would end, that it have a way to reconstruct and re energize its economy, and that it would no longer be under the threat of attack by Israel and the United States. And also you could say that on the other hand, the US's 15 point demands were also very maximalist because they essentially were ideas that were conceived before the war when the US thought Iran is really weak. The President's 15 point plan is Iran should surrender, surrender absolutely everything and get nothing much for it in return. So it's really a surrender demand. And so they both are going to the table with their maximal positions. They will have to drop off a lot of things and try to find somewhere in the middle where at least there are some things they can agree to. Now, the very fact that the President signaled to the Pakistanis, and I think privately said it much more explicitly, that he's willing to go to Islamabad with his own 15 point plan, but also accept Iran's 10 point plan as a starting point. It already is a massive concession to Iran.

[Jamie Poisson]

You know, I'm still thinking about that comment from Donald Trump from earlier this week when he was threatening Iran and he said a whole civilization will die tonight, that the use of such kind of plain spoken, frankly genocidal language is a historical anomaly for a US President. A country certainly responsible for all kinds of violence around the world, but one whose leaders have just never been so plain, I guess, about the use of mass violence and killings. The invasion of Iraq was obviously incredibly violent and based on a lie. But even George Bush, for example, said, quote, you are a good and gifted people, the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity. And you know, Iran is this millennia old civilization, more than 10 times older than the United States. Persia survived two invasions from Genghis Khan, Mongols, for example. These are people who, you know, I think take their history incredibly seriously. And what do you think that Trump fundamentally miscalculated about Iran?

[Vali Nasser]

I mean, first of all, I mean, he miscalculated about Iran even before he arrived at this kind of hyperbolic language. He miscalculated the resilience of the Islamic Republic, its ability to survive. He miscalculated the patriotism of the Iranian population. He overestimated how much the population was actually organized against the Islamic Republic. We know that the population is extremely angry at the Islamic Republic and can erupt at any moment, but it's not actually organized into a political movement that could have taken advantage even of the war. And he also underestimated how prepared Iranians were for the war and underestimated the fact that the Iranians may actually have a strategy and they may have actually be capable of outflanking him strategically. So the miscalculations were very broad and were systematic. And I think when he arrived at a point of starting to either with the help of Israel, or giving green light to Israel, or on his own, attacking Iran's infrastructure, he already was signaling to the Iranians that he had failed. In other words, they had moved from hoping that by killing Iran's leaders, the system would fall, that the people would rise up, to actually going from attacking the system to attacking the state, attacking the country. And particularly when he started attacking the country and its infrastructure, the Iranians understood this to be basically an attempt to make Iran a failed state. There was no longer a pretense of wanting a stable Iran afterwards to be a responsible part of the international community. When he said that I'm going to send Iran back to the Stone Age, that's exactly what the Iranians understood. And therefore, he ended up mobilizing the Iranian population, independent of the Islamic Republic, into a psychology of defense of the country, that this is our responsibility to defend it. So when Iranians began en masse creating human chains around their refineries and their electrical grids, Iranian musicians showed up in front of energy generation facilities playing music. I mean, this became essentially a form of popular level defiance of a superpower, that is that. That is declaring that he wants to destroy Iran. The rulers of the Islamic Republic were greatly angered by this. And first of all, they threatened that if the United States did this, that they would also destroy everybody else's infrastructure as well. And they had done something along those lines. When Israel attacked Iran's gas field, Iran attacked Qatar's gas field. So the message to Trump was that if you go after our electrical grid, we go after everybody else's electrical grid, and then everybody's going to go dark, not just Iran. And I think President Trump noticed that, or perhaps many leaders in the region began calling him to saying that you're basically playing Russian roulette with our economies and our infrastructure as well. And then the threat to erase Iran as a civilization, that not only graded the Iranian public's feelings, many even thought that he intends to use nuclear weapons on Iran, or what does that actually mean, but it also had impact on what he was intending to do if he thought that he was going to intimidate Iran to the table. The opposite happened at that point. There was a channel of communication between Steve Witkoff and Iran's foreign minister. The Iranians immediately shut it down, saying, we cannot talk to the United States under these circumstances. And then they went back to only exchanging notes with the Pakistanis over these issues. But in a way, by going to Islamabad, the president backed down from his own over the top rhetoric that in the end he went back to the same conversation that was ongoing with the Pakistanis. He had said that Iran's offers was not good enough, but then they ended up being good enough for him to go to the table. And so every step of the way, at least since three weeks ago, when it became very clear to him that his initial expectations of the war were not being met, that he's acting in a manner that shows that he's frustrated, he's lashing out, he's out of ideas, and his threatening, menacing language only tells the Iranians that they basically have caught his tail in the door. And as much as he's trying to wiggle his way free, he cannot do that.

[Progressive Insurance Announcer]

This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever think about switching insurance companies to see if you could save some cash? Progressive makes it easy to see if you could save when you bundle your home and auto policies. Try [e-mail] Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates. Potential savings will vary. Not available in all states.

[Helena Merriman]

If journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed. But even now, we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. Helena. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss the first time? The History Bureau. Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on BBC.com or wherever you get

[Jamie Poisson]

your podcasts, just to stick with some of the destruction in Iran just for a little bit longer. Iran is home to many UNESCO World Heritage sites, and a handful of them have been damaged in US Israeli attacks, just to name a few Tehrans. Goleston palace dating to the 14th century and the 17th century. Chel Sotoun palace in Isfahan. The phallic Ol Aflaq castle in Loristan province, which dates back to the Sasanian period, sometime between the third and seventh centuries. The governor of Isfahan, where some of the worst damage has occurred, said the attacks happened after the coordinates of the sites had been shared with all parties. It's worth mentioning that historic cultural sites are protected under the 1954 Hague Convention. And like, you know, how concerning is it to you that Iran's cultural history has been targeted in this war as well?

[Vali Nasser]

Well, at least the claim that Israel and the United States made that was that they were not directly targeting these sites, but they were also not taking any care not to hit anything close by to them that might damage them. And it obviously shows that to them they're approaching this war in a manner, let's say that Israel approached Gaza or is approaching Lebanon. In other words, total disregard not just for the people institutions, but also for history and what it means for the people. I would add to this that actually two more recent sites that were directly bombed and intentionally bombed were more significant as a symbol for the Iranians that Israel and the United States really intend to bring a Gaza future to Iran. So one was the Pastor Institute in Tehran, One of the oldest and most important medical research centers in Tehran has been hit by U. S. Israel bombings Iran. And the other one was the Sharif University of Technology, which is known as Iran's mit. One of the most, or perhaps I can say the most important technical university of the country, the president of the country. I mean, I haven't seen this degree of reaction from across the political spectrum in Iran as I saw in reaction to bombing of Sharif University. And yes, you have the similar kind of excuses that somehow these institutions were related to IRGC or were doing military kind of work. But to Iranians, that doesn't ring true. They know these institutions very well. They are symbols of Iran's modernization. They predate the Islamic Republic. And hitting them in this case actually directly really communicated that this is a war on the country. It's not war on the regime, it's not about the nuclear issue. This is really going after some fundamental things. And some of the bombing also raises questions like day before the Ceasefire was announced. Israel bombed a synagogue in Tehran. And you have pictures of the Jewish community walking over the rubble, trying to find and protect ancient pieces of the Torah and religious relics that were there. And so you begin to ask yourself what is basically in the mind of those who are conducting the bombing. And it's become the way in which it has become wanton ultimately shows the fact that the US Israeli war has lost its way. It's not reaching, arriving at any strategic objectives. It is destruction. And in a way, again, if you put it in the context of Iran, this country has now paid a very, very huge price for this war, regardless of its origins. And who's at fault. I mean, estimates is that the damage to Iran goes up to several billion dollars. Important industries have been erased, steelworks, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals. You mentioned cultural sites, huge areas of refineries, railways, et cetera, et cetera. And I think it's just created more resilience in the population and a determination, I think, among the leaders of the Islamic Republic that now that they have paid this price, they're going to get something out of it. In other words, just going back to a ceasefire is not good enough for them because of the damage that they have suffered. So that will play out in the course of these negotiations.

[Jamie Poisson]

You mentioned Lebanon. I want to ask you specifically about Lebanon and Israel here. Iranian leadership and the Pakistani Prime Minister said that the ceasefire agreement meant an immediate cessation of fighting in Lebanon, too. Israel has disagreed, saying it's not part of the agreement. US Vice President J.D. vance has said that he believes it would be, quote, dumb for Iran to let the ceasefire end over Israel's actions in Lebanon. And just how crucial is Lebanon to Iran's commitment to a ceasefire?

[Vali Nasser]

I mean, at some level, Lebanon does matter to the Revolutionary Guards and to Iran's leaders leadership because they know that Lebanon is paying a price because of them. And the Israeli bombing is not targeting only Hezbollah. It's actually destroying the entire social fabric of the Shia community. And that does have great impact on their thinking. But I think Lebanon matters to this ceasefire negotiations in two other ways. One is that Iran does believe, and it's now some reporting that that is the case, that Lebanon was part of the ceasefire. The Pakistani Prime Minister tweeted about it. New York Times is reporting that that tweet had been cleared by the White House. The Iranians believe that he was part of it. And ultimately there is a sense that perhaps President Trump said yes to everything just to get the ceasefire talks going. Not expecting that some of these issues he would have to defend or deal with afterwards. But first of all, to Iranians, it becomes a indication of whether the President is actually serious about what he promises. I mean, after all, this is a president who came out of the nuclear deal that the United States had signed twice while he was negotiating with Iran. He bombed Iran. And so there is very little trust of him in Tehran. And if the Iranians feel that, okay, he said yes to Lebanon and Immediately, Israel dropped 160 bombs on Beirut in 10 minutes and killed so many people throughout the course of the day that maybe nothing that he agreed to on the prelude to coming to Islamabad actually matters. The second issue is that Lebanon is a test of whether President Trump can control Israel and can actually assert, if you would, America's position on Israel. That's going to be key in any deal that Iran makes with the United States. That Israel would be bound by the terms of a ceasefire. It's not at the table, but it was America's partner in this war, and that ultimately the US Is really negotiating a ceasefire on behalf of both of them. And if the US Cannot basically control the actions of its partner, then that changes the entire dynamic of the conversation. So, yes, Vice President Vance is correct in the sense that Iran would be dumb to make Lebanon a deal breaker, but he's wrong in the sense that Iranians won't look at what's happening in Lebanon as a sort of a bellwether of what to expect in negotiations with the U.S. so the U.S. has to first show that it can control Lebanon before it has credibility to say that it can deliver on anything else at the negotiating table.

[Jamie Poisson]

You also mentioned before that Iran is going to really want to get something out of this. If the ceasefire does fall apart, does Iran have the capacity to return to that level of fighting and sort of sustain it for much longer?

[Vali Nasser]

Well, it doesn't have capacity to do so indefinitely. At some point, it's going to get exhausted and will not be able to sustain the same level. But its calculation is that its endurance is more than that of the endurance of the global economy, and therefore the endurance of the United States. The United States is also gradually getting short of certain ammunitions. It's also out of options. And if the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and pressure on the oil and energy infrastructure and the economies of the Gulf continues, I think the damage to the global economy will be much, much longer lasting. And so the United States is also in a race of time against averting what could be the worst in terms of recession, inflation across vast areas of the world. Already, if the Strait of Hormuz was to open up tomorrow morning, there were still months of backlog before the flow of trade and energy would be back to normal. If the straits are closed another month, another six weeks, the damage to the global economy would be much more. So already, this war, really, it's been some time that this war is not about the munitions. This war has become about endurance. And ultimately, just because the United States is bigger and more powerful, it doesn't mean that necessarily it has greater endurance than a weaker party here.

[Jamie Poisson]

Before we go, I do want to get a sense of where you think the Islamic Republic's leadership finds itself currently. Of course, many of them have been assassinated. Several political, clerical, and military leaders, including, of course, Ayatollah Khamenei. Now his son has taken over Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. How has the way the regime is led and governed changed?

[Vali Nasser]

Would you say what we're right now witnessing is a wartime cabinet, if you would. So the decisions are all military decisions. The strategy that Iran is implementing was conceived before the war started by the previous set of Revolutionary Guard commanders and the previous supreme Leader. But this new leadership is exercising it according to plan. We're not seeing yet much about how they intend to rule over Iran. The indications are not positive. This leadership that has taken over is more hawkish. It has a history of suppression of political dissent in Iran during previous decades. Iran's economy is still bankrupt, has suffered gravely in the war, and we're not that far from January, when the Islamic Republic killed thousands upon thousands of Iranians in order to suppress a massive level of protest across the country. So all of that is still there, but all that we are right now seeing is wartime management of a military campaign. I think when the dust settles, then we will have a better understanding as to how this new leadership will be different and in what ways from the previous leadership. And then the second question is, can they actually bring stability domestically to Iran? And that's a really open question, given the set of problems that I just mentioned, that they basically will be governing over Iran that is economically more broken. Even if it can claim that it did well in the war, it's still militarily, economically broken. It still has a deep gash of wound because of the January uprising. And the suppression to deal with, it's still hugely disliked by a large swath of the Iranian population beyond this war. So the political fate of the Islamic Republic is far from certain going forward.

[Jamie Poisson]

Valli thank you so much for this.

[Vali Nasser]

Thanks for having me. Good speaking with you.

[Jamie Poisson]

All right, that is all for this week. Front Burner was produced this week by Matthew Amha, Joytha Shangupta, Shannon Higgins, Kevin Sexton, Mackenzie Cameron, and Dave Modi. Our YouTube producer is John Lee. Our music is by Joseph Shabazin. Our senior producers are Elaine Chao and Imogen Burchard. Our executive producer is Nick McKay Blocos. And I'm Jamie Poissomm. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you on Monday.

[Progressive Insurance Announcer]

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.